The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s
interpersonal cheap talk game
Maria Csizmas
2014
BSc in Psychology
Author: Maria Csizmas
ID number: 111077-2319
Supervisor: XXXXXXXXX
Department of Psychology
School of Business
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
Foreword
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the BSc Psychology degree, Reykjavik
University, this thesis is presented in the style of an article for submission to a peer-reviewed
journal.
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The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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Abstract
Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game was addressed in an Icelandic campus, on the first
time with mood inducement. Researchers intended to found out more about human honesty
and dishonesty associated with either temporary happy or sad mood. The results of the study
were supporting the outcome of previous mood-induced economic experiments, marginal, but
significant difference found between the mood effects and dishonesty: students, who were
assigned to watch a sad movie and were senders, were more likely to send true, finance
related message to receivers than those who were assigned to watch a happy movie.
Participants were justifying dishonest messages with the small amount of money that was
offered for distribution in the experiment.
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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Introduction
People find it difficult to determine in a few words what selfishness means to them.
Moreover, they find disturbing, that sometimes both honesty and dishonesty can be related to
egocentrism, dependently on the circumstances (Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, &
Ariely, 2009). In a world, whereby financial scandals are on the cover of the magazines on
daily bases, and the gate between people who are critically poor or extremely reach is
growing, the role of economic psychology is more and more emphasized (Brüne , 2012).
This study presents an interpersonal, mood-induced “cheap talk game”, conducted at
the Reykjavík University of Iceland. The goal of the experiment is to determine the level of
honesty and dishonesty in interpersonal situations under temporary mood influence. The non
–manipulated cheap talk game, a type of experimental economic game, is a world-wide
recognized method in the assessment of human honesty and dishonesty (Henrich & Co,
2005). Important to note, that the CTG (cheap talk game) otherwise has never been
introduced to participants before with a mood-induction.
In ultimatum games, mood induction is influential not only on the choices of the
distributors, but also on the latency of decision making (Forgas & Tan, 2013a). Parallel to the
ultimatum games, the outcome of the dictator games indicated too, that temporary bad mood
increases concern to social norms in participants and incite them to become externally
focused, while short-term happiness recruits internal, selfish processes. A possible
explanation of the result constancy in mood manipulated games could be related to
physiological reasons, such as separated or convergent neural pathways (Rudebeck, Walton,
Smyth, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2006). Built on the results of these previous, economicrelated games, the hypothesis of this research is that subjects induced into a temporary happy
mood will be more likely to lie than subjects induced into a sad mood during Gneezy´s cheap
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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talk game.
Result constancy in non-manipulated games
The cue, mood-induced, or belief-related manipulations in economic games are
purposely distinguished from the non-manipulated experiments (Ockenfels & Werner, 2014).
Despite the differences, all finance-related games have the common purpose, and that is to
discover agent´s altruism, selfishness, honesty, dishonesty and fairness (Hodgson & Huang,
2012). The most simplified scientific definition of selfishness has been described as
controversy between self-interest and the best interest of the group (Caporael, Dawes, Orbell,
& van de Kragt, 1989). According to Krupka and Weber (2013) participants find both social
norms and financial gain important but their choices are constant across the wide variance of
dictator games; subjects generally tend to behave in a way that it could be considered socially
appropriate. Therefore, the predicted outcomes of the non-manipulated dictator games are
frequently opposing the negative scientific expectations concerning human selfishness.
The neurobiology of economic decision making
Previous economic experiments are suggest the existence of convergent neural
pathways (Weiland, Hewig, Hecht, Mussel, & Miltner, 2012). Happiness, as a neural reaction
to stimulus is related to the prefrontal cortexes (Kühn o.fl., 2011). Conversely, in dictator
games the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex are responsible
for fair offers (Weiland o.fl., 2012). When participants in dictator games were influenced to
become sad, they were more likely to become less selfish (Forgas & Tan, 2013b). This
outcome is supported by the fact, that the neural pathway of perceived sadness leads through
the anterior cingulate cortex, similarly to fairness and altruism (Yoshino o.fl., 2010). Despite
the independent experiments and studies on the field of neuropsychology on human decision
making, the result constancy of mood-induced economic games is scientifically unexplained.
