This study is intended to be a continuation of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study on “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”. Their seminal article, which found civil war onset to be a result of poverty (defined as a low GDP) and insurgency characteristics, was a considerable departure from previous studies for its assertion that ethnic diversity has no effect on civil war onset (see Gurr, 1993 and Horowitz, 1985 for alternate views). However, Fearon and Laitin’s results agree with recent civil war literature from economists (see Collier, 1999, Collier and Hoeffler, 2001 and Collier et al. 2001). My study deviates from Fearon and Laitin by focusing on how both domestic and international context effect civil war onset and duration. Geographers have also contributed to the study of conflict. In the early 1990s, O’Loughlin and Anselin (1991, 31) intended to “bring back geography to the study of international relations”. They modeled a state’s war behavior as “related to a) their domestic attributes, b) spatial dependence (neighbouring effect), and c) spatial heterogeneity (regional effect)”. In this project, domestic, international, and interregional factors will be analyzed for their impact on civil wars. My justification for including countries and regions in this analysis is twofold- first, conflict does not happen in a vacuum, and it seems logical to account for surrounding context and secondly, evidence from the spread of international conflict has emphasized the role of neighbors and regions (Siverson and Starr, 1991). Civil war is ultimately created by an interplay of domestic structures and domestic context. However, I contend that the effects of domestic structures, such as GDP, government structure, and ethnic makeup, and domestic context, such as 1

population growth, terrain, and resources, are exacerbated by weak state institutions. A lack of territorial sovereignty and an inability to form a national identity conspire to keep weak states more vulnerable to volatile domestic circumstances. The clustering of weakened states, and the subsequent clustering of conflict in weak states, allows for conflict to cross borders, infecting already vulnerable states. Therefore, a location of a state (and its civil wars) is not simply an attribute, but another potential cause of conflict. States with high risk are subject to an increased risk because 1) neighbouring wars exacerbate volatile domestic conditions inside bordering states, and 2) neighbouring wars can and do spread into nearby states as weak states. Weak states cannot mitigate conflict diffusion and escalation from outside state borders. This chapter is designed to explain the domestic, international and interregional structures and contexts which together cause civil war onsets, duration and clusters. A review of economic, political and social literatures constitutes an overview of domestic causation work. A discussion of weak states concerns what defines a weak state and how neighbouring states exacerbate state weakness and failure. A regional discussion is included to understand the constructs of regions and how those structures influence civil conflict.
2.1 Domestic Causation
Domestic structures within countries have received much attention in the civil war literature. Three main paradigms have emerged to explain the rise and proliferation of internal conflict- 1) economic, 2) political, and 3) ethnic fragmentation. Yet increasingly, attention is being shifted to the physical and human geographies of conflict-ridden states to explain the context within which these three 2

explanations become salient (Herbst, 2000, Buhaug and Gates, 2002, Collier and Hoeffler, 2001, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, and Gates, 2002). Geographic factors can be the missing link in understanding the propensity of countries to devolve into conflict when states with similar circumstances are conflict free. My project speaks to this tradition within the civil war literature. Physical geography work primarily includes terrain and resource analysis. Whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003) find evidence for the influence of terrain in conflict onset, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) dismiss this. Human geography concerns the human mosaic inhabiting a country, essentially its population and ethnic distributions. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) note how population distribution affects conflict onset risk. Although some exceptions are noted, work on civil war causation is not typically presented as if it were a cause of conflict. In detailing societal fractures and favourable environments for war, researchers highlight the context for war, but not the reason why outbreaks occur.
2.1.1 Economic
“War occurs if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to the costs” - Collier (1998, 563) Conflict’s global geography dispersion immediately summons a connection between the periphery and civil war; therefore one of the main discussions in civil war literature revolves around how the domestic economy influences war risk. The domestic economy of states is determined by both internal and external features. Osei-Kwame and Taylor (1984) discuss the endemic weakness of peripheral states as a function of their weak position within the international economic arena. Their 3

argument is grounded in the world systems tradition. At a basic level, a state exists “to relate its fragment of the world-economy to the larger system in such a way to benefit those who dominate the government of the state, but the location of the state in the world-economy structure will constrain government strategy” ( Osei-Kwame and Taylor, 1984, 575). A government’s strategy regarding how to participate within the world-economy (e.g. free trade, trade polices) is affected by “political and ideological competition from beyond the periphery” (Osei-Kwame and Taylor, 1984, 575). In short, peripheral governments have limited power due to their economic abilities, base, and location. Furthermore, regional ideological commitments (common in post-colonial governments) or adherence to international agreements (such as trading regulations) limit a peripheral government’s ability to dictate their position within the world-economy. Two central paradigms have emerged to explore the relationship between economies and conflict: 1) modernization, which considers civil war a reaction to global economic processes, and 2) poverty, which leads to the assertion that conflict is a development failure. Poverty is often offered as an explanation as the correlation between civil war and poor states cannot be overlooked, and poverty allows room to speculate whether low growth, misuse of foreign aid, income inequality, lack of education, infrastructure, or health issues create a justification for rebellion. Although inequality is often assumed to be the basis for the social injustice which leads to war, many do not make this claim (see Gurr, 1993; Horowitz 1985; Conner 1993 for the grievance literature). Poverty is also correlated with low economic growth, ineffective and corrupt governance, which is often cited as a possible reason 4

for rebellion (Herbst, 2000, Holsti, 1996, Collier, 1999, and Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The past and recent additions to the economic literature and theories behind both rebel and government economic motives for war are covered in this review.
Modernization
The original economic argument linking economic growth and domestic conflict was “melting pot” modernization (Newman, 1991). Heavily influenced by the works of Durkheim and Marx, melting pot modernization postulated that conceptions of ethnicity (and therefore ethnic diversity) would lessen in a time of economic growth and modernization. The concept of ethnicity and ‘belonging’ was ever flexible and malleable, and differences would continue to abate during a time of rising wealth. The increase of conflict in the 1970s prompted further thinking on the role of economic performance and conflict. As conflicts were viewed as essentially ethnic, researchers continued to address the problem as one of identity over structure. Conflictual modernization theory stated that in a time of rising incomes and access to wealth, governments choose particular ethnic groups to benefit from a country’s wealth (Newman, 1991, 455). Other ethnic groups have static, if not declining, economic conditions given the institutional bias against them. Gurr (1970), Horowitz (1985), and Walker Conner’s (1973) work during this period remain the best examples of conflictual modernization theory. In this theoretical framework, conflict arises from an intra-country disparity in income and rights distribution. In melting pot modernization, conflict is lessened because identities are less rigid and conflictual. To scholars who view the rise in civil war as a rise in ethnic struggles, conflictual modernization theory continues as the strongest economic explanation for 5

