n Skinner's Behaviorism
 I. Behaviorism as a version of Physicalism n II. Implications for Education and Government n III. Skinner's Theory of Value n Three Theories of the Mind n Hylomorphism (Aristotle, Aquinas) n Dualism (Descartes) n Physicalism (Hobbes, Skinner)
ä Eliminationism
ä Reductionism n Problems with Reduction: #3 n 3. The problem of multiple realizability.
ä The same mental state could be realized by infinitely many different physical states.
ä The same belief can be shared by people whose brains are quite different, even by creatures of different species.
ä Even -- aliens who are silicon-based, or androids with electronic brains. n Connection between #1 & #3 n This is a characteristic feature of teleological states: the same end can be achieved by infinitely many different means. n Screwdrivers can be made of many different materials, in many different shapes or forms (power vs. manual). n More than 30 different kinds of eyes in nature. n Problem #4: Qualities of Conscious Experience n Consciousness seems to involve certain qualities (called “qualia”, singular “quale”), like the feeling of pain or the appearance of colors, that cannot be reduced to physical properties. n Possibility of zombies, color-spectrum inversions. Undetectable by behavior, interaction with environment, brain states. n Behaviorism as a Version of Physicalism n Early version of physicalism: stimulus response model. n Build a simple, 2-column table: inputs in first column, outputs in second.

n Operant conditioning n Includes a kind of "memory" of past experience. n Possibility of positive and negative reinforcement. n X is a positive reinforcement of behavior Y if and only if the association of X with Y makes the repetition of Y more likely. n Human beings are finite automata. n Represent by a more complicated table.
ä Rows: possible inputs (environmental conditions).
ä Columns: possible internal states. n In each square, we put two things:
ä 1. The output, behavior produced.
ä 2. The new internal state into which the subject is transformed. n Everything is finite n finitely many inputs (conditions to which the subject is potentially sensitive) n finitely many internal states n finitely many possible behaviors. n III. Implications of Behaviorism for Education and Government n A. Education -- especially moral, character education.
ä Classical (teleological) view: there is a fundamental distinction between manipulation and education. n Education (on classical view) n Assists and nurtures natural development of moral sense, character n •Goal: teachers initiate learners into a state to which they have already attained (maturity, wisdom). n Manipulation (on classical view) n Circumvents or overrides natural functions, development. n Goal: to modify students' behavior for the good of society, without reference to the current state of the teachers. n Education vs. Manipulation n On the behaviorist view: this distinction is empty. All so-called education is merely a form of manipulation
(behavior control).

n There is no natural development, "no unfolding of a pre-determined pattern" (p. 89) n Government n On classical view, individual liberty is an important goal: n In order to attain happiness, each individual needs opportunities to exercise and develop virtue & practical wisdom. n This necessitates a sphere of private sovereignty. n Distinction: liberty & license n One has no right to do what is inherently vicious -- e.g., to murder, enslave or dominate another. n When law prohibits such vicious acts, no liberty is lost. n Contrast: Hobbes & Rousseau n Held that every law is a restriction of liberty. n Perfect liberty is possible only in the state of nature (anarchy). n Skinner: there is no such thing as liberty n So, no law, regulation or social control involves a loss of "liberty". Liberty is not an intelligible social goal. n Why not? Skinner denies the existence of choice, and of virtue. These are mythical components of happiness. n Persuasion vs. Manipulation n On the classical view, the state is a partnership, based on mutual respect, and the use of persuasion, not coercion or manipulation. n Persuasion: speech that engages the faculties of the rational mind, assisting them to function properly in reaching a reasonable conclusion. n Manipulation (misuse of rhetoric): speech that seeks to circumvent or override the faculties of the rational mind
(through the exploitation of weaknesses and biases), causing them to function improperly and form an unreasonable conclusion. n Skinner’s rejection of this contrast n Skinner denies the validity of the persuasion/manipulation distinction. n He denies the existence of such inner faculties, and of the distinction of proper/improper functioning. n Who controls the controllers? n Skinner argues that there "should" be reciprocity between controllers and controlled, effective measures of
"counter-conntrol". (p. 169) n However, he gives no reason why this should be so. Nor does he explain when efforts at counter-control are proper and when they are merely the result of neurotic attachment to "freedom".

