1NC
1nc V gmu

All case
o
o
o
o
Corruption good
Cartels LT
Pharma LT
Das on case

Pot bad- turns econ

Hemp- turns dz?





OR
Treaties:
i-law
afghan
LA rels k2 heg
Industries
Pharma- dz- superbugs
Ag – food shortages.
OFF
Legalization requires specifying how drugs are made legally available
Mark Haden 2, Adjunct Professor of the UBC School of Population and Public Health, “Illicit IV Drugs: A Public Health
Approach,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH VOLUME 93, NO. 6,
http://journal.cpha.ca/index.php/cjph/article/download/390/390
The existing laws could be changed to remove legal sanctions. With
“decriminalization”, criminal prosecution is not an
option for dealing with drugs. This term is often confused with the term “legalization” which specifies
how drugs can be legally available . The term “decriminalization” is limited in its utility , as it only
states what will not be done and does not explain what legal options are available . Proponents of
“decriminalization” usually distinguish between personal use, and trafficking and smuggling. Those who profit from the black market would still be
subject to criminal charges but personal use would not be subject to legal sanctions. Decriminalization, or benign neglect, means ignoring the problem
and results in unregulated access to drugs of unknown purity and potency.
Vote neg:
Fairness—legalize can include hundreds of regulations which radically alter the
case neg we need- makes the aff a moving target and spikes out of our disads
Legal education—vote neg on presumption
Charles D. “Cully” Stimson 10 is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military
prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor. “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No” Legal
Memorandum #56 on Legal Issues September 13, 2010. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/legalizing-marijuanawhy-citizens-should-just-say-no ac 6-18
Theoretical arguments in favor of marijuana legalization usually overlook the practical matter of
how the drug would be regulated and sold . It is the details of implementation , of course, that will
determine the effect of legalization on families, schools, and communities. Most basically, how and where would
marijuana be sold?
OFF
Obama’s full court press secures TPA now – but PC is key to get moderate dems
on board
Alex Brown 3-8-15, Journalist, “White House Gives Moderate Democrats Extra Attention on Free Trade”, National Journal,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/white-house-gives-moderate-democrats-extra-attention-on-free-trade-20150308
Obama's request for trade-promotion authority still murky on Capitol Hill, the White House is
targeting a group of moderate House Democrats in hopes of finding support for the bill. Trade
promotion, also known as fast-track, has long been an object of skepticism among Democratic
representatives; only 29 of them backed President Bill Clinton's push for the measure in 1998. This time around, much
of the caucus has stayed in wait-and-see mode on the proposal, which would set parameters on trade deals
With the status of President
negotiated by the White House but restrict congressional input on their passage to an up-or-down vote. In recent days,
Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman have been
pressing lawmakers on the deal, and Froman was joined by Jeff Zients, Obama's top economic adviser, to make the
case at Tuesday's meeting of the House Democratic Caucus. The outreach also has focused on
the New Democrat Coalition, a 46-member group of moderate Democrats. Zients, Pritzker, Labor Secretary
Thomas Perez, and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew have all addressed the caucus on the proposal. " There's been pretty fullcourt press from the administration," said an aide to a moderate Democrat who has been active
in trade discussions. Republicans are seen as far more supportive of free trade, but some Democrats
say they are skeptical that the party opposing Obama's authority at every turn on immigration will
give him more authority on trade. So getting buy-in from moderate Democrats could be key. "We're
going to continue to play a very important role in how do we shape a strong bipartisan agenda for trade as we move forward in this
session," said Rep. Ron Kind, the New Democrats' chairman. "There's no question the administration's stepped
up too, from the president on down, personally engaging individual members of Congress about the
importance of this and the timing as well." Another aide, who works for a progressive Democrat who opposes TPA, said the
measure is likely to pass with or without Democratic support. But, he added, the administration would rather not ram the legislation
through on a party-line vote that relies on the GOP. "The White House sees that they need to make the case to Democrats," he
said. Still, many Democrats have deep reservations about TPA, and earning substantial support—even from moderates—could be
an uphill battle for the White House. Democratic Rep. Gerry Connolly of Virginia, one of Kind's vice-chairs, said trade votes carry
political risk and backing them will not insulate Democrats from being targeted by pro-business campaign groups. Meanwhile,
several progressive groups have threatened to primary Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden in Oregon for his role in helping lead the
Senate's TPA negotiations (the challenger they've called for, Rep. Peter DeFazio, says he won't run). And just a year and a half ago,
151 House Democrats signed a letter pledging not to back an "outdated" fast-track agreement. Despite all this, much of the
caucus has held its fire on Obama's forthcoming proposal, and party leaders say they want to give
Obama a chance. "We're hopeful that the administration will take steps that will allow a significant number of the caucus to get
to yes," House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer said last month. "We're working on those. Hopefully the administration will be able to get
many to a path to yes, but that's yet to be determined." A House Democratic leadership aide added that Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi is "hoping we can get to some place where we can get to 150 Democrats for a bill." Still, he
noted, "that's gonna take a lot of work."
Plan saps capital and trades-off with his agenda
Youngers 13 Coletta A. Youngers 3-5-13 Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a
Representative of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and an independent consultant. “U.S. Elections and the War on
Drugs”, NACLA, https://nacla.org/news/2013/3/5/us-elections-and-war-drugs
Now elected to a second term, Obama has the opportunity to join the presidents of countries like Guatemala, Colombia, and
Uruguay who are calling for reform. To do so would take firm political commitment and a willingness
to
stand up to accusations that would no doubt be hurled by his domestic political opponents of
being “pro-drugs.” Unfortunately, the president has given little indication that this is a battle he is
going to stake political capital on in his second term. The Obama administration did implement modest but important
changes to domestic drug policy, some of which might have been reversed had Mitt Romney won the election. The administration
followed through with two of his three promises described above: At the end of 2009, Obama signed a law ending the prohibition on
most federal funding for sterile needle-exchange programs, which have proved effecting in stopping the spread of HIV and other
infections among injecting drug users; unfortunately, the U.S. Congress later reinstated the ban. He also encouraged legislation to
reduce significantly the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine, which was passed in August 2010. In general,
the Obama administration has shown greater interest than its predecessors in reducing incarceration rates. Perhaps the most
noticeable advance, however, is the greater priority placed on reducing demand for illicit drugs, with modest increases in funding
toward that end. The Obama administration’s annual drug-control strategy now emphasizes community-based prevention programs
and integrating drug treatment into mainstream health care in order to expand access to such services. Of particular importance,
drug treatment will be covered by health insurance under “Obamacare.” A reversal on that front—as would likely have occurred if
Romney had won the election—would have been a major setback to efforts to ensure that problematic drug users had access to
effective treatment programs. In regard to U.S. drug policy in Latin America, the administration has proved more diplomatic than its
predecessors. Whereas in the past, the White House has been quick to criticize drug legislation or other actions not to its liking, the
Obama administration has for the most part remained silent. Apart from diplomacy, however, U.S. drug policy remains on autopilot.
When Obama took office, expectations ran high among drug-policy activists that at the least the new administration would
discontinue spraying dangerous herbicides over the Colombian rain forest. Not only has aerial spraying continued, but forced
eradication of coca and poppy, used to manufacture cocaine and heroin, remains at the center of U.S. drug policy, despite
overwhelming evidence that it fails to reduce cultivation, generates violence and social conflict, and pushes some of the world’s
poorest farmers deeper into poverty. Plan Colombia, touted by the U.S. government as a major success story, has wound down, but
in its wake came the Merida Initiative in Mexico, which—as with the Andean Initiative launched in 1989—was front-loaded with U.S.
military and police assistance. U.S. anti-drug aid to Central America’s security forces has steadily increased through the Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). A cornerstone of U.S. drug policy toward the isthmus is the DEA’s Foreign-Deployed
Advisory Support Team, or FAST. Initially operating in Afghanistan to disrupt the poppy trade, FAST teams are now deployed in
Honduras, along with U.S. Special Forces, whose Green Berets have been training Honduran Special Operations forces. The
dangers of further militarization in a region with a tragic history of internal conflict, violence, and extremely weak institutions was
made painfully clear on May 11, 2012, when Honduran forces accompanied by DEA agents on an anti-drug mission near the town
of Paptalaya opened helicopter gunfire on a boat that police initially claimed was carrying illicit drugs, killing four people—two
women (one of them pregnant), a 14-year-old boy, and a 21-year-old man. All had legitimate reasons for being on the river early that
morning. Investigations into the killing are moving at a snail’s pace. Three key factors help explain why continuity has
prevailed over change in U.S. drug-control policies, and each presents a possible impediment to a change in course during
Obama’s second term. First, for the most part drug “warriors” on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper
hand on drug-policy issues debated in the U.S. Congress. As the elections reaffirmed the status quo in
Washington, there is no reason to expect that to change. Second, the drug-war bureaucracy remains bloated,
firmly entrenched, and extremely resistant to change. Apart from a few notable exceptions at ONDCP, the
same officials continue to be the driving force behind U.S. drug policy, in some cases for
decades. And over the years, the drug-policy bureaucracy has obtained a great deal of autonomy from
the broader official policy-making community. Finally, because of these dynamics, high-level and
committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo. Yet the Obama
administration is engaged in major debates on a range of salient issues that continue into its second term. Based on his comments
president’s political capital will more likely be spent on [other] issues such
as climate change and immigration reform.
following his reelection, the
Solves global trade
*Global trade order collapsing – TPA key to avoid protectionism and war
Ezell 14 (Stephen, Senior Analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), with a focus on innovation
policy, international information technology competitiveness, trade, and manufacturing and services issues, 10-29,
http://www.innovationfiles.org/trade-promotion-authority-a-vital-component-of-u-s-trade-policy/,)
there is currently a fight for the soul of the global trading system . The
years since the Great Recession have seen a dramatic increase in countries’ use of innovation mercantilist
policies—such as forcing local production as a condition of market access, subsidizing exports, stealing intellectual property, or manipulating currencies and standards—
which seek to favor domestic enterprises at the expense of foreign competitors. Viewing with envy
China’s rapid economic growth, dozens of other countries—from Brazil and India to Malaysia and South Africa—have
enacted similar mercantilist policies, giving rise to an emerging “Beijing Consensus” (i.e., innovation mercantilism). In fact, as evidence of this,
the World Trade Organization reported that the number of technical barriers to trade reached an all-time high
in 2012. And as this emerging “Beijing Consensus” gains strength, it comes at the expense of the
long-dominant, but now exhausted, “Washington Consensus” which has believed in the unalloyed
benefits of free trade, even when it is one-sided, and that has fretted that robust enforcement of trade rules may ignite a
trade war . As such, we need a new consensus, one that holds that trade and globalization remain poised
to generate lasting global prosperity, but only if all countries share a commitment to playing by a strong set of rules that foster shared, sustainable
growth. And that’s what the United States is doing in seeking to negotiate TPP and T-TIP agreements as
model, 21st century compacts that set the bar and lay the foundation upon which a stronger set of
future global trade rules can be built. If America doesn’t successfully conclude and pass through Congress these next1. Regarding the first point, make no mistake:
generation trade agreements—and let’s be clear, it will be much more difficult, if not impossible , to accomplish this without TPA—America risks
losing out on the ability to set the agenda and standards for a more robust and liberalized global trade system going forward. 2. The logic of
TPA is sound, and TPA actually helps make U.S. trade agreements better, in several ways. First, TPA is an effective mechanism for Congress to delegate its Constitutional
authority to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” as stipulated by Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Through TPA, Congress outlines high-standard objectives and
priorities for U.S. negotiators to pursue in trade agreements, a process which helps build consensus on U.S. trade policy. Moreover, the TPA increases transparency in U.S.
trade policy, for it establishes consultation and notification requirements for the President and USTR to follow throughout the trade agreement negotiation process—ensuring
that Congress, interested stakeholders, and the general public are closely involved before, during, and after the conclusion of trade agreement negotiations. In addition, having
given USTR direction in its negotiation of U.S trade agreements, TPA expedites the process of Congressional debate on trade agreements, as each chamber suspends ordinary
legislative procedures and considers implementing legislation subject to time-limited debate with no (or limited) amendments. And given the importance of the two massively
transformational agreements currently being negotiated in the TPP and T-TIP, it’s essential that we have a streamlined, easily managed framework for reviewing, analyzing, and
ultimately approving these trade agreements quickly and efficiently. Yet perhaps even more importantly, Trade Promotion Authority recognizes that U.S. trade
partners would be reluctant to negotiate agreements that would be subject to unlimited Congressional debate and amendments. As U.S.
Trade Representative Mike Froman wrote in a Foreign Affairs article, The Strategic Logic of Trade, last week, “ By ensuring that Congress will consider trade
agreements as they have been negotiated by the executive branch, TPA gives U.S. trading partners the necessary confidence to
put their best and final offers on the table.” And as Inside U.S. Trade wrote in an article on Friday, October 24, the timing of Froman’s Foreign Affairs piece
calling for TPA is likely because he’s “received a clear signal from one or more TPP countries that they need to see TPA passed before they will
put their best offer on the table.” In short, TPA helps make the trade agreements the U.S. signs better by compelling our trade partners
to put their best offer on the table.
Extinction
Panzer 8 Michael J. Panzner, Faculty – New York Institute of Finance.
Specializes in Global Capital Markets. MA Columbia,
Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition [Paperback], p. 137-138
protectionist
legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it
triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious
economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster . But if history is any guide, those lessons
will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public
anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify .
Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth
Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers
may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to
other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless
policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American
infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied
by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global
payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer
spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through
arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists
and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly .
The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and
dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as
factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether
involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate
supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter
with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will
become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters ,
often with minimal provocation . In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient
pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences . Alternatively, nations may look
to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist
sentiment toward other countries and cultures . Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution,
terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of
random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and
interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will
likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the
Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some
observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense
confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost
wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood.
resentments could also degenerate quickly , spurring the basest of human instincts
and triggering genocidal acts . Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using
Long-simmering
jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between
Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.
OFF
The United States should
-prohibit marijuana in the United States in accordance with the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs pending treaty review
-propose an amendment to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs that allows
amendment parties to experiment with conditional marijuana legalization in
accordance with the ultimate aims of the treaty, to be made binding upon the U.S
in the event of amendment acceptance.
-initiate criminal prosecution against United States government officials
responsible for torture and modify existing US policies to the extent required for
treaty adherence
The United States Congress should put Trade Promotion Authority at the top of
the docket
The United States should substantially increase drone strikes with focus on
Afghanistan, and publically announce the policy.
amendment solves, reinvigorates I-Law and avoids the culture of rule-breaking
that the plan creates
Nathaniel Counts, J.D. Candidate, “Initiative 502 and Conflicting State and Federal Law,” GONZAGA LAW REVIEW v. 49,
2013, LN.
Second, the
U nited S tates could submit an amendment for the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances that
would allow for possible recreational use of marijuana within the territory of state parties , but still
require criminal enforcement against international trafficking . Each convention has a provision
for amendments, which would allow the U nited S tates to alter the treaty obligations of all parties
such that non-enforcement against Washington recreational marijuana, and similar actions by
other parties, is no longer a breach. 154 As other countries have begun to liberalize their drug
laws, there may be support for such an amendment . 155 This must be paired with vigorous enforcement against
international traffickers though, so the policy does not negatively affect supply or transit countries. Initiative 502 gives the federal
government the opportunity to reevaluate the policies of the CSA and either renew efforts against recreational marijuana or allow
state governments to control domestic regulation of marijuana .
It is important , however, that in selecting an
approach, the impact of the inconsistency between state and federal law be minimized to avoid a
culture of rule-breaking, and that the United States work to bring itself into compliance with
international law, either through enforcement or by amending existing treaties .
Targeted killings are key to Afghan stability post-withdrawal
Byman 13 (Daniel, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, “Why
Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4)
In places where terrorists are actively plotting against the United States, however, drones give
Washington the ability to limit its military commitments abroad while keeping Americans safe.
Afghanistan, for example, could again become a Taliban-run haven for terrorists after U.S. forces
depart next year. Drones can greatly reduce the risk of this happening . Hovering in the skies
above, they can keep Taliban leaders on the run and hinder al Qaeda's ability to plot another 9/11.
Case—I-Law
I-Law Offense
US complies now, but full legalization collapses the global treaty regime
Wells C. Bennett, fellow, Brookings Institution and John Walsh, Washington Office on Latin America, “Marijuana Legalization Is
an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,” Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, 10—14, p. 17-20.
Wherever the limits of the United States’ enforcement discretion
under the drug treaties might be drawn precisely, we know that such
be an across-the-board, categorical affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of regulated,
comprehensive marijuana markets established by state law. And that’s just it: if more states take a legalize-and-regulate approach, a
federal-level decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons could start to look like blanket non-enforcement of
discretion by definition cannot
implementing legislation—something that, in our view, the drug treaties do not contemplate. The prospect of future marijuana regulation raises a
second, more fundamental reason to rethink things: the nation’s experiment with legalizing and regulating marijuana might actually go well. Suppose
Colorado and Washington both operate their regulated marijuana markets smartly, without offending federal enforcement prerogatives, and—most
importantly— without compromising public health and safety. We don’t think this is a fanciful or improbable scenario. Our Brookings colleague John
Hudak was the first to examine Colorado’s implementation effort up close. And he tentatively concluded that so far, the state’s initial rollout has been
imperfect but quite effective.39 If this path continues or even bends towards improvement, then other states may soon elect to follow Washington and
Colorado’s lead. And that, in turn, stands to exacerbate an already visible tension between obligations imposed by the drug treaties, and the federal
government’s enforcement posture towards legalizing states. To put the point another way, if
Colorado and Washington augur a
real trend, then the costs to the United States of treaty breach could be swiftly ratchet ed up wards. The INCB could
raise the volume and severity of its criticisms; we wouldn’t be surprised to hear protests from more prohibitionist countries about
the United States’ treaty compliance, or to see other nations start push ing the limits of other no less important
treaties to which the United States is party. When some or all of this happens, the United States won’t get very far in
emphasizing the CSA’s theoretical application nationwide, subject to enforcement priorities enunciated in the Cole Memo; or in appealing to larger
objectives woven throughout the drug treaties, and their conferral of policy flexibility. What if twenty or thirty states successfully establish, and police,
regulated markets for marijuana production and sale? Having that scenario in mind, we lastly emphasize the United States’ unique relationship both to
The U nited S tates was a—if not the— key protagonist in developing
the 1961, 1971, and 1988 Conventions, as well as the 1972 protocol amending the 1961 Convention; the U nited S tates has for decades
been widely and correctly viewed as the treaties’ chief champion and defender .40 That fact feeds back onto this one: The
U nited S tates also occupies a singular place in international relations. It can summon powers no other nation
can summon, but it also confronts risks no other nation confronts.41 For that oft-cited reason, the United States has a profound
interest in ensuring that counterparties perform their treaty obligations. Reciprocity is always a big deal
for any nation that trades promises with other ones—but it is perhaps uniquely so for ours . These
the drug treaties and to the wider international community.
factors mean that caution is in order regarding international law and the viability of the Cole Memo in the longer run. If the United States can “flexibly
interpret” the drug treaties with regard to marijuana, then Mexico is entitled to no less—though it might view the limits of its flexibility differently, or apply
it to another controlled substance within the treaties’ purview. Or imagine that a foreign nation’s controversial policy butts up against seemingly contrary
language, in a treaty covering an extremely important global issue other than drug control. Likely the United States will have a tougher time objecting
when, rather than conceding the problem or changing course, that nation’s foreign ministry invokes the need to “tolera[te] different national
approaches;” or recasts the relevant treaty as a “living document” subject to periodic, unilateral reinterpretation. This is not to suggest that compliance
challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to reshape the United States’ treaty commitments. Practice and prudence both support a more
nuanced, case-specific approach than that. Sometimes the United States has sought to make significant adjustments to multilateral frameworks or
even quit them; other times, the United States has weighed costs and benefits, and pressed on within the treaty despite consequential breaches—in
situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that regarding marijuana. But in those instances, the United States’
compliance failures often have come despite some hard striving by the federal government. The State Department, to name one well known example,
tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—
notwithstanding some repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and Arizona.42 In this case, though, no external
factors—federalism, say, or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court—have frustrated a strong push by the executive branch to vindicate the
drug treaties; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama administration. Given the circumstances, we
believe it was the correct decision. The Cole Memo nevertheless establishes at least some friction with a treaty obligation, by holding
back on CSA enforcement, so as to accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the reasons why are entirely understandable: given the
incipient nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo was reacting, the
U nited S tates essentially opted to take a wait-and-see
approach as to how problematic the treaty questions might become. So far as we are aware, this strategy is without precedent in U.S.
treaty practice. The U nited S tates should approach it carefully and deliberatively, given the country’s outsized interest in
reciprocal performance of treaty obligations. That depends in part on being able to credibly call out other nations for treaty
failings—something which in turn depends on strictly performing our own obligations , or at least making a good show of trying hard
to do so before coming up short. Again, we think the U nited S tates can sustain the status quo in the short term .
But today’s model likely won’t hold up year in and year out, for the reasons we describe above. The government therefore ought to
start thinking about some of the fundamental treaty reforms that its public statements seemingly have downplayed. Better to have
weighed such options early on, should existing policy’s downsides start to overtake its upsides—as we predict they could.
Diplomatic costs of the Brownfield doctrine have been small and manageable
Wells C. Bennett, fellow, Brookings Institution and John Walsh, Washington Office on Latin America, “Marijuana Legalization Is
an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties,” Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, 10—14, p. 11-13.
III. Viable in the Short Run…
Is the United States’ current policy workable? In the short run, we think it probably is . Consider
Brownfield’s claim that the United States is acting lawfully. He did not set out its legal basis in detail, but
nevertheless dropped hints with comments regarding flexibility and scarce criminal justice resources. Some of the treaties’
features are consistent with his views. The 1961 and 1971 Conventions do not specifically address the issue of
enforcement discretion, and thus don’t obviously seem to cabin its ordinary exercise by governments; for its part, the 1988
Convention explicitly recognized states’ discretion with respect to Convention-required offenses.24 And, as Brownfield’s
“four pillar” approach suggested, the drug control system is indeed concerned with international
trafficking networks, as illustrated by the 1988 Convention. The latter’s purpose—announced by its second article, and
important for the treaty’s interpretation—is to enable interstate cooperation so as to “address more effectively the various aspects of
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having an international dimension.”25 The United States’ approach
is rather broad-brush, to be sure. But it has a discernable basis in international law . We also might evaluate it in light
of the roads not taken, which in the rearview mirror look vastly worse than the one the United States ultimately did take. One much
discussed but wisely passed over option: in early 2013, there was a call in some quarters for the Obama administration to pursue
legal action founded on so-called federal “preemption” doctrines26— asking a court to declare that the CSA effectively wiped out
Initiative 502 and Amendment 64—or through federal enforcement, whereby federal prosecutors would make an example of some
unlucky Coloradan or Washingtonian who bought or sold marijuana in compliance with state law but in violation of federal law.27
The “find some fall guy” strategy had an arbitrary feel.28 Neither the criminal nor the civil approach was a surefire winner legally,
owing mostly to the CSA’s rather abstruse language regarding preemption.29 Both would have replaced one legal problem—a clash
between Washington and Colorado law and more rigid federal and international law—with something worse. Whether won with
prosecution or a civil lawsuit, victory on preemption grounds would gut Washington and Colorado regulation of marijuana but would
not restore their earlier prohibitions against marijuana. And that in turn would mean relegating essentially all civil and criminal
marijuana enforcement in those jurisdictions to federal authorities—something the latter certainly did not want, and could not
accomplish for practical as well as political reasons. The preemption strategy thus meant leaping out of the frying pan and into the
fire, and ultimately achieving little, in treaty compliance terms.30 Pragmatism likewise counseled against an immediate push to
revise the treaties, given the incipient nature of changes, and also given the time and effort needed to build a case for reform that
could achieve political traction in the Senate. That chamber, to put it charitably, can be a difficult environment for treaties. The
diplomatic costs of the United States’ position also have not been intolerably high. The INCB has
disagreed with the United States’ legal arguments, but its critiques have not been unusually
aggressive; the Board has not, for example, paired its objections with a threat to exercise its rather gentle, purely
recommendatory and rarely invoked sanctions power, regarding the import and export of drugs.31 And while the Board’s
former president, Yans, has spoken more harshly of U.S. policy than the Board has as a whole, he
has also reserved his most high-pitched condemnations for the government of Uruguay, which in December
2013 became the first country to approve legislation that legalizes and regulates marijuana at the national level.32 At the same time,
most other parties to the drug control treaties have kept mum about Washington and Colorado, at
least publicly. The quiet hardly serves to affirm the United States’ position, of course, but it certainly
doesn’t register dissent, either: when their international relations require it, aggrieved states certainly know how to make
loud noises about other states’ flouting of international norms.33
Zero chance of treaty collapse, even with anger over prohibition
David R. Bewley-Taylor, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and Humanities,
Swansea University, “Towards Revision of the UN Drug Control Conventions: The Logic and Dilemmas of Like-Minded Groups,”
SERIES ON LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF DRUG POLICIES n. 19, Transnational Institute, 3—12..
parties wishing to deviate further from the regime’s prohibitive norm
than its current flexibility will permit are unlikely to consider withdrawal by simply disregarding all,
or even specific parts of, the instruments. This has a great deal to do with the ongoing utility to be
found within the regime ; for instance, for many states the regime allows the effective regulation of the
licit trade in pharmaceuticals. In addition, there would be high potential costs incurred , in terms of
both reputational and more substantive geopolitical consequences , in any radical departure from
treaty obligations, an important point to which we will return. Accordingly, most Parties, as members of an
international community of UN states with respect for international law , are likely to seek an
alteration of their commitments to the regime by working according to the options contained
within the conventions and international legal practices more widely.
