2015 Illinois Philosophical Association Conference
Eastern Illinois University
Paper Abstracts
1. How Improbable is Our Finely-Tuned Universe? In a famous paper titled
“Why is There Anything at All?” (1996) van Inwagen argues that all possible
worlds are equally probable a priori. In this paper, we argue that if multiverses
are possible, then it follows that there is a 100% probability that a randomly
selected possible world would include at least one physical universe fine-tuned
for the evolution of intelligent biological life. Thus, if van Inwagen is correct and
all possible worlds are equally probable a priori, then we would expect the
actual world to include at least one finely-tuned universe if the actual world
came to exist by random chance. Dr. Jason Waller- Eastern Illinois University
Bob Milnikel – Kenyon College
Commentator: Dr. Grant Sterling – Eastern Illinois University
2. Two Arguments Against Indirect Mathematical Empiricism: Indirect
mathematical empiricists aim to provide a completely a posteriori account of
justified mathematical belief. To do so, they argue that (a) mathematical
propositions are expressed by indispensable sentences of our best current
scientific theories and (b) we are justified in believing mathematical
propositions in virtue of their theoretical indispensibility. Since scientific
theories are justified a posteriori, it follows that any belief justified in virtue of a
scientific theory is also justified a posteriori.
I raise two concerns about whether indirect mathematical empiricists can
achieve their aim. First, I argue that since some mathematical beliefs are more
justified than any scientific theories, they must possess a degree of theoryindependent justification. Second, I argue that a potential defeater for all
scientific theories (namely, the pessimistic meta-induction) is not a defeater for
many mathematical beliefs. This too suggests that such beliefs possess a degree
of theory independent justification. Dr. Robert M Farley – Hillsborough College
Commentator: Ryan Ross - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
3. Apology and Empathy: In this paper I argue for a new analysis of apology that
interprets them as a particular type of empathy (or sympathy) expression.
Currently, apologies are contrasted to empathetic expressions of “I’m sorry,”
which are taken to be philosophically uninteresting. Or, expressions of empathy
are positioned opposite of genuine apologies, as when expressions of empathy
(i.e. I’m sorry that you feel that way) are used to replace or obfuscate
responsibility (i.e. I’m sorry that I did that to you.) But if we understand
apologies as a particular kind of empathy claim, a view of apology emerges that
is better, as I will explain here. Dr. Teresa Britton – Eastern Illinois University
Commentator: Sungwoo Um - Duke University
4. Evidential Evil & Epistemic Possibility: Since theists haven’t yet provided a
logical proof of God’s existence compelling to atheists, and vice versa for atheists
and disproof, focus has shifted towards what it is reasonable to believe. In “The
Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” atheologian William Rowe
argues that because evil appears to serve no God-justifying good, evil is evidence
against God’s existence. Theists respond that because God’s reasons are
inconceivable to us, instances of apparently pointless evil are not evidential—it
is epistemically possible that they have a hidden justification. I briefly explain
epistemic possibility, then recount Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil and
outline theistic responses framed in epistemic possibility, examining Stephen
Wykstra’s CORNEA—a suggested semantics of “It appears that p.” I then
demonstrate through an extended example how CORNEA is inclusive enough to
reasonably permit theistic belief, but is too inclusive, inviting global skeptical
explosion. Jonathan York - Northern Illinois University
Commentator: Timothy Kirschenheiter - Wayne State University
5. Debunking Arguments Needn’t Make Us Insecure: Evolutionary debunking
arguments are meant to convince us that we cannot rationally retain our moral
beliefs, by way of convincing us that there is no explanatory connection between
the moral facts and our moral beliefs. A growing number of respondents
maintain the arguments can be blocked *without denying* that there is such an
explanatory disconnect. We present what we take to be the central problem with
these lines of response. Much of the discussion will focus on attempts to
vindicate these responses, by showing that the debunking arguments fail to
threaten the "security" of our moral beliefs.
