Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,
Immanuel Kant
Ellington Translation
Preface
1
1. The sciences have a ‘formal and material part.’
2. Concerning morals, the material part is there because something ‘must determine
the will…insofar as the will is affected by nature.’
3. Kant says such moral laws are ‘the way everything ought to happen’ but ‘also
consider the conditions under which what ought to happen does not.’
4. Kant, in saying this, admits that the moral laws in question can be empirical and
a-priori, where this latter is a term that means ‘acquired prior to experience,’ or
without it.
2.
1. Kant says ethics has ‘an empirical part…which might be called practical
anthropology,’ but the a priori part, he says, is ‘the rational part that might
properly be called morals.’
2. He says that these must be ‘carefully purified,’ so as to ‘know how much pure
reason can accomplish in each case and from what sources it draws it’s a priori
teaching.’
3. Kant says that this question is asked so as to decide ‘whether or not there is the
utmost necessity in constructing a pure moral philosophy that is wholly cleared of
everything empirical.’
4. Kant next gets into his significant and controversial claims. He says ‘That there
must be such a philosophy is evident from the common ideas of duty and from
moral laws.’
5. Moreover, not only must such a morals be a-priori, but also ‘if a law is to be
morally valid…as a ground of obligation…it must carry with it absolute
necessity.’
6. That is, ‘Thou shall not lie’ is meant, not only for humans, but ‘all rational
beings.’ By this, he means all beings that have a will, and are capable of acting
‘for the sake of the law.’
7. It follows that ‘the ground of obligation here, must be sought not in the nature of
man, nor in the circumstances of the world, but a priori in the concepts of pure
reason.’
8. But two problems. First, Kant does not establish that the empirical and a-priori are
incompatible. In fact, he only states that duty and law shows that they should be
separated.
9. Moreover, second, he does not establish that if laws are a-priori, then they must
be absolutely necessary. Of course, they are not mathematically necessary. He
must be speaking of some other necessity.
3.
1. Kant insists, then, that ‘moral philosophy rests on its pure part.’
2. But even so, he acknowledges that using the moral law, as such, requires ‘power
of judgment,’ which is ‘sharpened by experience.’ He does not say what this
sharpening amounts to.
3. But whatever it amounts to, Kant says the sharpening is ‘not so easy.’
4. Kant finally offers two reasons why empirical and a-priori matters should be
separated, even if they are unclear. First, he says that ‘motives of
speculation…are present a priori in reason.’
5. Second, he says that ‘morals are capable of all kinds of corruption.’
6. These two points concern the motives for action. The point is that without such a
morality, one cannot tell if one acts ‘in conformity with the moral law,’ or ‘for the
sake of the moral law.’
7. Or in other words, even if one thinks that one has acted ‘for the sake of the law,’ it
might yet be that one has some ‘corrupted’ motive that has tricked one into
believing so.
4-5.
1. Kant distinguishes his grounding of a metaphysics from Wolff, who wrote on
practical philosophy, but only considered ‘motives irrespective of any difference
in their source…as all homogeneous.’
2. Kant says that so far as he sees it, that such ‘homogeneous motives,’ do not
constitute a moral view at all. His view, by contrast, must distinguish ‘the idea
and principles of a possible pure will.’
3. Kant says that groundwork of morals is ‘intended for…seeking out and
establishing the supreme principle of morality,’ although he is careful to say that
that apparent confirmation of such a principle may be an illusion.
First Section
7.
1. Kant says the ‘only thing that is good without qualification is a good will.’
2. To support this thesis, he says that all other things ‘can become bad…if the
will…in its special constitution of character, is not good.’ But the will cannot
become bad because of those other things.
3. Kant says of all things only a good will ‘can correct their influence on the mind,
and rectify the whole principle of action and make it universally conformable to
its end.’
4. So Kant is saying that the will is the ‘condition’ of other things, and the latter
have ‘no unconditional worth.’ So the possible ‘corrections’ only come from the
will, not the other way around.
5. It follows that the will is unconditionally valuable. Even if the will were
impotent, ‘it would remain like a jewel, still shine by its own light as something
with full value in itself.’
6. So what does Kant think makes a ‘good will’ so good, in the first place? Now at
this time, he only says that a good will ‘is good through its willing,’ whatever
exactly that means.