As in many other issue areas, States
I-Law 1NC
Ilaw fails --- states will either inevitably cooperate, or ilaw can’t convince them to
Eric A. Posner 9, Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. The Perils of Global Legalism,
34-6
global legalists acknowledge that international law is created and enforced by states. They believe that states are willing to
expand international law along legalistic lines because states’ long-term interests lie in solving global
collective action problems. In the absence of a world govern- ment or other forms of integration, international law seems like the only way for states to
solve these problems. The great difficulty for the global legalist is explaining why, if states create and maintain i nternational
law, they will also not break it when they prefer to free ride. In the absence of an enforcement
mechanism, what ensures that states that create law and legal institutions that are supposed to solve global collective action prob- lems will
not ignore them? ¶ For the rational choice theorist, the answer is plain: states cannot solve global collective action
problems by creating institutions that themselves depend on global collective action. This is not
to say that international law is not possible at all. Certainly, states can cooperate by threatening to retaliate against cheaters, and where
international problems are matters of coordination rather than confl ict, international law can go far, indeed.7 But if states (or the individuals who control states)
cannot create a global government or q uasi-g overnment institutions, then it seems unlikely that they can solve, in
spontaneous fashion, the types of problems that, at the national level, require the action of governments . ¶
34 ¶ Most
Global legalists are not enthusiasts for rational choice theory and have ¶ 35¶ grappled with this problem in other ways.8 I will criticize their attempts in chapter 3. Here I want to
one approach, which is to insist that just as individuals can be loyal to government, so too can
governments) be loyal to international law and be willing to defer to its requirements even when self-i nterest does not
strictly demand that they do so. I nternational law has force because (or to the extent that) it is legitimate .9 ¶ What
makes governance or law legitimate? This is a complicated ques- tion best left to philosophers, but a simple and adequate point for present purposes is that no system
of law will be perceived as legitimate unless those governed by that law believe that the law does
good — serves their interests or respects and enforces their values. Perhaps more is required than this — such as political participation, for example — but
we can treat the fi rst condition as necessary if not suffi cient. If individuals believe that a system of law does not advance
their interests and respect their values, that instead it advances the interests of others or is dysfunctional and helps no
one at all, they will not believe that the law is legitimate and will not voluntarily submit to its authority .
¶ Unfortunately, international law does not satisfy this condition , mainly because of its institutional
weaknesses ; but of course, its institutional weaknesses stem from the state system — states are not
willing to tolerate powerful international agencies. In classic international law, states enjoy
sovereign equality, which means that international law cannot be created unless all agree, and that
international law binds all states equally. What this means is that if nearly everyone in the world agrees that some global legal instrument would be benefi cial ( a climate
treaty, the UN charter), it can be blocked by a tiny country like Iceland (population 300,000) or a dictatorship like North Korea.
What is the attraction of a system that puts a tiny country like Iceland on equal footing with
China? When then at- torney general Robert Jackson tried to justify American aid for Britain at the onset of World War II on the grounds that the Nazi Germany was the
focus on
individuals (and their
aggressor, international lawyers complained that the United States could not claim neutrality while providing aid to a belligerent — there was no such thing as an aggressor in
international law.10 Nazi Germany had not agreed to such a rule of international law; therefore, such a rule could not exist. Only through the destruction of Nazi Germany could
international law be changed; East and West Germany could reenter international so-¶ 36¶ ciety only on other people’s terms. How could such a system be perceived to be
Because no world government can compel states
to comply with inter- national law, states will comply with international law only when doing so is
in their interest. In this way, international law always depends on state consent. So international law must take states as they are, which means that little states, big
legitimate? ¶ There is, of course, a reason why international law works in this fash- ion.
states, good states, and bad states, all exist on a plane of equality. ¶
No global modeling- strong counternarcotics locked in
Russell Crandall 14, professor of American foreign policy and diplomatic history at Davidson College,
10/3/14, The Drug War Divide, www.the-american-interest.com/2014/10/03/the-drug-war-divide/
The idea that somehow the now readily given official acknowledgement of the vital rule of public institutions somehow justifies the longstanding drug
war—and its often militarized components and expense (roughly $6 billion annually)—is facile and counterproductive. The problem, rather, is that
there are few appealing alternatives to the drug war as usual—and the dearth of ideas in the OAS
scenarios report seems to suggest as much. After , say, pot legalization, there is no clear path on
the international drug war front that would make it a kinder, ge
ntler variant of the interdiction and punitive-based approach currently practiced.¶ One hallmark of the almost
half century-long U.S.-led drug war is that the strategy has no rearview mirror. There is no mechanism in the policy process to indicate at any moment
that past policies have not met expressed goals. Each new policy—whether spraying coca fields in Colombia or reducing prescription drug abuse—has
its own motivation and logic. Yet when confronted with a new set of challenges, we spend no effort to determine why previous policies did not succeed.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Obama Administration put out a “Goals to be Attained by 2015” document that included decreasing the prevalence of
drug use among teenagers by 15 percent and reducing the number of chronic abusers by 15 percent. Lamentably, if we had met these sorts of goals
over the past few decades, we would not still have a major drug problem in the United States. Latin America is not the only place, it seems, where a
lively political theater exists. Drug abuse has remained stubbornly persistent over the life of the drug war, even if particular drugs, like heroin, rise and
fall in cycles of popularity within it.¶ It is simply not enough for the Obama Administration to tell the American public that it has “reason to be optimistic”
about future drug abuse containment efforts, but then never reconcile this expectation to what the data actually tell us. Rosy predictions also undercut
any effort to assess whether the amounts we spend on the effort are worth it. If cocaine use decreases but marijuana use grows over a given period, is
that progress? Does that justify the budget expense? We don’t know, because we don’t even ask those kinds of questions. So we don’t know if the
money could have been better used on one of the innovative programs that the Administration is so enthusiastically promoting, like drug courts or fair
sentencing. Nor does the strategy address the obvious question of whether the drop in U.S. cocaine consumption simply reflects a shift to another
substance.¶ Since the strategy mutes any connection to what happens in Latin America, the attentive public also cannot readily know that, while
domestic cocaine consumption has dropped by half, there has been a concomitant spike in consumption in Brazil and Colombia. Another less
publicized development that might dampen our optimism is that Evo Morales’s Bolivia no longer cooperates with Washington on the drug front. That
almost no Bolivian cocaine makes its to the United States (American consumption is almost exclusively from Colombian product) likely explains why
Washington did not make more of the reality that the U.S.-led drug war is no longer operating in that heretofore vital South American “source”
country—not because of any success it scored, but only because commercial patterns changed.¶ Innovative
programs or Swedenstyle rhetoric aside, there is and will continue to be an inertial and almost impregnable militarynarcotics-industrial complex , especially on the international side of the drug war—though it will
always get less attention than the domestic side of drug policy, especially when punctuated from
time to time by Mountain Sweep-style media spectaculars. The Obama Administration has shown that we can embrace,
at least tentatively, a more holistic approach to our domestic issues. The question, though, is whether we have the courage to apply a new approach
within the broader war on drugs, and tell the American people that the old way of doing things in Latin America just doesn’t work. Only courage can
enable change. So far there is no sign of it.
Afghanistan 1NC
Afghanistan won’t escalate- everyone cooperates
Lamb et al 2014Robert D., Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation at the CSIS,
‘South Asia Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns,
http://csis.org/files/publication/140116_Lamb_SouthAsiaRegionalDynamics_WEB.pdf
Afghanistan's neighbors would suffer the consequences of a major escalation of Af- ghanistan's
internal conflict. All neighboring countries are concerned about refugee flows. All are concerned about
incursions by combatants across their borders to stage attacks, recruit fighters, or form alliances with local extremist groups. All are
concerned about the safety of their nationals working in Afghanistan (diplomats, development officials, train- ers, advisers, and so
on). And all are concerned about the security of any economic projects that they are sponsoring or would benefit from. Some are
concerned about the safety of Afghans who share their ethnic identify. And Pakistan and India are concerned about having influence
with the central government in Kabul and, in Pakistan's case, with the governors and power brokers in the provinces along its
border. In
the event of conflict escalation in Afghanistan, China would be in direct contact with the
Afghan government, the power brokers it has a relationship with, and with Pakistani civilian and
(especially) military leaders to strongly encourage a political settlement . It would put its economic projects on
hold temporarily. But it would not become involved militarily; instead, it would try to contain the fallout with, for
example, stronger border security . Iran would certainly take similar measures to contain spillover
from an escalated Afghan conflict, but otherwise its involvement would depend almost entirely on the state of its conflicts and
rivalries in the Levant and the Gulf, much higher-priority areas than Afghanistan. If things settle down to its west and south, Iran
might turn some attention eastward to Afghanistan's conflict. This
would not be in the form of direct military
incur- sions but rather of funding , military equipment, and possibly safe haven to Hazara, Tajik,
and Uzbek groups, as it has in the past, with a particular priority on protecting Afghani- stan's
Shi'ite minority. Saudi Arabia, working with Pakistan, would probably offer support to groups that
oppose Iranian-support groups. Qatar might follow Saudi Arabia's lead or it might offer to mediate talks
between opposing groups, as it has recently. Beyond that, Qatar and UAE would probably stay out. Russia
would probably increase its security presence in Central Asia, as noted above, but work
diplomatically with the U nited S tates, European powers, or NATO to find ways to contain the
spread of violence from Afghanistan into Central Asia.
LA Rels Stuff
Relations key to cellulosic ethanol- it fails otherwise
George Philippidis 8 is associate director of the Applied Research Center and co-director of the Energy Business Forum at
Florida International University. “Energy Security Achievable with Biofuels Made in the America” Ethanol Producer Magazine,
http://www.ethanolproducer.com/articles/4466/energy-security-achievable-with-biofuels-made-in-the-americas/
Undoubtedly, the
United States needs Latin America for energy security through diversification.
Conversely, Latin America needs the United States for capital and technology infusion to build or
expand their cane ethanol (and, in the future, cellulosic ethanol) capabilities to satisfy their own energy needs and enter
the U.S. market, the largest fuel market in the world (145 billion gallons per year of gasoline). ¶ This
interdependence calls for closer collaboration within the Americas in the energy sector and by
extension in agriculture, project financing, trade, immigration and poverty reduction. ¶ Biofuels Challenges in Latin America ¶ While
conditions are favorable for biofuels production, Latin America faces a number of challenges that make foreign
investors hesitant. Those issues need to be addressed on a hemispheric basis under the joint
leadership of the two biofuels giants, the U nited S tates and Brazil. The challenges include political,
economic, trade and social issues. Political instability and poor regulatory and legal frameworks
need to be addressed. Latin American countries need to commit to protecting foreign investment,
intellectual property and the sanctity of contractual agreements. ¶ For Latin America to realize its
full biofuel production potential, significant investment will be needed. Joint ventures between
U.S. and Latin American investors, helped with debt financing from regional development banks,
is the best means to fund local biofuel projects.
Cellulosic ethanol causes extinction
Tad W. Patzek Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The University of California, Berkeley June 3, 2008
“Chapter 2: Can the Earth Deliver the Biomass-for-Fuel we Demand?” in Biofuels, Solar, and Wind as Renewable Energy Systems,
http://gaia.pge.utexas.edu/papers/Chapter%2022.pdf **Suicide metaphor edited out
Physics, chemistry and biology say clearly that there can be no sustained net mass output from any ecosystem for more than a few
years. A young forest in a temperate climate grows fast in a clear-cut area, see Fig. 2.16, and transfers nutrients from soil to the
young trees. The young trees grow very fast (there is a positive NPP). but the amount of mass accumulated in the forest is small.
When a tree burns or dies some or most of its nutrients go back to the soil. When this tree is logged and hauled away, almost no
nutrients are returned. After logging young trees a couple of times the forest soil becomes depleted, while the populations of insects
and pathogens are well-established, and the forest productivity rapidly declines (Patzek and Pimemel. 2006). When the forest is
allowed to grow long enough, its net ecosystem productivity becomes zero on the average. ¶ Therefore, in order to export
biomass (mostly water, but also carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and a plethora of nutrients) an ecosystem must import
equivalent quantities of the chemical elements it lost, or decline irreversibly . Carbon comes from the atmospheric
CO2 and water flows in as rain, rivers and irrigation from mined aquifers and lakes. The other nutrients, however, must
be rapidly produced from ancient plant matter transformed into methane, coal, petroleum,
phosphates.17 etc., as well as from earth minerals (muriate of potash, dolomites, etc.), - all irreversibly mined by humans.
Therefore, to the extent that humans are no longer integrated with the ecosystems in which they live, they are doomed to
extinction by exhausting all planetary stocks of minerals, soil and clean water . The question is not if, but
how fast.¶ It seems that with the exponentially accelerating mining of global ecosystems for biomass, the time scale of our
extinction is shrinking with each crop harvest. Compare this statement with the feverish proclamations
of sustainable biomass and agrofuel production that flood us from the confused media outlets ,
peer-reviewed journals, and politicians.¶ 2.5.3 Is There any Other Proof of NEP = 0?¶ I just gave you an abstract proof of no trash
production in Earth's Kingdom, except for its dirty human slums.¶ Are there any other, more direct proofs, perhaps based on
measurements? It turns out that there are two approaches that complement each other and lead to the same conclusions. The first
approach is based on a top-down view of the Earth from a satellite and a mapping of the reflected infrared spectra into biomass
growth. I will summarize this proof here. The second approach involves a direct counting of all crops, grass, and trees, and
translating the weighed or otherwise measured biomass into net primary productivity of ecosystems. Both approaches yield very
similar results.¶ 2.5.4 Satellite Sensor-Based Estimates¶ Global ecosystem productivity can be estimated by combining remote
sensing with a carbon cycle analysis. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observing System
(EOS) currently "produces a regular global estimate of gross primary productivity (GPP) and annual net primary productivity (NPP)
of the entire terrestrial earth surface at 1-km spatial resolution, 150 million cells, each having GPP and NPP computed individually"
(Running et al.. 2000). The MOD17A2/A3 User's Guide (Heinsch et al.. 2003) provides a description of the Gross and Net Primary
Productivity estimation algorithms (MOD17A2/A3) designed for the MODIS1* sensor. ¶ The sample calculation results based on the
MODI7A2/A3 algorithm are listed in Table 2.2. The NPPs for Asia Pacific. South America, and Europe, relative to North America,
are shown in Fig. 2.17. The phenomenal net ecosystem productivity of Asia Pacific is 4.2 larger than that of North America. The
South American ecosystems deliver 2.7 times more than their North American counterparts, and Europe just 0.85. It is no surprise
then that the World Bank19, as well as agribusiness and logging companies - Archer Daniel Midlands (ADM). Bunge. Cargill.
Monsanto. CFBC. Safbois. Sodefor. ITB. Trans-M. and many others - all have moved in force to plunder the most productive tropical
regions of the world, see Fig. 2.18.¶ According 10 a MODIS-based calculation (Roberts and Wooster, 2007) of biomass burned in
Africa in February and August 2004. prior to the fires shown here, the resulting carbon dioxide emissions were 120 and 160 million
tonnes per month, respectively.¶ The final result of this global "end-game" of ecological destruction will be an unmitigated and
lightcning-fast collapse of ecosystems protecting a large portion of" humanity.20¶ 2.5.5 NPP in the US¶ The overall median values of
net primary productivity may be converted to the higher heating value (HHV) of NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.19. In 2003. thus
estimated net annual biomass production in the US was 5.3 Gt and its HHV was 90 EJ. One must be careful, however, because the
underlying distributions of ecosystem productivity are different for each ecosystem and highly asymmetric. Therefore, lumping them
together and using just one median value can lead to a substantial systematic error. For example, the lumped value of US NPP of
90 EJ. underestimates the overall 2003 estimate21 of 0.408 x 7444068 x 106 x 17 x 106 x 2.2 x 10"18 = 113EJ by some 20%. ¶ To
limit this error, one can perform a more detailed calculation based on the 16 classes of land cover listed in Table 2.2 in (Hum et al..
2001). The MODIS-derived median NPPs are reported for most of these classes. The calculation inputs are shown in Table 2.3.
Since the spatial set of land-cover classes cannot be easily mapped onto the administrative set of USDA classes of cropland,
woodland, pastureland/rangeland. and forests. Hunt et al. (2001) provide an approximate linear mapping between these two sets, in
the form of a 16x4 matrix of coefficients between 0 and 1.1 have lumped the land-cover classes somewhat differently (to be closer
to USDA's classes), and the results are shown in Table 2.4 and Fig. 2.20. ¶ The Cropland 4- Mosaic class here comprises die
USDA's cropland, woodland, and some of the pasture classes. The Remote Vegetation class comprises some of the USDA's
rangeland and pastureland classes. The USDA forest class is somewhat larger than here, as some of the smaller patches of forest,
such as parks, etc.. are in the Mosaic class. Thus calculated 2003 US NPP is 118 EJ yr"1, 74 EJ yr"1 of above-ground (AG) plant
construction and 44 EJ yr in root construction. In addition 12/74 = 17% of AG vegetation is in remote areas, not counting the remote
forested areas. Note that my use of land-cover classes and their typical root-to-shoot ratios yields an overall result (118 EJ yr~')
which is very similar to that derived by the Numerical Terradynamic Simulation Group {113 EJ yr-1).¶ Therefore, the DOE/USDA
proposal to produce 130 billion gallons of ethanol from 1400 million tonnes of biomass (Perlack et a!., 2005) each year - and yearafter-year-, would consume 32% of the remaining above-ground NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.20. if one assumes a 52% energyefficiency of the conversion.~ At the current 26% overall efficiency of the corn-ethanol cycle (Patzek, 2006a), roughly 64% of all AG
NPP in the US would have to be consumed to achieve this goal with zero harvest losses.23 To use more than half of all accessible
above-ground plant growth in all forests, rangeland. pastureland and agriculture in the US to produce agrofuels would be a
Conclusions ¶ I have shown that the Earth
cannot produce the vast quantities of biomass we want to use to prolong our unsustainable
lifestyles, while slowly [destroying our] committing suicide as a global human civilization.¶ In passing- I
have noted that the "cellulosic biomass" refineries are very inefficient, currently impossible to scale, and
incapable of ever catching up with the runaway need to feed one billion gasoline- and dieselpowered cars and trucks.
continental-scale ecologic and economic disaster of biblical proportions.24¶ 2.6
simply
Heg 1NC
Data disproves heg impacts
Peace is not because of the U.S. – only logical explanation is states want peace – the fact there is peace without hegemony
proves other factors outweigh – empirics only prove our claim
Theoretically if other people wanted war – us couldn’t stop them, thus people just don’t want war
There is peace where the u.s. isn’t which means there is obvi something else at play
Even when hegemony decreased, war still decreased which means that they’re not related
Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous
times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome
Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong
enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able
to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of
stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana
where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the
interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the
globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would
ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world
would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending
that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps
internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that
U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic
stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is
strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the
community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs states have decided that their interest are
served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down
through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could
maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability
would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could
not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be
patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be
simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to
expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always
proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide
has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those
decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological,
of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the
slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S.
involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony
is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection
between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United
States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100
billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic
stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military
capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas
responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a
strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in
global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world
grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its
security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would
suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove
mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S.
military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a
pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict
declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration
ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion
that the two are unrelated . It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.
Heg is resilient
Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations
theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. “ Theory of Unipolar
Politics” (Cambridge University Press) April 2014 Chapter 3, p. 80-112
Primacists, in contrast, predict no change in the basic structure of international politics for the
foreseeable future. They argue that, for a variety of reasons, balancing against the United States is unlikely ,
making room for the continuation of U.S. power preponderance at least for as far as our analytic lenses can
see.18 Brooks and Wohlforth, perhaps the most prominent IR theorists upholding the primacist view, argue that the power
differential between the United States and all other states is so wide that there is no possibility of balancing
against U.S. power any time soon: "the unprecedented concentration of power resources in the
United States generally renders inoperative the constraining effects of the systemic properties
long central to research in i nternational r elations."19 More strictly, primacists do not find any causal
chain that might lead balancing to occur. So although they stop short of arguing that unipolarity will be the perpetual
state of world affairs, there is not much in their arguments that would prompt a different conclusion.
According to the primacist view, the
durability of a unipolar world is supported by a panoply of mutually
reinforcing factors. First of all, there is the overwhelming advantage the United States enjoys in
relative power , which as noted earlier creates virtually insurmountable obstacles to other states that
try to balance against it." In addition, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has played an
important role as a global security provider - a role from which other countries benefit and that they therefore do not
want to undermine.11 Finally, the United States is seen as the ultimate guarantor of a liberal international
order, which is based on widely shared values. Other liberal states, which make up the majority of today's
international system, do not want to risk the stability of that liberal order by undermining the United
States' role as its linchpin." In sum, primacists argue that, given the United States' great advantage
in relative power and the benevolent, liberal fashion in which it plays the role of unipole, other
states have no incentive to undermine U.S. unipolarity, which is therefore primed to last .
Case--industry
Pharma 1NC (:25
Pharma resilient
Fitch Ratings 12-11 [Fitch Ratings' Report at Reuters 12-11-2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/11/fitch-ma-drivesnegative-global-pharma-r-idUSFit86078120141211]
Outlook: Global Pharmaceuticals (Strategic Industry
2015 will be a transitional year for
global pharma companies as they continue to evolve their business models and position themselves for structural
changes in the industry. Accordingly, we have revised the rating outlook to negative as we expected rating headroom for Fitch-rated pharmaceutical companies to
remain under pressure in 2015. This is reflected in the Negative Outlook on 28% of the Fitch-rated global pharma universe (Amgen, BMS, Merck,
(The following statement was released by the rating agency) Link to Fitch Ratings' Report: 2015
Evolution to Continue; M&A Reduces Rating Headroom) here LONDON, December 11 (Fitch) Fitch Ratings believes
Bayer). There was one downgrade in the sector during 2014 (AstraZeneca). Financial flexibility has been eroded during 2014 on the back of a sharp rise in debt-funded M&A
activity as companies focus on boosting scale in therapeutic areas and consumer healthcare. They are also improving R&D productivity to manage increasing costs and risks of
Fitch's sector outlook remains stable, reflecting that underlying long-term growth
drivers remain intact , characterised by an ageing and growing world population leading towards an increase of chronic
and lifestyle diseases, ongoing emerging-market investments in healthcare, and treatment and technology advances. However,
we also factor in the intensifying efforts of healthcare authorities to reduce costs, improve outcomes and focus on patient value. As a result, we expect stable
operating performance in 2015. Continued M&A, pressure towards increasing shareholder returns (particularly for US players), as well as the growing
bringing new drugs to market.
exposure to potentially rising interest rates as a result of increased debt levels across the sector are key rating risks. In addition, the industry's focus on scale in selected
therapeutic areas over diversification, the execution and integration of recent corporate activity, as well as risks and costs bringing the competitive late state R&D pipeline to
market may lead to pressures on the business risk profile of individual players. In aggregate, we expect global pharma sector to continue to display a strong investment grade
supported by favourable underlying demographics, emerging market growth, and
anticipated innovation in specialist treatment areas, with rating underpinned by strong and above average profitability and cash
credit profile,
generation. Fitch believes that stretched rating profiles could be repaired assuming a careful focus on capital allocation in the sector. The full report, '2015 Outlook: Global
Pharmaceuticals' is available at www.fitchratings.com or by clicking the link above.
No innovation crisis
not backed by data, it’s a profit motivated deception
Light and Lexchin, 12 Donald W Light professor, Joel R Lexchin professor 1Department of Psychiatry, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2250 Chapel Avenue, Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, USA; 2York University, School of Health Policy
and Management, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 8/11, http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf
Pharmaceutical research and development: what do we get for all that money? Data indicate that the widely touted
“innovation crisis” in pharmaceuticals is a myth. The real innovation crisis, say Donald Light and Joel
Lexchin, stems from current incentives that reward companies for developing large numbers of new
drugs with few clinical advantages over existing ones. Since the early 2000s, industry leaders, observers, and
policy makers have been declaring that there is an innovation crisis in pharmaceutical research. A 2002 front page investigation by
the Wall Street Journal reported, “In laboratories around the world, scientists on the hunt for new drugs are coming up dry . . . The
$400 billion a year drug industry is suddenly in serious trouble.”1 Four years later, a US Government Accounting Office assessment
of new drug development reported that “over the past several years it has become widely recognized throughout the industry that
the productivity of its research and development expenditures has been declining.”2 In 2010, Morgan Stanley reported that top
executives felt they could not “beat the innovation crisis” and proposed that the best way to deal with “a decade of dismal R&D
returns” was for the major companies to stop trying to discover new drugs and buy into discoveries by others.3 Such reports
continue and raise the spectre that the pipeline for new drugs will soon run dry and we will be left to the mercies of whatever ills
befall us.4 The “innovation crisis” myth The constant production of reports and articles about the so
called innovation crisis rests on the decline in new molecular entities (defined as “an active ingredient that
has never been marketed . . . in any form”5 ) since a spike in 1996 that resulted from the clearance of a
backlog of applications after large user fees from companies were introduced (fig 1⇓). This decline ended in
20 06, when approvals of new molecular entities returned to their long term mean of between 15 and
25 a year (fig 2⇓).6 Even in 2005, an analysis of the data by a team at Pfizer concluded that the innovation
crisis was a myth “which bears no relationship to the true innovation rates of the pharmaceutical
industry .”7 So why did the claims and stories not abate? A subsequent analysis also concluded
that the innovation crisis was a myth and added several insights.8 Based on US Food and Drug
Administration records, Munos found that drug companies “have delivered innovation at a
constant rate for almost 60 years.”
