ANA CIMIC Manual (English Version)

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AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
(CIMIC) MANUAL
2014
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AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CIMIC MANUAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter I
THE AFGHAN STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF CIMIC
1.
The Conflict Environment of Countering Insurgents and Conducting Stability
Operations
2.
Strategic Environment
3.
Implications for the Military
4.
The Afghan CMI/ CIMIC Architecture and ANA’s Contribution to a Comprehensive
Approach
5.
Other Activities
Chapter II
AFGHAN CIMIC OPERATIONS
6.
Definition of CIMIC
7.
Application of CIMIC
8.
The Aim and Purpose of CIMIC
9.
The Core Functions of CIMIC
10.
CIMIC Tasks
11.
The Components of CIMIC
12.
Interactions with the Communications Disciplines
Chapter III
CIMIC PLANNING AND EXECUTION
13.
Principles of CIMIC
14.
CIMIC as a Joint Function
15.
CIMIC and Civil Assessments
16.
CIMIC in Planning
17.
CIMIC in Execution
18.
Resourcing and Financing CIMIC Activities
19.
Lessons Learned
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Chapter IV
CIVIL ACTORS
20.
General, Humanitarian Principles, and working with Civil Actors.
21.
ANP and the OCC-R / OCC-P System
22.
Governmental Organizations
23.
International Organizations
24.
Non-Governmental Organizations
25.
ICRC and Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
26.
United Nations Civil Society Sectors
27.
Summation and Key Challenges
Chapter V
CIMIC TRAINING
28.
Three Base CIMIC Training Courses and Higher Level Situation Awareness
Course
29.
Future Training Base and Training Plan for ANA
ACRONYMS
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INTRODUCTION
The ANA CIMIC Manual describes the objectives, roles, context, and functions of the
Afghan National Army in the conduct of Civil-Military Cooperation and its support to national
level Civil-Military Integration.
It is a comprehensive document explaining CIMIC. It functions as one of the two
primary CIMIC manuals for the ANA. Its companion manual is the Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for the Conduct of CIMIC and Nonlethal Operations (CIMIC TTP Guide), which is
designed as a how-to guide and a practical guide for the planning and conduct of various
aspects of CIMIC and other related nonlethal operations. The final addition to the two base
manuals is an appendix to the CIMIC TTP Guide which provides standardized forms and
procedures for ANA wide utilization.
Chapter I provides explanations for the strategic environment in which Afghan CIMIC
operates in. It describes the focus of CIMIC given the current complex environment, and
explains the overall strategic environmental factors that will always apply for CIMIC.
Chapter II highlights Afghan CIMIC operations. Explaining the purposes of CIMIC, it
describes CIMIC core functions and tasks, as well as factors impacting them. It briefly
describes the applicable structures, relationships, and components of CIMIC which are
utilized and applied.
Chapter III highlights CIMIC planning and execution. First it explains the considerations
for CIMIC planning and how it is integrated into joint planning. It further develops the role
and utilization of CIMIC assessments and how to utilize in order to improve the quality of
CIMIC planning and execution. CIMIC must also develop an effective ability to harness
lessons learned as described in the chapter.
Chapter IV introduces the wide variety of civil actors which are important in the conduct
of CIMIC. Important civil actors include the elements of Afghan governance, Afghan security
forces, and a host of non-governmental and international organizations.
Chapter V lays out the structure of CIMIC training and education of the force in the
ANA.
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Chapter I
THE AFGHAN STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF CIMIC
1.
The Conflict Environment of Countering Insurgents and Conducting Stability
Operations
a.
Afghanistan is facing a complex insurgency in which the anti-government forces
are mixed in with the population and are attacking and undermining the legitimate
government of Afghanistan, the ANSF, and the traditions and structures of the Afghan
people.
b.
While historically traditional combat between opposing forces continues to be
important, the most critical engagements of the current conflict are those that have an impact
on or succeed in achieving a long-term effect on the civil environment.
(1) The goals of the insurgency are to undermine the government of
Afghanistan, and to defeat any development that leads to greater unity of the people with
their elected government representatives.
(2) The goal of the ANSF is to protect the population in a way that enables
national development. ANSF operations must reinforce the freedom of the people, and the
opportunity for the people to develop based on the principle of self-determination that are
clearly laid out in the Preamble of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
(3) National development during conflict is extremely difficult, and it is affected
not only by the success of the ANSF in defeating the enemies of Afghanistan, but also by the
ability of GIRoA and ANSF to set the conditions for national and subnational unity, and for
progress in all areas of Afghan life.
c.
CIMIC is an important function of the Afghan National Army. The civil
environment which is a critical part of the complex conflict underway is made up of the
people of Afghanistan, its tribal and ethnic groups, its national governance and subnational
governance structures, and its plans for economic and infrastructure development.
d.
The operations of the ANA, including CIMIC operations, works closely with other
ANSF and non-security elements of GIRoA, to impact and influence the following in the civil
environment:
(1) Synchronization of security operations with civil objectives through the
application of CIMIC.
(2) Coordination and harnessing of all the resources of the people, of the
government, and of security forces to defend the freedom of the people and their national
development.
(3) Through Civil-Military Integration at the strategic level and CIMIC at
operational and tactical levels, manage, coordinate, and conduct all aspects of national
power to defeat the enemies of Afghanistan and secure peace for the people.
(4) Through CMI at the national level, set the conditions for national and
subnational progress in the areas of governance, economic, reconstruction, and
infrastructure development, and social and ethnic peace.
2.
Strategic Environment
a.
Afghanistan is administratively divided into 34 provinces, with each province
having its own capital and a provincial administration. The provinces are further divided into
about 374 smaller provincial districts, each of which normally covers a city or a number of
villages. Each district is represented by a district governor.
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b.
Afghanistan is a multiethnic society, and its historical status as a crossroads has
contributed significantly to its diverse ethnic makeup. The population of the country is divided
into a wide variety of ethno linguistic groups.
c.
The security of Afghanistan is challenged by a wide variety of risks, military as
well as non-military. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the country.
Some of these risks are caused by the following:
(1)
ethnic, political and religious rivalries,
(2)
territorial disputes,
(3)
disputes over vital resources,
(4)
inadequate or failed efforts at reform,
(5)
human rights abuses,
(6)
weak governance.
d.
The resulting tensions may lead to local and regional instability and create a wide
spectrum of consequences, ranging from the need to provide humanitarian assistance to
security operations.
e.
The evolving strategic environment. The strategic environment is becoming
increasingly dynamic and complex. There are a variety of factors that directly influence or
cause change, as well as discernable patterns in that change. There are also a handful of
key strategic drivers of change:
f.
(1)
globalization of society,
(2)
political,
(3)
demographic and environmental change and
(4)
the impact of technology.
These strategic drivers and have an impact on the military and political situation:
(1) Globalization. The process of globalization, including the free flow of
ideas, people, goods, services and capital, continues. Twenty-four hour news media will
continue to broadcast the realities of globalization to an ever-growing audience. Terrorists
and extremists use the media and information networks to foster unrest through targeted
information campaigns.
