ODDBJØRN LEIRVIK
Global Ethics and Moral Disagreement
After September 11, 2001
A Christian-Muslim Perspective
Global issues are always approached from somewhere. My personal vantage point
is Christian-Muslim relations and interfaith dialogue on ethics in Norway. But here
as everywhere, local dialogues are affected by events on the global stage. In this
article, I will first give some examples of how dialogue on communal ethics in
Norway has entailed interfaith involvement in global issues. In the second part I
will share some reflections on the notion of ‘global ethics’. Here I will also present
the notion of ‘well-grounded moral disagreement’, which I believe is particularly
relevant in a Muslim-Christian context. In the final part I will discuss what kind of
lessons can be drawn from Muslim and Christian reactions to the dramatic events
of 11 September and its global aftermath.
Introduction: From the Local to the Global
Like interfaith dialogue in general, Christian-Muslim dialogue of an organised kind
is a very recent phenomenon in Norway. But during the 1990s it gained considerable momentum and even aspired to deal with global challenges.
The first partners to set up a regular structure for interreligious dialogue in Norway
were, perhaps not surprisingly, Christians and Muslims. Against the background of
growing grassroots contact a national Contact Group between the Church of
Norway and the Islamic Council of Norway was established in 1993. The Lutheran
Church of Norway is a state church, comprising 86% of the population. The Islamic
Council of Norway is an umbrella organization for most of the organised Muslims
in Norway.1 The Contact Group has provided an opportunity for regular dialogue
Of Norway’s about 100,000 Muslims (2% of the population), in 2001 about 63,000
were members of a Muslim organisation in Norway.
1
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STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 12 (2002) 2
and personal networking between leaders of the national church and the main nonChristian community in Norway. The other churches in Norway have also joined
the Contact Group, which has become a truly ecumenical enterprise not only in the
Christian but in the wider, Abrahamic sense.
During the 1990s several multilateral dialogue projects were also initiated. These
projects have included representatives of other world religions, alternative spirituality and secular humanism as well as Christians and Muslims. Two pioneering
projects were carried out at the Humanist Academy of Nansenskolen and later
documented in books. The first occurred in 1992-93 under the heading of
“Communal Ethics in Multicultural Norway.” A second project in 1996-97
focused on ”Religion, Life Stances and Human Rights in Norway” (see Eidsvåg and
Leirvik 1993 and Eidsvåg and Larsen 1993).
In a broader perspective the cues of ‘communal ethics’ and ‘human rights’ indicate
respectively two different approaches to interfaith dialogue on ethics. In a human
rights approach, one searches for the minimum of consensus which is necessary to
avoid discrimination against religious groups and violation of individual integrity.
In a quest for communal ethics one tends to be more ambitious. The search is then
for a maximum of consensus between adherents of different faiths on pressing
ethical issues. In the communal ethics project at Nansenskolen, the participants
sorted out disagreement and sought for consensus on life issues such as genetics,
abortion, the relation between parents and children, sexuality and marriage, and
euthanasia. In both projects the approach was mainly inductive, with concrete
challenges (pertaining to attitudes as well as legislation) as the starting point.
In 1996 a permanent forum for interfaith dialogue was formed: The Council for
Religious and Life Stance Communities in Norway. Although the Council mainly
addresses questions of interfaith attitudes and government policies in Norway, it
has also become a springboard for global involvement. In 1998 the interfaith
council co-initiated the so-called “Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion or
Belief.” The Oslo Coalition engages leaders of the Islamic Council, the Church of
Norway, the Council of Free Churches, the Jewish Community, the Buddhist
Community, the Bahá’ís and the Humanist Association in Norway. The basis of the
Oslo Coalition is common standards for human rights, as expressed in binding
international conventions. Its plan for 2002 included interreligious cooperation
with relevant partners in countries such as Russia, China, Indonesia, Iran, and the
Sudan. Focal points are religious freedom, gender equality, religious and civic
education, and interfaith dialogue in areas of communal strife.
