Sustainable Energy Transition: The case of the Swedish Pulp and Paper
Industry 1973-1990
Abstract
Through the historical case study method, this paper examines the transition towards renewable energy and
increased energy efficiency in the Swedish pulp and paper industry (PPI) during the 1970s and 1980s. Between
1973 and 1990, CO2 emissions were cut by 80 percent in this sector, and this was mainly achieved by
substituting biofuels in the form of byproducts from the pulp manufacturing process for oil. This reduction was
made possible also through other energy efficiency improvements as well as increased internal production of
electricity through back-pressure turbine power generation. Sweden was highly dependent on oil when the first
Oil Crisis broke, and the increased oil prices put pressure on the Swedish government and the energy intensive
PPI to reduce oil dependency. Of central importance for this energy transition was a highly collaborative strategy
of the PPI as well as between this sector and the corporatist Swedish state administration. The Swedish
government chose a proactive strategy by emphasizing knowledge management and collaboration with industry
along with the substitution of oil with internal biofuels. The transition was driven by the fact that focus was
directed towards unutilized potentials in the sector, where a previous waste problem now could be transformed
into energy savings and improved energy efficiency. Moreover, energy taxes and subsidies played a major role
as policy instruments in the Swedish energy policy of the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the study illustrates the central
role of governments and their ability to push industries into new technological paths through a wide palette of
interplaying policy instruments. The results further point at the importance of a more holistic understanding of
the interplay between different policies and their impacts in the longer run.
Keywords: Energy transition, oil crises, biofuels, pulp and paper industry, Sweden
1
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores industry and policy strategies to accomplish an energy transition in the
Swedish pulp and paper industry (PPI) in the wake of the Oil Crisis in 1973. The Swedish
industry structure is energy-intensive and the PPI, which together with the basic metal sector
has been a backbone in the Swedish industrialisation from the 1890s and onwards, is the
largest energy user. It currently accounts for 45 % of the total industrial energy use in Sweden
(SEA 2012: 19). In the European Union (EU) the PPI accounts for 14 % of the industrial
energy use (Jönsson 2011), and the Swedish PPI is the third largest energy user in Europe
after the German and Finnish PPIs (SFIF 2011).
Several previous studies have focused on the Swedish PPI, addressing policy implications and
short-term changes of energy efficiency within the sector (e.g. Ottosson and Magnusson 2013;
Henriksson et al. 2012; Eriksson et al. 2011), trends in energy performance, shifts in energy
use and changes in CO2 emissions over time (e.g. Stenqvist, 2015; Henriksson and Lundmark
2013; Lindmark et al. 2011). Lindmark et al. (2011) report that the biggest reduction of CO2
emissions and shifts in energy carriers of the Swedish PPI occurred between 1973 and 1990.
Over this period, the sector cut its CO2 emissions by 80 percent, mainly by substituting
biofuels in the form of by-products from the pulp manufacturing process for oil. This
reduction was made possible also through other energy efficiency measures, and increased
internal production of electricity through back-pressure turbine power generation. Hence, in
1990 the Swedish PPI was a world leader in terms of CO2 efficiency (IEA 2007:194). Still
today the energy efficiency of the Swedish (and Finnish) PPI is higher than of other major
pulp producing countries such as Brazil, the USA and Canada (Fracoro et al. 2012). From a
climate and energy policy perspective, the fuel shift in the 1970s and the 1980s, and
especially how the transition was accomplished, should be of great interest for policy makers
and industry representatives in energy-intensive economies.
The Arabic oil embargo and the increased energy prices in the 1970s had major impacts on
the energy-intensive industries and nations’ energy systems as a whole (Kander et al. 2013;
McNeill 2000). The oil crises also clearly stimulated major shifts in national energy policies.
Industry representatives and policy makers in Sweden and the EU today calls for several
strategies and policy instruments which were actually implemented in Swedish industry
during the 1970s and 80s. These primarily involve a stronger emphasis on the central state as
2
an important driving force in the energy transition, not the least for enabling knowledge
development and network building, as well as for assisting in funding energy-related
investments etc. (IVA 2013; IEA 2012). From this perspective, the experiences of the 1970s
and 1980s should be of great interest. Moreover, large parts of industry today face a need for
modernization and structural rationalization, and this is similar to the situation in the 1970s
and 1980s. Finally, the period covered in the article, 1973-1990, can be seen as formative for
industrial energy-related R&D of importance to meet the challenges and opportunities faced
by the industry sector today.
Since a large fraction of the total energy use in industrial societies is embedded in long-lived
capital equipment, where it often is a costly, uncertain and slow process to adopt new
technologies – stretching over decades when it comes to industrial plants (Rosenberg, 1994) –
a post perspective should provide us with a fuller picture of the strategies and their long-term
implications. Hence, the objective of this paper is to explore the strategies of the PPI sector to
accomplish an energy transition in the wake of the Oil Crisis in 1973 and up to 1990, and
further how Swedish policy attempted to reinforce this transition. Specifically, in the paper
we: i) investigate how the short and long run strategies of the PPI to change the energy mix
were organised and carried out over the studied period; ii) analyse the relationship between
the national energy policy on the one hand and the strategies and achievements of the PPI on
the other in changing the energy mix; iii) explore eventual interrelations between strategies
(of both the sector and authorities) to overcome the parallel energy and environmental
challenges in Swedish industry and particularly in the PPI; and iv) discuss what general
lessons can be learned from the historical case for efforts by policy makers and industry
representatives to increase energy efficiency and phase out non-renewable energy.