7. But against Kant, most people would say many things are good without
qualification, apart from the will. It is not true that only the will is
‘unconditionally valuable.’
8. And if Kant means that merely willing makes the will good, that seems to imply
that it is good regardless of what it wills. So what if the will only wills bad things?
Is it still good?
8.
1. Kant notes the objection that, perhaps there is a ‘hidden basis’ of the supposedly
absolute value of the will, perhaps ‘preservation, welfare, or happiness…is the
real end of nature.’
2. So if this were so, agents might believe that they were following the moral law
‘for the sake of the law,’ but in fact, they would be just trying to be happy,
whatever that amounts to.
3. But unlike animals, Kant says ‘reason’ is in control of human actions. Now
given that Kant says this at all, it is obvious that he sees quite a difference
between instinct and reason.
4. The difference between ‘reason’ and ‘instinct’ that he sees, moreover, is typical
for his time. Reason is following logic and the like, and instinct is composed of
blind impulses.
5. But Kant admits that it is odd that reason is in control of man. This is because
‘reason’ does not make us happy. He says ‘instinct’ would have done better, in
any happiness quest.
6. Kant offers reasons why reason does not make happiness. He says when a person
who ‘devotes himself to…enjoying life and happiness, the further does man get
away from true contentment.’
9
1. This is not all, for Kant thinks that this sort of person begins to have a ‘hatred of
reason,’ and to ‘envy…the common run of men,’ for the fact that reason does not
work, and other men get the pleasure.
2. But Kant thinks of this happiness or reason division in an extreme way. He says
that he means ‘preservation, welfare, or happiness,’ but speaks as though he
means the ‘blind pursuit of physical pleasure.’
3. Now even if this distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘instinct’ was common for his
time, it does not make it true. So these reasons why reason cannot make
happiness do not hold up.
4. In fact, it is fairly obvious that when one thinks of happiness in the ordinary way
and not as blind pursuit, it seems that instinct and reason are both appropriate to
getting it.
5. Kant concludes that reason has a different purpose. He says that ‘existence has
another and more worthy purpose, for which…reason is quite properly
intended…to which private purposes…must defer.’
6. But what can this purpose be? The purpose of reason, he says, ‘is to produce a
good will that is good in itself,’ which is the ‘highest good,’ and the ‘condition of
all the rest.’
7. Of course this reason that produces a good will ‘may restrict…the
attainment…happiness.’ Kant even insists that ‘happiness can be reduced to less
than nothing.’
8. But even if this is so, Kant has moved from his idea that the will is good ‘because
it wills.’ Now he says that a good will might well be bad, and so needs to be
somehow made good.
10
1. Kant suggests three propositions about duty. He does not explicitly say what his
first proposition is, but it seems to be that ‘reason commands that the will follow
duty.’
2. To prove how this is so, Kant does not consider acts that he thinks are already
‘contrary to duty,’ or ‘in accordance with duty, yet men have no immediate
inclination.’
3. The important cases, he says, are those where an act is in accordance with duty,
and one also ‘has an immediate inclination’ to do. So there is a question of why
the really agent did the act.
4. Kant takes the cases of a shopkeeper and child. The shopkeeper does not
overcharge the child, when he could. But did the shopkeeper act ‘for the sake of
duty,’ or only because of a ‘selfish motive.’
5. So Kant is saying that given the differences of motive here, the first proposition is
that only when an act is ‘done for the sake of duty alone,’ does the act have
‘moral worth.’
6. In this argument, Kant means to establish what morality really consists in. He
insists that the good motive constitutes ‘moral worth,’ and deviating from it is a
violation.
7. But this is controversial. This is because even if one knows what ones duty is,
why is motive is that important? Is it not the case that doing the right thing is just
as important?
13
1. Kant says his second proposition concerns ‘maxims’ for action. This is that ‘an
action done from duty has its moral worth…because of the maxim according to
which the act is determined.’
2. He explains that a maxim is a ‘subjective principle of action.’
3. But since ‘maxims’ are both principles and yet are subjective things arise in a
given context, Kant says maxims have a part ‘which is formal,’ and an incentive,
‘which is material.’
4. Kant says that only the ‘formal’ part of the maxim should determine action. He
says ‘the will must be determined by the formal maxim…the material is taken
away from it.’
