MAJOR GENERAL FRANKLIN “BUSTER” HAGENBECK
COMMANDER, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN
Are you satisfied with the arrangement of Task Force Mountain, which has brought together
elements from multiple units and countries?
Are you content with the fire support at your disposal?
What is your opinion of the separate chain of command of Task Force 11?
Major General (MG) Franklin “Buster” Hagenbeck was the Commanding General of the
10th Mountain Division during Operation Anaconda. As head of Combined Joint Task Force
Mountain, formed around the 10th Mountain Division, MG Hagenbeck commanded all ground
forces in the operation, with the exception of those under Task Force 11 and the CIA.
BACKGROUND
Born in Morocco to a U.S. Navy family, Franklin L. Hagenbeck spent much of his
childhood near Jacksonville, Fla.1 He entered the United States Military Academy at West Point
in 1967, at the height of the Vietnam War. A natural athlete, he played football at West Point.2
He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army in the spring of 1971 and was assigned
to the 25th Infantry Division, headquartered in Hawaii. Early in his career, Hagenbeck enrolled
in a Masters program at Florida State University and received a degree in exercise physiology in
Gregory Piatt, “Lieutenant general who grew up in Duval to lead West Point,” The Florida Times-Union, May 11,
2006; Sean Naylor, Not A Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York, NY: Berkley
Caliber Books, 2005): 11.
2
The Howitzer Year Book, 1971. Online: http://www.eyearbook.com/yearbooks/United_States_Military_Academy_West_Point_Howitzer_Yearbook/1971/Page_200.html,
as of January 28, 2012.
1
1978.3 Not surprisingly, given his athleticism and love of sports, he also served as an assistant
coach for the Seminoles football team during his graduate study.4
Over three decades, Hagenbeck held command at every level, from company to division.
Serving in the 25th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division,
and the 10th Mountain Division, he became a part of the Army’s airborne and light infantry
community—and his personal connections would serve him well in Afghanistan. He also held a
variety of staff positions during his military career, including two on the Joint Staff, first as the
Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate and
later as the Deputy Director for Current Operations.5 His Washington service made him known
and trusted among senior Pentagon leaders. Hagenbeck’s combat experience was limited to his
time with the 82nd Airborne Division in Grenada in 1983.6
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
In the fall of 2001, Hagenbeck assumed command of the 10th Mountain Division,
headquartered in snowy Fort Drum, NY. The course of his tenure with the 10th Mountain
changed dramatically after September 11, 2001, and the initiation of Operation Enduring
Freedom—the campaign to destroy al Qaeda and topple the Taliban in Afghanistan— on
October 7, 2001. In November 2001, the 10th Mountain Division headquarters deployed to
Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan. In Karshi-Khanabad, Hagenbeck would command the “forward”
headquarters—the headquarters closest to the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan— for all U.S.
and allied land units.
Hagenbeck would answer to Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, commander of the
land forces in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area, who had also relocated his
headquarters from Fort McPherson, Ga., to Camp Doha, Kuwait, to get closer to the action.
Mikolashek in turn reported to General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM’s overall commander.
Franks remained in CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa Bay, Fla. (For an overview of command
arrangements, see attached, “Chain of Command”)
At Karshi-Khanabad, Hagenbeck stood ready to provide the first conventional forces for
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.7 But he faced significant hurdles. Army officials
had selected his 10th Mountain to establish forward headquarters even though it was the most
undermanned, stressed, and stretched division headquarters in the Army, with significant
manpower already deployed elsewhere.8 The 101st Airborne Division, with no ongoing
deployments and the prized ability to conduct helicopter air assaults, would have been a more
natural and appropriate choice to deploy as the forward headquarters. But most of the 101st
Airborne was being held in reserve for possible operations in Iraq, leaving the 10th Mountain
Division to deploy to Uzbekistan.9 And CENTCOM placed stringent restrictions on the 10th
Gregory Piatt, “Lieutenant general who grew up in Duval to lead West Point.”
Gregory Piatt, “Lieutenant general who grew up in Duval to lead West Point.”
5
Official Biography, United States Military Academy at West Point.
6
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 11.
7
Ibid., 11.
8
Ibid., 86.
9
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 84-85.
3
4
Mountain headquarters, stating that only 50 to 60 troops were needed for the deployment.10
Knowing that a force this size was not enough to maintain a 24-hour operational tempo,
Hagenbeck negotiated a higher cap of 160 soldiers.11 Troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps and
Forces Command augmented the staff, particularly the intelligence section.12 When the 10th
Mountain Division headquarters arrived in Uzbekistan on December 1, more than a third of its
soldiers were strangers to Hagenbeck. But even though much of “Task Force Mountain” came
from disparate units, many of the officers and non-commissioned officers had served together in
the past.
