Japan Towards Reconciliation:
From Political to Social Wartime Narratives
Thesis
by
Aron James Miszlivetz
1305786
Words: 10,536
05/28/2015
Supervisor: Dr. Kiri Paramore
Table of Contents
 Introduction
3
I. 1945-1959: Historical Denial and Political Incompatibility
 “Little Boy”, “Fat Man”, Occupation and Yasukuni Defining Japan
4
 The Political Tool to Consolidate Power: Using the Past for the Present
6
 War Memories and Politics: The Troubled Relationship
8
II. 1960-1989: The Emerging Social Narrative for Peace and Democratization
 Japanese Society and War Memories: A National Trauma?
9
 Public Discourse
10
 The Moment of Change in 1989
12
III. The Post-1989 Era and Beyond
 Media and Democratization
14
 Society and the Myth of a Homogenous Nation
19
 Politics Cannot Create Suitable Narratives for Society
21
 Japan Towards Future Reconciliation: A New Modus Vivendi?
23
Bibliography
26
2
Introduction
In many ways, the dominant historical narrative of Japan remains hidden in a prewar, nationalistic
paradigm. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, the country underwent radical political and social
changes which affected every aspect of society and their perception of Japanese history. Contrary to
defeated Germany, where war memories became part of society and almost universally accepted,
Japan struggles with a highly politicized narrative of the past which is linked to the Yasukuni
controversy and the atomic bombs. Both the shrine and the bombings are represented as certain
unique symbols to the country, portrayed through specific lens to society. While politics remains a
dominant field of representing and reproducing history in Japan by creating a certain historical
narrative, Japanese society is changing. The public sphere is reinterpreting the dominant narrative
shown by the state and is creating new forms of understanding history.
In this thesis I would like to draw upon war memories which are used by politics to portray a
certain aspect of the country. More specifically, I focus on how different historical events led to a
shift in who controls the historical narrative and to what extent. By analyzing visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine, the importance of Emperor Hirohito, political parties and case studies, I examine the main
events that gave power to Japan’s rising civil society and the emerging counter-narrative behind it. I
argue that Japan’s history cannot be understood by looking at politics alone, since society is actively
shaping its own history through discourse and action as a form of agency. This concludes that Japan
is not the homogenous society that is portrayed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) but is more
open and diverse when it comes to historical reconciliation in the region. It is also important to
mention how this new emerging social narrative of Japan’s history is slowly but surely gaining
more legitimacy and how this will affect neighborhood relations with South Korea and China.
In the first chapter I explain how the attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the influence of
the U.S. occupation, has shaped Japan’s historical identity and the Yasukuni Shrine. I explain how
this has been used and reused as a political tool to define the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) in
contrast to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which led to two distinct political narratives. It is
also important to mention the “two-fold memory process” of Rainer Schulze (2004) which explains
how the state shapes social memories and how society shapes the state in a quest for social
legitimization. In connection with this, I will discuss how the LDP started to take control of certain
war memories and create a narrative for political purposes.
3
In the second chapter I shift from a political to a social perspective of war memories and explain the
most important historical moments that define Japanese society and how people relate to national
trauma. I will talk about the five distinct groups of Japanese society and their influence in
maintaining the new narrative through public discourse. I will also draw upon how the perception of
Yasukuni has changed in the post-1989 era and how major impacts, such as the fall of the LDP and
the death of the emperor, have changed society.
The last chapter begins with a discussion of the importance of the media and newspapers in
Japan. Since they have significant influence in the country, I will explain how society’s political
views have been shaped by the Asahi, Yomiuri and Mainichi newspapers and how the public
surveys represent society’s opposition towards the government. At the end of chapter I will explain
how society is not perceived as homogenous, but is more fragmented when history becomes
embedded in politics which has consequences for developing a consensus on how history is viewed.
Drawing upon this important fact I want to point out how the politicization of history and historical
narratives is detrimental to Japan’s social progress, but at the same time creates new possibilities
and areas of contestation against the status-quo. In the end I analyze how Japan is only at the
beginning of reconciliation with China and South Korea and what existing social tools it has
towards reconciliation. To conclude, I will argue how a shift from the political to the social sphere
makes reconciliation easier, acceptable and more legitimate for the victims and society.
I.
1945-1959: Historical Denial and Political Incompatibility
“Little Boy”, “Fat Man”, Occupation and Yasukuni Defining Japan
Current Japanese politics have been strongly defined by World War II. Few if any countries have
experienced the devastation and humiliation that Japan endured in defeat on the 6th and 9th of
August, 1945. The atomic bombs called “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” led to the ultimate and
unconditional surrender of the Imperial Japanese Army. The Children of the Atomic Bomb project
concluded that around 150,000 people died at Hiroshima and 75,000 at Nagasaki in a single day.
The whole Japanese nation was shaken by the destruction by the bombs even before they realized
the worst part: nuclear fallout. The nation grieved for weeks as they saw Japan lose its superiority in
a single day. The attacks had a great impact on Japan’s self-image as the superior nation in East
Asia.
After Japan was defeated, the nation saw itself as a victim of war, and politics has actively
promoted the concept of the “victimized-nation”. Many people see the victimized image as a result
of the Japanese state – a “handful of irresponsible militarists” against Japanese society who actually
4
embraced U.S. liberation (Fujiwara 2006: 149). The Allies who fought Japan in the Pacific were
mainly American soldiers who occupied Japan from 1945 to 1952. They introduced drastic changes
which had long lasting effects on Japanese politics and society. The Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers created a new “American” constitution for Japan rendering its army useless as stated
in Article 9 which would prohibit Japan from waging war forever in the future. The goal of Douglas
MacArthur was to introduce western values such as democracy and liberal economics to Japan in
order to “erase its essential spiritual structure” which was seen as militaristic (Seraphim 2006: 235).
This meant the disassembling of State Shinto and creating a bureaucracy with laïcité. This
important French term defines the total separation of religion from political and governmental
affairs, creating a secular state. This is highlighted in Article 20 of the new Japanese constitution:
Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive
any
privileges
from
the
State,
nor
exercise
any
political
authority.
No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice.
The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious
activity.