5. How do the first and second propositions differ? The first says one should do ones
duty ‘for the sake of the law.’ The second says following ‘formal’ maxims is how
to do this.
6. But similarly to problems above, Kant does not really provide any good reason
why only the ‘formal’ part of maxims should determine action. It seems the
‘material’ part is important too.
7. Next Kant offers his third proposition, which defines duty. This third proposition
is that ‘duty is the necessity of action done out of respect for the law,’ although
this is vague.
8. He insists that one cannot ‘respect an inclination,’ for one does not choose their
inclinations. Moreover, Kant insists that acts done from duty must ‘exclude
inclination.’
9. He says that ‘an object of respect can only be what is connected with my will as
ground,’ or what determines it. It follows that ‘only the law itself can be an object
of respect.’
10. So the ‘good which is called moral,’ is nothing but ‘the representational of the law
in itself…found only in a rational being…this representation is…the determining
ground of the will.’
11. But as noted, this is vague. It is one thing to say that only the moral law ‘can be
an object of respect.’ But what we are not told is what such ‘respect’ is in the first
place.
12. So of these three propositions, the first says we must act from ‘duty.’ The second
says this can be done by ways of ‘formal maxims.’ The third says duty is ‘respect’
for the law.’
14
1. Kant next informally introduces his notion of the categorical imperative. He says
that ‘since he has deprived the will of every impulse,’ then, the only thing left to
determine it is ‘conformity to universal law…as such.’
2. The first formulation of the imperative is to ‘never act except in such a way that I
can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.’ Kant says this is
‘mere conformity’ to law.
3. Kant gives the example of a maxim of promising, that he might ‘make a promise
with the intention of not keeping it.’ Kant says that, of course, one can do this,
and distinguishes the prudential reasons for not keeping promises, from duty
reasons.
4. Now obviously, one key point must be made here. Kant has not ‘deprived the
will of every impulse,’ but only said that he has. But given this, he cannot offer
this argument.
15
1. Kant says that prudence dictates this maxim to be advantageous to him insofar as
the lie might help him, and yet morally speaking ‘to deviate from duty is quite
certainly bad.’
2. Kant says this is so insofar as it violates the imperative above. He says he need
only ask himself ‘whether I would really be content if my maxim were to hold as
a universal law for myself as well as others?’
3. Kant says if matters are put in light of this imperative and question, he
immediately becomes aware that ‘I can will myself the lie, but cannot will the
universal lie.’
4. This is because ‘by such a law there would be no promises at all, since in vain
would my willing future actions be professed to other people who would not
believe what I professed.’
5. Kant says this has ‘nothing to do with consequences,’ but rather that he is
proposing universality as a test of whether or not proposed maxims could be
accepted as ‘fitting’ universal moral laws.
6. Kant is suggesting that maxims that pass this test are moral laws, and those that
do not cannot be. So if one ran this test enough, one would work up a set of
morally acceptable actions.
7. Philosophers have objected here. If one rephrases the imperative about lying, one
can will it. So how about ‘make promises with intention of not keeping it in life
threatening situations.’ That could be universal.
8. So Kant might be correct, but only when imperatives are put a certain way. As
soon as one rephrases imperatives to account for the problem, there is almost
nothing that cannot be universal.
16
1. Kant insists that he ‘respects’ such law, but he does ‘not yet know the ground of
such respect.’ He only knows that, as of yet, ‘ordinary reason’ uses such a law,
and that he respects it.
2. But even so, ordinary reason can ‘know its principle,’ for while such reason does
not always think ‘abstractly,’ it does ‘have it in view, and use it as a standard of
judgment.’
3. So there are many cases where ‘ordinary’ agents have not thought about any
categorical imperative or even a maxim, but they still ‘have it in view,’ in the
background.
4. Kant thinks it follows that ordinary reason, ‘can distinguish good or evil…as well
as any philosopher.’ Now this decreases the role of philosophy here to merely
clarifying things.
Second Section
19
1. Kant pretends that he is skeptical about his own view. He says some philosophers
say ‘there cannot be cited a single certain example of the disposition to act from
pure duty.’
2. The reason, he says, is not just that there is no evidence of ‘pure duty.’ But also,
it might well be that ‘what has been done’ is done ‘from more or less refined selflove.’
