Determinism and moral responsibility: The ancient Platonic critique of Stoic
compatibilism
Jan Opsomer (Leuven)
1. Compatibilism
“Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem, which concerns a disputed
incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is
compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of
moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility
between moral responsibility and determinism. (McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin,
"Compatibilism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), forthcoming
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/compatibilism/>)
(in)compatibilism about
 determinism and free will
 determinism and moral responsibility
 determinism and to eph’hemin (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ‘what is up to us’)
2. Stoic causal determinism and compatibilism
S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford, 1998, 33-53:
 General Causal Principle: Nothing happens without a cause.
 Specified Causal Principle: For every movement e (i) there are causal factors c1…cn which
are actively responsible for e, and (ii) for any possible alternative movement e* to e there is
a factor f in the starting situation s of e, such that because of f e (and not e*) occurred; i.e.
for e* (and not e) to occur there would have to have been some *f (≠ f) instead of f in s.
 Fate Principle: “Everything happens in accordance with fate.” (τὰ πάντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην
γίνεται)
3. The Principle of Charity
4. Conditional Fate
Sources: Ps.-Plutarch, On Fate (Περὶ εἱμαρμένης); Calcidius, in Tim. ch. 142-190; Apuleius, De Plat. 1.12,
205-207; Alcinous, Didaskalikos ch. 26; Nemesius, De natura hominis chs. 35-38; (Tacitus, Annales 6.22);
Alexander of Lycopolis, Contra Manichaeos
The doctrine of conditional Fate in ps.-Plutarch Περὶ εἱμαρμένης
4.1. What needs saving:






the divine character of fate, and hence its goodness and overwhelming power;
the unalterable quality of fate;
the ineluctable character of fate;
the belief that god is not the cause of evil, only of good things;
the harmony between fate and divine providence;
the meaningfulness and usefulness of praise and blame, reward and punishment,
prayer and worship;
o
o
o
the possibility of divination and the effectiveness of mantic practice;
more fundamentally: the belief that there is something ‘up to us’, understood as
the real possibility of alternative choices, which implies:
the reality of contingency.
4.2. Two meanings of Fate
A
A1
A1a
A1b
A1c
A2
Fate as substance (οὐσία, the world soul) and Fate as activity (ἐνέργεια, the law of
fate).
Fate as activity is
“a divine logos intransgressible because of inescapable causality”;
“a law in accord with the nature of the Universe, according to which what comes to be
takes place”;
“a divine law connecting future to past and present events”.
Cf. the ordinance of Adrasteia (Phaedr. 248C), the laws of Fate (Tim. 41E) the decree
(λόγος) of Lachesis, maiden daughter of Necessity (Rep. 617D).
Fate as substance is the world-soul in its threefold division, i.e. Clotho, Atropos and
Lachesis, ruling over the fixed stars, the errant heavenly bodies and the sublunary
realm respectively.
4.3. The quality of fate understood as activity.
B
Fate as activity is finite (πεπερασμένη), but covers an infinite number of events.
4.4. Fate extending to individual things:
C
C1
C2
Fate is like a political law.
Fate is universal.
Fate is conditional.
Phaedrus 248C
4.5. Other things related to Fate (What is up to us, rational choice, chance, the
possible, the contingent, providence)
D1 Everything is contained in Fate. D2
Not everything is according to Fate.
E
The possible is the genus of the contingent, which is the matter of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.
F
Substance (ἡ οὐσία = δυνάμενον) is prior to potentiality (δύναμις) and potentiality is
prior to the possible (τὸ δυνατόν).
whole
τὸ αὐτόματον
incidental to
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον
part
τύχη
incidental to
τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν with προαίρεσις
G1 All things that conform to Fate also conform to Providence.
G2 Not all things that conform to Providence conform to Fate.
… exercises …
over …
demiurge
primary providence
divine things
secondary gods
secondary providence
the coming to be of mortal things,
the preservation of species
daemons
tertiary providence
human affairs