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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Duration of information process and consistency cues
Considering other influential variables that are likely to play role in the outcomes of
economic games, the duration of information process could be a concern (Neo, Yu, Weber, &
Gonzalez, 2013). The procedure instruction of the cheap talk games require more attention
and time to understand than it does in dictator and ultimatum games (van ’t Wout, Kahn,
Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006). Therefore the effect of mood induction might not imprint
participant´s honest or dishonest actions as strongly as with other games, due to the “rest
period” between emotional arousal and the decision making (Reilly & Morris, 1983). Andrade
and Ariely (2009) were discovering the issue of consistency cues, when they compared
financial decision making between temporary angry and happy participants who were playing
both ultimatum and dictator games. The rules of the ultimatum game required a minute more
to understand than the rules in dictator games, and that minute significantly lowered
participant´s suggestibility by the cue that was signalled to them before the instruction
reading.
Method
Ethical requirements
The agent´s ethical requirements were to give up their name and e-mail address and
asked to give up their gender and age. None of the students were forced to participate, the
rules and purpose of the research was shared with them according to the written, ethical rules.
Participants and procedures
The participants of the study were 173 student from campus, among them were 73
women and 67 men, 3 persons were withheld their gender. 78% of the subjects were younger
than 24 years old.
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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The students who were in the same academic class were approached in campus, and
volunteered to participate in the experiment in the computer lab. They were than assigned into
two groups.
Measures
Mood induction and the Cheap talk game
One group watched a short comedy that induced happy mood, while the other group
watched a tragic historical scene with a sad ending. Subjects were separated, so they couldn´t
see each other´s movie, neither the answers. Immediately after the movies the participants
were rating their mood on a 7 stage scale; happy-sad, good-bad, heavy-light, and down-frisky.
The scores were averaged to create a summary measure: Cronbach´s alpha α = .94.
In particular, the design was a replicated version of Gneezy´s cheap talk game. Agents were
paired anonymously; one of them was the “receiver” the other was the “sender”. The receiver
was required to choose between options A or B, which were associated with the monetary
distribution to the sender. In case the receiver chose action A, he or she earned 500 Isk, while
action B provided to the sender 600 Isk. The receiver, without knowing the payoff had to
decide to take options A or B. Meanwhile the sender, who was aware the amount of money
paired with the options was required to send a message to the receiver: “Option A will earn
you more money than action B” or “Option B will earn you more money than option A”, in
another word: message “A” was true, while message “B” was false.
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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Results
Mood validation
Participants in the sad mood induction group rated their mood significantly worse than
those participants who were assigned to the happy mood manipulation (M = 3.32; SD = 1.08
vs M = 5.02; SD= 1.02; F (1, 141) = 93,76; p < .001.
Mood effects associated with dishonesty
Mood had effected significantly participant´s dishonesty χ2(1, N = 141) = 1, 74; p = .09
(one sided)
Participants who were receiving happy mood inducement were lying about 50% more
than those who were influenced to be in a sad mood (Fig. 1).
90%
81%
80%
71%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
29%
Honest
Dishonest
19%
10%
0%
sad mood
happy mood
Figure 1. shows the percentage of subjects which were lying and the percentage of those who
were telling the truth after temporary negative or positive mood effects.
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
33%
35%
30%
25%
21%
21%
20%
15%
15%
10%
10%
5%
0%
Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Figure 2. Percentage of participants who agreed or disagreed about lying in the experiment.
60%
50%
50%
40%
30%
20%
20%
10%
14%
6%
10%
0%
I needed the
money
The amount was This is just game.
so low that it
I wouldn´t do
didn´t matter this in real life
what message
I´ve sent
The receiver
would never
belive me
anyway
Something else
Figure 3. Participant´s reasons why they were sending a false message to the receiver.
Figure 1 displays the percentage of participants who were honest in a temporary sad mood
and those who were dishonest in a temporary happy mood 81 % of the subjects.