(2) Political. The technical and economic improvements in Afghanistan will
stimulate innovation by an adversary to achieve political objectives, including the
unconventional use of armed violence. Reaction to such threats must be coordinated across
all instruments of state power, which will necessitate close liaison between multilateral
networks and organizations.
(3) Demographic and environmental change. Poverty and inequitable
distribution of resources can lead to grievances, provoke extremists, and offer opportunities
for organized crime to threaten security. Poverty, hunger and disease in parts of Afghanistan
could contribute to threats to security. Poor governance and distribution of resources in areas
affected by demographic and environmental change will compound this problem.
Environmental disasters, increases in population migration, may lead to greater for
humanitarian assistance.
(4) Technology and military transformation. Changes in technology pose
new threats and new opportunities. Proliferation of technologies such as in information and
communications, and the miniaturization of explosives will be more accessible to others than
ever before. Greater access to technology by potential adversaries and non-state actors
could lead to different ways for direct and indirect attacks on Afghanistan.
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3.
Implications for the Military
a.
The complexity of the operating environment demands great skill from the ANA
against the enemies of Afghanistan. First and most important the ANA must protect the
civilian populace. Secondly the ANA must protect the developing structure of civil
government and civil society, while defending against enemy and criminal elements. Finally,
working closely with government and civil sector, the ANA must assist setting the stage for
national development.
b.
Evolving character of operations.
(1) ANA forces are being confronted simultaneously by groups and individuals
operating in unpredictable and innovative ways, and employing tactics with no regard for the
populace, Afghan law, international law, or accepted norms of morality.
(2) Those engaging in this irregular activity may exploit civilians in order to
promote their aims and maximize the impact of their actions. Conducting operations within
the framework of the so-called war amongst the people has significant implications for ANA
forces.
(3) Positive identification and engagement of opponents, particularly in urban
areas, are more difficult and heighten the risk of collateral damage. Furthermore, in complex
political and social contexts where the will of the indigenous population are critical to
success, there is a requirement to influence and shape perceptions through use of
information. The ANA needs a detailed understanding of the situation, its human context, and
the other agencies that could help to achieve a desired outcome.
(4) Intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination and sharing are critical to
anticipating, preventing, and containing threats within Afghanistan. A key element are the
law-enforcement agencies. Full understanding of the operational environment and a
proactive approach in the earliest stages of an emerging threat is required. Assessment will
support increased situational awareness and aid enhanced collaboration in rapidly evolving
situations. It requires the sharing of vital information between military and non-military actors.
Improvements in all aspects of the decision making cycle is necessary in order to shorten the
time for conducting effective action.
(5) Afghan forces operate to strengthen, uphold or restore peace and security,
to re-establish governance and authority, to assist in disaster relief, or to provide
humanitarian assistance. ANA forces are usually only one contributor. While working to
achieve the same goal, each organization may have different perspectives, priorities,
motivations, mandates, timeframes, cultures and processes. The groups involved are the
indigenous population with their formal and informal authorities, the news media,
International Organizations such as the UN, NGOs, local governance and national level
ministries and institutions.
4.
The Afghan CMI/ CIMIC Architecture and ANA’s Contribution to a Comprehensive
Approach
a.
Afghanistan must seek to influence these complex situations through a
comprehensive approach that includes cooperation among all the appropriate elements.
b.
Afghanistan’s experience in the current environment demands a comprehensive
approach including the coordinated action from civil and military actors, enabled by the
coordination and de-confliction of Afghanistan’s military and political organizations. This
requires a broad cooperation and planning approach based upon agreement by military and
GIRoA leaders. Engagement in a comprehensive approach to crisis management is focused
at three levels:
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Afghan CMI/CIMIC Architecture
c.
At the political and strategic level, Afghanistan concentrates on building
confidence and mutual understanding between international actors, Afghan security
ministries, Afghan non-security ministries, and the IDLG.
d.
At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate and coordinate between
operational headquarters, and other civil actors such as police, IDLG, and selected nonsecurity ministries, such as the MRRD, in order to conduct overall planning for complex
operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be required. This interaction
should be conducted within the framework of GFC’s Interagency Coordination Center, and
IDLG and MRRD for sub-national governance issues.
e.
At the tactical level, ANA force commanders at the ANA Corps and Brigade level
must be empowered to conduct effective cooperation and coordination with indigenous local,
district and provincial authorities, and police forces and line ministries representatives at
district and provincial level. This interaction should be conducted within the framework of
OCCR, OCC-P and OCC-D levels utilizing the coordination authority of IDLG for sub-national
governance issues. All three levels must function in a complementary manner to achieve
success.
f.
The ANA should focus on three methods to improve the comprehensive
approach at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels;
(1)
procedures.
Improving Afghanistan’s own crisis management cooperation and planning
(2) Improving Afghanistan's practical cooperation at all levels between military
and civilian partners. These include the United Nations and other relevant IOs, GOs, NGOs,
and local, district and provincial actors for the planning and conduct of operations.
(3) Enhancing Afghanistan's ability to bring military support to stabilization
operations and reconstruction efforts in all phases of military operations in concert with other
actors.
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g.
The success of crisis management and a comprehensive approach is dependent
on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding and collaboration, and
enough advanced planning, budgeting, and resourcing. Ideally there is advanced political
agreement on the desired outcome. A future desired outcome is likely to involve aspects
related to security, governance, and economic development. It may be necessary to look
ahead months rather than years and understand the long period of time required to achieve
some of the outcomes.
h.
Political agreement on a desired outcome is necessary for clarity on strategies
and objectives; however complete agreement between different actors may be difficult to
achieve. Instead it is better to develop a shared vision or unity of purposes for specific
objectives that can be agreed to. It also requires effective collaboration between military and
non-military actors, multiple institutions, agencies and organizations. Although the
implementation of a comprehensive approach may vary between levels of operation
(strategic, operational and tactical), and from one operation to another, a number of guiding
principles apply:
(1) Proactive engagement between all actors, before, during, and after an
operation is required.
(2) Shared understanding gained through regular, routine cooperation,
collaboration, working relationships, liaison, and education.
(3) Understanding the value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust
and a willingness to cooperate - institutional familiarity and information sharing are key.
(4) Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a
common goal (or outcome), and ideally on mutually agreed objectives, even when other
objectives exist among different organizations.
i.
From a military perspective, a comprehensive approach is founded on not only a
shared situational understanding, but also recognition that sometimes non-military actors
may support the military and conversely on other occasions the military's role will be
supporting those actors. Recent ANA operations suggest that these elements are interdependent. A military plan is most likely to succeed (in making a significant contribution to
the desired outcome) when it is nested within a comprehensive response, itself based upon a
shared understanding of the problem and a universal commitment to resolve it.
j.
Unity of command may be elusive and, realistically, only unity of purpose can be
achieved. In this case only through negotiation will commanders and other actors be able to
confirm responsibilities, resolve differences, facilitate coordination and create unity of effort
across a diverse multi-agency 'coalition'. Having terms of reference, memorandums of
understanding or agreements at a high level, provide some framework for coordination.
