Contracts I Section A- Overview Chapter 1 – Legal Issues and Business Policy - - Contract- a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty Types of K’s: o Unilateral K- promise for an act o Bilateral K- promise for a promise o An act for an act is a barter For a K there must be contractual intent. (Cohen v Cowles Media Co.) Consent to adopt cannot be bartered or sold (Stutz v. Stutz). The free market is not a suitable process when it comes to the selling of a human being. Purposes of K law: o Consent Theory- by manifesting their intention to be legally bound, promisors and promisees have consented to a legally enforceable agreement, a contract. Contract law should be designed to impose individual responsibility on those who make such promises (promisors). o Will Theory- Contract law should be designed to foster individual liberty, private autonomy, and freedom of transaction in the private sector, subject to minimum controls in the name of collective or public interests. Courts should vindicate the intentions of promisors and promisees who willingly exercise this “freedom of contract.” o Promise Theory- Contract law is necessary to uphold moral values by recognizing the sanctity of promise. When a promisor invokes the norm of promising, he or she should be held to his commitment. o Reliance Theory- Contract law should be designed to protect promisees and their reasonable expectations. When promisees act in reliance upon others’ promises, courts should protect them from injury due to broken promises to avoid injustice. o Utilitarian Economic Theory- The principles of contract law should be designed to maximize the potential gains from transactions by facilitating the process of voluntary trade. Contract law should be utilitarian and based on free market principles. o Critical Legal Studies Theory- Contract law based on any or all of the foregoing principles is not “value neutral,” as some of the proponents of the foregoing principles would have us believe. From its inception, contract law has been designed to protect and promote particular vested interests and privileged classes, the “haves” at the expense of the “have nots.” Private law, including contract law, should be deconstructed and then reconstructed to serve altruistic, societal interests in the pursuit of social justice rather than the venal interests of individuals. o Relational Theory- Rather than concentrate on discrete transactions or isolated agreements as events between equally situated parties, adherents of this approach “emphasize the social and interpersonal relationships between the parties to the contract.” Unlike the other schools of thought that embrace a neoclassical model and focus on offer and acceptance and the exchange of promises, this theory focuses on social practices, normative behavior, long-term relationships and how these factors operate together to influence transactions. There are many variations on relational theory. - If a K involves predominantly the sale of goods- UCC applies - Causes of action: o Traditional contract Express or implied in fact Civil law- between private parties Private law- the parties themselves define their obligations to one another Assent is necessary to make out a claim Elements- contractual intent, offer, acceptance, consideration, certain terms Remedies- typically, expectation damages and/or equitable relief; no punitive damages available in K law o Promissory estoppel Promisor made a promise Promisor should reasonably have expected reliance or forbearance Promisee reasonably relied or forbore The promise must be enforced to avoid injustice Recovery- usually limited to out-of-pocket expenses o Unjust enrichment, quasi-K, K implied at law o Tort Section B- Traditional Contract Formation Chapter 2 - Offers of Contractual Terms - Offers of K terms: contractual intent, promise or commitment, assent Promises and acts; unilateral and bilateral K’s o Unilateral contract- formed when an offeror makes a promise which the offeree accepts by actual performance of the act required under the terms of the offer Sarah offers Jack $50 to wash her car, and Jack washes it o Bilateral contract offer is made when the offeror offers a promise in exchange for the offeree’s return promise instead of an actual act by the offeree Sarah offers Jack $50 to promise to wash her car - Offer – Acceptance: the parties are then bound Objective Theory of Contracts – the “reasonable person” - Courts apply an objective theory of contracts, determining whether an offer has been extended based on the offeror’s outward manifestations of intent viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the offeree’s place. - When deciding whether an offer has been accepted, the courts apply an objective theory, asking whether the reasonable person in the position of the offeror is warranted in believing the offeree has accepted based on the offeree’s outward manifestations of assent. - Under the objective theory of contracts, hidden intentions are generally immaterial to a determination of contractual intent. (Lucy v. Zehmer- the court held a K where 2 drunk guys agreed on a sale of property on a barroom napkin; objective theory/outward manifestations are what matter) - Objectivism vs. subjectivism: o Play rehearsal hypo- You walk in on 2 people rehearsing for a plan. One offers and the other accepts a K. You, the observer, do not know the context. The reasonable person incorporates facts and circumstances. - - If a reasonable person would believe an offer is being made, then the speaker risks the formation f a K which was not intended. It is the objective manifestations of the offeror that count and not secret, unexpressed intentions (Barnes v. Treece) Constructive notice of revocation- use ideally the same medium of communication, or a similar medium of communication (constructive notice differs from actual notice) - The presumption is that family and social arrangements are ordinarily intended to be gratuitous (gifts) and are not intended to be K’s w/ legal effect (Morrow v. Morrow) o The definition of family is not solely related to legal concepts of blood relationships. It is the reality of the circumstances that matter (Morrow) - There is a presumption governing advertisements, price lists, catalogues, price quotes, etc. Ordinarily they are not offers but invitations to inspect the goods and make an offer. (usually too uncertain, e.g., no quantity term) o But the presumption may be overcome, i.e. by language of commitment (“for immediate acceptance”) o Advertisements are not presumed to be offers, unless they invite acceptance w/o further negotiations in clear, definite, express and unconditional language, and a reasonable person in the position of the offeree would construe the ad as an offer. o Ex. - “Fresh Broccoli- 68 Cent a Pound” – likely not an offer (no quantity term; unspecific) - There is a difference between an offer and an invitation for an offer. Apply the objective theory- what meaning would a reasonable person in the person’s position assign to the “offer”? (Volker Court v. Santa Fe Apts.) - In determining the correct interpretation of the expression in question, the expression is to be judged on the basis of what a reasonable person in the position of the offeree has been led to believe (objective theory). (Southworth v. Oliver) o Beyond this, there are other guides: language used, whether an expression definitely names a party (the offeree), and definiteness of the proposal o (these factors are all considered as a whole) - Offers under the UCC. – You do not need to identify when the offer was made, or when a K was formed, as long as there’s evidence that the parties understand that they’ve reached agreement and have a legally binding K (a relaxed view) Auctions (courts generally recognize 2 types): - Auction with reserve- the owner (offeree) invites offers in the form of bids, and can withdraw the goods (rejecting the high bid offer) at any time before the hammer falls. When the hammer falls, it signals the owner’s acceptance of the last, high bid. - Auction without reserve- The owner (offeror) declares that goods will be sold to the high bidder (offeree?). The owner has no right to withdraw the goods. What does the hammer signify then? (no identification as to who the offer is being extended to) - (Auctions do not fit nicely into the K model. An auction without reserve is the only situation where there may be a withdrawal of an acceptance.) - Ways in which an offer can terminate: o Lapse by offeror’s express terms in the offer o Lapse after reasonable time o Revocation by the offeror, directly or indirectly Exception- option K’s (irrevocable offers) o Counteroffer/rejection by the offeree Exception- option K’s o Death (revokes w/o notice) o Incapacity (revokes w/ notice) - A late acceptance is a