Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
1
Engagement CP
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
2
Thoughts:
This counterplan PICs out of the “engagement” component to the plan-text --- the argument is that economic engagement
policies all include some form of a condition (whether it is a positive/negative condition is not fully known) --- these
conditions always make the engagement less effective b/c the recipient state always perceives the policy as a manipulation
tactic
The CP gives the plan unconditionally --- you should either not use the phrase “economic engagement” or find a way to
functionally do the plan without engaging the country
NB doesn’t get to extinction, obviously – but it’s important if you can impact this say no argument with relations/trust --e.g. saying no would probably be a terrible signal for US leadership, if recipient countries no longer want to interact with
the global hegemon
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
3
Engagement PIC – 1NC
CP Text:
CP is competitive – Topical affs requires a quid pro quo – the CP is unconditional
Haas and O'Sullivan 00. [Richard N., former senior aid to President George bush, and Meghan L., Brookings Foreign Policy
Studies Program fellow, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy,
http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815733550/html/203.html#pagetop, 1-2]
The term engagement was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South
Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal
relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the
few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages"
states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however,
employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of
nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on
positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy
instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting
of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on
the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important
disagreements.
Unconditional incentives lead to better relations with regimes, whereas tit-for-tat
policies cause backlash
Haass and O’Sullivan, Director and Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, 2000
(Robert N. and Neghan L., Summer 2000, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” Volume: 42, No. 2, p.
9-10, EB)
The use of incentives to engage a country’s civil society is almost always a good idea. At times, opaque domestic politics in
the target country may frustrate efforts to discern who is in a position of power and who can deliver on promises made in
exchange for certain incentives. Or the overriding goal may be the change of a regime. These sorts of situations may
preclude conditional engagement, when the US seeks to establish a contractual relationship with the government of a
country. However, they may be ideal times for the initiation of ‘unconditional’ engagement – the offering of incentives
without any expectation of reciprocal acts. While in theory, any type of incentive could be offered unconditionally, cultural
incentives or inducements to civil society are the most appropriate measures because they are the least likely to shore up
dubious regimes.12 Such incentives may also be the most suitable option when US or European governments are faced
with domestic lobbies determined to isolate certain regimes. In these cases, even the most strident domestic groups are
unlikely to protest measures geared towards easing physical hardship and cultural isolation of the population at large in
the target country. The provision of economic incentives to the private sector of a target country can be an effective mode
of ‘unconditional’ engagement, particularly when the economy is not state dominated. In these more open economic
climates, those nourished by the exchanges made possible under economic engagement will often be agents for change
and natural allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the private sector and other
non-state actors, it is likely to widen the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of
international norms more generally. Certainly, US engagement with China has nurtured sympathetic pockets, if not to
American ideals per se, then at least to trade and open economic markets and the maintenance of good relations to secure
them. The only constraint on the scope and development of ‘unconditional’ engagement is the range of available
collaborators in civil society or the private sector. Fortunately, globalisation and the explosion of economic entities that
has accompanied it – while making economic isolation more difficult to achieve – presents a multitude of possible
partners for unconditional engagement with non-state actors.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
4
Competition
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
5
A2 Perm do Both
Perm destroys the relationship
Dolfsma et al 09 – Professorial fellow @ School of Economics and Business of the University of Groningen [Dr.
Wilfred Dolfsma, Dr. Rene van der Eijk (Prefessor of Organisation and Personnel Management @ Erasmus University
Rotterdam) & Dr. Albert Jolink (Professor of History of Management and Economics @ Erasmus University Rotterdam)
“On a Source of Social Capital:
Gift Exchange,” Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 89:315–329]
While trust can emerge and grow due to gift exchange, it can thus vanish as well: ‘‘Risk-taking and trusting behavior are
thus really different sides of the same coin’’ (Deutsch, 1958, p. 266; cf. Mayer et al., 1995). Uzzi (1997) has put it thus,
‘‘trust can break down after repeated abuse.’’ Trust may be betrayed (Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998), but if it works,
transaction costs can go down substantially, conferring economic benefits to the parties involved as well as social ones
(Dore, 1983). If the wrong gift is offered in the wrong way , a relationship will not start off and an existing
relationship can seize to exist, destroying the social capital that existed between parties in the process. Not only will the
parties involved then miss out on a potentially lucrative relation, but they may also lose ‘face’ (Smart, 1993). Pg. 323
Only unconditional gift is key to trust – conditions destroy it
Dolfsma et al, Myrdal Prize winning professor, 9
(Wilfred; René Van Der Eijk, researcher; Dr. Albert Jolink, Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam; “On a
Source of Social Capital: Gift Exchange”, http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journal/on-a-source-of-social-capitalgift-exchange-nfuozHd6s2?key=citeulike, Accessed 7/2/13, AZ)
Gift giving may be a strategic, self motivated action meant to create an obligation in the exchange partner to reciprocate
(Bourdieu, 1977; Darr, 2003; Humphrey and Hugh-Jones, 1992). As Zucker (1986) argues, creation of trust is implicit in
the expectation of a counter-gift in gift exchange; it should not become explicit, however (Bourdieu, 1992; Darr, 2003).
The generosity and voluntarism observed in gift giving may but need not be an illusion and only be altruism in appearance
(Blau, 1964; Mauss, 1954). Ostensibly, there is not neces- sarily an expectation of equivalent or formal return [Beals (1970)
quoted in Sherry, 1983], but in reality the purposive focal actor – consciously or uncon- sciously (Komter, 1996; McGrath
and Englis, 1996; Levi-Strauss, 1996) – takes into account past and or future outcomes for herself, and is at least partly
motivated by the expectation of some return-gift, whether direct (such as power over others) or indirect (such as social
approval) (Blau, 1964). It is this expectation of reciprocity and perceived sense of equity over the longer term that makes
the exchange mutually beneficial, and therefore its continuance is expected (Cook and Emerson, 1984). Enforcement is
self-regulating, since, between equals, if one partner fails to reciprocate, the other actor is likely to discontinue the
exchange (Nye, 1979). Because gift exchange is unbalanced when viewed at any one particular point in time, a longitudinal
perspective more accurately reveals the nature of gift giving. A deferred return obligates one individual to another and
creates ‘social debt’. Significant time may pass between the gift and the counter-gift. Gift exchange is carried out without a
legal contract (Ferrary, 2003; Uzzi, 1997), but instead informal existence of interpersonal relationships and trust makes it
possible to leave the particulars of the exchange unspecified (Uehara, 1990; Zucker, 1986). If the obligations could in fact
be enforced and imposed on by third parties, we would be talking about market transactions.
The perm sends mixed signals
Larson 97 - Professor of political science @ UCLA [Deborah Welch Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities in
International Relations,” Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997]
Mixing signals, that is, combining coercion and accommodation in an uncoordinated, ad hoc fashion, can undermine
credibility (Kriesberg, 1992, pp. 111–112). In his first letter to Reagan, Gorbachev cautioned him against inflammatory
language, “for trust is an especially sensitive thing, keenly receptive to both deeds and words. It will not be
enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages : one—for private contacts, and the
other, as they say—for the audience” (Shultz, 1993, p. 534). In short, noise reduces the impact and credibility of
conciliatory actions. How the other side responds to the state’s efforts at conciliation depends on how the former
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
6
Engagement PIC
interprets its actions. People do not usually reciprocate gifts or favors if they believe that the donor has ulterior motives or
is trying to manipulate them to do something that is contrary to their interests (Nemeth, 1970; Schopler & Thompson,
1968; Brehm & Cole, 1966). Similarly, if a state perceives that another state is pursuing a deceptive strategy, it will be
reluctant to acknowledge the gesture or to reciprocate. The state may also ignore the other’s unilateral concession if it
believes that the other state is militarily inferior and is trying to obtain an arms control agreement to reduce its
vulnerability. Pg. 723
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
7
A2 Perm do CP
Have to have conditions
Greg Forcese, 2002, BA, McGill; MA, Carleton; LL.B., Ottawa; LL.M., Yale; Member of the Bars of New York, Ontario
and the District of Columbia. Associate, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, LLP, Washington, Yale Human Rights & Development
Law Journal, “Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration,” p. 42
At the margins, “conditionalities” inducing adherence to codes of conduct and sanctions blur together. For instance,
while selective purchasing need not constitute a boycott, the Burma and South Africa procurement regimes discussed
above are clearly designed to curtail economic engagement with unpalatable regimes. Measures insisting on divestment
cross a subtle boundary, going beyond the “mitigation” goal of the second prong of responsible engagement. They clearly
constitute sanctions, the propriety of which must be scrutinized with an eye to the various concerns about sanctions, their
effectiveness and secondary effects.
