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Alley Agee
Truth
PKP 2012
Can No Fault Disagreements Exist?
In an age where the beliefs and opinions of others are more prominently displayed
and accessible than ever before, it is no wonder that the theory of relativism has been
developed and clung to so passionately. When faced with questions of whether one position
should or could be preferred over another position, it seems easiest to simply say, “It’s all
relative.” Relativism has been defended by many, and the simple argument of “it’s all
relative” has been left behind by defenders of the theory, though much of what relativism is
about can be traced back to this simple phrase. The issue, then, becomes whether this phrase
and the theory can actually hold up in matters of significant value.
An important concept in relativism is that of the no fault disagreement (NFD)—this is
how certain relativists have explained the phenomena of relativist disagreement. Essentially,
an NFD occurs when there is some kind of disagreement, or contradiction between beliefs of
two people. The relativist asserts that, although the two people may have different beliefs,
they are assessing from differing perspectives—i.e. they have different standard—therefore
neither person—or rather, neither belief—is wrong. The beliefs themselves can only be
judged relative to the standard within which they were created, therefore neither of two or
more parties with different standards concerning the same content will be judged “wrong” or
“at fault.” There are certain restrictions and boundaries for a faultless disagreement, as
outlined by Herman Cappelan and John Hawthorne. A disagreement must actually exist:
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It bears emphasis in this connection that there are plenty of cases where
one of a pair of people says ‘That is fun,’ but where we have no
significant intuition of contradiction between the two assertions.
Suppose a caterer says of a certain party ‘That party is not going to be
fun. I have to cook hors d’oeuvres all night.’ Suppose that, meanwhile,
someone in a separate conversation says of the same party, ‘That party
is going to be fun. I get to meet lots of school buddies that I haven’t
seen in a long time.’ In this case we have absolutely no strong sense at
all that the people are in disagreement.1
What Cappelen and Hawthorne are arguing is that for a no fault disagreement to exist the two
parties must be aware of the other’s argument and must be in disagreement with it—two
beliefs or statements cannot be pieced together out of context. (It may be important to note
that Cappelen and Hawthorne are working from a contextualist perspective, and the chapter
this quotation comes from outlines their arguments for why contextualism should be
preferred to relativism.) This idea of a no fault disagreement has helped to explain away
differences in opinion with the relativist theory. If someone were to say that apples are
delicious, but a friend says apples are not delicious, the NFD concept could be applied. First,
they would recognize that each of them is coming from a different perspective and has
different standards by which they judge the tastiness of apples. Then they can affirm that
since their standards are different, neither of them has any fault, and therefore their
disagreement, apparently, dissipates.
Not everyone can accept this concept, and there have been many different contentions
raised—that it is too easy a solution, that the parameters are ill-defined, or that it is
impossible to distinguish from an absolutist disagreement and therefore impossible to
Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne, ‘Predicates of Personal Taste,’ Relativism and Monadic Truth, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 109.
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express.2 Perhaps the most convincing of these contentions is that it simply cannot exist—
that “cases where the sense of no fault runs deep are the ones where the sense of
disagreement runs shallow.”3 In this paper I will examine this contention, but from a
perspective of the value and importance of the disagreement. Can a faultless disagreement
exist in cases where the beliefs are not shallow, where the beliefs are highly valued by those
in the disagreement?
To begin to answer this question, an introduction to different types of statements is
necessary. In ‘Predicates of Personal Taste,’ Cappelen and Hawthorne draw upon Peter
Lasersohn’s vocabulary of autocentric and exocentric,4 and it is this that I will use in the
remainder of the paper. Cappelen and Hawthorne explain the usage of the terms well, using
the example of taste:
…we can say that use of a taste predicate use of a taste predicate is
autocentric iff its truth conditions are given by a completion that
indexes the predicate to the speaker. Thus, a speaker says ‘That is
filling’ autocentrically iff its truth conditions are given by the claim
‘That is filling to me’ in the mouth of the speaker Meanwhile, a use if
exocentric iff its truth conditions are given by a completion that indexes
it to a person or group other than the speaker, which may, however,
include the speaker.5
Put in other words, an autocentric statement refers to a statement made that the speaker
intends to apply only to himself or herself, while an exocentric statement refers to a
statement that the speaker intends to apply to another person or group. These two types of
statements can be applied to the faultless disagreement concept in different ways. No fault
disagreements may apply more easily to statements or believes of an autocentric nature. Take
Dr. Adam Stewart-Wallace, Lecture, Truth, Pembroke-King’s Programme, July 2012.
Cappelen and Hawthorne, 132.
4
Peter Lasersohn, “Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste,” Linguistics and
Philosophy, Vol. 28 (6), 643-686.
5
Cappelen and Hawthorne, 104.
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the example given above. Someone say that apples are delicious, but what they mean is
autocentric: apples are delicious for them. Their friend, on the other hand, says that apples
are not delicious, but what she means is also autocentric: apples are not delicious for her. The
two different perspectives and standards are much more easily understood, and therefore it
makes sense that neither person is at fault.