valid counteroffer; it cannot be an acceptance o An offeror cannot waive a late acceptance (Ellefson v. Megadeth) Objective theory- neither the offeror nor the offeree would reasonably believe that they have a K upon a late acceptance - If the master of the offer (the offeror) sets a specific time for acceptance, the offer lapses upon expiration of that time. But if the offeror does not express a duration, an offer expires at the end of a reasonable time o “Reasonable time” - a question of fact; objective theory - Revocation of the offer - The offeror may revoke the offer even after the offeror has indicated that he wouldn’t revoke - - - It is not necessarily required that the offeror revoke the offer expressly (“Well, I don’t know if we are ready. We have not decided…” – a court held this to be a revocation) The offeror is free (absent an option) to revoke at any time before acceptance takes place (Green v. Keener) o Berendt’s “Gorka” hypo: “I’ll give you this money if you walk to the front of the room for it.” Gorka gets up, and Berendt says he revokes. Gorka could not assent to a unilateral K because he was not allowed to complete the act. To revoke a public offer, the offeror must give a public revocation (must publish a revocation in a manner equal to the manner of notice given the offer) An offer may be revoked indirectly, w/o any actual direct communication from the offeror to the offeree. o Hypo: Jordan offers to sell his sneakers to Pippen and Rodman. Jordan sells them to Pippen and does not express his revocation of the offer to Rodman. Then Rodman sees Pippen w/ the sneakers. A reasonable person in Rodman’s position would understand the offer to be revoked. o A later offer may revoke an earlier offer; objective theory(Forney v. TTX) Irrevocable offers: option contracts - An option is an offer which the offeror (optionor) agrees to leave open, on stated terms, usually for a specific duration. In effect, the optionor sells to the optionee (option holder) the optionor’s power to revoke the offer for that stated period of time. - An option is both an offer and a K. - An option must be supported by consideration independent of the other K’s involved. A very small consideration is sufficient, either a bargained-for benefit to the optionor or a bargained-for detriment to the optionee (must be a bargained for exchange) o The benefit or detriment does not have to be actual; it can be theoretical (Hamilton Bancshares v. Leroy- optionee could not use $10,000 for the specified option period; valid consideration) Firm offers under the UCC - Firm offer- a merchant’s assurance that an offer to buy or sell goods will be held open for a stated time or for a reasonable time. - Firm offers are not revocable for the stated time or a reasonable time, but not longer than 3 months - No consideration is required under a firm offer. Termination of offer by rejection or counteroffer - A rejection ordinarily terminates an offer - A counteroffer ordinarily terminates an offer o Counteroffer states different terms than those from the original offer; original offeror would reasonably believe that their offer is terminated - Exception- Ordinarily a rejection of an offer held open under an option does not terminate the offer (Ryder v. Wescoat) o Exception to the exception- If the optionor has materially changed his position, in reliance upon the optionee’s rejection, the option and the offer terminate prior to the option’s expiration date (where the optionor is unaware of the rule that a rejection of an offer held open under an option does not terminate the offer; if optionor is aware of the rule it may be a different story) o (If the optionor dies, the option remains open to the optionee) Termination of offer by death or incapacity - Death of the offeror or offeree, even w/o notice to the other party, terminates the offer. o Jordan v. Dobbins- The court said the offeree should be diligent enough to make sure that the person upon whose credit they are selling is living (Is this reasonable in modern times?) o (This is an exception to the objective theory; outward manifestations of assent; What would a reasonable person in the offeree’s shoes believe?) - Mental incapacity terminates an offer, but only with notice o Mental incapacity revokes the offer if the offeree knew or should have known of the offeror’s loss of mental capacity (Swift v. Smigel) Chapter 3 – Acceptance of Offers - The offeror is the master of the offer, but it is the offeree who has the power to complete formation of the K by accepting the offer. The ‘mirror image’ rule- at traditional common law, the offeree must agree to the exact terms stated by the offeror to accept. The terms of the acceptance must “mirror” those in the offer. - If the offeree varies a material term in response to the offer, the offeree’s response is a counteroffer that also implicitly operates as a rejection of the original offer. - In Illinois, even a minor, immaterial change violates Illinois’ strict application of the mirror image rule (Finnin v. Bob Lindsay). This is the minority view. - Material modification rule- the majority view is that immaterial or minor differences between the offer and acceptance do not prevent the formation of a K. If there is a material modification, there is no acceptance. o Material- of such a nature that knowledge of an item would affect a decision-maker’s decision-making - - Where an offeree changes a material term (i.e., quantity) in response to an offer, the original offer is terminated and can no longer be accepted. Where an offeree accepts and adds a term consistent w/ the original offer (i.e., “prompt delivery”), since the additional term is not a material change in the offer’s terms, the acceptance is effective. Hypo: “I accept your offer to sell me 100 cases of Mason fruit jars, first quality goods only” o The addition of “first quality goods only” is reasonably to be understood as part of the original offer. It is reasonably implied that the goods would have been first quality goods anyways. This is an acceptance, not a counteroffer. - UCC Section 2-207: (w/ respect to sales of goods) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation sent w/in a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. o Very different from the common law K approach o Utilitarian economic theory Mode of acceptance - The offeror is free to prescribe an exclusive mode of acceptance. In the absence of an exclusive mode of acceptance, the offeree may accept by using any reasonable mode of acceptance (objective theory) o For an offer to set an exclusive mode of acceptance, the offeree must use pretty explicit language (The law has moved toward utilitarian economic theory). o Panhandle v. Smith- Offeree accepted even though he added notes near his signature, because the court said the notes were immaterial. This was a “grumbling acceptance.” - The Statute of Frauds requires a writing in certain situations for there to be a K. If the Statute of Frauds does not apply, then whether a writing is necessary, and what kind of writing, depends on the parties’ intentions. o Mutual manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to make a K will not be prevented from so operating by later making a formal writing of the already assented to agreement (McCarthy v. Tobin- The later additions to the agreement were held to be ministerial and nonessential terms of the bargain) o UCC Section 2-201- Statute of Frauds for sales of goods for $500+ Acceptance by silence - R2d Section 69- an offeree’s silence ordinarily will not serve as acceptance (objective theory; silence is the absence of outward manifestations) o However, there are several limited exceptions (driven by utilitarian economic theory, etc.): (1) where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services w/ reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered w/ the expectation of compensation (Hoffman v. Purina), (2) where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent intends to accept the offer, (3) where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to accept. Dealing at a distance and the “mailbox rule” - Communications that are generally effective upon receipt: offer, revocation, rejection/counteroffer - Communications that are generally effective upon dispatch (mailbox rule): acceptance only - - - o Where the mail is an acceptable medium of communication, acceptance takes place (and a K is formed), when the offeree posts a letter of acceptance. The letter must be properly posted and addressed for the mailbox/dispatch rule to apply. Exceptions to the mailbox rule: acceptance of option/offers; second-thought acceptances that follow rejections o Both are effective upon receipt o R2d Section 40- an acceptance dispatched after a rejection is effective on receipt and only if it