conflict today. In some areas, globalization is seen as heightening ethnic identities through disparity while destroying identities in others. Therefore, conflict is a result of inequality produced domestically by a disparity of rights and internationally by the exacerbation of ethnic tensions through economic relationships involving the “winners” and “losers” of globalization. As a commentary on modernization theorists and ethnic conflict proponents, World Bank research by Collier et al. (2003, 66) finds “no effect of either income or land inequality on the risk of conflict, but do find that once a conflict has started it will tend to last much longer if income is unequal”. As Fearon and Laitin (2003, 82) note, at any level of ethnic fragmentation, when a country increases its income the risk of civil war onset decreases - a $1000 dollars decrease in GDP increases the risk of civil war by 41%. Inequality, shown to be decreasing over time (Economist 3/15/04), is rarely used in quantitative studies due to a) an inability to factor inequality through time and across countries and b) an assumption that inequality and grievances are widespread inside and across states, so widespread that it is not considered enough to provoke a rebellion.
Poverty
Current economic research uses the assumptions of economists to understand the onset of civil wars 1 . This research is overwhelmingly quantitative due to a need to distinguish economic performance patterns over space and time. Research programs by economists and those using rational choice analysis note how poverty has exacerbated conflict prone regions, low growth rates perpetuate poverty issues, 1 These assumptions are grounded in a “rational man” theory, where a person considers both the costs and benefits of an action, weighs each relative to the other, and logically chooses that which will have a more successful outcome. 6

and resource dependence increases the likelihood of conflict within a given country (Collier, 2000; Genicot and Skaperdas, 2002). The essential relationship of increasing income lessening civil war onset risk remains undisputed (Collier, 1998-2000, Fearon and Laitin, 2003). But how does poverty cause civil war? Poverty is considered both an economic development and political development failure. It represents the inability of a government to properly provide and sustain a livelihood for its people. At higher rates of initial per capita income, a government’s ability to retain control increases. In countries with lower GDPs, securing power and order become government priorities. The percentage of government monies on military spending doubles during conflict (Collier et al., 2003), which can produce a cycle of conflict as societal spending (education, health, development aid) is cut, and income further declines. Poor economic policies and poverty are both caused and reinforced by ineffective governments. Economic development is particularly vulnerable to upset, as priorities of both governments and investors are quickly shifted in turbulent times and places. Growth and civil wars have a cyclical relationship-- low growth rates are a proxy for underdevelopment of both state structures and people’s desire to invest within their country. The lower the initial income and size of state territory, the less incentive for the public to invest in institution building and infrastructure. In that scenario, considerably more is spent on the military to secure control (Genicot and Skaperdas, 2002). Elbadawi (1999, 2) finds that conflict is “disruptive to capital or transaction-intensive activities (such as roads, production of manufactures, or financial services); it can divert expenditure and the societies resources from 7

economic services (growth enhancing activities) to war efforts; and it can divert portfolios from domestic investment into capital flight”. Fearon and Laitin (2003, 80) note that a higher income is associated with a more developed infrastructure, and therefore better control of the state and its people. I also propose that conflict is related to the GDP of countries as lower GDP reflects a number of failures and weakness of a state’s government, which provides a reason for rebel challenges. Furthermore, civil wars have “a significant, but modest, negative influence on the steady-state level of GDP per capita, both at home and in neighbours” (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002, 92). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) note that neighbouring war has a considerably larger impact on a bordering countries’ GDP than on domestic GDP (presumably, domestic GDP was very low to begin with).
Economic Views of Rebels and Governments in War
National economic health is a clear indicator of state health. However, local economies are equally important to consider as the means to promote rebellion must be as feasible as the motive to rebel. The economic perspectives and decisions by rebel groups are clearly indicative of their eventual aims and logistic capabilities. Rebel groups incorporate three distinct perspectives-- that of a military organization, a political organization, and a business organization --in order to produce a feasible rebellion/alternative to central rule (Collier et al., 2003, 67). As a military organization, rebellions face issues of recruitment, cohesion, equipment, and survival. An inverse relationship exists between income and the costs of rebellions (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Costs of beginning and sustaining a rebellion over time and space rise when incomes are higher, when recruits to a rebel army are fewer due to a 8

lessened need for immediate income. When incomes are chronically below that which can support a person, the ability of a rebel army to provide income and support becomes attractive. Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 6) discuss this situation in reference to Angola’s UNITA rebel group quasi-criminal activities to create wealth to continue a rebellion. Rebel organizations integrate the role of ethnicity and ideology in an economic framework (Gates, 2002, 113). Rebel economic health is partially determined by the abilities of a rebel group to produce an attractive political viewpoint. The rebels’ ability to create a “grammar” of group grievance to justify a rebellion allows a conflict to take on an ethnic identity even in situations where an ethnic goal is not being pursued. Since the end of the Cold War rebellions are no longer financed by the ability to side with an ideological giant. Brubaker and Laitin (1998, 425) contend that during the Cold War rebels could easily mobilize resources by situating their domestic struggles along an ideological gradient (communism vs. capitalism). In the 1990s, rebels increasingly marketed their struggles as “ethnic,” as it is internationally plausible and profitable due to Diaspora support and international connections. “Ethnic grammar” is thought to significantly affect the motivations of rebel combatants. An organization’s ability to recruit is crucial-- by playing on a sense of ethnic grievance, the organization may be able to encourage recruitment -- “even when the rationale at the top of the organization is essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievance” (Collier, 1999, 1). Members of the same group may be satisfied with the belief that the end of the war will reap 9

considerable benefits for the ethnic group as a whole. Rebel leaders can integrate notions of homeland and rightful access to resources to bolster impressions of benefits relative to combat costs. Considering that secessionist rebellions are “considerably more likely if the country has valuable natural resources…. some evidence suggests that rebel leaders massively exaggerate the likely gains from capturing ownership of the resources” (World Bank, 2003, 60). Is ethnic grievance a façade under which lurk criminal intentions? As evidenced by resource rents, looting, and illegal activities, some authors (such as Kaldor (2001), Keen (1998), King (2001), Kaplan (2000), and Duffield (1998)) insist that present day rebellions have sacrificed political agendas for criminal intentions. Keen (1998) summarizes this view: “the persistence of civil wars has left many analysts puzzled, so has their nature. The absence of a clear political programmes, the proliferation of factions, disintegrating lines of command and ferocious attacks against civilians have produced both confusion and outrage” (Keen, 1998, 1). Activities include pillaging (to supplement or improve soldiers wages), protection extortion, trade of illegal material (drugs, arms, people), labour exploitation, land (for resources or bases), and stealing aid supplies (foreign aid) (Keen, 1998, 17). 2.1.2 Political Two intersecting paradigms exist to explain the role of political factors in civil war. Weak state literature focuses on the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state as contributing to the outbreak of war (Herbst, 2000 and Holsti, 1996). Forms of governance (autocracies, democracies, and anocracies) theory looks for associations between political structure and rebellion (Hegre et al., 2001). Weak state literature is theoretically well-informed while work on forms of governance is empirically sound. 10