Below follows an overview of the methods used and other key points of departure. Thereafter
we begin the examination, first of the policy developments to be followed by the industry
strategies (both inter-firm and firm-individual strategies) undertaken to accomplish the
transition. In the final sections of the paper we discuss our findings.
2. KEY POINTS OF DEPARTURE
3
We use the qualitative historical case study method since it allows lessons to be drawn from
post-industry and policy strategies. According to Meadowcroft (2011), much can be learned
for sustainable transitions “by examining […] earlier transitions […] as well as ongoing and
historic struggles over issues of the environment and sustainable development” (Meadowcroft
2011:75). Several previous, however almost exclusively quantitative, studies focus on the
changes in energy use of the sector since the 1970s (e.g. Stenqvist 2015; Henriksson et al.
2012), with few attempts to use qualitative methods to analyze in more detail the strategies
and instruments contributing to this development. Even so, it has been argued that a more
disaggregated level of analysis is particularly needed to understand knowledge formation in
the PPI (Laestadius 1998). 1 One important exception on the Swedish PPI is a study by
Ottosson (2011), which however “only” focus on the development from 1986 and onwards,
and also adopting a broader perspective than in the present study. Also Stenqvist (2013) has
some qualitative elements in his analysis, but he too focuses on developments only from the
mid-1980s and onwards, i.e., a time period during which a great deal of the energy transition
in the wake of the oil crises already had been accomplished. Thus, while the existing research
has provided a relatively good understanding of the outcomes of the industrial energy
transition in Sweden since the 1970s, the present study attempts to understand at greater depth
what made these outcomes possible.
The Swedish case study was conducted through qualitative analysis of mainly first-hand
sources, such as: i) policy documents (reports, program descriptions, Government Bills etc.)
from Swedish authorities (e.g., the Swedish Energy Agency, Ministry of Industry, Energy
Commission, Delegation for Energy Research, and SIND); ii) individual company’s annual
reports; iii) articles in the main journal of the Swedish PPI (Svensk papperstidning, SP); iv)
reports and committee minutes from industry-wide organizations (Stiftelsen Cellulosa- och
Pappersforskning; Svenska Cellulosa- och Pappersbruksföreningen), where much of the latter
is archived at the Stockholm Centre for Business History. The case study is also based on
complementary secondary sources from the Swedish social science literature (e.g. Vedung
1982; Sörlin 2006; Rothstein 1992; Lewin 2002; Marklund 1994).
1
Laestadius (1998) relates this to the special character of the knowledge formation process in the PPI, where
there are less of “analytical development activities”, which normally is what counts as R&D, and more of
“synthetical development activities”, where the building and designing of systems through integrating
components into complex wholes are what matters. Thus technology level and knowledge formation in the PPI
can only marginally be measured in the form of R&D investments.
4
Governments have major impacts on businesses, and the ways in which they define and
approach problems and possible solutions. However, corporate strategies diverge between
countries due to different institutional settings (e.g. Mikler 2009; Gunningham et al. 2003;
Wallace 1995). Thus, during the energy crises, Sweden proved major differences to, for
instance, the USA in business-state relations due to different institutional settings, with a
tendency of adversarial relations in the USA and a model of political cooperation and active
state intervention in the market taking place in Sweden (Hall and Soskice 2001). The
corporatist state administration constituted a main strategy of the Swedish government
throughout the 1930s up until the 1970s. An important aim was to address social and welfare
issues (Rotstein 1992; Lewin 2002). This further included joint research institutes with the
purpose of strengthening the competitiveness of Swedish industry. For instance, in the mid1940s, the Swedish state established the Swedish Pulp and Paper Research Institute (STFI) in
collaboration with the PPI to pursue research on forest products (Sörlin 2006).
At the same time as the Swedish society faced the energy crises it also experienced a green
reconstruction driven by a new environmental regulatory framework enforced in 1969. Also
in this context the Swedish state administration relied on business-state relations built on
cooperation and trust. Important new arenas for collaboration and research on the green
reconstruction were the state-industry funded Institute for Water and Air Protection (IVL),
founded in 1966, and the Forest Industries’ Water and Air Pollution Research Foundation
(SSVL), founded in 1963. SSVL was founded by the forest industry alone, however partly
funded and represented by state agencies (Bergquist and Söderholm 2011). Through these
new arenas, extensive amounts of information were developed and exchanged between the
environmental authorities and industry actors. Swedish environmental regulators based this
collaborative and even consensus-seeking policy style on the view that rational and balanced
decisions could only be reached when each party knew and understood what the other wanted
(Lundkvist 1977).
Also within the Swedish PPI there has been a long tradition of collaboration in green R&D,
and this in fact started already in the early 20th century within industry-wide organizations.
From a business perspective we can understand it as a need to share the costs and risks
associated with such pioneering development (Cortat 2009). Previous research has shown that
this collaborative tradition of the Swedish PPI, in combination with the consensus-seeking
state administrative strategy, underpinned the successful shift to greener technologies in the
5
sector over the 1970s and 1980s; environmental investments in the sector rendered
considerable emission cuts (Söderholm and Bergquist 2012). This is in turn consistent with
Mikler (2009), who suggests that information-sharing and collaborative market models, in
contrast to more liberal market models, tend to foster more proactive green strategies.