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GLOBAL ETHICS AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT
The formation of the Oslo Coalition indicates that the well-known Norwegian
ambition of international peacemaking has already become an interfaith vision.
Although its scope is human rights standards, the work of the Oslo Coalition is also
marked by a quest for communal ethics in a wider sense. Its human basis is
personal networks formed by face-to-face dialogues in Norway, which have also
kindled a desire for doing something together internationally. Probably, any
meaningful approach to global ethics must be based in small-scale, personal
networks. Alluding to the works of the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel
Levinas, I will suggest that global ethics cannot do without an ethics of the face,
oriented towards the vulnerability of the other (see Levinas 1985 and 1991).
A closer look at the agenda of the Oslo Coalition will show that Muslim-Christian
issues occupy a central place. Both in Norway and internationally Christians and
Muslims are increasingly engaging each other in both bilateral and multilateral
forums. The varying practice of referring either to ‘Muslim-Christian’ or
‘Christian-Muslim’ dialogue invites a reflection on who takes the initiative in interfaith enterprises. The bilateral Contact Group between the churches and the Islamic Council was initially a Christian-Muslim enterprise, in the sense that the
initiative came from the Church of Norway, the national church of the overwhelming majority. The multilateral interfaith council—and the ensuing Oslo Coalition—has a different background. It grew out of a minority alliance between
secular humanists, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and others. The alliance was formed
as a protest against the proposal of a new compulsory subject of religious education
in primary schools, which the minorities felt was too much oriented toward
Christianity as the national religion. On the initiative of this minority alliance, the
churches were invited to take part in the construction of an overall, nongovernmental interfaith council in Norway. With a view to Christian and Muslim
participation, the council was thus a Muslim-Christian initiative rather than a
Christian-Muslim one.
In my view, focusing on minority concerns in Norway is a good starting point for
common involvement in global issues. Global ethics should always have the concerns of the minorities and those most vulnerable as its focal point. Thus, it is good
that interfaith dialogue in Norway is Muslim-Christian and not only ChristianMuslim. By the same token, interfaith dialogue in the Sudan should be ChristianMuslim and not only Muslim-Christian.
Global Ethic/s and Well-grounded Moral Disagreement
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STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 12 (2002) 2
Proceeding to the broader question of global ethics, it should be noted that the
qualification ‘global’ in ‘global ethics’ may mean two different things. It can either
refer to the global scope of ethical reflection or to ethical values that may be
globally endorsed (Gerle 1995: 12-14.). In both cases, the quest for global ethics—
like the search for communal ethics in national contexts—should be expected to be
slightly more ambitious than a human rights approach. A global ethics does not
stop at stating inviolable rights: it aims at formulating interfaith moral obligations.
In a quest for global ethics there is also the question of whether one should take a
deductive or inductive approach. In a deductive search for values that can be globally endorsed the great ethical traditions constitute the frame of reference. The
alternative inductive approach is oriented more directly towards pressing global
challenges that often transcend the scope of traditional ethical reasoning. The inductive approach looks for ethical responses to concrete challenges, not just for
general values.
The two approaches are not mutually exclusive but still distinctive. In current
international discussion a distinction is often made between ‘global ethics’ and a
‘global ethic’. When translating the vision of his Projekt Weltethos, Hans Küng
speaks insistently of “a world ethic” or “global ethic.”2 His Global Ethic Foundation is based on the idea
... that the religions of the world can make a contribution to the peace of humankind only if
they reflect on those elements of an ethic which they already have in common: on a
fundamental consensus on binding values, irrevocable standards and personal attitudes .
(Website of the Global Ethic Foundation)
The “Declaration Toward a Global Ethic”, which was drafted by Küng and adopted
by the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1993, has the same orientation.
As Küng puts it: “The Declaration should have the name ‘Declaration toward a
Global Ethic’, not ‘Global Ethics’. ‘Ethic’ means a basic moral attitude, whereas
‘ethics’ denotes the philosophical or theological theory of moral attitudes, values
and norms ...” (Küng and Kuschel 1993: 59f.)3
2 His book Projekt Weltethos (1990) was translated into English with the title: Global
Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic (1991). The Norwegian translation was
given the title Etikk for verdens fremtid (1991).