MARKED
The new biologicals have been following the same pattern “in which approvals fluctuate around a
constant, low level.”8 These data do not support frequently heard complaints about how hard it is
to get any new drug approved. They also mean that neither policies considered to be obstacles to
innovation (like the requirement for more extensive clinical testing) nor those regarded as promoting innovation
(like faster reviews) have made much difference. Even the biotechnology revolution did not change the
rate of approval of new molecular entities, though it changed strategies for drug development.9 Meanwhile,
telling “innovation crisis” stories to politicians and the press serves as a ploy, a strategy to
attract a range of government protections from free market, generic competition.10
**Legalization kills pharma
Jackson, 12 Lee, “Will National Legalized Marijuana Help or Hurt Big Pharma, Tobacco and Alcohol?”
http://247wallst.com/investing/2012/12/11/will-national-legalized-marijuana-help-or-hurt-big-pharma-tobacco-and-alcohol/
One other big and powerful industry might have something to lose: Big Pharma. It is estimated that the global
pharmaceutical market will be worth more than $1 trillion by 2014. Industry giants Merck & Co. (NYSE:
MRK), Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ), Pfizer Inc. (NYSE: PFE) and Abbott Laboratories (NYSE: ABT) have warded off
patent cliffs for years using their large cash reserves to acquire smaller companies with robust
product pipelines. The last thing these companies want see is current product lines that are
producing dependable revenue flow to be dented by legal marijuana . The big pharmaceutical firms have a
lot of money to spread around, so when it comes to lobbying efforts, very few have this group’s clout. One thing it wants is for
marijuana to remain illegal. There are countless maladies where the ingestion of marijuana has been
believed to help alleviate or control the symptoms. These include glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, AIDS-related
complications, Crohn’s disease, fibromyalgia, chemotherapy complications and others. Big pharma has tried to come
with their own pot pill. There are more than 400 chemicals in marijuana, 80 of which are called “cannabinoids.” Drug
up
companies have tried reducing it to one chemical and results have been poor . Researchers find
that when you reduce cannabis to just tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), you lose efficacy and gain side
effects. In a book critical of the pharmaceutical industry called “Our Daily Meds,” author Melody Petersen offers a statistic showing
more than 100,000 people die each year from prescription drugs. This includes death from abuse and overdose, side effects,
misdiagnosis and interaction error. Many physicians may currently be reluctant to prescribe legalized
marijuana. A national mandate would provide many physicians with the moral and ethical cover
they need to be more aggressive if they feel medical marijuana may help their patients. Then it is
very possible that medical marijuana prescriptions will put a dent in many currently prescribed
drugs . This is not an outcome that big pharma is likely to tolerate well , unless they get in on the action
themselves.
FDA 1NC (:35
FDA cred shot AND plan’s worse
Dickson 13 – Virgil Dickson November 5, 2013 Regulatory and Policy Reporter at Modern Healthcare FDA credibility hurting
due to budget issues, commissioner says - http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131105/NEWS/311059963
Federal budget cuts and budget uncertainty are hurting the credibility of the Food and Drug
Administration, agency Commissioner Dr. Margaret Hamburg said Tuesday. At a conference hosted by Bloomberg Government,
Hamburg said the stakeholders regulated by the FDA expect predictability and transparency in how the
agency conducts its oversight. And that's been hard to deliver given the continuing federal budget
wars. One problem has been the freeze on user fees paid by manufacturers who want their products approved for safety
and efficacy. Because of the budget sequestration cuts, the FDA is set to lose $85 million in user fees in fiscal
2013, even though that money comes from regulated businesses, not from taxpayers. “You can't run agency as important as the FDA if you don't have
predictability, if you don't know what budget you'll be given during the year, or if you don't know whether you can draw from certain resources or not,”
Increased responsibilities , such as regulating medical mobile apps , also have made the
agency's work more challenging. She said the FDA has been “stretched thin for decades .” Hamburg said as
early next week Congress will vote a bill that would increase her agency's authority to regulate compounding
pharmacies , following the more than 60 fungal infection-related deaths that occurred as the result of contaminated drugs made at the New
England Compounding Center in Framingham, Mass. “While more responsibility has been given to us, our budget
has only expanded a little bit,” she said.
she said.
FDA just approved pot research
The Hill, 14 -- 6/20, http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/210117-fda-supports-marijuanaclinical-trials
The Food and Drug Administration says it supports clinical trials to determine whether marijuana
is safe and effective to treat certain diseases. In a post on its agency website, the FDA said Friday
it has not approved marijuana for general medical use but supports research into the health benefits of the
drug. “Although the FDA has not approved any drug product containing or derived from botanical marijuana, the FDA is aware
that there is considerable interest in its use to attempt to treat a number of medical conditions, including, for example,
glaucoma, AIDS wasting syndrome, neuropathic pain, cancer, multiple sclerosis, chemotherapy-induced nausea, and certain
seizure disorders,” the agency said. The FDA says it has approved trials for medical marijuana and has
been in contact with states where medical marijuana is not legal but state authorities are
interested in conducting trials to ensure they do not break federal laws. Those states include Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, New York and Pennsylvania.
That solves – your author
Eddy, 10 [CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Medical Marijuana: Review and
Analysis of Federal and State Policies Mark Eddy Specialist in Social Policy April 2, 2010]
The current efforts to gain legal status of marijuana through ballot initiatives seriously threaten
the F
D A
statutorily authorized process of proving safety and efficacy.
the federal government has taken primary responsibility for the
regulation of medical products
Pharmaceutical drugs must be approved for
use in the United States by the
FDA
ood and
rug
dministration
(Brief of the Drug Free America Foundation
et al., 2004112) Although the individual states regulate the practice of medicine,
, especially those containing controlled substances.
Food and Drug Administration (
), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act gives HHS and FDA
the responsibility for determining that drugs are safe and effective, a requirement that all medicines must meet before they can enter interstate commerce and be made available for general medical use.113 Clinical evaluation is required regardless of whether the
drug is synthetically produced or originates from a natural botanical or animal source. Opponents of medical marijuana say that
circumvented.
the FDA’s drug approval process should not be
To permit states to decide which medical products can be made available for therapeutic use, they say, would undercut this regulatory system. State medical marijuana initiatives are seen as inconsistent with the federal
government’s responsibility to protect the public from unsafe, ineffective drugs. The Bush Administration argued in its brief in the Raich case that “excepting drug activity for personal use or free distribution from the sweep of [federal drug laws] would discourage the
This
action by the state of California did not create a “novel social and economic experiment,” but
rather chaos in the scientific and medical communities. Furthermore
such informal
State systems could be replicated, and even expanded, in a manner that puts at risk the critical
protections so carefully crafted under the national food and drug legislation of the 20th century.
efforts that seek to bypass the FDA drug
consumption of lawful controlled substances and would undermine Congress’s intent to regulate the drug market comprehensively to protect public health and safety.”114 Three prominent drug abuse experts argued the following in their Amici brief:
, under Court of Appeals ruling,
115
The FDA itself has stated that FDA is the sole Federal agency that approves drug products as safe and effective for particular indications, and
approval process would not serve the interests of public health.
Only the
disciplined, systematic, scientific conduct of clinical trials can establish whether there is any
medicinal value to marijuana
The ballot initiative-led laws
create an atmosphere of medicine by popular vote, rather than the rigorous scientific and medical
process that all medicines must undergo . Before the development of modern pharmaceutical
science, the field of medicine was fraught with potions and herbal remedies. Many of those were
absolutely useless, or conversely were harmful to unsuspecting subjects Thus evolved our
current Food and Drug Administration
proces
This system is being intentionally undermined by the legalization proponents through use of
marijuana initiatives.
FDA has not approved marijuana for any indication.
, smoked or otherwise.116 The Drug Free America Raich brief elaborates further (pp. 12-13):
.
and drug scheduling
ses, which Congress has authorized in order to create a uniform and reliable system of drug approval and regulation.
medical
The organizers of the medical marijuana state initiatives deny that it was their intent to undermine the federal drug approval process. Rather, in their view, it became necessary for them to bypass the FDA and
go to the states because of the federal government’s resistance to marijuana research requests and rescheduling petitions. As for the charge that politics should not play a role in the drug approval and controlled substance scheduling processes, medical marijuana
Scientists on both sides of the issue say more
researchers charge that the federal government has all but shut
supporters point out that marijuana’s original listing as a Schedule I substance in 1970 was itself a political act on the part of Congress.
research needs to be done, yet
down marijuana clinical trials
some
for reasons based on politics and ideology rather than science.151 In any case, as the IOM Report pointed out, “although a drug is normally approved for medical use only on proof of
its ‘safety and efficacy,’ patients with life-threatening conditions are sometimes (under protocols for ‘compassionate use’) allowed access to unapproved drugs whose benef its and risks are uncertain.”152 This was the case with the FDA’s IND Compassionate
Access Program under which a limited number of patients are provided government-grown medical marijuana to treat their serious medical conditions. Some observers believe the pharmaceutical industry and some politicians oppose medical marijuana to protect
pharmaceutical industry profits. Because the whole marijuana plant cannot be patented, research efforts must be focused on the development of synthetic cannabinoids such as Marinol. But even if additional cannabinoid drugs are developed and marketed, some
believe that doctors and patients should still not be criminalized for recommending and using the natural substance. The New England Journal of Medicine has editorialized that [A] federal policy that prohibits physicians from alleviating suffering by prescribing
marijuana for seriously ill patients is misguided, heavy-handed, and inhumane. Marijuana may have long-term adverse effects and its use may presage serious addictions, but neither long-term side effects nor addiction is a relevant issue in such patients. It is also
hypocritical to forbid physicians to prescribe marijuana while permitting them to use morphine and meperidine to relieve extr eme dyspnea and pain. With both of these drugs the difference between the dose that relieves symptoms and the dose that hastens death is
very narrow; by contrast, there is no risk of death from smoking marijuana. To demand evidence of therapeutic efficacy is equally hypocritical. The noxious sensations that patients experience are extremely difficult to quantify in controlled experiments. What really
until the federal
government relents and becomes more hospitable to marijuana research proposals
the medical marijuana issue will continue to be fought at state and local levels of
governance.
counts for a therapy with this kind of safety margin is whether a seriously ill patient feels relief as a result of the inter vention, not whether a controlled trial “proves” its efficacy.153 Some observers suggest that
and more willing to consider moving
marijuana to a less restrictive schedule,
As one patient advocate has stated, “As the months tick away, it will become more and more obvious that we need to continue c hanging state laws until the federal government has no choice but to change its inhumane medicinal
marijuana laws.”154
Blood pressure safety data thumps
Blankfield, 13 -- Robert, Case Western School of Medicine, European Journal of Preventive Cardiology,
file:///C:/Users/Debate/Downloads/Credibility%20of%20the%20FDA.pdf
Why doesn’t the FDA require the collection of cardiovascular safety data for medications that
raise blood pressure? For new drug approvals, the FDA can require manufacturers to conduct
safety trials after a drug is approved.5 Many of the drugs listed in Table 1 were approved so long ago that they are
available generically. Even if the FDA desired the collection of safety data for these drugs, it is complicated to require manufacturers
to obtain data for drugs that are available generically The FDA lacks a legislative mandate to conduct research.
Consequently, the FDA lacks the financial resources to support prospective drug trials. For the drugs listed in
Table 1 for which safety data are inadequate, the FDA
might be able to support retrospective studies. There is
precedent for this approach . In collaboration with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the FDA
supported two recently published retrospective studies regarding the cardiovascular safety of attention deficit
disorder medications.6,7 The credibility of the FDA has been damaged by multiple drug approvals that
occurred despite inadequate safety data. Restoring the FDA’s credibility depends , in part, upon the
FDA requiring adequate morbid/mortal safety data for new drug approvals when drugs raise BP,
even though such requirements might increase the cost of drug development and/or slow down the development of new drugs.
Restoring the FDA’s credibility also depends upon the FDA supporting the collection of
morbid/mortal safety data for drugs that have already been approved but that raise BP. Collecting safety data
for drugs that have already been approved would be complicated. Nonetheless, doing nothing – and thereby accepting the
status quo – means tolerating drugs on the market that predictably increase the risk of serious
adverse cardiovascular events. The longer the status quo persists, the more the credibility of the
FDA diminishes .
Science Diplomacy 1NC
Science leadership fails
David Dickson, Director, SciDev, “The Limits of Science Diplomacy,” Science and Development Network, 6—4—09,
http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html
Only so much science can do Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue
"soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's
activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy,
held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it
seems. Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new
synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But
whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident .
For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been
reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's
Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific
innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a
driver for peace may be wishful thinking . Conflicting ethos Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the
meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world.
There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership —
whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true
partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that
goes against diplomats' implicit role : to promote and defend their own countries' interests. John
Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a
diplomat is someone who is " sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet codependent The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need
science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their
research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means
or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to
useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so
if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate
a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences —
acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is
dangerous. The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces
challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on
oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing.
change or reducing world poverty. But
Pharma: Dz 1NC (:25
Pharma doesn’t solve disease
Light 11 [Donald W. Light Lokey visiting professor at Stanford University and a professor of comparative health-care at the
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and Rebecca Warburton, associate professor and a health economist,
specializing in the costbenefit analysis of health-related public projects at School of Public Administration, University of Victoria 2011
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pharmamyths.
net%2Ffiles%2FBiosocieties_2011_Myths_of_High_Drug_Research_Costs.pdf&ei=7o26VL7IEIaSyQSqiYLAAw&usg=AFQjCNH0E
Mojy1ghTCzl6bWT0bIFZqj0sg&sig2=7AmvrPw2vDbJgGLgfdQmMA&bvm=bv.83829542,d.aWw]
In the undertaking of grand challenges and the search for vaccines and other magic bullets to eradicate
diseases of the poor, the very high costs of pharmaceutical research appear everywhere. When companies like GlaxoSmithKline announce they
will lower prices to a fraction of what they charge in affluent countries, the initial high price is justified based on the high risks and costs of research and development (R&D). For
decades, the very high costs of R&D have been the industry’s rationale for high prices in the developed world, and the basis for claims that companies cannot afford research
into primarily developing-world diseases, where high prices cannot be charged. The few companies that did not abandon vaccine R&D because prices were so low ‘solved’ that
problem by charging 20–40 times more than they used to, citing the high cost of R&D. When Michael Kremer’s version of an ‘advance market commitment’ (AMC) swept the
policy world and was embraced by the G8 as a fiscal magic bullet that would result in new vaccines for malaria or AIDS, it was premised on meeting the allegedly high costs of
R&D for multinational corporations, whose innovative researchers would find a vaccine for malaria or AIDS, where public or university researchers had failed (Kremer and
Industry executives, well supplied with facts and figures by the industry’s
global press network, awe audiences with staggering figures for the cost of a single trial, like tribal
chieftains and their scribes who recount the mythic costs of a great victory in a remote pass where no outside witnesses saw the battle. Companies tightly
control access to verifiable facts about their risks and costs, allowing access only to supported economists at consulting firms and universities, who
Glennerster, 2004, pp. 10–11; Farlow, 2005).
develop methods for showing how large costs and risks are; and then the public, politicians and journalists often take them at face value, accepting them as fact. The global
press network never tells audiences about the detailed reconstruction of R&D costs for RotaTeq and Rotarix that found costs and risks were remarkably low up to the large final
trials, and that concluded the companies recovered their investments within the first 18 months (Light et al, 2009). The companies could now sell these vaccines for rotavirus for
Pharmaceutical companies have a strong vested interest in
maximizing figures for R&D and supporting centres or researchers who help them do so. Since the
one-tenth their Western price and still earn profits.
Kefauver hearings in 1959–1962, the industry’s principal justification for its high prices on patented drugs has been the high cost of R&D, and it has sought further government
protections from normal price competition. These include increasing patent terms and extending data exclusivity, without good evidence that these measures increase
Industry
leaders and lobbyists routinely warn that lower prices will reduce funds for R&D and result in suffering and
death that future medicines could reduce . Marcia Angell, the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, describes this as ‘y a
kind of blackmail’ (Angell, 2004, pp. 38–39). She quotes the president of the US industry’s trade association as saying, ‘Believe me, if we impose price controls
innovation (National Institute for Health Care Management, 2000; European Commission for Competition, 2008 (28 November); Adamini et al, 2009).
on the pharmaceutical industry, and if you reduce the R&D that this industry is able to provide, it’s going to harm my kids and it’s going to harm those millions of other Americans
no other researchoriented industry makes this kind of argument (Goozner, 2004). In fact, they do the opposite: when profits
decline, they redouble their research efforts to find new products that will generate more profits. Not
who have life-threatening conditions’. Merrill Goozner, former chief economic correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, points out that
to do so guarantees their decline. The industry’s view of European ‘price controls’ (actually, large-volume discounts) is that they do not allow recovery of huge R&D costs so that
Europeans are ‘free riders’ on Americans and force US prices higher to pay for unrecovered costs the ‘free riders’ refuse to pay. This claim has been shown not to be supported
by industry and government reports and to be illogical as well (Light and Lexchin, 2005). The purpose of this report is to sharpen readers’ critical skills in asking pointed
questions about the seemingly insurmountable barriers of R&D, about the overpriced AMC that will result in most donations going to extra profits rather than more vaccinations
(Light, 2007), and about how much global pharmaceutical companies can afford to discount (Plahte, 2005). By demythologizing in detail the most widely cited estimate of
pharmaceutical R&D, the report will provide lessons in how such estimates are constructed.
This exercise in critical sociology and economics builds on the
substantial critiques of others (Public Citizen, 2001; Love, 2003; Angell, 2004; Goozner, 2004) but adds several new points. The report will conclude
bigger problems lie elsewhere, with most R&D not being directed at discovering clinically superior
medicines, even for affluent customers, because companies are so generously rewarded for developing hundreds of new
products little better than the ones they replace. Policy needs to move away from decontextualized magic
bullets and towards context-sensitive, socioeconomic programmes of health in which medicines can play a critical role.
that the
Burnout checks
Sandberg 14
Anders Sandberg is James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin
School, University of Oxford, Phys.org, May 29, 2014, "The five biggest threats to human existence", http://phys.org/news/2014-05biggest-threats-human.html
pandemics are unlikely to be existential
threats : there are usually some people resistant to the pathogen, and the offspring of survivors
would be more resistant. Evolution also does not favor parasites that wipe out their hosts , which is
why syphilis went from a virulent killer to a chronic disease as it spread in Europe.
Natural pandemics have killed more people than wars. However, natural
Superbugs
No medical benefits for pot---their ev is pseudo-science
TSR 14, over 25 years experience in marketing, business development, and product development in the medical products
industry, graduate degree in Biochemistry/Endocrinology from a major US research university, “Medical uses of marijuana–hitting
the bong of science (updated again),” www.skepticalraptor.com/skepticalraptorblog.php/medical-marijuana-hitting-bong-science/
it’s clouded by the extremely
small size of clinical trials, a large potential placebo effect, bad trial design, and different kinds of
bias. The systematic reviews tend to heavily qualify their conclusions, mainly because of the lack
of large, gold-standard, clinical trials. In other words, there isn’t enough, at this time, for a neurologist to say “this will help.” We don’t
know. Which, again, does not mean you can proclaim that if we don’t know, the we do know.¶ Dr David
Gorski, a real oncology researcher, whose knowledge and expertise in these areas matter quite a
bit , reviewed the research in many of the medical claims about marijuana and concluded that,¶
There’s no doubt that what is driving the legalization of medical marijuana in so many states has far more to do with
politics than with science. Right now, for all but a handful of conditions, the evidence is slim to nonexistent that
cannabis has any use as a medicine , and those conditions, such as CINV and chronic pain, can often be treated
more reliably with purified or synthesized active components. Moreover, for one condition for which there is reasonably good
For neurological disorders, there are some, but not broad, indicators that THC or its derivatives, could have benefits. But,
evidence for the efficacy of cannabis and/or cannabinoids, namely chronic pain, politicians are reluctant to approve medical marijuana.¶ This is the same thing with a lot of
Political expediency trumps real scientific research. Anthropogenic global warming, which is backed by a wealth
medical benefits,
almost all of which are unsupported by real scientific evidence , while ignoring some of the known risks of smoking the drug. If politicians want
science in this country.
of evidence, is rejected because it’s a “liberal conspiracy” or some such nonsense. Well, now politicians want to allow marijuana because of
to make marijuana legal, do so because it’s a recreational drug, not unlike alcohol.¶ The world of medical marijuana is using the same weak evidence, the same ignorance of
risks, and the same logical fallacies you hear from those who push “natural” herbs or supplements. And the more we look the more we find that there’s nothing there. We need
to separate recreational use of marijuana from medical use. They are not the same, and one shouldn’t support the other.¶ The TL;DR version¶ Marijuana prevents nausea in
cancer treatment patients–maybe, maybe not. No solid research in the area.¶ Marijuana cures cancer–no clinical evidence that it does.¶ Marijuana can treat neurological
conditions–not really, but some isolated cannabinoids may help ameliorate some symptoms of some conditions.¶ Marijuana has some risks that have not been fully explored.
But stay tuned, I have more to write on this.¶ There is no global Big Pharma conspiracy to suppress clinical research on marijuana. If it could “cure” one cancer, they’d be all
over it trying to find the right dose, delivery mechanism, and pretty advertising to make billions of dollars.¶ If you want to smoke marijuana (or eat it in a brownie–not sure that’s
a thing anymore, it was when I was in college) because it’s relaxing, or you need to blow off steam after a tough day, fine. Go for it. I absolutely do not understand why this
usage is illegal. It’s costly to society. And banning it provides no benefit to society.¶ On the other hand, I find most, if not all, of the medical claims made about marijuana to be
The evidence is just so weak or non-existent, I actually have no clue why it’s part of the discourse, but then again people deny
Yes, there are bits and pieces of intriguing evidence that a component of
marijuana may have some benefits to human health. But we’re a long ways from testing that with
real clinical trials, then getting it to market. And trust me, when someday we have found some real clinically significant uses, it’s not going to
laughable.
evolution, and we end up arguing that.
be sold as a “joint.” It’s going to be developed into some sort of medical delivery formulation (like a pill or injectable solution) that gets the purified pharmacologically relevant
compound to the physiological site where it would work. That’s how real medical science works.
AG
ag
Vertical farming now – Overcomes unsustainable ag
The Economist 10, Dec 9th 2010
Does it really stack up? http://www.economist.com/node/17647627
The necessary technology already exists . The glasshouse industry has more than a century's
experience of growing crops indoors in large quantities , says Gene Giacomelli, director of the Controlled Environment
Agriculture Centre at the University of Arizona in Tucson. It is now possible to tailor the temperature, humidity,
lighting, airflow and nutrient conditions to get the best productivity out of plants year round,
anywhere in the world, he says. The technology of hydroponics allows almost any kind of plant to
be grown in nutrient-rich water, from root crops like radishes and potatoes to fruit such as melons and even cereals like maize.
US and global biotech strong and resilient
- innovation – r&d – development – investment
Official Wire 8/10/12 (“US biotechnology market to grow at a CAGR of 8.7%”, http://www.officialwire.com/pr/usbiotechnology-market-to-grow-at-a-cagr-of-8-7/,)
The US biotechnology market has been forecast to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of
8.7% through the five years to 2017, to reach a market value of $132.2 billion.¶ The US Biotechnology
industry was adversely affected by the global financial crisis, with several leading companies reporting fall in revenues amid
restricted capital inflows, and project cancellations and delays. ¶ Revenue declined between 2008 and 2009, but growth
returned in 2010. In 2012, revenue is expected to increase 3.9% to $87 billion, which is slightly lower than
the expected CAGR of 4.4% from 2007 to 2012.¶ The US biotechnology market looks set to be driven by a
favourable regulatory environment c
ombined with an aging population and mounting environmental concerns.¶ On a global scale the
US represents the world’s largest biotechnology market, home to more than 1,300 firms and employing more than
60% of the worldwide workforce. The US leads with its innovation , extensive R&D , and regular company
developments in various spheres of the biotechnology sector.¶ The future looks bright for the US
biotechnology market with a substantial amount of investment expected in research and
entrepreneurship development in the near future.
Food--1NC
Food insecurity won’t cause war
Allouche 11 The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between
security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade ☆
UK
Available online 22 January 2011.
