Testimony
The Islamic Republic of Iran
Under President Hassan Rouhani:
Violation of Human Rights and State
Sponsorship of International Terror
Ali Alfoneh
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Testimony before the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International
Human Rights
Ottawa, Canada
Tuesday, May 13, 2014
1726 M Street NW ● Suite 700 ● Washington, DC 20036
Ali Alfoneh
May 13, 2014
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for providing me with this opportunity to share my analysis with you. Allow
me in particular to express my gratitude to this subcommittee for raising the twin issues
of the Islamic Republic’s use of terror against its own citizens, and the regime’s
sponsorship of international terrorism.
All too often, these two issues are treated separately, with international terror enjoying
greater attention in the West than the violation of human rights in Iran. This of course
sends a terrible message to the Iranian public: “The West cares as long as the Islamic
Republic’s terror targets Western interests but ignores violations of the human rights of
Iranian citizens.” This hearing is an important step in correcting that perception among
the Iranian public.
Introduction
Almost a year has passed since Dr. Hassan Rouhani was inaugurated as the seventh
president in the history of the Islamic Republic.
I would like to reflect on this past year of Rouhani’s reign to consider two questions
raised by the Subcommittee on International Human Rights:
1. What is the state of human rights in Iran under President Rouhani?
2. What is the state of the Islamic Republic’s sponsorship of international terror
under President Rouhani?
At FDD, we employed a simple methodology to answer these questions:
We systematically surveyed the open source material, in particular the Persian language
sources, searching for indicators of human rights violations and the sponsorship of
international terror.
In both cases, as will be explained below, our research demonstrates that the Islamic
Republic under President Rouhani has not changed its fundamental view of terror as an
instrument of power against real and perceived adversaries, both in Iran and abroad, in
order to secure regime survival.
Due to the paucity of current data, our survey could not assess President Rouhani’s
current views concerning these issues, but historical data strongly indicates that in the
1990s, Dr. Rouhani could not have been ignorant of the regime’s use of terror as a
domestic control mechanism and possibly approved terrorism as a means of projecting
power abroad.
Based on the evidence presented below, we conclude that there is no reason to expect
meaningful improvement in the state of human rights in Iran under President Rouhani.
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Ali Alfoneh
May 13, 2014
We further conclude that the Islamic Republic’s sponsorship of international terror is
likely to continue.
The state of human rights in Iran under President Rouhani
Although the human rights issue did not hold a prominent place in Dr. Rouhani’s
campaign platform, he declared his intention to formulate a Charter of Citizens’ Rights
[Manshour-e Hoqouz-e Shahrvandi] in order to promote equality.1 The first draft of the
charter has since been released,2 but rather than promoting equality, the charter reflects
the inequalities codified in the Constitution and institutionalized in the political praxis of
the Islamic Republic.
When condemning discrimination against citizens, the charter stresses that it is against
“inappropriate discrimination” [tab’iz-e narava], implicitly condoning “appropriate
discrimination.” Examples of what the charter considers “appropriate discrimination”
include religiously-based discrimination against women and the discrimination of staterecognized religious minorities, who, for instance, are not allowed to run for president.
Religious minorities not recognized by the state, such as Bahais, atheists and followers of
mystic interpretations of Islam, who are subjected to systematic discrimination by the
state, are not even mentioned in the charter.
Freedoms recognized by the charter are restricted by reference to the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic and existing legislation, which in practice negates those freedoms.
Freedom of speech, for example, will be restricted by censorship and subjected to
subjective interpretations such as the broadly defined “acts against national security,”
“propagation against the regime,” “insulting” the leader and high ranking authorities and
the like. The charter further restricts freedom with reference to abstract and debatable
principles such as the “foundations of Islam” and “national security.”
Dr. Rouhani’s Charter of Citizens’ Rights, in other words, is the best proof that the
president is not intending to change the current state of the human rights of Iranian
citizens.
But even further, there is proof that the state of human rights in the Islamic Republic is
deteriorating under President Rouhani.