3 In Küng and Schmidt 1998 Küng calls for “a globalization of ethics,” but only in
terms of values and attitudes: “no uniform ethical system but a necessary minimum of
shared ethical values, basic attitudes and criteria to which all regions, nations and interest
groups can commit themselves. In other words there is a need for a common basic human
ethic” (p. 105).
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GLOBAL ETHICS AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT
As one can see, Küng distinguishes between (1) the values and attitudes of ”a
global ethic” and (2) the traditional ethical systems in which moral formation will
normally take place—such as Christian Ethics and Islamic Ethics. In addition, the
Global Ethic project may also call for interreligious codes of ethics for groups of
professionals. Such concrete ‘ethics’ must obviously be developed inductively. 4
But the project itself is focused on more general values that can be deducted from
the great traditions.
The main part of the Global Ethic Declaration is a sermon-like admonition structured around “four irrevocable directives” which link up with classical Abrahamic
as well as Eastern injunctions. The Declaration calls for commitment to (1) “a
culture of non-violence and respect for life” (“You shall not kill!”), (2) “a culture
of solidarity and a just economic order” (“You shall not steal!”), (3) “a culture of
tolerance and a life of truthfulness” (”You shall not lie!”), and “a culture of equal
rights and partnership between men and women” (“You shall not commit sexual
immorality!”).
The focus of the Declaration is on values and attitudes (an ethic or ethos) that must
be globally endorsed for peace and respect to prevail. This does not mean that the
Declaration neglects the particular contributions of the different faith communities.
In fact, the Declaration urges the communities of faith to formulate ”their very
specific ethic”, which can be lived in forgiveness and compassion, renunciation and
selfless sacrifice. The Declaration seems to imply that such ideals or virtues can be
nourished only by faith, as part of, for instance, a specifically Christian or Islamic
ethics. But it also calls for a renewed “conversion of the heart” to those values that,
through deduction from the different traditions, may be said to be truly universal.
A different, more inductive approach to the question of global ethics can be found
in Elisabeth Gerle’s book In Search of a Global Ethics. Here she calls for a more
contextual and process-oriented approach to global ethics. Venturing beyond general values and attitudes, Gerle speaks of ‘ethics’ and not of an ‘ethic’. She
launches two clearly interrelated critiques of the deductive, ‘universal values’ approach. Firstly, she notes that “The asymmetry of the world complicates the notion
In one of its concluding paragraphs (35), the 1993 “Declaration Toward a Global
Ethic” calls for the development of “up-do-date codes of ethics” for as many “professions as
possible, such as those of physicians, scientists, business people, journalists, and
politicians.”
4
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STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 12 (2002) 2
of the universal .… The asymmetry has to do with power and participation giving
some groups more choices and more influence than others” (Gerle 1995: 19).
Secondly, and in conjunction with feminist insights, she suggests that relatedness
rather than abstract values should be the point of departure for the search for a
global ethics. With Seyla Benhabib she calls for a contextually sensitive universalism which is interactive rather than conceptual (Gerle 1995: 38f.; Benhabib 1992:
3), putting the stress on groups of people acting together.
Gerle seems to be advocating an inductive moral approach to pressing challenges
that are unprecedented in nature and global in range. To survive in dignity and
justice, people everywhere must engage in formulating a global ethics which surpasses traditional confines and the commonalities of “basic attitudes.” The global
struggle against AIDS or for ecological balance would suffice as life-and-death
examples.
But—and this a main point in my own reflection on ethical dialogue—if one leaves
the realm of abstract values and approaches the realities of moral action in a quest
for concrete responses to shared challenges, one will always have to face the reality
of moral disagreement. At the level of applied ethics this cannot be avoided.