Since the practice has been different for centuries in Japan, to prevent Japan’s
remilitarization, the Shinto Directive denied state control and financial support to religious shrines
(Mullins 2010: 95). For the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) the Yasukuni Shrine
became the symbol of Japanese militarism and nationalism (Mullins 2010: 97) and since 1952,
Yasukuni became a private religious site under the new constitution. The Shinto Shrine survived the
Shinto Directive which would separate church and state “by asserting its own liberation from the
control of the militarist state” (Orr 2008: 476). Thus, after the occupation, the Shrine transformed
from a public to a private place of commemoration of soldiers.
Since then, the Yasukuni site became a contested place of memory where “rituals,
institutional networks, constitutional law and interest politics have overlapped” rendering Yasukuni
a “matter of interest politics of the state rather than becoming a genuinely public matter” (Seraphim
2006: 230). The Yasukuni Shrine became the only place of remembrance where the Emperor
honored the war-dead, which for many war-bereaved families was the highest honor they could
receive (Seraphim 2006: 232). In the Shinto religion, soldiers who suffered violent deaths became
“wandering spirits” that have been enshrined here (Seraphim 2006: 232). This is also true for the
kamikaze pilots, where it was seen as an honor to die in order to protect the emperor and the
country. These spirits have been defined not as belonging to individual families, but as serving the
nation-state, as head priest Suzuki Takao has said (Seraphim 2006: 234). Spiritual rituals continue
to serve Japan’s religious community, but there was a great desire to reintroduce the Shrine under
5
state management which would make it the official symbol of the war dead and help promote
Japan’s prewar history, also denying constitutional pacifism. Since the Japanese government saw
the war dead as serving the state, they believed that this relationship, denied by the Allies, needed to
be strengthened.
This was the main purpose of the conservative LDP which saw the war dead as “generating
political capital” (Seraphim 2006: 238) for their ideological interests. This became the basis of party
ideology. Shaun O’Dwyer defined the objectives of Yasukuni as serving political, religious and
social purposes through the glorification of war and soldiers (O’Dwyer 2010: 155). To present the
increasing postwar militarization of the LDP’s political ideology, the former governor of Okinawa
gives an account of the increase in unilaterally erected war memorials and military monuments on
the island: 32 out of the 73 memorials are known to glorify war, he says (O’Dwyer 2010: 171). As a
former soldier his personal experience has made him question what the “national will” and the
“war-system” was (O’Dwyer 2010: 170). The national monuments have become a “fundamental
spiritual center for Japan’s militaristic ideology” (O’Dwyer 2010: 171).
The U.S., who also had interests during the Cold War, saw a brilliant opportunity to make an
alliance with Japan against the communist bloc which resided west of the country in China and the
Soviet Union. This is promulgated in the signature of the San Francisco Treaty, which “laid the
groundwork for an exclusionary system that detached Japan from its closest neighbors” (Dower
2014). “Yesterday’s militaristic enemy” became quickly rehabilitated as a “peace-loving ally”,
which according to Dower has encouraged historical amnesia.
The first step taken by the Allies deeply affected Japan’s godlike symbol, Emperor Hirohito.
The new “American” constitution which went into effect in 1947 defined the emperor as a mere
symbol of the nation. Reducing the role of the emperor who was previously the head of the State
Shinto religion, declared Japan as a defeated and victimized nation. Since Japan “easily accepted
the role of victim”, and the Japanese Emperor Hirohito never faced trial due to American
intervention, Japanese society was given the impression that the nation was innocent and thus not
responsible, and that therefore responsibility for the war must lie elsewhere (Igarashi 2000: 37-39).
The Political Tool to Consolidate Power: Using the Past for the Present
Since national symbols like the flag, national anthem and the emperor have been discredited, Japan
was left with an “easily accessible unifying symbol” which was called nihonjinron (Befu 2001:
102). This new discourse was used by the LDP to fill the ideological vacuum that was left behind
during the occupation which defined Japan as “uniquely unique” and saw the nation as “racially
unified” (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986: 406). Ian Reader explains Harumi’s interpretation as
6
representing Japan’s two-sided identity, on the one side as being “self-congratulatory” and, on the
other side, as expressing feelings of “inferiority” towards the world (Reader 2003: 105). The “selfcongratulatory” image is connected to Japan’s feeling of superiority, fighting against East Asian
nations as a glorious country, on the other hand, the unequal treaties from the past and defeated
Japan made the country feel inferior to the West. Nevertheless, the LDP has used the “militarized
Japan” and the “victimized Japan” images as political tools to advance its interest against the
Japanese Socialist Party which led to the creation of a nationalistic history.
The LDP which ruled for over 40 years has heavily utilized prewar Japanese history to
evoke patriotic and nationalistic sentiments which manifested in the controversial Yasukuni Shrine
visits. The narrative of the LDP represents Japan from a narrow military perspective where national
importance resides with soldiers and kamikaze pilots who fought in the war; here civilians play a
minor role in remembrance (Selden 2008). It must be noted that commemorating the deaths of
fallen soldiers is a highly selective process in Japan, where only some are remembered and others
celebrated (Fujiwara 2006: 146-147). In this process the heroic martyrs are remembered while their
criminal acts are suppressed. As war bereaved families received state pensions and much political
attention, there was no sign of remembering the civilians who died during the war. Paradoxically,
the Yasukuni Shrine and the Yūshūkan Museum have not been put to national consensus, but have
been treated as the major national symbol of Japan. This has been constantly brought up by the
Japanese Socialist Party who used war memories especially those of Yasukuni and U.S.
intervention to define themselves in opposition to the conservatives (Seraphim 2006: 320).
