PHI355 – PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECTS
AUTUMN SEMESTER
1. Niall Connolly - Dialethesim: Can there be true
contradictions?
2. Luca Barlassina – Self Knowledge
3. Joshua Forstenzer – The value of higher education
4. Tom Cochrane – Imaginative resistance to artworks
5. Holly Lawford-Smith – Collective Action
6. Chris Hookway – Hegel's Ethics
Reading Lists:
1. Dialetheism reading list
Priest, G., 1987, In Contradiction, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 2nd expanded edition,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Sainsbury, R.M. 2009, Paradoxes, 3rd edition (especially chater 7). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Irvine, A.D., 1992, “Gaps, Gluts and Paradox”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18
(Supplementary Volume): 273–99.
Parsons, T., 1990, “True Contradictions”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20: 335–53.
Priest, G., and T. Smiley, 1993, “Can Contradictions be True?” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 68 (Supplement): 17–54.
Priest, G., 1998, “What's So Bad About Contradictions?”, Journal of Philosophy, 95: 410–26
Eklund, 2002, “Deep Inconsistency”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80: 321–31.
Chihara, C. 1979, 'The semantic paradoxes: A diagnostic investigation' Philosophical
Review 88 (4):590-618
2. Self-Knowledge: Philosophy meets Cognitive Science
You have the ability to represent your own mental states. For example, in this moment, you
are in the position to form the belief that you are seeing these words. How can you do that?
That is, what are the cognitive mechanisms underlying your ability to know your own beliefs,
desires, emotions, perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and so forth? A distinguished
tradition in philosophy has it that there is a fundamental difference between knowing one’s
own mind and knowing other minds: the former, but not the latter, is based on direct,
introspective access to one’s own mental states, and for this reason is infallible (or, at least,
extremely reliable). Many cognitive scientists, however, are sceptical. They claim that
experimental evidence shows that knowledge of our own minds and knowledge of other
minds are based on the same cognitive processes. For this project, you will read a series of
papers in which empirically-minded philosophers and philosophically-minded psychologists
present competing accounts of self-knowledge. These are some of the problems you could
focus on: what are the cognitive mechanisms underlying self-knowledge? Is self-knowledge
more reliable than knowledge of other minds? Are knowledge of one’s propositional attitudes
(e.g., beliefs and desires) and knowledge of one’s conscious experiences (e.g., bodily
sensations) subserved by the same cognitive mechanisms? What is the function of selfknowledge and what happens when it breaks down? How did it evolve, and how does it
develop during childhood?
Bibliographical references
Core readings (in chronological order)
These core readings are compulsory. I suggest you read them in the given order. Please notice
that some authors, e.g., Goldman, changed their minds through the years, so you will find
them defending different theories in different papers. Don’t get confused!
1.
Gopnik, A. (1993). How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person
knowledge of intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16(1): 1-14.
2.
Goldman, A. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 16(1): 15-28.
3.
Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2003). How to read your own mind: A cognitive theory
of self-consciousness. In Q. Smith and A. Jokic (Eds.) Consciousness: New
Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press, 157-200.
4.
Goldman, A. (2006). Self-attribution. Ch. 9 of Id. Simulating Minds: The
Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Oxford University
Press.
5.
Gordon, R. (2007). Ascent routines for propositional attitudes. Synthese, 159:
151–165.
6.
Carruthers, P. (2010). Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 80: 76-111.
7.
Schwitzgebel, E. (2012). Introspection, what? In D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (Eds.)
Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Introductory readings
Some of the core readings are pretty demanding. You might get some guidance from the
following introductions and review pieces. These introductory readings are not compulsory.
1.
Schwitzgebel, E. (2014). Introspection. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
2.
Carruthers, P. and Engelbert, M. (2010). Introspection. Wiley Interdisciplinary
Reviews: Cognitive Science, 245-253.
3.
Gertler, B. (2015). Self-knowledge. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
3. The Value of Higher Education
Reading List
Bloom, A. 1987. ‘Part III: The University’, The Closing of the American Mind: how higher education
has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today's students, London/New York, Simon &
Shuster, pp. 243-381.
Boyer, E. L. 1996. 'The Scholarship of Engagement', Journal of Public Search and Outreach, Vol. 1,
No. 1, pp.11-20: Also available here:
openjournals.libs.uga.edu/index.php/jheoe/article/download/253/238
Cowley, H. W. 1955. ‘The Heritage and Purpose of Higher Education’, Improving College and
University Teaching, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May), pp. 27-31. Also available via Jstor:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27561711
Dewey, J. 2008. [1904]. ‘The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education’, The Middle Works,
edited by Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale (Illinois), Southern Illinois University Press. Also
available here http://people.ucsc.edu/~ktellez/dewey_relation.pdf
Giroux, H. 2006. ‘Higher Education Under Siege: Implications for Public Intellectuals’, Thought &
Action, (Fall) pp. 63- 78. Also available here:
http://www.nea.org/assets/img/PubThoughtAndAction/TAA_06_08.pdf
Gutmann, A. 1987. ‘Chapter 6: The Purposes of Higher Education’, Democratic Education,
Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press.
Gutmann, A. 1987. ‘Chapter 7: Distributing Higher Education’, Democratic Education, Princeton
(New Jersey), Princeton University Press.
