Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
Dealing With the New Generation of Jihadis: ISIL and Beyond
Arya Bhattarai
New College House
March 22, 2015
Arya Bhattarai is a Math and Economics double major from Kathmandu, Nepal. Outside of
Junto, Arya is the president of the Benjamin Franklin Financial Services Honor Society, and
the alumni chair of the Black Pyramid Senior Honors Society. Arya also works as a writing
and math tutor on campus. Arya will be pursuing an opportunity in Investment Banking upon
graduation. In the long run, Arya aspires to contribute to the economic development and
progress of his home country, Nepal.
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Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
Last summer, a group of radical militants drew global attention as they swiftly
conquered vast swathes of land across Iraq and Syria, and declared the formation of a new
state. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS/ISIS/ISIL), an Islamist organization that emerged out
of the insurgency in Iraq, is today considered by many to be the most dangerous jihadi
organization in the world, trumping even the reputation of its nefarious predecessor, Al
Qaeda. Over this past year, ISIL massacred several religious minorities, enslaved scores of
women and children, and brutally murdered many foreign nationals operating in their area.
Reacting to the threats posed by ISIL, both to the regional stability of the Middle East and to
the safety of their own citizens, several nations joined a US-led coalition last August, in order
to launch a coordinated military offensive against the extremist organization. So far, this
offensive has included airstrikes on key military targets in ISIL controlled territory, and
strategic support to moderate Syrian opposition rebels and the Iraqi government (State of the
Union, 2015).
While these tactics have been successful in curbing the advance of ISIL, they have
not eliminated the larger threats posed by the organization, particularly those that stretch far
beyond the battlegrounds of Iraq and Syria. These threats include the possibility of terrorist
attacks in Western countries from returning ISIL fighters, attacks from ‘lone wolves’—
individuals who aren’t affiliated with ISIL, but may be inspired by their propaganda, and
finally, the growing threats to national and regional security from ISIL offshoots that are
rapidly emerging in different parts of the world. Sadly, these threats cannot be mitigated
using military force alone; to eliminate these threats, what is needed in addition to the current
military strategy of the US-led coalition is a multi-faceted counterterrorism strategy outside
of the battlefield—one that focuses on countering the ideology that ISIL uses to spread its
violence around the world. This strategy must be implemented on multiple levels, and must
focus on preventing radicalization at the grassroots, countering extremist narratives that are
professed by groups like ISIL, and diminishing the appeal of not only ISIL, but of global
jihad itself.
Before we delve into this strategy, we must first understand the key threats posed by
ISIL outside of the battlefield. The first threat is related to the considerable presence of
foreign fighters within ISIL ranks. Recent estimates suggest that as many as 20,000 foreign
fighters have left to join ISIL, a figure that already dwarfs foreign fighter recruitment
numbers from previous conflicts like Afghanistan (CNN, 2015). And while most of these
fighters come from countries in the Arab World, it is estimated that at least 3,400 fighters
from Western Europe and the United States have also left to join ISIL (CNN, 2015). Western
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Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
governments expect some of these fighters to return, and are concerned about the terrorist
acts that they can commit if they manage to slip back into their home countries undetected. In
one such event last summer, Mehdi Nemmouche, an ISIL returnee from Syria, managed to
shoot and kill four people in a Jewish Museum in Brussels (The Telegraph, 2014). While
there have only been a few events of this nature so far, Intelligence Officials in the West are
mindful of the damage that can be done by an ISIL returnee, especially one who is seasoned
in combat (New York Times, 2015).
However, even if attacks from ISIL returnees are stopped, ISIL inspired lone wolf
attacks can continue to wreak havoc in the Western World. In September last year, a senior
ISIL commander, Abu Mohammad al Adnani, urged ISIL supporters around the world to
attack more ‘disbelievers’, especially those residing in Western countries (The Independent,
2014). Although a number of ISIL inspired lone wolf attempts were foiled last year, including
a plot to carry out a public beheading outside a well-known coffee shop in Sydney, Australia,
some of them were successfully orchestrated. For instance, there were two separate lone wolf
attacks last October that lead to the death of three soldiers outside the Ottawa parliament
building in Canada. The perpetrators behind these attacks were recent converts to Islam, and
are said to have been radicalized through ISIL related propaganda (The Telegraph, 2015).
One of the attackers, Martin Rouleau-Couture, had even attempted to fly to Syria in July, but
had been stopped by officials who were aware of his radicalization. The major problem with
lone wolf attacks is that they are immensely difficult to prevent even with the advanced
surveillance and intelligence capabilities that many Western governments possess. This is
because surveillance isn’t as useful in identifying individual perpetrators who may attack
with knives or guns, as it is in identifying a larger group of plotters who are constantly
communicating with each other using mediums that can be intercepted, such as phone lines
(The Telegraph, 2015). And while untrained lone wolf attackers are unlikely to kill a large
number of people, experts agree that their attacks can generate great ‘tension, polarization,
and terror’ among the masses, and can thus have a profound psychological impact on society
(Time, 2014).