One of the main politically divisive issues of Yasukuni is the enshrinement of the 14 ClassA war criminals in 1978 who were vindicated by the Tokyo Tribunal – similarly to the Nuremberg
Trial – as people who participated in the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances, or participation
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing” (The Avalon
Project 2008). For the conservatives this remains a legitimate issue, since they see the tribunal as
issuing unfair judgements towards the nation, such as excluding “Western imperialism” and the
deployed nuclear weapons by the U.S. as defining the defeat of Japan. The LDP viewed the war
criminals as people who served the nation and not as individuals guilty of war crimes. Furthermore,
Japan did not accept the legitimacy of the judgements issued by the tribunal, and – as General
MacArthur stated in 1951 – Japan acted in self-defense to protect its own security. As such, they see
the Yasukuni Shrine as a legitimate national memorial, which incorporates those who bravely
defended the nation. The ruling party felt entitled not only to commemorate them according to
Japanese customs, but felt a right of entitlement to “commemorate and write its past as it sees fit”
(O’Dwyer 2010: 147). The main problematic issues with such commemoration are the factual
7
claims that are often made by government officials. These range from belittling the number of
victims who died during Nanjing and downplaying the existence the Comfort Women issue.
According to Ian Buruma, the exhibits at the Yūshūkan Museum within Yasukuni are seen as
“straight-out wartime propaganda” (Buruma 1995: 223) and a “citadel of militaristic ideology”
(Ohnuki-Tireney 2002: 82). This made the relationship between memory and politics highly
incompatible.
Memory and Politics: The Troubled Relationship
It is clear that the LDP has systematically exploited certain unrevised and controversial historical
events and built up a certain political narrative around them. This has been used to maintain the
image of Japan’s uniqueness and superiority in East Asia during the postwar period and beyond.
But how exactly are these narratives built up from fragments of individual memories? Rainer
Schulze’s two-fold memory process can explain how this happens.
The first process is bottom up and is drawn from individual stories and memories which are
then transformed by social practices to common and collective memories. When this enters public
discourse it not only challenges the dominant narrative of the status-quo, but even transcends
borders and become transnational.
“The other process moves from the top down through a range of agencies, starting with
the nation state which aims to establish and maintain dominant patterns of memory and
commemoration, down to organizations which either support or challenge these patterns,
and further down to informal agencies and family and kinship networks which try to
promote or secure their particular memories” (Schulze 2004: 647).
The memory-politics relationship in Japan has culminated in the prime ministerial visits to
Yasukuni Shrine. During the postwar period, 18 LDP prime ministers out of 23 have visited the
shrine from 1951 to 2005. Due to social pressure there have been less and less visits to the shrine,
with a 10 year interlude from the mid-1980s. It seems like the majority of Japanese society did not
support the politically motivated historical controversies driven by the LDP. For example, the party
often uses sanpai as excuse, in other words “paying one’s respect to the dead” – when visiting the
shrines, which shifts away the responsibility of labeling some people war criminals and labels them
as dead (Seaton 2007: 68). Conversely, society does not accept the party’s definition of history and
many times has questioned the status quo on facts of history and wartime responsibility. Even prime
ministers saw the incompatibility of official visits to the shrine. Those of Prime Minister Koizumi
and others have blurred the distinctions between “official”, “private” and “public” visits (Inagaki
8
2010: 41). These commemorations are seen as going against the Japanese constitution which clearly
separates the church (Shrine) and the state (Inagaki 2010: 42; see also Inuzuka and Fuchs 2014: 22).
Hisakazu Inagaki suggests that it should not be political statesmen who mediate within the public
and private sphere, but that the power should reside with the citizens themselves (Inagaki 2010:42).
Thus the power to remember and the use of memory should be a public instead of a political matter.
Harry Harootunian indicates that reinstating the shrine with politics – which would reconnect
politics with religion – would mean “returning Japan to a time when people were socialized into
performing unhesitating service to the emperor” (Harootunian 1999: 147-148).
II.
1960-1989: The Emerging Social Narrative for Peace and Democratization
Japanese Society and War Memories: A National Trauma?
Japanese society’s stance on historical memory started to show great divergence between the state
and society from the 1960s onwards starting with the movement against the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty. The revised version would allow U.S. troops to be stationed further into the territory of
Japan while taking control of the country’s internal security. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi,
however, felt the pressure from the pacifist population. In the end, the Treaty only allowed U.S.
bases in the country; internal security went to the Japanese Self-defense Forces. The majority of the
population who were more pacifist, were part of the “progressive” group and closely linked to the
Japanese Socialist Party, however, the spectrum of society was extremely diverse ranging from left
to right.
In Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi’s (2009: 182) review, Philip Seaton enumerates five distinct
social groups who have different interpretations of war memories ranging from liberal to
conservative. The first group is the “I don’t know, I don’t care” group, who does not identify with
war memories in any way and are seen as neutral actors. The second group, are the “progressives”
who believe that the state must file an official apology and reconcile with the victims, offering them
compensation for the war crimes. This group is known to be promoted by the Asahi newspaper.
Within the third group are the “progressive leaning” people who at times feel a conflict of interest,
but to a greater extent still agree with the previous group. The next group is labelled as the
“conservatives” who are backed by the government who admit guilt, but feel that Japan has
properly apologized to the victims and given sufficient reparations for their sufferings. The more
interesting group would be the last one, which Seaton sees as being a minority in Japan who are the
“right-wing nationalists”. They view the aims of war as altruistic while the outcome benefited
Asians as a whole; according to them this “good war” was fought with “moral means”
(Wakabayashi 2009: 182).
9
As wide the range seems to be with the different social groups, there are general tendencies
which can account for a new type of social discourse on pacifism. The review of Eyal Ben Ari of
Philip Seaton provides excellent examples on how society dealt and still deals with the past. As
divisive as the war memories are, where they promulgate into “memory rifts”, there are not many
different opinions that are heard apart from the orthodox opinion (Ari 2008: 144). Seaton argues
that the politically powerful conservatives constitute only a minority while the majority of
progressives wield less political power which has not been emphasized outside the orthodox view.
These memory rifts in Japan feature a “battle between a politically powerful conservative lobby
whose war stance … has been a minority opinion but which has maintained control over the official
narrative and policy” versus “a politically weak progressive lobby which has the support of a small
majority of public opinion but has failed to … change the official narrative” (Kingston 2007: 258).
It seems as if the historical amnesia only concerns the conservative minority to a certain extent. In
general it is not amnesia that dominates Japan but the clinging on to war memories in every aspect
of political life, “probably the most contested memories of any of the major WWII combatant
nations” (Seaton 2007: 188).