Yet, control is the underlying assumption in both of these literatures. If states and governments have a complex of control, either through the validation of the government as the voice of the state or, as in an autocracy, a well-structured infrastructure of fear and domination, the probability of civil war is assumed to be low.
Types of Governance
Within the civil war literature, stable, open democracies are found to have less conflict when controlling for income. Few studies deviate from the finding that increased democratization produces less civil wars, or alternatively that the underlying causes of civil war (and war in general) are mitigated by the very structure and intent of a democratic system ( see Hegre et al., 2001; Huntington, 1999; Holsti, 1996; Collier 1998-2000) 2 . Both on a national and local level, democracies are assumed to be relatively conflict free due to the space for competing parties to voice diverse interests and the need for coalitions and compromise. Democratization is a product of changes in attitudes and cultures and the role of the citizen in reinforcing a government. It supports prospects for peace, human rights, geopolitical stability, and increased trade and economic development (O’Loughlin et al., 1998). As noted in Lipset’s ‘social requisites of democracy’ theory, a growing GDP suggests a growing middle class that votes, higher education, and a healthy, diversifying economy. Democracies are also internationally supported through foreign aid and increased foreign investment from the west. Yet, democratization is susceptible to reversals (O’Loughlin et at., 1998, 569). Hence, 2 Those that deviate from this thesis often do so due to the structure of their data (such as the inclusion of colonial wars in a dataset) (see Gates, 2002).
11

democratic stability, or ‘staying power’, is particularly salient. Democracies are considerably more stable than both autocracies and ‘inconsistent regimes’-- 3 to 5.5 times longer respectively (Hegre et al., 2001). Autocracies are often conflict free for quite opposite reasons than democracies. Autocratic governments engage in repressive political acts, which minimize the chance of a successful movement to challenge the power structure. In addition, punishments for revolutionary movements are likely to be quite severe. However, autocracies have a shorter ‘lifespan’ than democracies. This could be due to both international and domestic pressure to move toward a more open system. Autocracies have a median survival time of 6.5 years (Hegre et al., 2001, 19) and waves of autocratic transitions experience reversals, particularly on a regional level (O’Loughlin et al., 1998). Inconsistent regimes or ‘Anocracies’ create an environment where conflict flourishes. Anocracies are situated in the middle of the political spectrum, between autocracies and democracies. Anocracies are characterized by “governing authority ...weakened by confused, contradictory, inconsistent, and conflicting norms, roles, and institutional procedures. These incoherent regimes have difficulty responding consistently and decisively to petitions and provocations and, thus, much less effective in establishing normative expectations, managing societal conflicts, and averting ... force by challengers” (Marshall, 2001, 6). These regimes represent the worst of both worlds. Partially open, yet repressive, institutional structure invites protest, rebellion, and other forms of civil violence. Anocracies are four times more likely to experience a civil war than a democracy (Hegre et al., 2001, 34). 12

Anocracies are also transitional regimes with an average lifespan of 2.6 years. The risk of civil war is highest after a regime change, and hence transitional regimes naturally have a higher rate of civil war. However, the direction of change is found to have no discernable influence on the risk of current or future outbreaks of conflict (Hegre et al., 2001, 38). Whether these situations produce civil wars or whether civil wars produce anocracies is difficult to answer and has not been readily determined in analysis, although is it expected that conflicts follow regime change (Hegre et al., 2001, 35). More empirical work will be needed to understand whether conflict causes instability or vice versa. Transitions, such as those occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq currently, provide some insight into the role of anocracies and conflict. Anocracies are the face of a failed government and state. I contend that governments have tremendous influence on civil war onset and duration. Challenges (both revolutionary and secessionist) are directed towards the governments; therefore the intent/structure of governments must play a role in inciting rebellion. Government response is also considered to be a factor in war proliferation. Lengthy civil wars in the world (such as those in the UK, Sudan, and Burma) have very different government structures and varying levels of success. I propose all three types of government have different relationships to conflict proliferation. Democracies are capable of suppressing challenges through non-violent means, although are limited in their abilities to use violence to crush domestic challengers. Autocracies can destroy combatants, leading to less onset and short conflict durations, but also produce more rebellion due to backlashes and repression. 13

Autocratic governments and internal conflicts do not have a simple relationship. Anocractic governments should have a considerable effect on conflict because of an inability of a government to control activities within their borders and the anocractic propensity to change, which both Hegre et al. (2001) and Gates (2002) associate with increased risk of civil war.
2.1.3 Ethnicity
Ethnic diversity as a cause of conflict is based on the assumption that increased fractionalization makes it difficult to create a unified community, due to people having alternative allegiances. Power relations are not assumed to be equal in fractionalized societies. Ethnicity’s relationship to conflict is quite variable, as noted by a number of studies finding diversity linked to conflict (Horowitz, 1985 and Conner, 1993), diversity not linked to conflict (Collier, 1999 and Fearon and Laitin, 2003), diversity lessening conflict (Collier, 2001), ethnic dominance exacerbating conflict (Collier, 2001 and Gates, 2003) , religious affiliation causing conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002 and Huntington, 1996) and ethnic elites are a catalyst for conflict (Lake and Rothchild, 1996 and Brown, 2001). Recent studies have found that ethnic diversity does not create an increased risk of conflict onset. However, ethnic fragmentation’s relationship to conflict proliferation is more varied. Using different measures of diversity (such as number of ethnic groups, fractionalization measures and ethnic dominance measures) produces different relationships between ethnicity and war. Ethnic domination has proved to be a salient factor in civil war onset. The assumption is that dominant ethnic groups have more power, which should be important in civil war. However, this is not 14