arrives before the rejection Hypo: Offeror makes an offer by mail. Offeree rejects by mail (effective upon receipt). Before offeror receives the rejection, offeree changes his mind and mails an acceptance (effective upon receipt). The rejection arrives before the acceptance, and offeror sells to another before receiving the acceptance. The rejection was effective. The acceptance was not. (objective theory) The mailbox rule does not apply to telephone conversations. Telephone conversations are considered to be communications in the present, not dealing at a distance over time. Receipt and dispatch occur instantaneously. Experts disagree over whether the mailbox rule applies to faxes, e-mails, etc. o Almost all states have digital signature laws, authorizing electronic signatures as the equivalent of natural signatures. (important where the S/F applies to an agreement, requiring that the agreement be written and signed to be enforceable) Notice of acceptance - At old common law, in order to form the K and complete acceptance, the offeree had to notify the offeror. o This slowed down business, so courts started entertaining other theories. o It makes more sense for notice of acceptance to be required in cases of bilateral offers than cases of unilateral offers. - R2d Section 56- There is no acceptance…until the offeree notifies the offeror of the acceptance or at least employs reasonable diligence in attempting to do so (Sementa v. Tylman). Acceptance of unilateral offers - R2d Section 54- The K is formed when the act is performed. However, the offeror’s duty to perform will be discharged: o (1) if the offeree fails to make a reasonable effort to notify the offeror that he has performed, or (2) if the offeror does not otherwise learn of the offeree’s performance, or (3) if notice was not necessary because of an express or implied dispensing of notice - To satisfy the S/F there must be a writing, but that writing does not necessarily have to be the acceptance/contract (Still, it usually is) Rewards - Rewards are usually unilateral offers, offering a promise for an act. - Objective theory helps determine what the requested act is and the person(s) to whom the offer has been made. - Where a reward is offered by a private party, there can be no K unless the offeree is aware of the existence of the offer (Glover v. Jewish War Veterans). o Where the government offers a reward, the offeree is not required to have been aware of the offer when the offeree accepted (Government wants to encourage good citizenship. This goes beyond simple K law). - Knowledge and voluntary acceptance are enough to accept a private reward offer. o Intent to accept is required (acting w/ volition to do accept). Motive is largely irrelevant (ultimate objective). The effect of part performance: Unilateral offers - Some unilateral offers cannot be accepted instantaneously. The act of acceptance may take time. - R2d Section 45- where there is a unilateral offer and the offeree begins performance, an option at law is created (Taylor v. Multnomah County). A legally binding K is not yet created, but the offeree has a reasonable time to accept by performance. o If the offeree stops performance, the option at law disappears and the offeror may then revoke the offer. But the K is not formed until the offeree completes performance. - Option in fact- actual consideration is exchanged - Option at law- a legal fiction (“at law” = the courts consider it to be like…) - There is a difference between a beginning performance and preparation for performance. o The offeree must act in response to the offeror’s offer. (Ragosta v. Wilderthe offeror did not begin performance because they sought financing before receiving the offer) Bilateral offers - Under ordinary circumstances an offeree of a bilateral offer may accept by a return promise or by performance of the act sought. - Where a bilateral offeree begins performance of the act sought and then the offeror tries to revoke: o R2d Section 62- The tender or beginning of the invited performance is an acceptance by performance. Such an acceptance operates as a promise to render complete performance. - Hypo: I promise to pay you $50 if you promise to walk the Brooklyn Bridge. You start to walk the Brooklyn Bridge (responding to a bilateral offer by part performance). o Under R2d Section 62, there is a K. - Bilateral offer- offeree can accept by either a promise or an act. Unilateral offer- offeree can only accept by an act. o Hypo: Offeror requests an act. A promise to act is not an acceptance. Chapter 4 – Bargained-For Consideration Consideration defined - Consideration is a necessary, independent element for a K to be found and enforced by a court. - The presence of consideration distinguishes enforceable agreements from nonbinding transactions, such as gifts. - Some experts regard consideration as evidence or assurance of contractual intent. - Consideration is (1) something of legally recognized value (2) which the parties have intentionally exchanged through their bargain. Something of legal value - Something of legal value- may be either: (a) a benefit to promisor or (b) a detriment to promisee o Berendt promises to sell you his book for $50. There is consideration that supports both promises: benefit to promisor and detriment to promisee - Identification of consideration- based on application of objective theory. Intangibles may serve as consideration (i.e., refraining/forbearing from doing something that one is otherwise legally free to do) Subjective feelings, incapable of valuation (i.e., “love”) generally cannot serve as consideration. Bargained-for exchange - Bargained-for exchange- the intentional exchange of this for that - Intent to exchange (meaning to do so) is the key. o Motive (purpose/ultimate objective) is largely irrelevant. - R2d Section 71(2) – A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise. - Hypo: Nephew promises uncle to refrain from drinking, using tobacco, searing, playing cards for money until he turns 21 in exchange for $5000. o There is consideration here; Nephew abandoned what he had a legal right to do (nephew suffered detriment); not required to show benefit to uncle - Neither benefit to promisor nor detriment to promisee need be actual. o Detriment (as used in testing the sufficiency of consideration) - means legal detriment as opposed to detriment in fact. It means giving up something which immediately prior thereto the promisee was privileged to retain, or doing or refraining from doing something which he was then privileged not to do, or not to refrain from doing. o Benefit- means the receiving as the exchange for his promise of some performance or forbearance which the promisor was not previously entitled to receive. That the promisor desired it for his own advantage and had no previous right to it is enough to show that it was beneficial. - Browning v. Johnson- Browning sells his business to Johnson, but then changes his mind and offers Johnson $40,000 to rescind the K, and Johnson accepts. Then Browning changes his mind again and sues Johnson to get his $40,000 back, claiming Johnson provided no consideration for the rescission. o Johnson provided consideration to support Browning’s promise to pay Johnson $40,000 to rescind the sale of the business. o Benefit to promisor Browning- Johnson released Browning of his obligation to sell the business (and Browning sought the exchange) o Detriment to promisee Johnson- Johnson gave up the business he had bought “Sufficiency” vs. “adequacy” of consideration - Sufficiency- Is there something that the law will recognize as having any legal value at all? - Adequacy- Is it worth it? o Unlike sufficiency, adequacy suggests a comparative valuation of the consideration exchanged. o Adequacy of consideration must be determined at the time of the bargain; not based on hindsight o Courts do not usually inquire into adequacy (adequacy is not relevant) because as a general proposition we have a free market where the parties themselves determine value. o Ordinarily, inadequacy of consideration is not a defense to K enforcement. But there are important exceptions: Adequacy of consideration is relevant when P seeks extraordinary relief in the form of equitable remedies, such as injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, or specific performance. (Ohio Players case) Inadequate consideration or grossly disproportionate consideration may be evidence relevant to establishing a defense to K enforcement other than pure lack of consideration. Defenses where inadequacy may be relevant to establishing the defense- duress, fraud, mental incapacity The consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court (relatively rare; unconscionability) Past consideration and moral obligation - Courts hold that “past consideration