One may argue, however, that since both people are speaking autocentrically, there is
no disagreement at all—if neither person says the statement with the idea that apples are
universally delicious and anyone who thinks otherwise is wrong, then perhaps there is no
contradiction, and therefore no NFD. Perhaps no statements that are made autocentrically are
disagreements. The only boundary with which faultless disagreements must fall under is that
there must be, in fact, a disagreement. If there is no disagreement, then the idea of a faultless
disagreement dissipates, at least in relation to autocentric statements.
The relativist may not give up so easily though. Other than the idea that neither
person is willing to defend their statements outside their own personal taste, there is no
indication that a disagreement has not occurred. A relativist might argue that the fact that the
two parties are able to accept the other’s position is evidence for the no fault disagreement.
This may be a valid argument, but it doesn’t get them out of Cappelen’s and Hawthorne’s
critique: that only shallow disagreements are faultless. The apple example certainly is
shallow, and it would be difficult to think of an example that isn’t shallow. Furthermore, the
relativist is certainly not out of the water for disagreements that arise from exocentric
statements.
The exocentric statement disagreement is the more interesting of the two; by its very
nature it avoids most shallow arguments about personal matters. It also carries with it the
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idea that someone within the disagreement must be, at least, on the surface level, wrong: if
someone believe that apples are universally delicious, at some level he or she does have to
believe that someone who doesn’t think they are delicious is wrong. The relativist might be
able to claim that both parties could reach some kind of faultless consensus, but the
arguments here are much weaker than the same argument applied to the autocentric
statements. The potential for statements which are highly important for the individual is also
much greater than with autocentric statements, and it is to this idea that I turn to next.
In the study of persuasive rhetoric, an idea is commonly held among scholars that,
when trying to make a judgment about a particular issue, those with a high involvement
value and those who value the issue more will have preconceived notions about the topic that
are harder to change than those who do not care very much.6 It seems that this basic idea can
also be applied to beliefs of a person within a disagreement. For example, take a person who
does not highly value the deliciousness of apples—it is not important to her that she express
that idea and that others receive it. Therefore, any “disagreement” she may get into about the
deliciousness of apples simply doesn’t intrigue her very much. It is easier, then, for her to
accept the idea of a no fault disagreement—it isn’t of any consequence to her to admit that
perhaps the other person sees apples from a different perspective. A more important issue,
however, may not be dismissed as easily. Let’s say that the same person who thinks apples
are delicious (whether autocentrically or exocentrically, it doesn’t matter much) also believes
that it is exocentrically wrong to eat meat, implying that it is wrong for everyone. Because of
this belief, she gives up the eating of meat. A friend may come along and respond, “I think
it’s perfectly acceptable to eat meat, and in fact, I believe it is wrong not to.” What place
6
This refers to Social Judgment Theory.
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does the faultless disagreement have here? If the eliminating of meat from the human diet is
important enough, so important that a person chooses to give it up, then he or she would have
to believe that the other person who does eat meat is wrong in his or her belief and lifestyle,
particularly if the belief is exocentric. This disagreement is much harder to “dismiss” as no
fault than the apple disagreement because both parties are more value-involved.
Perhaps we should take the analogy even one step further. Suppose the same woman
who believes apples are delicious and that it is wrong to eat meat also exocentrically believes
that murder should never be committed. The same friend who believes apples are not
delicious and that humans should eat meat also exocentrically believes (for the sake of the
analogy) that murder is perfectly acceptable. Now the disagreement is even more valueinvolved. At some level, the first woman simply will not be able to accept that murder is
acceptable, especially since she believes that it is wrong for everyone and not just for her.
Similarly, the person who believes murder is acceptable will not be able to accept the
judgments made by her friend. At this point, faultless disagreement becomes impossible.
A committed relativist, however, might try and reply that a no fault disagreement
exists, though it may not be acknowledged by both parties. This argument is extremely weak:
if NFD’s can exist that are not acknowledged by the parties within the disagreement, then
what is the value of the NFD in the first place? Furthermore, many of the other problems
with NFD briefly mentioned earlier simply become stronger, particularly the distinction
argument and the boundary argument. If NFD’s can exist without acknowledgement, then all
arguments have the potential to become NFD’s, making it extremely difficult to distinguish
between NFD’s and actual absolutist disagreement. Similarly, if NFD’s exist without
acknowledgment the parameters extend infinitely.
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If NFD’s cannot hold up (or even exist) in disagreements involving beliefs of high
value, then what is left for the relativist in justifying disagreements? Presumably, nothing.
Does this discount the entire relativist theory? Not necessarily: it simply means that no fault
disagreements do not work outside of shallow contradictions. The relativist, then, must come
up with a different theory for how relativism plays out in real-world belief clashes, or else
some other theory may need to be accepted. Perhaps this paper is a good argument for local
relativism—issues that are not highly valued can be considered relative and can have no fault
disagreements, whilst more important issues (i.e. those which only global relativists would
force into a relative perspective) may need more careful consideration. Regardless, I have
presented an area in which it may be more difficult for faultless disagreement to exist: the
exocentric, highly valued statements.