On March 13, 2014 Dr. Ahmad Shaheed, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, released his latest report,3 which praises the release
of 80 political prisoners upon President Rouhani’s election but condemns the
imprisonment of 92 human rights defenders; 39 bloggers and journalists; 307 members of
religious minorities, including Shi’a religious activists who do not share the belief in the
concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist [Velayat-e Faqih], members of the Bahai faith
converts to Christianity, Sunni Muslims and Islamic mystics; and more than 200 activists
propagating the cause of ethnic minorities in Iran who are currently imprisoned.
Dr. Shaheed’s report also documents the execution of 624 individuals in 2013, which is
an increase from 522 executions in 2012. The majority of those executed were found
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Ali Alfoneh
May 13, 2014
guilty in murder or narcotics-related crimes, but there were also a few cases where the
individuals were convicted of waging armed struggle against the Islamic Republic,
waging war against God, and terrorism related charges.
Since the release of Dr. Shaheed’s report, the newspaper Ebtekar was banned for three
days,4 while Aseman,5 Bahar,6 9 Dey,7 and Qanoun8 are indefinitely banned. Moreover,
on the morning of April 17, 2014, the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization,
elements within the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and more than one hundred
prison wardens violently attacked the political prisoners at Ward 350 of Evin Prison. This
marked the peak of violence against political prisoners since Dr. Rouhani’s presidential
inauguration.9
There are those who defend President Rouhani’s human rights record. On May 3, 2014,
Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, expediency council chairman, accused
unnamed individuals and power centers of increasing the pressure against political
prisoners “in order to put the government under real pressure, to exhaust it and tell the
world that they [the government] are inefficacious without authority.”10
Historical data, however, suggests that in the 1990s Dr. Rouhani could not have been
ignorant of the regime’s use of terror and human rights violations as a control mechanism
domestically, and possibly approved terrorism as a means of projecting power abroad.
-
On July 14, 1980, Mr. Rouhani, in his capacity as parliamentarian and
political/ideological commissar in the regular military, demanded the public
hanging of perceived “plotters” against the regime and “saboteurs.”11
-
Ever since Mr. Rouhani was appointed Representative of the Supreme Leader to
the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and SNSC secretary on
November 13, 1989, 12 he was involved in decision making concerning acts of
armed suppression of dissidents in Iran, including extremely violent armed
suppression of the May 1992 riots in Mashhad, as well as Shiraz and Eslamshahr,
which Mr. Rouhani admits the SNSC failed to predict. 13 Moreover, the
assassinations of Iranian dissidents, both in Iran and abroad, which took place
during the Rafsanjani presidency and later became known as “chain” or “serial”
killings, were part of a pattern of which Mr. Rouhani and Ayatollah Rafsanjani
could not have been ignorant.14
-
In a July 14, 1999 speech, Mr. Rouhani referred to student uprisings as a “foreign
opportunist plot,” and blamed a group of people “who have no connection to our
dear students.” The Law Enforcement Forces’ suppression of the student activists
and the subsequent Revolutionary Tribunal rulings against them, used similar
allegations, which of course were pure fabrications made by Mr. Rouhani and the
regime.
Based on the findings of Dr. Shaheed and further restrictions of press freedom in the
aftermath of the publication of his report, and Dr. Rouhani’s earlier statements, we
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Ali Alfoneh
May 13, 2014
conclude that there is no reason to expect any significant improvement in the state of
human rights in Iran under President Rouhani.
The Islamic Republic’s Sponsorship of International Terror under President
Rouhani
The Islamic Republic’s support for international terror is codified in Article 154 of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which states: “While scrupulously refraining
from all forms of interference in the affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggle
of the oppressed against the oppressors in every corner of the globe.”15 This concept was
later termed the “export of the revolution.”
The late Hojjat al-Eslam Mohammad Montazeri, one of the founding fathers of the Office
of the Liberation Movements, which was the main agent of exporting the revolution
abroad, in his March 19, 1980 interview with Payam-e Enqelab (mouthpiece of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)) explained the support of “liberation
movements” as a means of keeping enemies of the regime in Tehran busy on their own
soil rather than challenging the Islamic Republic at Iran’s international borders.16 This
fundamentally was the reason why the Islamic Republic began supporting terrorist
organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas.