Hagenbeck’s first weeks in Uzbekistan did not turn out as planned. While northern
Afghanistan had fallen more quickly than expected to the Northern Alliance—a collection of
hardened Afghan militias long opposed to Taliban rule— and U.S. Special Forces, conventional
forces stood by to participate in what most believed would be a long fight for Kabul and southern
Afghanistan. These areas also fell quickly, and by late December Hagenbeck again found
himself on the sidelines of a war that appeared to be largely over. As he later recalled, he was
“chomping at the bit to do something.”13 Increasingly frustrated at not getting to participate in
combat in Afghanistan, Hagenbeck ordered his staff to draw up concepts of operations that
would allow his unit to join the fight. Major Paul Wille, the division’s chief of plans, and Captain
Francesca Ziemba, the main intelligence planner, got to work.14 Despite having limited access to
current intelligence, Wille and Ziemba focused their efforts on the Shah-i-kot, a valley in eastern
Afghanistan near the Pakistani border, where there had been some reports of enemy activity.
Much of what they knew came from the CIA and Special Operations Forces teams that had
moved into the area. By the end of December, they presented a plan to Hagenbeck, who liked it
and sent it along to Mikolashek. After weeks passed with no response, Hagenbeck flew to
Kuwait in late January to present a second plan, this time for the headquarters’ return to Fort
Drum.15
PLANNING OPERATION ANACONDA
The combination of unconventional forces and Afghan militias had routed the Taliban
more quickly than expected, but al Qaeda fighters still remained a focus of operations. By early
January 2002, intelligence reports identified al Qaeda fighters assembling in villages of the Shahi-kot (“Place of Kings” in Pashto) Valley. The Shah-i-kot valley lies in the mountainous and
remote Paktia province along the border with Pakistan, roughly 80 miles southeast of Kabul.
U.S. officials were concerned that the enemy would flee over the border to Pakistan, as they had
a month before during the battle of Tora Bora—the famous fight during which U.S. air power,
special forces teams and local Afghan militias failed to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and
other high-profile al Qaeda leaders, allowing them to escape into Pakistan. Hagenbeck and his
staff had had a ringside seat for Tora Bora—Hagenbeck had even been asked to prepare a last10
Ibid., 86-87.
Ibid., 87.
12
Ibid., 87.
13
Ibid.,, 12.
14
Ibid., 12-13.
15
Ibid., 11-13.
11
minute plan for the operation but had quickly concluded that he lacked sufficient forces to do a
complete and timely job of surrounding bin Laden and his followers. CENTCOM had been
tracking the Shah-i-kot and began drafting a plan to target the remaining pocket of al Qaeda
fighters and prevent their escape into Pakistan. (For the Shah-i-kot’s regional location, see
attached map of Afghanistan)
The terrain of the Shah-i-kot Valley presented a difficult operating environment. The
Shah-i-kot is five miles long and two and a half miles wide.16 A high ridgeline four miles long,
one mile wide, and several thousand feet above the floor, forms the western side of the valley.17
This ridge is nicknamed “the Whale” because of its shape. The eastern ridgeline of the valley is
even steeper. Its highest point, known as Takur Ghar, is 10,469 feet, or about 5,000 feet above
the valley floor.18 A narrow ridgeline called “the Finger” protrudes into the southern end of the
valley.19 The floor of the valley is habitable; a couple of hundred Afghans lived there in each of
four small villages—Marzak, Babulkhel, Serkhankhel and Zerki Kale.20 The mountains are
riddled with caves, which offered ideal hiding spots for enemy fighters. Whoever controlled the
decisive terrain along the ridgelines, specifically those on the Whale, the Finger, and the eastern
ridge, had an important advantage.21 (For an overview of the Shah-i-kot’s terrain and villages,
see attached map, “Shah-i-kot Valley”)
Initial intelligence estimates of the enemy presence varied widely, ranging from 100 to
1,000 fighters.22 Although large numbers of Taliban fighters had surrendered in the early months
of Operation Enduring Freedom, those who remained in the Shah-i-kot were believed to be
hardened al Qaeda veterans. Most were foreigners—Uzbeks and Arabs—but a handful were
Afghans.23 Over time, a consensus emerged that there were between 150 and 250 enemy fighters
in the valley, along with about 800 civilians.24 Intelligence assessments suggested that the
fighters were concentrated in the valley near Serkhankhel, with some positions on the nearby
mountains for observation.25 Nearly all the intelligence agencies believed that the enemy would
not put up a fierce resistance—that al Qaeda fighters would fight only long enough for their
senior leaders to escape and would then surrender, as they had at Tora Bora.26 As Hagenbeck
would later note, the rough terrain and weather made it difficult to generate a clear intelligence
picture.27 The lack of local assets in the Shah-i-kot—as well as fears about tipping off the enemy
by using low-flying surveillance aircraft, such as Predators— made intelligence gathering more
difficult still.