3. To the credit of the skeptics, Kant says, those who question pure duty and say it is
all secret self-love would like duty to be real and authentic, but say ‘human
nature…is too weak’ to follow it.
4. Perhaps this was more true in Kant’s day, but it is surely not now. Many
philosophers, such as Hume, hold that there is really no such thing are ‘pure duty’
at all.
5. Anyway, Kant concedes that ‘there is no possibility by means of experience…to
make certain a case…in which the maxim on which an action is based rested
solely on moral grounds.’
6. Kant even admits that even if agents ‘can find nothing but duty…there cannot be
inferred from this that there was not some secret impulse of self-love, merely
appearing as duty.’
7. Now these admissions are enough for many to prove that his view is false. Of
course, it is a natural reaction to say that if it cannot be found in experience, it
does not exist.
20
1. Kant notes that if one concedes that duty is found in experience on ‘prepares for
the triumph’ of his opponents. He admits that ‘rather than the strict command of
duty…one often comes upon the dear self.’
2. But Kant says this is just the point to question, for perhaps duty is not found in
experience, but ‘prior to all experience.’ He thinks he can escape the problem by
founding duty outside experience.
3. He says that duty can be outside of experience, and yet still command.
4. It follows that ‘even if there never have been actions springing from such pure
sources…reason of itself and independently of all experience commands what
ought to happen.’
5. Kant notes that this places duty outside of ‘all contingent conditions of humanity.’
It follows that the moral law ‘must be valid not merely for man, but for all
rational beings.’
6. Now human experience is tainted by the ‘contingent conditions of humanity,’ and
we would have to infer from that the ‘unlimited respect’ for all rational beings,
which is surely impossible.
7. Kant defense is questionable here. He rejects the claim that there is no evidence
for duty and that it is explained by deceptive self-love merely by insisting that
duty is not found in experience.
8. Now it may be that duty should be found outside of experience. But this is not
going to convince anyone who needs to see some evidence that duty is something
real.
9. In fact, if this sort of response could be offered generally, many things would
escape refutation. Instead of proving that God exists, one might say he is outside
of experience.
21
1.
In a related point, Kant says that it follows that trying to derive morality from
‘examples,’ is bound to fail. He proceeds to attack a version of ‘example’ moral
philosophy.
2. He launches his attack on the Divine Command Theory here, which is the view
that the rightness or wrongness of actions is established by arbitrary Divine
pronouncement.
3. Kant says that even God cannot establish morality, if he wants to do so by
example. Even his example is just what someone thinks. It follows that to
‘merely imitate’ his example is beside the point.
4. That is, imitation of any example does not make it right.
5. Kant also cites the circularity problem with Divine Commands. Kant says that
agents know that God is good because he ‘must first be compared’ to a prior idea
of goodness.
6. This is to say that the only way agents know that God is a good example to
follow is because they already have a prior notion of goodness, which they think
God measures up to.
7. Although Kant does not mention it, the Divine Command Theory is also
inconsistent with the goodness of God. It says God is arbitrary, and this is
inconsistent with his goodness.
8. But morality from example is not Kant’s only target here. He also attacks what
he calls ‘popular’ morality, or his familiar them of that which does not separate
the ‘empirical from the rational.’
9. He says that this ‘produces a patchwork of observations and half-reasoned
principles.’ It produces an ‘amazing mixture of…the constitution of human
nature.’
10. But the Divine Command Theory and ‘popular’ morality are not the only theories
affected here. If Kant is right, then even ‘virtue ethics,’ which relies on the
‘example’ of a ‘unified’ life goes too.
11. Kant would say that any virtuous person, no matter how perfect, again falls into
the trap he sets. It is just a mixture of traits, which cannot distinguish what is
really moral.
22
1. Kant insists, then, that a ‘completely isolated metaphysics of morals…is an
indispensable substratum of all knowledge of duties.’ This is just for knowing
what duties are.
2. Moreover, it is ‘a desideratum of the highest importance for the actual fulfillment
of their precepts.’ So metaphysics of morals is also important for getting duties
acted out.