US policy can’t be separated from power relations – trade is always conditioned
UNIDO, 2008
(2008, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, “Public goods for economic development,”
www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/Public_goods_for_economic_development.pdf, EB)
If a multilateral economic institution such as the WTO is to be thought of as a GPG then it needs to be not only an effective
and efficient instrument of policy making beyond the territorial state (GG I) it also needs to diminish what is widely
agreed to be a democratic deficit that arises from the two speed process of the rapid globalisation of the world economy on
the one hand and the considerably slower globalisation of governance on the other. There are a number of ways to address
this issue. One is normatively through political theory. While this can produce interesting ways of thinking about the
democratic deficit, such literature, especially what we might describe as calls for cosmopolitan democracy, often looks a
little esoteric to proponents of GPG theory. Not only does it play down the role of the institutions—although note David
Held’s (2004) interesting turn from talking about cosmopolitan democracy to talking about ‘cosmopolitan
multilateralism’—this literature invariably ignores, or at least downplays the nature of old fashioned power politics. There
is no getting away from the fact constraints on the multilateral international economic institutions--and the prospects of
enhancing GGII—cannot be separated from the structural power and intellectual purpose of the USA an issue avoided in
much GPG theoretical literature. This is not the only issue to be addressed, but it is a necessary one. US multilateralism
has always been an exercise in what some call ‘Ambivalent Engagement’ (Stewart and Forman, 2002) and others call
‘Instrumental Multilateralism’ (Foot, et al, 2003). The US has accorded greater, but never unconditional,
support to multilateral problem solving in the economic domain. The principal distinction is the long-standing difference
in US attitudes towards the financial institutions, in which it has demonstrated a high degree of intrusion and desire for
control and the governance of international trade (via GATT and now the WTO) in which it has traditionally been
prepared to underwrite, and largely accept, rules-based governance. Ironically, it may be that the creation of the WTO has
pushed the writ of that organisation farther into the domestic political processes (via the development of a dispute
settlement mechanism) of the member states than many, including the United States, anticipated and may in fact be
prepared to tolerate in the longer run (Elliott and Hufbauer, 2002: 404-7).
Precision is key—a broad definition destroys the topic and creates confusion
Resnick 01 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, J.C)
A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too
broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are
"non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The
definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally
nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the
non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy,
Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar:
Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy
strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16)
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
8
Engagement PIC
As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from
which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is
only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply
engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could
be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
9
XT – A2 Perm do CP
American foreign investment always has an agenda – Senators confirm
Curry, 2013
(Tom, 1-30-13, NBC News “US aid seems secure despite Egyptian turmoil,”
http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/30/16773231-us-aid-seems-secure-despite-egyptian-turmoil?lite,
accessed 7-5-13, EB)
Kerry explained to his colleagues last week that Egypt is simply too important for America not to fund. “We have critical
interests with Egypt,” he said. “Egypt has thus far supported and lived by the peace agreement with Israel. And has taken
steps to begin to deal with the problem of security in the Sinai. Those are vital to us and to our national interests and to the
security of Israel.” And on Tuesday an array of senators agreed with Kerry and McCain that the flow of U.S. funds to Morsi
must continue. When senators are asked about funding, the term they use is “engagement.” Asked whether the turmoil in
Egypt should cause a pause in U.S. aid, Sen. Bob Corker, R- Tenn., the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said Tuesday, “I don’t think it should affect our engagement, necessarily, with the country.” Sen. Bob Casey,
D- Pa., who has been serving as chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on the Middle East, noted that “I have
always said when we provide aid, it’s never unconditional and we should always evaluate our aid in the context of what’s
happening at a particular time. But I don’t favor these blanket aid bans that we often hear debated here (in the Senate).”
Engagement is conditional
Mastanduno, government professor, ‘03
(Michael, “The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice”, pg. 184-185, js)
Much of the attention in political science to the question of interdependence and conflict focuses at the systemic level, on
arguments and evidence linking the expansion of economic exchange among states on the one hand to the exacerbation of
international conflict or the facilitation of international cooperation on the other. The approach taken in this chapter
focuses instead at the state level, on the expansion of economic interdependence as a tool of state craft. Under what
circumstances does the cultivation of economic ties, that is, the fostering of economic interdependence as a conscious state
strategy, lead to important and predicable changes in the foreign policy behavior of a target state? Students of economic
statecraft refer to this strategy variously as economic engagement, economic inducement, economic diplomacy, positive
sanctions, positive economic linkage, or the use of economic “carrots” instead of sticks. Critics of the strategy call it
economic appeasement.
U.S. engagement shapes the domestic and foreign policies of rising powers
Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington
University, 2002
(Marc, June, “Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement,” European Journal of International
Relations, 19: 2, p.187-230, EB)
Johnston and Ross define engagement generically as ‘the use of noncoercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo
elements of a rising major power’s behavior’ (1999: 14).11 Engagement strategies generally intend to induce a rising power
to adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the dominant international order. A strategic mode of
action might seem to be built in to such a definition, since it implies the purposive use of a policy by one state to change
the behavior of another state. The concept of communicative action does not rule out purposive action, however. The
distinction rests upon the orientation of the action and the approach to the other. Whether strategic or communicative,
engagement strategies are intentional policies aimed at creating more cooperative relations between states, not a
condition defined by empirical levels of interaction or an unintended byproduct of interaction. Engagement typically
involves some combination of the provision of incentives, the increase of trade and investment, diplomatic dialogues, the
building of interdependencies and the induction of the target state into international organizations. Strategic engagement
strategies follow the logic of strategic action, in which the initiator aims to manipulate the behavior of an actor through
threats and incentives in order to bring it in line with one’s preferences.12 What characterizes these strategies as ‘strategic’
is that they are instrumental state policies attempting to shape a targeted state’s behavior in a predetermined direction.
They take the target as an object, rather than as an equal partner. These threats and incentives may lead the target to
rationally recalculate its interests as it realizes the costs of the proscribed behavior, but the mechanism of change is
ultimately a behavioral one (Schimmelfenig, 2000). American engagement policies, for example, rely upon high levels of
trade and membership in international economic organizations to moderate the target’s conception of its interests by
shifting incentives, building networks of interdependence and giving it a stake in the status quo. Such strategic
engagement strategies aim ‘to influence and affect China’s behavior through a consistent penalty-reward mechanism. The
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
10
Engagement PIC
problem, however, is that the model does little to accommodate and incorporate China’s strategic concerns and demands’
(Wang, 1998: 70).
Engagement is a mutual exchange between two states.