What ties into Seaton’s classification of society is Carol Gluck’s interpretation of what she
calls the “four custodians of the past”. The progressive intellectuals who oppose, and conservative
intellectuals who support the postwar status quo (Gluck 1991: 71), the media which sells a
“commodified” history of the popular past (Gluck 1991: 73) and individual memories, life stories
and personal experiences of those who were affected by it (Gluck 1991: 76). These social actors
also face social tensions among each other and are in constant, heated debate, revolving around the
interpretation of history and its outcomes for the future. However, the media plays an important role
within society in interpreting and translating a new historical narrative which in general does not
support a militaristic, nationalistic understanding of the past, facing national responsibility and
defying official visits to the Shrine.
Public Discourse
In the following discussion I would like to address how Japanese public opinion has change during
the last decades through a broad political spectrum of organizations from the right to the left. For
example, the underlying problems of the right-wing organizations through the War-bereaved
Families Association (Izokukai) will be addressed. The rise of left-wing organizations present a
counter example, such as the Japanese Teachers Union and peace protests that are seen as
10
representing the opinion of the majority, creating a narrative which is different from the
government’s interpretation.
The War-bereaved Families Association, (Izokukai) is the de facto non-official organization
connecting the LDP and Yasukuni Shrine together in a non-formal way. During the war the
organization enjoyed governmental privilege in financial compensations for loss and recognition of
military service (Seraphim 2006: 61). The consequence of the political-civil relationship politicized
war memories which instead of mourning have turned into celebration (Seraphim 2006: 61).
Members of the association received not only pensions but many social benefits, such as free
railway transportation, burial funds and free tuition (Seraphim 2006: 64). The “war-bereaved”
became national heroes only because they were part of the victimized population. After the U.S.
occupation, which tried to eliminate nationalistic and military elements from the organization, there
was a rise in militaristic and nationalistic ideology from the war-bereaved movement (Seraphim
2006: 81). They called for the “spirits of executed war criminals……to be enshrined” (Seraphim
2006: 81). Political ideology replaced the social security agenda and demanded the restoration of
Yasukuni to its original prewar state. By the late 1980s, the association referred to the Great East
Asian War as a war of “self-defense” to protect the people and the state (Tanaka 1995: 79). The
organization believed in the continuity of the prewar militaristic state as the true nation-state and
actively exploited interest politics in society.
Contrary to homogenizing and hegemonizing war memories, the Japanese Teachers Union
(JTU) organized a protest of over 600,000 people who believed that Yasukuni should be open,
democratic, publicly discussable and educative for younger generations (Seraphim 2006: 248).
Their slogan “never send our students to the battlefield again” emphasized the union’s pacifist and
democratic character. They fought against what they saw as the de-democratization of the country
through institutionalizing war-memories (Seraphim 2006: 248). They were seen as the opposition to
the government-sponsored War-bereaved Families Association. The movement wanted similar
action to what is stated in paragraph 10 of the Potsdam Declaration: “The Japanese Government
shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the
Japanese people”. The JTU had a powerful tool through education in schools and public spaces
where debate about Japan’s wartime responsibility and the public role of Yasukuni Shrine played a
major role. This laid the foundation for the “Anpo generation” in the 1960s, the generation which
had experienced the war and promoted peace. The mass protests against the renewal of the U.S.
Security Treaty was a sign that people wanted to take control of state-led democracy, memories and
war issues. Only a minority of Japanese society downplayed the traumatic experiences with
“narrative strategies”, contrary to what Igarashi (2000: 12) says. The majority of society wanted to
deal with the national trauma, but this also had negative consequences.
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When Japanese society copes with cultural trauma, it faces many difficult problems related
to social change, including the costs, pain and suffering society must endure (Sztompka 2000: 450).
According to Piotr Sztompka this can happen in the event of a lost war, mass murder of an ethnic
group and the revisionist interpretation of nationalistic heroic tradition (Sztompka 2000: 452). This
type of revisionism is not new to Japan, since the government tries to shed positive light on Japan’s
traumatic history. This dynamic, evolving traumatic sequence (Sztompka 2000: 452) has a tendency
to create cultural disorientation when society has memories of collective wrongdoings or feels
shame and guilt (Sztompka 2000:453-454). The biggest cultural shock society experienced was the
atomic bombs and losing the war, which changed the perception of what it is to be Japanese. This
encouraged avoiding public acknowledgment and confession through shame instead of guilt. At the
same time the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 changed German society, Japan’s transformation also
began.
The Moment of Change in 1989
The turning point came in 1989 when Emperor Hirohito died, which opened up the national
discourse on war related issues. This was also the time, when – after 38 years of rule – the LDP lost
power in 1993. This can be seen as a great divergence between the two, political and social factions
of conservatives and liberals. During the 1990s the effects of globalization reached Japan along
with the international and humanitarian laws and norms which it needed to abide to. This was the
time when it could not avoid economic, political and social interaction with East Asian nations,
such as China or South Korea. After so many decades of visits to Yasukuni, the official visits
stopped, first by Takeshita Noboru in 1987 and finally by Mori Yoshiro in 2001. Suddenly Prime
Ministers started to openly apologize for Japan’s atrocities, even though they did not discuss the
Yasukuni controversies. The following table represents the development of different historical
arguments on Japan’s responsibility from a conservative and a liberal standpoint.
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Kiyoteru Tsutsui’s (2009) seven frameworks of analysis provide a theoretical guide to
identify the degree of accepting guilt within the international scope of discourse between the
conservative and the progressive parties. The first frame is called denial, where all facts and
evidence are refuted. This has been used by the LDP many times, denying the number of victims of
Nanjing and the existence of comfort stations. The second one justifies the actions with the
argument of self-defense, e.g., Japan needed to defend itself against foreign aggression. Japan’s
preemptive action in self-defense has been used to justify its actions throughout the war. The third
frame is evasion, where “our suffering” is greater than “your suffering,” e.g., there are more civilian
victims of the atomic bombs than civilian victims of Japanese aggression. The fourth frame,
projection, makes a small group responsible for wrongdoings, such as Germany blaming the Nazi
leadership for crimes against humanity. The fifth setting is displacement where one accepts guilt
and shows responsibility, but also emphasizes that other nations committed worse crimes. The last
two frameworks are similar, however the sixth one, remorse, defines the whole nation as guilty,
including those that were not born at that time; whereas universalism directs wrongdoings outward
from which humanity as a whole must learn: for example the Holocaust. The table below shows
Japan’s status within these frameworks from a conservative and liberal point of view in comparison
with domestic and international developments. The chart clearly shows that development towards
the 7th framework has been ongoing since 1945 with certain setbacks, but clearly shows the
complexity and difficulty of this ongoing process.