3. So if Kant is right, this ‘isolated’ morality is quite important.
4. How do agents use such isolation? Kant says ‘the pure thought of duty…has by
the way of reason alone, in consciousness of dignity…has influence on the human
heart so much more powerful that all other incentives which may be derived from
the empirical field, that reason…despises such incentives and is able gradually to
become their master.’
5. So unlike the ‘mixed morality’ above, the advantage of this view is that it has
established a substratum for moral action, and has systematically eliminated all
‘confused’ motives for action.
6. Now obviously, Kant has again overstated his case. Does the ‘pure thought of
duty’ eliminate ‘other incentives?’ No, it does not. If not, then such duty is never
pure after all.
7. So if duty is not ‘pure,’ does that mean that ‘mixed morality’ leads to bad
consequences? Again, no. Kant treats others moral systems like a set of blind
impulses, which they are not.
23-24
1. Kant repeats his earlier statement that that ‘everything in nature works according
to laws,’ but only a rational being acts ‘according to his conception of laws,’
which implies will.
2. Kant says ‘the will is nothing but practical reason.’
3. But he recognizes that although he said above that the pure thought of duty has
influence that is ‘so much more powerful’ than various incentives, in practice this
is not so. Because of a agents ‘subjective constitution,’ reason ‘does not
sufficiently determine the will,’
4. Since agents are not perfect beings that always do whatever they determine is
best, they merely are aware of their failings. This lack of determination manifests
itself as an ‘imperative.’
25
1. Kant says that generally speaking, imperatives are ‘formulas for determining
action,’ but come in two types. These imperatives are either ‘hypothetical or
categorical.’
2. Hypothetical imperatives command acts that ‘represent the means of getting
something else one wants.’ So hypothetical imperatives do not say things are
good in themselves.
3. Categorical imperatives by contrast, are those that ‘represented an action as
objectively necessary in itself.’ Now it is controversial to say there are such
things, but that is that.
4. Kant says that hypothetical imperatives divide into those of ‘skill’ or ‘prudence.’
that provide the means to ‘all sorts of arbitrary ends.’ These are things that may
or may not be adopted.
26
1. But, Kant says, in anticipating Mill, there is one hypothetical imperative that
everyone shares, ‘presupposed by all rational beings.’ This is ‘happiness,’ and is
something sought ‘by a natural necessity.’
2. Kant says this is known ‘a-priori.’
3. But Kant says that just because happiness is ‘necessary and a-priori,’ that does not
make it ‘categorical.’ He insists that the ‘hypothetical’ imperatives that lead to it
are only ‘prudential’ ones
4. In short, prudential imperatives could never be made categorical because
happiness is ‘indeterminate,’ and what constitutes it is merely ‘empirical,’ and so
may change.
5. It follows that agents ‘cannot on any principle determine what makes them truly
happy.’ This is because ‘principle’ cannot predict the various factors that will
determine happiness.
6. But if Kant were correct that happiness is only hypothetical, then why not claims
that other supposedly categorical maxims are hypothetical for the same reason? It
seems they might be.
7. But also, why not claim that Kant mischaracterizes ‘happiness.’ In fact because
of the stability of human nature that Kant ignores, happiness is not nearly as
indeterminate as he says.
29
1. Kant repeats his claim that if one were to look for the categorical imperative in
‘experience,’ one might always be deceived by a mere ‘pragmatic precept…of our
own advantage’
2. He again says that if there is to be any such categorical imperative that is not a
mere deception, ‘the possibility the categorical imperative must be investigated
entirely a priori.’
3. Kant admits that this puts the investigation at a severe disadvantage, and suggests
that perhaps ‘the mere concept’ of the categorical imperative may ‘supply us with
formula’ of itself.
4. Kant suggests that ‘I know immediately what it contains.’
5. In short, it contains ‘only the necessity that the maxim should accord with this
law, while the law contains no condition to restrict it,’ or it contains universality
without empirical conditions.
6. It follows that ‘there is only one categorical imperative.’ It is ‘act only according
to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.’
7. Now although Kant mentioned this form of the categorical imperative before, this
is his first formula of it. It is that agents must be able to will acts as universally
the case.
31
1. Kant says he will delineate four duties. He has a broad conception of what
morality covers, and first offers two inescapable duties to self and others, and then
two occasion ones to self and others.
2. In other words, perfect and imperfect duties.
3. First, he mentions suicide, when life gets ‘inconvenient.’ The maxim would be to
‘shorten his life when its continued duration threatens more evil than promises
satisfaction.’