always the case as demonstrated by Iraq’s Shia majority. Many countries rife with civil war do not have institutions that allow researchers reliable information on ethnic groups. Furthermore, as Mozaffer and Scarritt (2003) note, determining identity is contingent upon scale and agenda, both of which can change in reaction to political events. I propose that nature of ethnicity as defining oneself and group as distinct and separate from others can exacerbate conflict proliferation risk in an insecure environment. Most global (quantitative) studies have focused on the number of ethnic groups and the abilities of governments to deal with multi-ethnic societies. A misperception that increased ethnic fragmentation is correlated with increased conflict is exemplified by Anthony Smith’s (1998) supposition that ethnic conflict is a byproduct of ethnicity. Yet, current findings dismissing diversity as conflict-prone are debated (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Collier, 2002). The following section reviews the current work on diversity and conflict, religion and conflict, and government policies on conflict. The societal and elite manipulation of ethnicities is covered in numerous case studies on conflict; this review is to understand the environment where elite manipulation is most successful.
Ethnic Fragmentation
Ethnic fragmentation as a conflict risk is discussed by Gurr (1993), Horowitz (1985), and Brown (2001). As Horowitz (1985) noted --“identity comes with hostility”. A fragmentation measure is presumed to represent the number of ethnic groups with whom a portion of the population affiliates. Mozaffer and Scarritt (2003) discuss how an assumption of ethnic identity being confined to one particular group 15

does not allow for scaled identities (especially in Africa). Depending on who the ‘other’ is, and is located, ethnic affiliations can grow or constrict.
3 Yet, “ethnicity is a malleable and flexible concept” (Holsti, 1996, 123). A litany of difficulties exist both in measuring diversity and understanding how it is created and recreated over time and space. Recent work has dispelled notions of fragmentation as a catalyst for conflict and has found that increased ethnic fragmentation does not increase the likelihood of a civil war (Collier, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001 and Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, in a democratic system, increased diversity should actually mitigate conflict risk through a system of compromise and coalitions. Government systems may also exacerbate ethnic conflict risk as ethnic diversity may be an issue within an autocratic system. The dictatorial dependence on one small ethnic group, exemplified by Saddam Hussein’s relationship with Sunnis in Iraq, is one example of this phenomenon. Others have found no relationship between ethnic fragmentation and increased conflict in all political regime types when controlling for income (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Ethnic dominance can increase the risk of rebellion. Domination exists when one ethnic group is a permanent majority- typically 45-90% of the population. This argument is based on the “predicted effects of ethnic diversity as dependent upon the opportunities for predation of primary commodity exports and taxation of diasporas” 3 For example, in Nigeria a conflict may be on a national scale and therefore groups may represent themselves as ‘northern’ or ‘southern’. In southern Nigeria, a conflict between two ethnic groups could be devised as an Igbo/Yoruba disagreement. A conflict within a Yoruba area could be between the Egba and Ijeba peoples. 16

(Collier and Hoeffler, 2001, 7). A dominant group may also have a considerable number of potential recruits and hence the chance of success may be greater. Collier (1998) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) recognize the role that ethnicity plays within conflict scenarios, and acknowledge the creation of a war ethnicity is a crucial determinant in conflict duration and intensity. Yet, their arguments are based on outcome and/or perceived ulterior motives of ‘ethnic’ disputes. Both agree that ethnicity’s function in conflict onset rests primarily in the lessening of ‘coordination costs’. As explained in the discussion of rebel economics, ethnic ties with related ethnic grievances lessen the costs of recruiting and sustaining a fighting force. The costs are essentially lessened due to perceived benefits being shared throughout the ethnic group. This new perspective on the non-ethnic nature of ethnic wars has detractors who regard conflict as the interplay of diversity and grievance. Grievances (based on the distribution of resources) and ethnic identification as a basis for rebellion are grounded in the impression that modernity does not lead to a more democratic system (Ellingson, 2000, 237). Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) find similar results to Collier and Hoeffler (2001)-- economic and political underdevelopment are the root causes of conflict (specifically in Africa)--but also find that ethnic fragmentation may lead to poor economic health in the form of bad economic policies. However, in a later study, Sambanis (2001) takes issue with both Collier (2001) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) findings, believing that war termination studies find a considerable difference between wars involving ethnic agendas versus non-ethnic wars. He concedes that causation in revolutionary wars is consistent with economic explanations (poverty, 17

low growth, and resource dependence) while ethnic war onset is explained by government type or political determinants. In addition, a positive association with ethnic fragmentation (heterogeneity) and civil war onset is found when studies are disaggregated by war type (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002, 260). Their analysis is problematic because onset, duration, and termination theoretically (and empirically) involve different variable effects, and additions of other factors (such as the role of external intervention).
Religious Diversity
Reynal-Querol (2002) finds societies divided by religion are more prone to intense conflict than situations with considerable ethnic divisions. She bases this theory on the indivisibility and non-negotiable character of religious identification, which is directly contrasted with the malleability of ethnic identities (as noted by Mozaffer & Scarritt, 2003 and Holsti, 1996). In addition, she finds that religious polarization and animist diversity are the most important factors in explaining the incidence of ethnic civil war. This is taken as evidence to support Huntington’s provocative thesis on religious/cultural fault lines as the cause of conflict (Reynal Querol, 2002, 52). However intriguing her findings are, the study itself is quite biased and her results are questionable due to her data selection. Her codes are based on the stated goals and religious affiliation of combatants and not overall religions in countries. It does, however, encourage a discussion on religion within civil war, which has found by many authors to be an insignificant statistically. Again, many groups may be religiously persecuted and have legitimate grievances, but starting a 18

civil war is a radically different situation – in addition to motive, potential rebels must also have the means to launch an attack on the state. Although ethnic grievances do exist in states, the ability to test for grievance within models is extremely limited. Most countries have people who experience ethnic grievance, but only a select few choose to engage in civil conflict to alleviate their suffering. Theoretical work has focused on the grievance narrative as a façade (the greed vs., grievance discussion), but little empirical work has been accomplished. I propose that diversity is not a salient factor in civil war onsets if population growth is accounted for. Rebels in more fragmented countries may not be able to garner support along ethnic lines if the goal of the rebellion is to promote one group. However, the manipulation of war situations by ethnic elites could exacerbate the effect of diversity in wartime.
2.1.4 Domestic Context
Contextual factors are those that are present in all countries, but exercise a particular impact in high risk countries. Contextual factors are neither necessary nor sufficient for war outbreak, but add and change the environment of conflict. I present these as human and physical geographies, which may be similar across numerous countries. In war situations as those described above, people and the environment take on different roles, some which may benefit the onset and continuation of conflict. Physical Geography Is rough terrain beneficial to rebels? Results vary. A recent study notes a positive effect (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); other studies note no effect (Collier et al., 19