Resnick 01 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, 559-61, J.C)
A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory
regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through
the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic,
military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of
target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state
and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior
military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶
Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC
CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or
grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic
exchanges(n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of
increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of
interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the
prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender
state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a
number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be
established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can
achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the
behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power
between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope
that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. ¶ This definition implies that three necessary
conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of
contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in
multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective
policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a
change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant,
as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state,
the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US
dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its
national economy.(n28)¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a
potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited
regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's
Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the
pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does
not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issueareas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below,
permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.
Engagement targets countries to build strategic relationships
Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington
University, 2002
(Marc, June, “Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement,” European Journal of International
Relations, 19: 2, p.187-230, EB)
With the breakdown of American relations with China after 1989 and the rapid growth of Chinese power in the 1990s, the
American policy of engagement attempted to encourage China to become a moderate participant in the international
status quo through the building of economic interdependence, participation in international institutions and strategic
dialogues. The widespread belief in the failure of this policy has helped to drive the spiraling conflict between the two
states. Drawing on Habermas’s distinction between strategic and communicative action, this article argues that the
unacknowledged rationalist theoretical foundations of the policy of engagement explain its empirical experience.
Engagement rested on a strategic mode of action, in which the building of interdependencies and dialogues were
instrumental policies to change the target state. Rationalist signaling models demonstrate effectively why engagement is
likely to fail within such a strategic mode of action. The policy of engagement carries within it the potential for a
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
11
Engagement PIC
communicative mode of action, however, in which states enter into public dialogues in order to more effectively
communicate, discover and shape preferences, and arrive at mutually acceptable institutions. Communicative
engagement, designed to allow for the free exchange of reasoned argument under conditions which minimize the direct
application of power, provides a superior means to achieve the avowed goals of engagement. Through an analysis of an
important potentially conflictual strategic relationship, this article advances the emerging dialogue between rationalist
and critical theories by focusing on communication, uncertainty and the transformative potential of public discourse. It
draws on a theory of communicative action rooted in Habermas to evaluate the empirical record of engagement in the
1990s, and to articulate theoretical foundations for a communicative engagement.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
12
Precision Key
Defining engagement as a mutual exchange between two states is key to good
policymaking and avoiding error replication.
Resnick 01 (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, J.C)
In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking.
Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion . They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and
hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable
empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability
to build an effective foreign policy.
The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways:
First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related
approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective
research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such
research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st
century.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
13
Empirics Prove
North Korea food program exemplifies economic engagement – quid pro quo, not
direct aid
Babson, World Bank Resident Representative, expert on Korea and Northeast Asia economics,
2011
(Bradley O., 03-11-11, US-Korea Institute at Sais, “Rethinking Economic Engagement with North Korea,”
http://38north.org/2011/03/rethinking-economic-engagement-with-north-korea/, 07-02-13, EB)
Economic and political disengagement from North Korea by the United States and South Korea embody the doctrines of
“strategic patience” and “reciprocity” adopted by these two administrations and has been amplified by increased military
hostilities between the two Koreas during the past year. In a departure from previous governments in both countries, the
Obama and Lee administrations have resisted requests for humanitarian assistance of any significant scale. Although
widespread concern for the plight of ordinary North Koreans is genuine, some actors believe it is paramount to respond to
demonstrated humanitarian needs, while others also recognize that political factors need to be taken into account when
calibrating a response. Concerns about whether the North Korean government appeal is motivated by domestic priorities
to shore up stocks to meet expectations created for 2012, and whether monitoring protocols will be honored after previous
experiences, contribute to the hesitation to respond robustly. Also, provision of humanitarian assistance has implications
for the perceived role of foreigners by the recipient groups and the effectiveness of the government’s own systems and
capacity for providing food for the people. Any claims that food aid is fully “independent” of other considerations are not
credible for those concerned with the wider political dynamics of engagement with North Korea. This means that food aid
should be understood to have significance as a political tool and also should be synchronized with an overall economic
engagement policy that is shaped by political and not solely humanitarian objectives.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
14
Unconditioned Aid Good
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
15
Conditioned Aid Fails
Conditional engagement is costly and fails
Kahler and Kastner, Kahler is Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at IR/PS and Distinguished
Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego. Kastner is an Associate Professor, International Relations at U. Maryland.
‘04
(Miles and Scott, “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:
ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN”,
http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/kastner/KahlerKastnerNov2004.pdf, js)
Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an
explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies,
sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target
country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in
exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly
plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to
succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less
prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target
country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if
the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries
with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also
making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large:
both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the
bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed
between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within
the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among
adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
16
Unconditioned Aid Better
Engagement operates best through catalysis
Nincic, Professor of Political Science at UC. Davis, ‘11
(Miroslav, “The Logic of Positive Engagement”, 176, js)
While one-time economic concessions may induce the other side to abandon some aspects of its external behavior, they
rarely have much of an effect on domestic political structures and priorities. Nor are they likely to lead the adversary to
abandon any policy benefiting the regime's domestic legitimacy—such as the nuclear enrichment program in the Iranian
case. These are changes that positive engagement can produce, if at all, through catalysis, not by quid pro quos .
Thus, the path-dependent logic behind the preference for negative pressures against adversaries may, under certain
conditions, be undermined. Further, the initial purpose of engagement stands to be a beneficial and fairly specific quid pro
quo, an objective that may be extended once catalytic possibilities are more fully revealed. Finally, even the quest for a
quid pro quo may be undermined by lack of a common numeraire linking naturally dissimilar concessions and counterconcessions: a common measure of value can, as a rule, only emerge inductively, through the mutual calibration afforded
by negotiations. At this point, it is useful to shift focus and ask what conclusions can be drawn regarding the conditions
within the target country on which a successful use of positive incentives rest. The theoretical framework guiding much of
our analysis has accounted for conditions for successful incentives from both the initiator's and the target's perspectives.
The inducement must be such that the target's incentive to bad behavior is offset or, in the case of catalysis, effectively
altered. Because misbehavior typically has a substantial political purpose, the carrot offered must be correspondingly
large. And because constraints on the initiator's side limit the magnitude of allowable concessions, it is particularly
important to understand when the target's commitment to its objectionable policies may be more or less strong. One of
this book's central arguments has been that this commitment recedes when the regime's domestic position shows signs of
instability: when the support of those groups on whose backing the regime has traditionally relied is no longer readily
available or when it does not suffice to neutralize challenges from previously quiescent quarters. When regime equilibrium
reaches a point of at least latent instability, positive incentives could serve two complementary purposes.