Dr. Dan Korman – University of Illinois
Dustin Locke - Claremont McKenna
Commentator: Nethanel Lipshitz - University of Chicago
6. A New Paradox in Lewis’ Paradise: In this paper, I have presented a paradox to
argue that the unrestricted principle of recombination leads to the implausible
conclusion, given a plausible assumption, that there can be neither the
aggregate, nor the class of all Lewisian possible worlds. While a restriction on
the size of possible worlds would effectively prevent the paradox, any such
restriction could not be free from criticism that it was objectionably arbitrary. It
should also be noted that the paradox argument addressed in this paper
undermines exclusively GMR (or any modal theory which considers possible
worlds as concrete entities), for the property of automorphy could only be
instantiated by concrete objects. Unless the proponent of GMR finds a way to
deal with no aggregate or class of all possible worlds, GMR should be rejected as
untenable. Seungil Lee – University of Illinois
Commentator: Milo Crimi - UCLA
7. Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent
Criminals: In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that human
beings lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our
actions. Some of these philosophers are Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and
Bruce Waller. Each of these philosophers realizes that insofar as no one is
morally responsible for their actions this presents a problem concerning what
should be done with dangerous criminal offenders. In response to this, they
endorse a quarantine approach to the issue to justify the nonpunitive detention
of criminals who pose a threat to society. In my essay I explain their view and
argue that it falls prey to a problem of quarantining the innocent. Thus, I
conclude that we should have deep moral reservations about such views.
Dr. John Lemos - Coe College
Commentator: Dr. Christopher Pynes – Western Illinois University
8. Modality for Moderate Empiricists: On Some Problems and Prospects for
Structural Counterfactuals: We consider some problems and prospects for
marrying two recent research programs – Williamson’s counterfactualist
approach to the epistemology of modality and Pearl’s causal modeling approach
to counterfactuals – to provide an epistemology acceptable to moderate
empiricists. We consider some problems already noted in the literature arising
from counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents and embedded
counterfactuals. Adam Edwards – University of Illinois
Jonathan Livengood - University of Illinois
Commentator: Meagan Phillips - Northern Illinois University
9. Friendship and Epistemic Partiality: My aim in this paper is to closely
examine the relationship between friendship and epistemic partiality. First, I
argue that what good friendship involves as its constituent part is not epistemic
partiality per se, but what I call friendly hope, which is the source of the former.
Second, I address the worry that friendship can be an epistemic vice, since, even
assuming that it does not demand epistemically objectionable partiality, it
frequently gives rise to such partiality. I argue that the sort of epistemic
partiality from friendship is not as epistemically objectionable as it first appears.
I conclude that friendship as such is neutral from an epistemic point of
view. Sungwoo Um – Duke University
Commentator: Dr. Peter Boltuc - University of Illinois, Springfield
10. Epistemic Possibility: Contextualism or Relativism? There are two dominant
theories regarding epistemic modals: relativism and contextualism. Both theories
share the idea that sentences involving epistemic modals have truth-values and are
context-sensitive. The main difference between relativism and contextualism is what
determines the truth-conditions of a modal claim. For relativism, the context of
assessment establishes the truth- conditions of a modal claim; meanwhile, for
contextualism, the truth- conditions are determined by the context of utterance. The
aim of this paper is to show that John MacFarlane’s relativism provides a better
account of epistemic modals than Keith DeRose’s contextualism. To develop this
argument, I have organized the paper as follows: first, I examine the contextualist
treatment of epistemic modals, and then explain the relativist approach. Afterwards, I
defend the thesis that relativism has a better explanatory power for epistemic modals
than contextualism. In the last section, I present a potential objection to relativism and
a reply to it. Nathaly Garcia – Northern Illinois University
Commentator: Caley Howland - Northern Illinois University
11. In Defense of Biological Normativity: This essay aims to show that the rejection
of biological normativity on the ground that it is inconsistent with our best science
generates a reductio against the very epistemic commitments that undergird the
move to reject biological normativity in the first place. I also briefly outline an
Aristotelian approach to normativity that avoids the reductio while remaining
broadly in line with naturalist sympathies. Embracing this approach to biological
normativity unifies normativity across biology, epistemology, and metaethics.
Insofar as simplicity and explanatory unification are theoretical virtues that
constitute evidence of a theory’s truth, there is at least some reason to believe in
the existence of objective biological norms. Jeff Wisdom – Joliet Junior College
Commentator: Graham Renz – University of Missouri
12. Is the proponent of neo-Darwinian theory committed to the existence of a
Designer? Drawing inspiration from Plantinga’s seminal work, we will argue that
the proponent of neo-Darwinian theory is committed to the existence of a
Designer. Fales’ convincingly makes the case that Plantinga is incorrect to hold
that neo-Darwinian theory makes globally reliable belief forming mechanisms
unlikely. In this paper we will argue that a purely neo-Darwinian account of
evolution makes it very unlikely that simplicity, a local belief forming mechanism,
is a reliable guide to truth. Given the role simplicity plays in science, if simplicity is
not a veridical method of theory selection, scientific realism is likely false and we
should, concomitantly, refuse to treat neo-Darwinian theory realistically. Scientific
realism and neo-Darwinian theory can be saved if we are willing to posit the
existence of a Designer responsible for our preference for simplicity.
