Pragmatic Ethics of Belief is Evidentialism
Wei Jing
I.
Introduction
Ethics of Belief is a philosophical concept at the junction of epistemology and ethics.
Epistemology concerns what counts as knowledge, for which justification, belief and truth are
the core concepts. Ethics concerns the norms regulating human behaviour. Conventionally,
epistemology is retrospective and descriptive which examines what is knowledge, while
ethics is prospective and normative which explores what should we do. Ethics of belief brings
the two together – what should we believe. It concerns the moral norms of belief formation,
belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. The central question concerned is whether it is
obligatory to have sufficient evidence for beliefs (or whether it is always morally wrong to
believe something on insufficient evidence).
Some philosophers, like William Clifford and John Locke, hold that it is always obligatory
to have sufficient evidence for a belief (Zalta et al., 2010). These philosophers are referred to
as evidentialists. On the contrary, some other philosophers, like Pascal and Reisner (Zalta et
al., 2010), argue that sufficient evidence is not obligatory for beliefs. These philosophers are
referred to as non-evidentialists. William James (1896, cited in Zalta et al., 2010) criticizes
that Clifford’s evidentialist principle is impracticably stringent. In his “The Will to Believe”,
James (1896, cited in Zalta et al., 2010) proposed a more liberal principle of belief –
pragmatic ethics of belief. By criticizing Clifford’s principle, James’ pragmatic ethics of
belief is conventionally classified as non-evidentialism (Zalta et al., 2010).
In this paper, I will argue that James’ pragmatic theory of belief is essentially evidentialism,
rather than non-evidentialism as it is conventionally understood. I will first discuss the
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principles of evidentialism, non-evidentialism, and James’ pragmatic ethics of belief. Then by
analysing the insight of James’ theory, I will argue that James’ theory is essentially
evidentialism, if we follow pragmatism’s definition of facts, truth and justification. I will
further clarify my argument by distinguishing pragmatic ethics of belief from some nonevidentialist principles.
II.
Evidentialism, Non-evidentialism, and James’ Ethics of Belief
In The Ethics of Belief, Clifford (1877) argues that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and
for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence”. Clifford gives a shipowner’s story to
exemplify his argument. The shipowner saw his ship’s ricketiness and heard its unusual
sound. But knowing that repairing the ship was costly and would cause delay for the
passengers, he pushed aside the worries and came to believe that his ship was seaworthy.
Unfortunately, the ship sank in the middle of the sea. In the story, Clifford (1877) claims that
the shipowner was “verily guilty of the death of those men”, because “he had no right to
believe [that his ship was seaworthy] on such evidence as was before him”. To strengthen his
argument, Clifford changes the story. He supposes that the ship fortunately safely reached the
destination. In this case, even if no harm was caused, he claims that the shipowner is still
blameable of his wrong belief (Clifford, 1877).
Contrary to Clifford, non-evidentialists argue that in some contexts, it is permissible and
even obligatory to hold a belief without the support of sufficient evidence (Zalta et al., 2010).
Non-evidentialists emphasize the purpose (or aim) of a belief. More explicitly, if one wants to
achieve some aim and he knows that some beliefs will make that aim (easier to) obtain, then
he has prima facie obligation to form and hold those beliefs, even if for which he has no
sufficient evidence. For example, suppose you want to maintain a good relationship with your
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friend who once borrowed $100 from you. You are not sure whether he has return to you the
money, even though he says that he has. But you are sure that to believe that he has returned
you the money is good for maintaining your friendship. In this case, you have a prima facie
obligation to believe that your friend has returned to you the money even though you do not
have sufficient evidence for the belief.
James criticizes the impracticable stringency of Clifford’s principle. James (1896)
addresses “two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion”, namely, to believe truth,
and to shun error. The two duties are separable, although they sometimes overlap. Sometimes,
when we believe some truth, we may incidentally avoid some falsehood at the same time.
However, James (1896) argues that it hardly ever happens that by merely disbelieving a
falsehood we necessarily believe a truth. We may disbelieve a falsehood by believing nothing
at all (James, 1896). For example, agnosticism believes neither the existence of God nor the
nonexistence of God.
James (1896) argues that neither one of the two duties, to believe truth and to shun error, is
morally more privileged than the other. On this account, Clifford’s principle is partial. It
favours avoidance of error over pursuit of truth. When Clifford is cautious of believe
falsehood, he is craven of pursuing truth. James (1896) set up the conditions, in which
Clifford’s principle is likely to hinder pursuit of truth – cases of genuine options. James (1896)
defines a genuine option as an option that is forced, living, and momentous.