In the Scandinavian context the concept of well-grounded moral disagreement has
been introduced by the Swedish ethicist Göran Bexell who introduced his theory of
“a well-grounded moral view” in Christian ethics in 1990 (Bexell 1990: 4; 1992: 3136) ; Bexell and Grenholm 1997: 258-74). According to Bexell, there are four different
elements in a well grounded-moral view: (1) a consideration of facts and
experiences, (2) an evaluation of relevant norms and values from the traditions, (3)
a moral choice based on both facts and ethical evaluations, and (4) the element of
personal virtue and character. There must a balance between these elements in a
well-grounded moral view.
It is on this basis that Bexell also speaks of a well-grounded moral disagreement.
He lists several examples of how Christians have lived with—or should learn to
live with—contrary moral judgements that are recognised by the moral community
as plausible and legitimate interpretations of Christian ethics. A classical example
is absolute pacifism versus moral judgements based on the theory of just wars. A
late modern example is conflicting moral judgements within the Scandinavian
churches (and elsewhere) regarding homosexual relations.
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GLOBAL ETHICS AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT
How should the question of moral disagreement be dealt with by Muslims and
Christians and globally? At one level, it is a constant challenge for Christian and
Islamic ethics respectively to decide what kind of moral positions may be regarded
as plausible and legitimate applications of the classical tradition in question.
Experience shows that this process is open-ended and calls for respectful dialogue
within each moral community.
But the question of how to handle moral disagreement also arises at the interreligious level. In many cases some Christians and some Muslims reach moral
judgments that are nearly identical but conflict with the moral judgments of other
co-religionists. In the last half of this article I will look at Muslim-Christian
responses to 11 September and the ensuing bombing of Afghanistan as an example.
Again, Norwegian reactions will be my vantage point.
Christian-Muslim Reactions to September 11 and its Aftermath
In his book The Clash of Civilisations (1997) Samuel Huntington argues that global
conflicts in the post-Cold War era will be increasingly defined by identity politics
and coincide with the fault lines between culturally and religiously defined “civilisations.” In Huntington’s view, this is particularly true of Western Christianity and
Islam.
In my view, Huntington seriously underestimates the internal differences and
conflicts within the so-called ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ civilisations. A closer look at
reactions to September 11 and the ensuing ‘war on terrorism’ disproves Huntington’s theory rather than confirms it.
Five days after September 11, the Bishop of Oslo, the General Secretary of the
Humanist Association, the Jewish Rabbi, and the vice-president of the Islamic
Council stood “Together in grief” in an interfaith event which affirmed their joint
rejection of religiously-motivated violence. Hand in hand, they sung “We Shall
Overcome”.5 In other Norwegian cities too there were similar symbolic events
staged by Christians and Muslims together.6
5
Dagsavisen (September 17, 2001).
See reports of interfaith events in Bergen and Kristiansand in Bergens Tidende 6
(October 2001) and Fædrelandsvennen 23 (October 2001).
6
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STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 12 (2002) 2
Two weeks after September 11 the Contact Group between the Church of Norway
and the Islamic Council had its regular meeting. A press release was formulated in
which Christians and Muslims were encouraged to participate in each other’s grief
and concern. Aware of the danger that Muslims in Norway might be victimised
because of the terrorist attacks, Christians and Muslims were also encouraged to
make contact on the local level. Conscious of the greater responsibility carried by
the majority community, Church of Norway parishes were enjoined to take the
initiative and to act as shields.7
In Norway official reactions to 11 September were nearly entirely united among
Muslims and Christian leaders. But what happened after the US-led ‘war on
terrorism’ was launched, with the bombing of Afghanistan as its first dramatic
expression? In Norway the Islamic Council soon voiced their apprehension that the
bombing campaign would only entail new innocent civilian losses.8 Perhaps more
surprisingly—in view of the fact that the Norwegian government unreservedly
supported the bombing—several bishops reacted similarly.9 On October 12, the
Church of Norway’s Committee on International Issues went as far as to state that
the bombing campaign was both “ethically doubtful and strategically unwise.” The
Committee stated that in the struggle against terrorism, the call of the churches is
always to side with the victims—either in the US or in Afghanistan—and, from the
perspective of the victims to call for reconciliation.10
The next day the church committee’s resolution was the top news on the Islamic
Council’s website. A few weeks later, converging Muslim and Christian views
materialised as well in a joint letter from the imam of the largest Pakistani mosque
in Oslo and the General Secretary of the Church of Norway’s Council on
Ecumenical and International Relations. The letter was sent to Kjell Magne
Bondevik, the Christian Democrat prime minister of Norway. In this letter Muslim
and Christian leaders jointly criticised the government’s unreserved support for
American policy, demanded a halt to the bombing for humanitarian reasons, and
called for international responses to terrorism that do not inflict suffering on
innocent civilians.11 The focus was on vulnerability and the greater responsibility of
7 Published on the website of the Church of Norway, www.kirken.no (25 September
2001).