On Figure 2 weobserved the percentage of subjects who agreed or disagreed having sent
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The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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dishonest message to their receiver, whereby the vast majority of agent´s (33 %) did not
admitted of lying. 21 % of the participant´s strongly agreed of having sent false message and
21 % of students were strongly disagreed. The justification of subject´s decisions of sending a
false message displayed on Figure 3, and shows that 50% of students found the amount of
money was so low, that for them it didn´t matter what message they´ve sent
Discussion
The present study intended to show that temporary mood-induction can influence
the outcome of an interpersonal cheap talk game. According to the research-hypothesis,
participants who are conditioned to be in a happy mood will be less fair and honest than those
who´s mood are manipulated to a depressive direction.
The results of the experiment were in accordance with previous studies on
interpersonal mood-induced dictator games and they were supporting the hypothesis above
(Forgas & Tan, 2013b).
Tan and Forgas (2010) were implicating the participant´s tendency to economic fairness in a
temporary sad mood, but encouraging lying in happiness. Similarly to the dictator games,
ultimatum games were providing the same outcome after mood manipulation (Forgas & Tan,
2013b). However, the mood effect on unfairness was highly significant in the previous
researches. The explanation why the present study provided marginal significance could be
explained by longer information process in cheap talk games , that dampens emotional arousal
before the decision making (Andrade & Ariely, 2009). This outcome requires neurological
measures within the economic game experiments for the better understanding of human
cognition.
The measures on brain functions under economic decision making are able to
distinguish a deliberation locked and a verdict locked neural analyses (Schaich Borg, Sinnott-
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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Armstrong, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 2011). The finding suggests, that morality is related to the
cortical regions, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex
and the temporoparietal junction. These brain sections are responsible not for immediate
moral deliberations but excluding the moral verdicts, explaining why clinical patients may
have intact moral judgment but impaired moral behavior. Certain socio-economic studies,
unrelated to neuroscience, are also requiring solid evidence on how experimental inducement
can incline participants to make moral decisions (Scheres & Sanfey, 2006).
Assumptions on the course of actions during an experimental economy game, such as
expecting that people have negative attribution towards certain ethnicities and nations of war
crimes, can be misleading (Whitt & Wilson, 2007). When it comes to the data processing
stage of a non-manipulated DG, people are often more fair than vengeful and this positive
phenomenon requires further examinations by social psychologists (Forgas & Tan, 2013b).
From a cognitive point of view unselfish giving became identified as altruism, empathy or
sensitivity of justice. The phenomena of altruistic sharing is under the influence of justice
sensitivity and affective empathy but cognitive empathy remains detached by these variables
(Edele, Dziobek, & Keller, 2013). Cognitive empathy assumes an overall understanding of
other´s feelings and needs, but does not require personal involvement or emotional arousal
when it comes to economic distribution. Participants with high cognitive empathy are less
likely to share money fairly than those subjects, who possess high affective empathy or justice
sensitivity.
Strengths and limitations of the present study
From the viewpoint of an economic psychologist which has a goal to observe and
portray the patterns of people´s actions, the mood-induced cheap talk game provides great
opportunity for a complete study. Since Gneezy´s cheap talk game has never been induced
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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with mood manipulations before this study can be the contemplation of the mood manipulated
dictator and ultimatum games. Considering other scientific positions, similar to the previously
mentioned neurological findings, researchers may require more explanations, whereby the
observations of economic and moral decisions are paired with fMRI measures or other
physiological follow ups (Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & van Winden, 2007). The
environment, type of institution, amount of money or purposely administered manipulations,
as mood-inducement and cues, are capital issues in the analization of any economic games, so
as the possibility of negative or positive consequences of the participant´s decisions
(Boatright, 2010).
The economic crisis, that is now spread throughout the world indicates a distributional
defeat of the global finances and values, often related to small group of distributors, who may
suffer in personality disorders that may impact their moral judgment.
The limitations of the experimental economic game, which is the missing explanations
of the observed result constancies in both manipulated and non-manipulated experiment,
could be avoided with the administration of a study, that includes theoretical representation of
all the three economic games (dictator, ultimatum and cheap talk game), moreover paired with
fMRI measures, whereby practical explanations of moral behaviour could be processed on the
same randomly assigned participants.
The effect of mood induction in Gneezy´s interpersonal cheap talk game
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