How to Interpret an Act: IRAC
I – Issue, state what the issue is. Like what word needs to be interpreted
R – Rule, Modern Synthesized Approach (Driedger)
A – Application, here you need to mention the different rules that are present and how they
apply. (G/O sense, scheme, purpose, external context, legislative intent/history)
C- Conclusion
1. Start with Introductory statement then discuss Issue
This is a case which requires an analysis of statutory interpretation. The issue in this case is
whether “the act applies to EPs situation and if the field in which the petting zoo playground of
the fair was held can be classified as a playground under s. 12.6(e) of the act”. From this list, it
can be deemed that whether this fair is a “playground” is the only issue because it is not a
publicly owned piece of land nor does it fall under the other more specified categories provided
under s. 12.6 of the Act. Also the other factual elements of the offence have been met. Therefore
the interpretation of this case will turn on the meaning of the word playground as it is used in s.
12.6(e). For the reasons described below, I conclude that the field in which the “petting zoo
playground” of the fair was conducted will be classified as a playground under s 12.6(e) and
should not have used the developmental pesticide.
-
this is statutory interpretation exercise
state what is most contentious and what the court would most likely conclude
this analysis looks at this statute and for the reasons below I conclude this
clearly state what the issue is
Need to decide which words are contentious in the act and what the decision is going to
turn on.
In the BBM example it is clear from the facts that the farmer owns the truck so just
mention that, just need to say that it is not an issue.
Make sure that you don’t identify the wrong issue. Like in BBM case, the issue is how
“about” is to be interpreted, not whether can take the truck on the highway
Also mention that since we are in BC will also go to the BCIA for help
3. Rule/Principle
The approach that will be used to interpret this Act will be the Modern Synthesized
Approach. It states that “statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the
legislation alone (Rizzo, para. 21). Rather, as Driedger’s principle states, “the words of an act
should be read harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of
Parliament” (Rizzo, para. 21). Therefore, when conducting this analysis the grammatical and
ordinary sense of the word will be examined. Then the purpose of the act will be looked at and
then the scheme of the act as a whole will be explored. Lastly the context in which this was
enacted, will be considered. The British Columbia Interpretation Act (BCIA) will also be used to
assist in the interpretation.
4. Application
Grammatical and Ordinary Sense:
- Before we conduct the grammatical and ordinary sense analysis, we must first go to the
act and BCIA to see if the word is defined there. If it is, then there is no need to conduct
this analysis. However, “” is not defined in either the Act or the BCIA and so we can
proceed with the analysis.
- Dictionary
o Shaklee: in absence of statutory definition, can use dictionary definition. But
sometimes dictionary definitions are so broad that you need to consider what the
ordinary person understands that word as meaning.
o Dictionary definitions may not always be determinative therefore it is necessary
to examine other factors that can determine how a word is to be defined. (Riddell)
- Ordinary Person
o “what would the reasonable person of average intelligence and understanding take
to be the usual meaning of the words?” (Shaklee)
o Sharpe: you read a word from the perspective of the reasonable person.
- Plain meaning
o McIntosh: the idea that the words should be read as they are written
- Plausible meaning
- Ordinary meaning
Purpose
- Purpose must also be established by looking at the context. Legislative intent can be
declared or implied.
- Components of the Act: Purpose statement, preamble, title is enacted with the Act, so
can show purpose also can use preamble, they assist (s.9)
- Section 8: this says that the interpretation must be remedial. This means that “every
enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction
and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of is objects.” So interpret so that it
fulfills the legislative purpose the best
- Presumptions about the area (tax, human rights) – they can go elsewhere
o Human Rights: Shouldn’t have strict interpretation of human rights legislation,
you have to be broad and the focus must be on human rights.
 Jubran: Have to let it apply because a narrow reading on the section is
inconsistent with the directions of the Supreme Court of Canada that
human rights legislation be given a broad interpretation that will advance
its purposes and objects and that the “strict grammatical approach” is
inappropriate.
o Taxation Statutes: Due to the complexities of polices and principles embodied in
taxation statutes, the court is reticent when faced with the task of interpretation.
The court will refrain from judicial innovation except in the case of explicit
authority by Parliament.
 Ludco: When interpreting the Income Tax Act courts must be mindful of
their role as distinct from that of Parliament. In the absence of clear
statutory language, judicial innovation is undesirable.