Implementing a comprehensive approach requires sensitivity, rapport, respect, trust,
patience and tact, as well as determination to collaborate with all actors, military and civilian,
at all levels.
k.
The role of military force in achieving the desired outcome must be very carefully
considered, and must be understood by those directing the strategy. If the successful use of
force leads directly to the achievement of the desired outcome, then it can be said to be
decisive. But if the military contribution simply enables, or supports, the achievement of the
desired outcome by others, then it is not the decisive factor. In the case of the latter, it is
important to include from the outset those elements - political, civil, organizational, and
economic - that are to be enabled by military operations and support.
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5.
Other Activities
ANA forces are likely to be required to support a broad range of activities:
a.
Interim governance. The respective district and provincial authorities, along with
police forces, are responsible for governance. Where instability develops in ungoverned
space, or an existing provincial or district government has insufficient authority, then an ANA
lead security operation may be needed to support some form of interim governance. The key
will be to build authority, restore order, encourage respect for due political process, and then
hand over to the indigenous authority as soon as possible. The precise form and function of
governance institutions and the extent of any military contribution will be determined at
Afghanistan’s political level. In a comprehensive approach, the Chief of the General Staff (as
the military-strategic commander) will provide his operational level commander with direction
on interim governance (including relevant objectives and the military contribution to them),
agreed to by the President and National Security Council, and where applicable by other
relevant institutions (such as IDLG).
b.
Restoration of essential services. In the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic
incident or natural disaster, or a military operation, civil agencies may be unable to act
quickly or operate with sufficient safety. The reconstitution of critical infrastructure and the
restoration of essential services may fall to the military within the means available. The aim is
likely to be two-fold:
(1)
to provide support to those in need, and
(2)
to cement the support of the civil population.
c.
Services deemed essential will depend on the situation and the needs of the
people. They may include the protection and/or restoration of medical care, the reestablishment of transportation systems, and the provision of potable water, and other
utilities. As the security situation becomes more benign, non-military organizations should
reassume responsibility for reconstruction. Even in these cases, it is far better to have preplanned relationships with the civil ministries that have the responsibilities for infrastructure
and emergencies.
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Chapter II
AFGHAN CIMIC OPERATIONS
6.
Definition of CIMIC. The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission,
between the ANA Commanders on all levels and civil actors, including local population and
local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental organizations and
agencies.
7.
Application of CIMIC.
a.
CIMIC staffs are fully integrated into their respective HQ, have full vision of and
are authorized to coordinate CIMIC activities and projects in the AO.
b.
CIMIC activities form an integral part of the ANA commander’s plan, contributes
to his mission and is related to implementing the overall strategy and achieving a stable and
sustainable end state.
c.
ANA will seek to accommodate and support the activities of civil actors in
achieving the agreed, shared end state.
d.
CIMIC activities, as projects or other development activities are conducted with
the purpose of transitioning responsibilities to the appropriate civil organizations or local
authorities in a timely manner.
8.
The Aim and Purpose of CIMIC.
a.
The aim and purpose of CIMIC is the interaction between military and civil actors
within a comprehensive environment to support the military commander’s plan. Ideally, all
actors will work to a common objective, but where this is not possible; this interaction will
ensure that activities to support each plan are harmonized as far as possible. This will
minimize interference or unintended conflict between all actors. This interaction might consist
of, but is not limited to, coordination, cooperation, mutual support, coherent joint planning
and information exchange, and covering the political mandate. It includes ANA, sub-national
and national governance, and civil actors.
b.
Background. CIMIC is applicable to all types of ANSF operations. In all
conceivable scenarios, commanders are increasingly required to take into account political,
social, economic, cultural, religious, environmental, and humanitarian factors when planning
and conducting their operations (See Figure 2-1). Furthermore, commanders recognize that
operational areas contain the presence of a large number of civil actors with their own
mandate, aims, methods, principles, structures, roles and perspectives, that might have
implications for operations and vice versa. The context and profile of CIMIC will alter
according to the nature of the crisis or operation.
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Figure 2-1: CIMIC factors on all Afghan missions.
c.
The three essential aspects of a CIMIC comprehensive approach are identified:
(1)
instruments.
Improving the application of Afghanistan’s own crisis management
(2) Improving Afghanistan’s practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the
UN and other relevant international organizations, NGOs and local actors in the planning and
conduct of operations.
(3) Enhancing Afghanistan’s ability to bring military support to stabilization
activities and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a conflict.
d.
Operations governed by mainly combat to achieve operational objectives might
contain a different CIMIC interaction compared to stabilization operations or disaster relief
operations. The nature and core functions of CIMIC remain the same. A broader spectrum
of CIMIC might be found in stabilization operations.
(1) CIMIC support to tactical operations is a critical part of ANA CIMIC. It
requires deliberate and planned interaction by the ANA with civil actors, local governance,
and the populace.
(2) The ANA will analyze the civil aspects of a tactical operation, and
coordinate with the civil sector all that is required to achieve security objectives. Identifying
and executing necessary tasks in support of security operations is a critical ANA CIMIC
responsibility.
e.
Relationships with civil actors: ANA will usually seek to conduct operations in
conjunction with civil actors where the level of interaction will range from non-cooperation, to
coexistence, to full cooperation. Some of the conditions for military success can be achieved
by harmonizing the military commander’s aims and methods with those of the civil actors. In
a complex operation involving major civilian elements, the military campaign plan or OPLAN
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is only one of the various plans. This also includes utilizing concerted and integrated
planning mechanisms at the strategic level. CIMIC is one of the commander’s tools for
establishing, maintaining and expanding these relationships. Challenges will be enhanced by
the presence of the media and the expectations of both the international and local
communities, especially, but not limited to hostile environments or high-intensity missions. In
these situations, CIMIC will mitigate against undesired outcomes. Civil Actors are further
discussed in Chapter IV.
9.
The Core Functions of CIMIC.
Figure 2-2: Core Functions of CIMIC.
a.
Civil-Military Liaison. Establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at
appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonization, information sharing, concerted or
integrated planning and conduct of operations. This includes:
(1)
Timely identification of relevant actors.
(2)
Development of a liaison structure (formal and frequently updated).
(3)
Organization of CIMIC information.
b.
Support to the Force. Commanders, depending on the circumstances, will
require significant support from within their AOR as well as coordination of effort to minimize
disruption to military operations. For that reason, CIMIC is proactive by contributing to
operations planning and participating in operations. This includes, in cooperation with other
military functions:
(1)
Tactical support to military operations
(a) CIMIC supports military operations by shaping, planning and
coordinating interactions with the civil environment.
(b) CIMIC and related noncombat elements coordinate between the
military, the civil population, civil leaders, and civil organizations in order to influence,
conduct activities, and achieve objectives.
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(c) CIMIC coordinates for the utilization of civil resources, to support
military and local civil objectives.
(d) CIMIC is often very effective in assisting civilian assets and civilian
organizations to coordinate in difficult environments.
(2)
Civil Situation Awareness
(a)
Provision of information on the civil situation to military forces.
(b)
When required, provide assessment to the civil situation picture.