Yet, the biggest threat that ISIL poses to the regional and national security of many
Western nations has to do with the pace with which the organization is gaining support in
areas outside of its primary stronghold. The director of the American Defense Intelligence
Agency, Lt. Gen. Vince R. Stewart, made a statement earlier this month indicating that ISIL
has started assembling a ‘global footprint’, as it has already received pledges of support from
extremists in a number of countries, including, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan (The
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Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
New York Times, 2015). The international community observed a manifestation of this
phenomenon last week, as it witnessed an ISIL affiliate in Libya abduct and behead 21
Egyptian Coptic Christians near the North African beach town of Sirte (IB Times, 2015).
With ISIL at their doorstep, countries like Italy are now on high alert, as they fear infiltration
from ISIL fighters who may enter their shores in the guise of North African refugees, and
gradually unleash havoc as they develop a critical mass of radicalized followers (IB Times,
2015). Yet, looking past such country specific scenarios, political analysts highlight a broader
concern that the US-led coalition may effectively be heading into a hydra-headed conflict, if
it cannot contain ISIL’s expansion to new shores (New York Times, 2015). Indeed, if ISIL
continues to spread its tentacles to other countries, it will become increasingly difficult to
gain decisive victory over the organization using military force, as it will become practically
impossible to launch airstrikes and send armies to deal with every single ISIL affiliate in
existence.
So, considering the limitations of a military offensive in containing the spread of ISIL,
and its ability to incite acts of violence even from non-members, members of the US-led
coalition will have to adopt a different type of counterterrorism strategy to safeguard the lives
of their citizens from the numerous threats that are posed by the extremist organization. And
the key to designing such a strategy is to first understand the main factors that have allowed
ISIL to attract as many followers, and command as much influence as it does today. A report
by The Soufan Group—a New York based intelligence and security consultancy—claims that
while there are a number of reasons that have motivated foreigners to partake in the Syrian
conflict, and join extremist groups like ISIL, many of these individuals are motivated by what
is often known as the jihadi narrative (The Soufan Group, 2014). This narrative is simply that
Islam is under attack, and that it is a religious obligation for Muslims to protect their faith,
and its fellow believers from danger—something many ISIL militants believe they are doing
in Syria and Iraq. And ISIL has been particularly successful in marketing this narrative, along
with its other agendas, through its masterful use of borderless technologies, such as social
media. In a recent testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Nicholas
Rasmussen, current director of the National Counterterrorism Center, claimed that ISIL “has
proven far more adept than core Al Qaeda—or any of Al Qaeda’s affiliates—at using new
media tools to reach a broader audience.” (CNN, 2015) By effectively marketing its ideology
through a well-crafted social media campaign, not only has ISIL drawn scores of recruits to
the deserts of Iraq and Syria, but it has also attracted numerous pledges of allegiance from
around the world. Given this situation, it seems unlikely that decimating the core leadership
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Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
of ISIL, including its current leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, will slow down the advance of
the extremist organization, unless the methods by which it recruits and radicalizes are
dismantled. Thus, the most important battle against ISIL may be one that is fought outside of
the battlefield—one that focuses on diminishing the organization’s ideology, appeal, and
recruitment tactics through a combination of local, national and global efforts.
The local aspect of this approach involves dealing with the initial grievances that may
lead individuals towards radicalization. Martin Reardon, who is the senior vice president of
The Soufan Group and a 21-year veteran of the FBI with a specialization in counterterrorism
operations, asserts that the initial grievances that may push one to the path of extremism are
almost always local (Al Jazeera, 2014). These may include poverty, lack of education, lack of
opportunity, or alienation from a prevailing system or culture. Maajid Nawaz, a former
extremist and current director of Britain’s first counter extremism think tank also attests to
this idea, and describes ‘perceived local grievances’ as one of the main contributors to
radicalization (Real Time with Bill Maher, 2015). Therefore, it is critical for governments to
understand the local grievances that are prevalent amongst their people, and work to find
ways by which they can be addressed effectively. This may include reforming laws or
practices that sanction discrimination or, whether intentionally or unintentionally, serve to
alienate vulnerable communities. However, if such changes aren’t made on the ground, ISIL
and similar jihadi groups can continue to exploit existing local grievances to their advantage.
For example, Sharia4Belgium, an underground group that was recently accused of funneling
Belgian fighters to Syria, has repeatedly pointed to Belgium’s laws—such as its ban on full
face-veils—as examples of the nation’s intolerance towards Islam (Stuff, 2015). Further,
critics have even claimed that Belgium’s inability to fully integrate its immigrants—many of
whom are Muslim, and feel alienated from the country’s largely Catholic culture—has
contributed to making Belgium a hotspot for ISIL related recruiting (Stuff, 2015). Indeed,
Belgium has already sent 350 jihadis to Syria, which is more than any other country in
Europe on a per capita basis.