Concessions Are Key When Inducing Adversarial Cooperation
Larson, Professor at UCLA International Institute, 1997
[Deborah Welch, 1997, “International Society of Political Psychology”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792108, 7-4-13, JB]
More likely, the initiator will offer benefits or make concessions to reduce ¶ distrust and to induce the adversary to
cooperate on security issues; positive ¶ sanctions are more legitimate and appropriate (Baldwin, 1971). A state can use ¶
concessions to achieve any of three possible goals. First, a concession may be part ¶ of the bargaining process between two
states. A state makes a concession in order ¶ to elicit a counter-concession from the other side. Second, a state may make a
¶ concession as an indication of good faith. For example, to prove that it will carry ¶ out a disengagement agreement, a state
may unilaterally withdraw a portion of its ¶ troops, as a first installment. Third, in a more extreme version of this, a state
may ¶ make a concession in order to change its image as aggressive and intransigent. Each ¶ type of concession is slightly
more risky than the previous, and hence likely to ¶ promote greater trust.¶
Gift Giving Builds Trust
Servatka, New Zealand Department of Economics and Finance, 2011
[Maros, 12/1/2011, Games.com, “Building Trust- One Gift At a Time”,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ec0ffa75-5dd0-4cad-b1e6eb7885f6c422%40sessionmgr110&vid=2&hid=119, 7/2/13, JB]
The majority, if not all, economic interactions rely on trust [1] and thus, engaging in trusting ¶ behavior provides a socially
desirable outcome since it (often) improves economic efficiency [2–4] and ¶ well being [5–10]. However, there exist
individuals without a preference for fair outcomes who betray ¶ this trust by appropriating the majority or the entire
created surplus. If the proportion of such people in ¶ the population is high, trusting everyone might not be optimal. Given
this, mechanisms to foster trust ¶ and trustworthiness may play a crucial role in establishing relationships and allowing
transactions to ¶ occur. Negotiations literature suggests that one way to create trust is to make concessions (e.g., [11]) ¶ or
gestures before the transaction takes place. This advice is also commonly presented in the ¶ popular press[12].¶ Previous
experimental literature sheds some light on the reasons why concessions might be so ¶ crucial. In a nice experiment [13]
find that cooperation is best achieved when the parties first cooperate ¶ in a small-stakes, low-temptation environment and
then slowly evolve through a series of successful ¶ interactions into a large-stakes partnership. Based on [13] insight,
concessions could be viewed as ¶ giving a gift prior to the transaction and thus creating goodwill or a reputation for being
kind that ¶ influences the behavior of the other party [14–19].¶ A similar argument has been previously made in [20,21]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
17
Engagement PIC
with respect to generosity. Both anecdotaland scientific evidence shows that people care about the well-being of others
and often are willing to sacrifice a significant amount of resources to promote fair outcomes, reward kind actions with ¶
kindness and punish deliberately hostile actions [22–31]. Therefore, it is likely that a trustee’s gift ¶ might influence
trustor’s perception of the trustee and subsequently increase his trust. To explore ¶ this issue further we evaluate the effect
of gift giving on trust in a stylized setting of the investment ¶ game [32]. We build on our previous research presented in
[33] that compares the ability of monetary ¶ and non-monetary mechanisms to enhance trusting behavior. This earlier
study provides evidence that ¶ a gift does have the potential to increase trust. While certain aspects of gift giving have
previously been ¶ explored in the context of dictator and gift-exchange games (see [26,28,34] for excellent surveys), the ¶
novelty of oursetup is that here the gift preceeds the actual transaction and acts as a catalyst. ¶ The importance of gift
exchange has been addressed in various areas of economics, such as labor ¶ relations (e.g., [35,36]), customer relations
[24], bargaining [37], and price setting [38]. [34,39] ¶ provide a thorough account of the laboratory experiments on giftexchange in labor markets. The ¶ relatively robust laboratory results that the higher the gift the stronger the reciprocal
response have also ¶ been tested in the field [40–42]. While [43] and [44] provide additional evidence for the importance
of ¶ gift exchange respectively in a charitable donation setting and a tree-planting firm, [45] find that ¶ positive reciprocity
effects detected in lab experiments can wear off quickly in a door-to-door ¶ fundraising task or in library data entry. On the
other hand, also in a library data entry task, [46] ¶ observe a strong effect of giving a physical gift (a thermos) to worker
subjects on their productivity, ¶ but no effect of an equivalent value cash gift.¶ A gift in our experiment is very stylized.
However, historically gifts were also used to signal intent ¶ between two parties attempting to form a transaction [48,49]
and thus served as building stones of ¶ relationships by strengthening trust [50–56]. This leads to an important question:
What is trust? A ¶ somewhat general but intuitive definition can be found in [57] who states that trust is the expectation ¶ of
the trustor that the decision process of the trustee will be guided by certain rules or norms in order to ¶ reach fair outcomes
(see also [58] for a discussion of repeated interaction and partner selection). From ¶ this perspective, a gift increases the
trustor's belief that the trustee will play by some rules or norms to allow for mutual, fair gains from the interaction.
However, in order to operationalize gifts and observe their impact on trust, throughout this paper we adopt the view
presented in [59] according to which: [A trusting action is] an action that generates a monetary gain which could be
shared with ¶ another agent and exposes the trustor to the risk of a loss of utility if the other agent defects and ¶
appropriates too much or all of the monetary gain.
Mutual Trust Key to Adversary Cooperation
Larson, Professor at UCLA International Institute, 1997
[Deborah Welch, 1997, “International Society of Political Psychology”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792108, 7-4-13, JB]
Mutual trust is probably a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for ¶ adversaries to cooperate on security issues. If my
argument is correct, then ¶ where enemies were able to reach agreements, we should find either that there ¶ was already
adequate trust or that at least one state took actions to instill greater ¶ trust in the other side. We need to rule out the
possibility that the states could ¶ cooperate without trusting each other because they faced a common enemy, ¶ shortage of
economic resources, allied pressure, or domestic political con- ¶ straints. Without some degree of mutual trust, however,
any such agreements ¶ should not endure.
Gifts Are More Likely to Be Reciprocated Than Concessions With Conditions
Larson, Professor at UCLA International Institute, 1997
[Deborah Welch, 1997, “International Society of Political Psychology”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792108, 7-4-13, JB]
People are more likely to reciprocate gifts and favors for which the giver made ¶ a sacrifice because such gestures are less
apt to have ulterior motives. Similarly, a ¶ state can begin to prove its good intentions by making a costly concession
(Tesser, ¶ Gatewood, & Driver, 1968; Gergen et al., 1975; Komorita, 1973; Pruitt, 1981, pp. ¶ 124-125). Gorbachev explained
that "the new thinking is the bridging of the gap ¶ between the word and the deed, and we embarked on practical deeds"
(Gorbachev, ¶ 1987). Thus, for example, in his December 1988 speech to the United Nations, ¶ Gorbachev announced that
he was reducing Soviet troops by 500,000 and with- ¶ drawing 5,000 tanks from Central Europe (Garthoff, 1994b, p. 366).
¶ In pursuing this strategy, generally the state should not make the concession ¶ contingent on a prior response from the
opponent. The other side may regard "I ¶ will if you will" promises as a cheap attempt to get them to make the first
concession ¶ (Mitchell, 1991). On the other hand, when the initiator announces and then carries ¶ out a conciliatory gesture,
the consistency between word and deed leads to trust; ¶ we can rely on the state's leader to do what he says he will
(Schlenker, Helm, & ¶ Tedeschi, 1973; Lindskold, 1978). The initiator takes the risk that the other side will ignore or exploit
a conciliatory gesture. Both theory and empirical evidence hold that making oneself ¶ vulnerable to exploitation by
cooperating first builds trust (Swinth, 1967).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
18
Gift giving breaks down mistrust and leads to cooperation – those who are parasites
don’t accomplish anything
Carmichael and MacLeod, Professor of Economics (both), 97
(H Lorne and W. Bentley “Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2527277, Accessed
7/6/13, AZ)
A population of strategies that start out with one or more defections can ¶ successfully screen out invaders of this kind.
'Mistrust of strangers' has evolutionary ¶ value. More interesting, however, is our main result that a stable gift-giving
custom ¶ may emerge. Under this convention, an exchange of gifts at the beginning of a new ¶ match will break down
mistrust and allow cooperation to start immediately. The ¶ reason is simple. A parasite in a gift-giving society will have to
buy a succession of ¶ gifts, while incumbent honest types need buy the gift only once. The gift giving ¶ custom lowers the
relative return to being a parasite
Just gift giving is better than QPQ – those unwilling to give receive the least
Dolfsma et al, Myrdal Prize winning professor, 9
(Wilfred; René Van Der Eijk, researcher; Dr. Albert Jolink, Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam; “On a
Source of Social Capital: Gift Exchange”, http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journal/on-a-source-of-social-capitalgift-exchange-nfuozHd6s2?key=citeulike, Accessed 7/2/13, AZ)
As Levi-Strauss (1996) puts it, ‘‘to give is to receive.’’ The literature on gifts, as well as empirical findings on gift exchange,
shows that those who give more are also the ones who receive more (Komter, 1996). Inclusiveness comes in degrees.