(c) Identify civil key indicators and sensitive factors having critical
impacts on the conduct of operations; as well assessment of the impact of the military
situation on the civil environment.
(d)
Recommend military activities to mitigate the impact on the civil
environment.
(3)
Promote force acceptance of the ANSF.
(4)
Contribute to influencing the civil society in the AOR.
(5) The conduct of CIMIC activities may include small-scale CIMIC projects.
This capability requires advanced planning and receipt of approval during annual budget
planning and resourcing.
(a) Quick-impact projects use small amounts of funds that are combined
with local labor and resources to achieve an important need in local communities.
(b) Larger projects require professional management, advanced planning
and budgeting, and will require utilizing organizations that have the necessary technical
capabilities.
(c) Some funds and resources are for compensatory activities, such as
compensating for the impact of military activities on civilians, and are used in accordance
with established laws and policies.
(6)
Facilitate access to civilian resources, when needed.
c.
Support to Civil Actors and Their Environment. Within a comprehensive
approach, military support to civil actors and their environment will generally only be
conducted if required to create conditions supportive for the accomplishment of the military
mission. They may include a wide spectrum of resources such as information, personnel,
material, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. Enabling this
is a role of CIMIC and it may be executed by all elements of the military. The preferred
approach to providing support is in the following order:
10.
(1)
First - Enabling support by means of capacity building.
(2)
Second - Support by means of capacity sharing.
(3)
Third - Support by military means only (as a last resort).
CIMIC Tasks.
a.
CIMIC is to interact with the appropriate civil actors on behalf of the respective
ANA commander to accomplish the mission. This is always the main task of CIMIC during
any and all phases of operations.
b.
CIMIC has important tasks in all phases of combat and counterinsurgency
operations, whether it be Before-During-After, or Clear-Build-Hold.
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BUILD
SHAPE








Liaison to the local
population
Assess and develop a
common civil situation picture
for ANA commanders and
staff to understand.
Identify civil situations that
may impact the military
mission and achievement of
objectives.
Plan, coordinate, and get the
resources necessary for
CIMIC support to operations.
Plan the logistics of
Humanitarian Assistance.
Support overall unit planning
Plan and coordinate the civil
support for all phases of the
operation, to include
Develop and plan risk
mitigation for potential Build
and Hold mission problems







Identify the civil situation’s
impact on ongoing military
missions
Develop risk mitigation
measures (emergency
response)
Conduct engagements in
order to gain support for
ongoing operations
Engage with local leaders in
order to get their support for
military objectives with local
population and local
governance
Conduct actions and
engagements to enhance
trust between local
populations and ANSF
Meet with local leaders and
non-security ministries
necessary to set the stage
for “Hold” operations
Deliver Humanitarian
Assistance or other
nonlethal assistance
HOLD







Support local population
needs
Support GIRoA in identifying
and coordinating for longterm development
Assist in GIRoA’s
relationship with local area
as part of development
Conduct battle damage
assessment and provide for
or coordinate support for
victims
Update assessments in
order to understand, and to
inform on the civil situations.
Conduct follow-on
relationship-building in
areas in which your unit will
have a long period of
operations
Prepare lessons learned
and update planning for next
year’s operational planning
Figure 2-3: Typical tasks during the phases of Clear, Build, Hold operations.
c.
In accomplishing those tasks CIMIC staff will:
(1) Establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at the appropriate levels,
facilitating cooperation, harmonization, information sharing, integrated planning and conduct
of operations.
(2) Identify and explain military goals, objectives, and concepts of operation as
necessary to selected civil actors, while keeping within appropriate OPSEC and classified
material release guidance.
(3) Facilitate concurrent, parallel, and where possible integrated planning
between the ANA, ANP, NDS, and friendly civil actors.
(4)
Integrate with other staff branches on all aspects of operations.
(5) Continuously evaluate the operational environment, including local needs
and capability gaps to determine requirements and to resolve issues.
(6) Work towards a timely and smooth transition of responsibilities to the
proper civil authorities.
(7)
Advise the commander on all of the above.
(8)
Share information with all staff branches.
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11. The Components of CIMIC. Because CIMIC is so diverse, there are many
components to CIMIC.
a.
General. In order to achieve all of the above, Afghanistan needs a dedicated
CIMIC capability. This capability exists when the following five components are in place:
(1) Awareness and acceptance. An awareness and acceptance at all levels,
especially by middle and high level decision makers (to include General Staff, Ministry of
Defense and other line ministries) is crucial for a robust and sustainable national CIMIC
function.
(2)
A doctrinal hierarchy comprising policies, manuals, and SOPs.
(3) The understanding, will and ability to utilize the core functions and
principles, and the supporting manuals and CIMIC training courses.
(4) Selected, trained and competent CIMIC personnel capable of operating in
joint and interagency environments.
(5)
Trained CIMIC personnel in assigned tashkil positions.
(6)
Appropriate logistic support of infrastructures to ensure operability.
b.
The conceptual. The conceptual aspects of CIMIC encompass policy, doctrine,
planning, and procedures throughout Afghan commands and include the supervision and
coordination of CIMIC during training and operations.
c.
Training, education, exercises, operations, and general awareness. The training
aspects of the CIMIC capability covers, but is not limited to, courses, presentations,
conferences, and seminars as well as the lessons learned process. Most important is the full
integration of CIMIC in ANA exercises therefore making it a routine part of operational
conduct.
d.
Physical resources. The physical aspect of CIMIC capability comprises the
resources the commander allocates to the conduct of CIMIC, and its related activities in a
given situation. Because situations differ, the composition of CIMIC assets cannot be
prescriptive. However, CIMIC staff must populate all HQ levels. Their role is to advise the
commander, participate in joint planning to prepare and develop the CIMIC assessment and
the CIMIC lines of activity in support of the commander’s plan, while also conducting liaison.
As a result, ANA units may be tasked to assist and contribute to CIMIC activities.
e.
Role of CIMIC projects and ANA involvement in managing resources applied to
civil objectives. The primary authorities responsible for civil objectives in Afghanistan are the
non-security institutions (NSI), whose responsibilities are proscribed in law and the
constitution. Only in special cases, should ANSF be involved in CIMIC projects or providing
funding for civil objectives.
(1) Fiscal planning. CIMIC projects and other CIMIC activities in need of a
budget require detailed fiscal planning prior to execution. Such activities must fit under
guidance from national authorities. These activities are only available through long-term
planning executed within the cycle of budget planning (usually at least six months in
advance).
(a) QIPs may be useful for meeting objectives during tactical operations.
However, the ANSF must go through the (annual) budgeting process in order to have this
capability and funding and resources available.
(b) Since long-term projects almost always require sustained
involvement, coordinating with civil organizations, GO, IGO, and NGOs is the most efficient
way of supporting the accomplishment of the civil objective.