Previous research also indicates that the collaborative green R&D tradition of the Swedish
PPI is not general for the sector as such, but likely something more related to the emergence
of diverse national models (Bergquist and Söderholm 2015).
In the green transformation of the Swedish PPI during the 1970s and 1980s, there were even
situations where environmental regulations increased not only the environmental performance
of the PPI but also its’ economic performance by directing focus to unutilized efficiency
potentials (Söderholm and Bergquist 2013), i.e., being consistent with the strong version of
the so-called Porter hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde 1995). Below we will focus on the
strategies of the Swedish PPI in changing its energy mix and use, and the relation between the
energy policy and the strategies and achievements of the PPI in this regard. The tradition of
industry-wide collaboration in green R&D within the sector motivates us to mainly focus on
the industry level. Networking within the same industrial sector has further shown to be
important also for effective energy management (Thollander and Ottosson 2008; Johansson
2014). Below we start by examining the policy strategies of the Swedish state administration.
3. ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENTS POST 1973
The oil crises caused major shifts in the energy policies of a number of Western governments,
and Sweden was no exception. Energy policy was not an independent policy field in Sweden
prior to the oil crises, but it saw a period of rapid expansion from the mid-1970s, and onwards
embracing all sectors in the economy, from transport to households and the industry. A few
energy issues had been integrated with industrial policy already before this, but then primarily
with the goal to ensure cheap energy for the industry as well as a favourable balance of trade
and energy security in the case of international conflicts (Vedung 1982). Despite the presence
of big hydropower reserves in Sweden (and the lack of significant oil or coal resources), oil
accounted for as much as 72 percent of the national energy use in the beginning of the 1970s.
This made the Swedish economy heavily dependent on imports of fossil fuels (Schipper et al.
1994). Thus, after the threat of an acute energy supply crisis in the first quarter of 1974, a
6
central short-term policy goal for the Swedish government was to prevent a deteriorating
balance of payments and reduce the dependence on oil. As the Swedish industry accounted for
a large part of oil use and thus had major impacts on the national energy system and balance
of payments, an industry-related energy policy debate was soon initiated (Regestad 1977).
As during past energy crises (e.g., in 1945), a committee, the Energy Program committee, was
appointed by the government to prepare a proposal for a new R&D program. Deadlines were
tight and when the committee presented its proposal in 1974 (Ministry of Industry, 1974),
which after that came to form the basis for the government Energy programme (Government
Bill 1975:30), it constituted the largest public civil R&D effort in Sweden so far. From a
research-organizational perspective the program represented a new approach, i.e., an attempt
to coordinate an interdisciplinary and a multi-sectorial commitment. For this reason a total of
five different government agencies were responsible for various parts of the programme.
These were: Swedish Board for Technical Development (Styrelsen för teknisk utveckling,
STU); Transport Delegation (Transportdelegationen, TFD); Swedish Building Research
Council (Svenska Byggforskningsrådet, BFR); National Energy Administration (Nationella
Energiadministrationen, NEA); and Energy Research Board (Energiforskningsnämnden,
EFN). Research, development, prototype and demonstration plants (PoDs) constituted
important features in this industry-focused energy policy, and government support for R&D
was considered of key significance. The risks faced by individual companies when taking on
expensive, long-term projects were perceived too high, and without government support the
necessary development of alternative energy technology could be blocked. The National
Board for Industrial Development (Statens Industriverk, SIND) was notified means for the
funding of PoDs (Wittrock and Lindström 1984; Marklund 1994).
The industry was very much in focus for the new energy policy initiatives. Thus, 20-25 % of
the Energy programme’s resources were each year allocated to individual companies, research
institutes and universities to deal with industry-related energy issues. Subsidies were given
both to process measures and PoDs (Marklund 1994:140ff). In the 1970s, most of the
industry-focused funding was directed to research institutes and private companies, where the
PPI received the largest chunk of the subsidies. For instance, during the state budget period
1975/76, 37 % of the subsidies to PoDs went to the PPI. The chemical industry came in
second place and it received a corresponding 23 % (SIND 1978:2). However, over the 1980s,
the universities’ share of industry-focused funding increased greatly whereas the share
7
allocated to private companies was reduced to almost nothing. This was in line with the
governmental policy of the late 1980s, leaving a greater share of responsibility to industry in
dealing with development activities within the energy technology area.
The first Energy programme ran for three years where after new energy programmes were
initiated every three years during the 1970s and the 1980s. 2 In parallel, other
policy
programmes with an energy focus were also initiated, such as the Oil replacement programme
1980-83 and 1984-87; the Investment programme 1983-84; the Fuel environment fund 198387; the Technology development programme 1986-88; the Energy technology fund 1988; and
the Technology procurement programme for electrically efficient technology 1988-1993
(Marklund 1994). In parallel, additional studies with a focus on energy-related R&D were
performed by e.g. SIND and STU, and the challenges facing the PPI attracted a lot of
attention also during the 1980s (SIND 1976:3; SIND 1983:2).3
Through the funding and inquiries the government authorities exchanged information on
energy issues with individual firms and central industry organisations of the PPI. Thus, the
authorities knew of and could list a number of on-going energy-related development projects
of the PPI, such as related to the bleaching stage4 and the technology to increase the drycontent of the black liquor in the recovery boiler. The government’s perception was that it
was only through long-term R&D work and efficient allocation of direct support from
subsidy-granting organizations that significant energy gains could be achieved in the PPI
(Swedish Ministry of Industry 1977b; SIND 1976:3 and SIND 1977:6). On the whole, there
has been a strong believe in research, development and demonstration as engines of change in
the Swedish energy policy, and the per capita spending on research, development and
demonstration (RD&D) has been fairly high in Sweden relative other IEA countries (Nilsson
2
One example is the 1981 program (Government Bill 1980/81:90), focusing on incineration technology, new
electrical production technology and biofuels. This programme had the biggest budget so far, i.e., SEK
1400million (USD 280 million).