Actors can try to shape their environment to become members of a group (inclusion) – giving them access to the ben- efits
of social capital present in that particular group. Actors who are unable or unwilling to give, prove to be the poorest
recipients (Komter, 1996) – both a cause and an effect for those individuals to have no social networks (Gouldner, 1960).
Komter (1996) has, consistent with the above-mentioned, observed that ‘‘people seem to choose – probably mostly not
consciously – those social partners in their gift rela- tionships who are attractive to them, because they can expect them to
give in return at some time.’’ Homans (1950, p. 182) points out that ‘‘the higher a man’s social rank, the larger will be the
number of persons that originate interaction for him’’ (cf. Darr, 2003). Bodemann (1988) point out that powerful people –
being in a position where they can confer benefits to others – will receive more gifts than less powerful individuals so that
they might be more likely to reciprocate the focal agent. The (less-ex- tended) social networks of less powerful or resourcepoor individuals lead to less participation in gift exchange and diminishing opportunities to develop feelings of
‘faithfulness and gratitude’ (Simmel, 1996). Individuals may however very well seek supportive relationships with network
members who have different – not just more – resources (see, e.g., Lin and Dumin, 1986).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
19
Conditioned Aid Fails—Venezuela
Venezuela would reject the aff’s perception of engagement from the U.S.
Mawdsley 2012 [Emma, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, Cambridge University,
"The Changing Geographies Of Foreign Aid And Development Cooperation: Contributions
From Gift Theory." Transactions Of The Institute Of British Geographers 37.2 (2012): 256-272.]
It appears that Western imaginative geographies of foreign aid have, for the most part, failed to recognise the presence
and activities of a substantial range of Southern and other non-DAC donors. However, this situation has changed sharply
in the last few years, and the NDDs are now an increasingly visible part of the aid landscape. A major driver of this new
visibility has been China’s rise. Although development cooperation constitutes only a small proportion of China’s portfolio
of activities, it is still sizeable in absolute terms, and furthermore has often been significantly exaggerated (Bra ̈ utigam
2009). The burgeoning interest in China’s ‘aid’ has spilt over into a growing awareness of other emerging powers, and
other¶ Emma Mawdsley¶ non-DAC donors. Additional factors have also contributed to the growing shift in awareness of
‘new’ development actors, including the accession of ten ‘new’ EU states, requiring that they (re-)cre- ate development
institutions and funding; Hugo Chavez’s positioning of Venezuelan aid as an open challenge to US hegemony in Latin
America; and the growing surveillance of official and private Arab aid following 9⁄11. Various initiatives are now emerging
within the traditional centres of the development industry in response to the issue of non-DAC donors (Fues and Cooper
2008; Fues and Wolff 2010; Le Pere et al. 2010; Grimm et al. 2009). Debates and programmes to engage them are evident
in the newly created UN Development Cooperation Forum, the OECD’s Global Forum on Development, and the
Development Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 2005 DAC announced that outreach
to the non-DAC donors was now a formal policy agenda. In 2006, under the auspices of the Russian Presi- dency, the G8,
the OECD and the World Bank held a conference on ‘Emerging Donors in the Global Development Community’; and in
2011 DFID announced a major policy shift in its intent to work with and in the ‘emerging powers’ (Mitchell 2011). For
their part, some of the NDDs are keen to collaborate and move closer to the DAC community, including Turkey and
Russia. Others are cautious about aligning with the ‘mainstream’. According to Rowlands, Brazil and South Africa are
more open to ‘trilateral’ cooperation, but even here,¶ Though less reticent [than China and India], Brazil remains wary of
such arrangements, and takes care to ensure that it is not simply re-establishing older hierarchical relations wherein it
plays a subordinate role to a traditional donor. (2008, 16)¶ Others, such as Venezuela, openly reject cooperation with what
they see as the highly discredited policies and practices of the Western-dominated aid community (see Glennie 2008;
Woods 2008). To date, China and India have mostly refused to enter into collaborative donor arrangements on the
grounds of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other nations.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
20
A2: Legal Barriers
Gift giving can go beyond legal barriers
Dolfsma et al, Myrdal Prize winning professor, 9
(Wilfred; René Van Der Eijk, researcher; Dr. Albert Jolink, Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam; “On a
Source of Social Capital: Gift Exchange”, http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journal/on-a-source-of-social-capitalgift-exchange-nfuozHd6s2?key=citeulike, Accessed 7/2/13, AZ)
Gift exchange can lead to lower transaction costs since it allows individuals to trade with one another without relying
solely on formal mechanisms such as legal contracts and litigation. In the process of exchanging gifts, both parties get to
know each other and the other’s perceptions and frame of ref- erence. It is believed by most exchange theorists that actors
will engage in gift exchange if both parties believe that exchange provides them with more utility (satisfaction) than any
other option currently open to them (Uehara, 1990). Offer (1997), Bouty (2000), and Ferrary (2003) point out that under
certain circumstances reciprocal exchange without the presence of a contract or financial compensation is preferred.
Firstly, not all goods exchanged are merchandisable in the sense that their circulation cannot be transmitted via the
market with a com- mercial contract and a monetary counter payment (for example, certain types of information). Secondly, reciprocal exchange has been preferred when trade involves a personal interaction, and when goods or services are
unique, are expensive, or have many dimensions of quality.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
21
Aff Answers
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
22
A2: T QPQ
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
23
Engagement Not Just QPQ
Economic engagement involves giving incentives to promote bidirectional flow of goods
and people
Haass and O’Sullivan, Director and Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, 2000
(Robert N. and Neghan L., Summer 2000, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” Volume: 42, No. 2, p.
9-10, EB)
Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer
tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic
aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans
or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry
into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global
market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international
institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could
involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian
authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between
Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state
institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental
organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other nongovernmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.
There is no difference between unconditional and conditional engagement.
Noland 00 (Marcus, Peterson Institute for International Economics, "The Summit and the Economic Future of the
Peninsula,")
South Korea has an enormously important role in this. Setting aside the issue of post-colonial claims against Japan, South
Korea would be the leading source of trade and investment for North Korea. Moreover, it is unlikely that either Japan or
the US would get too far ahead of South Korea in the diplomatic game. South Korea will inevitably lead engagement with
the North, despite what one hears in some quarters of Washington.
At the same time, engagement with the North presents some risks for the South (as well as its allies). In his March "Berlin
Declaration," President Kim Dae-jung indicated the willingness of the South Korean government to directly underwrite
the economic rehabilitation of the North. Although the South Korean government has gone to great lengths to try and
distinguish unconditional "humanitarian aid" from other sorts of economic engagement which would be undertaken on
the basis of reciprocity, this distinction (maintained by other governments as well) is fictional .
Indeed, the use of private South Korean firms as tools of South Korean foreign policy simply complicates businessgovernment relations in South Korea and makes the creation of a more liberal transparent economic system in the South
all the more difficult. Some in the United States, fear that Kim Dae-jung will "sell out" the US on issues such as the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems.
Economic engagement need not include conditions
Shirk, 9 -- Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation director [Susan, et al, "North Korea Inside Out: The Case for
Economic Engagement," Independent Task Force, Dec 2009, asiasociety.org/files/pdf/North_Korea_Inside_Out.pdf]
A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior . In the past, Washington has conditioned
engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization . This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful . It has the
perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats . The U .S .
can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up . While some engagement should continue to be
conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached .
Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and
should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement.
Economic engagement doesn’t require action—it makes the other nation want what you
want
Mansfield, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science, 2003
(Edward, “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate”, pg. 182, js)
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
24
Engagement PIC
Along those lines, the recent literature has served a second important purpose—to clarify the underlying logic of
economic-engagement strategy and to point to some of the likely determinants of success or failure. In a striking
convergence, virtually all of the recent studies highlight the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy strategy
as the key factors driving the potential effectiveness of economic engagement. The basic causal logic of economic
engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement was a
long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting
(asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of
interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the
source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to
want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain runs from economic
interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.
Economic engagement can be both conditional and unconditional
Kahler 6 (Miles Kahler, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San
Diego, Scott L. Kastner, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, 2006, Journal of Peace
Research, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the
Taiwan Strait,” 43(5), p. 523, this evidence was obtained at http://bauscharddebate.com/2013/03/defining-economicengagement/)
While the determinants and effectiveness of economic sanctions have been the subject of a substantial and growing literature in international relations,
much less attention has been given to economic engagement strategies, where a country deliberately expands economic ties with an
adversary to change the target’s behavior. This article develops a theoretical framework that distinguishes between three types of
engagement strategies: conditional policies that directly link economic ties to changed behavior in the target state;
unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to act as a constraint on the behavior of the target state;
and unconditional policies where economic interdependence is meant to effect a transformation in the foreign policy goals
of the target state.
Can be conditional or conditioned
Kahler, 4 – University of California, San Diego, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies [Miles,
and Scott Kastner, University of Maryland Department of Government and Politics, “Strategic Uses of Economic
Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan,” 2006,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fwww.bsos.umd.edu%2Fgvpt%2Fkastner%2FKahlerKastner.doc&ei=n1eRUcnVOpTW8gT06oGADA&usg=AFQjCNFN
Fta1M5d4wNmGEXYkeG86I4Ehdw&sig2=282hgP-ZbOqOdCok5zJqkA&bvm=bv.46340616,d.eWU]
Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an
explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional . Conditional policies, sometimes called
“linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy,
conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000)
analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be
employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will
be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change
policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states
may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the
eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large:
both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner
to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make
credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market
exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in
that they do not include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes
that economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect change in the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a
reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilateral level might
yield an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be
associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized. At a minimum, two causal
pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a
constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the
goals of the target state.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
25
Not QPQ—Empirics
Engagement can be direct aid or exchanges – US and China programs for Africa prove
GAO, Government Accountability Office, 2013
(February 2013, Government Accountability Office, “SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic
Engagement,” 07-02-13, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652041.pdf, EB)
The United States and China have emphasized different policies and approaches for their engagement with sub-Saharan
Africa. U.S. goals have included strengthening democratic institutions, supporting human rights, using development
assistance to improve health and education, and helping subSaharan African countries build global trade. The Chinese
government, in contrast, has stated the goal of establishing closer ties with African countries by seeking mutual benefit for
China and African nations and by following a policy of noninterference in countries’ domestic affairs. Both the United
States and China have seen sharp growth in trade with subSaharan Africa over the past decade, with China’s total trade in
goods increasing faster and surpassing U.S. trade in 2009. Petroleum imports constitute the majority of U.S. and Chinese
imports from sub-Saharan Africa, with China also importing a large amount of other natural resources. China’s exports of
goods to the region have grown and far exceed U.S. exports of goods. Information on other key aspects of China’s
engagement in sub-Saharan Africa is limited in some cases, since China does not publish comprehensive data on its
foreign assistance or government-sponsored loans to the region. Data-collection efforts focused on specific countries, as
GAO’s case-study analysis shows, can provide further insights but do not fully eliminate these information gaps. Both the
United States and China chiefly import natural resources from subSaharan Africa, but data from Angola, Ghana, and
Kenya suggest that U.S. and Chinese patterns of engagement have differed in other respects. The United States has
primarily provided grants to Kenya for health and humanitarian programs. Data from Ghana and Kenya suggest that
China has provided much smaller amounts of grant assistance and pursued increasing engagement through loans for
large-scale infrastructure projects. Information from Angola, Ghana, and Kenya indicates that direct competition between
U.S. and Chinese firms is limited, with U.S. firms concentrated in higher-technology areas. Further, differences across the
three countries suggest that host-government requirements, such as regulations on hiring local labor, influence Chinese
and U.S. firms’ engagement in each case-study country.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
26
A2: Gift CP
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
27
A2: Gift Giving Doesn’t Force Reciprocation
A gift still creates an obligation at some point to reciprocate
Mawdsley 2012 [Emma, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, Cambridge University,
"The Changing Geographies Of Foreign Aid And Development Cooperation: Contributions
From Gift Theory." Transactions Of The Institute Of British Geographers 37.2 (2012): 256-272.]
The essence of Marcel Mauss’ landmark essay on ‘the gift’ is that the act of giving creates a social bond between giver and
receiver (Mauss 1990). According to Mauss, there are three elements to this: giving (which establishes the social bond);
receiving (because to refuse would not just be to renounce the gift, but also the social relationship); and reciprocating (to
demonstrate in return one’s own honour, wealth and standing). Critically, there is an ambivalence in the performance of
the gift – it must be conducted as voluntary, disinterested and ‘free’, even as it sets an obligation at some future point to
reciprocate. The gift economy there- fore has a social function – the creation and tending of social relationships.
Grants are still a form of development cooperation that is associated with hierarchy
Mawdsley 2012 [Emma, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, Cambridge University,
"The Changing Geographies Of Foreign Aid And Development Cooperation: Contributions
From Gift Theory." Transactions Of The Institute Of British Geographers 37.2 (2012): 256-272.]
It is not just the first half of the terminology that is contested: for many in the South the word ‘donor’ is burdened with
associations of paternalism, hierarchy and neo-colonial interference. Some of the (re-)emerging actors prefer to call
themselves ‘development partners’ in a conscious promotion of a discourse of horizontal relations of mutual benefit, noninterference and respect for sovereignty, rather than the vertical hierarchy invoked by the terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’.
Similarly, they often prefer the term ‘development assistance’ or ‘development cooperation’ to ‘foreign aid’. This brings us
to the question of what actually constitutes development cooperation, and whether it can be accurately or meaningfully
compared with DAC definitions of ‘foreign aid’, a debate that is both technically complicated and open to sharp political
and ideological disagreements (Brautigam 2010).Different Southern actors define ‘development cooperation’ in
different ways, but it includes grants , loans, lines of credit, debt cancellation, studentships and technical training,
resource-for-infrastructure swaps, the provision of doctors, nurses and other skilled professionals, humanitarian relief,
and so on.
Grants appear to be unreciprocated but this signals symbolic domination
Mawdsley 2012 [Emma, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography, Cambridge University,
"The Changing Geographies Of Foreign Aid And Development Cooperation: Contributions
From Gift Theory." Transactions Of The Institute Of British Geographers 37.2 (2012): 256-272.]