4. But Kant objects, saying this could not be ‘universal.’ He says ‘one
sees…contradiction in a system of nature whose laws destroy life by the very
same feeling that acts to stimulate the furtherance of life.’
5. Since this is so, this maxim is ‘consequently, opposed to the supreme principle of
duty, ’ or the categorical imperative.
Supposedly, suicide at will cannot be
universalized.
6. Now this example is very weak. The ‘contradiction’ Kant speaks of does not
exist. If universalized, only a small amount of ‘inconvenienced’ would die, and
society would live on.
7. Second, Kant mentions false promises. The maxim would be ‘when I believe
myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back,
although I know I can never do so.’
8. Kant objects, because from the universality of this law, it would happen that ‘no
one would believe what was promised him but would merely laugh at all such
utterances as being vain pretenses.’
9. He says this is ‘necessarily self-contradictory,’ and so again is opposed to the
categorical imperative. This is so, insofar as a consequence of universal lying
would undermine truth telling.
10. Third, Kant mentions self ‘cultivation.’ The maxim would be ‘if he finds himself
in comfortable circumstances…he will indulge in pleasure rather than broadening
and improving his natural gifts.’
11. Kant says that in fact, this maxim could be universal, but ‘he cannot possibly will
this to be universal’ for ‘a rational being necessarily wills that all his faculties be
developed.’
12. It follows that even if this maxim of ‘cultivation’ is not self-contradictory, it is
undesirable, and does contradict some of the common precepts that constitute
rationality.
32
1. Fourth, Kant mentions benevolence towards people who are ‘struggling with great
hardships.’ The maxim would be something like ‘if I see such a oppressed person,
I am under no obligation to help him, and so will not.’
2. Kant says that, again, this could be universal, but it is impossible to will that it be
so. In cases where ‘has need of benevolence of others,’ one would deny the
maxim.
3. So as with the last maxim, the point is that while it is not self-contradictory to
hold to this maxim, it contradicts some things one does hold, in this case about
mutual assistance.
4. Kant notes that there are two kinds of ‘contradiction’ here. Kant says that the
former kind, what he calls ‘contradiction in thought,’ because they cannot even be
thought of without contradiction.
5. Kant also says there are ‘contradictions in will,’ where they are not really
contradictions at all, but only contradiction some other thing one wills, which is
universal.
33
1. Kant says that if agents violate the categorical imperative, use their maxims to
violate things like his examples, they do not question the imperative itself, for
‘which is impossible.’
2. But he thinks, but are rather making an ‘exception for themselves.’ Because of
‘inclination,’ agents pretend that the objective moral law does not apply to them,
or can be suspended.
3. So agents might hold that the categorical imperative holds ‘generally,’ but just not
to them at the time. That is, it holds for others generally, but they are the lucky
exception to it.
4. Kant says if agents realized what they were doing, they might ‘find a
contradiction’ in thought or will. But this is so only if agents see themselves as
subject to objective law.
5. But Kant admits, there is really no contradiction, ‘only opposition.’ For what is
occurring is that man sees himself at one moment as subject to reason, and at
another as ‘affected by inclination.’
6. Kant is saying that everyone really knows that they are subject to the categorical
imperative. They can fool themselves that they are not, but rationality demands
acknowledging it.
7. This means that it does not matter if one calls the problem ‘consistency’ or
‘opposition.’ This is because either way, the agent has no rational reason for
making himself an exception.
33-34
1. Kant thinks that up to this point in his argument, he has shown that ‘if duty is to
be…authoritative…it must be categorical…not hypothetical.’ He has not really
shown even this.
2. The idea here is that if duty were only hypothetical, then it may not apply, and so
lose its ‘unconditional necessity’ for action. If one thinks of happiness as ‘natural
necessity,’ there is no problem.
3. Kant says he has also shown ‘the content of the categorical imperative…for every
application.’ He showed that the categorical imperative was willing universality,
and gave examples.
4. But as noted, Kant has not been persuasive with his examples. In fact many things
he thinks lead to contradictions do not, imperatives can be reformulated to avoid
contradiction.