Hartley, M. 2009. ‘Reclaiming the democratic purposes of American higher education: Tracing
the trajectory of the civic engagement movement’, Learning and Teaching: The International
Journal of Higher Education in the Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 3, Special Issue: Perspectives on
Citizenship Education (Winter), pp. 11-30. Also available via Jstor:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23744816
Newman, J.H. 2008. [1854], ‘Discourse 5: Knowledge its own end’, The Idea of a University,
ebook, Gutenburg Project. Also available here:
http://www.newmanreader.org/works/idea/discourse5.html
Schultz, J.L. 2008. ‘Purpose of College: Integrative Literature Review’, Research and Teaching in
Developmental Education, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring 2008) , pp. 68-76. Also available via Jstor:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42802311
West, C. ‘Prophetic Imagination: Confronting the New Jim Crow & Income Inequality in America’,
Engaging Pedagogies in Catholic Higher Education, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-7. Available at:
http://journals.stmarys-ca.edu/epiche/vol1/iss1/1/
4.
Imaginative Resistance to Artworks (Tom Cochrane)
This topic addresses an area of recent interest in aesthetics where it has been
recognized that audiences may sometimes resist engaging imaginatively with artworks,
particularly for moral reasons. Given that many of the effects that artworks have upon
audiences are probably mediated by our manner of imaginative engagement, this
phenomenon has significant implications.
Initial readings
Gendler, Tamar Szabo (2006). ‘Imaginative Resistance Revisited’. In S. Nichols ed. The
Architecture of the Imagination. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hume, David (1757). ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. Can be found online at
<http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/361r15.html>
Walton, Kendall, (2006). ‘On the (So-called) Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. In S.
Nichols ed. The Architecture of the Imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 137148.
Todd, Cain (2008). ‘Imaginability, morality, and fictional truth: dissolving the puzzle of
‘imaginative resistance’’ Philosophical Studies, No. 143: 187-211.
Liao, Shen-yi., Strohminger, Nina., & Sripada, Chandra Sekhar (2014). ‘Empirically
Investigating Imaginative Resistance’ British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (July):
339-355.
To help consider possible implications
Elgin, Catherine. (2007). ‘The Laboratory of the Mind’ in A Sense of the World: Essays on
Fiction, Narrative and Knowledge eds. W. Huemer, J. Gibson & L. Pocci. London,
Routledge: 43-54.
Gaut, Berys (2004). ‘The Ethical Criticism of Art’ chapter 24 in Aesthetics and the
Philosophy of art- the analytic tradition: an anthology eds. P. Lamarque & S. H. Olsen. Blackwell,
London: 283-294.Harold, James (2005). ‘Infected by Evil’ Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 8, No.
2 (June): 173-187.
5. Collective Action
Reading list
Collective rationality / belief / intention:
Hurley, S.L. “Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action”,
Synthese 86 (1991),
173-196.
Gilbert, Margaret. "Modeling Collective Belief", Synthese 73 (1987), 185-204.
Bratman, Michael. "Shared Intention", Ethics 104/1 (1993), 97-113.
Kuran, Timur. “Private and Public Preferences” in Economics and Philosophy (Vol. 6,
1990, pp. 1-26).
Moral obligation / responsibility:
Held, Virginia 1970. Can a Random Collective of Individuals be Morally
Responsible? Journal of
Philosophy, 68/14: 471–81.
Collins, Stephanie. "Collectives’ Duties and Collectivization Duties”, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy
91/2 (2013), 231-248.
Stilz, Annie. “Collective Responsibility and The State”, The Journal of Political
Philosophy 19/2 (2011),
190-208.
Sartorio, Carolina. “How to be responsible for something without causing it”,
Philosophical Perspectives
18 (2004), 315-336.
Kutz, Christopher. “Acting Together”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
61/1 (2000), 1-31.
Empirical / experimental:
Ostrom, Elinor., Walker, James. & Gardner, Roy. “Covenants With and Without a
Sword: SelfGovernance is Possible”, American Political Science Review 86/2 (1992), 404-417.
6. Morality and Ethical Life in Hegel’s Elements of the
Philosophy of Right
Hegel distinguishes from morality (concerned with individual judgments of we ought to act)
from
Ethical Life (which is a matter of social practices). According to Hegel, morality is subjective and
ungrounded unless grounded in social ethical life.
Reading List
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, edited and translated by Nisbett, Cambridge University Press
Particularly important; the sections on Morality and on Ethical Life
Kenneth Westphal, ‘Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral world view’, Philosophical Topics, 1991,
133-76.
Terry Pinkard, ‘Self-understanding and self-realizing spirit in Hegelian ethical theory’,
Philosophical
Topics, 1991, 71-98.
Robert Pippin, ‘Hegel, ethical reasons, Kantian rejoinders’, Philosophical Topics, 1991, 99-131.
Robert Pippin., ‘Idealism and agency in Kant and Hegel’, Journal of Philosophy, 1991, 532-41.
A.Wood, ‘The emptiness of the moral will’, in Stern (ed), vol IV, and in The Monist, 1989, 454-83
A MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 1967, chapter 15, 199-215.
Knowles Dudley, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right, chapters on 7 and 8, on Morality.
Knowles,Dudley, chapter 9 on Ethical Life
Rose, David, ‘Moral Freedom’, chapter six, ‘Moral freedom’,
And chapter 7, ‘Social Freedom.
Wood, Allen, Hegel’s Ethical thought, especially chapter 7, IThe Concept of morality