Hattori argues that the grant element of official foreign aid should be categorised, in Mauss’s schema, as ‘gift’ rather than
economic exchange or redistribution. But unlike gifts between equals – gifts as part of an exchange system – the gift of aid
is one that is unreciprocated. Unlike loans, grants are not paid back: they are exempt (or rather, as we shall see, appear to
be exempt) from the obligation to return something to the giver. Here Hattori turns to Marshall Sahlins (1972), who
finesses Mauss’s arguments with a greater attentiveness to power. Sahlins’ typology of giving includes the category of
‘negative giving’, in which the norms of reciprocity are indefinitely suspended. Under these circumstances, Sahlins argued,
the social relationship that is created and maintained by gift giving is one of superiority and inferiority , rather
than a competitive interplay of honour, dignity and status. According to Hattori, official foreign aid clearly exhibits the
features of Sahlins’ ‘negative giving’: it arises from a condition of significant material inequality between donor and
receiver; it makes a (supposed) virtue of unreciprocated giving; and it can be understood, therefore, as a practice that both
signals and euphemises symbolic domination . Bourdieu (1977 1990) adds further to gift theory by exploring
the acquiescence of the recipient in their ‘symbolic domination’, proposing their active complicity in maintaining an
unequal social order. Persistent unreciprocated receiving allows social inequality to be naturalised as the ‘normal order of
things’, and thus perpetuated. In the case of foreign aid, we can see this expressed materially and psychologically as
dependency.
¶
Gifts increase difference and still link—there is no such thing as a free gift
Eyben 2006 [Rosalind, Professorial Fellow Institute of Development Studies, "The Power Of
The Gift And The New Aid Modalities." IDS Bulletin 37.6 (2006): 88-98.]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
28
Engagement PIC
Thus for both official donors and recipients, aid is primarily conceptualised, with its associated rules and norms, as either
an economic contract or an entitlement. Aid conceived as a gift has few friends in the official world of aid but it is
attractive to anthropologists studying aid because it appears to illuminate what may be actually happening as distinct from
what people say they are doing. So far, such studies have focused on the non-governmental sector, where ideas of
philanthropy and charitable giving are much stronger than in official aid circles. Stirrat and Henkel (1997) look at how a
gift of money from a private donor in the North moves through a chain of non-governmental organisation (NGO)
relationships until it reaches its ultimate recipient. Drawing on the classic on gift theory by the French sociologist, Marcel
Mauss, Stirrat and Henkel argue that while the money flows one way, symbolic reciprocity moves up the chain the other
way. Most notably, they propose that while the gift is understood by the donor as an expression of social solidarity and the
way it is given attempts to deny difference between the donor and the recipient, a gift in practice reinforces or even
reinvents these differences (Stirrat and Henkel 1997). Sampson (2002) writes in a similar vein about the chain of giving
and receiving, in which it is always the giver who has the power, stressing that there is no such thing as a free
gift.
Quid pro qou is more sincere
Social Capital and Deliberative Theory:¶ A Synthesis and Empirical Test¶ Peter Muhlberger¶ Institute for the Study of
Information Technology and Society (InSites)¶ Carnegie Mellon University¶ Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 01
The idea of sincerity in this definition is intimately connected with social trust, so¶ it is important to understand its
nature. A rational actor might understa¶ nd such sincerity¶ as a¶ quid pro quo¶ . Two combatants agree to resolve their
differences by resorting to¶ reason. That is, it is agreed that whoever provides the better reasons wins. To make this ¶
agreement plausible, each combatants must convince the other¶ that they really do intend¶ to resolve the conflict if they
lose the argument. Thus, they must at least feign sincerity.
Gifts expect something in return
Camerer 88 Supplement: Organizations and¶ Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of
Social Structure (1988),¶ pp. S180-S21, gifts as economic and social symbols,
http://authors.library.caltech.edu/22177/1/2780246%5B1%5D.pdf
Gift-giving¶ has¶ often¶ puzzled¶ economists,¶ especially¶ because¶ effi-¶ cient¶ gifts-like¶ cash¶ or¶ giving¶ exactly¶
what¶ a¶ person¶ asks¶ for-¶ seem¶ crass¶ or¶ inappropriate.¶ It¶ is¶ shown¶ in¶ a¶ formal¶ game-theoretic¶ model¶
that¶ gifts¶ serve¶ as¶ "signals"¶ of¶ a¶ person's¶ intentions¶ about¶ future¶ investment¶ in¶ a¶ relationship,¶ and¶
inefficient¶ gifts¶ can¶ be¶ bet-¶ ter¶ signals.¶ Other¶ explanations¶ for¶ the¶ inefficiency¶ of¶ gift¶ giving¶ are¶ advanced,¶ and¶
some¶ stylized¶ facts¶ about¶ gift-giving¶ practices¶ are¶ described¶ (many¶ of¶ which¶ are¶ consistent¶ with¶ the¶ signaling¶ view¶
of¶ gifts)
Gift giving implies reciprocity
Camerer 88 Supplement: Organizations and¶ Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of
Social Structure (1988),¶ pp. S180-S21, gifts as economic and social symbols,
http://authors.library.caltech.edu/22177/1/2780246%5B1%5D.pdf
In¶ most¶ anthropological¶ accounts,¶ reciprocity¶ is¶ essential-accepting¶ a¶ gift¶ implies¶ a¶ solemn¶ obligation¶ of¶
repayment¶ (as¶ in¶ accepting¶ a¶ loan).¶ This¶ insistence¶ on¶ reciprocity¶ suggests¶ that,¶ for¶ primitives,¶ gifts¶
actually¶ provide¶ insurance¶ or¶ credit,2¶ substituting¶ for¶ exchange¶ in¶ formal,¶ anony-¶ mous¶ markets¶ (see¶
Posner¶ 1980;¶ Hemenway¶ 1984).¶ If¶ so,¶ the¶ flamboyant¶ gift¶ giving¶ chronicled¶ by¶ anthropologists¶ is¶ not¶ a¶ good¶ guide¶
to¶ modern¶ gift¶ giving,¶ and¶ it¶ is¶ especially¶ misleading¶ to¶ assume¶ that¶ modern¶ gift¶ giving¶ must¶ be¶ reciprocal¶ (it¶ is¶
not¶ always¶ so),¶ as¶ many¶ scholars¶ have¶ (e.g.,¶ Schwartz¶ 1967,¶ p.¶ 8;¶ Titmuss¶ 1971,¶ p.¶ 72;¶ Akerlof¶ 1982,¶ p.¶ 550)
Gift giving implies a self-narcissism and are always a facade of generosity
Arrigo and Williams,¶ of the California School of Professional Psychology,¶ 2K¶ (Bruce and Christopher, Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice, August page First Search gjm)¶
The gift has no idiosyncratic or artful definition that needs to be addressed. Derrida’s concept of the gift is simplyas it
sounds: Something that is given to someone by someone else.¶ Gift ¶ , however, is a misleading term. Once anaward is
given to someone, that someone assumes a debt (of gratitude or a reciprocation of the gift). The giver of the gift, in return,
is “consciously and explicitly” pleased with him- or herself for the show of generosity (Caputo,1997, p. 141). This
narcissistic, self-eudemonical exchange is in fact in- creased if the receiver is ungrateful or isunable, through the
anonymity of the gift, to show gratitude. Thus, the offering that is made without expectation of explicit gratitude simply
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
29
Engagement PIC
nourishes the narcissism of the giver. This is the paradoxical dimension of the gift. Thesender of the gift, instead of giving,
receives; and the receiver of the gift, instead of receiving something, is in debt(Caputo, 1997). To avoid mobilizing the
circular economy of the gift (the circle of exchange, of reciprocation, andof reappropriation), the gift must not appear as
such. Thus, the giver must not be aware that he or she is giving, andthe receiver must not be aware that he or she is
receiving. Only under those circumstances would the giver not fuelthe fire of narcissistic generosity, and the receiver not
assume a debt. As Caputo (1997) notes, the pure gift “couldtake place only if everything happened below the level of
conscious intentionality, where no one intends to giveanything to anyone and no one is intentionally conscious of
receiving anything” (p. 147). Phenomenologistsremind us, following Aristotle’s (1925) notion of act and intentionality, that
the agent always acts for its own good.The agent always intends to act for its own good; otherwise, it will not act at all (e.g.,
Heidegger, 1962; Husserl,1983). Thus, there are always degrees of intentionality—expectation, reciprocation, and
reappropriation—on thepart of the giver. The giving of the gift serves a purpose. It can be traced to narcissism masked by a
facade of generosity, or it can be linked to anticipation of something that will come back at some point some time in
thefuture (Derrida, 1997). This is where the notion of economy arises. What fuels the economy are “entitiesdetermined
and exchanged, of calculation and balanced equations, of equity and sound reason, of laws andregularities” (Caputo, 1997,
p. 146). It is the gift that the community has an affinity for in the name of democratic justice. The justice that the gift does,
however, authenticates the reality of a pseudo-democracy. An imitation (i.e.,illusion) of justice that, as an artifact of
simulation, is more real that reality itself; one that is (im)possible in thecommunity that we refer to as democratic society.¶
12¶ ¶ .