is no consideration” - A moral obligation ordinarily fails to provide consideration; subjective and cannot be valuated objectively - Past consideration is not bargained-for; can also be argued that past consideration is not of any legal value - Examples: o A couple nurses a sick sailor back to health, and sailor’s parents then promise to pay couple for services rendered. No consideration. Services rendered were not the product of a bargained-for exchange; they were conferred gratuitously. o Woman chases D w/ hatchet, and D flees to P’s house, where P takes a blow to hand and saves D’s life. D then promises to pay P for saving his life, but does not end up paying. No consideration; no bargained-for exchange; gratuitous o Employee puts in 30 years at employer’s workplace, and employer promises to pay employee a nice pension when she decides to retire. Employee retires and a year later, employer stops paying, and asserts no K because no consideration. Past consideration is no consideration; no enforceable K here; P fails under a K theory Courts holds P can recover under promissory estoppel; P retired from a lucrative position in reliance upon employer’s promise to pay her the pension o A promise to pay for past services rendered is not consideration to support a K (Dementas v. Estate of Tallas- Tallas had a moral obligation to Dementas, but no consideration) Pre-existing duties - Pre-existing duty rule- A promise to do what one is already legally obligated to do cannot serve as consideration for the other party’s promise or act. o Similarly, promising to refrain from doing what one is legally forbidden to do cannot serve as consideration. Refraining from taking illegal drugs—something one is legally prohibited from doing—cannot serve as consideration under preexisting duty rule. - R2d Section 73- The performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration; but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in a way which reflects more than a pretense of bargain. - Pre-existing legal duty rule- designed to prevent the “hold-up game” (where a party withholds a performance already owed in order to coerce additional payment, commitments or agreements from the other party) - Hypo: Berendt refuses to teach you the intricacies of consideration unless you each pay him an additional %500. You pay him, but later sue him for restitution. o You win. Berendt has merely given you what you were already legally entitled to receive. You pay tuition, and Berendt is legally obligated to teach the intricacies of consideration. - Hypo: After you graduation, but before bar exam, Berendt offers to teach you consideration again in return for $500. You accept, he gives a review, but later you sue Berendt for restitution. o You will not win this time. He was not legally obligated to give you a review after you graduated. - - Several people seek to collect a reward for providing information or acting to assist in the apprehension of bank robbers: bank employees who provided info to police, state police who arrested the criminals in their jurisdiction, a deputy sheriff who arrested a suspect while out of his jurisdiction. o Bank employees and state police could not collect. They were already legally obligated as employees to perform the acts (did nothing beyond scope of employment) o Deputy sheriff recovered the award because he was acting outside the scope of his employment. He had no pre-existing duty as an employee to make the arrest (outside of his territorial jurisdiction). Kuder v. Shroeder- Court holds that under NC law wife had a pre-existing legal duty to do what she did (support husband), and therefore wife did not provide valid consideration for a K. o Dissent- The type of support wife provided was outside the scope of the marital duty of support under NC law, so there was valid consideration (but uncertain terms for a K; would allow unjust enrichment claim) Disputed claims, settlements and modifications - Courts may deny enforcement to settlements that have been coerced in bad faith disputes (i.e., threats to sue public figures or celebrities based on baseless accusations) - Courts have employed the pre-existing duty rule to deny enforcement to modifications of existing K’s where one party has extracted the modification in bad faith by refusing to perform under the original K. o I.e., athletes who refuse to perform unless they get a new K; pre-existing duty rule thwarts “hold-up game” - The modern trend is no longer to focus on the validity of the claim. Instead, courts now enforce settlement of a doubtful claim, or even an invalid claim, if the claim was made in good faith. - R2d Section 74- Forbearance to assert or surrender a claim or defense which proves to be invalid is not consideration unless…the forbearing or surrendering party believes that the claim or defense may fairly determined to be valid (good faith). o The relevant point in time is “at the time the K was executed” o The surrender of, or forbearance to assert, an invalid claim by one who has not an honest and reasonable belief in its possible validity, is not sufficient consideration for a K. - A good faith forbearance to litigate a claim, which proves to be invalid, is sufficient consideration to uphold a settlement K o Dyer v. National By-Products- employer argued that employee had a preexisting duty not to sue employer for personal injury; because his sole remedy was WC; employee forbore in good faith - Withholding an amount admittedly owed, on condition that payment of that amount settles a separate disputed claim, violates the pre-existing legal duty rule. o The resulting settlement is unenforceable and cannot serve as a defense to a suit to collect the disputed amount. - Where a sum due is unliquidated (not cleared or paid off) or disputed and a remittance of an amount less than that claimed is sent to the creditor w/ a statement explaining that it is in full satisfaction of the claim, the acceptance of such a remittance by the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction. o This rule is not applicable where a portion of the alleged debt in excess of the amount paid is acknowledged and not in dispute (no consideration would have been given). Modifications - Like a rescission, a modification of an existing K is itself a K, ordinarily subject to the requirement of consideration. - Modifications must be entered into willingly by the parties; must be uncoerced o Pre-existing duty rule is invoked to prevent the hold-up game (i.e., Berendt refuses to teach you consideration unless you pay him more) - Employment at will- employer is free to terminate employee for any reason at any time, and employee is free to quit for any reason at any time. o Common law rule- employment is at will absent express provisions to the contrary o What makes a K employment at will is the lack of duration terms in the K o If employer provides employee w/ a manual, handbook or set of policies w/ procedural or substantive commitments, the relationship may not be at will, but instead may be an employment K incorporating the manual’s terms. - Modification must be the product of bilateral negotiation which leads to a bargained-for exchange, and must be voluntarily entered into. o Therefore an employer may not unilaterally modify an existing employment K, withdrawing commitments made in an employment manual and converting the employment relationship to employment at will. (Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital) - R2d Section 89- To be enforceable w/o additional consideration, a modification must be: (1) voluntarily entered into; (2) made before the K was fully performed by either party; (3) prompted by unanticipated circumstances; and (4) the modified terms must be fair and equitable. Illusory promises - At traditional common law, illusory promises are said to provide no consideration and are unenforceable. o But modern courts strive to vindicate parties’ intentions, and have developed devices for circumventing the illusory promise doctrine. - Illusory promise- although it may resemble a true promise, an illusory promise is empty of commitment, usually because a party reserves the discretion not to perform at all. o Ex.- Berendt says, “I promise to teach you the law of consideration tomorrow, if I feel like it.” - Conditioning a promise on willingness to perform renders the promise illusory. But conditioning a promise on ability to perform does not render the promise illusory. o Ex.- “I promise to teach you the law of consideration tomorrow unless a blizzard prevents me from coming in.” Relates to ability; circumstance that is outside of his control; nonillusory promise - - - - - Office Pavilion South Florida v. ASAL Products- Pavilion agreed to fill orders as made to them by ASAL, but ASAL did not promise to buy a single chair. ASAL did not commit to buy any chairs; illusory promise. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon o Wood promises to share profits w/ Lucy from sales of any items he sold w/ her name on them. But wood did not expressly promise to sell x amount of anything. o Strict application of illusory promise doctrine- this would be an illusory promise o Cardozo finds an implied commitment to use reasonable or best efforts Cited in Ohio Players case- implied that the parties made mutual promises to engage in best efforts o “The whole writing may be instinct w/ an obligation, imperfectly expressed” Requirements K- x promises to buy all the widgets x needs from y manufacturing company (x relinquishes the right to buy widgets form any manufacturers other than y manufacturing company) Output K- buyer agrees to buy all of the outputs of a seller At traditional common law- requirements K’s and output K’s were considered illusory. Buyer may need nothing, or seller may manufacture nothing. o Modern courts have devised ways to circumvent the illusory promise doctrine, enforcing requirements K’s if a party agrees to buy all its needs from the seller. (facilitating transactions & vindicating parties’ intentions) By promising to buy all its needs from seller, buyer has implicitly made a commitment to refrain from buying from others. Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co. o Did Laclede’s right of cancellation render all its other promises in the agreement illusory so that there was no consideration? No. A cancellation clause will invalidate a K only if its exercise is unrestricted. Laclede’s right of cancellation was limited: it could not cancel until 1 year after the first deliver of propane by Amoco; any cancellation could be effective only on the anniversary date of the agreement, and Laclede had to give Amoco 30 days written notice of termination. - Multiple and alternative promises: (A & B are non-illusory promises; o is an illusory promise) o A + B = consideration; A + o = consideration; o + B = consideration; o + o = no consideration; A or B = consideration; A or o = no consideration; o or B = no consideration; o or o = no consideration - Principles of construction from R2d Sections 202 & 203: o Where an agreement is subject to 2 constructions, one rendering it invalid, the other sustaining validity, choose the valid interpretation. o Provisions in an agreement should be interpreted together, not in isolation, when determining the parties’ intentions. o You construe an ambiguous provision against the party who created the ambiguity. Chapter 5 – Reasonable Certainty of Contract Terms - - Courts require reasonably certain terms: o To determine the parties’ intentions as to whether they wish to contract at all o To discern whether the parties’ negotiations have culminated in mutual assent or agreement as to the material terms of the bargain o To identify the parties’ terms in order to: Determine whether there has been a breach, and if so Fashion a remedy that is appropriate Uncertain terms may indicate lack of contractual intent, lack of agreement, absence of consideration, may prevent a determination that a breach has occurred, and may prevent formulation of a remedy even in the event of a breach Missing terms - Omitted terms that would ordinarily be significant to a reasonable person may suggest: o Parties are still engaged in preliminary negotiations and do not intent to be bound yet; or o Parties assume that customary terms are part of the deal; or o Parties regard the omitted terms as unimportant to them - Omitted/missing terms may not be fatal to the K (particularly under UCC’s gap filler provisions) o Courts are divided over whether, under what circumstances, and how they should provide missing terms for parties (competing K law policies) - - - There is a trend of courts to seek to vindicate the parties’ intentions instead of letting strict application of legal rules render agreements unenforceable. Courts are hesitant to enforce agreements w/ uncertain terms. But some courts will seek to vindicate parties’ intentions where there is particularly strong evidence of intent of the parties to contract. Pyeate v. Pyeate- married couple orally agrees to support one another during each one of their education; wife supports for years and then husband divorces; wife sues for breach of K. o Court holds parties had no K; terms were indefinite (no terms provided regarding tuition, period of time, where wife could go to school, no way to determine breach or remedy); parties had no contractual intent when they agreed o Court refuses to infer reasonable terms to try to vindicate parties’ intentions (wife recovers under unjust enrichment) Option for tenant to renew w/ rent to be negotiated: o Deadwood- Unenforceable because option is indefinite, vague, uncertain o Mamaroneck- Where the parties have manifested an intent to be bound, and left a price term to be determined, the agreement may still be sufficiently - definite if the missing term (here, amount) may be determined objectively w/o need for new expression from the parties: Agreement itself may provide a method for determining the amount; or Agreement may make reference to an extrinsic event, condition, or standard, or a commercial practice or trade usage to set the amount o Moolenaar- renewal rent “shall be renegotiated” (no method or objective standard is to be used to determine rent); but the court goes extremely far to vindicate parties’ intentions (pretty rare case), and allows tenant to renew R2d Section 32- A K is valid if it is “so definite in its terms” that the “performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain” UCC Section 2-204- Even though one or more terms are left open, a K for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a K and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy o Offer, acceptance, etc. can still be examined under UCC, but they are not absolutely necessary. o A K may be found in the bargain of the parties by their language or implication from other circumstances (i.e., course dealings, usage of trade) o Quantity term- Only a quantity term must be provided by the parties to satisfy the requirement of definiteness under the UCC Misunderstanding vs. mistake - Characterization of the issue (as a misunderstanding or mistake) can be determinative of whether there is a K at all, or if there is a K, on whose terms. o Misunderstanding- usually will lead to a K on one of the parties’ terms (but may still be no K) o Mutual mistake- no K o Unilateral mistake- can also be a misunderstanding - Misunderstanding- i.e., 2 parties use the same term, but each attributes a different meaning to that term (may be unilateral mistake- one party makes a mistake and other does not) o One party believes A. Other party believes B. o Usually courts will employ the objective theory to resolve the misunderstanding in favor of one of the parties’ understandings and against the other party (R2d Section 20) - Mistake (mutual) – both parties erroneously believe the same thing o Both parties believe A, and both are in error. o To characterize a fact pattern as a mutual mistake- both parties must share same erroneous belief as to a basic assumption in their agreement: Can you sensibly fill in the blank? Both parties erroneously believe _____. If you can- mutual mistake; If you can’t- no mutual mistake (probably a misunderstanding) o Mutual mistake- no K. Even though it may be said there was a meeting of the minds, the agreement was based on an erroneous assumption that was material to the bargain. - o R2d Section 20 (I) – There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations. R2d Section 202- Unless a different intention is manifested, technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when used in a transaction w/in their technical field. Section C - Alternative Theories for Recovery Causes of action - P’s generally prefer to sue in tort (if the facts support a tort cause of action): punitive damages are generally available in tort but not in K. - But many situations are not suitable for treatment in tort; and remedies available through a K action (i.e., specific performance) may be preferable over tort remedies. - Hierarchy of causes of action w/in K law: o Breach of traditional K, either express or implied in fact; o Promissory estoppel; and o Unjust enrichment (or quasi-contract; or K implied at law) o (The courts’ preference for recovery in this order of causes of action may be explained by purposes & policies of K law, especially “will theory”) o (implied in fact- an actuality; implied at law- tends to be a fiction) Chapter 6 - Avoidance of Unjust Enrichment Quasi-Contract (unjust enrichment) - Courts may find a quasi-contract (a) where there has been an attempt to contract, or (b) where there has not been