8
Cf. their website, www.islam.no.
9
“Biskopar krev bombestans,” Klassekampen (October 29, 2001).
10
www.kirken.no (October 18, 2001).
11 “Norske kristne og muslimer krever bombestans,” Aftenposten (October 31, 2001); cf.
“Ber Gud stoppe Bondevik,” Dagbladet (October 31, 2001).
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GLOBAL ETHICS AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT
the more powerful. It is interesting to note that two days before the mosque in
question had expressed its abhorrence of the massacre of Christian worshippers in
the Pakistani city of Bahawalpur. Their imminent protest showed a Muslim concern
for the vulnerable other (Aftenposten (October 29, 2001)).
If Muslims and Christians could learn to interact on the basis of a shared concern
for the vulnerable other, that would surely be a great step forward in the quest for
global ethics. But the basic attitude of shared concern for the vulnerable other does
not necessarily mean agreement on the level of applied ethics. Returning to
Norwegian church leaders’ reactions to the bombing campaign, it must be added
that their reactions were not unanimous. When the Synod met in mid-November, it
had to recognise different moral judgements as to the legitimacy of the bombing
campaign.
This could be described as a well-grounded moral disagreement, which probably
also involved different evaluations on the factual level. In the light of the eventual
fall of Taliban, many would contest the initial evaluation of the Church Committee
that the bombing campaign was “strategically unwise.” Apart from divergent views
at the factual level, there was also the normative controversy between just war
approaches of a more or less restrictive kind and more pacifist stands.
The interesting thing is that the moral disagreement in question did not in any way
coincide with cultural and religious divides. Some Muslims and some Christians
joined hands against other Muslims and other Christians, who held different moral
and political views on how terrorism should be combated. The same was true
internationally. It should be noted that those who favoured the combating of the
Taliban and al-Qa’ida by means of heavy bombing that threatened innocent
civilians also did so on an interfaith basis. I am not primarily referring to the
political alliance that was forged between the US government and important
Muslim regimes in the region. The ethical component in that kind of alliances is not
always crystal-clear. But also within the complex mix of power politics and alleged
moral agendas an interfaith ethics of the face may be at work.
Let me cite but one example from the battlefield. The American captain Jason
Amerine took part in covert operations on the ground together with the forces of
Hamid Karzai, before the Taliban were defeated and Karzai became the new head
of government. Before the eventual fall of the Taliban-held village they were
attempting together to liberate, both Amerine and Karzai were lightly wounded by
an American bomb which went astray. In an illustrated newspaper interview,
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STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 12 (2002) 2
Amerine speaks warm-heartedly of Karzai as a “comrade.”12 In a photograph from
the inauguration ceremony one could see Karzai in prayer with some distracted
European observers in the background. As for Amerine, I do not know if he is
among the Christian soldiers who celebrated the Eucharist on Afghan soil, or
whether he is a Jew or a non-believer. In any case, the military anti-Taliban
campaign was an interfaith campaign as good as any and as controversial as
always. Obviously, there are good reasons for being suspicious of the alleged moral
agenda of a superpower or of that of different factions in a civil war. But who am I
to suggest that the alliance between the US and the anti-Taliban forces in
Afghanistan was only motivated by ephemeral political considerations and not by
some strong moral motives as well?