First, an option is forced if there is no way to avoid it (James, 1896). For example, to be
religious or not to be religious is a forced option; but to be a Christian or a Buddhist monk is
not (you may avoid the choices by being a free-thinker). Second, an option is living when all
its choices make sense and are real possibilities in the person’s mind. For example, to finish
writing this paper or not to finish it is a living option for me; but to give up manufacturing
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nuclear weapon or not is not a living option for me (but it is a living option for Kim Jung-il),
since I am not faced with these choices. Third, an option is momentous if it is unique,
significant, irreversible, and if there is not much time to wait. When I see a child drowning, to
save him or not is a momentous option for me; but whether to go to a movie this Sunday is
not momentous (I still have enough time to think, and even if I do not go there this Sunday, I
can still go next Sunday).
When the option is genuine, that is, when it is forced, living and momentous, the person
must make a choice swiftly. Whatever choice he make (even not to choose is one choice for
him, which is choice for Clifford when he lacks sufficient evidence), he makes the choice at
his only peril. James (1896) argues that in such a case, the person should choose based his
passion, desire, or will. There is no time to wait for sufficient evidence to come (to wait is to
choose not-to-choose). Truth or falsehood will be in the making after the choice.
James (1896) claims that in cases of genuine options of beliefs, belief in some truth may
bring about that truth’s existence. He addresses some social contract and collective action
situations. For example, friendship is based on mutual trust, or mutual belief, in each other. If
one disbelieves the other because he lacks sufficient evidence for the other’s belief in him,
then friendship is impossible. James (1896) claims that governments, armies, commercial
systems, etc. are grounded on the similar mutual trust and mutual belief of the people. If
Clifford’s principle is to apply, these systems will never come into existence, since nobody
have sufficient evidence for whether others will cooperate in the system or whether the
system will be successful. However, they trust each other, and believe that others will
cooperate. This brings governments, armies, commercial systems, etc. into existence.
James’ pragmatic ethics of belief, in short, claims that belief in truth helps create truth. It
accepts Clifford’s principle, when the option of belief is not genuine. But when the option of
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belief is genuine, that is, when it living, forced, and momentous, the person should choose
whether to belief according to his own will and at his own peril.
III.
The Insight of Pragmatic Ethics of Belief
James’ pragmatic ethics of believe is conventionally classified as non-evidentialism. It
apparently claims one’s right to (pragmatically) believe something on insufficient evidence
when the belief leads to good ends. However, it is not essentially so. Pragmatism is a
reformation of philosophy, including ethics and epistemology. It reforms the definitions of
the facts, truth, and justification. If we follow pragmatism’s own definition of these concepts,
pragmatism is not non-evidentialism. It is essentially evidentialism.
3.1 Pragmatic Facts
For Aristotle, facts (substances) are the things that exist in their own right. In other worlds,
facts are things in themselves, a priori, and independent from our consciousness. But
pragmatism rejects this notion of facts. In pragmatism, facts are our experiences of things (the
world, an object, an event, etc.).
For Dewey, things are what they are experienced as. Things exist only in relation to us. It
is our experience that determines what things are. For example, my mobile phone is
experienced by me as a mobile phone. But if I give it to a 3-year-old kid, it is a game machine
for him, since he uses it only to play games rather than make phone calls or send messages.
Peirce has a similar notion of objects. Peirce (1878, cited in Ames, 2013) claims that “[when
you] consider the practical effects of the objects of your conception, [t]hen, your conception
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of those effects is the whole of your conception of the objects”. In other words, our
conception of an object is the effects that the object has on our experience.
Dewey’s and Peirce’s notions of facts are similar to that of James. James (1907, cited in
Ames, 2013) also claims that “reality is what it is known as … and what an object is known
as depends on … sense experience.” For pragmatism, facts are not things in themselves. Facts
are our experiences of things (or, in Peirce’s words, the practical effects that things have on
our experiences).
3.2 Pragmatic Truth
Some philosophers, like Clifford, identify truth with facts. For them, something is truth if
and only if it is factual. But in pragmatism, truth and facts are different concepts. Facts are
what things are experienced as. Facts are experienced as, in a retrospective sense.
But truth is progressive. “For pragmatists, truth and falsity are not properties of ideas, nor
even the relations of ideas to facts, but instead are characteristics of the performance of ideas
in situations” (Ames, 2013). In short, what is true is what performs well in (past, present, and
more importantly, future) situations. In James’ (1907) words,
Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to
them … The ‘facts’ themselves meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth
is the function of beliefs that start and terminate among them.
In short, facts simply are; truth is an outgrowth of facts. Truth is in the making and it
creates values. “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief,
and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons” (James, 1907). In other words, what is truth is
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good. Furthermore, truth may come in degree (more true, less true, most true, etc.). What is
most true is what works the best in the way of leading our lives and creating experiences.
