Burge, Individuation and Causation in Psychology
303
1. Relations between the person and his envirionment are partly constituative
of his have certain kinds of mental states.
2. This is grounded in thought experiments:
a. someone knows not the microstructure, but thinks of
aluminum.
b. on counterfactual envirionment, some doppleganger does not so
think; he thinks of twalum.
c. now, the doppleganger has no aluminum thoughts.
The 'differences
in thoughts depends on relations to their envirions.'
3. Person here grew up around aluminum.
Grew up interacting with
aluminum.
4. And, person there grew up round twalum; and, interacting with twalum.
304
1. Cognitive science utilizes 'nonindividualistic kind individuation.'
2. The response to this is just that:
a. common sense uses nonindividualistic kind individuation.
b. but, psychology cannot reasonably individuate kinds the
same
way.
c. it, must individuate 'narrow content.'
d. this argument derives from the idea that 'unbenowned to
itself,
coginitive science needs narrow content to later have wide content.'
3. But, as Burge points out,
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e. but, the notion of narrow content is not employed outside philosophy.
Section One
1. The Fodorian causal powers argument:
a. psychological explanation is causal explanation.
b. states and processes should be individuated by causal
powers.
c. anti-individualism postulates dopplegangers with different
mental
states but not different brain states.
d. but, people who do not differ in brain states, do not
differ
in
causal powers.
e. so, psychology should type states nonindividualistically.
Note: I should abbreviate these to be concise; the following is more what is
meant I think:
a. causal explanation
b. by, causal powers
c. different mental, same brains
d. this is impossible; for same brain, same powers.
e. anti individualism is false.
2. Burge says that he will concentrate on fourth step.
The different brains,
different causal powers step.
3. But, about the first two steps, about causal explanation and powers, it
ignores anomalous monism:
a. the mental is causal
b. but psychological types do not enter physicalistic laws.
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c. psychological laws are generalizations, whose efficacy is accounted
for physically.
Note: In other words, Fodor acts as though to be causal, and to have causal
powers, can only be accounted for by the most basic, physics.
Note: Burge's point is that psychological states are still causal, and have causal
powers, but such causality, and such powers, are not typed by physics.
306
1. Burge notes that Fodor's notion of causal power, depicted in steps one and
two, is 'physiological causation.'
3. Physiological processes are where all the 'real' causation happens.
2. Physics types determine how it is that psychological types must be.
4. In other words when there is a change in a physiological type, there must
be a change in a psychological types.
5. So, Fodor thinks that he can derive from physics, independently of
psychology, a notion of psychological kind individuation.
6. Burge says this is hopeless.
Section Two
307
1. Burge turns to Fodor's two arguments for the 'no same brain, different
mental state' view:
2. Argument 1:
a. 'bring aluminum' gets aluminum; 'bring twalum' gets
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twalum.
b. these intentional differences are supposed to have
different causal powers.
c. but, 'causal powers must be assessed across contects;'
that
is,
tested in each others context.
d. but, sadly, when this is done, they do the same thing in
other's context.
In other words they think and behave
each
the same.
e. thus, they do not have different powers, but the same.
3. Argument 2:
a. Fodor concedes that, even in each other's context, there
is
an
intentional difference.
b.
so,
the
twins
would
still
differ
in
their
intentionally
individuated behavior.
Note: Burge notes that Fodor has two replies, and goes thru them.
I think
that his first reply though, is better left until later; when Burge adresses it.
309
1. Reply:
a. imagine h and t particles; changing them does not affect
causal powers.
b. they are not the right
kind of properties, to
affect
such
powers.
c. one would need mechanisms and laws to connect h and t
changes to neurological changes.
d. there are no such laws.
e. thus, these do not affect causal powers; they do not do anything.
f. the same applies to being in a water or twater, or
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aluminum or twalum world.
They too do no explanatory work.
2. Continuation of Reply. This is, generally, a separate argument though.
3. Reply:
a. on the anti individualist view, there would have to be
some
mechanism to connect water or twater worlds, with mental states.
b. this, would have to just jump over any affect on the
brain.
c. it is just a mystery how this could ever happen.
seems
It
impossible.
4. Burge reply is that Fodor is conflating causation with individuation.
First
let us get this exact distinction clear:
a.
causation
for
the
brain
neural chains of events.'
is
'whether
causal
claims
These are 'chains of individual
run
via
events.'
b. individuation in psychology 'whether patterns of causal relation
between envirions and individual bear on
psychological kinds, in a way different
individuation
from neural kinds.'
of
These are
'chains of types of events.'
5. The specific conflation is that
a. 'only a neurological law and types can connect envirion with
individual.'
b. 'but, there is no reason why a psychological law and
cannot make the connection.'
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types
6. Example of Geology
a. land mass is typed in relation to other things, other
masses and
spaces.
b. it is possible thus to have the same physical thing but
different
geological type.
c. so, geological types are not locally supervenient upon
physics.
7. And, again, Biology
a. heart is typed functionally in relation to other organs.
b. it is possible to have the same organ, put in a martian, doing
something different.
c. and, biological types are not supervenient upon physics.