-
-
Imperial Oil: The particularity of tax provisions have often led to an
emphasis on textual interpretation.
o Municipal Law: United Taxi Drivers – a broad purposive approach to the
interpretation of municipal legislation is also consistent with this Court’s
approach to statutory interpretation generally.
o Professional Bodies: gradual shift away from the strict interpretation
Charter Values (this act has this purpose and should conform to these values)
o Presumption that legislature does not intend to adversely affect individual rights,
that where there are two reasonable interpretations, the court should select the one
which does the least harm to the individual rights, or presumption that legislation
which affects individuals rights should be given strict construction
o Bell ExpressVu: The courts did not look too kindly on government interference
on individual property rights. This then grew to apply to other rights in general
 Only should consult the Charter when situations of ambiguity arise.
 If the courts were to interpret all statutes such that they conformed to the
Charter, this would wrongly upset the balance between the three levels.
o Therefore when a statute is unambiguous, the courts must give effect to the
clearly expressed legislative intent and avoid using the Charter to achieve a
different result.
o Go to presumption of individual rights, only when ambiguous, last resort. Only
after you have conduct the modern synthesized approach and it is still ambiguous.
Benefit conferring legislation: parliament wouldn’t make legislation to be beneficial to
someone if it’s interpreted in a way that’s not beneficial to them (Merk, Rizzo).
Scheme: Other provisions in statute, subsections
- When examining scheme of the act one has to examine all the other sections of the act
which relate to the section in question.
- Look to see if there are definitions in the statute
- Binlinguality: Canada 3000 - one language is broader, go for restricted one. For bilingual
legislation shared meaning must be taken
- Latin Maxims
o Principle of Associated Meaning: a word takes its meaning from the
surrounding words. McDiarmid Lumber: In this case it was said that it makes
sense in the context of the act for the interpretation of the word agreement to be
formed by treaty.
o Presumption Against Tautology (Rule of Effectivity): All the words in an
enactment are put there for a specific purpose and accordingly one should not
adopt an interpretation of a provision that has the effect of rendering any of the
words in any section “redundant” or “mere surplussage”. McDiarmid: if
agreement was interpreted to cover all type of agreements between governments
and Indians, then the word treaty would have no role to play. Therefore,
agreement must be read more narrowly as supplementing treaty. “Or” must also
be considered because it is there for a reason
o Ejusdem Generis Principle: Provides that a general phrase (blanket clause) will
take its meaning from the specific words that precede it. The inevitable result
being that the general phrase will be narrowed. Nanaimo (City): the pile of dirt
-
-
didn’t fall under the basket clause because the municipality didn’t intend to
include almost everything as being a nuisance.
o Expressio Unius: Express meaning of one thing excludes all others by necessary
implication. The potential scope is immense, and therefore the courts have said
that this is a dangerous principle and should be used with great caution.
Children’s Aid Society: no indication that silence is meant no responsibility
o Uniformity of Expression: Schwartz v. Canada - Words used by Parliament are
deemed to have the same meaning throughout the statute.
 This presumption was rebutted in Sharpe, where the word person was
given different interpretations in different parts of the statute.
 Section 12, BCIA
Marginal notes and headings
o Headings: S. 11 of BCIA says inserted for convenience not interpretation. In the
federal, Lohnes says that they are intrinsic aids in interpreting.
o Marginal notes: In BC they are not used, Basaraba says they ought not to be relied
upon in interpreting a statue. In the IA, s. 14 says that they form no part of the
enactment and are only there for convenience. Wigglesworth says that they are
not an integral part of the Charter
Punctuation/schedules
o Punctuation is a weak tool and may not always be used (Jaagusta and Popoff)
o Schedules are clearly part of a statue and may be used for interpretation purposes.
If a conflict with the body of a text, the body prevails. They are at the end of an
enactment.
External Context
- Other Factors: Going beyond the statute and looking at legal precedents/common law
interpretations
o Horizontal Coherence: The idea that we assume a legislature to speak in one
voice and therefore the interpretation of one statue may be aided by looking at any
other enactment of the same legislature
 Columbia River v. BC: It is a fundamental principle of statutory
interpretation that one can look to other statutes in pari material (relating
to the same subject) for guidance (pg. 4-57).