Dr. Abraham Graber and Luke Golemon – Western Illinois University
Commentator: Dr. Jason Waller – Eastern Illinois University
13. The Assertion of Epistemic Possibilities: In this paper I consider two departures
from truth-conditional semantics of epistemic modals like relativism: radical
invariantism and expressivism. I argue that neither offers a fully satisfactory
account of epistemic modals. I do so by first outlining three formal features of
relativism that, when rejected or revised, present problematic consequences for
each theory. In the second section, I present Kent Bach’s radical invariantism
and argue that it fails to properly capture our belief states when making
assertions about epistemic possibilities. In the third section, I briefly argue that
while expressivism might fare better, it is ultimately unable to fully establish
itself against the relativist position. The upshot of my discussion is that three
formal features—concerning semantic completeness, factualism, and the
informational content of truth-evaluable epistemic modal sentences—seem
necessary for any theory seeking to model assertions of epistemic possibilities.
Ali K. Aenehzodaee - Northern Illinois University
Commentator: Timothy Buchanan - Northern Illinois University
14. Objects as Processes: Dissolving the Problem of Collocated Objects: The
author finds “traditional” accounts of the collocation of objects unacceptable, i.e.
it is denied two objects can be located in the exact same region of space-time.
This paper argues the basic distinction between conventional and nonconventional objects, grounded in the characteristic actions of objects, allows for
an intuitive and parsimonious solution to collocation. First, the distinction
between conventional and non-conventional objects is explicated and defended.
Next, the notion of non-conventional, intrinsically unified objects (processes) is
explored and unpacked. In the final section, that account is put to work
dissolving the problem of collocated objects by locating conventional objects in
the mind, and non-conventional objects in the external world.
Graham Renz – University of Missouri
Commentator: Kristin Seemuth Whaley – University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign
15. A Moral Argument against the Existence of God: In this paper, I argue against
the existence of a perfect God by arguing that if a perfect God exists, then this
God is performing a wrongful inaction by withholding the crucial information of
God’s existence and love. This wrongful inaction derives from the fact that God
knows that many of us lack this crucial information, God could easily supply this
information, and this information is likely to lead to us changing our minds
concerning whether we should be performing immoral actions or not. I consider
objections to this argument that claim that God has already sufficiently revealed
God’s self, that God revealing God’s self in this manner would limit our free will,
and that God remains hidden in order to achieve some greater good(s).
Timothy Kirschenheiter – Wayne State University
Commentator: Dr. Mylan Engel – Northern Illinois University
16. Situationism and the Discerning Situation: The Need for Robust Character
Traits: Situationists argue given that situational factors have great influences on
our actions, trying to rely on robust virtues is futile. Rather, we should refocus
our moral energies on discerning what situations we enter into. This paper
shows the tension between these two claims. If situational factors greatly
influence our behavior, such factors will also greatly impact our ability to choose
which future situations to enter into. A possible solution is proposed: Perhaps
situations vary in the extent of their psychologically influencing factors and we
can choose our future situations when these factors are absent. Situationists,
such as John Doris, allow for local traits – ones indexed to specific
situations. One might argue that a consistent trait exhibited in situations which
lack influencing factors is just a type of local trait. However, I argue that if this is
the case, then traits developed is these cases look more robust, rather than local.
Maria Altepeter – Northern Illinois University
Commentator: Joseph Spino – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
17. Disagreement, Internalism and Genuine Predicates of Personal Taste: The
problem of lost disagreement is seen as a problem for contextualists when it
comes to providing an account of predicates of personal taste (further referred
to as PPTs). Michael Glanzberg believes that a contextualist account, motivated
by the semantics of gradable adjectives, can escape such a problem. However, a
problem remains for Glanzberg in that the only disagreement his account allows
for arises in cases where both speakers are not asserting genuine PPTs. After
developing an account of genuine PPTs based on R.M. Hare's judgment
internalism and arguing why we should accept such an account, I argue that
Glanzberg’s account does not give us disagreement in cases involving them.
Viewed in such a way, we find that Glanzberg has not given us a contextualist
account that can overcome the problem of lost disagreement.