Jeremy Allouche
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton,
At sub-national scales (i.e. the intra-state level and the local level), the link between scarcity and conflict is
more complex. At the intra-state level, recent research on civil wars shows that countries suffering from
environmental degradation (soil degradation, deforestation and freshwater supply linked to high population density) were
indeed more likely to experiance civil war, but that the magnitude of the effects was secondary to
political and economic factors (see for example [Urdal, 2005] and [Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998]). The same is true
for hunger and food insecurity as a cause of conflict. The work of Collier and the US State Failure Task Force
seems to suggest a possible correlation between food insecurity and civil wars. Collier found a strong relationship between
indicators of deprivation (such as low per capita income; economic stagnation and decline; high income inequality; and slow growth
in food production per capita) and violent civil strife (Collier, 1999). The US State Failure Task Force found that infant mortality, a
surrogate measure of food insecurity and standard of living, was one of three variables most highly correlated with civil war
a number of specialists have challenged the notion that food
insecurity is a proximate cause of conflict and prefer to emphasize ethnic and political rivalry
(Goldstone et al., 2003). However,
(Paalberg, 1999). Nonetheless, most analysts would agree that structural conditions of inequality and hunger are among the
resource scarcity’ is not in most cases the result of
insufficient production or availability but is usually linked to the politics of inequality.
underlying causes of conflict. But again, ‘physical
Food security improving now
Financial Times, FT 14 5/28 (“Boost for global food security,” 5/28/2014, http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/05/boost-for-globalfood-security/, JMP)
Some good news for a change. Food security - the availability and affordability of food – has got
better , according to research published on Wednesday.¶ The 66-page report from the Economist Intelligence
Unit, sponsored by DuPont, the chemicals company, found that despite last year’s freak weather patterns drought in California, heatwaves in Australia and floods in Russia – food security improved in
almost three-quarters of the world’s countries .¶ Food security is a growing concern, given the expectation that the
world’s population is likely to peak at 10bn mid-century, meaning an extra 3bn mouths to feed.¶ The biggest improvements
were in countries with the worst food security problems, namely sub-Saharan Africa, where only two –
South Africa and Botswana – have a global food security index of more than 50 per cent.¶ This has led to a narrowing of
the gap with the most food-secure countries – headed by the US – where improvements were slower.¶
Lower wheat and rice prices were behind the improvement, as was a better world economy. The EIU
report backs up the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s recent research showing a fall in the number of hungry people from 868m
in 2010-12 to 842m – still 12 per cent of the global population.
2NC
CP
Building international political support for change can only occur gradually, not
abruptly – reaching a common position requires maintaining diplomatic
credibility within the existing treaty regime
Bewley-Taylor, 13 - Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and Humanities, Swansea University,
UK (David, “Towards revision of the UN drug control conventions:
Harnessing like-mindedness” International Journal of Drug Policy 24 (2013) 60– 68, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2012.09.001)
LMGs = Like Minded Groups of nations
Further complexity arises from the issue of sequencing . While, as Young suggests, the generation of like-mindedness
can be a protracted affair across a variety of regimes, the construction of any meaningful LMG with the goal of revising the UN drug
control conventions is likely to be more prolonged and fluid than in other issue areas. T he significant divergence of
views among members of the global drug prohibition regime suggests that any formal change to
the regime will come about in an incremental fashion rather than via a Kuhnian-like paradigm shift. This
has much to do with the somewhat unique nature of drug policy itself. Approaches to domestic drug policy, and hence attitudes
towards the current international control framework, are prone to change. National policies, to use the terminology of MacCoun and
Reuter (2001, p. 308), undergo both relaxations and tightenings.
Moreover, these processes occur at different rates depending upon specific national circumstances. Indeed, while recent years
witnessed a clearly identifiable growth of pragmatic national policies, every soft defecting state has moved to ‘relax’
legislation or practice at its own pace. Both knowledge transfer and example-setting have played a role in influencing
the direction of policy.
Nevertheless, policy shifts have been triggered predominantly by unique national, even local, circumstances. Work on bridging the
gap between research and policy ably demonstrates that change in drug policy is a complex process involving
many variables. Simon Lenton’s adaptation of John Kingdon’s classic multiple streams model shows how only when the
‘Problem’, ‘Policy’, and crucially ‘Politics’ , streams coincide with an infrequent window of
opportunity will the conditions be ripe for a change in policy (Lenton, 2007). As Kingdon and others point out,
policy changes can be regarded as rare punctuations in long periods of equilibrium where little happens (Baumgartner & Jones,
2009; Kingdon, 2003). Within the area of domestic drug policy, ‘The combination of high uncertainty about the outcome of a change,
the partial irreversibility of any bad outcomes, and a pervasive tendency for decision makers to favor the status quo . . . pose steep
barriers’ to change (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001, p. 373). In terms of tightenings, local circumstances also determine the timing of
policy shifts; although these tend to take place with greater speed. For instance, the political utility of being seen as ‘tough on drugs’
has resulted in the rollback of liberal approaches to cannabis possession in a number of states as administrations, or even
individuals within governmental posts with a drug policy remit, have altered. A case in point is the rereclassification of cannabis in
the UK in 2008 (Stevens, 2011, pp. 77–83).
Such a situation has the potential to cause complications in not only the initial creation of a coalition of states working against or
without the cooperation of a hegemonic state like the USA, but also – crucially – its subsequent maintenance during what, bearing in
mind the diverging perspectives on the issue within the international community, would no doubt be a lengthy period of activity. The
creation of any effective LMG is dependent on the willingness of a sufficient number of national
administrations to expend diplomatic energy in the pursuit of the desired outcome within the
international arena. Within the field of UN drug policy reform, achieving a critical mass of nations will be entirely dependent on
the state of national drug policy among potential group members. In other words, the construction of a group of likeminded nations will only take place when an adequate collection of states have all reached a point
where decision makers feel that, conscious of the potential costs of such a move, the only way to better
address the drug issue within their own borders is to alter aspects of the international drug
control treaties. Reaching a necessary commonality of position and hence of interest across a group of
nations is likely to be both prolonged and unpredictable.
Solves I-Law 2NC
Amendment passes AND reinvigorates I-Law
Wells C. Bennett, fellow, Brookings Institution and John Walsh, Washington Office on Latin America, “Marijuana Legalization
Poses a Dilemma for International Drug Treaties,” interviewed by Jonathan Rauch, FIXGOV, Brookings Institution, 10—16—14,
www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/10/16-marijuana-enforcement-modernize-international-drug-treaties-rauch, accessed
10-22-14.
You argue that the
U nited S tates, starting now, should proactively rule in drug-treaty changes as a
possibility, instead of ruling them out. What do you mean by that? So far, in public anyway, the United States has described the
drug treaties as living documents that can be updated through interpretation. Now, what’s missing from that is a suggestion that the
drug treaties might be changed structurally through provisions established within the treaties themselves. There are real
advantages that go with, say, a treaty amendment process. Your paper emphasizes that revising the
marijuana treaties could actually strengthen i nternational law. How so? There are two ways to go about
ensuring that i nternational law accommodates domestic policy change. One is to engage in a unilateral
interpretive exercise. The other is, where possible, to use channels that have been set up in i nternational law
itself. There are times when the former route is appropriate, but it carries certain risks, and one of those risks is
undercutting an international legal regime on which the U nited S tates increasingly depends. The
other approach, though it involves costs and challenges of its own, has the benefit of operating within
i nternational law itself. Going that route pays tribute to i nternational law. But why now? Why not wait? Because
you’re always setting a precedent . There are costs to not doing it now . Moreover, the U nited S tates has
been justly described as the biggest advocate for and defender of the drug treaties . In the past, when it
perceived deficiencies in the drug control regimes, it pushed for changes using procedural avenues created by the drug control
system itself. So there’s
a precedent set by the U nited S tates acting within this regime and using the
rules that it sets forth. What kinds of changes should we be starting to think about? Nothing aggressive or radical, certainly.
But ideally you would want to codify at the international level the kind of domestic flexibility that the Justice
Department is claiming. For example, you might consider a treaty amendment making clear that a national government could allow
federal subunits to liberalize their marijuana policies in a rigorous and regulated way, but still allowing or even requiring the national
government to intervene if liberalization at that level goes awry. Flexibility just for marijuana? Not other illegal
drugs? Right. In fact, that’s an advantage to making these changes using mechanisms within the
treaties: when you negotiate for them in that way, you can provide greater clarity about what
you’re allowing and not allowing. The U nited S tates is understandably anxious about setting bad
precedents with respect to much more dangerous substances, things that would cause the whole
drug control framework to unravel. The amendment procedure accounts for that in a better fashion
than does a unilateral approach. Is it realistic to talk about adjusting the treaties? Would our partners consider
it? Would the Senate approve it? Yes, I think it is realistic. Reaching a consensus at the international level
would be difficult. Obtaining Senate approval would also be difficult. But difficult does not mean impossible . As
an issue, marijuana summons unique support from both sides of the aisle domestically. On the
international level, the U nited S tates has successfully changed the treaties when it has pushed to
do so. So the difficulty of the project shouldn’t take it off the table. If we and our partners made treaty reform work for marijuana,
would that ramify beyond drug policy ? At a minimum, success in treaty reform could reaffirm the
U nited S tates’ commitment to acting within international legal structures, and in that regard give us
credibility in all kinds of international forums. Any time you’re trying to persuade parties to a
treaty to go your way, it helps to be able to point to other treaty areas and say you acted as
scrupulously as possible.
Ilaw top
L 2NC (1:00
Plan signals an a la carte approach to treaty compliance – spills over to the entire
system
German Lopez 14 10-2, Writing Fellow, Vox, 10/2/14, “How much of the war on drugs is tied to international treaties?,”
http://www.vox.com/cards/war-on-drugs-marijuana-cocaine-heroin-meth/war-on-drugs-international-treaties
Still, Martin Jelsma, an international drug policy expert at the Transnational Institute, argued
that ignoring or
pulling out of the international drug conventions could seriously damage America's standing
around the world . "Pacta sunt servanda ('agreements must be kept') is the most fundamental principle
of international law and it would be very undermining if countries start to take an 'a-la-carte'
approach to treaties they have signed; they cannot simply comply with some provisions and ignore
others without losing the moral authority to ask other countries to oblige to other treaties ," Jelsma
wrote in an email. "So our preference is to acknowledge legal tensions with the treaties and try to
resolve them."
To resolve such issues, many critics of the war on drugs hope to reform international drug laws in
2016 during the next General Assembly Special Session on drugs.
"There is tension with the tax-and-regulate approach to marijuana in some jurisdictions," Malinowska-Sempruch said. "But it's all
part of a process and that's why we hope the UN debate in 2016 is as open as possible, so that we
can settle some of these questions and, if necessary, modernize the system ."
U: 2NC (1:20
Brownfield doctrine is mobilizing support for international reform now
John Collins, Phd Candidate, International History, London School of Economics, “The State Department’s Move to a More
Diplomatic Policy on Drugs Is a Rational Approach to a Difficult Question,” London School of Economics, 12—1—14,
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-adifficult-question/, accessed 1-2-15
The US State Department recently restated a major shift in US drug diplomacy. At its core is the idea of
allowing greater variation in international policies and the opportunity to develop new national innovations. Ambassador William
Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, recently summed up
the idea: Things have changed since 1961. We must have enough flexibility to allow us to incorporate those changes into our
policies … to tolerate different national drug policies, to accept the fact that some countries will have very strict drug approaches;
other countries will legalize entire categories of drugs. This new ‘Brownfield Doctrine’ has provoked significant international policy
discussion and debate. What is the Brownfield Doctrine? The Brownfield Doctrine is a framework for thinking
about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term . It’s based on shifting
enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via flexible interpretation of certain
antiquated provisions of the international drug conventions. It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’
interpretations of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described
this, similar to the US constitution, as viewing the treaties as ‘living breathing documents’ which should be interpreted via their
preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is
based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different
national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed.
Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects. For example the
recent O rganization of A merican S tates Special General Assembly on Drugs invoked principles
derived from the doctrine. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because
it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer and bully on international drug policy
– the United States. Regardless of who authored it, the four-point approach is on balance a sensible path
forward for the immediate future and allows breathing room for innovation and changes in policy,
which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform. If a Latin American or a European
country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US.
A2 “SCOND Collapse”
Yes dissatisfaction, but it isn’t universal and the system includes release valves
through soft defection – the aff crushes that
David R. Bewley-Taylor 12, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University Wales, and
founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, March 2012, “Towards revision of the UN drug control conventions: The
logic and dilemmas of Like-Minded Groups,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr19.pdf
Recent years have seen a growing unwillingness among increasing numbers of States parties to
fully adhere to a strictly prohibitionist reading of the UN drug control conventions; the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended by the 1972 Protocol), the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.2 Such behaviour has been driven by a belief that
non-punitive and pragmatic health oriented domestic policy approaches that are in line with fundamental human rights standards
better address the complexities surrounding illicit drug use than the zerotolerance approach privileged by the present international
treaties; treaties that for the most part were negotiated and adopted in an era when both the illicit market and understanding of its
operation bore little resemblance to those of today.
Since this stance runs counter to the rigid interpretative positions held by some parts of the UN
drug control apparatus, and many other States Parties, tensions within the international treaty system, or
what has usefully been called the global drug prohibition regime,3 are currently pronounced. Witness, for
example, the critical statements and positions of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB or Board), the ‘independent and
quasi-judicial control organ for the implementation of the treaties’. 4 What can be called ‘ soft defecting’ states, those
choosing to deviate from the prohibitive ethos of the conventions whilst remaining within what they
deem to be the confines of their treaty commitments ,5 are regularly criticized by the Board for engagement, in some
cases at a subnational level, with a range of tolerant policy approaches.
Prominent among these are harm reduction interventions aiming to reduce the link between injecting drug use
and HIV/AIDS (particularly drug consumption rooms/safe injection facilities), medical marijuana schemes and the
‘decriminalization’ of drug possession for personal use.6 Despite the positions of the Board, the detailed and
robust legal justifications put forward by many states demonstrate that the policy choices are defensible
within the boundaries of the existing treaty framework. Moreover, they are further justified, and in some cases
required, by national constitutional guarantees and concurrent obligations in international law. That national constitutional principles
should operate as the locus for determining the appropriateness of certain policies (such as the criminalisation of personal
possession of illicit substances) is specifically written into the drug control conventions.7
Although revealing their considerable flexibility, the process of soft defection also inevitably highlights
the limited plasticity of the conventions – they can only bend so far .8 The very act of justifying the legality of
various policy options relative to the treaty framework emphasises an inescapable fact. Should they wish to do so, states
already pushing at the limits of the regime would only be able to expand further national policy
space, particularly in relation to production and supply , via an alteration in their relationship to
the conventions and the prohibitive norm at the regime’s core. Within such a context, growing and much
needed attention is being devoted to the legal technicalities of treaty revision.
A2 Herd
Multilat inherently fails – their author’s conclusion
*Their ev = straw person – multilat doesn’t work in practice
*Alt causes = structural failure – poor coordination, deadlines, lack of commitment, poor execution
Graeme P. Herd 10 , Head of the International Security Programme, Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security
Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010, “Great Powers: Towards a “cooperative competitive” future world order paradigm?,”
in Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, p. 197-198
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic catastrophe that could trigger US precipitous decline), and
the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real question is what will be the nature of relations between
these Great Powers? Will global order be characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world system , in which shared
strategic threats create interest-based incentives and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers? This pathway
would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda based on nascent similarity across national policy agendas . In
addition. Great Powers would seek to cooperate by strengthening multilateral partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20
and regional variants), regimes (e.g., arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms, including international law .
Alternatively, Great Powers may rely less on institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their orderproducing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within their near neighborhoods. Under such circumstances, a re-division
of the world into a competing mercantilist nineteenth-century regional order emerges 17 World order would be
characterized more by hierarchy and balance of power and zero-sum principles than by interdependence.Relative power shifts that allow a return to
multipolarity - with three or more evenly matched powers - occur gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment in the post-Cold War has been
crowned, according to Haass, by an era of non-polarity, where power is diffuse — "a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors
possessing and exercising various kinds of power"18 Multilateralism is on the rise , characterized by a combination of stales and
international organizations, both influential and talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of global
governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as groups with no formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and immediate reactions to crises,
while formal treaty-based institutions then legitimize the results.'9As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble: Global cooperation is the only way to
master the new, asymmetric global challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on its own, nor can the entire international
community do so without the help of non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first
century.20Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined as "multipolarity in an age of interdependence" — Grevi suggests that managing
existential interdependence in an unstable multipolar world is the key.21 Such complex interdependence generates shared
interest in cooperative solutions, meanwhile driving convergence, consensus and accommodation between Great
Powers.22 As a result, the multilateral system is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a global age - the rise of emerging
powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a complex balance between multiple states."23 The G20 meeting in London in April
2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial architecture so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more participative, transparent and
responsive manner: all countries have contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24
**THEIR EVIDENCE ENDS
However , when we turn to assessing the coherence of current generic responses to the management of these strategic
threats, as addressed by the authors In Part II of this volume, it is clear that the evident need for greater cooperation does not always
translate into practical pragmatic effect. While there is a clear conceptual need for greater cooperation
between states to jointly manage sources of strategic threat, operational reality lags behind . Stepanova argues that efforts to manage the threats
of terrorism and political extremism through Intelligence, legal, judicial, military and police cooperation, as well as political
coordination, can occur multi- laterally but operates best at the bilateral level . Moreover, the global dynamics of terrorism are driven by major armed
conflicts, particularly those characterized by external interventions. Lindstrom notes that the key challenge to managing prolif eration is the increasing
Internal and external pressures facing the principal non-proliferation regimes, as well as strengthening non-proliferation tools, not least the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Caty Clément observes that when addressing the threat of state fragility and regional
there is general agreement that integrated or the whole of national government approach is weak and that poor
coordination between international actors and tn different fields of activity is still prevalent.: s In the words of Ramesh Thakur: "Unilateral and ad
crises
hoc interventions will sow and nourish the seeds of international discord. Multilateral and rules-based Interventions will speak powerfully to the world's determination never again to return to institutionalized
indifference to mass atroci- ties "26 Rhodes argues that in the US under Obama, 111 an era of global financial cnss, the economy—energy nexus IS the central secunty Issue, and that strengthen- Ing fragile
states primanly through an emphasis on good governance rather than the promotion of democracy IS now the pnonty. Vaahtoranta notes that the US and China share an Interest In supporting stable global
energy production and transpor- tatlon at an affordable price, and that shared Interests generate cooperation and market-based approaches. Bates Gill rerntnds us that China's current focus IS more on
"domestic" or "Internal" threats to Chinese statehood and It is through th1S pnsm that Chinese strategists prlorltlze the "global" challenges Identified bv the West, Nevertheless, common ground between China
and the other four powers is expanded In the words of Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Fu Y Ing:
In terms of foreign policy. China has no intention of scrambling for hegemony or sharing hegemony With anyone, The major task of China's diplomacy is to create an external environment of peace and
cooperation so that it can concentrate on building the country
though the global financial crisis has increased the need for multilateral partnerships and made
which in tum should promote more effective
international cooperation against a range of shared threats, the practical results are meagre :
deadlines have been missed; financial commitments and promises have not been honored, execution has
stalled, and international collective action has fallen far short of what was offered and, more Importantly, needed.
These failures represent not only the perpetual lack of International consensus, but also a flawed
obsession with multilateralism as the panacea for all the world's Ills.
Indeed,
countries more selective by bringing greater focus to building partnerships and strategic relationships,
LA
OV 2NC
It’s unsustainable- but takes down the biosphere with it
Tad W. Patzek Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The University of California, Berkeley June 3, 2008
“Chapter 2: Can the Earth Deliver the Biomass-for-Fuel we Demand?” in Biofuels, Solar, and Wind as Renewable Energy Systems,
http://gaia.pge.utexas.edu/papers/Chapter%2022.pdf **Suicide metaphor edited out
By extrapolating human population growth between 1650 and 1920 to 2007, one estimates 2.2 billion people who today could live
mostly on plant carbon, but use some coal, oil, and natural gas. Therefore it is reasonable to say that today 4.5 billion people4 owe
their existence to the Haber-Bosch ammonia process and the fossil fuel-driven, fundamentally unstable “Green Revolution,” as well
as to vaccines and antibiotics. Agrofuels are a direct outgrowth of the “Green Revolution,” which may be
viewed, see Appendix 2, as a short-lived but violent disturbance of terrestrial ecosystems on the
Earth. ¶ Since most people have cooked or ridden in a vehicle, many feel empowered to talk about energy as though they were
experts. It turns out, however, that issues of energy supply, use, environmental impacts, and – especially – of free energy are too
complicated for the adlib homilies we hear every day in the media. Professor Vardaraja Raman, a well-known physicist and
humanist, said it best: “A major problem confronting society is the lack of knowledge among the public as to what science is, what
constitutes scientific thinking and analysis, and what science’s criteria are for determining the correctness of statements about the
phonomenological world.Ӧ It is a misconception that Constraint 2 can be removed with fresh plant carbon, while forgetting the scale
of Constraint 1 and ignoring Constraint 3. Constraint 4 helps us to maintain that more biomass converted to liquid fuels means more
of the same lifestyles, and a stable continuation of the current socioeconomic systems – Constraint 3 be damned.5 Constraint 5
plays the role of a wild card. Its unknown negative impacts may dwarf everything else I have mentioned in this work. ¶ This leads me
to the first major conclusion of this work:¶ Business as usual will lead to a complete and practically
immediate crash of the technically advanced societies and, perhaps, all humanity . This outcome will
not be much different from a collapse of an overgrown colony of bacteria on a petri dish when its sugar food runs out and waste
products build up. Today, the human “petri dish” is Earth’s surface in Fig. 2.5, and “food” is the living matter and water we consume
and the ancient plant products and minerals (oil, natural gas, coal, etc.) we mine and burn.¶ The Earth operates in endless cycles as
in Fig. 2.9, and modern humans race along short line segments, as in Fig. 2.10 and 2.7. At each turn of her cycles, the Earth renews
herself, but humans are about to wake up inside a huge toxic waste dump with nowhere to go.¶ 2.3 Plan of Attack¶ As you are
beginning to suspect, it is not sufficient to limit ourselves just to discussing liquid transportation fuels and their future biological
sources. These transportation fuels intrude upon every other aspect of life on the Earth: Availability of clean water to drink and clean
air to breathe, healthy soil and healthy food supply, destruction of biodiversity and essential planetary services in the tropics,
acceleration of global climate change, and so on.¶ As with many important policy-making decision processes, I start from the end,
cellulosic ethanol refineries. This is where most public money, attention, and hope are. I show that these
refineries are inefficient compared with the existing petroleum- and corn-based refineries, and are
difficult to scale up.¶ Then I return to the beginning and show that even if the cellulosic biomass refineries were marvels of
efficiency, they still could not maintain our current lifestyles by a long stretch, simply because the Earth will not give us the
extra biomass needed to keep on existing as we do. For a while we might continue to rob this
biomass from the poor tropics, but the results are already disastrous for all humanity, see Fig. 2.11.
here the
U- No Cellulose 2NC
Oil prices, financing, policy uncertainty stall cellulose now
Jim Lane 12-10-14 is editor and publisher of Biofuels Digest where this article was originally published. Biofuels Digest is
the most widely read Biofuels daily read by 14,000+ organizations. “What $60 Oil Means For Biofuels”
http://www.altenergystocks.com/archives/2014/12/what_60_oil_means_for_biofuels.html
$60 Oil As if tough financing conditions and policy instability weren’t worrying enough for many observers, along
comes a crash in global oil prices. One of the US-based Digesterati writes:¶ “Most of the biofuels projects that I have worked
on in the last 5 years have based their proformas on an $80/barrel oil price. With the recent dip and
worldwide “power play,” I feel that investors as well as Boards of Directors will
be really re-evaluating their
business models , with most going overseas to markets that do not have the abundant reserves that we do. ¶ “If we can
make biofuels at a competitive price at $60-$70/barrel, they will be the big winners but I don’t see
that happening . I feel that chemicals will be the big winners right now. I am working on a couple of feasibility
studies around biofuels and it is hard for me to come up with an independent conclusion that will
be credible, too much US political risk, economic risk, and international political risk.Ӧ Another of the Digesterati forwarded this
summary of an MIT Review article:¶ “According to Wallace Tyner, an agriculture and energy economist at Purdue University, all
cellulosic ethanol plants were planned for oil above $100 a barrel, and since now it’s at US$70, they are
no longer profitable and new plants simply won’t get built . Updated requirements are expected from the EPA
early next year. If the mandates are repealed, says Tyner, “then cellulosic biofuels and biodiesel would cease to exist.”
Progress won’t be sustained
Kevin Bullis, “The Cellulosic Ethanol Industry Faces Big Challenges,” MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, 8—12—13,
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/517816/the-cellulosic-ethanol-industry-faces-big-challenges/
the new wave of plant
openings, good news as it is for the emerging industry, also shows just how far it still has to go.
A series of cellulosic-biofuel plants are finally starting to come on line after years of delay. But
Last week, the chemical company Ineos started making ethanol from wood chips and other plant materials at a facility in Florida,
that can produce up to 8.5 million gallons of fuel a year. By next year more than a dozen multimillion-gallon plants are scheduled to
be finished in the U.S. Although the plants are considered commercial scale, they’re still relatively small compared
with corn ethanol plants, which often produce 100 million gallons of fuel per year. The facilities won’t come close
to meeting the requirements set out by the 2007 r enewable- f uel s tandard, which was central to President Bush’s
efforts to bring fuels made from biomass to market. What’s more, many of the new plants will struggle in an already
saturated ethanol market. Cellulosic biofuels, made from materials such as wood chips and corn stalks, were mandated as part of
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. They were supposed to help end what Bush called America’s “addiction to oil.”