16
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 43.
Ibid., 43-44.
18
Ibid., 43-44.
19
Ibid., 43.
20
Ibid., 44.
21
Ibid., 106.
22
Ibid., 46.
23
Ibid., 46, 118-119.
24
Ibid., 118-119.
25
Ibid., 119.
26
Ibid., 120-121.
27
“Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda, an interview with MG Franklin L. Hagenbeck,” Field
Artillery Magazine, September-October 2002, 6.
17
The Special Forces of Task Force Dagger, under the command of Colonel John
Mulholland, did the initial planning for the operation. Under their plan, the operation was to rely
on unconventional and Afghan forces backed by U.S. air power. As in previous operations in
northern Afghanistan, Afghan Military Forces, this time led by Zia Lodin, would mount the main
attack.28 The experience at Tora Bora, however, had shown how important it was to have
significant blocking forces to seal off any potential enemy retreat. Mulholland, appreciating that
his Green Berets and their Afghan allies were not up to the task, agreed with Hagenbeck that
conventional forces could be used for the first time in the conflict. Hagenbeck, however, had
only a single 10th Mountain battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Paul LaCamera’s 1st Battalion, 87th
Regiment, which had been used to guard the air bases in Uzbekistan and then in Afghanistan.
Senior Army officials added two battalions from the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division,
called the “Rakkasans” (“falling umbrella” in Japanese) since their service in the occupation of
Japan following World War Two—where they were the first foreign force in more than 2,000
years to enter Japan— and led by Colonel Frank Wiercinski.29 All three battalions would be
grouped under Task Force Rakkasan. The Rakkasans were also given a small detachment of CH47 “Chinook” helicopters for transport and AH-64 “Apache” attack helicopters as fire support.
But they were forced to do without their normal and most reliable form of firepower, their
portable 105mm howitzers. Franks and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were worried
about the size of the U.S. “footprint” in the region and remembered how indiscriminately the
Soviet army had used artillery.
Hagenbeck’s staff took over the planning on February 14, although CENTCOM did not
make the move official for another week.30 By that time, the operational plan was already well
developed. Hagenbeck’s planners went to Afghanistan a few days ahead of the general and
worked with Task Force Dagger and Task Force Rakkasan planners to finalize the concept. After
some early friction, cooperation increased over time. Hagenbeck was briefed on the plan when
he arrived in Bagram air base north of Kabul on February 17. The operational concept (the
formal plan of attack) was largely consistent with Mulholland’s earlier vision, with
unconventional troops and Afghan forces leading the assault. Zia’s troops and two teams of
Special Forces known as Task Force Hammer would attack from the west, while troops from
Task Force Rakkasan would be airlifted in to block the escape routes out of the valley to the
south and east.31 (For an overview of the battle plan, see attached, “Anaconda Plan”)
D-Day for the operation was originally to be February 25, but after Mikolashek noted that
it fell during a religious holiday, it was moved to February 28. Once Mikolashek and Franks
approved the operational concept on February 17, planners from all the task forces worked
quickly to finalize the details.
The final operational concept closely resembled earlier plans. Task Force Hammer and
Zia’s 300 to 400 Afghan fighters would approach the Shah-i-kot from the west. Task Force
Rakkasan would be airlifted in via helicopter to occupy blocking positions to the south and east
to seal off the valley. In addition, a collection of Navy SEALs, U.S. Special Forces, and special
operations forces from allied countries would form an outer cordon along with other Afghan
28
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 46-48.
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 48.
30
Ibid., 87.
31
Ibid., 65, 93.
29
militiamen.32 Australian SAS (Special Air Service—the Australian equivalent of the U.S.’s Delta
Force) troopers would establish positions south of the valley to keep watch. If they spotted any
of the top three high-value targets (Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mullah
Mohammed Omar), troops from Task Force 11 stationed at the Bagram air base north of Kabul
would launch a separate attack.33 Because fire support was to come from air assets, rather than
artillery, Hagenbeck, instead of having command over fire support for his units, would have to
ask the CENTCOM air component, under General Michael “Buzz” Moseley, for help. To do
that, Hagenbeck would have to go up the chain of command, through Mikolashek and Franks.