8. These examples show then that:
a. special sciences are typed, such that, they cut across
each other.
b. ones like geology etc are more 'envirionmentally
sensitive'
than neurology.
c. so, it is possible 'to make such sciences
envirionmentally sensitive, in such ways that lower sciences
are
not.'
Note: So, the types of psychology are envirionmentally sensitive.
less so.
Neurology
There can thus be changes in psychological types without affecting
neurological types.
Note: This happens independently of lower sciences.
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So, supervenience fails.
Section Three
311
2. We must return to Argument 1, about the cross context test.
By the
cross context test, remember, the twins do the same things, so have same
causal powers.
3. But, the twins do not pass.
There are 'contexts' where they produce
different effects.
4. We could create a context where the twins each was brought what they
wanted.
5. Or, create a context in which there was a causal history belief checker.
It
would again register a difference between causal powers.
6. So, on Fodor's own physicalistic test, the twins have different powers.
312
1. Now the minute differences noted might be said to be irrelivant to any
particular science.
2. This however shows that the test 'does not distinguish' whether changes or
differences 'will fall under the kinds of any particular science.'
3. The test thus is blind to any and all the kinds in special science.
4. It just notes physical changes, which may or may not be relevant to any
science.
5. The test is insensitive to different typologies, so insensitive to different
ways of recognizing causal powers.
6. That is, with a heart, blood pressure, regulatory systems, general function
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are all important.
7. Physiology tests hearts by measuring such things.
These are functional,
and envirionmental.
8. Now another science may have other interests, which might look at the
same stuff, but take into account different functions, or envionmental facts.
9. The test is blind to this.
313
1. So, the test does not show anything.
the same movements in a context.
The two twins might physically do
According to physics, perhapps same
causal powers.
2. But, since the test ignores envirionmental psychological differences,
according to psychological typology, it is no good.
They would have different causal powers.
Section Four
1. It is thought that 'since a relation to aluminum or water' is not
psychologically relevant,' anti individualism must be wrong.
2. For anti individualism cites such relations as making a psychological
difference.
3. But, Burge says 'just because anti individualism cites such relations, does
not mean they are psychological kinds.'
4. Psychology need not cite 'bears such and such relation to water' as a kind.
5. The appropriate psychological kind is 'having the concept of water.'
6. So, there a conflation between relational properties and individuating
kinds, with Fodor and Block.
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314
1. Burge notes Block's objection that for 'individual psychology' the twin
differences are irrelevant.
It does not matter that they stand in relation to
different truth conditions.
2. That is, for brisket twin brisket twins, regardless of their possible
conceptual possibilities, they taste the same thing.
3. Burge says that he agrees.
things.
For, at one time, they do taste the same
If that is all individual psychology is, so be it.
4. But, Burge notes, that for other aspects of psychology, other typologies,
such intentional differences will be relevant.
Note: I assume that Block commits the property kind fallacy because he
assumes that Burge is committed to saying that the possible conceptual
differences are psychological kinds and explanatorily relevant.
Note: But Burge is only committed to the fact that were we to do a different
kind of psychology, then such intentional differences might count as kind
differences.
As in the taste case they do not.
5. Moreover, Burge urges, even if we were taking taste intentionality into
account, so that there were intentional taste differences...
6. It does not follow that 'such a science need cite linguistic affiliation to
account for the difference.'
7. There may be many other differences, such as evolution, innateness,
learning, etc.
8. He says that the properties cited to accout for difference depends upon the
objectives at hand.
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Note: So you can speak of the twins having different intentional states.
But,
depending on what you are doing, it may be other things that make the
important differences to the matter at hand.
315
1. Generally Block commits the fallacy of thinking that since individual
psychology is not about the social, it 'cannot make use of intentional kinds
that are produced by social things.'
2. But, Burge notes that this is a mistake in reasoning, for the proscription of
intentional states does not follow.
3. Many kinds of psychology do not address social issues, but use intentional
ideoms.
Note: I assume that this means that we can speak of beliefs, etc, even with
taste.
4. And, even when special sciences try to explain the envirions, they need not
explain their individuating kinds.
5. Just as 'biology does not explain all the biological conditions that go into
making an organ a heart.'
6. Just as perception also does not explain the conditions under which its
types are individuated.
7. In other words a special science does not need to treat all its background
conditions.
Section Five
316-317
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1. We get our norms of what counts as causal power from the particular
special science used.
2. such norms are relative to the science; different sciences call the same
items different causal powers.
3. Of the special sciences, many of them presuppose causal patterns of entities
in the envirionment.
4. When this is so, kinds are 'no longer supervenient on the underlying
sciences.'
5. And, 'it follows that,' and this is key 'that the causal powers of the special
science are no longer supervenient on the causal powers of the underlying
science.'
6. So, where two items 'may have the same causal powers by the underlying
science,' they conversely 'may have different causal powers by the higher
science.
7. As against Fodor, and Davidson, Burge says that 'causal powers of a special
science cannot be identified from outside of that science.'
8. So, the causal powers of any such science are irreducible to others.
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