The renewable-fuel standard called for a rapid increase in the amount of fuel that comes from conventional corn-based ethanol as
well as cellulosic ethanol. Corn ethanol production surged, but cellulosic-ethanol production has been delayed
both by technical challenges and by a lack of funds for commercial plants. The renewable-fuel standard
originally called for a billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol to be blended into the nation’s fuel supplies this year, but the Environmental
Protection Agency has reduced the target to just six million gallons. Next year’s target is 1.75 billion, but the EPA is expected to set
a new level based on what it expects companies can produce.
It’s not cost competitive, tech barriers
Sara Gonzalez-Garcia et al, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Santiago de Compostela, “Life Cycle
Assessment of Hemp Hurds Use in Second Generation Ethanol Production,” BIOMASS AND BIOENERGY v. 36, 2012, pp. 268279, p. 275-276.
As mentioned above, there
are a few obstacles and constraints that need to be overcome if secondgeneration ethanol is to be regarded as a sustainable and cost-effective source of energy. Nowadays,
biofuels are commercially uncompetitive with fossil fuels (petrol and diesel) in Europe because the technology
is still being developed. Although lignocellulosic biomass is abundant and inexpensive, not all cellulose biomass is
suitable and can be used as feedstock, due to the constraints of the present technology used to
hydrolyze the biomass efficiently in terms of cost and energy consumption [2].
There are multiple investment barriers that block cellulose
Tim Sklar, biofuels project consultant, “Obstacles Bedevil EISA’s RFS Biofuels Mandate,” OIL & GAS JOURNAL 3—17—08,
npg.
Barriers to investment Further, there
are a number of perceived or actual barriers to attracting the amount of
investment needed to this infant industry: * The market for new advanced biofuels, such as butanol and
dimethyl ether as gasoline replacements, face market resistance. In the case of recently introduced biofuels such as
biodiesel and E85, the oil industry is still not fully convinced that it should be making substantial investments that will
be required in building biofuels processing plants, in establishing new biofuels distribution networks, or in undertaking new biofuels
marketing campaigns. * Growers of soybeans have not yet been convinced to abandon wheat or corn as
a second crop in order to produce canola or other oil seed crops in the hope that biodiesel producers will
expand and create a demand for vegetable oil that does not now exist. Likewise, crushers are reluctant to increase capacity to
support yet-to-be-planted oilseed crops or to produce vegetable oil for yet-to-be-built biodiesel plants. * Grain elevator
operators and farm cooperatives that generate large quantities of agricultural waste are not eager
to organize and invest in joint ventures for collection, preprocessing, and storage operations in anticipation of attracting
investors to build new agriwaste-to-ethanol plants, * Pulp and paper mills that have access to large amounts of pulp wood
and wood waste are not fully convinced that they should produce cellulosic ethanol or other advanced fuels,
as they have never been in the fuels business. They also are reluctant to upset the cost they now pay for wood and wood waste, or
to modify their pulp mill operations if it could in any way adversely impact their paper-making operations. * And no one is
running out to build biofuels plants at a cost of $125-275 million each.
Relations key to share resources and expertise – gets cellulosic on board
George Philippidis 8 is associate director of the Applied Research Center and co-director of the Energy Business Forum at
Florida International University. “Energy Security Achievable with Biofuels Made in the America” Ethanol Producer Magazine,
http://www.ethanolproducer.com/articles/4466/energy-security-achievable-with-biofuels-made-in-the-americas/
Undoubtedly, great
technical progress has been achieved in cellulosic technologies during the past 15
technical challenges before becoming cost-competitive. Most likely there will be no
single technology winner, but rather technologies will be adapted to the particular characteristics of local feedstocks. Closer
collaboration within the Americas will allow the countries of the Western Hemisphere to capitalize
on their collective technical expertise and biomass resources to produce significant amounts of
ethanol further enhancing their energy security, economic growth and environmental record. ¶ Manage
years. Still, they all face
Expectations Properly ¶ The new federal renewable fuels standard calls for the United States to raise its annual biofuel production
from 6.5 billion gallons per year in 2007 to 36 billion gallons per year by 2022. This is a tremendous undertaking in terms of
investment required, construction activity and infrastructure development. Corn ethanol alone will not suffice to reach that goal,
since U.S. corn ethanol production will max out at approximately 15 billion gallons per year. Hence, there will be a significant gap
between U.S. ethanol supply and demand, as shown in Figure 1. In this model the supply projections are based on a realistic
capacity growth of U.S. corn and cellulosic ethanol, whereas demand is based on a combination of historical trends in the number of
total and flexible fuel vehicles on the road, per capita miles driven per year, and estimated E10 and E85 market penetration rates. ¶
The projected ethanol shortage will have to be filled by ethanol derived from sources other than corn. Cellulosic ethanol is viewed as
the only feasible domestic solution for the United States, but expectations of commercial cellulosic plants within the next two to three
years are not realistic. Resolution of scale-up issues in newly built demonstration plants will require several years, and lengthy
construction (due to a shortage in stainless steel) will add more time. ¶ If expectations for cellulosic ethanol are not properly
managed, the whole biofuels industry will suffer from a potentially fatal public and investor reaction. There have already been "false
starts" in the past. This time around, when policy, technology and investment have finally converged, we can not afford to miss the
golden opportunity for a long-term prospective. ¶ Latin America Part of Solution ¶ The United States must look at its hemispheric
neighbors to make up the demand-supply gap. Sugarcane ethanol from Brazil, Colombia and Central America
needs to be an integral part of the U.S. energy strategy, especially when an increase in cane ethanol capacity in
Latin America provides an expedient, cost-effective and low-risk strategy. This can be accomplished by adding (or expanding)
ethanol production capability at existing sugar mills to enable them to produce a diverse portfolio of products: sugar, ethanol,
renewable electricity and steam, animal feed (molasses) and fertilizers (vinasse). ¶ Undoubtedly, the United States needs Latin
America for energy security through diversification. Conversely, Latin America needs the United States for capital and technology
infusion to build or expand their cane ethanol (and, in the future, cellulosic ethanol) capabilities to satisfy their own energy needs
and enter the U.S. market, the largest fuel market in the world (145 billion gallons per year of gasoline). ¶ This interdependence calls
for closer collaboration within the Americas in the energy sector and by extension in agriculture, project financing, trade, immigration
and poverty reduction. ¶ Biofuels Challenges in Latin America ¶ While conditions are favorable for biofuels production, Latin America
faces a number of challenges that make foreign investors hesitant. Those issues need to be addressed on a hemispheric basis
under the joint leadership of the two biofuels giants, the United States and Brazil. The challenges include political, economic, trade
and social issues. Political instability and poor regulatory and legal frameworks need to be addressed. Latin American countries
need to commit to protecting foreign investment, intellectual property and the sanctity of contractual agreements. ¶ For Latin America
to realize its full biofuel production potential, significant investment will be needed. Joint ventures between U.S. and Latin American
investors, helped with debt financing from regional development banks, is the best means to fund local biofuel projects. ¶ Although
one has to recognize the complexity of agricultural subsidies world-wide, there is no excuse for setting up barriers to the open trade
of biofuels. For biofuels to truly become world commodities and hence cost-competitive, import quotas and tariffs need to be
eliminated. ¶ Through economic growth and employment opportunities the biofuels industry can become a means to alleviate rural
poverty in Latin America and reduce migration to the United States. For local people to take advantage of employment opportunities,
the public and private sectors need to team up to provide workforce training and development with the active participation of local
educational institutions. ¶ Recommendations ¶ Ethanol and other biofuels are a key part of the solution to our country's need for
energy diversification. The corn industry has introduced Americans to a new era of fuels, but we need additional abundant ethanol
resources to break our addiction to oil. Domestic cellulosic biomass and biofuels from Latin America are two
key sustainable resources. The U.S. needs to pursue a four-prong biofuels strategy. First, the corn industry needs to
improve the sustainability of its ethanol by eliminating fossil energy use and concentrating on agronomic and process improvements
rather than conversion of more U.S. land to ethanol production. ¶ Second, through public-private partnerships the
United States should treat the commercialization of cellulosic technologies as a matter of national
security (a new Manhattan project) and invest all the necessary resources to accelerate deployment. ¶ Third, the United
States should pursue closer energy integration with Latin America though regulatory
convergence and open biofuels trade , thus encouraging private investment in sugarcane ethanol
production to supplement domestic capacity. This is the fastest and lowest risk means to boost E85 availability
within three to four years and displace gasoline use to an extent significant enough to cause oil demand and prices to drop.
M: A2 “Cellulose Solves”
Cellulosic kills soil decomposers—causes extinction via food and environment
John Ikerd 2008, Professor Emeritus of Agricultural Economics at the University of Missouri. “Rethinking the Meaning of
Waste in Relation to Energy, Food, and Climate,” June 24, 2008 http://web.missouri.edu/ikerdj/papers/Lake%20Ozark%20%20Rethinking%20Waste.htm
Understandably, cellulosic ethanol has become the latest political favorite in the quest for renewable replacement for fossil energy,
even though its technical and economic feasibility is still uncertain. However, forages are typically used as feed for livestock, which
produce meat and dairy products and trees can produce fruits and nuts – food. So, the competition of cellulosic
ethanol with food production still exists; it’s just less obvious because the connections are less
direct and more complex. The ethical questions are no different. Each kcal of biofuels potentially
deprives someone somewhere of a kcal of food.
This would seem to leave agricultural wastes as the ideal source of bioenergy. Much of the solar energy
captured by agricultural crops is left in the fields as crop residues, to be burned, buried, or to dissipate into the air as it rots. Eighty
percent or more of the energy in feed grains and forages fed to livestock is excreted as livestock urine and manure, much of which
fouls streams and groundwater or volatizes into the air as noxious odors and greenhouse gasses. In fact, all livestock-related
activities, including feed grain production and clearing of forests for livestock forages, are estimated to account for 18-percent of
total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and approximately 80-percent of greenhouse gasses emitted by agriculture.[4] Much of the
remainder of agriculture’s estimated 22.5-percent contribution to total U.S. greenhouse gas production is accounted for by
deforestation, crop residues, and nitrous gasses released through soil fertilization. Clearly, using agricultural wastes for bioenergy
and biomaterials could make a significant contribution to the twin challenges of fossil energy depletion and global climate change.
Furthermore, if all biological wastes were truly wastes, there would be no competition with food production. No ethical compromise
would be involved.
However, crop residues and livestock urine and manure are not wastes when viewed from an
ecological perspective. The complex ecological system through which all bioenergy flows may be represented
as a pyramid with various layers of living organisms. The bottom layer is made up of the
organisms in the soil, the next layer is plants, the next is all those things that feed on plants,
including insect and animal herbivores, next is the things that feed on both plants and animals,
the omnivores, mainly humans, and finally the things that eat only animals, the meat-eating
carnivores. A generalization exists in ecology that on average, about ten-percent of the energy available in one layer will be
passed on to the next level; thus the pyramid narrows dramatically as it rises. “Not everything in the lower levels gets eaten, not
everything that is eaten is digested, and energy is always being lost as heat”[5] – to entropy. So each higher level of the pyramid
contains only about ten-percent as much as energy as the level immediately below it. As Aldo Leopold put it, “for every carnivore,
there are hundreds of his prey, thousands of their prey, millions of insects, and uncountable plants.”[6]
A critically important layer of this living pyramid is its foundation: the billions and trillions of
microorganisms in the soil , the decomposers that extract and live from the energy remaining in
the wastes generated at all other levels in the pyramid, including human wastes, livestock wastes, and crop residues. All new
energy enters the biological pyramid at the plants layer, made up of the solar collectors. Energy is stored by all levels of the pyramid
but all the energy captured ultimately escapes into space as heat – the process of entropy. However, the inorganic nutrients –
nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, calcium – that plants must combine with carbon, hydrogen, oxygen in the process of storing
energy – as carbohydrates or sugars – are continuously recycling through the pyramid, with the soil’s biological system as its
foundation. Many of these inorganic nutrients become available to plants only after they have been released from wastes and stored
by decomposers. The food energy that supports earthworms, bacteria, fungi, nematodes, and other decomposers in the soil is the
energy left in the things that we humans call wastes. The various “wastes” reclaimed by the decomposers amount
to about one-fourth of all of the solar energy currently captured by green plants. This is the
energy that some now propose to extract from the energy flow to use for biofuels and
biomaterials.
Everything we do affects everything else, including us. When we generate energy from wood wastes or sawdust,
we are depriving the decomposers in forest soils of food and thus deprive food from forests of
the future. When we generate energy from crop residues, animal manure, and other agricultural
wastes, we are depriving the decomposers in agricultural soils of the food they need to make soil
nutrients available for plants of the future. We humans are biological beings; we eat other biological organisms. We
can’t eat the sun or digest the electricity generated by windmills, falling water, or photovoltaic cells. If wastes equivalent to ten
percent of our current fossil energy use were diverted from the agricultural waste stream, it would deprive the decomposers of about
75-percent of so-called wasted energy they use to help feed agricultural crops. When we generate energy from agricultural residues
and wastes, we are depriving people of food just as surely as when we generate bioenergy from food crops; the process is just a bit
more complex.
The same basic ethical and ecological questions are raised by using agricultural wastes to produce biofuels and biomaterials as are
depriving the soil decomposers of
their life’s energy may represent an even more serious threat to the future of humanity than does
depleting the earth’s remaining fossil energy . Even if we deplete the earth of fossil energy, humanity might still learn
to live from the daily inflow of new solar energy – we would still have biological sources of food. If we starve the biological
foundation of the earth’s living pyramid , the decomposers, we may well have deprive d future
humanity of their only significant source of biological energy – their only source of food.
raised by using corn and soybeans to produce ethanol and biodiesel. In addition,
Cellulose fails—
Robert Bryce, senior fellow, Manhattan Institute, “The Cellulosic Ethanol Delusion,” COUNTERPUNCH, 3—30—09,
www.counterpunch.org/2009/03/30/the-cellulosic-ethanol-delusion/, accessed 9-15-14.
ethanol boosters have promised
cellulosic” ethanol
For years,
Americans that “
lurks just ahead, right past the nearest service station.
Once it becomes viable, this magic elixir — made from grass, wood chips, sawdust, or some other plant material — will deliver us from the evil clutches of foreign oil and make
the U.S. “energy independent” while enriching farmers and strengthening small towns across the country. Consider this claim: “From our cellulose waste products on the farm
such as straw, corn-stalks, corn cobs and all similar sorts of material we throw away, we can get, by present known methods, enough alcohol to run our automotive equipment
in the United States.” That sounds like something you’ve heard recently, right? Well, fasten your seatbelt because that claim was made way back in 1921. That’s when
American inventor Thomas Midgley proclaimed the wonders of cellulosic ethanol to the Society of Automotive Engineers in Indianapolis. And while Midgley was excited about
the prospect of cellulosic ethanol, he admitted that there was a significant hurdle to his concept: producing the fuel would cost about $2 per gallon. That’s about $20 per gallon in
the hype over the fuel
continues unabated. And it continues even though two of the most prominent cellulosic ethanol companies in the U.S.,
Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings and Verenium Corporation, are teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. As noted last week by Robert Rapier
current money. Alas, what’s old is new again. I wrote about the myriad problems of cellulosic ethanol in my book, Gusher of Lies. But
on his R-Squared Energy blog, Verenium’s auditor, Ernst & Young, recently expressed concern about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern and Aventine was
recently delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. On March 16, the accounting firm Ernst & Young said Verenium may be forced to “curtail or cease operations” if it cannot
raise additional capital. And in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the company’s management said “We continue to experience losses from operations, and
we may not be able to fund our operations and continue as a going concern.” Last week, the company’s stock was trading at $0.36 per share. It has traded for as much as $4.13
over the past year. Aventine’s stock isn’t doing much better. Earlier this month, the company announced that it may seek bankruptcy protection if it cannot raise additional cash.
Last Friday, Aventine’s shares were selling for $0.09. Over the past year, those shares have sold for as much as $7.86. The looming collapse of the cellulosic ethanol producers
cellulosic ethanol – which has never been produced in commercial
quantities — has been relentlessly hyped over the past few years by a panoply of politicians and promoters. The list of politicos includes Iowa
deserves more than passing notice for this reason:
Senator Tom Harkin, President Barack Obama, former vice president Al Gore, former Republican presidential nominee and U.S. Senator John McCain, former president Bill
Clinton, former president George W. Bush and former CIA director James Woolsey. There are plenty of others who deserve to take a bow for their role in promoting the delusion
of cellulosic ethanol. Prominent among them: billionaire investor/technologist Vinod Khosla. In 2006, Khosla claimed that making motor fuel out of cellulose was “brain dead
simple to do.” He went on, telling NBC’s Stone Phillips that cellulosic ethanol was “just around the corner” and that it would be a much bigger source of fuel than corn ethanol.
Khosla also proclaimed that by making ethanol from plants “in less than five years, we can irreversibly start a path that can get us independent of petroleum.” In 2007, Kholsa
delivered a speech, “The Role of Venture Capital in Developing Cellulosic Ethanol,” during which he declared that cellulosic ethanol and other biofuels can be used to
completely replace oil for transportation. More important, Khosla predicted that cellulosic ethanol would be cost competitive with corn ethanol production by 2009. Two other
promoters who have declared that cellulosic ethanol is just on the cusp of viability: Mars exploration advocate Robert Zubrin, and media darling Amory Lovins. Of all the people
on that list, Lovins has been the longest – and the most consistently wrong – cheerleader for cellulosic fuels. His boosterism began with his 1976 article in Foreign Affairs, a
piece which arguably made his career in the energy field. In that article, called “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?” Lovins argued that American energy policy was all
wrong. What America needed was “soft” energy resources to replace the “hard” ones (namely fossil fuels and nuclear power plants.) Lovins argued that the U.S. should be
working to replace those sources with other, “greener” energy sources that were decentralized, small, and renewable. Regarding biofuels, he wrote that there are “exciting
developments in the conversion of agricultural, forestry and urban wastes to methanol and other liquid and gaseous fuels now offer practical, economically interesting
technologies sufficient to run an efficient U.S. transport sector.” Lovins went on “Some bacterial and enzymatic routes under study look even more promising, but presently
proved processes already offer sizable contributions without the inevitable climatic constraints of fossil-fuel combustion.” He even claims that given enough efficiency in
automobiles, and a large enough bank of cellulosic ethanol distilleries, “the whole of the transport needs could be met by organic conversion.” In other words, Lovins was
making the exact same claim that Midgley made 45 years earlier: Given enough money – that’s always the catch isn’t it? – cellulosic ethanol would provide all of America’s
transportation fuel needs. The funny thing about Lovins is that between 1976 and 2004 — despite the fact that the U.S. still did not have a single commercial producer of
cellulosic ethanol — he lost none of his skepticism. In his 2004 book Winning the Oil Endgame, Lovins again declared that advances in biotechnology will make cellulosic
ethanol viable and that it “will strengthen rural America, boost net farm income by tens of billions of dollars a year, and create more than 750,000 new jobs.” Lovins continued his
unquestioning boosterism in 2006, when during testimony before the U.S. Senate, he claimed that “advanced biofuels (chiefly cellulosic ethanol)” could be produced for an
average cost of just $18 per barrel. Of course, Lovins isn’t the only one who keeps having visions of cellulosic grandeur. In his 2007 book, Winning Our Energy Independence,
S. David Freeman, the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, declared that to get away from our use of oil, “we must count on biofuels.” And a key part of Freeman’s
biofuel recipe: cellulosic ethanol. Freeman claims that “there is huge potential to generate ethanol from the cellulose in organic wastes of agriculture and forestry.” He went on,
saying that using some 368 million tons of “forest wastes” could provide about 18.4 billion gallons of ethanol per year, yielding “the equivalent of about 14 billion gallons gasoline
[sic], or about 10 percent of current gasoline consumption.” Alas, Freeman fails to provide a single example of a company that has made a commercial success of cellulosic
ethanol. Cellulosic ethanol gained even more acolytes during the 2008 presidential campaign. In May 2008, the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi touted the passage of the
subsidy-packed $307 billion farm bill, declaring that it was an “investment in energy independence” because it providing “support for the transition to cellulosic ethanol.” About
the same time that Pelosi was touting the new farm bill, a spokesman for the Renewable Fuels Association, an ethanol industry lobbying group in Washington, was claiming that
corn ethanol was merely a starting point for other “advanced” biofuels. “The starch-based ethanol industry we have today, we’ll stick with it. It’s the foundation upon which we
are building next-generation industries,” said Matt Hartwig, a spokesman for the lobby group. In August 2008, Obama unveiled his “new” energy plan which called for “advances
in biofuels, including cellulosic ethanol.” After Obama’s election, the hype continued, particularly among Democrats on Capitol Hill. In January 2009, Tom Harkin, the Iowa
senator who’s been a key promoter of the corn ethanol scam, told PBS: “ethanol doesn’t necessarily all have to come from corn. In the last farm bill, I put a lot of effort into
supporting cellulose ethanol, and I think that’s what you’re going to see in the future…You’re going to see a lot of marginal land that’s not suitable for row crop production,
because it’s hilly, or it’s not very productive for corn or soybeans, things like that, but it can be very productive for grasses, like miscanthus, or switchgrass, and you can use that
to make the cellulose ethanol.” Despite the hype, cellulosic ethanol is no closer to commercial viability than it was when Midgley first began talking about it back in 1921. Turning
switchgrass, straw or corn cobs into sizable volumes of motor fuel is remarkably inefficient. It is devilishly difficult to break down cellulose into materials that can be fermented
into alcohol. And even if that process were somehow made easier, its environmental effects have also been called into question. A September 2008 study on alternative
automotive fuels done by Jan Kreider, a professor emeritus of engineering at the University of Colorado, and Peter S. Curtiss, a Boulder-based engineer, found that the
production of cellulosic ethanol required about 42 times as much water and emitted about 50 percent more carbon dioxide than standard gasoline. Furthermore, Kreider and
Curtiss found that, as with corn ethanol, the amount of energy that could be gained by producing cellulosic ethanol was negligible. In a recent interview, Kreider told me that
the key problem with turning cellulose into fuel is “that it’s such a dilute energy form. Coal and
gasoline, dirty as they may be, are concentrated forms of energy. Hauling around biomass makes
no sense.” Indeed, the volumes of biomass needed to make any kind of dent in America’s overall
energy needs are mind boggling. Let’s assume that the U.S. wants to replace 10 percent of its oil use with cellulosic ethanol. That’s a useful
percentage as it’s approximately equal to the percentage of U.S. oil consumption that originates in the Persian Gulf. Let’s further assume that the U.S. decides that switchgrass
is the most viable option for producing cellulosic ethanol. Given those assumptions, here’s the math: The U.S. consumes about 21 million barrels of oil per day, or about 320
billion gallons of oil per year. New ethanol companies like Coskata and Syntec are claiming that they can produce about 100 gallons of ethanol per ton of biomass, which is also
about the same yield that can be garnered by using grain as a feedstock. At 100 gallons per ton, producing 32 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol would require the annual
harvest and transport of 320 million tons of biomass. Assuming an average semi-trailer holds 15 tons of biomass, that volume of biomass would fill 21.44 million semi-trailer
loads. If each trailer is a standard 48 feet long, the column of trailers (not including any trucks attached to them) holding that amount of switchgrass would stretch almost
195,000 miles. That’s long enough to encircle the earth nearly eight times. Put another way, those trailers would stretch about 80 percent of the distance from the earth to the
moon. But remember, ethanol’s energy density is only about two-thirds that of gasoline. So that 32 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol only contains the energy equivalent of
about 21 billion gallons of gasoline. Thus, the U.S. would actually need to produce about 42.5 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol in order to supplant 10 percent of its oil needs.
That would necessitate the production of 425 million tons of biomass, enough to fill about 28.3 million trailers. And that line of semi-trailer loads that stretch about 257,500 miles,
plenty long enough to loop around the earth more than 10 times, or to stretch from the Earth to the Moon. But let’s continue driving down this road for another mile or two. Sure,
it’s possible to produce that much biomass, but how much land would be required to make it happen? Well, a report from Oak Ridge National Laboratory suggests that an acre
of switchgrass can yield about 11.5 tons of biomass per year, and thus, in theory, 1,150 gallons of ethanol per year. Therefore, to produce 425 million tons of biomass from
switchgrass would require some 36.9 million acres to be planted in nothing but switchgrass. That’s equal to about 57,700 square miles, or an area just a little smaller than the
state Oklahoma. For comparison, that 36.9 million acres is equal to about 8 percent of all the cropland now under cultivation in the U.S. Thus, to get 10 percent of its oil needs,
there’s no infrastructure available to
plant, harvest, and transport the switchgrass or other biomass source to the biorefinery. So just to
review: There are still no companies producing cellulosic ethanol on a commercial basis. The most prominent companies that have tried to do so are circling the drain. Even
if a company finds an efficient method of turning cellulose into ethanol, the logistics of moving the required
volumes of biomass are almost surely a deal-killer. And yet, Congress has mandated that it be done. The Energy Independence and Security Act
the U.S. would need to plant an area equal to 8 percent of its cropland. And none of that consider the fact that
of 2007 mandates that a minimum of 16 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol be blended into the U.S. auto fuel mix by 2022.