3.3 Pragmatic Justification
Philosophers do not and a unanimous theory of justification (or evidence). But in general,
their think justification (evidence) includes both the truth (facts) and our consciousness of the
truth (facts). In other words,
X is justified for you (X is an evidence for you), when X is true and you know that X is true.
Since most philosophers identify truth with facts, it is also the case that X is justified for
you, when X is a fact and you know X. However, for pragmatism, truth is different from facts.
Therefore, the definition of justification (evidence) will be different, depending on whether
we define it based on facts or on truth.
Suppose we use facts, that is, X is justified for you, when X is a fact and you know X. Then
for pragmatism, X is justified for you, when X is in your experience and you know that X is in
your experience. Since your experience is activity of your consciousness, you always know
your experience. Therefore, X is your evidence when X is in your experience. According to
this simple definition, dream, imagination, and wishful thinking are all valid evidences, since
they are all real experiences. This definition is not what pragmatists want.
For pragmatism, it is better to define justification (evidence) based on truth. That is, X is
justified when X is true and you know that X is true. Truth, for pragmatism, is not static. It is
in the making. It is what works well in the way of leading our experience. Since truth is
progressive, justification based on truth must also be progressive, or explicitly,
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X is justified for you (X is an evidence for you), when X works well in the way of leading
your experience and you know that X works well in the way of leading your experience.
Justification, like truth, is progressive and in the making. In James’ (1896) words, “I live,
to be sure, by the practical faith that we must go on experiencing and thinking over our
experience, for only thus can our opinions grow more true”. Justification is the examination
of experience and the verification of faith, on the way of experiencing. Justification of a
belief does not arrive before the formation of that belief. Instead, you are justified of the
belief when that belief works well in the way of leading your experience, after your formation
of that belief.
Your will to belief is, not the result, but the starting point of your justification process of
the belief. For example, when making friends, your belief that you will get along well with
each other is the starting point of your friendship; and your friendship is your justification
that you get along well with each other. Your belief cannot be the result of your friendship,
because friendship is impossible without your beliefs in each other. This applies in other
collective action and social contract cases, for example, marriage, government, commercial
system, social movements, etc.
3.4 Pragmatic Ethics of Belief is Evidentialism
We have viewed pragmatism’s definition of facts, truth, and justification (evidence). Facts
are our experiences of things. Truth is what works well in the way of leading our experiences.
Justification is based on truth, rather than facts, and
X is justified for you (X is an evidence for you), when X works well in the way of leading
your experience and you know that X works well in the way of leading your experience.
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If we follow pragmatism’s definition of facts, truth, and justification, we will see that
pragmatic ethics of belief is a species of evidentialism. As James does, we may separate the
options of beliefs into two sets, namely, the non-genuine options of beliefs, the genuine
(living, forced, and momentous) options of beliefs.
James (1896) admits that Clifford’s principle applies when the option of belief is not
genuine, namely, when the option is not living, or not forced, or not momentous. In such
cases, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient
evidence” (Clifford, 1877). In non-genuine options of belief, we may wait to collect more
evidence to strengthen the belief. For example, suppose that I am doing a multiple-choice
question in an exam, but I am not sure whether the correct option is C, although it looks to
me the best option. I have confidently finished all other questions and there is still 30 minutes
left. The best thing for me to do then is to, first, think of things that may validate or invalidate
my belief in C; and second, think of other options A, B, and D, and try to validate or
invalidate them. After I have eliminated the other options and I have come up with things that
strengthen my belief in C, I am (more) justified that C is the correct option.
However, what if there is only 2 seconds left when I am still not sure, although C looks to
me the best option? This is a case where the option is genuine: it is living since the choices A,
B, C, D, and not-to-choose are all real possibilities for me; it is forced since not-to-choose is
among the choices; it is momentous, since it is irreversible (not enough time for me to change
after the choice has been made), there is no time to wait, and (we may suppose that) it is a
very important exam. We suppose that no negative mark will be given for wrong choices. In
this case, the best thing for me to do is to trust my belief in C. I should just choose C. My
justification is that choosing C leads to better (or at least not worse) results than choosing notto-choose (Clifford’s choice).
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Thus in genuine options of beliefs, our will decides our belief. Our justification (evidence)
is that the belief (and thus the choice) leads to better results than to believe nothing at all (to
choose not-to-choose). To believe nothing at all is the worst choice here, and it is the least
pragmatically justified choice. In such cases, pragmatically, the principle that “it is wrong
always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence” is not
violated, when we hold our belief. Our belief has the most sufficient evidence, namely, it
leads to the best experiences. On the other hand, Clifford’s choice to believe nothing has the
most insufficient evidence, since it leads to the worst experiences. Therefore, in genuine
options of belief, we should hold our belief and refrain from believing nothing.