n If the controller has the proper goals, why shouldn't his power be absolute? n Can there be effective countercontrol, when the controller is acting benevolently? No rational basis for objection. Result: the nanny state. (Hillaire Belloc, The Servile State). n Skinner's Theory of Value n Definition:
ä Good things are positive reinforcers. n A positive reinforcer is a consequence of behavior that makes the behavior more likely to recur. n Relativism n Immediate consequence: radical relativism. n What is good for you may not be good for me. n What reinforces us depends not only on genetic endowment, but also on "training" by environment. Both vary from person to person. n Optimism? n The best things are those consequences that most effectively reinforce behavior. n In the long run and for the most part, the most effective reinforcers must succeed in reinforcing. n Consequently, most people behave so as to produce the most effective reinforcers. n Absurd consequences? n This means that most people enjoy the best possible life (given Skinner's definition of the best). n E.g., addicts enjoy the life that is best for them, since their behavior is under the control of the most powerful reinforcers. n Ditto for serial killers, who are most effectively reinforced by the thrill of violence. n Consequence: fatalism or quietism. This is already the best possible world. n Can Skinner respond? n We want to say at most: that people enjoy the best possible life, given their circumstances. n But, what reinforces whom is always relative to circumstances. n So, can Skinner give an account of which circumstances are best? n Skinner and Survival Value n Skinner adopts survival value as the ultimate value. n The survival of one's "culture".

n Raises two questions: n 1. The survival of what exactly? n 2. What makes survival of the culture/species an especially gripping value, given behaviorism? n 1. The survival of what? n If we modify our culture radically through behavior modification our genes through genetic engineering, what survives the process?
ä Analogy: in Vietnam, "to save the village, we had to destroy it." n Are we ensuring the survival of our culture, or are we ensuring its extinction and replacement? Ditto for our species. n 2. Is survival value especially gripping, given behaviorism? n Apparently not -- depends on what happens to reinforce Skinner, due to historical accidents. n Possible confusion
We might think the following: n If natural selection is the ultimate cause of human morality, then the survival of the species (or one's "culture") is the highest moral value. n Two problems: n 1. This depends on a very dubious theory of group selection. n According to the consensus of biologists, natural selection does not favor behavior that benefits the whole species at the expense of the individual's genes. n So, natural selection would not tend to give human beings an overriding concern for the welfare of the species
(or of any other large group, like the culture). n 2. Confuses the relationship between natural selection and moral values. n Any concern for the welfare of humanity is a product of a "high" morality (in Darwin's sense), which is in turn the by-product of other, more fundamental adaptations. n But, within the sphere of "high" morality, a concern for the welfare of humanity depends on a belief that humanity is worthy, deserving of survival. n From the perspective of morality: n Mere survival of the species is not the ultimate end -- it is merely a means to the perpetuation of other values, such as the perpetuation of love, dignity, friendship, science, art, etc. n The Cognitive Revolution
Two scientific challenges to behaviorism:

n Chaos theory n Chomsky’s linguistics n Chaos theory n The physical attributes of the human body are capable of infinite variation: vary continuously along a spectrum. n To represent the body as a finite automaton, we must assume that states that vary only slightly differ only slightly in their effects. n This is true only for linear (non-chaotic) systems. n The body is a non-linear, chaotic system. n The Butterfly Effect: small, imperceptible differences in input can make massive differences in output. n It's not surprising that it's easier to put a man on the moon than to teach a classroom full of children to read. n Chomsky's linguistics n Representing human beings as computers (Turing machines), not finite automata. n Potentially infinite memories -- idealization. n Performance vs. competence.
ä Equivalent to: efficient vs. final causation.
ä Competence: what the mind is supposed to do.