an attempt to contract - Basis of a quasi-contract cause of action- society’s expectations (not the parties’ intentions) - No assent is necessary for recovery. The K exists “at law,” not in fact (strictly speaking- not an actual K) - Remedies: o Quasi-K is an equitable action- the remedies are fashioned according to notions of fairness and justice o Remedies are flexible o Recovery is usually limited to- (a) the value to the D of the benefit conferred, or (b) “quantum meruit” – the reasonable and customary cost for the goods and services But remedy may even be restitution for the cost of out of pocket expenses Unjust enrichment vs. quantum meruit - Some jurisdictions distinguish between the 2. Both causes of action are based on equitable principles, but recovery differs. - Unjust enrichment- P’s recovery is based on the value of the benefit unjustly received by the D (awards P the value of the benefit that D received) - Quantum meruit- P may recover even where no actual benefit is conferred for the reasonable value of the goods or services P rendered (awards P the value of the services provided, even if D received no benefit) o Cotham v. Wisdom- Quantum meruit recovery (in this case, the reasonable and customary value of the medical services rendered); D actually received no benefit. He died despite the surgery performed w/ due care. 5 elements necessary for a quasi-K cause of action (all 5 must be present) - (1) D received a benefit for which society expects him to pay - (2) D’s retention of the benefit w/o paying would be unjust - (3) P provided a benefit for which P reasonably expected remuneration (payment) - (4) The parties either had a direct relationship or the benefit was conferred by mistake - (5) No other cause of action is available to P - Apply the elements; There must be no other cause of action available to the P to recover under a quasi-K theory. - Mere volunteers- Courts decline to award recovery in unjust enrichment or quantum meruit to mere volunteers or good Samaritans. (Which elements are missing?) o You are not obligated to pay Bob the bongo guy just because you enjoy his music while waiting in line at the train station. Chapter 7 – Promissory Estoppel - - - Promissory estoppel arose as an alternative cause of action to traditional K, usually where consideration was missing from a transaction Doctrine of equitable estoppel preceded PE and was the model for PE o Equitable estoppel- a party who misrepresents a fact is estopped or prevented from asserting contrary facts in a judicial proceeding o Courts began fully embracing PE around 1900 Promissory estoppel (PE) - where P reasonably relies on D’s promise, and it would be unjust to deny some form of recovery for that detrimental reliance, P may recover damages, usually corresponding to the extent of the reasonable detrimental reliance (reasonable is key) Because promisor should have expected promisee to rely on the promise, promisor is said to be estopped (prevented) from asserting there was no consideration. R2d Section 90: - To make out a case for relief in promissory estoppel, P must establish 3 elements: o (1) The promisor made a promise which he or she should have reasonably expected would induce reliance (either an act or a forbearance) by the promisee or another; o (2) The promisee did in fact rely on the promise; and o (3) Enforcement of the promise is needed to avoid an injustice. Promissory estoppel remedies - Traditionally, the remedy in PE has been limited to “out-of-pocket” expenses directly incurred due to reasonable detrimental reliance. - R2d Section 90 – The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. - In recent years, some courts have opened the door to larger recoveries in PE, approaching or matching recoveries under traditional K theories, such as damages based on the expected benefit of the bargain. - - - Ricketts v. Scothorn- Grandfather promises granddaughter money, telling her she no longer has to work. She quits, grandfather dies, and estate refuses to pay. o Proper case for PE; court awards her breach of K damages, but it should have awarded her out-of-pocket expenses reasonably traceable to the detrimental reliance Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores- Hoffman recovers under PE theory for relying on a promise to open up a new store o The court allows Hoffman’s wife as a 3rd party to recover. Ravelo v. County of Hawaii- County tells Ravelo he is hired as a police officer; Ravelo and wife quit their jobs, and County decides not to hire Ravelo o No traditional K (employee at will) o Ravelo and wife (3rd party) recover under PE theory Promissory estoppel in Illinois - In IL, to establish a claim for PE recovery, P must prove: o (1) D made an unambiguous promise to P; o (2) P relied on such promise; o (3) P’s reliance was expected and foreseeable by D, and; o (4) P relied on the promise to P’s detriment - In 2009, IL Supreme Ct confirmed that PE is available as an affirmative cause of action for recovery and not limited to a defense. o Concerning appropriate damages, it stated: “Damages may be appropriately limited to restoring P to the position he was in prior to relying, to his detriment, on the promise.” Section D – Defenses to Contract Formation Chapter 8 – Consent to Contract Impaired Impairment of free will – incapacity (minor and mental infirmity), duress, undue influence, fraud, mistake, unconscionability Incapacity - Effective expression of contractual intent and assent presumes that the parties possess capacity to exercise free will or autonomy. An agreement reached by someone who lacks capacity to exercise free will may be deemed voidable by the courts. - Incapacity includes: minority, mental infirmity, impairment or insanity, and in limited situations- intoxication or effects of medication or drugs Minority or Infancy - - - - Minors have the power to avoid K’s w/ adults. K’s between a minor and an adult are voidable by the minor or the minor’s parent or guardian. o Adults do not have the power to avoid K’s w/ minors. Voidable- K is valid until someone w/ the authority exercises that power of avoidance (void- void ab initio) o As long as minor does not avoid the K, the K between adult and minor is enforceable Minor may exercise power of avoidance while still a minor or w/in a reasonable time after reaching majority (18 yrs old in most jurisdictions). o “Reasonable time” – question of fact Minor may disaffirm or the minor’s parent or guardian may disaffirm on minor’s behalf Affirmance/ratification - If minor does not disaffirm w/in a reasonable time after reaching majority, minor is said to affirm or ratify the K - Minor may also expressly affirm or ratify a K entered into during minority, but may only do so after reaching majority. o Express ratification while still a minor is ineffective to affirm the K entered into during minority. Exceptions to general rule affording minor power to avoid - (1) Where the K is for “necessaries” or “necessities” o Courts require minors to compensate adults who have contracted to provide necessaries to the minor o This exception is often characterized as avoidance of unjust enrichment or as in the nature of a quasi-K to yield a quantum meruit set off o Recovery for the conferral of necessaries is generally limited to the reasonable charge for the goods or services conferred on the minor (quantum meruit) o For goods or services provided to minor to be subject to the exception for necessaries, 3 elements must be present: (1) The goods or services must be of such a nature that they are important or required for the maintenance of the minor; (2) Minor must have an actual need for the goods or services that is urgent or at least immediate; and (3) Minor must rely upon his/her own credit E.g., minor is emancipated (free from parents) or parents are destitute (very poor) - (2) Where a statute provides otherwise - (3) Some jurisdictions- Where minor has misrepresented their age in order to enter into the transaction, minor is prevented from asserting minority (equitable estoppel) o Other jurisdictions- Lying minor may still avoid, but adult may recover in tort for damages due to minor’s false assertion of a majority Restitution - Under ordinary circumstances, when minor avoids a K w/ adult, minor must perform restitution to the extent such restitution is possible, returning whatever is left of the consideration that had been provided by the other party - Dissipation- Minor has no obligation to restore consideration to adult if the consideration has been dissipated (naturally used up or otherwise gone through no fault of minor) o Keser v. Chagnon- minor had no obligation to give back certificate of title on the car; third party had the certificate o Exception- If minor has dissipated the consideration by a malicious act, such as intentionally