Caleb Leedy
The Tri-Moral Model: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Relativism and Universalism
A great schism in Philosophy is the divide between ethical relativism and ethical
objectivism; the former holds that the “moral rightness and wrongness of actions vary from
society to society”1 and that “no absolute or objective moral standards…apply to all people
everywhere,”2 while the latter maintains that “everyone has sufficient reasons to follow [the
moral] law”3. Morality is thus the need for any true change—the “ought” that changes what “is”
into “what it should be.” However, this limited definition of morality fails to account for the
change in scope of moral issues. There is a wide range of moral issues and grouping the morality
of killing people with the morality of eating meat is an unjust incorporation. Part of the problem
when discussing moral issues is that universalists discuss moral issues of a vaster larger scale
than ethical relativists. Universalists tend to argue about issues that can apply to everyone, like
infanticide4, whereas relativists tend to base their argument on more personable issues, like the
correct way to greet strangers5. Thus, there needs to be a differentiation between moral beliefs.
There is a difference between the moral scope of infanticide and greeting others. To solve the
problem of different degrees of moral importance, we need to characterize such moral beliefs
into the Tri-Moral Model, having Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Moral sentiments. Therefore,
by breaking morality into three different groups, morality is neither purely objective, nor purely
relative; the degree to which morality needs be universally accepted is the degree to which moral
standards violate fundamental rights.
Primary morals are principles that must be true regardless of location and context. In
1. John Ladd, Ethical Relativism, qtd. in Louis P. Pojman A Critique of Ehical Relativism
2. Ibid.
3. Gilbert Harman, “Is There a Single True Morality”
4. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy
5. William Graham Sumner, “Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Manners,
Customs, Mores and Morals”
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regards to the truth of moral principles, neither a correspondence test—a truth test that measures
whether belief matches with reality—nor a coherence test—a truth test that measures the validity
of an argument—will be used. The former will not be used because there is no physical
representation of morality on earth. The latter will not be used because the coherence of morality
would have to be tested against many different views of thinking—a scope too large for this
paper. Rather, truth will be tested based on whether a statement, as Kessler eloquently describes,
“works”6. Primary morals must be universal because universalism is the only framework of
belief that works. There must be an objective standard to be able to change an “is” into an
“ought.” Without universalism there is no impetus to be able to change anyone’s actions or
belief. Santa Claus is just as moral as Bull Conner because the lack of an objective standard
means that neither one of the figures is doing anything good or bad. Ethical relativism cannot
apply to Primary Morals because ethical relativism cannot judge diametrically opposing ideas
between cultures. If a mugger wants to kill his victim and the victim does not want to die, the
ethical relativist cannot reconcile the two ideas because the sovereignty of ideas has been given
to culture, to which anyone can appeal. As Pojman explains, having a subjective view of societal
morality, that is an ethical relativistic view, could require that “Adolf Hitler was as moral as
Gandhi, so long as each believed he was living by his chosen principles”7. The fundamental
belief of ethical relativism, that that the morals of all cultures have value is absurd. Defining
culture to be the beliefs of a collection of people, one could determine that a culture is the beliefs
shared between an X amount of people. Because there is nothing unique about having X amount
of people believe an idea rather than (X-1) amount of people, we could subtract people from the
6. Gary Kessler Voices of Wisdom 8th Edition 359
7. Louis P. Pojman “A Critique of Ethical Relativism”
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group and still maintain the culture until we have two people. Any human being is prone to
mistakes. Having two people agree does not create a correct argument. Even adding more
people, while it might be more unlikely, does not guarantee that a correct idea will be agreed
upon, especially since the additional person is as mistake prone as the people in the group.
Therefore, ethical relativism cannot justify Primary Morals—there must be an objective standard
from which to judge people. Only a Universalist approach can provide an objective standard
from which a person’s decisions may be scrutinized. Without this moral weight ethics implodes,
as there is no means to criticize other people.8 However, only Primary Morals are justified by the
universalistic view of morals because ethical relativism is not self-contradictory with the
Secondary and Tertiary Spheres of morality.
