Moore’s Paradox: A Comprehensive Assessment
(i) Table of Contents
1. Introduction
Part One: What Moore’s paradox is and why it matters
2. The problem and its importance for philosophy and for the social sciences
3. A rich diet of examples
4. A history of the paradox: significant past approaches—and their limitations
Part Two: The Paradox in Belief
5. A theory of propositional belief
6. A theory of rational belief
7. A theory of absurdity in belief.
8. The self-falsification approach as applied to Moore’s examples in belief; irrationality and
absurdity
9. The self-falsification approach as applied to Sorensen’s examples in belief; irrationality
and absurdity
10. The self-falsification approach as applied to the rest of the examples in belief; irrationality
and absurdity
11. The non-circularity of the approach
12. The conscious belief approach and its application to Moore’s examples in belief
13. The conscious belief approach as applied to Sorensen’s examples in belief.
14. The conscious belief approach as applied to the rest of the examples in belief.
15. An examination of the unity of the two approaches: belief-revision.
Part Three: The Paradox in Assertion
16. Expressing belief
17. A theory of assertion
18. Solving Moore’s paradox in assertion; the expressivist approach—and its limitations
19. Solving Moore’s paradox in assertion; believing the speaker
20. The rationality and absurdity of assertion
21. Believing the speaker: the irrationality and absurdity of Moore’s examples in assertion
22. The priority of belief thesis
23. Believing the speaker: the irrationality and absurdity of the rest of the examples in
assertion
24. Assertion-behavior dissonance: behaviour at odds with one’s sincere assertions
Part Four: The epistemic approach to the paradox in belief
25. Justifying circumstances for internalist and externalist justification.
26. Dealing with objections.
27. The epistemic approach: the irrationality and absurdity of Sorensen’s examples in
belief
28. The epistemic approach: the irrationality and absurdity of the rest of the examples in
belief
29. A comparison with Fernandez’s extrospective approach.
Part Five: The knowledge version of the paradox
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30. Is the knowledge-version paradoxical?
31. Norms of assertion
32. The knowledge-version in belief
Part Six: Related Issues
33. The epistemic Ramsey test
34. ‘Moorish’ assertions and beliefs
35. The surprise exam paradox
36. The equal weight thesis in social epistemology
37. Moore’s paradox in desire
38. Eliminativism, dialethism and Moore’s paradox.
39. Philosophical commitments to Moorean beliefs: benign or fatal?
Part Seven: Defining Moore-paradoxicality.
40. The preface paradox and its versions.
41. Defining Moore-paradoxicality.
Bibliography
Index
Introduction
It is raining but you don’t believe that it is raining. Imagine accepting this claim. Then you are
committed to saying ‘It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining’. This would be an absurd
thing to claim or assert, yet what you say might be true. It might be raining, while at the same
time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of
you to assert something about yourself that might be true of you? This is Moore’s paradox.
The paradox is most immediately gripping in speech since it would mostly clearly be absurd
of you to assert to someone ‘It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining’. But the paradox
occurs in thought as well, since if you silently believe the content of that would-be assertion
then you seem no less absurd. Yet as we have just seen, the content of such an absurd
belief might be true. How is that possible? What is the source of the absurdity? And why
does it strike us that a contradiction is somehow at work when there is no contradiction in the
content of what is asserted or believed? Must the absurdity be a form of irrationality?
In two different works G.E. Moore gave the following examples of assertions:
‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did’ (1942, 543)
and
‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ (1944, 204).
Moore says of these utterances that ‘[i]t is a paradox that it should be perfectly absurd to
utter assertively words of which the meaning is something which might well be true—is not a
contradiction’ (Baldwin 1993, 209). Conjunctions such as the one above appear to have
originated not with Moore but with A.M. MacIver (1938).