Moseley’s regional air command, which oversaw air missions in Afghanistan as well as ongoing
“no-fly zone” operations in Iraq and other activities in the CENTCOM region, was not involved
in the planning for Anaconda until a week before the operation was to commence, and Moseley
himself was not notified until two days before the operation. Air support in the Shah-i-kot was
expected to be limited; this miscalculation would cause significant challenges as the battle
unfolded. The operation was supposed to last roughly 72 hours total, after which point
Hagenbeck could decide whether to order further attacks on fleeing al Qaeda fighters.34
AD-HOCRACY: THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
A key principle of military doctrine is unity of command—a single commander
controlling all the forces involved in an operation. When this is not possible, commanders must
seek unity of effort. The command structure for Operation Anaconda did not allow for unity of
command, and the piecemeal organization complicated unity of effort. Hagenbeck’s staff called
the organizing principle of the force they were to command “ad-hocracy.”35
As head of what was officially dubbed Combined Joint Task Force Mountain, Hagenbeck
was given control over all ground forces in the operation, with the exception of those belonging
to Task Force 11 and the CIA. Gen. Franks retained control over Task Force 11, which was
composed of elite special operations units tasked with hunting al Qaeda’s most senior leadership,
on the grounds that the covert nature of the work prevented it from falling under the control of a
conventional commander.36 Task Force Mountain had operational control of Task Force
Rakkasan, consisting of 1st Battalion, 87th Regiment (assigned to the task force from the 10th
Mountain Division), 1st Battalion, 187th Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 187th Regiment, and a jumble of
helicopters from different units.
Personal relationships helped generate some cohesion in the command structure. For
example, Hagenbeck and Wiercinski had previously worked together in the 101st Airborne
Division, the former as assistant division commander and the latter as director of operations.37
Many of the officers in the chain of command had also spent time in the Ranger Regiment, and
therefore shared similar training, values, and experience. Having not been allowed to deploy with
32
Ibid., 118.
Ibid., 118.
34
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 118; Rebecca Grant, “The Echoes of Anaconda,” Air Force Magazine, April
2005, 46-52.
35
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 89.
36
Ibid., 92.
37
Ibid., 89-90.
33
his two assistant division commanders, Hagenbeck appointed two other generals to serve as his
deputies: Brigadier General Gary Harrell and Brigadier General Mike Jones, both experienced
Special Forces officers who were known to many at Bagram.38 This move gave Hagenbeck
useful liaisons with Task Force 11 and the CIA, the units over which he had no command
authority.
In an effort to reduce friction between the separate chains of command and to advance
situational awareness, one officer from Task Force Mountain was allowed access to Task Force
11’s operations center. As important, an officer from the Advance Force Operations unit
(AFO)—a special operations unit that had been tasked with conducting high-risk reconnaissance
missions in the area—was also assigned to liaise with Task Force 11.
AFO had been operating near the Shah-i-kot under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Peter Blaber, and maintained a permanent presence in the Task Force Mountain operations
center.39 This allowed Blaber to share intelligence with Hagenbeck and ensure that Task Force
Mountain knew of the AFO’s positions.40 Even though Blaber was not at Bagram but at the town
of Gardez – where the CIA maintained a “safe house” that essentially served as a forward
command post – Blaber and Hagenbeck developed a close working relationship that helped
mitigate the challenges of the command structure.41
OPERATION ANACONDA UNFOLDS
As the operation unfolded, Hagenbeck faced a series of difficult decisions. On the first
day of the operation, which was delayed until March 2 because of bad weather, Task Force
Hammer, the Afghan militia under Zia Lodin and their U.S. Special Forces advisors, came under
heavy mortar fire. Without much of the expected air support, their advance was delayed and the
attack ultimately stalled. But the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Division troops were already
en route, and Hagenbeck needed to decide whether to continue with the mission or abort it.
Ultimately, wishing to maintain the element of surprise and believing that Hammer’s delay was
temporary, he chose to continue.42 Although U.S. helicopters successfully inserted half the
infantry forces into their planned “blocking positions,” bad weather had delayed the deployment
of the remaining troops. The troops quickly came under heavy fire from a well-armed enemy
who had taken up strong defensive positions along the ridgeline. Not only was the enemy force
much larger than had been anticipated, but it occupied the high ground and offered fierce
resistance instead of retreating. The lack of fire support was telling, and although a small number
of Apache attack helicopters and the daily allotment of Moseley’s aircraft fired on al Qaeda
positions, the enemy kept up a withering fire throughout the day.