In his past statements, Dr. Rouhani has commented on the usefulness of terror as a means
of deterring the enemy. As the Islamic Republic’s clandestine nuclear cooperation with
the Khan network in Pakistan became known, Dr. Rouhani made a speech discussing the
June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Dahran, Saudi Arabia, which he insisted
was a “domestic [Saudi] affair.”17 On December 22, 2006, a federal judge ruled that Iran
is responsible for the bombing and ordered the government of the Islamic Republic to pay
$254 million to the families of 17 Americans who died in the attack. 18 The attacks,
Rouhani argued, showed the United States that “at least for some time – it no longer can
count on this island of stability [Saudi Arabia].” Rouhani continued: “[U]ntil today, in the
region there was one type of fundamentalism, Shi’a fundamentalism, which they [the
United States] tried to do away with, but today Sunni fundamentalism too has risen.” 19 If
we read between the lines, it is clear Dr. Rouhani was saying that the regime in Tehran
was ready, if necessary, to unleash Sunni terrorism against the United States in the region
in an attempt to delay a military confrontation, which in the same speech, he expressed as
inevitable.
Addressing Friday prayer leaders in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, Dr. Rouhani almost expressed joy: “Within the United States, there is terror,”
Rouhani said. He continued, “A fear, unprecedented in the course of the past hundred
years… Arms sales has increased 70%… the public fears more attacks, this time with
chemical agents, which adds to public fears… discussions about use of anthrax and
biological agents being used in future attacks is creating greater fear among the
people…” Mentioning examples of how ordinary Americans prepare for such attacks,
Rouhani rhetorically asks the audience, “You see how this island of stability has been
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Ali Alfoneh
May 13, 2014
transformed into the land of fear?”20 Dr. Rouhani seems to have been communicating
what he perceived as weaknesses of the United States to the Friday prayer leaders.
Ever since taking over the presidency, Dr. Rouhani has become even more careful in his
public statements. We do not have reason to believe that he fundamentally disagrees with
the support of terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and to a degree Hamas as means of
power projection abroad, but there may be tactical differences between President Rouhani
and other major actors in the Islamic Republic’s decision-making establishment.
The Rouhani government’s approach to the crisis in Syria provides interesting insights
into those tactical differences.
The Alawite regime in Syria is not only the oldest state ally of the Islamic Republic, it
also serves the strategic interests of Tehran as a bridge between Shi’ite interests spanning
from Western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. As former president Rafsanjani said in a
December 24, 2012 meeting with Iraq’s special envoy to Iran, “We must possess Syria. If
the chain from Lebanon to here is cut, bad things will happen.”21
Major General Qassem Suleimani, 22 commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF), has stressed the importance of Syria as a core component
of the Iranian-led “resistance” to Israel and the United States. Interestingly, during
Suleimani’s September 4 address to Iran’s Assembly of Experts, he identified the
importance of Syria in challenging two Sunni Arab adversaries of the Islamic Republic:
Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Remarkably, Ayatollah Rafsanjani recently condemned the Syrian government’s use of
chemical weapons. We believe Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s statements, which were delivered
at a time a United States invasion of Syria seemed inevitable, may have been an attempt
to demonstrate President Rouhani’s readiness to sacrifice Bashar al-Assad so as not to
lose all of the Islamic Republic’s assets in Syria.
Challenging Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s public statements, Major General Suleimani 23
pledged the IRGC’s full support to the Syrian dictator. Supreme Leader Khamenei took
the side of the IRGC and issued a brazen warning to Washington against the use of force
in Syria24 while foreign minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif candidly told members of the
P5+1 group that he is not authorized to discuss developments in Syria.25
The struggle for Iran’s official line in the Syrian conflict clearly showed that Major
General Suleimani had the upper hand, and not President Rouhani.
Based on these findings, we conclude that the Islamic Republic under President Rouhani
has not changed its fundamental view of terror as a means of power projection abroad.
Differences between President Rouhani and other decision-makers, such as the
Revolutionary Guards, are tactical and not strategic, and the Islamic Republic’s Syria
policy shows that the IRGC, rather than President Rouhani, had the upper hand in
strategic decision-making concerning use of terrorism.