2001; Buhaug and Gates, 2002). However, terrain is considered a contributing factor in conflict proliferation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Collier et al., 2001). Insurgent conditions, such as mountainous and forested regions, allow for a small number of rebels to launch attacks and hide successfully.
4 If rebel insurgencies are located in mountainous or forested terrain, they may be less likely to be caught by government troops. Furthermore, excessive retaliation from a government will undoubtedly lay waste to settlements in this area, which encourages recruitment for rebels. Studies detailing the role of terrain are useful, but unless the insurgency is actually located in these areas of rough terrain, the point is moot. Mapping insurgencies and rebel movements is a way to understand this correlation. Resources Although resources play a somewhat contested role within civil war research, their economic impact is undisputed. A state’s economic dependence on natural resources exports initially increases the risk of war; this is interpreted as representing the attraction of resource rents to rebels (Collier, 1998, 568). Empirical works by Collier (1998) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) find a statistically significant relationship between oil economies and conflict onset. The relationship between conflicts and other commodities- diamonds, timber, and precious metals are not well understood. A national income dependent on resource rents has a significant effect on the structure of the economy, and therefore the government apparatus.
5 Natural resource 4 The basis of this theory is surely in accounts of guerrilla wars in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan amongst others.
5 The effect of resources on government instability and economic growth is related through “Dutch Disease”. Dutch disease is an economic condition wherein many public resources are dedicated to one particular economic activity or resource extraction and trade. Other possible sources of income are 20

endowment is linked to poor economic growth and governance-- “resource rents provide political leaders with a classic means of staying in power by establishing a regime organized through a system of patronage….such regimes can divert themselves of the need for popular legitimacy by eliminating the need for broad based taxation, … (and) financing a repressive security apparatus” (Le Billon, 2001, 567). Yet, when resource revenue is over a certain percentage of national income, governments can provide both sufficient security and stability within a country’s borders to mitigate the perceived benefits from rebellion (Collier, 1998, 571). In the 1990s, the role of resources in conflict received considerable attention due to a number of conflicts seemingly run on resource monies. The linkage of the environment and security began in the 1980s, and was followed by extensive studies in the 1990s by Homer-Dixon and the Toronto group into identifying the role of environmental scarcity in conflict. Focusing particularly on scarcity of resources-- water, forests, fish—and violent domestic and international conflict, researchers were able to construct a causal pathway. These case studies expanded to understand the role of resource abundance in encouraging conflict. However, the ‘third generation’ of environment and security work integrates environmental factors with socio-economic considerations, in order to achieve the “big picture”. Empirical work confirms the role of resources in conflict, but “find that the impact of environmental issues on civil wars is much less significant than economic issues” (Ronnfeldt, 1997, 476). ignored. When a downturn in the demand of the favoured resource occurs, the economy falters. This is then related to the first finding above- conflict is often in countries with a stagnant or declining growth rates and GDP. 21

The recent increase in resource concerns comes after a cessation of funding due to the end of the Cold War, making rebels dependent on private sources of income to sustain rebellions. The political ecology perspective notes that resource and conflict is a symptom of larger issues- particularly the weakened role of the state (Le Billon, 2001). In addition to increasing the risk of conflict, natural resources “increase the vulnerability of countries to armed conflict by weakening the ability of political institutions to peacefully resolve conflicts” (Le Billon, 2001, 562). The socially constructed nature of resources explains why certain countries have a higher risk of conflict. As Harvey (1996) quoted in Le Billion (2001, 565) - “resources are not; they become. Whether or not nature is transformed by a resource is related to human desires, needs, and practices; or, from a political economy standpoint, the conditions, means and forces of production”. Resources, and their positive or negative effects, are therefore products of the structure in which they play a part. Resource conflict “peripheralizes” and fragments an economy. Rebels create networks of fragmented economies for their collective benefit--“fragmentation and peripheralization together shape new territories extended across scales” to create aggressive symbiotic relationships in conflict (Le Billon, 2001, 571-2). Rebel actors may, therefore, have an interest in perpetuating conflict in order to sustain illicit economic activities. King (2001) discusses how aggressive symbiotic relationships and economic networks are a prelude to the post-modern peripheral state where territory within is designated and ruled by local strongmen with international ties. 22

Whether resources increase conflict risk directly through motivating and sustaining war or indirectly through depressing growth rates and sustaining an ailing state, political ecology provides a view into the role of resources in conflict. Resource networks do shape new economies as insisted upon by the greed literature (Keen, 1998, Kaldor, 2001, and Duffield, 1998) and they are responsible for the increase in secessionist claims. Human Geography Research on the human geography of civil wars is limited to work on populations and ethnic geography. Population differences and densities in countries and rural to urban migrations are both associated with a higher risk of conflict (Collier et al., 2001). Fearon and Laitin (2003, 85) also find that a higher population increases the risk of conflict, but it does not increase the impact of ethnic diversity within a country. These relationships are undertheorized, which leads researchers to make potentially spurious connections concerning large populations and support bases for rebel groups. “Ethnic geography” attempts to find a connection between ethnic disputes and violence -- “82% of the all independent states are comprised by two or more ethnic groups, which are often involved in disputes either with each other or with the state itself” (Toft, 2003, 17). The central concern is territory and the importance of territory in creating and sustaining identity via the concept of ‘homeland”. The ‘homeland principle’ is “vital because it determines how economic and political resources are distributed, which languages are spoken etc.” (Toft, 2003, 23). This argument is similar to Holsti’s conception of the state as representing a community. 23

Toft does not discuss the role of ethnic concentrations in aiding rebels nor whether these disputes were held in or concerned the ethnic homeland.
2.1.5 Domestic Conclusion
Conflict onset and proliferation are the results of a number of intersecting causal factors. For the purpose of this analysis, I contend that the domestic circumstances of poverty and low economic growth rates indicate that a government may not be able to provide services and security to its people. When military spending takes precedence over social services, the conditions under which people live encourages the potential formation of challenges. Low growth rates may be responsible for the attraction of rebellion on less than ideological grounds. Considering that civil war is waged against the government and the state, the intent and structures of governments have a tremendous impact on conflict onset and proliferation. While state weakness is due to both a lack of legitimacy and ineffective territorial control, government weakness is a condition of peripheral government’s dependence on military control for state order. Therefore, both the state and government are vulnerable to challenges. Ethnic diversity’s role in both civil war onset and proliferation is unclear. However, considerable research has found no relationship between civil war onset and diversity. The role of elites and security in war situations may considerably change civil war’s relationship to diversity. If a war’s discourse is based on ethnic lines (whatever its actual goals), ethnicity may become a salient factor in continuing conflict. 24