From the chart I identified that the conservatives have several mixed arguments, while the
liberals are more consistent in their opinion. To clearly show the stages of development, I numbered
13
each framework from 1 (denial) to 7 (universalism), as seen on the chart above, and present the
numbers from a chronological perspective from 1945 up to 2004.
1. Denial
2. Justification
3. Evasion
4. Projection
5. Displacement
6. Remorse
7. Universalism
The corresponding political stance of each opinion can be mapped as follows:
The conservative pathway:
1945-1954: Remorse and denial
1955-1964: Justification
1965-1974: Denial
From 1975 onwards mainly denial and justification with evasion and displacement
The liberal pathway:
1945-1954: Projection
1955-1974: Evasion
From 1975 onwards: Remorse with universalism
The conservative arguments were more focused on denial and justification, while the liberal opinion
was more focused on remorse.
During times of peace protests in the 1960s and 1970s conservative intellectuals tried to
justify Japan’s wartime acts against humanity, however, as Japan became more integrated in the
globalized world and more pressure came from the democratic, pacifist majority, the more the
narrative started to shift from the right to the left. To summarize, the international political
environment shapes national discourse, where globally integrated states are more sensitive to
external pressure (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005 in Tsutsui 2009: 1396). However, it is not only
the international arena that can force nations to change narratives. Japanese civil society – which
has been closely linked to the political left – has been shaping the narrative since the mid-1950s.
Their main agenda was to prevent state denial of constitutional pacifism and to defend democracy
against the de facto revival of the state Shinto religion (Seraphim 2006: 240).
As much as postwar Japan produced a “national victimology” (Fujitani et al. 2001: 7) including the
emperor, the creation of self-victimization created a new type of discourse. This new strand of
14
thinking from a victim’s perspective was connected to a strong “anti-militaristic ethos” where Japan
as a victim has a special global role in propagating world peace and understanding (Berger in Tsu et
al. 2005: 84).
III. The Post-1989 Era and Beyond
Media and Democratization
It is not only civil society that pushed Japan towards revising its own history. Japan’s most
prominent newspapers became powerful tools that supported and encouraged the publication of
public polls and analyses. Several polls from the liberal Asahi and conservative Yomiuri provide
statistical analyses of public opinion. It is important to mention that the globalization of social
norms and human rights have also promoted a shift in the Japanese mindset (Tsutsui 2009: 1393).
Kazuya Fukuoka explains that by the millennium 50% of the Japanese surveyed by NHK (Nippon
Hōsō Kyōkai, Japan’s Broadcasting Corporation) believed that the country must bear responsibility
for its crimes, whereas in June 2005, the liberal Asahi newspaper found that 60% of respondents
view the historical issue as unresolved. A year later more than half (51%) of the people surveyed
did not believe that the government had given sufficient and heartfelt apologies along with adequate
compensation to the victims. The problem with Chinese-Japanese and Korean-Japanese relations is
that the countries interpret the others’ intentions on their own terms, instead of trying to understand
different circulating opinions (Fukuoka 2013: 35). As the relations towards Japan worsened, there
was a visible shift in Japanese public opinion (Fukuoka 2013: 37).
The poll below from Mainichi newspaper shows the decline in the support of Prime Minister
Koizumi’s official visits.
The liberal Ashai shows a similar opinion on the issue with declining support reaching an all-time
low in 2006.
15
This opinion has been surpassed by the idea of simply keeping the Yasukuni Shrine only
without the Class-A criminals. The Asahi survey from April 2005 found that two thirds of the
respondents see Yasukuni not as a symbol of Japanese pre-1945 militarism, but rather as a “place to
remember Japan’s war dead” (Fukuoka 2013: 41-42). These shifts in opinions are closely linked to
what Fukuoka calls “major newspaper narratives”. Media sources, such as Asahi, Yoriumi and
Nihon Keizai have merged their opinions into one main moderately opposing narrative towards the
government’s opinion. Asahi even incorporated victims’ opinions (Chinese, Korean) into their
newsletter (Killmeier and Chiba 2010: 345).
Overall, Fukuoka gives three main reasons for the changes in public opinion. First, there has
been pressure by the media and society for anti-visit campaigns which, according to Sobel (2001:
14), could “condition governmental action”. Furthermore, the public had two alternative options of
de-enshrining war-criminals or creating a new, non-religious site of remembrance. The public view
has shown a great discrepancy between the opinion of society and the Prime Minister.
“Commemoration of war dead provides one of the most important foundations for national selfunderstanding and national cohesion” (Fukuoka 2013: 44). Nevertheless, if the “ultimate object of
commemoration” is “moral unity,” then the Yasukuni Shrine for Japan does not fit into this
definition but remains a site of remembrance without consensus (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz
1991: 411). However prominent the anti-government opinion may be, Japanese society is still
fragmented and confused when dealing with war crimes committed by the state. The following
paragraph will discuss what the main points are of misunderstanding and lack of cohesive opinion.
During the past decade there have been many public discourses outside of Japan which tried
to create consensus for public war memories for Japan, but identified several problems which
hinder the process. One of these events was the Trilateral Retreats organized by the Mansfield
Foundation which included six representatives respectively from, Japan and Korea and took place in
Hawaii and Montana in the United States. Most of the participants held influential positions within
their society and came together to encourage understanding and cooperation. The first session held
in Maui, Hawaii, October 9-11, 2002, was the Japanese-Korean panel where they came to the
16
following conclusion which limited the two nation’s mutual understanding. Problems with Japan
included historical amnesia, textbook controversy, discrimination against Koreans, Yasukuni visits,
lack of national consensus on history, “homogeneity” and insularity. The top priority remains for
intellectuals to de-politicize history and raise factual awareness of history along with marginalizing
the extreme and conservative right groups through education (Konishi 2002: 7). The JapaneseChinese session in Whitefish, Montana in 2003 shows similar problems with Japan. The
overlapping problems pointed out are concerned with Japan’s military issues and historical
controversies. The problems that divide Japanese society also divide it from its neighboring
countries. Historical amnesia, Yasukuni visits, absence of national consensus and the Japan-U.S.
relationship are the most pressing issues which are detrimental not only to the relationship between
Japanese society and the state, but also between China and South Korea.