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Ali Alfoneh
May 13, 2014
Policy Recommendations for the Government of Canada
We would recommend the following:
1. The Government of Canada has hitherto provided a sanctuary for victims of
human rights in Iran. Many Iranians found a second home in Canada and as
Iranian/Canadians contribute to the Canadian society. I am urging the
Government of Canada to continue this humanitarian effort.
2. The Government of Canada has designated the IRGC Quds Force (IRGC QF) as a
terrorist organization. In addition to recommending that the entire IRGC be
designated as a terrorist organization, I also urge the Government of Canada to
identify and subject further individuals and entities involved in state sponsorship
of international terror to sanctions. This should include entities like the Imam
Khomeini Aid and Relief Committee, which provides material support to the
IRGC QF and in some cases acts as a front for the IRGC QF.
Allow me to thank you once more for inviting me to testify before this distinguished
subcommittee.
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Ali Alfoneh
May 13, 2014
“Manshour-e Hoqouq-e Shahrvandi Tadvin Khaham Kard.” [I Will Formulate a Charter of Citizen
Rights] Bashgah-e Khabarnegaran (Tehran) April 11, 2013, available in Persian at:
http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4336410/%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF (accessed May 11, 2014).
2
Moavenat-e Hoqouqi-ye Riasat-e Jomhouri: “Matn-e Pishnevis-e Manshour-e Hoqouq-e Shahrvandi –
Gam-e Avval: Osoul-e Kolli, Barnameh va Khat-e-Mash-ye Dowlat.” [Draft of the Charter of Citizen
Rights – First Step: General Principles, Government Policy and Guidelines] December 2013, available in
Persian at: http://www.president.ir/att/shahrvandi.pdf (accessed May 11, 2014).
3
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: “Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” March 13, 2014,
available at: http://shaheedoniran.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/A-HRC-25-61-updated.pdf (accessed
May 11, 2014).
4
“Towqif-e Ebtekar…” [Ebtekar Banned] ISNA (Tehran) April 26, 2014, available in Persian at:
http://isna.ir/fa/news/93020603651/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AA%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%81 (accessed May 11, 2014).
5
“Towqif-e Aseman…” [Aseman Banned] ISNA (Tehran) February 20, 2015, available in Persian at:
http://isna.ir/fa/news/92120100253/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A2%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84 (accessed May
11, 2014).
6
“Rouznameh-ye Bahar Towqif Shod.” [Bahar Daily Was Banned] Aftab (Tehran) April 19, 2010,
available in Persian at:
http://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/97868/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%B4%D8%AF (accessed May 11, 2014).
7
“Haftehnameh-ye 9 Dey Towqif Shod.” [9 Dey Weekly Banned] ISNA (Tehran) March 18, 2014,
available in Persian at: http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/92122717981/%D9%87%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-9-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%81-%D8%B4%D8%AF (accessed May 11, 2014).
8
“Rouznameh-ye Qanoun Towqif Shod.” [Qanoun Newspaper Was Banned] Fars News (Tehran) May 7,
2014, available in Persian at: http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930217000571 (accessed May
11, 2014).
9
“Hamleh-ye Vahshianeh Be Band-e 350 Evin.” [Savage Attack Against Evin’e Ward 350] Kaleme
(Abroad) April 17, 2014, available in Persian at: http://www.kaleme.com/1393/01/28/klm-180841/
(accessed May 11, 2014).
10
“Ayatollah Hashemi: Dar Defae Az Mazloum Jeddi Bashid…” [Ayatollah Hashemi: Be Serious When
Defending the Innocent…] May 3, 2014, available in Persian at: http://www.kaleme.com/1393/02/03/klm181956/ (accessed May 11, 2014).
11
Edareh-ye Tadvin-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Showra-ye Eslami: Mashrouh-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e
Showra-ye Eslami [Unabridged Proceedings of the Islamic Consultative Assembly] Tehran: Edareh-ye
Tadvin-e Mozakerat-e Majles-e Showra-ye Eslami. N.D. Dowreh-ye Avval, p. 202.