In addition, particular human and physical contexts are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions, but in the right circumstance, both can have considerable impact on the risk of civil war onset and proliferation. Large populations, resource dependence, and rough terrain are domestic components which exacerbate conditions created by the interplay of economic, political and social circumstances. It is important to note that these variables do not have the same effect across all countries.
Within the developing world, states differ in the probability of civil strife. I contend that the cause and perpetuation of civil war is not solely due to domestic structures and contextual factors. The strength of a state and location of states contribute to the effect of domestic causes, which are necessary, but not sufficient to explain conflict or the spread of conflict. State weakness exacerbates the effects of domestic factors which cause civil war, and also contributes to the diffusion and perpetuation of civil war across borders- into neighbouring (and potentially weak) states. The diffusion of conflict, or the escalation of parallel conflicts, is rooted in the illegitimacy of state borders and the inability to control both territory and the people in it. Domestic conflict spreads in the same way people and services cross borders the Third World. Diffusion and escalation are important and understudied features of civil war because entire regions can escalate into a series of civil wars feeding off each other (e.g. West Africa in the late 1990s). Regional conflict formations are evident in interstate war (O’Loughlin and Anselin, 1991), and are speculated to exist for civil war (Kaplan, 2000 and Cohen, 1963). It is also clear that within regions, particular states are more prone to civil conflict than others. Why states devolve into conflict and how the presence of a 25

violent neighbour influences a state’s conflict risk is a question addressed in this project. The “location of states, their proximity to one another, and especially whether or not they share borders, emerges time and again as key variables in studies of international conflict phenomena: from major power general war to the diffusion of international conflict, to the analysis of peace between pairs of democracies” (Starr, 2002, 244).
2.2 States and Civil War
“The people must recognize this state, or this union, as theirs; and they must be willing to have their quarrels in that context. Once a large number of people stop believing that the State is theirs, and that the government is their instrument, then the political unit is no longer viable.”- President Julius ZK. Nyerere- “Why we Recognized Biafra” in Herbst (2000).
A considerable amount of weak state literature is based on African states. This may be for many reasons; I believe it is because the escalation of conflict in Africa and an impression that “African problems” are similar. However, weak states exist throughout the world and are responsible for an increasing trend in civil war. Other countries (Burma, Afghanistan, etc.) may not be so readily compared to each other because of a belief that conflict is driven by particular domestic circumstances. I do not take this perspective here. Weak states and conflict diffusion are driven by a process that is based on both domestic and international factors. The dominant questions that arise from this literature are whether theories of identity and sovereignty affect the rise, proliferation, and spread of civil war. 26

2.2.1 Nature of Statehood in the Modern System
Nation-states are privileged as ‘containers of society’, although only about 10% of states can be described as such (Conner, 1993). Within International Relations and Political Science, the territorial understanding of space represents the world as a collection of states, as lone blocks or units. However the salience of these state units is not uniform. In theory, a basic minimum of “statelike” features is required for international recognition as a state. Yet because an international system dictates the structure and confines of (for example) Rwanda does not mean that the identity of those living within this container identity themselves as Rwandans (no matter what the ruling party says-- see Economist 3/25/04), or that the territory bestowed upon Rwanda is recognized as sovereign because of its international designation of such. Many states occupy this contradictory position of international legitimacy and domestic weakness. Those who openly fray at the seams (or have a destroyed state apparatus) are deemed “failed” (see Reno, 1998 and Jackson, 1990). The international system is numerically dominated by weak states with limited control over their peripheries (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, 88). To understand the nature of Third World state building, we must consider that “it is not conducted within an international vacuum; external variables have tremendous influence” (Ayoob, 1995, 42 cited in Lemke, 2003, 60). External influences include 1) the lack of adequate time to develop (varying methods of decolonization); 2) the unrepresentative and authoritarian character of numerous regimes; 3) attempts at secession and social justice and 4) the “near impossibility of failed states actually officially failing and being replaced by some other recognized 27

political arrangement (Lemke, 2003, 61). Two discourses regarding the basis of weak statehood are presented here- 1) weak statehood as based on an inability to create a nation/community to form the basis of society and represented by a valid government and 2) weak statehood as caused by the lack of territorial control by central governments, as territory represents a physical manifestation of sovereignty.
Identity and the Social Contract
State weakness is a result of lacking legitimacy (Holsti, 1996, 97). Legitimacy is understood in two ways: 1) vertical legitimacy- or the “right to rule” through the establishment of a connection between society and political institutions, and 2) horizontal legitimacy, which defines the criteria and limits of the political community. Weak and failed states have proved unable to represent the communities upon which the state is built and are unable to garner support for the state as the defining political unit for the population. Frequently, an extensive military is created when either of these legitimacies remains unachievable. Legitimacy not endowed to states through the representation of a national identity can be created through various state services and actions. Yet, in weak and failed states, this avenue cannot be pursued. Growth promoting and human service related activities (education, health care) are bypassed in favour of a complex of coercion to enforce order. Peripheral states that cannot solidify a power base through legitimate means often turn to violence and coercion (Gurr, 1988, 50). Furthermore, “states involved in recurring episodes of violent conflict tend to a) develop and maintain institutions specialized in the exercise of coercion, and b) to develop elite political cultures that sanction the use of coercion in response to challenges and 28

perceived threats” (Gurr, 1988, 51). Military spending in developing countries— particularly those in Africa and the Middle East—have the heaviest economic burden in terms of its share of GDP; “external security factors play a major role in South Asia and the Middle East, while in Africa the acceleration in military expenditure is primarily due to domestic armed conflict and restructuring of the armed forces” (SIPRI, 2002).
6 With the rise of military power, intra-state security dilemmas are likely to develop where “attempts to increase state strength generate resistance that weakens the state. In attempts to overcome resistance, governments rely on coercive measures against local power centers and ethnic/religious groups” (Holsti, 1996, 117). Another perspective on the internal security dilemma is that it is a reaction to the state’s violation of the social contract (Azam, 2001). The inability of peripheral weak and failed states to provide a modicum of government services/control and the state’s positioning as a societal threat results in the failure of the social contract. The local answer to a state’s inability to provide basic services is to depend on ethnic ties, which become the most salient political affiliation --“state formation in Africa is a transition process starting from an institutional endowment of ethnic divisions. Ethnic capital, a term coined by Borjas (1992), ensures to most African people the provision of services that a modern state has taken over in rich countries (e.g. security, social insurance, education) are provided for by the ethnic group” (Azam, 2002, 430). The prevalence of ethnic capital as an effective substitute for state services is evident in Africa (Azam, 2001) and in the former Soviet Union (James, 2001). The 6 Found at http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb02/ch06.html 29