(2) If a CIMIC project or other CIMIC activities needs funding, then proper
budget planning, development and execution needs to occur through the processes and
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schedules as established by MoD as inputs into the MoF (National) budget. If a proposed
CIMIC project or other activity functionally aligns better with another organization (Budgetary
Unit) or Ministry such as a road project (MoPW) or a medical clinic (MoPH) then early,
frequent, and sustained communications and coordination needs to occur with the applicable
organization.
12.
Interactions with the Communications Disciplines.
a.
Since one of CIMIC’s main functions is its interactions with the civil environment
in order to achieve military and civil objectives, CIMIC operators must master and implement
the use of the Communications Disciplines.
b.
In every case, the use of the Communications Disciplines are more effective
when they are synchronized together and combined with other sections and other
organizations, in a deliberate and planned manner.
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*** NOTE ***
Following diagrams will be needed for translation purposes only, not for English version of
the manual.
CORE FUNCTIONS
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Support to civil actors
and their environment
Support to the Force
Civil-Military Liaison
AFGHAN CIMIC
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Chapter III
CIMIC PLANNING AND EXECUTION
13.
Principles of CIMIC.
a.
Understanding the operational context. Military operations in Afghanistan take
place within a wide political, cultural, and civil context, and commanders are required to take
account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian
factors when planning and conducting operations. CIMIC operators must assess how these
factors impact current and planned
operations.
Principles of CIMIC.
(1) Understanding operational context.
 Cultural Context.
 Assess Operational Environment
(2) Understand the aims and objectives
of the military and civil actors.
 Unity of effort.
 Synchronize effects
 Pursue Common Goals
(3) Operate within the Law
 Fulfill legal obligations
 Be humanitarian aware
(4) Gain respect and trust.



Interaction
Transparency
Legality
(5) Civilian Primacy and Ownership


Reduce dependency
Plan for transition to civilian
ownership
(6) Effective Communications

Strategic Communications
(7) Integrated Planning



Prioritization
Synchronization
Resource Management
b.
Understand the aims and objectives
of the military and civil actors. Military
success alone is not enough and operations
must be coordinated with civilian actors and
synchronized with civil objectives. CIMIC
requires understanding who the civil actors
are, and assessing their involvement.
Military and CIMIC personnel must actively
seek to coordinate with civil elements, and
work to develop cooperation, unity of effort,
synchronized effects, and common goals.
c.
Operate within the law. Fulfilling legal
requirements and following the laws are
important for the reputation of the ANSF and
their relationship with civil society. ANSF
commanders must understand what the
humanitarian effects of their operations are,
and always consider them during planning
and conduct of operations. Additionally,
knowing the local populace and local leaders
is important in understanding what is
considered acceptable by the populace
during military operations.
d.
Gain respect and trust. Respect and
trust between military and civil partners do
not come automatically. These attributes
are achieved by sustaining relationships and
active coordination and communications
over a long period of time, in ways that
reflect transparency concerning actions and
objectives, and respect the laws. Successful
respect and trust developed with the
population will undermine enemy efforts to
influence the population and civil groups.
e.
Civilian Primacy and Ownership. It must be remembered that the military
should not have primacy concerning civilian responsibilities. The undertaking of tasks and
activities in the civil environment to generate a ‘feel good’ factor can create unbalanced
perceptions, both local and national, of the military mission. It may also lead to long-term
dependency on military resources, rendering both military disengagement and follow on
civilian activity more difficult. It is important to develop a culture of ownership and ‘self help’
within the local population. For these reasons, when the military is directed to perform in
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place of civil actors, it is important to pre-plan the transition to civil control as early as
possible.
f.
Effective Communications. Developing and maintaining effect strategic
communications is an important part of implementing the principles of CIMIC. Military
commands must assess the civil and security organizations they interact with, and plan and
implement regular liaison and communications. Communications will be adjusted for
different organizations, such as civil society, GOs, NGOs, and IOs. This will limit
misunderstandings from affecting the mission.
g.
Integrated Planning. All the principles of CIMIC listed above are synchronized
as part of an integrated planning effort. Priorities must be agreed upon and they must guide
the planning and execution of joint actions. Effective synchronization is necessary to deconflict the objectives of different civil and military organizations. Synchronization with the
civilian environment and CIMIC integration into routine military planning cannot be a one-time
only thing, it must become routine in order to sustain its effects. Military units must be used
to integrating CIMIC into their operations. As part of joint planning with other ANSF and civil
organizations, managing and collaborating on the use of limited resources is another
important planning consideration. For CIMIC to have long-term effects, integrated planning
must be built into short-term and long-term plans.
14.
CIMIC as a Joint Function.
a.
CIMIC is an integral part of military operations, spanning from responding to
humanitarian emergencies to the conduct of armed conflict. Through CIMIC the commander
will rely on their links with civil actors. CIMIC’s contribution, functions and disciplines are
crucial to maximizing the impact of military operations.
b.
Examples include but are not limited to:
(1) Joint Planning. Collaborative planning with civil and military partners
increases the chances of successfully meeting objectives.
(2) Joint Targeting. CIMIC works collaboratively with partners to identify civil
objectives and civil targets, and strategies and joint actions in order to influence and impact
them to achieve desired results. Joint targets can be as diverse as soft targets, such as
influencing people and organizations, or it can be hard targets such as critical infrastructure.
(3) Joint Assessment. Allows for updated information of the civil operational
environment and has the benefit of including the opinions of civil partners.
(4) Civil Information. Recording and reporting of ANA, ANP or enemy caused
battle damage to respective civil administration counter-parts.
(5) Information Operations (IO) and CIMIC work together to influence the right
target audience.
(6) Continuous information and knowledge acquisition though liaisons with civil
partners improves understanding of the civil situation.
Public Affairs supported by CIMIC contacts.
15.
CIMIC and Civil Assessments.
a.
Role. Situational awareness is a vital element for mission success. It may rely on
CIMIC contribution in the form of detailed and accurate assessments of the civil environment.
These assessments will provide a picture of the civil situation to enable all command levels in
the ANA to understand the situation and better inform future decisions with coherent
planning.
b.
Types of Assessments. Provincial and district civil situation assessments based
on the methods shown below:
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(1)
SWEAT-MSO (see Figure 3-1)
(2)
ASCOPE(see Figure 3-2)
(3)
PMESII (see Figure 3-2)
Figure 3-1: SWEAT-MSO Assessment Model.
POLITICAL
MILITARY
ECONOMIC
,
AREAS
,
INFRASTRUCTURE
SOCIAL
,
,
,
,
,
INFORMATION
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
STRUCTURES
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
CAPABILITIES
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
.
,
ORGANIZATIONS
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
PEOPLE
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
EVENTS
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
Figure 3-2: ASCOPE / PMESII Assessment Model.
c.
Other types of assessment are conducted on Provincial, District or Village
Assessment worksheets, which track specific information for the specified areas.
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16. CIMIC in Planning. At the operational and at the tactical level, planning follows a
specific operational-level or tactical level planning process. It is essential that CIMIC
representatives are an integral part of the planning process and are members of the
operations planning staff.
a.