Therefore, in both the non-genuine and the genuine options of beliefs, the evidentialist
principle that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on
insufficient evidence” is pragmatically observed, if we follow the pragmatic definitions of
facts, truth and evidence. Thus, pragmatic ethics of belief is a species of evidentialism.
IV.
Distinction from Alternative Theories
In previous section, by analysing its insight, we conclude that pragmatic ethics of belief is
essentially evidentialism. Although James’ apparently criticizes Clifford’s evidentialist
principle of belief, his own principle does not violent the evidentialist principle in any cases,
if the epistemological terms are defined in pragmatic sense. Indeed, pragmatism makes no
separation between epistemology and ethics. In Lewis (1970, cited in Ames, 2013) words,
For the pragmatist, there can be no final division between “normative” and
“descriptive”. The validity of any standard of correctness has reference to
some order of “descriptive facts”; and every determination of facts reflects
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some judgement of values and constitutes an imperative for conduct. The
validity of cognition itself is inseparable from that final test of it which consists
in some valuable result of the action which it serves to guide. Knowledge – so
the pragmatist conceives – is for the sake of action; and action is directed to
realization of what is valuable.
In short, in pragmatism, epistemology and ethics are united. Truth is the good. Knowledge
is the norm and guidance of action for the realization of the truth (good).
In practise, pragmatic ethics of belief may lead to the same results (same choices of beliefs)
as some non-evidentialist theories, for example, prudential theory and utilitarian theory.
However, it is essentially different from the non-evidentialist theories.
4.1 Prudential Ethics of Belief
Prudential ethics of belief stresses the means-end relation. If you have an end and you
know a belief that will make the end obtain, then you have a prima facie (prudential)
obligation to hold that belief, even though you do not have sufficient evidence for that belief
(Zalta, et al., 2010).
Pragmatism is prudential, since it directs a belief (means) to a truth (end in the making).
However, it is different from the non-pragmatic prudential theories. In the second multiplechoice exam case, both pragmatists and non-pragmatic prudentialists would insist that I
should hold my belief and choose C. However, the non-pragmatic prudentialists would admit
that I do not have sufficient evidence for believing C, while pragmatists would claim that I
am justified in believing C since I know that it works best in the way of leading my
experience.
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This applies in all genuine options of beliefs: while non-pragmatic prudentialists admit our
lack of sufficient evidence, pragmatic ethics of belief claims our evidence based the belief’s
performance in leading our experiences.
4.2 Utilitarianism
Pragmatism should be distinguished from utilitarianism. In utilitarianism, the only thing
that is essentially and ultimately good is pleasure (or avoidance of pain). In its means-end
relation, a means is justified if it leads to promotion of pleasure (or avoidance of pain). But
for pragmatism, there is nothing as an ultimate good. Pragmatism’s truth (or good) is in the
making. It is the convergence of experience to a belief, and the verification of a belief in
experience.
Utilitarianism is dogmatic, which specifies and end, namely, pleasure, to guide actions. It
justifies actions by the Greatest Happiness Principle. But pragmatism is open-minded, which
does not predefine any ends. Its end is in the making, and revisable. Any belief that serves as
good guidance of actions is justified; and any action that leads to experiences converging to
the belief is approved.
V.
Remark
Ethics of belief concerns questions at the junction of epistemology and ethics.
Conventionally, epistemology verifies knowledge in a retrospective sense, while ethics
guides behaviour in a prospective sense. But when it comes to the question “what should we
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belief”, epistemology and ethics come together. Evidentialists claim that “it is wrong always,
everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence” (Clifford, 1877),
while non-evidentialists argue that it is sometimes permissible to hold a belief on insufficient
evidence.
James’ pragmatic ethics of belief criticizes Clifford’s evidentialist principle, and is
conventionally classified as a species of non-evidentialism. However, in this paper, by
analysing the insight of James’ theory, we find that it is essentially evidentialism. Pragmatism
redefines the epistemological terms – facts, truth, and justification. It defines facts as
experience, truth as goodness. It makes distinction between facts and truth, whereas
conventional philosophies identify the two. Pragmatic justification (evidence) is based on
truth rather than facts, more explicitly,
X is justified for you (X is an evidence for you), when X works well in the way of leading
your experience and you know that X works well in the way of leading your experience.
Based on pragmatism’s own definition of facts, truth and justification (evidence), James’
pragmatic ethics of belief observes evidentialist principle of believe in all cases, both the
genuine and the non-genuine. Therefore, pragmatic ethics of belief is essentially a species of
evidentialism.
Reference
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Dewey, J. (1930). “What I Believe”. The Essential Dewey. Vol. 1, pp 22-29. Indiana
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James, W. (1896). The Will to Believe. Penguin Classics 2007.
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism. Penguin Classics 2007.
James, W. (1909). Meaning of Truth. Penguin Classics 2007.
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