3
The state-owned energy company “Vattenfall AB” in the end of the 1980s further conducted the rather
comprehensive Uppdrag 2000 (Mission 2000) -project on energy efficiency. The aim was to, primarily through
full-scale experiments in reality, make a realistic assessment of how much electricity that could be saved in
society (www.vattenfall.se).
4
The PPI conducted extensive R&D work on bleaching with oxygen during the 1960s and early 1970s, both
within industry-wide research institutions and in R&D labs of individual companies, such as the MoDo Group.
This technique, which was established at Swedish mills in the late 1970s and early 1980s (quite early from an
international perspective), reduced the lignin content in the unbleached pulp by half, and the released organic
substance could instead be used for energy production. In this way the oxygen technique was an important
energy-efficient as well as emission-reducing measure for the industry. See Söderholm and Bergquist (2013).
8
et al., 2004). This was particularly the case during the 1970s and the early 1980s, but also
energy taxes and fees played a major role in the Swedish energy policy during this period.
Apart from the strong focus on RD&D within the energy technology area, a general increase
in energy efficiency and expanded nuclear power programs for electricity production
represented accessible and preferred strategies for the Swedish government. However, another
long-term governmental strategy, and in part overseen in previous literature, was the policy
for the increased production and use of renewable energy, preferably biofuels. Later, when the
resistance to nuclear power increased as a reaction to the incident in Harrisburg in 1979, and
Sweden decided to phase out nuclear power, bioenergy got an even bigger role in the Swedish
energy policy.5 The focus on bioenergy in Sweden was in part reflected in the design of the
country’s energy taxes. Thus, whereas taxes and fees on coal and oil were raised, domestic
fuels, such as forest fuel and peat were instead subsidized through the Oil replacement fund.
Fuel choices were further regulated through the new Solid Fuel Act, which, for instance,
contained clear directives to municipalities to increase the use of domestic fuels in local
energy planning (SP 1982).
As the energy policy increased the interest in wood incineration the PPI feared that the
practically accessible quantities of forest fuels would be over-subscribed, which in turn could
threaten the cheap access to raw materials for the sector (SP 1982; Wohlfahrt 1982).
However, soon the forest industry itself began to gather and utilize forest fuel in terms of
forest waste and small timber. This occurred on a broad front in the early 1980s, and basically
all companies with forest assets started such activities. Some companies also prepared for peat
production (Axelsson 1983). The investments (see also section 4) gained returns, and a large
part of the reduced use of oil in the 1980s could be achieved by an increased use of forest
fuels. Between 1983 and 1995 there was a 25 % increase in forest fuel use (SEA 2000: 33ff).
As a consequence of the fear of shortages of wood but also as a way of increasing energy
efficiency, both the authorities (Swedish Ministry of Industry 1977b) and the PPI (Ekheimer
2006) further worked for an increased use of recycled paper in pulp production. The energy
use for the production of pulp from recycled paper was only one-fifth of the energy needed
for making mechanical pulp from virgin wood. Alongside with improved methods for
5
Policies to phase out fossil fuels in favor of bioenergy concerned all sectors, and there were even long-term
ambitions in the 1970s and 1980s (although never realized) to phase out petroleum as motor fuel with methanol
made of organic substances. For the Swedish case, see Vedung (1982) and Mårald (2011).
9
removing ink and other contaminants, such as plastic from the recycled paper, an increase in
the use of recycled paper was made possible (Swedish Ministry of Industry 1977b). Thus,
whereas recycled paper was not used at all in Swedish pulp production prior to 1975, it came
to be an important raw material. The introduction in 1975 of a compulsory collection system
for old newsprint from the households was also a key prerequisite for this development
(Ekheimer 2006).
4. BUSINESS STRATEGIES TO ACCOMPLISH ENERGY TRANSITION
In this section we examine the strategies of the Swedish PPI to accomplish the energy
transition. First we present some statistics over the development and some background to the
choice of strategies. Thereafter (in sections 4.2-4.3) we examine the strategies from an interfirm- and private company levels, respectively. Figure 1 illustrates the change in the energy
mix of the Swedish PPI in the wake of the first Oil Crisis in 1973. As can be seen, the largescale substitution away from oil took place during the 1970s and the 1980s, and it was mainly
achieved through increased use of internal bio-fuels (BIOint). Oil inputs were reduced by
approximately 20 TWh if we compare the year 1973 with 2006, while the use of internal
biofuels increased by 30 TWh. The total energy use stayed relatively constant and varied
between 60 and 70 TWh (i.e., 216-252 PJ) (SEA 2000: 33). The reduction in oil inputs was,
however, not always a continuous process. The substitution was most significant between
1973 and 1984. While oil inputs were reduced in the PPI we can also see an increased use of
electricity from the early 1980s and onwards. This was mainly due to the growth of the more
electricity intensive mechanical pulp production (as compared to the otherwise dominating
Kraft pulp production6). Wood is however exploited better in mechanical pulp production,
and as wood was relatively cheaper in competing countries, such as North America,
mechanical pulp production was considered more competitive.