Heg
La war
No one can challenge the US
Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations
theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. “Theory of Unipolar
Politics” (Cambridge University Press) April 2014 Chapter 5, p. 113--143
Other countries are unlikely to develop the latent power necessary to launch a military challenge
to U.S. preponderance any sooner.¶ Europe an states face a steep demographic decline that is likely
to hinder their ability to grow relative to the United States, at least for the next several decades .
Furthermore, it is unlikely that their economic integration will lead to a political union possessing
unified military capabilities.40 As such, a challenge to U.S. military power will be unlikely to emerge
out of Europe. Japan and Russia, for their part, face profound demographic challenges that
hinder their long-term ability to generate the necessary latent power for a military challenge to
U.S. power preponderance.41¶ Likewise, other emerging economies such as Brazil and India are likely
to take longer than China to catch up with the United States. Brazil, having grown at more than 3
percent per year for the previous five years (a period during which the U.S. economy remained stagnant)
produced one-seventh of the U.S. GDP in 2013. Even if Brasilia manages to implement policies that
enable it to maintain its current rate of 3 percent growth over the U.S. economy, it will take Brazil more
than a half-century to match the level of absolute U.S. GDP. As for India, its economy has been
growing even faster, at an average rate of more than 6 percent per year between 2008 and 2012. Still, by
the end of this period it represented only one-eighth of U.S. GDP.4* Furthermore, India faces
institutional roadblocks to economic growth at least as important as those encountered by
China.43 All these states could, of course, pool their resources in a balancing coalition against the
United States, but the barriers to collective action by such a diverse group of states are
remarkably high. Some of them have historically been U.S. allies , whereas others have a past of
mutual enmity between them. Such a broad balancing coalition against the United States is
therefore an exceedingly unlikely prospect for as long as the United States continues to implement a strategy of
defensive accommodation toward major powers.'
Latent power solves overstretch
Brooks and Wohlforth 8 Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College
and Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government (Stephen and William, World Out of Balance, pg
211)
Analysts who argue that the United States now suffers, or soon will suffer, from imperial overstretch
invariably fail to distinguish between latent power (the level of resources that could be mobilized from society)
and actual power (the level of resources a government actually chooses to mobilize)." In his original formulation of imperial
overstretch, Kennedy had in mind a situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot cope with its existing foreign
policy commitments. To date, there is virtually no research on whether the United States faces this prospect. Part of the problem is
that because the Bush administration made no attempt to ask the public for greater sacrifice, there is no observable evidence of
whether it would be possible to extract more resources for advancing Ll.S. foreign policy interests. The Cold War experience
indicates that the U.S. public is capable of supporting, over long periods, significantly higher
spending on foreign policy than current levels. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the U.S. public would be
willing to support a dramatic increase in foreign policy spending now if policymakers called for it. The larger issue is that though IR
scholars use the term, they have not theorized or researched imperial overstretch as a constraint independent of counterbalancing.
In the historical cases highlighted by Kennedy and others, leading states suffered from imperial overstretch in significant part
because they faced counterbalancing that demanded more resources than they were able to extract domestically. As chapters 2
and 3 showed, the United States does not face a counterbalancing constraint . This raises a key question of
whether there are limits to the U'S. polity's capacity to generate power in the absence of the threat posed by a geopolitical peer rival.
Lacking a focused research effort, scholars can now only answer with speculation.
Nukes make heg inevitable
Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations
theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. “ Theory of Unipolar
Politics” (Cambridge University Press) April 2014 Chapter 3, p. 80-112
This argument about unipolar durability is predicated on a broader, more theoretical argument about the conditions under which
systemic balances of power are more likely to recur. In a nutshell, my argument is that a nuclear world makes it possible
for states to achieve the primary goal of balancing - survival - without causing a shift in the
systemic balance of power. A robust nuclear arsenal virtually guarantees the survival and
security of any state that possesses it, even one with a marked conventional inferiority. At the
same time, the presence of nuclear weapons raises the costs of a potential conflict between the
unipole and a challenger. Therefore, major powers in a unipolar world have no necessary
incentive to pursue a balancing strategy against the unipole once they acquire a robust nuclear
arsenal. The impact of the nuclear revolution on the structure of international politics reveals that
unipolarity is potentially durable because major powers can be satisfied in their quest for
security without challenging the power preponderance of the unipole.
A2
Ext1--Pharma Resil 2NC
Err aff – threats of collapse are exaggerated
Birnbaum 10 [Jeffrey H. Birnbaum is an American journalist and television commentator. He previously worked for the
Washington Post and Washington Times. 9-29-2010 http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/92026:big-pharma-reports-of-itsdemise-have-been-greatly-exaggerated]
Big Pharma: Reports of Its Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated The past decade has been
tumultuous for the pharmaceutical industry. The news media generally paints "Big Pharma" with a broad brush, an
unflattering portrait of corporate greed more concerned with short-term profits than supporting public health through access to
better, "smarter" medications. A recent Huffington Post article is a striking example of such caricature: in a list of "10 American
Industries That Will Never Recover," pharmaceuticals is No. 4, flanked by realtors and newspapers. Chief amongst the reasons
for its putative demise are mergers, layoffs, patent expirations with a diminishing pipeline of new drugs
and a growing trend toward generic medications. Price controls and increasingly strict regulatory hurdles add to the
pressure. Faced with such challenges, I believe this industry will thrive if they are willing to reinvent themselves,
bearing in mind a basic principle set forth by George Merck in 1950: "We try never to forget that medicine is for the people. It is not
for the profits. The profits follow, and if we have remembered that, they have never failed to appear."
New drug innovations
Ward, 9-26 [2014 Andrew, Financial Times “Drug development: Big pharma back in the game it made”
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/83bf54da-1bcd-11e4-9db1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FBV21KiK]
Big pharma is back . That, at least, is the impression created by a wave of new cancer drugs rapidly
approaching market. After years of hand-wringing about an innovation drought, there is hope that this month’s US
regulatory approval for a groundbreaking skin cancer medicine from Merck signals a revival in
productivity . Keytruda, shown to extend significantly the lives of some people with advanced melanoma, the most deadly form
of skin cancer, is first among a fresh class of treatments that harness the immune system to kill cancer cells. Bristol-Myers-Squibb,
another big US drugmaker, is hot on Merck’s heels with its own melanoma medicine, while Roche of
Switzerland and AstraZeneca of the UK are also in the mix. Cancer is not the only area where innovation has
picked up. Hepatitis C has also seen advances that are producing big commercial dividends.
However, whereas Gilead Sciences, the relatively young Californian biotech company, has so far been the main beneficiary of the
hepatitis C windfall, the breakthroughs
in cancer are breathing fresh life into more established players.
annual revenues from so-called immuno-oncology drugs
could climb as high as $ 35bn – outstripping the value of previous blockbuster categories such as
cholesterol-lowering statins. Others are more cautious but few doubt that these products promise a shot in
the arm for the industry. This optimism is reflected in Merck’s share price, which has gained more than a quarter over the
Andrew Baum, analyst at Citigroup, predicts that
past year in large part because of the prospects for Keytruda, which analysts predict will achieve $1.5bn in annual sales by 2017.
The drug is known as a checkpoint inhibitor which works by blocking a protein called programmed death receptor 1, or PD-1, which
cancer cells latch on to in order to avoid detection by the immune system. By targeting this protein, Keytruda and similar drugs aim
to unleash the body’s disease-fighting T-cells against tumours. Most people with advanced melanoma previously died within a year.
Recent data showed that, when treated with Keytruda, 69 per cent of patients were still alive after a year and 62 per cent after 18
months. Rival anti-PD-1 drugs have produced similar results but challenges remain. Although highly effective when they work,
checkpoint inhibitors so far seem to benefit only a minority. Researchers are trying to find biomarkers that will identify those patients
most likely to be responsive. Meanwhile, the drugs are being tested in combination with others with the aim of creating more potent
and more broadly-effective treatments. Another priority is to extend the drugs beyond melanoma. Merck, for example, has been
testing Keytruda on gastric and bladder cancer, with data expected in coming days at the annual conference of the European
Society of Medical Oncology in Madrid. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Roche and AstraZeneca will also issue updates on their progress in
almost every big pharmaceutical company
and a host of smaller biotech companies are looking for a share of the expected spoils from
immuno-oncology . Pfizer is working with Merck on combination therapies, while Celgene has
teamed up with Bristol-Myers Squibb. Novartis, Johnson & Johnson and others are quietly positioning themselves for
various tumour types. While the leading pack battle for early dominance,
the next generation of checkpoint inhibitors as the science becomes more sophisticated.
--A2 “Patent Cliff”
Patent cliff good- spurs innovation
Chiejina ’14 (Alexander Chiejina, Bussiness Day, “Drug patent cliff to drive pharma firms into innovation, research”,
http://businessdayonline.com/2014/01/drug-patent-cliff-to-drive-pharma-firms-into-innovation-research/#.VDA9ArXD9DU, January
24, 2014)
Multinational pharmaceutical firms such as Novartis, Sanofi, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, etc, are on
the brink of a decline in revenues due to patent expiry dates as many are losing the exclusive
rights to produce some of their blockbuster drugs. This situation, industry experts believe, could
lead to new research and product innovation, with generic drug producers set to benefit hugely
from the patent cliff. While pharma companies are set to lose more than $267 billion once a raft of
patents have expired by 2016, the ongoing patent expiration is expected to force generic
manufacturers to replenish product pipelines with new generic versions to expand markets
globally, including the African pharmaceutical market. As more drugs head towards their expiry dates, their original
makers are likely to see their profits drop significantly, face stiff competition from other producers which who could begin to make cheaper, generic
versions of their drugs. Drugs whose patent are expired or are heading towards expiry include drugs for ailments such as hypertension, osteoporosis,
rheumatism, lung infections, glaucoma, cholesterol, leukaemia, etc. A report by the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics titled ‘The Global Use of
Medicines: Outlook through 2016’, reveals that patent expiries and the introduction of low-cost generics will reduce spending through the forecast
period (2012-2016). The report noted that patent protected brand volume growth is expected to slow in advance of key patent expiries. “Patent expiries
will reduce brand spending by $127bn through 2016. Overall, exclusivity expiries in one or more of the developed markets will impact 13 of the top 20
products, or 7 of the top 10 current leading medicines, including Lipitor, Plavix, Advair Diskus, Crestor and Nexium,” the IMS report stated.
Industry experts believe the patent cliff will lead to a focus on developing targeted treatments,
which require companies to invent and bring more products into the pharmaceutical space to fill
the pipeline and generate comparable revenue levels. For a long time, pharmaceutical companies have relied on profits
from their popular medicines to enable them to invest in developing newer drugs. Interestingly, the effort that goes into researching, clinical trials and
marketing a new drug run into millions of dollars. With
further patents on commonly used drugs expiring, or
heading towards expiry, their original makers are likely to see their profits drop massively. They
will face greater competition from other producers, who could begin to make cheaper, generic
versions of their drugs. As tropical diseases are popular research areas, pharmaceutical institutes look set to tap into this area and
research on tropical diseases such as lymphatic filariasis, Onchocerciasis, malaria, and Schistosomiasis. Africa’s pharmaceutical
industry is growing as most multinationals look toward the continent for their expanding global
footprint. Tinotenda Sachikonye, an analyst at Frost and Sullivan, said that Africa’s focus is shifting from over-the-counter (OTC) medicines like
painkillers (aspirin or ibuprofen) to treatments for diseases, like diabetes and cancer. “The local manufacturers in Nigeria contribute to about 30 percent
of all manufacturing revenues in the country, so they’ve got quite a strong local manufacturing base. There is barely any research into new drugs in
Africa as generics represent as much as 70 percent of all the drugs produced,” Sachikonye noted. A peep into the global generic drug market show
The generic drug industry covers
the marketing and sale of medication containing the same active ingredients and dosages as
brand-name drugs manufactured by the pharmaceutical industry. Drugs can be prescribed under
their chemical name without specifying a particular pharmaceutical brand or company. When
brand-name drugs come off patent, the market is opened up to generic versions. Patent protection
generally protects a drug’s intellectual property rights for about 20 years, but as the patent is
effective from the clinical trial stage, the actual time the drug is on the market can be far less,
often between 10 and 14 years. After a patent expires, pharmaceutical companies come under
fierce pricing pressure due to competition from their less-expensive generic counterparts.
that the market will be worth under $169 billion in 2014, according to a report from BCC Research.
Ext2--No Innovation 2NC
New Breakthroughs not key – it’s a myth to extract government protections that ensure
industry profit
Light and Lexchin, 12 -- Donald W Light professor, Joel R Lexchin professor 1Department of Psychiatry, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2250 Chapel Avenue, Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, USA; 2York University, School of Health Policy
and Management, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 8/11, http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf
Myth of unsustainable research and development Complementing the stream of articles about the innovation crisis
are those about the costs of research and development being “unsustainable” for the small number of new drugs approved. Both
claims serve to justify greater government support and protections from generic competition, such as longer data
exclusivity and more taxpayer subsidies. However, although reported research and development costs rose
substantially between 1995 and 2010, by $34.2bn, revenues increased six times faster, by $200.4bn.25
Companies exaggerate costs of development by focusing on their self reported increase in costs
and by not mentioning this extraordinary revenue return . Net profits after taxes consistently
remain substantially higher than profits for all other Fortune 500 companies. 34 This hidden
business model for pharmaceutical research, sales, and profits has long depended less on the
breakthrough research that executives emphasise than on rational actors exploiting ever broader
and longer patents and other government protections against normal free market competition.
Companies are delighted when research breakthroughs occur, but they do not depend on them,
declarations to the contrary notwithstanding . The 1.3% of revenues devoted to discovering new
molecules compares with the 25% that an independent analysis estimates is spent on promotion ,
and gives a ratio of basic research to marketing of 1:19.
It’s industry hype – revenue provides resilience
Light and Lexchin, 12 -- Donald W Light professor, Joel R Lexchin professor 1Department of Psychiatry, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2250 Chapel Avenue, Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, USA; 2York University, School of Health Policy
and Management, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 8/11, http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf
Hidden business model How have we reached a situation where so much appears to be spent on research and development, yet
only about 1 in 10 newly approved medicines substantially benefits patients? The low bars of being better than placebo, using
surrogate endpoints instead of hard clinical outcomes, or being non-inferior to a comparator, allow approval of medicines that may
even be less effective or less safe than existing ones. Notable examples include rofecoxib (Vioxx), rosiglitazone (Avandia),
Although the industry’s vast network of public relations
departments and trade associations generate a large volume of stories about the so called
innovation crisis , the key role of blockbuster drugs, and the crisis created by “the patent cliff,”28 the hidden business model
gatifloxacin (Tequin), and drotrecogin alfa (Xigris).
of pharmaceuticals centres on turning out scores of minor variations, some of which become market blockbusters. In a series of
articles Kalman Applbaum describes how companies use “clinical trial administration, research publication,
regulatory lobbying, physician and patient education, drug pricing, advertising, and point-of-use
promotion” to create distinct marketing profiles and brand loyalty for their therapeutically similar
products.29 Sales from these drugs generate steady profits throughout the ups and downs of
blockbusters coming off patents. For example, although Pfizer lost market exclusivity for atorvastatin, venlafaxine,
and other major sellers in 2011, revenues remained steady compared with 2010, and net income
rose 21%. 30 Applbaum contends that marketing has become “the enemy of [real] innovation.”31 This perspective
explains why companies think it is worthwhile paying not only for testing new drugs but also for
thousands of trials of existing drugs in order to gain approval for new indications and expand the
market.32 This corporate strategy works because marketing departments and large networks of
sponsored clinical leaders succeed in persuading doctors to prescribe the new products .33 An
analysis of Canada’s pharmaceutical expenditures found that 80% of the increase in its drug budget is
spent on new medicines that offer few new benefits.16 Major contributors included newer
hypertension, gastrointestinal, and cholesterol drugs, including atorvastatin, the fifth statin on the Canadian
market.
Superbugs
Pot not key- psudo science--finishing
the evidence is slim to nonexistent that cannabis has any use as a medicine , and
those conditions, such as CINV and chronic pain, can often be treated more reliably with purified or synthesized
active components. Moreover, for one condition for which there is reasonably good evidence for the efficacy of cannabis and/or cannabinoids, namely chronic
pain, politicians are reluctant to approve medical marijuana.¶ This is the same thing with a lot of science in this country. Political expediency trumps
real scientific research. Anthropogenic global warming, which is backed by a wealth of evidence, is rejected because it’s a “liberal conspiracy” or some such
nonsense. Well, now politicians want to allow marijuana because of medical benefits, almost all of which are unsupported by real
scientific evidence , while ignoring some of the known risks of smoking the drug. If politicians want to make marijuana legal, do so because it’s a recreational
all but a handful of conditions,
drug, not unlike alcohol.¶ The world of medical marijuana is using the same weak evidence, the same ignorance of risks, and the same logical fallacies you hear from those who
push “natural” herbs or supplements. And the more we look the more we find that there’s nothing there. We need to separate recreational use of marijuana from medical use.
They are not the same, and one shouldn’t support the other.¶ The TL;DR version¶ Marijuana prevents nausea in cancer treatment patients–maybe, maybe not. No solid
research in the area.¶ Marijuana cures cancer–no clinical evidence that it does.¶ Marijuana can treat neurological conditions–not really, but some isolated cannabinoids may
help ameliorate some symptoms of some conditions.¶ Marijuana has some risks that have not been fully explored. But stay tuned, I have more to write on this.¶ There is no
global Big Pharma conspiracy to suppress clinical research on marijuana. If it could “cure” one cancer, they’d be all over it trying to find the right dose, delivery mechanism, and
pretty advertising to make billions of dollars.¶ If you want to smoke marijuana (or eat it in a brownie–not sure that’s a thing anymore, it was when I was in college) because it’s
relaxing, or you need to blow off steam after a tough day, fine. Go for it. I absolutely do not understand why this usage is illegal. It’s costly to society. And banning it provides no
The evidence is just so weak
or non-existent, I actually have no clue why it’s part of the discourse, but then again people deny evolution, and we end up arguing that. Yes, there are
bits and pieces of intriguing evidence that a component of marijuana may have some benefits to
human health. But we’re a long ways from testing that with real clinical trials, then getting it to
market. And trust me, when someday we have found some real clinically significant uses, it’s not going to be sold as a “joint.” It’s going to be developed into some sort of
benefit to society.¶ On the other hand, I find most, if not all, of the medical claims made about marijuana to be laughable.
medical delivery formulation (like a pill or injectable solution) that gets the purified pharmacologically relevant compound to the physiological site where it would work. That’s
how real medical science works.
burnout
No ABR impact
Jesse Pines, Associate Professor, Emergency Medicine and Health Policy, George Washington University, “Should We Be
Afraid of the Superbug?” FOREIGN POLICY, 9—3—10,
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/03/should_we_be_afraid_of_the_superbug, accessed 9-14-14.
For a few days this August, much of the news media in the West became convinced that we were headed back
to the 1800s, medically speaking. A study in the September 2010 issue of British medical journal the Lancet argued that bacteria
carrying genes for NDM-1, a gene that imparts resistance to a key family of antibiotics, had made their way through India and
Pakistan into Britain and were now threatening to derail medical treatment across the developed world. Linked with the always
shady-sounding concept of "medical tourism" -- the practice of traveling to other countries for budget surgery -- the so-called
"superbug," able to breed vicious and deadly infections, became an instant media panic during a slow news month. The Drudge
Report and Andrew Breitbart's news website both featured it. A Guardian science columnist wrote, "Now, the post-antibiotic
apocalypse is in sight."¶ Er, not so much. As with most August stories, the
reality of superbugs is a bit more complex
than the media has portrayed it . Yes, antibiotic-resistant bacteria are a threat, as this week's news of an outbreak among
premature infants in London reminds us. But no one yet knows how bad NDM-1-related infections could be. Not only is it far too
early to say we're headed for apocalypse, we've also got a lot to learn from superbugs -- namely, how our own overuse of antibiotics is making it more likely that a superbug of the future could live up to this summer's hype.¶ Alexander Fleming
discovered the first antibiotic by accident in 1928, when he left out a bacterial culture for a month while on vacation and came back
to find that some of the bacteria had been killed by a fungus named Penicillium. By the early 1940s, a commercial product, penicillin,
was mass-produced to cure bacterial infections in humans, and medical practice hasn't been the same since. ¶ These days,
antibiotics are a major weapon in medicine's war on disease, used to treat everything from life-threatening infections like meningitis
to more run-of-the-mill ear infections. For more advanced medical technologies, like chemotherapy or organ transplantation,
antibiotics are needed to prevent and treat infections while patients heal. Neither treatment would be possible without antibiotics.¶ At
this point, in fact, antibiotics are suffering from their own success. They are so engrained in the medical and social culture that overprescription is a major problem. Recent surveys have found that 70 to 80 percent of doctors' visits for sinus infections result in an
antibiotic prescription. But most sinus infections are caused by viruses, and antibiotics don't cure viral infections. ¶ The medical sin of
antibiotic overuse goes beyond mere ineffectiveness -- it actually can be harmful. Here's how it works: Bacteria are everywhere on
our bodies, even when we are not sick. When we take antibiotics for a bacterial infection, they only kill certain bacteria (usually the
ones making us sick). Then, as the body gets better, the surviving bacteria multiply and take over. Now and then a few remaining
bacteria carry special resistance to antibiotics -- which is what kept them alive in the first place. With the other bacteria out of the
way, the resistant bacteria (i.e., the superbug) can multiply and sometimes cause problems. For example, if one of those superbugs
causes an infection, some antibiotics won't work anymore, and then you have an infection that is more difficult to treat. ¶ One of the
prototypical superbugs caused by antibiotic use (and overuse) is Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). MRSA is
resistant to many antibiotics, including penicillin, and causes a variety of problems in humans: mostly skin infections, but also more
invasive diseases like pneumonia and bloodstream infections.¶ Another superbug that's been around for a while but has also taken
a recent media tour is Clostridium difficile (C. diff), which can be spread when antibiotics wipe out normal intestinal bacteria that
keep C. diff in check. A recent study found C. diff infection occurred in 13 out of every 1,000 hospitalizations. C. diff causes diarrhea,
and in some cases a particularly severe and sometimes lethal infection of the colon. ¶ Looking at bacteria carrying the NDM-1 gene,
C. diff, and MRSA, it's not surprising that people would panic over the possibility of these or other, even more resistant, bugs of the
future making our advances in antibiotics worthless. And it's a legitimate fear. Although there are antibiotics and other treatments
that work against all known superbugs, bacteria will continue to evolve, developing stronger antibiotic resistance in the future. It is
conceivable that bacteria will someday outsmart our best medical technologies. ¶ But it
is unlikely that it will happen any
time soon. One reason is that there are many different classes of antibiotics , so while some don't work
against superbugs, there are usually others that do. Antibiotics that have been shelved for years might even
be re-introduced to fight superbugs, though obviously this would be less than ideal because of higher risk of side
effects. A better and more likely solution is for drug companies and other scientists to discover new classes of
antibiotics. The financial incentives for heading off a true superbug-led medical catastrophe would be huge -something that always drives medical innovation quite nicely, as it did with treatments for HIV in the 1990s.