The following tables represent the main outcomes from the trilateral discussions between
Japan, China and South Korea. Focusing on Japan, as seen from a Korean and a Chinese
perspective, shows many overlapping issues. This ranges from official visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine, the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals, unbalanced historical education in textbooks
and the lack of national unity about history.
17
18
As much as Japanese media seems to be in line with the national Yasukuni issue, it is seen
less likely to agree on the emerging international issue of Comfort Women. While the internet and
media facilitated democratization and strengthened civil groups in Japan, the politics of memory
became part of the international discourse and the spread of global norms has helped to maintain
bilateral discourses over contested history issues (Kingston 2008). Seraphim argues that the more
Asian nations discussed Japanese war responsibilities, the more Japan has turned to (West)
Germany in order to define what it could win or lose (Seraphim 2006: 263). This means that the
country which entered into a world, free from the ideological division of the Cold War, needed to
reassess its relationship within East Asia. While Yasukuni was an ongoing debate over decades in
Japanese discourse, the country had an emerging historical issue in 1991. This was the Comfort
Women issue. In order to see how Japan reacted to the escalation of the issue, which was
highlighted by the national media and press, I will analyze a book by Philip Seaton.
Since Japan holds one of the biggest and most notable media companies, historical debates
have increasing lead to national debates. Even though newspapers are divided along political lines,
Karel von Wolferen describes Japanese press and media as a “well-tuned single-voice choir” (van
Wolferen 1989: 96-97). To contest the view that media did not report on wartime issues such as
19
Yasukuni or Comfort Women, Seaton picks all wartime related articles from Asahi, Mainichi and
Yomiuri newspapers. He found that 277 out of the 725 war related articles (38%) discussed the
Comfort Women issue (van Wolferen 1989: 101). In December 1991, one plaintiff affected by the
Comfort Women issue openly confronted the Japanese state, stating her name and the atrocities she
experienced through the media. While the Japanese government kept denying state involvement in
the military comfort women stations, the foreign media was already reporting on the issue, but
interestingly it wasn’t enough to trigger a diplomatic media crisis in Japan. It was only when proof
was found by Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chuo University, who researched military archives
and found that state involvement was not fictitious, was the evidence presented in the national
media and the press. This has triggered a national debate about the connection of the Japanese state
to war atrocities. The liberal Asahi opted for government compensation which it justified by the
success of the U.S. compensations to American-Japanese held in camps during the war. In stark
contrast to this, the conservative Yomiuri newspaper was in the government’s line, that
compensations had already been made in a bilateral treaty in 1965. In the conservative newspaper,
in line with the Japanese government’s argument, the Comfort Women issue was treated as a
political, interstate conflict instead of a public issue within Japan. While the more liberal
newspapers pushed towards giving full compensation, Japanese society seems more divided
towards the issue which contradicts the homogenous nation theory.
Society and the Myth of a Homogenous Nation
Benedict Anderson was right when he coined the term: “imagined communities”. When defining
Japan as a non-homogenous nation, it is important to define the faultines between society and sociopolitical actors. As we have seen in the analysis of Japanese media, there are several distinct progovernment or anti-government opinions. In Kiichi Fujiwara’s analysis, Japanese society is neither
fully anti- nor pro-government. He states that the majority of the people did not oppose Prime
Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, however the Class-A war criminals are highly
problematic for the population. What the author makes of this is that people want to remember all
the victims of war, not just soldiers or citizens as the government often does, but to have, rather, a
collective remembrance as individuals of the past (Fujiwara 2006: 152). Most of the people do feel
that China and South Korea are angry for a justified reason, but they would not go as far as issuing
financial compensation and reparations to the victims (Fujiwara 2006: 152).
This divide is further illustrated by what Foucault calls “counter-memory”, which is,
according to George Lipsitz, a type of social memory which “looks to the past for the hidden
histories excluded from dominant narratives, but unlike myths that seek to detach events and actions
20
from the fabric of any larger history, counter-memory forces revision of existing histories by
supplying new perspectives about the past” (Lipsitz 1990: 213). The public sphere uses countermemory in order to create a new meaning of war memories. The positive aspect of a diverse society
is the variety of narratives it can create. I would argue that Japan is not mainly divided along the
lines of a nation-state but rather along the line of historical memories and representations. Carol
Gluck says that each nation constructs a national “mythistory” in which stories and history are
continually reworked and reflected by the nation (Gill et al. 1990:1). Contrary to Anderson, this is
not an invented tradition for an imagined community, but more likely a collective of experiences
from everyday people and ordinary citizens (Notehelfer 1999: 436). Japan is not constructed as a
nation through myths, but is shaped by multifaceted discourses which are part of social reality
(Burgess 2010). The problem with the nation-state is that it continually forces ethnic and cultural
homogeneity (Burgess 2010). In the case of Japan, this theory is nihonjinron. But how did
nihonjinron enter legitimate public discourse?
Since national symbols such as the flag, national anthem and the emperor have been
discredited, Japan was left with an “easily accessible unifying symbol” called nihonjinron (Befu
2001: 102) or “a discussion on national identity” (Dale 1986: 119). This new discourse was used by
the LDP to fill the ideological vacuum that was left behind during the occupation that defined Japan
as “uniquely unique” and saw the nation as “racially unified” (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986: 406).
Burgess cites Oguma (2008) who sees nihonjinron as a uniquely postwar Japanese product.
Contrary to this, Harumi Befu defines nihonjinron as not unique to Japan, but rather a species of
cultural nationalism which is found everywhere (Befu 2001:14; Yoshino 1992: chapters 3, 4, 10).