destroying a motorcycle purchased from an adult. Mental Infirmity - - K’s entered into by those who are mentally incompetent are voidable by the incompetent’s guardian or by the individual himself, if and when the individual reacquires competence. Avoidance must be exercised w/in a reasonable time. Same rules regarding restitution, dissipation, and necessaries apply as for minors. Definition of incompetence has been controversial and inconsistent; R2d Section 15 offers 2 alternative tests for incompetence: o Cognitive test- A person or guardian may avoid on behalf of a party who by reason of mental defect or illness does not understand the nature of the transaction, even if the other party did not know or have reason to know of the incompetent’s condition Inconsistent w/ objective theory, but a long-standing test that nobody has a problem w/ o Reasonable manner test- A person or guardian may avoid where due to mental illness or defect the contracting party was unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction, and the other party knew or had reason to know of the condition Consistent w/ objective theory (to avoid, the other party must know or have reason to know the condition of the person), but people have a problem w/ it Ortelere v. Teacher’s Retirement Board- court applies reasonable manner test: (1) she may have understood what she was doing, but she couldn’t control herself; couldn’t act in a reasonable manner (expert testimony) (2) the other party had reason to know of her mental incompetence (questionable) o The courts have made clear that eccentricity is not insanity (Old Mason Lee’s will) Intoxication - - A party seeking to avoid for intoxication must satisfy 1 of the 2 mental incompetency tests (does not understand the nature of the transaction, or is unable to act in a reasonable manner), and the other party must know or have reason to know of his condition Person under the influence of prescription drugs- treated as a person w/ a mental incapacity Duress - A party may avoid for duress where the other party has deprived the victim of the exercise of free will: (R2d Section 176) o (1) Through a wrongful, coercive act (a bad faith act that need not be illegal); o (2) The act leaves the victim no alternative but to agree to the other party’s terms; and o (3) The coercive circumstances were caused by the other party. What is “a wrongful act”? - Mere vexation (i.e., annoyance) and threats of embarrassment- generally not duress o But a threat to embarrass made in bad faith, unrelated to the matter or transaction settled, may be duress - Threatening to file an unfounded suit- duress - Withholding consideration admittedly owed- duress (hold-up game) o Athlete already under K threatens not to play to get a raise (pg 206) – duress o (Often duress goes hand-in-hand w/ consideration & pre-existing duty rule Undue Influence - - - - Undue influence is a relatively modern defense that courts would prefer not to use unless more traditional defenses are unavailable and justice can only be served by employing this doctrine If you’re the D, you don’t start your list of defenses w/ undue influence (or unconscionability, which bears a strong resemblance to undue influence). They are disfavored (and somewhat subjective) Typically, undue influence resembles but falls short of duress, because the circumstances were not caused by the other party. Instead, the other party takes unfair advantage of victim’s circumstances. Undue influence- An agreement is voidable by one who entered into the agreement due to persuasion which tends to be coercive in nature, overcoming the will w/o convincing the judgment. o Typical elements- high pressure, mental, moral, or emotional weakness in victim, misrepresentations of law or fact, confidential or dependent relationship in which victim is at an inherent disadvantage, grossly unfair terms or inadequate consideration (not adequate to invalidate a K, but may be evidence of undue influence) Misrepresentation and Fraud - - In addition to being a cause of action in tort, fraud is available as a defense to K enforcement or as grounds to avoid K’s and obtain restitution. o Tortious fraud includes element of “scienter” (knowledge of the falsity and intention to deceive) and if made out, victim may recover in tort or may elect to avoid and claim restitution. Where misrepresentation is alleged, victim may avoid the K but has not made out a claim in tort. o Misrepresentation (“constructive fraud” or “innocent fraud) - same elements as fraud but w/o scienter Elements of misrepresentation - (1) An assertion not in accordance w/ present or past facts at the time the assertion was made (but usually not future events) - (2) Misstatement must be material: It induced or contributed to victim’s decision to agree (sort of a “but for” test) o If misstatement is intentional, then misstatement need not be material. - (3) Victim actually relied on the misstatement. - (4) Victim’s reliance was justified or reasonable. - (5) Victim’s reliance on the misstatement was to his detriment. - - - To avoid enforcement of a K due to misrepresentation, victim generally need not prove intent to defraud (innocent misrepresentation or constructive fraud is enough to avoid) Statements of opinion- generally not misrepresentations Failure to disclose important facts by one party may be a misrepresentation, where that party knows the other party is in no position to know or discover the facts which would be material to him Fraud generally involves an intentionally false statement Mistake Mutual mistake - Mutual mistake- where both parties share the same erroneous belief as to a basic assumption of the bargain, they may have a meeting of the minds, but it is not meaningful. (R2d Section 152) o Either party may avoid the transaction - Misunderstanding- each party has a different understanding of the same thing (i.e., 1 party believes “cows” includes heifers and the other party does not) o Though there may be no meeting of the minds and no K due to a misunderstanding, it is more likely that 1 of the 2 conflicting views will prevail. - When determining whether a situation presents mutual mistake, unilateral mistake or a misunderstanding, characterization of the facts is the key. Start w/ Berendt’s test for identifying a mutual mistake: Can you fill in the blank w/a reasonable description of the facts? o Both parties shared the same erroneous belief that_____. o If you can’t fill the blank in reasonably, then it’s likely you have a misunderstanding. And misunderstandings are frequently unilateral mistakes. - Mutual mistake (R2d Section 152) o (1) Both parties had the same erroneous belief at the time the bargain was made. o (2) The mistake was as to a basic assumption of the bargain. o (3) The mistake had a material effect on the exchange. o (4) The party seeking to avoid did not assume the risk inherent in the bargain. - Mistake as to essence rather than value o At traditional common law, an erroneous belief as to the value of consideration was not a legal mistake at all. Courts required an error as to the essence of consideration (substance of the consideration itself) for avoidance due to mistake. Sherwood v. Walker- court permitted avoidance by seller based on mutual mistake as to essence of the consideration. Mutual mistake was that both parties erroneously believed they were transacting a barren cow: the essence of the cow, not the value, was the mistake o Michigan Supreme Ct purportedly abandoned the distinction between essence and value (concepts so similar as to be inseparable) But later the court goes back to keeping the distinction Unilateral mistake - At traditional common law, party could avoid a K due to mutual mistake, but not due to unilateral mistake. o Courts remain reluctant to allow avoidance for unilateral mistake. o The modern trend, though, is to permit avoidance for unilateral mistake as well, but only under limited circumstances. - Unilateral mistake (R2d Section 153) o (1) One party makes a mistake (could also be a misunderstanding) o (2) As to a basic assumption of the bargain o (3) Material to the exchange o (4) The party seeking to avoid does not bear the risk o (5) Enforcement of the K would be unconscionable, or the other party had reason to know of the mistake or caused the mistake (Element 5 suggests that facts could be characterized to avoid under unconscionability, misunderstanding, constructive fraud, etc.) o Also- the effect of restoring the status quo ante (where the parties were prior to agreement); i.e., whether it irreparably damage one of the parties Unconscionability - - Unconscionability is the newest K defense (mid 20th c.), and the defense that courts are least likely to use; a last resort defense to K enforcement Unconscionability- Agreements that shock the conscience of