5. But Kant warns, these two conclusions are fine, but he has not shown ‘that there
is a categorical imperative.’ To do this, Kant says, he will have to enter into ‘the
metaphysics of morals. ’
35
1. Kant discusses his second formulation of the categorical imperative. He says that
rational beings have a ‘will,’ the ‘faculty of determining itself to actions in
accordance with the representation of certain laws.’
2. He says the wills ‘ground of self-determination’ is ‘an end.’
3. Kant says that ‘if this end is given by reason alone, it must be valid for all rational
beings.’ Here he means the ‘end’ of an action, which justifies being done in the
first place.
4. He says that ‘let us suppose that there were something whose existence has in
itself an absolute worth, something whose which as an end in itself could ground
determinate laws.’
5. To answer his own supposition, Kant says ‘man…every rational being, exists as
an end in himself and not merely as an means to be arbitrarily used by this or that
will.’
6. Kant says ‘he must, whether directed to himself, or other beings, be regarded at
the same time as an end.’ But here, Kant does not seem to mean a justifying ‘end’
of action, but the agent who wills it.
36
1. But why do agents think of themselves as ‘ends in themselves?’ Kant insists that
it is having a will, or ‘the nature’ of rational beings that ‘marks them out as ends
in themselves.’
2. He says ‘this imposes a limit on all arbitrary use of such beings.’ Kant later says
this is the ‘supreme limiting condition.’ Such beings, it seems, ‘are objects of
respect.’
3. Kant defines an ‘end in itself’ as ‘one for which there can be substituted no other
end.’ This definition seems neutral between and ‘end’ of action, and an ‘end’ as
that being who wills other ends.
4. Kant insist that ‘rational nature exists as an end in itself.’
5. Every rational being ‘thinks of his existence this way,’ as an end without any
‘substitution.’ Moreover, everyone else thinks this ‘on the same rational ground
that holds for me.’
6. So then, the categorical imperative, in this form, is to ‘act in such a way that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another at the
same time as an end and not merely as a means.’
7. Kant says from this ‘all laws of the will can be derived.’
36-37
1. Kant goes through his last four examples. He says that suicide ‘treats the self as a
means…to a tolerable situation.’ But again, this does not follow if one has
consented to this.
2. Making false promises does the same, as the lied to person ‘cannot possibly
concur’ with my action. Now this seems correct, if it is true that the lie is not
consented to.
3. Similarly, violations of duties of self-cultivation may be consistent with treating
humanity as and end, but, obviously, ‘it is not consistent with the advancement of
this end.’
4. Now Kant does not say how this is. But he seems to mean that if one does not
cultivate talents, then, one will act in ways that allows others to be treated as ends,
accidentally.
5. Duties of benevolence, again, may be so consistent, but ‘this would harmonize
only negatively.’ This again would allow others to be treated as means, but
accidentally.
6. Now even if Kant were correct here, he ignores the objection that it might be
justified often to treat others as ‘mere means,’ when something more important is
at stake.
7. A comment on the former two formulas of the categorical imperative. These are
procedural. If agents present maxims to them, this is a procedure to derive the
content of maxims.
38-39
1. The forthcoming two formula of the categorical imperative are not procedural.
Nothing can be presented to them, as such, nor derived. Hence Kant does not
mention his four examples.
2. Kant recaps his two formulas, so as to introduce a third. He says that universal
law ‘is objectively the ground of all practical legislation.’ But subjectively, the
‘ground…lies in the end,’ and eventually, in the ‘rational being as an end in
itself.’
3. So what is this third formula? Kant insists the universal law and subjective end
imply a third formula, the ‘idea that the will of every rational being…legislates
universal law.’
4. Kant says this ‘legislation of universal law’ has advantages over the first two
formulas. He says the first two formulas might have renounced being
hypothetical, but might yet be so.
5. This is because since the law is ‘objective,’ the agent must have a ‘interest’ or
what Kant calls ‘an attracting stimulus,’ making the law appealing. So why is
this?
6. Kant says that because the law is objective and because agents are not perfect, the
will ‘has to be necessitated’ by something to follow it, opening the door for all
kinds of ‘attracting stimuli.’
7. But it is different when agents ‘legislate’ the law. This is because if the agent
‘legislates’ the law, then it can have no interests that determine this. So why is
this?