Since these assertions claim different possible truths as not believed or disbelieved, let
us neutralise this difference with a common possible truth, to give us
It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining
that is of the ‘omissive’ form
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p & I do not believe that p
so called because I assert that I fail to believe a specific truth, and
It is raining but I believe that it is not raining
that is of the ‘commissive’ form
p & I believe that not-p
so called because I assert that I commit a specific mistake in belief. These useful labels are
coined by Roy Sorensen (1988) although I was the first to spot the difference (Williams
1979). Early writers on the paradox, including Moore himself (Green and Williams 2007 4–6)
considered it only as occurring in speech. Then the focus was upon the pragmatic absurdity
of a speech-act. Many of their writings are faulted by a failure to distinguish omissive from
commissive cases, a pitfall I warned of back in Williams 1979 (See also Green and Williams
2007, Introduction). With Roy Sorensen’s Blindspots (1988) came the recognition that the
paradox occurs in thought as well; if I silently believe (1) or (2) then I seem no less absurd,
yet what I believe might be true.
Then came attempts to explain the absurdity in belief. Salient among these remains
Sydney Shoemaker’s (1995) who approaches the paradox in terms of conscious belief.
Many of these again fell afoul of the difference between omissive and commissive cases
(Green and Williams 2007, Introduction).
Since then the orthodoxy has been that an explanation of the absurdity should first
start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then
this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives
explanatory priority to belief over assertion. In fact the translation involved is much trickier
that might at first appear. Let us call assertions and beliefs that are absurd in the way Moore
exemplifies ‘Moore-paradoxical’. Let us also call assertions and beliefs the contents of which
have the same syntax as the contents of Moore-paradoxical beliefs, ‘Moorean’. This
nomenclature will guard us against the assumption (one that will turn out to be false) that
Moorean assertions or beliefs must always be Moore-paradoxical.
I will argue that Moorean absurdity in assertion is not always a subsidiary product of
the absurdity in belief, even when the absurdity is conceived as irrationality. Instead we
should aim for explanations of Moorean absurdity in assertion and in belief that are
independent even if related, while bearing in mind that some forms of irrationality may be
forms of absurdity, even if not conversely.
Nonetheless it will turn out that an explanation of the absurdity is belief is the best
place to start, since assertion is to be explicated in terms of the less complex notion of belief,
although this will require some of the apparatus of the philosophy of language in order to
identify those features of the thought implicated in the belief that generates the absurdity.
Accordingly I will sketch a theory of belief, a partial theory of rational belief and a partial
theory of absurdity in belief. Later I will sketch a theory of assertion, a partial theory of
irrational assertion and a partial theory of absurdity in assertion.
Central to the book will be the self-falsification approach and the conscious belief
approach to the paradox in belief. In Williams 1994 I noticed that the omissive belief is selffalsifying. Given, as is highly plausible, that believing a conjunction involves believing each
of its conjuncts, if I believe that (p and I do not believe that p) then I believe that p. But then
my second-order belief is false, since its second conjunct is false. Although my belief is not a
belief in a necessary falsehood, it is self-falsifying in the sense that although what I believe
might be true of me and although I might believe it, it cannot be true of me if I believe it. I
now argue that Moore-paradoxical belief may be explained in terms of a norm of avoiding
specific recognizably false beliefs:
Do not form—or continue to have—a specific belief that you can be reasonably
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expected to recognize is your very own self-falsifying belief.
and the norm of avoiding overtly contradictory beliefs:
Do not form—or continue to hold—a pair of overtly contradictory beliefs.
these being imperatives of belief-formation and maintenance that would be endorsed by a
community of epistemically rational believers
My conscious belief approach differs from Shoemaker’s. He holds the self-intimation
thesis that he supposes true of rational believers, that
If one believes that p then if one considers whether one believes that p, then one
believes that one believes that p.
I showed that this approach won’t work (Williams 2006a; 2010, see also 2012). A better and
simpler approach (Williams 2006a; 2010;2012, see also 2011b) appeals to the principle that
conscious belief both distributes and collects over conjunction:
One consciously believes that (p & q) just in case one both consciously believes that
p and one consciously believes that q.
This is plausible against the background of the synchronic unity of consciousness (Bayne,
2008; Tye 2003): all the conscious states you have at a given instant are unified into a single
encompassing state. The only other principle I need is
If one consciously has the first-order belief that p, then one both has the first-order
belief that p and one consciously believes that one believes that p.
The irrationality of conscious Moore-paradoxical belief may be satisfactorily explained with
these two principles. How they will help to explain their absurdity is a matter for further
investigation. The unity of the two approaches also needs further investigation.