Brendan Learnihan-Sylvester – Northern Illinois University
Commentator: Ben Cilwick - Northern Illinois University
18. Seeking a Cartesian Contextual Definition of 'Life': According to Descartes, nonhuman animals, as well as human bodies, are automata — that is, self-moving
machines — lacking both vegetative and sensitive souls. Such a view raises an
intriguing question: what, for Descartes, is the difference between living and nonliving things? At various places, Descartes’ account suggests two distinct proposals
for a principle of life, one of which appears too restrictive and the other of which
appears too permissive. MacKenzie and Ablondi have each attempted to reconstruct a
Cartesian contextual definition of ‘life’ that avoids these problems. Here I argue
against certain aspects of both MacKenzie’s and Ablondi’s interpretations of
Descartes. I then propose an alternative, hybrid view that combines features of both
MacKenzie’s and Ablondi’s accounts. Milo Jon-Christopher Crimi - UCLA
Commentator: Dr. Andrew Youpa - Southern Illinois University
19. The Weight of Evidence: Joshua Cohen argues Thomas Pogge’s Strong Thesis
fails to empirically establish that minor changes to the global order since 1980
would have eliminated global poverty. I argue Pogge’s responses are compelling.
He maintains there is strong, though not definitive, evidence. Further, current
research methods limit the extent of relevant data. Finally, Cohen relies on
questionable assumptions. In addition, I consider alternative responses Pogge
has available including suggesting that historical events prior to 1980 are
relevant to the current global order and that Pogge’s project is justified as a
pragmatic proposal. Nonetheless, I suggest Cohen’s critique could defeat
negative duty claims. Given this, I briefly consider ideas for future inquiry.
Twigz (Jim) McGuire – Northern Illinois University
Commentator: Haley Dutmer - Northern Illinois University
20. Would, Might, and the Bite of Skeptical Arguments from Possibility: In the
Southwest Philosophy Review, Mylan Engel Jr. argues that the skeptical
argument from possibility (AP) is equivocal, invalid, unsound or questionbegging. One version of AP (XA2) is unsound by virtue of its dependence on a
false principle (MEP), to wit, that for any proposition if it is metaphysically
possible then it is epistemically possible. My purpose in this essay is to show that
XA2 avoids Engel's critique and thereby provides a seemingly sound argument
for external world skepticism. I begin by introducing the general form of AP, and
then clarify AP by disambiguating the modal operators at work in it. Secondly, I
argue that the metaphysical possibility of P -- where P is representative of a
subset of propositions (X) of MEP -- entails the epistemic possibility of P. Finally,
I end by illustrating that a suitable skeptical hypothesis is a member of set X, and
thereby conclude that XA2 provides a seemingly sound argument for external
world skepticism. Dan Dake – Northern Illinois University
Commentator: Dr. Todd Stewart - Illinois State University
21. Shape Phenomenology and Shape Perception: The reports of individuals who
have had their vision restored as adults after becoming blind early in life suggest that
they are often unable to recognize even simple shapes by vision alone. It is often
assumed that the empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important
about the relationship between visual and tactile representations of shape. But this
assumption is mistaken if the initial visual experiences of newly sighted individuals
do not represent the shapes of objects. I maintain that the initial visual experiences of
at least some newly sighted individuals do not represent shape but do instantiate the
phenomenal properties characteristic of shape experience. Consequently, the
empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important about the
relationship between perceptual phenomenology and perceptual content—it tells us
that perceptual content is not determined by or “built into” perceptual
phenomenology. Dr. Boyd Millar
Commentator: Jonathan York - Northern Illinois University
22. Scientific Models, (Anti-)Fictionalism, and the Distinct Questions of
Representation and Mediation: A trend in the recent philosophy of science
literature has been to compare scientific models to artistic products: like
paintings, models are imperfect depictions of the world; like works of literature,
they are descriptions of an imagined world or of what this world might have
been like. In contrast with this popular view that treats modeling as fictionmaking, Margaret Morrison (2015) has offered a moderate perspective,
reserving the adjective “fictional” to models of imaginary targets. Despite the
differences, however, both extreme and moderate versions of fictionalism
presuppose representationalism about models and thus inherit the problems
inherent to that view. By adopting the alternative (anti-representational)
artifactual view of models, I reject fictionalism and the comparison between
science and art, favoring instead the analogy with engineering: like scaffolds,
models facilitate engaging with the world without representing it. Accordingly,
treating models as (non-representational) intermediaries motivates
distinguishing between the questions of representation and mediation.
Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira – University of Cincinnati
Commentator: Dr. Brandon Polite - Knox College