pervasiveness of ethnic capital and support systems, coupled with the diversity often assumed as a characteristic of the periphery, misleads popular authors to make spurious conclusions about the roles of ethnicity and ethnic group cohesion in conflict situations (see Kaplan’s 2000 work on the rise of conflict in West Africa and Ignatieff, 1993). The ethnic distribution system is not the root cause of violent internal conflict, but an indication of an inability to provide a stable base and services for all people. This, in turn, indicates the illegitimacy of both the government and the state. Agnew (2000, 60) relates this system to medieval Europe-- “communities were united only be allegiances and personal obligation rather than abstract individual equality or citizenship in a geographically circumscribed territory”.
Territories and Territoriality
Territoriality is the “primary geography expression of social power” and “the means by which space and society are interrelated” (Sack, 1986, 5). Therefore, territorial control is particularly powerful as an indicator of state weakness, as it provides a view into understanding the production and replication of sovereignty over space. Herbst (2000) attempts to connect the abilities of governments and the idea of a state as a function of geographic control. Tax, resource, and road networks serve as modes of state ideology transport. Herbst’s theory is based on Boulding’s (1962) “loss of strength” gradient, but within a domestic theater. The loss of strength idea centers (literally) on the seat of power, the capital. The assumption is that infrastructure within African countries will connect the capital to resource areas, large populations centers and tax bases. Empirical evidence on road construction in African countries supports these assumptions. 30

Combining Herbst’s impression of the geography of sovereignty with Sack’s perspective that territories are “socially constructed forms of spatial relations and their effects depend on who is controlling them and for what purposes” considerably deepens the theoretical implications of the territorial argument. In an analysis of population centers in Sub Saharan Africa, the “understanding of geography …is at odds with the understanding of sovereignty” (Herbst, 2000, 151). Herbst means to describe how the geography of the state (international borders) does not correspond to the geography of state control. This mismatch of geographies needs to be understood in light of claims that challenges to central rule come from “hinterlands”. Hinterlands are defined as areas that are effectively outside of state control. A combination of a state’s economic weakness (lack of infrastructure) and a lack of concern for areas distant from central power or resource areas, conspire to make hinterlands forgotten territories. Given that “70% of African minorities are concentrated in one contiguous geographical area” (Scarritt and McMillan, 1995, 328), rural/minority populations can be effectively cut off from the state. Separatist wars are typically associated with ethnic groups who are located in clearly defined regions of the state. These rebellions make minorities within a rural base more likely to see large scale violence than urban or dispersed minorities (Buhaug and Gates, 2002 and Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). This threat is considerably higher if precious natural resources are in the area (Buhaug and Gates, 2002, Collier et al. 2003). Even if a state is in relative peace, the existence of hinterlands is indicative of both a government’s agenda and a physical manifestation of whom and where 31

constitutes “the state”—“the division of space reflects, but also shapes, the ethnic and social landscape of most societies” (Yiftachel, 1999, 288). The spread on conflict is directly associated with both territorial and identity weakness. Situations of porous borders, ethnic groups straddling state boundaries, rebels launching attacks from neighbouring states, population flows and separatist movements all conspire to diffuse and escalate conflict beyond a single state border.
2.2.2 How does Conflict Spread Through and Across Weak States?
A lack of territorial sovereignty within weak states allows for conflict to spread over borders. Border regions can also be used to assess the spread of domestic conflict, as they have been used in international conflict analysis (Siverson and Starr, 1991). The salience of borders highlights the mismatch of nation and state. Borders serve two purposes- 1) a legal borderline which separates territories and joins states and 2) a zone where people negotiate meanings associated with their identity such as membership in a nation or state (Wilson and Donnan, 1998, 9). Border formations can have a tremendous influence of nation and state sovereignty. If neither territory nor identity is structured and protected by the state, there seems no conceivable reason why conflict, like people and services, cannot pass through porous boundaries, contributing to the diffusion and escalation of civil wars. Complied with the high risk of war endemic to developing states, weak states are in a position of ‘double jeopardy’- they are both domestically suited to civil war outbreaks and internationally surrounded by high risk weak states which allow for conflict to spread across borders. Therefore, the location of a state can be an underlying cause in domestic conflict outbreak and duration. 32

Essentially, the effect of state A’s activities (such as war) on state B is contingent upon the structures within state B. Whitaker (2003) makes this point referencing how the refugee flows during the early 1990s into both the Congo and Tanzania (both from Rwanda) resulted in very different outcomes. In the Congo, Rwandans were an integral part of the overthrow of President Laurent Kabila (before the end of major fighting in the Congo Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe had sent troops, and Uganda and Rwanda were active participants). In Tanzania, a relatively stable and forceful government allowed for refugees to stay for a short time before demanding they leave. Lake and Rothchild note a similar conclusion: “conflict does diffuse abroad, but largely to states that already contain the seeds of discord” (1998, 342). Diffusion and escalation are the processes in which conflict can be internationalized (Lake and Rothchild, 1998). Diffusion and escalation are not mutually exclusive, nor do they exhaust the ways in which conflict is spread. These theories are based on cross-border interactions of people, mainly as refugees or combatants (e.g. Rwandans in Congo, Sierra Leoneans in Liberia). In diffusion, refugee inflows (and a resultant change in the power dynamic or competition for resources) results in an unstable situation, potentially leading to conflict (Whitaker, 2003). A host country allowing the use of territory for increased attacks on a neighbouring country can lead to conflict escalation or mobilize ethnic groups across borders (again, Rwanda and Sierra Leone). Violence involving refugees is typically short (1-4 years) (Lischer, 2000). Although considerable attention has been paid to the effect of refugees on political 33

violence, evidence from 1987 to 1998 (Lischer, 2000) found that there was a significant drop in refugees since the end of the Cold War (from 8 million in 1987 to 4.3 in 1998). But those receiving states showed an increase in political violence during this time. In 1987, Africa accounted for 43% of receiving states; in 1997 and 1998, Africa accounted for 70% and 60% respectively (Lischer, 2000, 3). Together, these facts suggest that refugee situations in Africa devolve into violence more often than other receiving states, because of state weakness.
2.3 Regions and Regional Conflict
The perspective taken here is that the current international system can be defined as a capitalist world economy existing with a fragmented political/cultural system. Regions, as a unit of significance, are associated with a peripheral reaction to core power dominance. Economic and security concerns have highlighted the importance of regional power centers, which facilitate the spread of power from the international to the national realm (Vayrynen, 1984, 339). Regional subsystems are characterized by a distinctiveness both geographically and economically (ASEAN), politically (EU) or culturally (North Africa). Regional subsystems are also associated with regional power centers and their respective spheres of influence, such as Indonesia, India, Iran, Nigeria, and China. The differential entrenchment of the capitalist system produces both ‘homogeneity’, where economic involvement harmonizes regional subsystems and ‘heterogeneity’ as regions are located in different structural positions in the world (Vayrynen, 1984). 2.3.1 Regional Formations Regional formations can be based on a number of characteristics. Three types of regions- geostrategic/ political, economic and cultural are discussed here. 34