CIMIC staff activities and contribution to a MDMP include:
(1) In an operational appreciation and assessment process, the broad direction
CIMIC is determined as well as critical issues are to be identified. The relevant results are
documented in a CIMIC initial estimate. During the mission analysis process, the aim is to
ensure that all civil factors that have military implications are considered in the analysis. As
information is made available the CIMIC initial estimate is updated and regularly improved.
(2) During operational concept development, CIMIC contributes to operational
design and the description of decisive conditions, decisive points and operational objectives.
CIMIC evaluates the potential impact of operations on the civil environment in order to
recommend mitigation to the impact of military operations on populated areas.
(a)
CIMIC objectives and CIMIC personnel requirements are identified.
(b)
CIMIC contributes specific concerns to each course of action
development.
(c) Risks are identified to CIMIC objectives and CIMIC considerations
and incorporated into the overall joint risk management plan.
17.
CIMIC in Execution.
a.
CIMIC in execution must meet the mission end state and objectives. Therefore
CIMIC field work must contribute to creating, influencing and sustaining operational
objectives with the use of CIMIC principles. CIMIC remains valid across all operations, and
principles will remain the same even if the focus of an effort may change.
b.
Specific issues in the conduct of CIMIC execution:
(1) Projects. CIMIC personnel may occasionally be required to participate in
civil-military projects as part of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. However, for the ANA
this is a last resort, and the ANA should always seek civilian support and civil government to
conduct project. Since ANA capabilities to contribute to CIMIC projects is limited, it is crucial
for CIMIC personnel on each level to facilitate and encourage civil actors to contribute to
security operations with reconstruction projects; implementation or restoration of subnational governance; rule of law; public health access, and other essential services.
(2) CIMIC and intelligence. The work of CIMIC personnel at the tactical level
generates large amounts of information that when processed with other related information
may result in useful intelligence. CIMIC personnel have to be capable of assessing
information to be collected and distributed to higher echelons of the intelligence community.
(3) Civil emergency planning. The focus of civil emergency planning is the
protection of vulnerable communities against the effects of emergency situations (crisis,
violence or peacetime emergencies such as disasters), and systematic the coordination of
ANA and civil resources in support.
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18.
Resourcing and Financing CIMIC activities.
a.
Funding for projects is best obtained through close coordination and
communication with the NSMs. This requires participation in the annual budget process.
b.
Once a project is identified, the proper NSM needs to be identified and an initial
proposal present for NSM action. Keys details necessary for a successful proposal include
but are not limited to the following: benefits to the local community, impact to security,
proposed timeline, estimated costs, lists of potential stakeholders, political support from
PGOV/DGOV or other political or elected government bodies.
c.
Coordination should start at the lowest level of the NSM such as district or
provincial level and then elevate to the Ministerial level when appropriate support has been
gained. The ANSF need to be their own advocates for NSM funding.
19.
Lessons Learned.
a.
The implementation of an Afghan CMI/ CIMIC Policy, the success of its missions
and its transformation requires the continuous improvement of internal procedures,
interoperability and military effectiveness. The Lessons Learned process is an important tool
to assist commanders to achieve improvements, while recording and communicating best
practices.
b.
Lesson Learned including best practices, have to be captured and implemented
to improve CIMIC education, training, procedures (including TTPs/ SOPs), and doctrine
development. Therefore, the content of the LL process is to be shared with civil partners
whenever possible. Communications with all partners is the most important factor to
developing best practices on the military and civil side. Results of this process have to be
integrated into training, education, exercises and operational execution.
c.
Lessons Learned can improve organizational learning on the military as well as
the civil side. The learning process is dynamic. It creates a mindset to appreciate change.
This could lead to more capable structures and processes. This is especially valid for CIMIC
in transferring applicable civil procedures into the military.
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Chapter IV
CIVIL ACTORS
20.
General, Humanitarian Principles, and working with Civil Actors.
a.
A common feature to modern missions is the complex assortment of people and
groups beyond the military that are involved. In addition to the indigenous population and the
enemies of Afghanistan, there are media organizations, diplomats, IOs, GOs, and NGOs.
b.
Each group has its own set of principles which govern their work and conduct.
Although they may differ in organizational design, they are all founded on a main theme or an
area of expertise, ranging from humanitarian aid and reconstruction to political, economic,
and infrastructure development. Different approaches result in different agendas, structure,
organization and procedures. Understanding the motivation of other groups enables military
personnel to minimize friction when interacting with outside groups.
c.
UN affiliated IOs, NGOs, and GOs usually follow three principles: humanity,
neutrality and impartiality.
(1) Humanity. Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with
particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the
elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
(2) Neutrality. Assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or
taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
(3) Impartiality. Assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic
origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion/sect. Relief of the suffering must
be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
21.
ANP and the OCC-R / OCC-P System.
a.
Properly resourced and effectively coordinated civil police forces play an
important role in reaching a stable and secure environment in Afghanistan. The ANA and the
different ANP pillars vary in mission, task, capability, doctrine, procedures, and
understanding of humanitarian and development issues. Inter-ministerial coordination
between MoD and MoI primarily is conducted during the weekly G-3 Security Shuras. IDLG
and other non-security ministries should be encouraged to participate in these weekly
meetings. Inter-ministerial coordination is governed by the Afghan CMI/CIMIC Policy, which
sets the framework for CIMIC on the operational and tactical level. CIMIC staffs should
ensure that a close relationship is established and maintained.
b.
At operational levels there are many ANA and Afghan police organizations, which
interact through the OCC system and at the national ICC. The ICC functions as a national
joint information coordination center facilitating the ability of the ANA and ANP to develop an
Afghan COP. It plans, integrates, coordinates, and monitors security operations as well as
coordinate between ANSF and non-security ministries via IDLG representatives in the ICC.
c.
At the tactical level, OCC-Rs are responsible for the coordination of joint military
and civil response to developing situations in the AORs of the respective ANA Corps, ANP
Type A HQs, and ABP Zone HQs.
d.
The OCC-Ps have generally the same function as the OCC-Rs but also serve as
a location where provincial level military, police, and governmental representatives can share
information, fuse intelligence, request external support, and whose personnel can facilitate
the planning and execution of joint operations and the maintenance of a Civil COP. Liaison to
Provincial Governors, IDLG representatives, and provincial ministerial line department
representatives should be maintained in order to coordinate and synchronize efforts for a
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comprehensive approach.
horizontally.
22.
Information is to be shared on each level vertically and
Governmental Organizations.
a.
These include Afghan independent departments or ministries, Province and
District Governors, their offices and the Ministries’ line department representatives SNG:
PGOs, DGOs, and PLDs).
b.
These ministries should conduct strategic level participation in inter-ministerial
coordination. Key partners for SNG and CMI/CIMIC are:
IDLG
Independent Directorate of Local Governance – responsible for employing
and managing subnational governance employees
MRRD
Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development – responsible for
managing reconstruction and development programs
MoPW
Ministry of Public Works
MoF
Ministry of Finance
MoEc
Ministry of Economy
MAIL
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MoE
Ministry of Education
MoPH
Ministry of Public Health
IARCSC (or CSC)
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission –
manages merit based hiring for Afghan government.
c.