Michael Weiner has argued with Japanese scholars, politicians, and the media which reaffirms
“commonsense understandings of Japan as a homogeneous and mono-cultural polity” and for trying
to “compress differences into a single set of national traits” (Weiner 2004b: 2-4). Since giving
nihonjinron a specific definition is nearly impossible and lacks the structure and coherence to
qualify as a body of knowledge, I would rather agree with Stuart Hall’s statement that:
“A discourse is a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a
way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a
topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the
topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed”
(Hall 1992: 291).
Oguma identified two distinct discourses of the Japanese nation and Japaneseness (Oguma
2002:15). The first is called the “mixed-nation theory” which argues that the Japanese are a mix of
the aboriginals and the conquerors of the island. The “homogenous-nation theory” stated the
21
contrary, that current Japanese lived through a “lineage” and that they lived on the island since
ancient times. The third line of discourse that Burgess points out is the “multicultural Japan” where
tolerance, cultural respect and autonomy are stressed by the slogan tabunka kyōsei shakai also
known as “multicultural co-existing society” (Burgess 2004). Those people who lived on the
periphery of Japan were referred to as Japanese in “obligations” but less in “rights” (Askew 2001:
114). In this sense, I would like to point out the fourth discourse which Burgess refers to as
“individual Japan” emphasizing the bushido-style individualism – where the U.S. occupation could
have strengthened the concept of the individualistic society – within this holistic framework. As
encompassing as the approach might be, this does not exclusively depict Japan as a collective
group-oriented society (Burgess 2010).
As we can see, Japaneseness can be interpreted in many ways depending on which lens we
use to view society, as individuals, groups of individuals or a collective whole. This has not only
made national identity difficult to define for oneself, but also makes it difficult to describe what
type of history Japan has, and what history the individual wants to be part of. It is clear that Japan
cannot be defined through an island-nation mentality, but has to be part of a bigger regional
structure.
Politics Cannot Create Suitable Narratives for Society
Since the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, national identity and memories cannot be
explained through the narrow lens of politics. In this context, the Yasukuni Shrine is interpreted
from the perspective of the homogenous-nation theory, where only Japanese are remembered and
only those who have fought during the war. It is highly selective which shows that civilians are not
represented in the Shrine, neither Korean nor Chinese soldiers. Kei Koga states that while during
the postwar era from 1945 to 1985, 17 prime ministers have visited the Shrine there was no
apparent criticism from neighboring countries (Koga 2015: 4). He states that it is the specific date
of the visits which is problematic. The 15th of August was the memorial day of the end of the
Pacific War. In 1975 Takeo Miki visited the Shrine not in his official but private capacity. This was
important to show the separation of state and religious affairs; however, as the first postwar prime
minister to visit, this raised two important questions. The first issue was should visits be exclusive
to the 15th of August or should prime ministers choose a different date to avoid provocation. The
second issue was to what extent “private” and “official” visits should be distinguished from each
other. It is very telling that from 1985 to 2013, 16 out of 19 prime ministers did not visit the
Yasukuni Shrine. In 1995, Tomi-ichi Murayama went as far as expressing “remorse” and “apology”
for “damage and suffering to Asian nations” (Koga 2015: 4), followed by Shinzo Abe’s comments
22
that the visits are to “uphold Murayama’s statement……to never wage war again” (Koga 2015: 7).
The main problem with the shrine is that it does not act as a proper burial site like Arlington
cemetery; instead it enshrines the spirits of the war dead (eirei) and worships them as (kami) deities
(Murakami 1974: 152). The complex issue with Yasukuni is the ongoing tension between political
and socio-cultural factors. Since it became an independent and private religious institution, it also
holds informal ties with the government, and thus suffers a dilemma between the politico-religious
(Shinto State) and socio-cultural dimensions of customs (Koga 2015: 11). Nationalists have often
argued that a prime minister will always visit the Shrine in his or her official capacity, since he/she
is the prime minister of the country and nothing less (Koga 2015: 13). Thus, officials often referred
to the visits as a “duty” towards the public which does not violate the constitution (Akazawa 2005:
23-24).
Politics will always have specific interests when creating a national narrative for society,
either to gain public, legal support or by declaring it is “the will of the nation”. Koga argues,
however, that the “institutionalized academic discussions at a grassroots level”, where the different
epistemic meaning of Yasukuni are discussed and debated from the bottom-up, could foster an
alternative solution for remembrance. Politics needs to detach itself from the historical symbolism
that it wishes to exploit with the Yasukuni Shrine. The bi- and trilateral discussion on a social and
academic level could trigger new ideas for an “alternative Yasukuni”.
This has already been on the agenda in Japan, where Prime Minister Koizumi was open to
discussing different alternatives for Yasukuni. Different memorial sites could be a viable option,
such as the Chidorigafuchi cemetery. National polls from the media showed that by 2006, nearly
two-thirds of the respondents wanted to have a different, alternative form of commemoration
(Fukuoka 2013: 31). There was also high public support for the de-politicization of Yasukuni
through the de-enshrinement of the controversial Class-A war criminals. The poll made by the
liberal Asahi newspaper concluded that respondents saw the Yasukuni Shrine as a “place to
remember Japan’s war dead” rather than as a “symbol of Japan’s militarism” (Fukuoka 2013: 4142). Yasukuni has failed the government objective of creating a sense of national moral unity and
represents a national commemoration without consensus (Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz 1991: 411).
Instead of the nationalization of historical narratives, Japanese society seems driven by the fact that
history is not exclusively part of political life, but equally a part of the social and cultural spheres in
Japan. The unilaterally declared meaning of certain sensitive symbols not only creates a backlash
within Japan but also feeds negative sentiments from China, South Korea and international
organizations. It is clear, however, that it is not a question of what types of memories are
remembered, but whose memories are remembered. In this case, it is the memories of the
(politically) powerful contesting against the memories of the silenced majority. It is the “imagined”
23
collective memory versus the memories of individuals. Politics needs to reconsider its role in
historical debates and should keep neutrality central to such debates. The final judgement and
collective commemoration should reside within the realm of society where historical differences
and tensions could be overcome by collective remembrance.
Japan Towards Future Reconciliation: A New Modus Vivendi?