The cp links to the net benefit
Emmons and McCullough, Professor of Psychology at UC Davis and Director of the Evolution and Human Behavior
Laboratory at University of Miami, 4
(Robert and Michael, “The Psychology of Gratitude”,
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Qz4nhZ3ZMmgC&oi=fnd&pg=PA195&dq=gift+giving+trust&ots=CFL5k
2GfUc&sig=B1xpHUHLobdThVFDWVAk-pGuPUQ#v=onepage&q=gift&f=false, Accessed 7/6/13, AZ)
Several scholars of authority have criticized Mauss for his spiritual inter-¶ pretation of the hau. Firth (1929/1959), for
example, preferred secular to¶ spiritual explanations. According to him, the fear of punishment or social¶ sanctions is the
real reason to fulfill one's obligation to return a gift. These¶ sanctions can include a threat to the continuity of economic
relations, or to¶ the maintenance of prestige and power. Another anthropologist, Sahlins¶ (1972), offered an alternative
explanation, which is secular as well. Return-¶ ing to the original text of the Maori legend, he discovered an interesting as-¶
pect that Mauss neglected in his rendering of the story. The participation of a¶ third party in the cycle of gift exchange is
crucial to Sahlins' conception of¶ hau: For a gift to bring increase, it is necessary that a third party causes this in-¶ crease.
In the Maori legend, after having received the birds taken by the¶ hunters, the priests offer some of them to the Mauri (a
sacred stone acting as¶ a shrine), which can then cause the birds to abound. According to Sahlins, ¶ the term profit would
have been a better translation of hau than Mauss's¶ "spirit." Sahlins conceived of hau as the "increase power" of the goods
of the¶ forest. The ceremonial offering of birds by the priests restores the fertility of ¶ the forest. In Sahlins's words, "The
hau of a good is its yield, just as the hau of¶ a forest is its productiveness" (1972, p. 160).
Adversaries View Concessions as Tricks and Indications of Weakness
Larson, Professor at UCLA International Institute, 1997
[Deborah Welch, 1997, “International Society of Political Psychology”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792108, 7-4-13, JB]
Use of positive sanctions has its own risks and drawbacks. The target may ¶ ignore or discount a conciliatory gesture from
the enemy--charging, for example, ¶ that it is a propaganda ploy, a means to buy time for armament, or a response to ¶
domestic opponents. Even worse, the adversary may view a concession as an ¶ indication of weakness.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
30
Barriers Prevent Gifts
Too many barriers to unconditional engagement
Kahler and Kastner, Kahler is Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at IR/PS and Distinguished
Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego. Kastner is an Associate Professor, International Relations at U. Maryland.
‘04
(Miles and Scott, “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:
ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN”,
http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/kastner/KahlerKastnerNov2004.pdf, js)
The barriers to a successful unconditional engagement strategy that aims to achieve elite transformation in the target state
would appear substantial. Strategies in this vein are likely to encounter substantial resistance in the target state: most
elites probably don’t want to be “transformed,” and they certainly don’t want to be replaced. Faced with likely resistance,
initiating states pursuing this strategy must be prepared to open economic links unilaterally (i.e. without the cooperation
of the target), hoping that the prospect of bilateral economic ties will generate a latent coalition of groups desiring a
peaceful environment in which they could take advantage of those ties, and that eventually a political entrepreneur will
mobilize this latent coalition in an effort to challenge the existing order. Because transformational strategies may require
long time horizons and may also incur repeated disappointments, they are perhaps most likely to be successful when a
broad and stable consensus—one able to withstand changes in governing party—exists within the country initiating such a
strategy (see, for example, Davis 1999).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
31
Links to Politics
Gift Giving Cost’s State Image And Arouses Political Opposition
Larson, Professor at UCLA International Institute, 1997
[Deborah Welch, 1997, “International Society of Political Psychology”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792108, 7-4-13, JB]
A concession may be costly in terms of its effects on a state's bargaining ¶ reputation, image, or tactical advantage. A
concession might also be costly because ¶ it arouses domestic political opposition within the state or requires economic ¶
resources to carry out. Costly cooperative signals include withdrawing troops from ¶ a strategic area, admission of wrong,
lifting a trade embargo, sharing scientific and ¶ technological information, establishing diplomatic relations with the
enemy, or ¶ allowing on-site inspection of military facilities. Conciliatory actions are more ¶ costly, and therefore more
credible, if they are noncontingent, irrevocable, and ¶ increase the initiator's vulnerability (Mitchell, 1991).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 13
Engagement PIC
32
A2: Gifts Create Trust
Gifts given without reciprocation causes distrust
Dolfsma et al, Myrdal Prize winning professor, 9
(Wilfred; René Van Der Eijk, researcher; Dr. Albert Jolink, Professor of Economics at the University of Amsterdam; “On a
Source of Social Capital: Gift Exchange”, http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journal/on-a-source-of-social-capitalgift-exchange-nfuozHd6s2?key=citeulike, Accessed 7/2/13, AZ)
Gift exchange as a distinct form of exchange that is characterized by a set of three principles that Mauss (1954) has been
very adamant about. As part of a community, anybody is obliged to (1) give, (2) receive,2 and (3) reciprocate (cf. Dore,
1983; Gouldner, 1960; Levi-Strauss, 1996; Malinowski, 1996; Sahlins, 1972; Schwartz, 1996; Simmel, 1996). The
imperative nature of this threefold obligation derives from its cultural embeddedness (Sherry, 1983). These obligations are
certainly social, in that they are enforced by the community. In addition, they may have moral overtones. As a result,
donors and recipients feel psychologically obliged to act according to the principles (cf. Schein, 1965). In a situation where
this psychological contract is vio- lated, one will question the reciprocal goodwill of the other and will thus not trust the
other. Accep- tance of the gift is, to a certain extent, acceptance of the giver and the relationship between the parties
(Carrier, 1991; Larsen and Watson, 2001). It is also an acceptance of the perception that the giver has of the receiver. It is
for this reason that a gift which is perceived as improper by the receiver may be rejected, may fail to initiate a relation, and
may harm an existing relation and the trust inculcated there. Refusal of the initial gift marks the refusal to initiate the
dynamic of exchange; thus to refuse a gift is to refuse a relationship and one’s role in that relation (Ferrary, 2003; Mauss,
1954). Reciprocity is open to discretion as to the value and form of the counter
gift: the currency with which the obligation is repaid can be different from the form with which they were incurred.
Schwartz (1996) states that it is even prohibited to make an equal-return ‘payment’ (homeomorphic reciprocity) in gift
exchange, as that is tantamount to returning the offered gift to the donor and discontinuing the relationship.