While it is critical to address the local grievances that can lead to radicalization, states
must also strive to counter extremist narratives that are propounded by organizations like
ISIL. As mentioned earlier, the jihadi narrative that Islam is at war with the West, and that
Muslims must, therefore, resort to violent means to defend their faith is one that has
convinced several individuals to join or pledge allegiance to ISIL. Undermining the
legitimacy of this narrative is thus crucial in reducing the appeal of ISIL, and containing the
spread of its ideology. Several think tanks have suggested ways in this can be done, including
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Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
The Washington Institute, a think tank that focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East,
which published a report in 2010 highlighting a number of way by which governments could
successfully counter extremist narratives. Some of the suggestions of this report may be
applied to deal with ISIL; these include highlighting the inconsistency of ISIL’s ideals with
Islam, and exposing the unglamorous life of being a soldier within their ranks (The
Washington Institute, 2010).
Disillusionment regarding an extremist organization’s true motives, and the morality
of their methods has often been a reason for people to defect. For instance, Nazir Abbas, a
former senior commander of Jemmah Islamiya, an Al Qaeda affiliate in Indonesia, left the
organization after hearing Bin Laden’s fatwa, or edict, in 2000 that praised the killing of
Americans and Jews, wherever possible, as the highest of religious acts (The Washington
Institute,
2015).
After
defecting,
Abbas
soon
began
working
with
Indonesian
counterterrorism officials, and started to openly denounce what he began to see as the
highjack of Islam by individuals like Bin Laden. Similarly, in today’s context, one way for
governments to dissuade people from joining ISIL, or pledging allegiance to them, may
involve offering a prominent voice to scholars of Islam, who can expose the un-Islamic ideals
and practices of the extremist organization. States may also be able to support ongoing
initiatives by scholars and Muslim community leaders, such as the initiative of 120 scholars
of Islam from around the world, who wrote an open letter to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi last year,
emphasizing how most of ISIL’s principle religious arguments were facile (Letter to
Baghdadi, 2014).
It is also crucial for states to expose the harsh realities of life in the Islamic State, as
ISIL propaganda often portrays a completely fabricated version of it. Along with messages
that advocate for bloodshed, ISIL propaganda sites and social media pages are flooded with
images that try to portray the normalcy of life in the caliphate, including workout videos,
Instagram pictures of cats and sunsets, and tweets with the most surreal, and absurd,
hashtags, such as #jihadfitness (The Washington Post, 2014). There are also more somber
videos where active militants, including Western fighters, offer justifications for ISIL’s
brutality, and take pride in being part of a battle that they believe was prophesized 1400 years
ago (The Washington Post, 2014). The Washington Group’s report indicates that the most
effective way to counter such propaganda is to demonstrate, through the voice of former
defectors, how life in the Islamic State differs greatly from the picture that propaganda videos
seem to paint. Judging from past experience with other terrorist organizations, even if ISIL
defectors focus mainly on highlighting petty concerns such as the financial constraints, and
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Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
squalid living conditions that define life in the caliphate, they may be able to prompt a
number of committed radicals to drop out (The Washington Group, 2010). Therefore, it is
extremely important for governments to develop the intelligence capabilities to detect and
identify ISIL returnees, so that they can find and use defectors within the group to speak
against the organization’s propaganda.
While states may be able to leverage their relationships with religious leaders and
former ISIL defectors to counter the organization’s extremist narratives, such efforts alone
may not be enough. Though ISIL has spilled its hateful ideas on several social media sites,
there aren’t nearly as many people who have used social media to speak against the extremist
group’s skewed narratives. Martin Reardon of the Soufan Group states in an OP-ed article he
wrote last year that it is time for the global community to start using the very tools that
organizations like ISIL have relied on—namely, social media sites, blogs, and online
forums—as part of a global initiative to undermine the jihadi narrative (Al Jazeera, 2014).
Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation also emphasizes the need for a ‘global, grassroots,
youth-led movement’ that utilizes borderless technologies to diminish extremist narratives,
and establish that the greatest enemy of Islam isn’t the West—it is Islamic extremism (TED,
2014). Maajid also adds that ‘we’, implying the global community, need to work together to
make ‘Islamic extremism as unpopular, in terms of ideology, as Soviet styled
communism.’(Real Time with Bill Maher, 2013)
ISIL has emerged today as a major threat to the national and regional interests of
many nations around the world. Even as the organization is stalled on the battlefield, its
ideology continues to metastasize at an alarming pace. And the organization’s growth poses
great threats for the future, even for regions that are distant from the group’s primary
strongholds in the Middle East. Therefore, it is imperative that the international community
works together to degrade the organization, both on, and outside of the battlefield. However,
in contrast to counterterrorism efforts of the past, now the emphasis must shift from a shortterm strategy that just focuses on eliminating leaders, and destroying military targets, to a
long-term strategy that uproots ISIL’s ideology, or at least diminishes it to point where it is no
longer appealing, and thus can longer pose great danger to people around the world. And
though this effort to undermine ISIL’s ideology consists of several local and state level
initiatives, at the end of the day, this effort truly needs to be a coordinated, global initiative.
References
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Dealing with the new generation of jihadis—ISIL and beyond
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