1NR
HR Cred Add On Ans
Obama is backing off china human rights pressure now-- that’s key to
cooperation on korea, warming, cybersecurity—turns the aff
By Paul Eckert 11-3-13 WASHINGTON | Sun Nov 3, 2013 6:15am EST “Analysis: Tensions with allies rise, but U.S. sees
improved China ties” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/03/us-usa-china-xi-analysis-idUSBRE9A205B20131103
(Reuters) - With ties between Washington and many close allies strained because of eavesdropping revelations and differences
over U.S. policies in the Middle East, the Obama administration can take some comfort from an improvement in
ties with China.¶ A year after China's President Xi Jinping took over the helm of the country's ruling Communist Party, senior
U.S. officials say
they see increased cooperation on a range of issues from climate change to
North Korea 's nuclear weapons ambitions. They also regard greater bilateral military contacts as
an important safety valve if there are any potential flare-ups.¶ On the economic front, Washington is focused
on China's November 9-12 Communist Party conclave where Xi's blueprint for making the world's second-largest economy more
open is expected to be unveiled.¶ Xi's administration already has spawned optimism with an agreement to reopen bilateral
investment treaty talks and a pilot free trade zone in Shanghai that augurs well for deeper reforms to address Chinese investment
Not all is rosy . Serious fault
lines remain over issues that have long vexed the Sino-U.S. relationship, such as human rights .
and trade barriers. Both could help dent the $300 billion annual U.S. trade deficit with China.¶
Western experts and Chinese activists are concerned that China's record on human rights may be worsening under Xi, who became
China's president in March, given there have been crackdowns on lawyers, activists and Internet opinion leaders. ¶ Potential discord
also lurks in China's recent increasing recourse to what its critics call gunboat diplomacy in maritime territorial disputes with Asian
neighbors, including U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. ¶ But officials from both countries say they are
committed to what China calls a "new model of major country relations" - a Xi mantra that aims to
minimize Sino-U.S. rivalry as China's global power grows.¶ To Washington, the concept means
"there is room on planet Earth for a rising, strong, stable, prosperous China and a United States
that continues to serve as the champion of a liberal, democratic, free-market and rules-based system,"
said Daniel Russel, the State Department's top Asia diplomat.¶ Washington and Beijing intend to "avoid a
mechanistic dynamic in which a rising power and an enduring power were inevitably destined for
conflict," he added.¶ The most common concrete example U.S. officials give of a better working
relationship is North Korea, whose nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs are seen as one of Asia's most
serious security threat s.¶ Washington has long sought to convince Beijing to do more to rein in
Pyongyang, a Chinese ally since the Korean War. North Korea's nuclear test in early 2013, the latest of three since 2006, was
accompanied by threats of nuclear attack on the United States and South Korea.¶ "We've seen (China) be more
forward-leaning in applying pressure on the North Koreans," said Ben Rhodes, Obama's deputy national
security adviser for strategic communications.¶ "That's in part because the cycle of provocation that was taking place in the spring
was concerning to them because it was destabilizing the region ... and ultimately it was not consistent with their own interest," he
told Reuters.¶ China, often criticized by the United States and its allies for weak enforcement of U.N. Security Council sanctions on
the North, last month published a detailed list of technologies and goods banned from export to North Korea because of their
potential use in weapons of mass destruction.¶ PRIORITY ISSUES¶ The narrowing of differences on North Korea was a
key outcome from Xi's informal summit with President Barack Obama last June in Rancho Mirage, California - a
desert retreat that allowed the two leaders to meet for eight hours over two days. ¶ That informal summit, mainly designed as a
trust-building exercise, also produced an agreement to reduce the use of greenhouse gases and to
launch a bilateral working group to hold regular discussions on cyber-security.¶ "The U.S. and China are
cooperating not on boutique projects, not on off-Broadway, where it doesn't really matter, but on priority, critical issues that
genuinely matter to both of our people and genuinely matter to the region and the world," said Russel, who attended the summit, in
an interview.¶ In early 2012, when Xi was China's vice president, he toured the United States as a guest of U.S. counterpart Joe
Biden, visiting a small town in Iowa where he did a brief home stay in 1987, as well as Los Angeles and Washington. ¶ The
Washington trip included a visit to the Pentagon, which helped set up a packed 2013-14 calendar of exchanges between the two
countries' militaries. Military-to-military ties have long been the weakest link between the two powers. ¶ WAITING FOR XI'S PLAN¶
U.S.-China ties have warmed but then cooled in the past, and analysts warn that Xi's agenda may only start to become clearer after
this month's Communist Party Central Committee Plenum sees him put his full stamp on Chinese policy. ¶ On economic policy,
Americans see room for optimism, based on Xi's record since the 1990s as a business-friendly party and government leader
overseeing roaring economies in Shanghai and the vibrant coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang. ¶ "Everything about his past
where he served before in China indicates that there are reasons to be optimistic that he will take a more pro-market approach than
his predecessor," said Kenneth Jarrett, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and a former U.S. diplomat in
China.¶ The U.S. Treasury on Wednesday said China was not a currency manipulator and had allowed the yuan to appreciate 12
percent against the dollar since June 2010, while adding that the Chinese currency still appears undervalued. But in a semiannual
report to Congress, the criticism of China was muted and less prominent than an attack on Germany, which was accused of
hampering economic stability in Europe and hurting the global economy because of its focus on exports rather than boosting
domestic demand.¶ On human rights and regional security, however, there are more question marks.¶ A party
directive called Document No. 9, believed to reflect Xi's beliefs, makes it a taboo to discuss publicly "Western
notions" such as constitutional rule, universal values, press freedom, judicial independence and civil society.¶ In
less abstract terms, China's widening crackdown on bloggers, lawyers and activists has seen the detention or
arrest of scores if not hundreds
of people. nL5N0IC2J8]¶ Obama, while not dropping the human rights issues, appears
to have decided not to turn it into a make-or-break issue for Sino-American relations.
Credibility means we pressure china
Washington Post 10 (“Clinton, Gates offer distinct messages on human rights in Asia”, 7/22/10,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/07/perhaps_it_is_a_coincidence.html)
Clinton, on her first overseas trip, caused waves when she said promotion of human rights in China would have to take a
back seat issues such as climate change and the financial crisis. Administration officials at the time said the White House was
taking a more subtle approach on human rights, first seeking to reestablish U.S. credibility by
pledging to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and then working behind the scenes to
advance change overseas.
Relations fragile now—human rights pressure is the only scenario for collapse
Bandow 12 (nov 7, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald
Reagan. “The U.S. And China: Seeking Cooperation, But Finding Confrontation” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/uschina-seeking-cooperation-finding-confrontation
Now some Americans fear another hostile
superpower is being born. Yet despite the headlines, often dominated by conflicts, such as today’s
controversy over the status of blind human rights attorney Chen Guangcheng, the U.S.-China relationship is
overwhelmingly beneficial for both sides.¶ Politically the two governments are wary friends rather
than bitter enemies . Rather than conduct real or shadow wars against each other Beijing and Washington have regular and
routine peaceful contacts. Despite its disquiet over America’s determination to dominate the globe, China often
acquiesces to U.S. policy.¶ Of course, Beijing remains an authoritarian state. Although personal autonomy has greatly
The bilateral relationship then was based on containing Soviet power.
expanded, there is no comparable political freedom: the surest way to win a trip to the laogai, or labor camps, is to advocate human
rights over party prerogative. For instance, Chen earned official enmity by opposing coerced abortion and sterilization. However, the
PRC today is far improved over the Maoist version, and there is at least reason to hope for continuing positive change. ¶ Bilateral
economic ties are broad. The PRC’s prosperity has expanded the global economic pie, which is good for Chinese, Americans, and
most everyone else. In the PRC hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of immiserating poverty. China’s economic
reforms have been one of the most extensive anti-poverty programs in human history.¶ Americans, too, have benefited
economically, most directly as consumers and investors, but increasingly as sellers and investees . The PRC also helps
finance the U.S. government. The U.S. trade deficit is large, but that figure has little meaning: it is merely an accounting
aggregation of private transactions. Moreover, America’s deficit with the rest of Asia has fallen as production has shifted to China.¶
With Beijing’s economic rise has come a greater international presence. Nevertheless, the U.S. has little to fear so far. China has
aided such pariah regimes as Burma, North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe while providing aid and purchasing resources throughout
Africa and South America. However, like America during the Cold War, Beijing is learning how hard it is to turn temporary advantage
into permanent gain. For example, Burma is moving to the West, North Korea routinely ignores the PRC’s wishes, Sudan has split
apart, and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe is fading. In countries like Zambia we now see the Ugly Chinese instead of the Ugly
American.¶ Even greater alarms have been raised about Chinese military spending. Beijing has become world number two, but a
distant number two, devoting an estimated $100 to $150 billion annually to the military, compared to more than $700 billion by the
U.S. The PRC is determined to build a competent force, and who can blame it? Since the late 1800s China has been at war (or at
least fought battles) with Great Britain, a coalition of Western nations, Japan, South Korea, America, India, Russia, and Vietnam.
Beijing has special interest in deterring the U.S. given Washington’s penchant for regime change, regular naval patrols in East Asia,
support for Taiwan, constant attempts to “strengthen” East Asian alliances, and persistent talk of containing the PRC. But China is
years if not decades away from building a military which could challenge American global primacy and threaten the U.S. homeland.¶
American policy toward China must reflect this range of complex interests. Washington wants the PRC to liberalize politically, open
more economically, support U.S. objectives internationally, and remain militarily vulnerable. It’s an ambitious agenda that isn’t likely
to be fulfilled—and certainly not quickly, easily, and under American pressure. ¶ Trade issues remain divisive. Mitt Romney has
promised to “begin on Day One by designating China as a currency manipulator,” followed by imposing a variety of “punitive
measures,” including “creating a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.”¶ No doubt, the Chinese don’t
play fair. But what country does? Romney maintains the charming fiction that America is an economic ingénue “genuinely committed
to free trade” being gang-raped by an ugly world. However, the U.S. maintains a long list of trade restrictions. Moreover, in practice
American anti-“dumping” laws are another protectionist barrier used by domestic industries to hamper international competition. ¶
Washington also has consciously followed a weak dollar policy, hoping, just like Beijing, to spur exports worldwide. Moreover, the
dollar’s status as a reserve currency allows the U.S. to export inflation. No wonder the Chinese have complained about irresponsible
American fiscal policies and reduced their purchase of Treasury securities.¶ With the PRC now possessing the
world’s second largest economy, Washington has lost any ability to dictate . Instead of namecalling and threatening—which the Obama administration also initially engaged in—America’s best approach is
negotiation. In fact, progress apparently was made during the recent meetings in Beijing, despite the simultaneous controversy
over Chen’s status. For example, China agreed to further open its markets, cut business subsidies, and implement broader
economic reforms. More remains to be done, but U.S. threats are unlikely to achieve much. ¶ Whining will be no more effective when
it comes to China’s international and military policies. The good news for Washington is that the PRC remains behind and the path
forward is anything but smooth. China remains a poor nation with an economy built on pampered state enterprises, bad banks, and
a property bubble. A highly distorted demographic future due to the “one child” policy could leave the country old before it is rich.
Without the natural release of democracy the PRC looks like a volcano ready to blow: violent protests against abusive local
governments are routine, while the public battle surrounding now disgraced party official Bo Xilai demonstrates the national political
structure’s fragility. Beijing may surmount all of these challenges, but becoming the next superpower will not be easy. ¶ Still, while the
PRC’s trajectory is uncertain, China almost certainly will become a stronger competitor to the U.S. Even so, Beijing does not
want conflict. Commerce has brought riches, which have helped satisfy an emerging middle class.
Derail the economic gravy train and the unelected Communist Party will lose its legitimacy. Challenge America militarily
and risk losing a devastating war. The residents of Zhongnanhai are ambitious, not suicidal.¶
Anyway, the U.S. would do better to improve its game than complain. Washington’s dominance over the last two or three
decades has been unnatural and will inevitably decline. Accommodating rather than resisting change will
better preserve American power and influence. Particularly important will be strengthening economic
competitiveness and diplomatic skills. Instead of simply issuing demands when it wants something
from the PRC, such as support against Iran and North Korea, America will need to persuade Beijing that the policy
is in the latter’s interest as well.¶ As for security, the U.S. and China are bound to have disagreements over
the years, but none should threaten vital American interests and thus lead to conflict. Rather than
confront militarily a nuclear-armed power in its own region over interests which it views as essential, Washington should expect its
allies to do much more in their own defense.¶ Perhaps the toughest challenge will continue to be human rights.
Washington long has supported democracy and liberty only in the breach. During the Cold War the U.S. backed a gaggle of thugs
since they were anti-Communists. Even today Washington cheers democracy activists in the Middle East—
except in Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Human rights in Central Asia are a painful
afterthought when it comes to U.S. military bases. Anti-democratic excesses among friends such as
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore are passed by. And grievous human rights problems in
Afghanistan and Iraq are embarrassments best ignored.¶ Still, the fact that Washington often is hypocritical
doesn’t change the fact that Beijing remains a tough authoritarian system which sometimes deploys brutal repression. Human rights
the Chen saga reminds us that principle
must be leavened with pragmatism when dealing with other nations.¶ U.S. power is limited.
Washington has found it impossible to compel smaller and weaker, even impoverished, starving
states—Burma, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Serbia, Syria—to do its bidding. All of these ignored ever tougher
sanctions, several rebuffed military threats, and a couple even resisted military attacks. ¶ America’s ability to compel
China to respect human rights is even less . Wei Jingsheng, another courageous Chinese human rights activist,
complained: “The Chinese leadership does not fear the United States government; it only fears the loss of its
are universal and Americans should promote liberty when possible. Yet
power.” But that is simple reality. War is unthinkable. Sanctions would leave America friendless across Asia and Europe, undermine
the weak U.S. economy, and turn Beijing into an active adversary if not enemy. Which leaves diplomacy and publicity. ¶ Admittedly,
such steps are of limited effectiveness. Nevertheless, the PRC has much at stake in its relationship with America and thus has an
incentive to keep Washington minimally satisfied. China also worries about its international image: beating up on dissidents does not
win friends and influence people.¶ However, the
regime faces important countervailing pressures . Gaining
and maintaining power are the most important objectives of any authoritarian political system.
Weakening the system of repression risks emboldening opposition forces. Moreover, no leader of a
rising country with a nationalistic population wants to be seen as genuflecting to the American
government. “Appeasement” and “weakness” are charges that can be tossed about with equal
enthusiasm in Beijing as in Washington.
pressure kills relations, global human rights, and causes a china-US war
Bandow 12 (nov 7, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald
Reagan. “The U.S. And China: Seeking Cooperation, But Finding Confrontation” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/uschina-seeking-cooperation-finding-confrontation
In short, the Obama administration appears to have handled a difficult situation reasonably well , despite the
exaggerated criticism from those like Mitt Romney, who denounced the “day of shame for the Obama administration.” While Chen
was in the U.S. embassy Washington had a moral obligation, irrespective of Beijing’s desires, not to turn him over for likely
prosecution or persecution. (The situation was different than for Wang Lijun, Bo’s top cop who fell afoul of his political mentor and
sought refuge at an American consulate in February; the U.S. owes nothing to those with blood on their hands.) If the Chinese
government would not let Chen leave the country, he should have been allowed to stay in the embassy as long as he wished. In
fact, after Tiananmen Square the late astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and his wife remained at the U.S. embassy for 13 months before
being allowed to depart China.¶ However, once Chen left the embassy—the exact circumstances remain in dispute—U.S. officials
could do little for him. Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) proclaimed that Chen’s status was “a test to the United States of whether or not
human rights really matter.” The Washington Post editorialized: “the United States must defend him and his family—and not allow
business as usual in U.S.-Chinese relations.” If only it was that easy.¶ Even had the embassy sent someone to the hospital with him,
it could not watch over him day and night for the rest of his life. Nor could Washington effectively protest every new sanction
imposed by Beijing for every new offense, real or imagined. Washington cannot dictate how another country
treats a particular citizen or enforce another government’s promise to treat him a certain way. In
fact, in 2006 the Bush administration unsuccessfully pushed for Chen’s release on criminal charges, for which he spent nearly four
years in prison. Chen’s apparent change of heart, deciding that he wanted to leave China, was understandable, but left Washington
with little leverage. The “study abroad” tactic probably was the best option available. ¶
Nevertheless, there are some who
seem prepared to sacrifice the entire bilateral relationship in an attempt to advance human rights .
For instance, The Patriot Post, a conservative online publication, lamented that “Obama’s lack of leadership
on the world stage has repeatedly left democracy activists around the world at the mercy of their
repressive regimes.” Actually, the chief miscreant in such cases is “their repressive regimes.” Anyway, what, one wonders,
would the critics have the president do to such governments—including several important American allies—if they resist U.S.
rights cannot become the sum of America’s relationship with China.
First, the U.S. has a range of interests at stake. Economic ties are important and involve more
than just corporate profits: job creation and economic growth also matter. Beijing also can
advance or impede important American geopolitical interests, including nuclear proliferation,
international conflict, and human rights—consider issues involving Burma, Iran, North Korea, and
Sudan, to name a few.¶ Most important is the maintenance of peace. One of the most dangerous
international moments occurs when a new weltmacht challenges established powers. In the case
of Germany two world wars resulted . This history must not be repeated with China . That requires
fostering a cooperative rather than confrontational relationship, despite sometimes important
differences.
pressure? Nuke ‘em?¶ Human
China war causes extinction
Straits Times 2k 6-25-2000
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a
full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its
national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other
countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US
and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the
region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not
With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine
Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes
of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal,
could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway,
end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world orde r.
commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US
from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen
Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons . If the US had to
resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of
winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses
about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that
Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic
Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong
pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign
Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.
There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem
inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
intervention.
US/China relations key to the global economy and preventing Korean war
Carpenter 9/5, Senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute
(13, Ted Galen, Don’t Wreck Relations with Russia and China over Syria, www.cato.org/blog/dont-wreck-relations-russia-chinaover-syria)
Conversely, we need cooperation from Moscow and Beijing on a host of important issues. Without Russia’s
help, there is little chance for serious progress on nuclear issues, either reducing the bloated U.S. and Russian stockpiles of such
weapons or discouraging Iran and other countries from barging into the global nuclear weapons club. China’s cooperation is even
more important. Not only is China a major purchaser of U.S. government debt, which in an era of chronic
budget deficits is no trivial matter, but the country is an increasingly crucial U.S. trading partner and a vital
factor in the overall global economy. An angry, recalcitrant China would not be good for America’s or the
world’s economic health. China is also the most important player in efforts to discourage North
Korea from engaging in reckless, destabilizing conduct. During the first half of 2013, Beijing
appeared to grow weary of Pyongyang’s disruptive, provocative conduct and began to exert
pressure on its obnoxious client. That pressure has been at least one factor in North Korea’s more
conciliatory behavior in the past few months. But China will have little incentive to continue that
course if Washington tramples on Beijing’s interests in Syria and the rest of the Middle East.
Korean war goes nuclear - extinction
Hamel-Green 09, Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development, Victoria University
(Michael, The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, www.japanfocus.org/Michael-Hamel_Green/3267
The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple,
interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual
nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat
projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns
over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about
whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The
consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and
economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is
the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to
the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium
range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2
million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result
in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research
even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more
quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear
indicates that
exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States
currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32
Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25
degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will
cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over
the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also
follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many
years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke
injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.
**if they say HR solves extinction**
Correlation is not causation – even if countries that have good HR are less likely
to go to war, it’s due to other factors like democracy, military capabilities,
economic growth, etc – confounds they can’t control for
Low credibility key to NGO distancing—that’s key to human rights
Weisbrot, 09 Ph.D economics U of Michigan; co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington,
D.C.
(Mark, “Washington's Lost Credibility on Human Rights,” 3-11 http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&columns/washingtons-lost-credibility-on-human-rights/) atw
U.S.-based human rights organizations will undoubtedly see the erosion of Washington's
credibility on these issues as a loss – and understandably so, since the United States is still a powerful country, and
they hope to use this power to pressure other countries on human rights issues. But they too should be careful to avoid
the kind of politicization that has earned notoriety for the State Department's annual report – which
clearly discriminates between allies and "adversary" countries in its evaluations. The case of the recent Human
Rights Watch report on Venezuela illustrates the dangers of this spillover of the politicization of
human rights from the U.S. government to Washington-based non-governmental organizations (NGO's).
More than 100 scholars and academics wrote a letter complaining about the report, arguing that it did not meet "minimal standards
of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility." For example, the report alleges that the Venezuelan government discriminates
against political opponents in the provision of government services; but as evidence for this charge it provides only one alleged
incident involving one person, in programs that serve many millions of Venezuelans. Human Rights Watch responded
with a defense of its report, but the exchange of letters indicates that HRW would have been better
off acknowledging the report's errors and prejudice, and taking corrective measures.
Independence from Washington will be increasingly important for international human rights
organizations going forward if they don't want to suffer the same loss of international legitimacy
on human rights that the U.S. government has. Amnesty International's report last month calling
for an arms embargo on both Israel and Hamas following Israel's assault on Gaza – emphasizing that
the Obama administration should "immediately suspend U.S. military aid to Israel" until "there is no longer a substantial risk that
such equipment will be used for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses" – is a positive
example. The report's statement that "Israel's military intervention in the Gaza Strip has been equipped to a large extent by U.S.supplied weapons, munitions and military equipment paid for with U.S. taxpayers' money," undoubtedly didn't win friends in
the U.S. government. But this is the kind of independent advocacy that strengthens the international credibility of
human rights groups, and it is badly needed.
***
China relations solve everytying
KOREA
TAIWAN
SOUTH ASIA
ENVIRONMENT (WARMING/SPECIES)
John Desperes, analyst, RAND Corporation, CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, ed.
Shuxun Chen & Charles Wolf, 2001, p. 227-228.
Nevertheless, America’s main interests in China have been quite constant, namely peace, security, and prosperity, and a healthy environment. Chinese interests in the United States have also
been quite constant and largely compatible, notwithstanding sharp differences over Taiwan, strategic technology transfers, trade, and human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been
consistently driven by strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan’s relations with the mainland remain
peaceful; in sustaining the growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive lives.
China’s growing economy is a valuable marke
What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America’s prosperity.
t to many
workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it could become much more valuable by opening its markets
China also affects America’s security. It could either help to stabilize or destabilize
currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front
line; in the Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia,
where renewed warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America’s
environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and protects its dwindling
habitats will affect the global atmosphere and currently endangered species.
further.
Relations key to Chinese human rights
Carter 2 (John, LTC, USAF et al, “Implications of the U.S. War on Terrorism for U.S.-China Policy: A Strategic
Window” http://research.airuniv.edu/papers/ay2002/affellows/carter.pdf)
The event most likely to disrupt this future fundamental change in China would be the emergence
of a clearly adversarial US-China relationship. A state of Cold War between the U.S. and China would reinforce the view of
conservative Chinese leaders that America is China's greatest threat. This would allow China's current conservative leaders
to use Chinese nationalism as an excuse to crackdown on dissent and to override any burgeoning
reform movements. Long term American cooperation and engagement with China will reap benefits, as China becomes a more open society. It must be
recognized that only the Chinese people themselves can create a more open society that promotes democracy
and human rights. American policy, as a result of the post-9/11 cooperative relationship between the U.S. and China, must encourage the natural
transformational forces within China to develop and nurture. Allowing the transformational forces within China to take root will allow China to become a more
open society. A more open society does not necessarily mean a democratic society along the American or European models. A more open society means that
China would be embarking on a path to democratization in its own distinctive style. Current
U.S.-China relations in the post-9/11 period
have been encouraging. As a result of September 11 the, Chinese leaders are trying to forge an overall improvement in relations with the U.S.
and the West.
Econ Ans
No impact to econ
Daniel Drezner 14, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World
Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict
and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis
would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that
the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression,
diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East,
border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global
The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has
concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in
2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have
military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not
triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of
relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with
the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date
generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been
expected."43
public disorder.
Econ’s resilient
Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of
Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IRColloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
Prior to 2008, numerous foreign policy analysts had predicted a looming crisis in global economic
governance. Analysts only reinforced this perception since the financial crisis, declaring that we live in a “G-Zero” world.
This paper takes a closer look at the global response to the financial crisis. It reveals a more optimistic
picture. Despite initial shocks that were actually more severe than the 1929 financial crisis, global
economic governance structures responded quickly and robustly. Whether one measures results by economic
outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional flexibility, global economic governance has displayed surprising
resiliency since 2008. Multilateral economic institutions performed well in crisis situations to
reinforce open economic policies, especially in contrast to the 1930s. While there are areas where governance has
either faltered or failed, on the whole, the system has worked . Misperceptions about global economic governance
persist because the Great Recession has disproportionately affected the core economies – and because the efficiency of past
periods of global economic governance has been badly overestimated. Why the system has worked better than expected remains
an open question. The rest of this paper explores the possible role that the distribution of power, the robustness of international
regimes, and the resilience of economic ideas might have played.
US economy decoupled from the world
Charles Hugh Smith,Of Two Minds, 1-6-12, p. Lexis
It's possible that the U.S. economy can keep logging positive statistics even as the global
economy spiralsinto depression. Never mind that gasoline consumption has plummeted or that savings have dropped or
that austerity and higher debt service payments insure a deep recession in Europe; and who cares about China's real estate bubble
popping? None of that matters here--or so it seems. Heck, maybe we've entered a new golden era of low
volatility; that's possible, too. Everything's fixed, and the U.S. has successfully decoupled from
the rest of the global economy. Based on sentiment and volatility readings, those are the
consensus views .Reportedly16 out of 16 stock market mavens see nothing but rally ahead--and
we all know unanimity is astonishingly accurate in predicting stock prices. The U.S. dollar has
traded on a see-saw with equities for years; recently, both equities and the dollar have surged. So
either the see-saw has broken or this is the mother of all divergences.