12
“Entesab-e Aqa-ye Hassan-e Rouhani Be Onvan-e Namayandeh-ye Moazzam-Lah Dar Showra-ye Ali-ye
Amniat-e Melli.” [Appointment of Mr. Hassan Rouhani As His Excellency’s Representative to the
Supreme National Security Council] Paygah-e Ettela-e-Resani-ye Daftar-e Maqam-e Moazzam-e Rahbari
1
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Ali Alfoneh
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(Tehran) November 13, 1989, available in Persian at:
http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=contentShow&id=202 (accessed May 11, 2014).
13
Hassan Rouhani: Amniat-e Melli va Diplomasi-ye Hastehi [National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy]
Tehran: Majma-e Tashkihs-e Maslehat-e Nezam, Markaz-e Tahqiqat-e Estratezhik, 2012. P. 62.
14
Hojjat al-Eslam Ali Younesi, intelligence minister under Mohammad Khatami, recalling his conversation
with Rafsanjani says: “When I was appointed intelligence minister, Mr. Hashemi [Rafsanjani] discussed
with me on two occasions and said: ‘The way you have chosen has made this ministry into a municipal
office, and an ineffective organization of which no one is afraid.’ I reminded him that everywhere else in
the world, this method is called an intelligence service, and we too must pursue this so that the Intelligence
Ministry is in the service of the people.” “Younesi Vazir-e Ettelaat-e Sabeq Fash Kard: Tarh-e Masaleh-ye
Holocaust Be Shedat Be Naf-e Esraeil Tamam Shod.” [Younesi, Former Intelligence Minister Discloses:
Discussing the Holocaust Issue Was Extremely Beneficial to Israel] Ebrat News (Tehran) n.d., available in
Persian at: https://www.balatarin.com/permlink/2008/11/30/1462678 (accessed April 29, 2013).
15
“The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
16
Tahlili Bar Zarourat-e Tashkil-e Sepah Dar Se Bod-e Ideolozhi, Siyasi, Nezami” [An Analysis of the
Necessity of Establishing the Guards in the Three Dimensions of Ideology, Politics, and Military], Payam-e
Enqelab (Tehran), March 19, 1980, p. 32.
17
Hassan Rouhani: Andisheh-ha-ye Siyasi-ye Eslam [Political Thought In Islam] Volumes I-III. Tehran:
Entesharat-e Komeyl, ca. 2009. P. 382.
18
Carol D. Leonnig: “Iran Held Liable in Khobar Attack.” The Washington Post, December 23, 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/22/AR2006122200455.html.
19
p.cit. Andisheh-ha-ye Siyasi-ye Eslam, Vol.II, p. 382.
20
“Enfejarha-ye Amrika va Manafe Melli-ye Jomhouri-ye Eslami.” [The Explonsions in America and the
National Interests of the Islamic Republic] Rahbord (Tehran) Autumn of 2001, NO 21, op. 22-23.
21
“Montasher Nashodeh-ha-ye Hashemi Darbareh-ye Souriyeh.” [Hashemi’s Unpublished Material on
Syria] Hashemi Rafsanjani (Tehran) September 3, 2013, available in Persian at:
http://www.hashemirafsanjani.ir/fa/node/209295 (accessed February 10, 2014).
22
“Ta Akhar Az Souriyeh Hemayat Mikonim.” [We Will Defend Syria to the Very End] Fars News
(Tehran) September 4, 2013, available in Persian at:
http://farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920613000905 (accessed February 10, 2014).
23
Op.cit. “Ta Akhar Az Souriyeh Hemayat Mikonim.”
24
“Amrika Darbareh-ye Souriyeh Khata Mikonad…” [The United States is Wrong About Syria…] Fars
News (Tehran) September 5, 2013, available in English at:
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920614000362 (accessed February 10, 2014).
25
“Amrika: Zarif Faqed-e Ekhtiarat-e Mozakereh Darbareh-ye Souriyeh Ast.” [The United States: Zarif
Has No Authority to Discuss Syria] BBC Persian (London) February 4, 2014, available in Persian at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2014/02/140204_u02_zarif_syria.shtml (accessed February 11, 2014).
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