On the operational level, IDLG should serve as coordinator for NSI, and interact
with the ANA and MoD/MoI in order to coordinate the civilian contribution to a shape, clear,
hold, build strategy.
d.
On tactical levels, or for civilian counter-parts on the provincial level, PGOs and
the provincial line ministries representatives should contribute to coordination and
synchronization through the OCC-P system. At the same time PGOs and the provincial line
ministries representatives should maintain their vertical line of communication to IDLG’s
GovMIC and to their respective line ministries. On district level the same processes are
applicable. In addition, official security shuras, district administration meetings and/ or district
council meetings (where applicable) represent useful venues for CIMIC interaction.
23.
International Organizations.
a.
An IO is an intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by
international law and established by a group of states. By international agreement it has
enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing
common aims. Notable examples include organizations of the UN, EU, and trade
organizations such as the WTO, as well as others.
(1) Principles and values.
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(a) The different nature of IOs makes it difficult to generalize about their
characteristics. Clearly, a security focused body like NATO is fundamentally different to an IO
that serves a humanitarian or diplomatic agenda.
(b) International security organizations tend to have evolved characteristics
that mirror military hierarchical structures, while humanitarian international organizations are
more decentralized have fewer managers and more workers. The humanitarian bodies’
decision-making, financing, and resourcing procedures are highly devolved with individuals
operating with considerable autonomy. Rather than being appointment based, ‘authority’ is
derived from competence and negotiations where the impact of personal dynamics can be
very important.
(c) Coordination between humanitarian organizations is rarely ‘ordered’.
Instead, it tends to reflect a temporary accommodation based upon circumstances. However,
as the sophistication of the solutions fielded by security and humanitarian actors has
increased there is some convergence in the nature of those operating in the field. Both
sectors value characteristics such as: loyalty, integrity, initiative, humanity, leadership,
perseverance and intellect.
(d) Cross flow of personnel from the military into IOs has increased so that
many major IO country teams now contain ex-military staff. Despite this trend IOs maintain
distance between themselves and the military.
(2) Decision making process and hierarchies. IOs can suffer the same discontinuity in
perspective between the field and headquarters as happens in the military. This can increase
if communication becomes difficult, or the tempo of events exceeds their decision-making
capacity.
(3) National organizations for international assistance, such as the USAID or the
DFID are, depending on their specific area of expertise, dependent on their sponsoring
nations. They have expertise in good governance, health support, economic development,
infrastructure reconstruction and development, education, or political capacity building. Their
main focus varies from granting HA support to long term development projects.
24.
Non-Governmental Organizations.
a.
An NGO is a private, non-profit voluntary organization with no governmental or
intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities
whose primary purpose is either to design and implement development- related projects or
defend or promote a specific cause, and organized at local, national, regional or international
level.
b.
The UN formally recognizes certain private associations as a result of their
consultative status with the economic and social council. The UN collectively refers to these
associations as NGOs. In common usage, however, the term is applied to any private body
engaged in humanitarian or other charitable activities, whether or not they maintain UN
consultative status.
c.
In recent decades there has been an enormous increase in the number and scale
of NGOs. At one extreme the body may resemble a multinational corporation, with significant
budgets, international presence and considerable diplomatic leverage. At the other end of the
scale local NGOs may pursue a narrow agenda with a low budget and limited means.
d.
NGOs are often highly motivated, displaying a vocational drive and belief in the
causes championed by their donors. Increasingly, they are willing to concede that
coordination is necessary in pursuit of high-level aims. Caution over partiality and association
with a comprehensive approach remains a very real and understandable issue.
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e.
Military personnel must understand the necessity for NGOs to defer to the values
their donors expect them to be championing. This ‘donor sentiment’ demands that NGOs
seek effective solutions in the most pressing of circumstances.
(1) First and foremost NGOs are accountable to their beneficiaries ensuring
that the effects of their actions benefit those that they are trying to help.
(2) Secondly, NGOs are accountable to their benefactors, be they individuals
or national donors, ensuring that funds donated are spent effectively and appropriately.
(3) Finally NGOs are accountable to their trustees, thereby ensuring that their
actions remain true to their organization’s values.
f.
Experience has shown that an acceptable degree of complementary activity can
be achieved whilst adhering to the humanitarian principles that must guide NGO activity.
g.
Most NGOs are now signatories to the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’. This voluntary code lays
down principles of conduct for NGOs and describes how host governments, donor
governments and IOs should shape the working environment.
h.
It is important that military personnel understand these humanitarian principles
and their rationale. Most NGOs will operate within a territory using a recognizable and flat
command and control structure based upon a country director, supported by a small number
of deputies, and field personnel implement policies and deliver programs.
25.
ICRC and, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
a.
The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose
exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and
internal violence and to provide them with assistance. Its authority was formed through a
permanent mandate founded in international law; a worldwide mission to help victims of
conflicts.
b.
It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by ICRC
Movement organizations in situations of conflict and their aftermath. The ICRC has a unique
status as it fulfills a role conferred upon it by international treaties of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, to which virtually all countries in the world are party (and their Additional Protocols of
1977) and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted
by the state parties to the Geneva Conventions in 1986. ANA commanders at all levels
should be prepared to receive ICRC representatives at all times due to their special role in
armed conflict.
26.
United Nations Civil Society Sectors.
a.
In December 2005, the Inter Agency Standing Committee principals designated
global cluster leads for eleven sectors or areas of activity that in the past either lacked
predictable leadership in situations of humanitarian emergency, or were considered needing
strengthened leadership and partnership with other humanitarian actors. This complements
those sectors and categories of population where leadership and accountability are already
clear, e.g. agriculture (led by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN), food (led by
the World Food Program), refugees (led by UNHCR) and education (led by the UNICEF),
and others.
b.
The cluster leaders, together with their partners, provide the following types of
support to strengthen field response (see Figure 4-1):
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(1) Technical surge capacity (e.g. camp management and coordination staff,
early recovery advisors, logistics response teams, health emergency and assessment
response teams).
(2)
Trained experts to lead cluster coordination at the field level.
(3) Increased stockpiles, some pre-positioned within regions (e.g. emergency
shelter materials).
(4)
Standardized technical tools, including for information management.
(5) Agreement on common methods and formats for needs assessments,
monitoring, and benchmarking.
(6)
Best practices and lessons learned from field tests.
Agriculture
UN FAO
Camp coordination / management: - Conflictinduced Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
UNHCR
Natural disaster induced IDPs
UNHCR and IOM
Early recovery
UN Development Program – DP
Education
UNICEF; Save the Children – United Kingdom
Emergency shelter: - Disaster situations
IFRC
Conflict-induced IDPs
UNHCR
Emergency telecommunications: Process
UNOCHA
Emergency telecommunications: Data
UNICEF
Emergency telecommunications: Security
WFP
Health
WHO
Logistics
WFP
Nutrition
UNICEF
Protection
UNHCR
Water, sanitation and hygiene
UNICEF
Cross-cutting issues Age
Health: HelpAge International
Cross-cutting issues Environment
UNEP
Cross-cutting issues Gender
UNFPA, WHO
Cross-cutting issues HIV / AIDS
UNAIDS
Figure 4-1: Lead International Organizations by function.