6
Kraft pulp production implies that strong, unbleached pulp is prepared according to the sulphate method.
10
Fig 1. Energy mix in pulp and paper industry (TWh) 1973–2006. BIOext is the bio-fuel inputs from other sectors
and BIOint is internal (byproduct) bio-fuels (see Lindmark et al. 2011).
The experiences further show overall improved energy efficiency within the sector throughout
the period; although the sector’s total energy use stayed relatively constant, pulp production
increased by 70 % (or 2,7 million tonnes) and paper production by 127 % (or 5,5 million
tonnes) between the years 1970 and 1998 (SEA 2000: 33). In the 1970s and 1980s, this
process of improved energy efficiency coincided with an on-going structural change in the
industry, i.e., towards fewer and larger production units and an improved ability to take
advantage of economies of scale (Järvinen et al. 2012). In 1972 there were 66 paper mills and
96 pulp mills in Sweden. The corresponding numbers for 1998 were 50 and 46, respectively
(SEA 2000: 33). The concentration of production units allowed, among other things, a higher
degree of integrated pulp and paper production where the energy intensive step of drying the
pulp (at the pulp mill, only to dissolve it again at the paper mill) was avoided. This structural
change is however insufficient as main explanatory element of the transition as the fuel switch
from oil to biofuels did not require that large investments. 7 Thus, boiler capacity was
expanded on solid fuel boilers, typically bark boilers, at the expense of oil boilers, and
investments were made in bark presses and later in bark dryers to increase incineration
capacity. Moreover, the dry-content of the black liquor in the recovery boiler was increased
and the quantity of fuel to the liquor system was increased through the introduction of the
oxygen bleaching technology in the late 1970s. Organic material that previously had gone to
7
Neither in the period 1984-2011, structural changes impacted greatly on the energy use of the Swedish PPI
(Stenqvist 2013).
11
runoff in the bleaching process now returned to the liquor system (Eliasson 2014; Swedish
Ministry of Industry 1977b: 117-131).
4.1 Different strategies to decrease the external need for energy
In 1974, the cost for external energy in the form of electricity and fuel constituted as much as
12 % of the Swedish PPI’s total production costs; this can be compared to 4.1 % for all
manufacturing industry in Sweden the same year (Swedish Ministry of Industry 1977b:38ff).
Thus, energy issues came to the forefront for the Swedish PPI on a different scale than had
been the case before, and the goal was to, as far as possible, free the sector from the oil
dependence to the advantage of a more economically secure energy source (Norrström 2013).
Different options were available and debated within the sector as a direct response to the first
oil crisis. The option to simply increase the use of coal was discussed and emphasized by
some industry representatives. Still in the early 1980s, several paper mills even renovated and
made new investments in boilers to replace oil with coal. Most of the sector however found
the related costs too high, in part since the use of coal would require expensive scrubber
(abatement) systems (Sundblad 1977). The Swedish PPI instead early on chose to invest
heavily in replacing oil with domestic fuels (black liquor, bark, forest fuel and peat) in parallel
to improving secondary heating systems and reduce steam consumption, such as by investing
in more presses, wires etc. in the drying/paper machines (Eliasson 2014).
The replacement of oil with electricity was, if technically possible, not economically justified
for the PPI (Eliasson 2014). It was furthermore considered more difficult to reduce the
electricity use than the use of heat , in part because electricity use was divided into a large
number of relatively small units (Norrström 2013). However, it was believed that the external
need for electrical energy could be reduced through increased back-pressure turbine power
generation. 8 In 1973, the sector already produced about one-third of its needed electrical
energy this way, and the possibility to increase production further was considered great.
Consequently, managers and researchers of cellulose technology emphasized the benefits of
government support in this area. Moreover, the Swedish Cellulose and Paper Mill Association
(SCPF) appointed a working group to inventory the potential for expanded back-pressure
turbine power generation (Sundblad 1977; Hartler 1978). In fact, for competitive reasons the
8
Back-pressure turbine power generation: when electrical energy is produced by means of available temperature
fall in plants that use steam. The PPI uses a lot of high pressure temperature steam. Without the generation of
electricity through back-pressure turbine power the sector´s dependence on imported fuel would have been
considerably greater (Rydin 1980).
12
sector needed to increase the wood yield and refine the pulp, which over time required
increased electricity use (see also Figure 1). Thus, access to electrical energy at reasonable
prices was decisive to the sector, and beyond what the sector would manage to produce itself.
However, the price of external electricity would turn out to be kept low in Sweden, at least
during the 1980s and early 1990s.9
4.2 Inter-firm initiatives
To manage the new energy-related challenges the Swedish PPI (industry-wide) appointed a
standing Energy committee consisting of 12 members from among management and technical
personnel within the sector. This occurred already in 1973. A major objective of the new
committee was to encourage the development of energy saving/efficiency measures with
improved mill performances built-in. Other objectives included the collection and diffusion
within the sector of information about such development, and the appointment of
representatives to investigate special subjects and to represent the industry in public bodies
and investigations. The committee further promoted the interest of the sector in governmental
energy policy processes, and assisted firms in compiling grant applications (Marklund
1994:143-44). Eventually the committee, backed up with financial support from the
government, also engaged in training programmes to which companies could send their
personnel for technical training in energy issues (Axelsson 1982).