Based in Bagram, a hundred miles from the fight, Hagenbeck had difficulty
communicating with the forces in the Shah-i-kot. Two hours into the fight, he was finally able to
connect with Task Force Rakkasan commander Wiercinski, whose position on the Finger gave
him a good view of the valley. Hagenbeck, hearing of the intensity of the enemy fire and
38
Ibid., 91.
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 92-93.
40
Ibid., 93.
41
Ibid., 142.
42
Ibid., 208-209.
39
understanding from Blaber’s scouts that there were no civilians present, ultimately asked that Air
Force and Navy jets “level” the village of Marzak.43
Throughout the first day of the operation, infantry forces faced intense fire. LaCamera’s
troops were hit especially hard as they sought cover in an area of the valley between the Finger
and the eastern ridge that became known as "Hell's Half-pipe." Fearing that fire from the enemy
holding hilltop positions would down a helicopter, Hagenbeck decided to delay sending choppers
to evacuate the wounded until after dark.44 He also indefinitely delayed sending in the remainder
of Wiercinski’s forces because of enemy fire at the landing zones.
At the end of the first day, Hagenbeck faced a crucial decision: whether to pull the 10th
Mountain and 101st Airborne units out of the valley or to reinforce them and continue the fight.45
After having taken heavy fire all day from light arms, mortars, heavy machine guns and even
artillery pieces, he was strongly tempted to withdraw, but, convinced in part by an appeal from
AFO commander Blaber, he ultimately decided to “reinforce success” and commit to the fight.
Hagenbeck ordered the remaining conventional forces into the northern end of the valley so that
they could maneuver south and, when darkness fell, extract the forces that had been pinned
down.46 This was a contentious decision opposed by a number of officers in the tactical
operations center.47 (For an overview of the conventional fight on 2 March, see attached,
“Anaconda Reality (March 2, 2002)”)
Ironically, Operation Anaconda would come to be known most for a fight that took place
after the main conventional effort and outside of Hagenbeck’s chain of command. The battle for
Takur Ghar, undertaken by Task Force 11, would result in three downed U.S. helicopters and
seven deaths, sparking major controversy in Washington. Task Force 11’s commander made the
decision to insert forces directly onto Takur Ghar without informing Hagenbeck. He also cut
Blaber out of the command chain. Hagenbeck didn’t learn of the unfolding Takur Ghar fight
until he was told of the first downed helicopter. Moreover, the desperate attempts to rescue and
save the small units trapped on the mountaintop had absorbed a substantial proportion of the air
cover available on March 4, which had complicating Hagenbeck’s plans. In the end, clearing the
Shah-i-kot would take another week. Conventional forces would discover a honeycomb of caves,
some fortified, some not, on the eastern ridge, and would spend the remainder of the operation
clearing them of al Qaeda forces. (For an overview of the events of March 4, when U.S.
conventional troops were still in the Shah-i-kot and a battle raged on Takur Ghar between U.S.
SEALs and Rangers and al Qaeda fighters, see attached map, “Anaconda Reality (March 4,
2002)”).
CONCLUSION
Because of a combination of factors—a well-armed and larger-than-expected enemy
force, rugged terrain, bad weather, and significant difficulty in communicating with and
coordinating among the various units on the ground, the air support, and the headquarters—what
was supposed to have been a three-day mission unfolded into a two-week operation. All told,
43
Ibid., 265.
Ibid., 253.
45
Ibid., 265-267.
46
Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 266-267.
47
Ibid., 267.
44
eight Americans died, including seven special operators of Task Force 11, who were killed on
the third day when their helicopter landed close to an enemy position (in an operation under a
separate chain of command and of which Hagenbeck was not notified).
In June 2002, shortly after his return from Afghanistan, Hagenbeck gave an interview to
Field Artillery magazine in which he questioned the effectiveness of the Air Force’s support fire
and defended the decisions he had made during the operation. Despite his controversial remarks,
he was promoted to lieutenant general and assumed the position of U.S. Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel.48 From 2006 to 2010, he served as the 57th superintendent of West Point
before retiring from the military.49
48
Official Biography, United States Military Academy at West Point.
Gregory Piatt, “Lieutenant general who grew up in Duval to lead West Point;” Official Biography, United States
Military Academy at West Point.
49