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27.
Summation and Key Challenges
a.
The increasing proximity between military and humanitarian actors implies a need
for the two communities to find agreement on core issues of responsibility and competence.
This implies understanding exactly where these areas are. This could involve agreement that
militaries focus on providing assistance that humanitarian agencies cannot (such as security
and immediate humanitarian food, water, clothing and shelter in difficult areas), and that both
communities work together more effectively to define respective roles and objectives in the
protection of civilians.
b.
The increased engagement of the military in policy and “operational areas of
humanitarian concern” means that careful coordination with the civil sector is necessary,
understanding and respect for the rule of law is mandatory, and transition planning to normal
civilian control must be conducted from the start of operations.
c.
The field of language and terminology especially requires attention of both
military and civilian personnel. The different use of terms between military and civilians can
cause misunderstanding and create loss of efficiency. Awareness and communications
training will provide CIMIC personnel with the needed tools to avoid many difficulties in this
area.
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Chapter V
CIMIC TRAINING
28. Three Base CIMIC Training Courses and Higher Level Situation Awareness
Course.
A solid E&T program is a prerequisite for effective and efficient conduct of CIMIC staff
work and CIMIC activities. Basic E&T for all CIMIC personnel is essential in advance of all
CIMIC activities in theatre, regardless of the type of mission. CIMIC E&T should be tailored
to requirements. It is recommended to integrate CIMIC personnel with the other military
elements in the pre-operational phase to harmonize and synchronize their efforts. CIMIC
should therefore be integrated at both staff and force level training and exercises. In addition
to training dedicated CIMIC personnel, ANA commanders should include CIMIC training
modules for other military force elements that may be employed in direct support of CIMIC
activities. To achieve unity of effort, commanders have to support training with civil actors.
This underlines the common purpose, develops better division of responsibilities and creates
an understanding of respective capabilities and limitations. Without those having been
identified upfront there is no shared basis for E&T. Wherever applicable military and civil
actors should identify opportunities for collective training and exercises.
29.
Future Training Base and Training Plan for ANA.
a.
Basic Education and Training. The personnel employed in CIMIC have a varied
background of military expertise. Therefore basic E&T has to start at the lowest common
level of all CIMIC personnel. Civil expertise should contribute wherever applicable, either in
the teaching process or as a source of information. Recommended qualifications and
proficiencies for this training are:
(1) Language skills: capable of effective communications - speaking/ writing/
reading/ listening; giving briefings and writing reports.
(2)
Negotiation skills and ability to prepare and conduct meetings.
(3)
Information Technology and radio communication skills.
(4)
Displaying a diplomatic, transparent, and open minded attitude.
(5)
Proactive and able to provide advice and support to civil and military actors.
(6)
Culturally competent and respectful of gender equality.
(7)
Media awareness (including additional media training).
(8)
Demonstrated reliability and credibility.
(9)
Show leadership qualities and effective in team-interaction.
(10) Display flexibility and logical thought under pressure.
(11) Physically and mentally ‘fit for action’ including basic military skills, if
necessary, refreshed prior to operations).
(12) Work according to the ‘military code of conduct’ and respect rule of law.
(13) Ability to operate in an austere environment.
b.
Staff personnel training is necessary for CIMIC staff personnel who work at the
different staff levels, alongside other joint functions. A prerequisite is knowledge of the
MDMP and its procedures, with special focus on the CIMIC contribution. The CIMIC and
Nonlethal Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Guide is very useful for this purpose. Civil
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expertise should contribute to this process where applicable. Recommended qualifications
and proficiencies are as listed below.
(1)
Capable of effective written and verbal communications.
(2)
Knowledge of ANA staff procedures and structures.
(3)
Capable of collecting, selecting and assessing information.
(4)
Understanding political and strategic implications of military actions.
(5) Understanding the cross-cutting elements of CIMIC and civil-military
interaction as well as its differences.
c.
Specific requirements demand specified E&T. Once a requirement has been
identified, E&T should be designed and tailored to prepare for that function. Examples are:
(1)
Ability to make initial critical CIMIC assessments.
(2)
CIMIC field expertise.
d.
Prior to training of personnel for specific CIMIC assignments, there should be a
selection based on age, military and related CIMIC experiences, maturity, and appropriate
level of rank. CIMIC training also includes integrated training with appropriate civil actors.
Recommended qualifications and proficiencies are:
(1)
Mission knowledge commander’s intent, plans, orders, tasks, etc. .
(2)
Situational awareness.
(3) Have a working knowledge of the civil side (organizations, structures,
policies, missions, aims, goals, constraints, restraints, ‘code of conduct’, capabilities,
concerns, etc.).
e.
Civil-military liaison training.
Civil military liaison demands a special set of skills (e.g. negotiation, mediation and interview
techniques, communications theory and practice) that need to be addressed, trained and
enhanced to enable successful performance of CIMIC.
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ACRONYMS
AACP: Afghan Anti-Crime Police
ABP: Afghan Border Police
ALP: Afghan Local Police
ANA: Afghan National Army
ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANP: Afghan National Police
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces
AO: Area of Operations
AOR: Area of Responsibility
ASCOPE: Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events
AUP: Afghan Uniform Police
CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation
CDE: Collateral Damage Estimation/Estimate
CMI: Civil-Military Interaction
CoA: Course Of Action
COP: Common Operational Picture
DFID: United Kingdom’s Department for Foreign International Development
DG: District Governor
EC: European Council
E&T: Education & Training
EU: European Union
FS: Functional Specialists
GFC: Ground Forces Command
GIRoA: Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GOs: Governmental Organizations
GovMIC: Government Management Information Centre
GS: General Staff
HQ: Headquarters
ICC: Interagency Coordination Centre
ICRC: The International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent
IDLG: Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IO: Information Operations
IOM: International Organization for Migration
IOs: International Organizations
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IT: Information Technologies
LL: Lessons Learned
MDMP: Military Decision Making Process
MoD: Ministry of Defence
MoF: Ministry of Finance
MoI: Ministry of Interior
MoPH: Ministry of Public Health
MoPW: Ministry of Public Works
MRRD: Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations
NDS: National Directorate of Security
NSC: National Security Council
NSI: Non-Security Institutions
NSMs: Non-Security Ministries
OCC-R/P/D: Operation Coordination Centre-Regional/Province/District
OPLAN: Operation Plan
OPSEC: Operational Security
OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA: Public Affairs
PG: Provincial Governor
PGOs: Provincial Governor Offices
PLD: Provincial Line Director
PMESII: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information
QIPs: Quick-Impact Projects
SNG: Sub-National Governance
SOP: Standing Operating Procedures
SWEAT-MSO: Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash – Medical, Safety, Other
TTPs: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UN: United Nations
UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Program on HIV / AIDS
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNEP: United Nations Environment Program
UNFAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioners Office for Refugees
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
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USAID: US Agency for International Development
WFP: World Food Program
WHO: World Health Organization
WTO: World Trade Organization
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