After a few months the committee had compiled a list of development projects that were
already running within the sector, and were of such kind that the government was expected to
be willing to support them. These concerned, for instance, expanded back-pressure turbine
power generation, the incineration of bark and other forest waste, and the possibility of
exploiting gas produced through the incineration (SP 1982; PPRF 1973). The projects were
conducted at the inter-firm (sector-wide) and partly state-industry collaborative R&D
platforms that had been established already in the 1940s and the 1960s, then with the primary
purpose to pursue research on forest products respectively the environment (i.e., STFI and the
Forest Industries’ Water and Air Pollution Research Foundation (SSVL)). There was thus
really no need to establish new industry-wide R&D arenas as the existing arenas and partly
also previous R&D projects could be reused for and/or oriented towards energy-related R&D.
9
In the 1970s, a small number of large electric utilities dominated the Swedish electricity market, and these were
in the midst of investing in nuclear power and thus had to secure a continued market for electricity. Largely these
utilities kept down the price of electricity whereas the use of electricity increased exceptionally in Sweden
compared to other European countries, especially in the 1970s and the 1980s (Högselius and Kaijser 2007).
13
Only a few years later, in 1977, no less than 50 new energy projects had been started or
proposed within the sector. Those involved 37 energy conservation- and 14 energy generation
projects, most conducted and proposed in collaboration between organisations closely
associated with the sector, such as STFI, SCPF, and the Steam Boiler Association
(Ångpanneföreningen).
This mobilization involved development projects at various stages. Initially it concerned
projects that gave immediate results, such as go-through procedures and to learn to “think”
more in terms of saving energy. Simply by making sure that all instruments and processes
functioned optimally, 10 % reductions in energy use could be achieved (Robertsson 1975;
Rydin 1980). In the medium and long term the mobilization concerned projects aimed at
changing, improving and developing new technology for the purpose of increased energy
efficiency.
Development projects were conducted also together with universities and research institutes
outside the sector, for instance the Thermal Engineering Research Institute (Värmeforsk)
(Marklund 1994:143 reference no 28). Another proactive strategy of the sector as the
universities’ share of the industry-focused public funding increased over the second half of
the 1970s, was to provide relevant university departments with a list of more than 30 (for the
PPI) pressing energy-related research projects. The university departments were encouraged
to apply for subsidies for the projects from different sources of public funding (Wohlfahrt
1977). Individual companies contributed to the projects typically by developing and testing
new machinery and new processes in full scale, but to some extent also through conducting
applied research. As the government allocated significant subsidies for prototypes and
demonstration plants, such activity further increased greatly. New processes and technology
on a factory-wide scale could be subsidised by as much as 50 % (Sundblad 1977; Regestad
1977).
In this way knowledge of energy efficient technologies and processes was diffused within and
beyond the sector. However, other activities focused exclusively on collecting and spreading
knowledge, and often managed to accomplish this successfully. For instance, the Energy
committee regularly, about every five years between 1974 and 2001, had performed energy
studies (including statistics) of all Swedish P&P manufacturers (e.g. Wiberg 1974). These
results were widely diffused within the sector whereby individual mills could compare their
14
energy performance with other mills. Another project initiated by the committee investigated
best available technology in the manufacturing of four standard grades, i.e., in modern kraft
liner mills, tissue paper mills, sulphate mills for bleached commercial pulp and in newsprint
mills. By accounting in this way for what was practically achievable for modern mills, the
committee wanted to produce a data foundation that could serve as a practical handbook for
technicians in the industry (SP 1975; PPRF 1973). The Steam Boiler Association was
commissioned to conduct the model mill study which resulted in four role-model books – one
for each primary type of mill – for energy optimizations in existing and projected mills
(Jönsson 1977a; 1977b). One representative of the sector bears witness of the importance of
the regularly performed energy studies (including statistics) and handbooks for the energy
transition in the PPI. By making information of the best-available energy saving measures
available to all mills, a company could bench-mark its own energy use and at the same time
receive the tools to, if desired, basically develop a model factory (in terms of energy use) with
the best pieces across (Norrström 2013). In addition, in 1974 SCPF appointed a special
working group with industry professionals to conduct an inventory over which projects
aiming for energy savings/efficiency which were considered extra urgent by the sector. The
inventory was thereafter continuously updated and published in catalogues issued within the
sector every second year (Marklund 1994:143-44).
These are all illustrative examples of the open and well-structured exchange of information
and R&D collaboration between companies within the PPI, which had been established also
when it comes to the parallel environmental adaptation of the sector. Early on the
comprehensive information-exchange and collaborative platforms of the sector meant that it
developed a quite purposeful policy on energy savings/-efficiency, also in terms of promoting
the interests of the sector in the governmental energy policy process and in obtaining grants.
For instance, the work was very well adapted to STU’s grant policy (Marklund 1994:144).
From a policy perspective the collected information further formed a valuable knowledge
basis for the Energy program.