 R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd: “Principle of interpretation presumes
harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes dealing with the
same subject matter” (para 52)
 Bell ExpressVu: Context plays an important role when a court construes
the written words of a statute. Also quotes Ulybel
 As a general rule, courts are under an obligation to make all possible
efforts to avoid a finding of inconsistency. A later enactment will prevail
over an earlier one, a specific enactment will prevail over a general
enactment and earlier more specific enactment will prevail over a later,
general enactment. Levis (City)
o Vertical Coherence: Is a legal requirement that provision of an enactment must
conform to “higher level” enactments. In the event of a conflict, higher level
enactments prevail and lower level enactments are non-operative.





o
o
o
o
o
All legislation must be consistent with the Constitution
Subordinate Legislation must be consistent with their enabling statute
Federal is paramount over provincial
Where human rights conflicts with general, the former is paramount
Commonwealth of Canada: should also not interpret legislation that is
open to more than one interpretation as so to make it inconsistent with the
Charter and hence of no force and effect” (para 37).
 R. v. Sharpe: “If legislation can be read in a way that is both constitutional
and not, the former reading should be adopted
 Bell ExpressVu: “to the extent to which this Court has recognized a
Charter values interpretive principle, such principle can only receive
application in circumstances of genuine ambiguity, ie. where the statutory
provision is subject to differing but equally plausible interpretations (466).”
 Blanket presumption of Charter consistency could sometimes frustrate true
legislative intent, contrary to what is mandated by the preferred approach
to statutory construction.
International Instruments: should have coherence between Canadian
Legislation and International Agreements. Baker: external treaties can be
powerful even when they are not domesticated. In this case those conventions
recognized the importance of being attentative to the rights and bests interests of
children
Public policy: consequences on society – parliament wanted certain effects on
society, interpret the act to bring about these consequences. Rizzo: union
concerns, Canada 3000: could take over other planes
Consequentialist analysis
 Avoiding absurd or anomalous results (more general absurd results).
Irrational when the outcome in which people deserving better treatment
receive worse treatment. (Sullivan quote – Merk case)
 Parliament doesn’t intend absurd results in their legislation, Canada 3000,
Rizzo, Merk
Temporal Application/vested rights
 These are the common law presumptions, so should be external to the act
 The Presumption Against Retroactivity and the Presumption Against
Interference with “Vested Rights”
 The presumption relating to Territorial Application: A legislature is
presumed to enact a statute only in relation to persons, property, things or
events that fall within the territorial boundaries of its legislative
jurisdiction.
Extrinsic aids: materials from which you glean the social context
 Judges take judicial notice of this
 Judicial Decisions like precedent, authority, date of the case, jurisdiction,
court level and so on influence
 Administrative Interpretations: Decisions of administrative tribunals and
interpretations by civil servants and ministers

-
-
-
Texts: Textbooks, scholarly treaties, and other legal literature are now
clearly admissible for interpretative guidance. They are not binding, but
may carry substantial weight if their source is widely recognized as an
expert in the relevant field.
General History
o What was going on in society that that led to this act
o What was happening in the society at the time, factual context.
o The judge may at times take judicial notice of facts that are known to be related to
the mischief that the statute was intended to remedy.
Legislative Evolution
o Any other acts before this that dealt with the matter
o Other predecessors, Re-enactments from predecessors
o What the previous versions of the same statute said. This can help determine if the
change was done for substantive changes in law, or whether it was merely
housekeeping. (section 37(2) cautions not to assume that changes are substantive)
o Re Simon Fraser: Historical evolution shows that the disposal of certain words is
relevant. Since you have an old provision taken out in the new version, you have
to assume that the legislature intended to remove it.
o S. 37 says no implications from repeal or amendment, etc. This was aimed at the
mischief that minor changes in law were seen as being substantial. It is to avoid
minor changes being given big effects.
Legislative history
o The current statutes history – how it came into being (amendments, social
circumstances surrounding enactment
o The specific history of that statute. The weight attached to this will vary. The
following possible documents may be used, in descending order of weight
o Briefing notes
o Alternative draft versions of the statute
o House committee reports
o Hansard, arguments made with regards to this act. But NOT determinative – can
be political (Sharpe, Rizzo)
o Press Releases
o Firearms Act: Issue was whether the parliament had the legislative authority to
enact certain legislation. They say to determine purpose, can look at the context
for Parliamentary history. They go to the Hansard and use the Minister’s speech
to help interpret the purpose of the legislation