If politics cannot create a legitimate discourse and narrative of Japan’s historical problems, then in
what ways could the grassroots movements promote a new alternative to society’s historical
understanding? In this final section, I would like to analyze the effects of the country’s new social
and political processes and policies which can create more areas of common interest than division,
such as the issue of contested history. Japan’s social changes do not only affect the structure and
mindset of society, but have lasting effects on neighborhood relations. Japan’s new social discourse
on history could be capable of reconciling the East Asian region by strengthening common
interests. Mel Gurtov (2008) states, that Japan faces a multilevel conflict with China, which is
structural, societal, psychological and political. This not only applies to one of its neighbors, Japan
faces similar conflicts with South Korea too. David Crocker states the following on reconciliation:
“… the most minimal account … is nothing more than ‘simple coexistence’ in the sense
that former enemies comply with the law instead of killing each other. Although this modus
vivendi is certainly better than violent conflict, transitional societies … should aim for more
… Among other things, this implies a willingness to hear each other out, to enter into giveand-take about matters of public policy, to build on areas of common concern, and to forge
principled compromises with which all can live. The process, so conceived, may help to
prevent a society from lapsing back into violence as a way to resolve conflict” (Crocker
1999: 20).
I chose to apply different themes of the eight point framework from David Crocker, since it
does not provide a single solution to all past wrongdoings, but is a blueprint of eight different tools
that a society can choose from. I will discuss how the most relevant points relate to Japan, and
summarize the solutions that can be useful tools towards reconciliation.
The first tool deals with truth, the “hard facts” or “forensic truth” (Crocker 1999: 7). This is
the information that explains which types of human rights have been violated, by whom, where,
when and how. In the context of Japan it is crucial to establish proper research about state
involvement in issues such as Yasukuni, Comfort Women and the Nanjing Massacre. A trilateral
commission could identify the perpetrators and the different levels of responsibility by researching
24
solid facts. One needs to be cautious, however, when researching the truth, since it can be a doubleedged sword and can harm people instead of benefitting them (Crocker 1999: 9). When researching
the truth of events, confrontation should be avoided where it is possible and mitigated where it
persists. In my opinion, the basic facts should be constructed with proper evidence so that each
individual can decide to believe it or not. Research on the truth of events can help create a common
understanding within Japanese society and within the region without the influence of politics.
Secondly, Crocker talks about a “public platform for victims” where people can explain and
share their lived experience of wartime atrocities (Crocker 1999: 11). The respect for human dignity
can overcome personal humiliation empowering them as citizens (Crocker 1999: 11). There is a
risk, however, of backlash and atrocities towards victims and perpetrators which can be prevented
by conducting independent investigations of accusers’ testimony (Crocker 1999: 11). After a four
decade silence on the Comfort Women issue, Japan has begun to downplay the events, which can be
counterbalanced by researching the truth on this issue.
Research on the truth not only helps victims to share their stories, but solves Japan’s burning
problem of accountability and punishment (Crocker 1999: 11-12). It is important that victims
receive proper compensation and perpetrators who held high positions in the Japanese government
and military – along with nationally declaring Hirohito as a violator of human rights – are legally
held accountable. It is also important to distinguish the responsibility between “sins of omission”
and “sins of commission” (Crocker 1999: 13). For example, how does the U.S. failure to hold war
criminals and the emperor accountable of war crimes against East Asian nations compare to those
of the wartime military leaders? Here national responsibility is weighed against international
responsibility. To establish a platform for responsibility, the rulings of international tribunals should
be adhered to at all times, including the one by the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on
Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery declaring Hirohito and the military establishment guilty of war
crimes against humanity (Sakamoto 2001: 49).
The last important point for Japan is what David Crocker calls “public deliberation” which
would shift Japan’s historical narrative from the political to the social sphere, including public
spaces, institutions and social agents. This concludes in a type of social contract/social agreement
which “permits a fair hearing for all and promotes morally acceptable compromises and tolerance of
remaining differences” (Bohman 1996 in Crocker 1999: 21).
Ever since the first “comfort woman” broke the silence after several decades there has not
been a year in Japan without public discussions of war memories linked to the Yasukuni Shrine and
social responsibility. If the country truly wants to reconcile within the region then it must do it
without the interference of politics and national interest. Apology must be sincere, heartfelt and put
forward by society as a whole. Japan’s new social wartime narrative can help people to understand
25
their past by opening up independent research groups in academia and hosting public discussions on
wartime experience. Politics here can only be useful if it follows upon its deeds, compensations and
does not use history for its own self-interest.
As stated before, it is not only the atomic bombs and the U.S. occupation that transformed
the image of Yasukuni, including Japanese history, but it is how politics transformed and used these
events to portray a different type of history for the country. This has caused ongoing conflict with
China, South Korea and sometimes even with its closest ally, the United States. Naturally, society
started to seriously deal with their national trauma from the 1960s onwards, which was further
developed from 1989 when the emperor died and some years later when the LDP lost its long-time
rule. The post-1989 era could also be called the “time of true democratization” which was promoted
by the full scale of Japanese media that publicized the peoples’ opinions. The polls presented the
underlying discrepancy between society and politics when it comes to controversial issues on
history. The non-homogenous society was more actively engaged in providing an official apology
and to reset relations with its neighbors than to push the nationalistic agenda of the government and
the Liberal Democratic Party. By providing the example of the official and unofficial role of
Yasukuni Shrine, it can be seen that politics has failed the people to an extent where it could not
provide society with an alternative form of commemoration. In conclusion, David Crocker
emphasizes public instead of political tools which a society can choose from to start the
reconciliation process. If Japan is willing to research the truth, provide victims with a platform and
compensation, hold the perpetrators accountable, or mix several of these tools together, it will be
able to create a type of “Swiss army knife” which can help solve Japan’s unique memory problems.
Memory is always more complex than the official use of history. The creative tension between the
political rhetoric and exploitation of memory, and individual and collective memories might bring
about new approaches to the past; in other words, the dissonance between official political usages of
history and memory and what people remember may open up a new and creative public space to
discuss and debate the past.
“Since we cannot change reality, let us change the eyes which see reality”
-
Nikos Kazantzakis
26
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