4.3 The individual companies
In this section we focus on the individual company level, i.e., the level where the investments
underpinned by the above-described knowledge diffusion takes place. In the wake of the first
Oil Crisis in 1973, focus soon was on energy and environmental issues in the research
laboratories of both manufacturers and machinery suppliers in the PPI, and this focus was
15
maintained during the 1980s. Basically it was about making a better use of resources with
regard to energy and fibre raw materials (SCA 1974; STORA 1981). Opportunities to achieve
environmental and energy gains were greatest in parallel to renovation and new construction.
Thus, in 1974, a renovated mill of the company Stora Group managed – while at the same
time expanding its production – to reduce the annual consumption of oil from about 63,000
m3 to 38,000 m3 (630 to 380 GWh) and the annual need for electricity supplied from outside
from 200 GWh to 120 GWh. This was in part achieved by technical measures, such as
through increased incineration of black liquor and bark, and increased generation of backpressure turbine power (STORA 1974:34-35). The mill further joined all Scandinavian
manufacturers of newsprint, and agreed on reducing the long-established standard weight for
newsprint from 52 to 49 grams per square meter. This measure was well received by the
customers in the market, which soon came to demand even thinner grades (STORA 1974:10).
Although 60 % of the total fuel requirements of the sector already were met by black liquor
and bark in the mid-1970s (SMI 1977b), the interest in biofuel continued to increase over the
1970s, together with work for improved heat economy. Thus, for the company SCA in 1981,
the energy ambition was to transform low-value waste heat in various processes to high-value
heat for reuse, and also to expand the supply of waste heat to municipal district heating
networks. The strategy was also to increase the use of forest waste and peat. The company
had already come a long way with the development of systems for collection and transport of
forest fuel. There were also large peat assets on company land waiting to get extracted if only
extraction methods and dewatering technology could be further developed. This work was ongoing in 1981. SCA further counted on a continued transition to mechanical pulping that
offered higher yields although it was noted that this would involve increased electricity use.
The company however assumed that Sweden would continue to have good access to
electricity at an internationally competitive price (SCA 1981:17). In this respect, the nuclear
program was considered important.
In 1983, the Stora Group established that since the mid-1970s, extensive energy efficiency/saving measures had been undertaken at the company’s mills. Fuel use had been reduced
significantly and oil had been replaced by other fuels. Of particular importance in this respect
was the transition to solid fuels. In its annual report of 1983 the company reported that it had
been proven economically feasible to utilize forest waste in the form of branches and tops that
normally had been left behind after cutting. Such fuel was now to some extent supplied to the
16
mills. Likewise, solid fuel-fired boilers had recently been put into use at two mills. The
boilers, which could be fired with either coal, forest waste, bark or peat, was to be partly fired
with large quantities of bark that were stored at the mill sites as waste from previous pulp
production. The company soon noted that the new boilers contributed with significant
reductions in costs and oil used; the two mills saved 50,000 respectively 80,000 m3 (500 and
800 GWh) of oil annually and between 1979 and 1983, the STORA Group’s total use of oil in
turn decreased from about 140,000 to 25,000 m3 (1400 and 25 GWh).10 The company further
calculated that per thermal unit, the average price of solid fuel amounted to about half the
price for fuel oil (STORA 1983). The economical boilers were likely partly financed by
government subsidies as the Stora group received a total of SEK 9.4 million (USD 1.9
million) in subsidies for energy-efficiency measures in 1981 (STORA 1981). Energy
efficiency measures at the mills of the STORA Group also included cooperating with
municipal energy works for heat deliveries (STORA 1983).
At first there was a general concern within the sector that the on-going greening of the
industry would imply increased energy use (STORA 1973: 13). Also the Swedish Minstry of
Energy was in the 1970s concerned that this was a possible obstacle in the energy saving/efficiency efforts of the PPI (SMI 1977a). However, instead a ‘win-win’ situation would
apply from the transition from oil to internal biofuels as this meant both heavily reduced
emissions of, for instance, CO2 emissions and the overcoming of a previous waste problem,
i.e., of bark, which earlier had to be stored and thereby caused environmental problems at the
site. This win-win situation related to energy- and environment efforts emerged since both
challenges concerned the improved use of resources with regard to energy and raw materials;
this would soon become generally known in the sector. For instance, in 1974 the Stora Group
invested in a new paper machine, which was operated based on recycled paper instead of
wood as raw material. After it had been in use for some time the company concluded that the
machine not only contributed with environmental gains but also involved halving the mill’s
energy use (STORA 1974: 34). In the mid-1980s, a pulp mill within the MoDo Group with
the goal to cut emissions of Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) in turn invested extensively
in a bioenergy plant according to the recently developed Anamet method. Except for reducing
the emissions of BOD7, from 45 to 6 tons per day, the new method also helped to reduce oil
use by about 40 % from producing methane gas (Söderholm and Bergquist 2013).
10
Except from paper mills the STORA group also comprised of a copper mill.
17
5. Discussion
Through the qualitative historical case study method we learn that the strategies of the
Swedish PPI to accomplish the energy transition observed by, among others, Lindmark et al.