Global econ resilient and decoupled
Jean Pisani-Ferry 8/28/13 (Professor of Economics at Université Paris-Dauphine and currently serves as the Director of
Economic Policy Planning for the Prime Minister of France, project syndicate, “The Post-Crisis Global Economy in Three Words”
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-post-crisis-global-economy-in-three-words-by-jean-pisani-ferry)
Five years have passed since the collapse of the American investment bank Lehman Brothers triggered financial
mayhem and marked the onset of the Great Recession. Though the dust may not have fully settled, three catchwords sum up
what we have learned so far – and what remains to be done. The first word that comes to mind is resilience . Five
years ago, many feared a repetition of the Great Depression of the 1930’s. Indeed, as Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke have
shown, the collapse of world industrial production in 2008-2009 initially tracked that of 1929-1930 very well. The fall in world trade
volume and equity indices was even faster. Fortunately, the historical paths subsequently diverged. Five years after the 1929 crash,
the world was still in depression and trade had contracted sharply. Today, the United States is still going through its worst
employment recession since World War II, and Europe’s GDP has not returned to pre-crisis levels, but global output has
grown 15% since 2008, and world trade is up more than 12%. The world avoided a Great
Depression II mainly because there was no global financial crisis this time. What occurred in 2008 was
a US crisis that contaminated Europe, because the two financial systems were almost completely integrated. The
rest of the world, however, was largely immune . China and other emerging countries were hit by a severe demand shock
that affected their exports, but not by the financial turmoil. On the contrary, the value of US government bonds that China and others
held rose in response to the drop in interest rates. Another reason for the rebound was the well-timed response engineered in 2009
by the G-20. For the first time, emerging and developing countries participated in a coordinated reflation effort, and, alongside their
advanced-country counterparts, promised to resist trade protectionism. The recovery soon demonstrated that the
global economy had more than one engine. This gave the US economy time to heal, and even made it
possible for Europe to experience its own crisis without triggering a generalized downturn. The
second word that characterizes the last five years is acceleration . In 2008, everyone knew that the rise of
emerging and developing countries was redrawing the global economic map. But this was thought to be a
gradual, long-term trend. In reality, what was supposed to take one or two decades took just five years. A simple
statistic illustrates the point: in 2007, the advanced countries accounted for almost three-quarters of the G-20’s combined GDP. By
2012, their share had fallen to 63%. The combination of growth differentials and high oil and raw-materials prices has resulted in a
massive shift in the distribution of world income. Furthermore, all advanced countries have experienced rapid deterioration in their
public finances. Whereas ten years ago public-debt crises were considered a plague that afflicts developing countries, the malady is
now the advanced economies’ curse. According to the International Monetary Fund, the average debt/GDP ratio at the end of 2012
was 110% in the advanced countries, but just 35% for emerging countries and 42% for low-income countries. Of course, such
statistics can be misleading. The US and Europe still enjoy the services of a vast capital stock – machines, buildings, and public
infrastructure built over decades or even centuries. Furthermore, immaterial capital increasingly matters, too: US authorities recently
revised GDP upward by $400 billion after recognizing that research and development spending should be categorized as
investment. Emerging countries may be growing faster, but their per capita capital stock still does not match that of advanced
countries (in fact, this is precisely what development is largely about). Nonetheless, global politics is one field in which relative
income changes and the poor state of rich countries’ public finances matter. When the US and Europe threatened to withdraw
financial support from Egypt in order to influence the behavior of the country’s military leadership, they soon realized that Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states could be much more convincing, because they had much deeper pockets. This leads to the third
catchword of the last five years: rebalancing. Globalization 1.0 was built around US consumers and Chinese
producers. The next phase should be built around consumers and producers the world over.
According to projections by Homi Kharas and Geoffrey Gertz of the Brookings Institution, there now are 700 million more
people with $10-100 per day to spend than there were in 2003. Moreover, what they call the global middle class is
expected to grow by another 1.3 billion over the next ten years. So there is obvious potential for a major
rebalancing toward consumption-led growth in the emerging and developing world. This new phase
of globalization portends major benefits for the global economy. Instead of the somewhat one-sided trade pattern of the
last two decades, it means greater well-being for households in developing countries and opportunities for more producers in the
advanced economies. At the same time, consumption habits will need to change everywhere: the middle class cannot triple in size
and continue to rely on the same energy- and carbon-intensive spending patterns
Cyber Add-on Ans
Their ev’s from March—squo solved—they don’t enforce it
Walker, 14 (Hunter, “The FBI Can’t Hire Cyber Security Recruits Because They All Smoke Weed” Slate, 5/21,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/business_insider/2014/05/21/fbi_director_james_comey_has_trouble_recruiting_it_savvy_workers_beca
use.html)
FBI Director James Comey is starting to think the law enforcement agency's zero tolerance policy on marijuana might be, like,
a total bummer.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Comey discussed
how the bureau's pot prohibition was making it
harder to find tech savvy recruits when he spoke to the annual White Collar Crime Institute conference Monday.
"I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to
the interview," Comey said.
As a result of this, Comey said the FBI is "grappling with the question right now" of whether or not to change its marijuana policy.
Currently, the agency will not accept job applicants who have smoked pot at any point within the past three years.
In fact, Comey indicated
the bureau is already relaxing its restrictions on marijuana . When one attendee at the
Comey said they
conference said one of their friends was discouraged from trying to work at the FBI due to the pot policy,
"should go ahead and apply" in spite of their marijuana smoking.
Zero impact to cyber-attacks --- overwhelming consensus of qualified authors
goes neg
- No motivation---can’t be used for coercive leverage
- Defenses solve---benefits of offense are overstated
- Too difficult to execute/mistakes in code are inevitable
- AT: Infrastructure attacks
- Military networks are air-gapped/difficult to access
- Overwhelming consensus goes neg
Colin S. Gray 13, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of Reading and External Researcher @
the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War College, April, “Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not
Falling,” U.S. Army War College Press, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE SKY IS NOT FALLING ¶ This analysis has sought to explore, identify, and explain the
strategic meaning of cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been “So what?” Today we all do
cyber, but this behavior usually has not been much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have endeavored to
analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely technical and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done and how to go about
doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is understanding what cyber, as a fifth domain of warfare, brings to national
security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of tactical behavior un - guided by any credible
semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a large literature already exists that claims fairly
convincingly to explain “how to . . .” But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec
ommendations offer some understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make sense to this strategist, at least. ¶ 1. Cyber can only be an
enabler of physical effort. Stand-alone (popularly misnamed as “strategic”) cyber
its immateriality.
action is inherently grossly limited by
The physicality of conflict with cyber’s human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in our
species’ strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of action on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But the
strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in tactical achievement, is not promising. To date, “What
if . . .” speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is either contextually too light, or, more often, contextually
unpersuasive . 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment advanced with considerable confidence. Although
societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in Libicki’s apposite words, that “[i]n the
absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to the occupation of territory. It is almost
inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war can overthrow the adversary’s government
and replace it with a more pliable one.” 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are
fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. ¶ It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the
air, or in space. On the one hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all,
cyber warfare would be very unlikely to harm human beings directly , let alone damage physically
the machines on which they depend. These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue
manner with damaging physical consequences) might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent
action in other domains. But most likely there
would be serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of
cyber action, which must include the possibility of escalation into other domains of conflict. Despite
popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a precision weapon anytime soon . 51 In addition,
assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as surely they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible
labeling as cyber war, the
distinctly limited harm likely to follow from cyber assault would hardly appeal
as prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is most probable that cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a
contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as
hostile action by net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely unconvincing.¶ 2. Cyber
defense is difficult, but should
be sufficiently effective. The structural advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they
are easy to overstate. Penetration and exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be
swift almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes
notice for a long while, or it might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is
likely to be hard (though not quite impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic
“What if . . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative
briefings that hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state
that our nuclear retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a
series of Heroic Assumptions. ¶ The
literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the nuclear
attack stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston
Churchill wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, “[t]he terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate.” 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber
domain. Not only are there cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber operation.
Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and constructors of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber space who assuredly err in this and that detail. The
more sophisticated—usually meaning complex—the code for
cyber, the more certain must it be that mistakes both lurk in the program and will be made in
digital communication.¶ What I have just outlined minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of
what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain of war. All human activities are more or less harassed by friction
and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book One of On War , 53 will know this.
Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14 states explicitly that “Strategy is more
difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and
execution of strategies.” 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an enemy’s cyber power is typically,
though not invariably, an impracticable target set for physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The
discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential
vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency ought to be avoidable at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki
offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to be taken at face value: ¶ [T]here is no inherent reason that improving informa - tion
technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical information in existence (for example, the names of every secret agent). Really critical
information should never see a computer; if it sees a computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be
air-gapped.¶ Cyber defense admittedly is difficult to do, but so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, “[i]n this
medium [cyberspace] the best defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense.” 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclearframed competition in U.S.–Soviet/Russian rivalry, the geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible.
Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be our own design and operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us
temporarily.¶ When cyber is contextually regarded properly— which means first, in particular, when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for
Landpower, sea
power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to be capable of accepting combat
damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on. There is no fundamental reason that less
should be demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel
defense planning—it should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather than perfect. 57 Our
nuclear dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol lowed in the other domains in the past. Because the digital age is so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling.
However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded reaction to the new science and technology of the time that is reminiscent of the
cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58 We
can be confident that cyber defense should be able to
function well enough , given the strength of political, military, and commercial motivation for it to
do so. The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of
networking. Naturally, a price is paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important defense decisions involve choice,
so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security.¶ 3. Intelligence is
critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the past decade confirms what we could know
already from the science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically,
cyber power is not technically forgiving of
user error. Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise information if their
intended exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while efforts to disrupt electronic
Supervisory Con - trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to achieve widespread harmful
effects. But obviously there are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and command) systems need to be networks for
communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated as a potential source of serious danger.¶ It is one thing to be able to
be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay. But it is quite another to be capable of
inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an enemy. Critically important military
computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the inspired amateur outsider, nor to the
malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a hypothetical “cyber Pearl Harbor” reflects
both poor history and ignorance of contemporary military common sense. C
ritical potential military (and other) targets for cyber attack are extremely hard to access and
influence (I believe and certainly hope), and the technical knowledge, skills, and effort required to do
serious harm to national security is forbiddingly high. This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means absolutely could
not secure near-catastrophic results. However, it is to say that such a scenario is extremely improbable . Cyber
defense is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail can one be in the making of cyberspace, that
confidence—real confidence—in cyber attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular discussion to what rather
idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could be restricted to the
EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the potential to inflict
catastrophic damage would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four geographical domains of war? I believe not.¶ Because
we have told ourselves that ours uniquely is the Information Age, we have become unduly respectful of the potency of this rather slippery catch-all
term. As usual, it is helpful to contextualize the al - legedly magical ingredient, information, by locating it properly in strategic history as just one
important element contributing to net strategic effectiveness. This mild caveat is supported usefully by recognizing the general contemporary rule that
information per se harms nothing and nobody. The electrons in cyber - ized conflict have to be interpreted and acted upon by physical forces (including
agency by physical human beings). As one might say, intelligence (alone) sinks no ship; only men and machines can sink ships! That said, there is no
doubt that if friendly cyber action can infiltrate and misinform the electronic informa - tion on which advisory weaponry and other machines depend,
considerable warfighting advantage could be gained. I do not intend to join Clausewitz in his dis - dain for intelligence, but I will argue that in strategic
affairs, intelligence usually is somewhat uncertain. 59 Detailed up-to-date intelligence literally is essential for successful cyber offense, but it can be
healthily sobering to appreciate that the strategic rewards of intelligence often are considerably exaggerated. The basic reason is not hard to
recognize. Strategic success is a complex endeavor that requires adequate perfor - mances by many necessary contributors at every level of conflict
(from the political to the tactical). ¶ When thoroughly reliable intelligence on the en - emy is in short supply, which usually is the case, the strategist
finds ways to compensate as best he or she can. The IT-led RMA of the past 2 decades was fueled in part by the prospect of a quality of military effec tiveness that was believed to flow from “dominant battle space knowledge,” to deploy a familiar con - cept. 60 While there is much to be said in praise
of this idea, it is not unreasonable to ask why it has been that our ever-improving battle space knowledge has been compatible with so troubled a
course of events in the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan. What we might have misunderstood is not the value of knowledge, or of the information from
which knowledge is quarried, or even the merit in the IT that passed information and knowledge around. Instead, we may well have failed to grasp and
grip understanding of the whole context of war and strategy for which battle space knowledge unquestionably is vital. One must say “vital” rather than
strictly essential, because relatively ignorant armies can and have fought and won despite their ig - norance. History requires only that one’s net
strategic performance is superior to that of the enemy. One is not required to be deeply well informed about the en - emy. It is historically quite
commonplace for armies to fight in a condition of more-than-marginal reciprocal and strategic cultural ignorance. Intelligence is king in electronic
warfare, but such warfare is unlikely to be solely, or even close to solely, sovereign in war and its warfare, considered overall as they should be. ¶ 4.
Why the sky will not fall. More accurately, one should say that the
sky will not fall because of hostile action against us in
cyberspace unless we are improb - ably careless and foolish. David J. Betz and Tim Ste vens strike the right note when they conclude that “[i]f
cyberspace is not quite the hoped-for Garden of Eden, it is also not quite the pestilential swamp of the imagination of the cyber-alarmists.” 61 Our
understanding of cyber is high at the technical and tactical level, but re - mains distinctly rudimentary as one ascends through operations to the more
Nonetheless, our scientific, technological, and tactical knowledge and
understanding clearly indicates that the sky is not falling and is unlikely to fall in the future as a
result of hostile cyber action. This analysis has weighed the more technical and tactical literature
on cyber and concludes, not simply on balance , that cyber alarmism has little basis save in the
rarified altitudes of strategy and policy.
imagination of the alarmists. There is military and civil peril in the hostile use of cyber, which is why we must take cyber security seriously, even to the
point of buying redundant capabilities for a range of command and control systems. 62 So seriously should we regard cyber danger that it is only
prudent to as - sume that we will be the target for hostile cyber action in future conflicts, and that some of that action will promote disruption and
uncertainty in the damage it will cause.¶ That granted, this analysis recommends strongly that the U.S. Army, and indeed the whole of the U.S.
Government, should strive to comprehend cyber in context. Approached in isolation as a new technol - ogy, it is not unduly hard to be over impressed
with its potential both for good and harm. But if we see networked computing as just the latest RMA in an episodic succession of revolutionary changes
in the way information is packaged and communicated, the computer-led IT revolution is set where it belongs, in historical context. In modern strategic
history, there has been only one truly game-changing basket of tech - nologies, those pertaining to the creation and deliv - ery of nuclear weapons.
Everything else has altered the tools with which conflict has been supported and waged, but has not changed the game. The nuclear revolution alone
raised still-unanswered questions about the viability of interstate armed conflict. How - ever, it would be accurate to claim that since 1945, methods
have been found to pursue fairly traditional political ends in ways that accommodate nonuse of nuclear means, notwithstanding the permanent pres ence of those means.¶ The light cast by general strategic theory reveals what requires revealing strategically about networked computers. Once one
sheds some of the sheer wonder at the seeming miracle of cyber’s ubiquity, instanta - neity, and (near) anonymity, one realizes that cyber is just
another operational domain, though certainly one very different from the others in its nonphysi - cality in direct agency. Having placed cyber where it
belongs, as a domain of war, next it is essential to recognize that its nonphysicality compels that cyber should be treated as an enabler of joint action,
rather than as an agent of military action capable of behav - ing independently for useful coercive strategic effect. There
are stand-alone
possibilities for cyber action, but they are not convincing as attractive options either for or in
opposition to a great power, let alone a superpower. No matter how intriguing the scenario design
for cyber war strictly or for cyber warfare, the logic of grand and military strategy and a common
sense fueled by understanding of the course of strategic history, require one so to contextualize
cyber war that its independence is seen as too close to absurd to merit much concern.
Food--No War 2NC
Food scarcity doesn’t cause war
Salehyan, 08 – Department of Political Science, University of North Texas (Idean, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No
Consensus Yet,” Journal of Peace Research, May, palgrave)
First, the deterministic view has poor pre-dictive power as to where and when conflictswill break out. For
every potential
exampleof an environmental catastrophe or resourceshortfall that leads to violence, there
aremany more counter-examples in which con-flict never occurs. But popular accounts typ-ically do not look
at the dogs that do notbark. Darfur is frequently cited as a casewhere desertification led to food
scarcity,water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading tocivil war and ethnic cleansing.5Yet, foodscarcity and
hunger are problems endemic tomany countries – particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa – but similar problems elsewhere havenot led to large-scale violence. According tothe Food and
Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations, food shortages and mal-nutrition affect more than a third of the
popu-lation in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros,North Korea, and Tanzania,6although noneof these
countries have experienced full-blown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes,coastal flooding, and droughts –
which areall likely to intensify as the climate warms –are frequent occurrences which rarely lead toviolence. The Asian Tsunami of
2004,although caused by an oceanic earthquake,led to severe loss of life and property, flood-ing, population displacement, and
resourcescarcity, but it did not trigger new wars inSoutheast Asia. Large-scale migration has thepotentialto provoke conflict in
receiving areas(see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch,2006), yet most migration flows do notleadto conflict, and, in this regard,
social inte-gration and citizenship policies are particularlyimportant (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan,2007). In short, resource scarcity,
naturaldisasters, and long-term climatic shifts areubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare;therefore, environmental conditions,
bythemselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks.
Second, even if local skirmishes overaccess to resources arise, these do not alwaysescalate to
open warfare and state collapse.While interpersonal violence is more or lesscommon and may
intensify under resourcepressures, sustained armed conflict on amassive scale is difficult to conduct.
Meier,Bond & Bond (2007) show that, undercertain circumstances, environmental condi-tions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflictsrarely escalateto sustained violence. Martin(2005) presents evidence from
Ethiopia that,while a large refugee influx and populationpressures led to localized conflict over naturalresources, effective resource
managementregimes were able to ameliorate these ten-sions. Both of these studies emphasize therole of localdispute-resolution
regimes andinstitutions – not just the response of centralgovernments – in preventing resource con-flicts from spinning out of
control. Martin’sanalysis also points to the importance ofinternational organizations, notably the UNHigh Commissioner for
Refugees, in imple-menting effective policies governing refugeecamps. Therefore, local hostilities need notescalate to
serious armed conflict and can bemanaged if there is the political will to do so .
Food wars are a myth – there’s zero empirical evidence
Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”,
Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)
First, aside from a few anecdotes, there islittle systematic empirical evidencethat resource
scarcityand changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an
abundance ofnatural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has
warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at UppsalaUniversity
and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world.
Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.
If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the
crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N.
World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencingchronic food
shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war.Similarly,
the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and l ed to
severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes
in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more toarmed
conflict than resource scarcityand natural disasters.
Food: Improving Now 2NC
Food security improving now
Dupont, 5/28 (“Global Food Security Index Improves,” 5/28/2014, http://nationalhogfarmer.com/environment/global-foodsecurity-index-improves, JMP)
The question of global food security is significant, but a new report from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) sponsored by DuPont
offers improving grades on an important report card. The 2014 Global Food Security Index shows that 70
percent of countries in the study saw food security scores rise over the previous year.
This index, which measures 28 different food security indicators, looks at the issue for 109
countries. Craig F. Binetti, president, DuPont Nutrition and Health, comments: "The index provides a
common set of metrics that enable us to track progress in food security globally, and the
outcomes thus far are promising . But we know it will take continued collaboration, innovation and investment in
agriculture, food and nutrition to overcome the vast challenges to feeding the world's growing population."
With the prospect of feeding 9 billion people by 2050, food security is a global issue. Food prices are a key factor impacting security,
with many in the developing world already spend half to three-quarters of their income on food. Rising worries over water availability
and access to arable land, add to the food security challenge.
The index showed that every region improved from the prior year , but most progress was seen in SubSaharan Africa, driven primarily by improved political stability and economic growth, despite the food-insecure-environment. The
index slid for Central and South America and Asia Pacific as diet diversification fell and there was a decline in public spending on
agricultural research.
In developing countries, the index shows the key challenges include inadequate infrastructure, political risk and food price inflation.
For developed countries, the challenges include adapting to urbanization and the continued rise of obesity.
2NR
2NR Evidence
Heg can’t solve China war and miscalc happens
Carpenter 01 (Ten Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 5-30-01, “Going Too Far
Bush’s Pledge to Defend Taiwan” Cato Institute) http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/fpb66.pdf
Proponents of giving Taiwan a security guarantee blithely assume that Beijing would back down if faced with
a clear demonstration of American “resolve.” The reasoning of Tom Lantos was typical: “An unambiguous statement
will guarantee that hostility in the Taiwan Strait will not take place.” 1 4The Wall Street Journal also exuded confidence that a U.S.
security commitment to Taiwan will never be challenged: “Thanks to Mr. Bush’s statements repudiating the policy of ‘strategic
ambiguity,’ there is now less chance of a miscalculation by China’s leaders that they could attack Taiwan and then tough out the
resulting international opprobrium.” 1 5 Realities of Deterrence Such beliefs are based almost entirely on America’s
Cold War experience. The conventional wisdom is that aggressors will always be deterred from
molesting a U.S. ally or client to whom Washington provides an unambiguous security commitment.
But the assumption that the deterrence of Soviet aggression during the Cold War can be replicated with
regard to China over Taiwan is dubious. A strategy of deterrence is hardly infallible. Indeed, the
historical record is littered with the wreckage of failures of deterrence. Many Europeans in the
early years of the 20th century assumed that the Continent’s elaborate system of alliances would make
war unthinkable. The tragic events of 1914 demonstrated how wrong they were. A generation later,
the explicit British and French security guarantees to Poland did not deter Germany from invading
that country. In addition to the balance of military forces, three factors are especially important in determining
whether extended deterrence—attempting to deter an attack on an ally or client—is likely to
succeed: the importance of the stakes to the protector, the importance of the stakes to the
challenging power, and the extent of the challenging power’s inclination to gamble. All three
factors worked to Washington’s advantage to an unusual degree in its confrontation with the
Soviet Union. America’s major Cold War security guarantees—those for which the United States was prepared to put the safety
of its own country at risk—were confined to Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Both regions were considered crucial to America’s
own security and economic well-being, and U.S. policymakers were determined to prevent those power centers from coming under
the control of the rival military superpower. It was therefore credible to leaders in the Kremlin that the United States would be willing
to incur significant risks—even the possibility of a nuclear war—to thwart a Soviet conquest. Conversely, while those regions would
have been a significant strategic and economic prize for the Soviet Union, neither area was essential to Moscow. Nor did Soviet
leaders or the Soviet population have an emotional attachment to either region. There was, therefore, a definite limit to the risks the
Kremlin was willing to run to gain dominion. Although Soviet leaders could never be sure that the United States would really go to
war on behalf of its allies, challenging the commitment would have been an extraordinarily reckless gamble. Fortunately for the
United States, the Soviet leadership tended to be relatively risk averse. Most of Moscow’s challenges occurred on the periphery,
primarily in the Third World. Although Soviet leaders occasionally tested the U.S.-led alliance network (especially over West Berlin),
they did not put their prestige on the line to such an extent that a tactical retreat became impossible. Indeed, as believers in Leninist
doctrine, the Soviets were patient—pocketing geopolitical gains whenever they could be obtained at relatively low risk but backing
off when the risk appeared excessive—supremely confident that their system would prevail in the long run. There are crucial
differences in all three deterrence factors when it comes to the prospect of a showdown over
Taiwan. Taiwan may have some importance to the U nited S tates, since it is a significant trading
partner and a sister democracy. Nevertheless, its relevance to American economic and security
interests hardly equals the central importance U.S. policymakers thought that Western Europe
and Northeast Asia had during the Cold War. The problem is that Chinese officials probably understand
that point as well. Soviet leaders may have considered it credible that the U nited S tates would risk a
major war to keep Western Europe and Northeast Asia out of Moscow’s orbit. But it is far less
likely that the Chinese believe that Washington will incur the same risk merely to defend Taiwan—a
“country” the United States does not even officially recognize. While Taiwan’s importance to the United States is
much less, the island’s importance to China is much greater than was that of Western Europe or
Northeast Asia to the Soviet Union. To Beijing, Taiwan is not merely a political and economic
prize; the status of the island is caught up in issues of national pride and prestige. Taiwan is a reminder
of China’s long period of humiliation at the hands of outside powers. When such potent emotions are engaged, even
normally dispassionate political leaders do not always act prudently or even rationally. Nor is it as
certain that the Chinese leaders will be as risk averse as the old Soviet hierarchy. The reaction of
high-ranking PRC military officers when Adm. Blair warned them a few months ago that the United
States would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an unprovoked attack was not reassuring. The
military officers reportedly reacted with disbelief verging on scorn. 16 That attitude is reinforced by a pervasive
impression within the PRC military hierarchy—an impression founded on an interpretation of the rapid U.S.
withdrawal from Somalia and the way the U.S. military waged the Gulf War and engaged in the Kosovo conflict—that the
American people are so averse to casualties that they would simply be unwilling to fight a serious
war over Taiwan. 1 7 It matters little whether Chinese skepticism about U.S. intentions is right or wrong. If the Chinese
believe the U.S. commitment is a bluff, they will be inclined to call that bluff. Applying the
supposed lessons of the Cold War to deter China from settling the Taiwan issue on its own terms
could, therefore, lead to either a humiliating U.S. retreat or a disastrous armed conflict.
Economic ties don’t prevent war—WWI proves—high risk of China war
Dowd 13 (Alan, American Security Council Foundation Senior Fellow, 3-18-13, “Collision Course or Peaceful Pacific?” The
Dowd Report) http://67.199.60.145/Articles.aspx?ArticleId=774
Some argue that the risk of war—even an accidental war—is precluded by the economic linkages between
China and its neighbors. After all, China needs the Asia-Pacific region’s markets, and the region needs China’s cash. China
owns $1.1 trillion in U.S. debt. China’s annual trade with the U.S. is some $535 billion, with Japan $333 billion, with
South Korea $246 billion, with Australia $123 billion. However, it pays to recall that European nations enjoyed
deep and intricate commercial connections a century ago. Then came the summer of 1914. Indeed,
Kevin Rudd, the foreign minister of Australia, describes the South China Seas as “a tinderbox on water” and
points to ominous parallels to the Europe of 1913, where a combustible mix of “primitive, almost atavistic
nationalisms” and “great power politics” opened the door to a war no one wanted. “The idea of
armed conflict, which seems contrary to every element of rational self-interest for any nation-state
enjoying the benefits of such unprecedented regional economic dynamism, has now become a terrifying,
almost normal part of the regional conversation,” he sighs.