the court are avoidable. o Courts usually state that a K cannot be avoided under unconscionability unless no other traditional defense is available and these 2 major defects are present: procedural unfairness and substantive unfairness o Some jurisdictions limit unconscionability to a defense against enforcement, not a ground for recovery Some elements of unconscionability (Berendt’s list) o (1) Extreme disparity in bargaining power or ratio o (2) No real bargaining: take it or leave it bargaining o (3) Standardized form and/or fine print (K of adhesion) o (4) Unfair surprise o (5) Victim was in a weakened, vulnerable condition o (6) Other party took unfair advantage of weakened victim o (7) Victim was w/o legal or other advice o (8) Victim was uneducated, poor, or in disadvantaged state o (9) Public policy is better served by denying enforcement o (10) Terms are inherently unfair or oppressive o (11) Grossly inadequate consideration that is “shocking to the conscience of the court” Chapter 9 – Impact of External Law: Illegality and Public Policy - Mainly agreements that the parties intended to be K’s (external defenses) - General rule- Illegal bargains are void. Courts leave the parties where they find them. o Policy- the benefit of the legal process should be withheld from those who knowingly and willingly enter into an illegal bargain (The law will not aid once w/ unclean hands) Hypo: You pay Berendt money to commit a crime. Berendt takes the money but doesn’t do it (breaches). You sue Berendt for specific performance or restitution. o You will not be able to recover specific performance or restitution. - Exceptions to illegality - (1) Where a party is “not in pari delicto” (not equally at fault) - (2) Where a party performs locus poenitentiae (withdraws from the illegal transaction before serious wrongdoing or harm occurs and willingly cooperates w/ authorities) - (3) Where enforcement would better serve public policy than denying enforcement (usually identified in a statute) Private cohabitation agreements - Meretricious relationship- based on sexual favors o Generally against public policy; consideration is “immoral” (prostitution) - Whether agreements between consenting adults, to cohabit and provide mutual support w/o the formality of marriage are meretricious, illegal, and unenforceable o IL Hewitt case (1970’s) – illegal o WI Watts case- legal Private cohabitation agreements (and quasi-K’s) are enforceable because such agreements involve more than the sale of sexual favors and no longer offend evolving social norms. Denying enforcement might actually encourage the party w/ greater income to make promises knowing he could avoid the consequences of revoking. Restrictive employment covenants - Restrictive employment covenants- generally disfavored as restraints against trade, but courts will enforce them if they are drafted to protect legitimate “protectable” interests. o Courts generally enforce restrictions that are reasonable w/ respect to time, area, and activity. o Courts are more likely to enforce in-term employment restrictions than post-term restrictions. - In most states, courts will enforce post-term covenants not to compete if o (1) Interest is a protectable one (thrown into doubt in IL) o (2) Covenant is ancillary (supplementary) to a valid K or relationship o (3) Covenant is supported by adequate consideration o (4) Restraint is reasonable as to area, time, and scope of activity o (5) Enforcing the restraint will not do damage to the public o (6) Enforcing the restraint will not cause undue hardship to the former employee - Remedies for breach of covenants not to compete o Former employer usually seeks to enforce the restrictive covenant by obtaining equitable, injunctive relief as well as damages for breach. o Reformation (the “blue pencil” rule): Some courts will strike the offensive portion of the covenant or rewrite it, and enforce the reformed covenant. Courts differ; IL- will reform the covenant if employer did not intentionally overreach Chapter 10 – Statute of Frauds - Writings not required at common law: At common law, oral agreements are enforceable, unless the parties themselves require a writing in order to contract. - - Evidentiary value of a writing: At common law, presence or absence of a written agreement may be relevant to the issue of whether the parties have contractual intent. o E.g., a writing may be evidence of contractual intent to overcome the family presumption (Morrow v. Morrow) 1676- British Parliament passes the first S/F, requiring that certain agreements be written to be enforceable Purposes of the S/F: o Preventing fraud o Evidentiary purpose (faulty memory) o Cautionary purpose (provides an opportunity for the contracting parties to reflect and consider the importance of their commitment) What the S/F requires - According to the S/F, to be enforceable o (1) Certain types of agreements must be in writing; o (2) The writing must set forth the material terms of the agreement; and o (3) The writing must be signed by the party to be charged w/ the K. - Even if alleged agreement falls w/in the S/F and there is no satisfactory writing, agreement may still be enforceable under one or more of several exceptions. Approaching the issue of the S/F (i.e., on exams) - When faced w/ a fact pattern, first note whether the agreement is oral or written. If there is a writing, there is probably no S/F issue, unless the written agreement falls short of the content or signature requirements. But S/F may be an issue if the agreement is oral. - Ask 3 questions: o (1) Is the agreement one of those that falls w/in the S/F? o (2) If so, is there a writing that satisfies the S/F’s content requirements (Does it contain the material terms of the parties’ agreement and required signature(s)?) o (3) If not, do one or more of the exceptions apply? - Do not overlook the possibility of the S/F on an exam (think about it for every question; if there’s an “oral” agreement- you should address the S/F) Agreements that fall w/in the S/F - (1) Sale of goods for $500 or more - (2) Sale of any interest in real estate (including restrictive covenants on the use of land) - (3) Agreements not capable of performance w/in 1 year of the time of agreement (I.e., leases of more than 1 yr; leases of less than 1 yr need not be in writing) o If agreement is capable of being performed w/in 1 yr, then it need not be in writing (even if it turns out not to be performed w/in 1 yr) - (4) Surety agreements (I.e., debtor promises creditor to make good on principal’s obligation to creditor) - (5) Agreements in contemplation of marriage and other less significant agreements (I.e., pre-nuptial agreements) Modern trend away from strict adherence to S/F - - - Courts seek to vindicate parties’ intentions where identifiable and facilitate transactions (strict adherence to S/F can impede these objectives) Recent history of judicial treatment has been to minimize wherever possible the impact of the S/F by o Construing the S/F’s coverage narrowly; o Moving away from the formerly strict requirements concerning a writing’s contents; and o Broadening the exceptions Hypo: Berendt hires you as a research assistant for 1 year, to start January 1 o Writing is required- not capable of performance w/in 1 year o Death does not mark completed performance (doesn’t matter that you may die w/in 1 year); for a K for a duration of time (not a lifetime employment K) Lifetime employment: o Majority position (and R2d)- falls outside scope of S/F; oral agreements for lifetime employment enforceable Definition of lifetime employment is employment until death; death marks the end of performance, and it is possible that employee could die w/in 1 yr o Minority position (only IL)- falls w/in S/F; oral agreements for lifetime employment unenforceable Promise of lifetime employment is a promise of permanent employment, a promise anticipating a relationship longer than 1 yr Exceptions to S/F - Full performance, by the party claiming the benefit of the oral agreement - Partial performance, where it is not otherwise possible or practical to restore the status quo or compensate claimant for the value of his performance - Equitable estoppel - Promissory estoppel (not available as an exception to S/F in IL) Compliance w/ S/F - If the agreement falls w/in the S/F, the writing must contain: o All the material terms o Reasonable certainty of terms o The signature of the party to be charged w/ the K o More than one writing may be used to satisfy the writing requirement, if they are integrated in some fashion. o Writings not intended to be the K itself may satisfy the S/F (i.e., employer’s letter welcoming a newly hired employee) o If writing is lost or destroyed: R2d- If you have a witness that saw the writing, then it exists, even if it’s been destroyed.