What I am suggesting is that both the bombing campaign and the protest against it
may be taken as interfaith examples of moral disagreement. Not all parties would
be ready to see the disagreement in question as ‘well-grounded’—in view of
Christian or Islamic ethics. But globalisation implies that such disagreements on the
level of applied ethics will increasingly be interfaith in nature: not in the sense of
Christian versus Muslim views but in terms of controversial Muslim-Christian
alliances that converge with corresponding intra-Muslim and intra-Christian
controversies.
Until now I have not mentioned Osama bin Laden. How does he fit into this
picture, dead or alive? It is the task of Muslims to decide whether he and his like
represent a well-grounded version of Islamic ethics. Most Muslim leaders who have
spoken out state emphatically that he is not. But a not negligible minority of
militant Muslims have supported his draconic views of divine justice. Muslims are
often asked by Christian dialogue partners to be more liberal, for instance, in
questions about gender relations. In this case, Muslims and Christians alike
probably see the need to be more restrictive as to who is inside and who is outside
the respectable moral community.
For Western Christians, the main ethical challenge is perhaps of a different kind. A
paramount challenge in the West is how to draw the line between Christian ethics
and state logics, such as the power politics of a ‘great nation’ and its military allies
who sometimes claim to have a moral agenda but act primarily on the principle of
self-interest.
12
10
For the following, see Aftenposten (December 23, 2001): 8.
GLOBAL ETHICS AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT
Conclusion: Muslim-Christian Concern for the Vulnerable Other
In conclusion, I would like to underline once more the importance of personal
networks in both Muslim-Christian dialogue and global ethics endeavours. In acute
crises such face-to-face networks show their real value. Recent events have
demonstrated what an ethics of the face à la Levinas is all about: it has to do with
recognising the vulnerability of the other in critical awareness of asymmetrical
relationships which always leave the stronger party with a greater responsibility. A
global ethics of the face invites us to recognise our shared vulnerability in shifting
power relations.
While searching for ethical responses to the other’s vulnerability, one will also
have to face moral disagreements. As long as interfaith partners recognise that
divergent moral judgements are ‘well-grounded’, such controversies will not be
antagonistic. As I see it, both Christians and Muslims need to become more
generous in accepting that common values may lead to differing moral judgements.
But the question of limits to acceptable positions and actions can never be
suspended. On the contrary, the question of limits must now be approached even
more vigorously and on an interfaith basis. Linking Bexell’s theory with the ethics
of the face, I will suggest that a moral view (or action) that does not respect the
integrity and vulnerability of the other should not be considered as wellgrounded—either by Christians nor Muslims.
This is global ethics or, if one prefers, inductive universalism in ethics: not only the
willingness to abide by some minimal human rights standards, not only the
readiness to state some basic ‘global ethic’ attitudes but first and last the will to
enter into concrete, moral alliances that are intercultural and interfaith in nature. If
based on face-to-face relations, such alliances will be as morally binding as they are
ethically controversial. In fact, they may entail a new kind of moral community.
What would be the role of Muslim-Christian dialogue in this process? In this article
I have given an indirect answer by reflecting on Muslim and Christian responses to
post-September 11 events. The implication of my reflections is that Muslims and
Christians are challenged in a special way to develop a global ethics of shared
concern for the vulnerable other. In my introduction I said that global ethics can
only be approached from somewhere. The ‘somewhere’ of Muslim-Christian
dialogue is a shared legacy of spiritual as well as political competition for control
in more or less the same geographical areas, paired with a solid stock of enemy
images which have led Muslims and Christians to perceive each other as main
antagonists. These images are still very much alive on both sides and must be
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STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 12 (2002) 2
carefully dismantled and disarmed if there will ever be a global ethics which is
sensitive to the vulnerable other. This challenge can only be met by Muslims and
Christians together in action.
Historically, both Christians and Muslims have had great difficulty in recognising
shared values. They have had even more problems with recognising and accepting
well-grounded moral disagreement. And we have just recently embarked upon the
task of putting up mutually binding limits to morally acceptable action. The time
has come to tackle the questions of moral disagreement and limits to moral action
together, as a contribution to a global ethics which is both obligating and generous.
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