8. But Kant says if the agent does have an ‘interest,’ it would require ‘yet another
law restrict its self-interest to the condition that such interest should itself be valid
as a universal law.’
9. So Kant seems to be offering a ‘infinite regress’ argument to show how good his
‘legislating will’ argument is. He would rather not begin the regress of ‘laws’ at
all.
10. Kant thinks that the way to avoid the ‘regress’ is not to admit that the ‘legislating
will’ needs an interest at all. This is only possible if the agent himself makes up
the law.
40
1. Kant moves on to his last formula of the categorical imperative.
2. He says that by a ‘kingdom of ends’, he imagines ‘the concept of every rational
being as one who must regard himself as legislating universal law by his wills
maxims.’
3. So Kant envisions a community of completely impartial rule makers.
4. Kant insists that members legislate not only for others, but are also ‘also subject
to these laws.’ But members do not respect the laws that other members make,
only their own.
5. Now this may seem odd, but Kant is saying that completely free ‘autonomous’
beings cannot pay attention to the maxims of others. If they did, they may not be
choosing freely.
41
1. Kant quickly moves off the subject of this kingdom.
2. He insists that the formulation of the categorical imperative, that is, universality,
end in itself, and kingdom of ends ‘are at bottom only so many formulas of the
same law.’
3. But he says, there are ‘subjective’ differences.
4. Kant says that the form of maxims is their ‘universality,’ the matter is their ‘end,’
and when combined there is a ‘completeness,’ in that ‘all maxims… harmonize in
a kingdom of ends.’
5. So the picture here, is that universality is the form of the categorical imperative,
the only kind of end that is compatible with this is an end in itself, yet there are
many such ends, or ‘legislators’ in a kingdom.
42
1. Kant reformulates his general summary, but in terms of a ‘good will.’ He says he
want to ‘end where he began…with the unconditionally good will.’ This does not
change his points.
2. He says that such a will ‘cannot be evil’ insofar as it cannot ‘conflict with itself.’
3. Kant says such lack of contradiction is achieved only by following the
‘universality.’ But there is a limit here. This is so in that each will ‘sets itself an
end,’ when it acts.
4. But of course, this means that ‘universality’ implies that some ends cannot be
pursued. The important limit, then is that each person is a ‘end in-itself,’ treating
everyone as such an end.
43
1. Moving on, Kant thinks, since the will recognizes his own end in-itself, it follows
that ‘every rational being…must be able to regard himself…as subject to all laws’
he makes.
2. But, to respect the ‘ends in-themselves’ of every other will, it is important also
that agents act as though they are legislating in a harmonizing ‘merely possible
kingdom of ends.’
3. Kant insists that such a kingdom would need this ‘harmony’ for ‘it would be
realized through the many maxims…prescribed to all rational beings by the
categorical imperative.’
4. But again, Kant recognizes that his own formulation of this kingdom prevents any
‘expectation that anyone will follow your maxims.’ Even so, wills must pretend
the kingdom exists.
5. So this is how Kant sees it. Universality implies limits. But one of these is treating
everyone as ends. This implies that all will be involved in a hypothetical kingdom
of ends.
44
1. Kant says, in summary, that ‘autonomy’ is key to morality.
2. That is, ‘morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to
the possible legislation of universal law by means of maxims of the will. That will
whose maxims are necessarily in accord with the laws of autonomy is holy, or
absolutely good, will.’
45-48
1. Kant repeats much of what he has said about any moral philosophy that is not
based on duty, ‘and why they all fail.’ He says failure happens because of
‘heteronomy.’
2. So what is ‘heteronomy, then?’
3. Kant says it is the situation one gets into when one tries to follow a moral theory
that demands one pay attention both to empirical and a-priori constraints on moral
choice.
4. But recall that the empirical constraints on action come in two forms. First, there
are those desires, or peculiarities of human nature. These are internal constraints
on actions.
5. And there are those intended consequences, like wanting a new car. Or these may
comprise the setting of such consequences, like living in a given country. Such
are external constraints.
6. But Kant says that since the agent and the world change, trying to keep track of
these empirical constraints on action is impossible. So the will is torn between the
empirical and a-priori.
7. And since keeping track of these is impossible, there is no way to subsume any
‘heteronomy’ ridden moral view under principles. So these views are one and all
unprincipled.