Different regions have particular underlying conflict probabilities. My argument is that regional conflicts are a mixture of intra-national, intra-regional, and extra regional conflicts. Considering that most conflict is currently intra-state, and the strength of regions is based on actors (states) at the bottom of this hierarchy, regional systems in the periphery experience a double risk on conflict. Regional conglomerations of states are at internal risk because of conflict diffusion, and international interests exacerbate tensions and power relationships inside regions which result in shatterbelt-like scenarios. Of course, the opposite is also true. Systems that experience a great degree of stability are at a lesser risk of internal conflict because of the stability of the larger region. The European Union is an example of where a commitment to peace, a stable economic environment and a core position allowed for the pursuit of change through peaceful measures as opposed to violence.
Geostrategic/Political
Geostrategic civil war theory discusses civil war onset and civil war proliferation as an outcome of a global-regional dynamic (see Cohen, 2003). This perspective is based on the differences, or heterogeneity, amongst the world regions. In this vein, the Middle East is a fundamentally different region than Europe, and is therefore more prone to conflict by virtue of the characteristics which define it. This phenomenon is exemplified by the proxy wars during the Cold War, when numerous civil wars within the developing world were attributed to superpower competition and continuing support for opposing ideological sides. The most troublesome period beginning in 1979 until 1986 witnessed a shift in superpower focus from Europe to 35

the “arc of crisis”- Kenya through the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan (O’Loughlin, 1986, 290). At that time the Third World was home to unstable regimes seeking aid and allies (Litwak and Wells, 1988). Another geostrategic theory is Saul Cohen’s Shatterbelt concept (1963); he identifies conflict prone regions with internal cultural, economic, and political diversity coupled with competing external involvements and a precious natural resource. Shatterbelt theory continues to be supported by the spatial configuration of international involvement today, and one can extend shatterbelt theory to internal situation of individual states. Current shatterbelts include the Middle East, South East Asia, and the Caucasus. Economic Economic regions are defined by collaborations between neighbouring or proximate countries to maximize economic power within the world system. As noted above, these arrangements (such as a trading block) can also constrain the choices of states within the world economy, but also provide (if effective) protection from larger global economic forces. Vayrynen (1984) contends that regions defined by economic motives become dependent and homogeneous, due to similar processes occurring in each. Conflict in these areas is likely to be due to external causation. Yet Vayrynen’s theories apply more to interstate war and reiterates that war is rare if the region is fully engaged within the world economy. The influence, constraints, and alliances that strengthen economic relationships rarely allow for conflict. 36

Cultural
Huntington’s (1996) “Clash of Civilization” theory structures the world into eight civilizational regions, based on religious (and hence cultural) affiliation. His main concern is the state of the post Cold War world where wars will occur on the fault lines (or borders) between civilizations. For example, the Kashmir conflict is not an Indian civil war, but a clash of civilizations between Islam and Hinduism; Chechnya is not a civil war, but a clash of Islam and Orthodoxy. Criticisms of Huntington include how he does not address a multitude to conflicts which do not adhere to his criteria of civilizational wars. Also, in order to entertain Huntington’s theory, one must first accept that the world is currently divided into eight distinct civilizations/cultures and those are based solely on religion. Empirical evidence has found that intercivilizational dyads (country groups) are not more likely to be embroiled in conflict, and in fact are somewhat less conflict prone than intra civilization dyads (Chiozza, 2002, 728). Based on these regional classifications, geostrategic/political regions are the most prone to both domestic and interstate conflict. Politically-based regions have the highest risk of conflict not only because of the heterogeneity (differences amongst countries) inside the regions, but also because of external influence. Geostrategic regions are labeled so because they occupy a position which power can be broadcast from. Due to this position, political regions are inherently conflictual. Certain political regions can ally themselves economically and culturally to mitigate the risk of conflict through interdependence (e.g. the European Union). Other regions, such as Central Africa or South Asia, are conflictual not because they avoid 37

interdependence, but their interdependence encourages conflict to spread through countries. 2.3.2 Why and how do regions break into conflict? Geostrategic regions are the most at-risk for domestic conflict. Differences amongst and across states inside political regions are not mitigated, but exacerbated, by the interests of outside powers and geostrategic influences. The actions and events in political regions are contingent upon a number of different actors within and outside geostrategic regions. The devolution of states into civil war is not solely based on domestic attributes, but is also determined by larger international and interregional forces. These forces are made salient through the interdependence of actors within and across states. Opportunity and Willingness How neighbouring wars (and larger regions) will affect a civil war is determined by opportunity and willingness. Again, Siverson and Starr (1991, 25) used these concepts to understand the diffusion of international war. Opportunity is defined as the possibilities available to an entity within an environment; essentially this refers to the degree of interaction. Interaction in this project is determined by borders, but assumed to exist amongst ethnic groups and international rebel alliances. Willingness is related to the decision to take advantage of the opportunities presented by interaction. Both are built upon the concepts of interdependency- or collective outcomes. Collective outcomes dictate that actions, events, and decisions are not solely determined by an individual actor (such as a state). International ties (such as trading 38

relationships or alliances) and interregional ties (such as trading blocks or political units) constrain and influence the decisions of those involved. Opportunities are determined by the interaction between entities within these structures, willingness reflects the abilities to make decisions given the constraints imposed by collective outcome structures. I apply this concept of collective outcomes to civil war to understand both the process of conflict diffusion and the influences of larger forces on domestic wars. However, my unit of analysis is not the state, as I assume it is not in a state’s interest to expand the theater of conflict into another state. Instead, I will focus on the diffusion of war through the agents of diffusion- rebels and refugees. Opportunities presented by interactions and rebel and refugee willingness to engage with interactions contribute to the spread of domestic conflict across peripheral states. Therefore, domestic conflicts are determined by collective outcomes, which are influenced by domestic circumstances and local level interactions. The state itself is constrained by its internal weakness and its position within the world system. 39

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