Secondary Morals are principles that one can accept in another culture, but not in one’s
own culture. Unlike Primary Morals where diametrically opposing ideas are annihilated,
contrasting Secondary Morals can be tolerated, yet it would be difficult constantly be around
someone with opposing Secondary Morals. One example of a Secondary Moral could be the
killing of domestic dogs for food. While killing dogs for food may be acceptable in an eastern
culture, I would have problems with someone killing my own dog here in the west. For
Secondary Morals there is no universal law to which one must always follow. Instead, one must
be conscious of the culture in which one is. Practically speaking, ethical relativism is an
appropriate tool to use to justify a Secondary Moral because the stake of the issue is not as vital
as a Primary Moral. Due to the fact that Secondary Morals are dependent on culture in which one
is located, universalism is too overreaching because universalism requires that all culture accept
8. The absurdity of not being able to criticize another is more profound once one considers the
fact that no one is justified in criticizing the one who is criticizing.
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the same moral or morals, which need not apply to Secondary Morals because differences within
the environment of a culture could produce different moral standards. While having ethical
relativism as the core of a moral code is absurd because the lack of an objective standard forgoes
any “ought” to change what a culture “is,” ethical relativism is needed in Secondary Morals
because ethical decisions are based on culture.
Tertiary Morals are principles that vary from culture to culture or within a culture, and
can be accepted in a culture different than the culture of origin. For example different people
have different opinions regarding pencil tapping. From experience I have found that the tapper
generally regards pencil tapping as morally sound, while the listener believes that pencil tapping
ought to end. The scope of pencil tapping is insignificant enough that not only is there a lack of
universal law, but there is also the lack of a cultural law. Consequently, neither Primary nor
Secondary Morals can properly be applied to the situation. Tertiary Morals are basically
Secondary Morals applied on a smaller scale—the individual. Like Secondary Morals, Tertiary
Morals are justified by ethical relativism. In fact, Tertiary Morals are just like Secondary Morals
except that these principles can be carried out in foreign cultures without any consequences.
While anyone can divide morality into many different parts the key to the Tri-Moral
Model is answering the question: how does one determine to which category a moral principle
belongs? For the Tri-Moral Model, the category that a moral principle aligns with is based upon
the degree to which the moral principle violates fundamental rights. A fundamental right is a
natural right that is, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, “self-evident”9 and “unalienable”10. If a
moral principle deals with a right that is “self-evident” or “unalienable” then it is a Primary
9. “The United States Declaration of Independence”
10. Ibid.
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Moral. If the moral principle does not violate a self-evident or inalienable right, but breaks a
legal right within a culture, then the moral principle is a Secondary Moral. If a moral principle
violates neither a self-evident or inalienable right, nor a legal right, yet still remains a moral
principle then it is a Tertiary Principle. The primary difference between Primary, Secondary, and
Tertiary Morals is the scope of the fundamental rights—Primary Morals are morals that should
be universal; Secondary Morals are morals that should be cultural; Tertiary Morals are morals
that should be individual. It is important to understand that this paper simply argues for the
existence of three categories of morality—Primary Morals, Secondary Morals, and Tertiary
Morals—not where specific morals should be categorized. A main objection to the Tri-Moral
Model is the fact that a relativist may insist that no universal moral exists, or the Universalist
may claim the morals are purely universal. However, these objections can also be understood
within the Tri-Moral Model. The relativist is simply claiming that all morals are Secondary and
Tertiary, while the Universalist is claiming that all morals are Primary. This question regarding
the location of specific morals is too broad; this paper does not address this issue. Instead this
paper only asserts the existence of three classifications of morals—Primary Morals, Secondary
Morals, and Tertiary Morals.
Overall, the Tri-Moral Model, separating morality into Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary
branches, accounts for the fact that morality is neither purely relative, nor purely objective.
Understanding this model will hopefully reconcile the divide between universalism and ethical
relativism.
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Bibliography
Harman, Gilbert. "Is There a Single True Morality?." In Explaining value and other essays in
moral philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press ;, 2000. 77-100.
Kessler, Gary E.. Voices of wisdom: a multicultural philosophy reader. 8th ed. Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1992.
Ladd, John. Ethical relativism. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1974.
Pojman, Louis P.. Ethical theory: classical and contemporary readings. 2nd ed. Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1995.
Rachels, James. The elements of moral philosophy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.
Sumner, William Graham. Folkways; A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages,
Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals.. New York: The New American library, 1960.
United States Declaration of Independence. 1776