(2011), in the wake of the oil crises, involved industry-wide energy inventories together with
knowledge development and diffusion. A key feature of the related R&D work was the way it
mainly was organized and carried out in industry-wide collaboration. The knowledge
development involved development projects at various stages, from making sure that all
instruments and processes functioned optimally to improving and developing new technology
for the purpose of further energy savings. The change of the energy mix was in turn
concerned with improved utilization of raw materials and energy efficiency, where the
potential for improvements proved to be comprehensive. The interrelation between the
increased energy efficiency and parallel disposal of waste (bark and newspaper) and
emissions (e.g., CO2, organic substances and elemental chlorine) further illustrates the
dynamic nexus between energy and environmental challenges. Hence, while phasing-out oil
use several environmental problems could be addressed simultaneously. The Swedish PPI
case at the same time illustrates that when businesses enter new technological and more
sustainable production paths it is complex and not always intentional from start. Thus, in
phasing out oil the sector reduced its emissions of CO2 considerably even before the concerns
about climate change had been raised on the global agenda. Even though Sweden later on
become a frontrunner in terms of climate policy and introduced on the world’s first CO2 taxes,
this was introduced only in 1991.
Much of the basic knowledge to generate energy from burning internal organic residual
products and through back-pressure turbine power generation was already known before the
oil crises. However, as the oil price was low and stable before the 1970s, there were few
incentives from an industry perspective to explore this further, and also from a policy
perspective to support such development. This sheds important light on the dynamics between
the price developments of different energy carriers and the development of more sustainable
production processes; it relates to the strong version of the Porter hypothesis essentially
arguing that ‘properly-designed’ environmental regulations, such as market based instruments
18
like pollution taxes, may not increase only the environmental performance but also the
economic performance of industries by directing focus to unutilized potentials.
If a high and unstable oil price was the central driving force behind the energy transition, the
already established infrastructure for collaborative R&D projects in the Swedish PPI certainly
boosted and speeded up the transition. Effective collaboration had hitherto been built up by
the industry around environmental and efficiency issues, and now it was a short step to
collaborate also on energy issues. Thus, already in 1973 the sector established a new industrywide collaborative arena, the Energy committee, which due to the governmental R&D focus
largely focused on collecting and diffusing knowledge on old and new energy-related R&D
projects in the sector, many in collaboration with research institutes, universities, consultant
companies and equipment suppliers outside the PPI. In this way invaluable knowledge on
cutting-edge technology was diffused within and beyond the sector. However, since the fuel
switch did not necessarily mean that complex technology or large investments, it is also
reasonable to assume that the regularly performed energy studies (including the generation of
statistics) and diffusion of handbooks also were important as sources of information and thus
constituted a key driving force behind the transition
The collected knowledge was further purposefully used by the sector to promote its interests
in the governmental energy policy. Only after a few months in operation the committee had
compiled a list of development projects that were already running within the sector and that
were of such kind that the government could be expected to be willing to support them. The
governmental energy policy of the 1970s in turn affirmed the R&D-related information
exchange with the PPI as it formed a valuable knowledge basis for the government and its
many R&D programs launched within the energy policy framework. The government strategy
to support R&D through a number of R&D programs and R&D directed funds presupposed a
(as well as was certainly reasoned by then already established) transparency and insight into
the industry’s needs and prerequisites. The state-industry collaboration was close at hand for
the Swedish cooperative state, and the collaboration had recently been deepened by the
ongoing green reconstruction of industry. In addition to R&D collaboration and information
exchange, the government’s strategy to substitute domestic biofuels for oil by subsidizing
domestic forest fuels and peat formed a more general influence on the chosen strategies of the
PPI, as well as the fact that environmental gains and energy efficiency often went hand in
hand for the PPI.
19
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Industry-wide and state-industry collaboration and related information exchange boosted the
energy transition of the Swedish PPI on several levels, from R&D to purposeful energy policy
and an opportunity for mills to benchmark their energy use, and we can assume that the
combined impact was important, that the transition otherwise would have been more
protracted and the substitution of oil by biofuels less obvious and slower. Through the R&D
subsidies the central government coordinated knowledge production for the transition to come
about. Also energy taxes and fees played a major role in the Swedish energy policy of the
1970s and the 1980s. Thus, the Swedish case illustrates the central role and ability of central
governments to push industries into new technological paths through a wide palette of
interplaying policy instruments. And related to Swedish and EU energy policy today – which
often calls for the central state to take on a more active role for knowledge development and
network building – most of the institutional framing is in many respects still in use and no
other actor but the central government has the legitimate power to govern society through the
different policy instrument. There is likely no other actor equally suited to coordinate
knowledge production in collaboration between public and private actors at different levels of
society.
When it comes to collaboration in industry sectors, the Swedish PPI had already discovered
the advantages of pooling competence along with costs and risks within the sector in
connection to green technology development. The government strategy to support R&D
through a number of R&D programs and R&D directed funds, such as subsidies for prototype
and demonstration plants, however reinforced the rationale for the sector to continue in this
direction. This bigger picture of the Swedish energy policy and energy transition of the PPI
implies that rather than focusing on the impacts from individual policy instruments, such as
energy taxes, it should also be important with a more holistic understanding of the interplay
between different policies and impacts in the longer run, such as on technological
development. Large parts of today’s industry face a need for modernization and structural
rationalization, which is similar to the situation in the 1970s and 1980s. Still, there is need for
further qualitative studies on how different strategies/work methods, forms of collaboration
and policy instruments have influenced the conditions for energy savings/efficiency in other
20
industry sectors and countries over time. What influence has, for example, periods of lower
energy prices (e.g., in the 1990s) exerted on the industry's energy efficiency efforts and
organization?
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