A third approach of the paradox that I have followed is the epistemic approach (2004;
2006c; 2009; 2010). This has interesting parallels with Jorge Fernandez’s (2003a; 2003b;
2005) extrospective solution to Moore’s paradox in belief, according to which the very states
that (subjectively) justify one's first-order belief that p justify one's second order belief that
one believes that p. Both are inspired by a remark from Evans (1982) Moore’s examples in
belief. Here I defended a principle of internalist justification, that
If one is justified in believing that p then one is justified in believing that one believes
that p.
as well as its commissive analogue
If one believes that one believes that not-p then one is not justified in believing that p.
I also defended a principle of externalist justification, that
All circumstances that justify one in believing that p are circumstances that
justify one in believing that one believes that p.
as well as that of its commissive counterpart
All circumstances in which one is justified in believing that p are circumstances
in which one is justified in believing that one does not believe that not-p.
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This approach is aimed at showing that Moore-paradoxical beliefs are impossible to justify.
Although this aim still seems to be right to me, the approach has met with controversy
(Brueckner 2006; 2009a; Vahid, 2005; 2008). Accordingly it will be prudent to re-examine
this approach as a separate, relatively detached topic. I will also examine the relation of
Fernandez’s extrospective approach to my own, as well as assessing its viability in the light
of objections from Zimmermann 2004; 2005 and Gertler 2011.
Here is how I provisionally plan to proceed, section by section. These sections fall
into seven parts. The first describes the paradox and traces its connection to other questions
in philosophy as well as economics, psychology, sociology and politics. Part 2 deals with the
paradox in belief and part 3 deals with it in assertion. Part 4 discusses the epistemic
approach to the paradox. Part 5 deals with the knowledge version of it and part 6 discusses
related issues. In part 7 I define Moore-paradoxicality.
Part One: What Moore’s paradox is and why it matters
1. The problem and its importance for philosophy and for the social sciences
In this section I discuss the importance of paradox in general and of Moore’s paradox in
particular for social sciences such as economics, psychology, sociology and politics. The
paradox in belief may be seen as a form of epistemic irrationality. Understanding the exact
nature of the irrationality will help us to understand what epistemic rationality is and how it
differs from what might be called the practical rationality of belief. Alternatively the paradox in
belief may be seen as a form of absurdity. Understanding the exact nature of the absurdity
will help us understand what norms of belief are to be endorsed by a community of thinkers.
The paradox in assertion may be seen as a form of practical irrationality. Understanding the
exact nature of the irrationality will help us to understand what practical rationality is.
Alternatively the paradox in assertion may be seen as a form of absurdity. Understanding the
exact nature of the absurdity will help us understand what norms of assertion are to be
endorsed by a community of communicators. I show why an understanding of epistemic
irrationality, norms of belief and of assertion should be of interest to social sciences such as
economics, psychology and politics, and compare this with how these phenomena are
already understood within these disciplines. This should be of interest particularly to those
social scientists who espouse the theory of rational choice.
At the same time a resolution of the paradox illuminates central philosophical
questions of belief, judgement, consciousness, self-knowledge, the nature of the first-person,
de se versus de re belief, justification, evidentialism, self-expression, conversation, decision
theory, functionalism, eliminativist materialism, scepticism, knowledge of other minds and
speech-acts.
The paradox also illuminates, and is illuminated by, other important paradoxes. The
preface paradox is taken by some to demonstrate the possibility of holding a set of
inconsistent beliefs, each of which are held rationally. Taking it this way is controversial, but
if this is correct—as I will argue in a later section—then the irrationality found in Mooreparadoxical belief cannot be defined in terms of inconsistent beliefs. This in turn will
constrain the definition of Moore-paradox belief and of Moore-paradoxical assertion that I will
argue for later in the book. A moot question is whether the definition should include
assertions or beliefs such as
It is raining but I have no justification for believing that it is raining
Let us provisionally call such beliefs or assertions ‘Moorish’. I will show that an analysis of
what goes wrong with Moorish beliefs provides a solution to the surprise exam paradox and
helps to locate what goes wrong with the epistemic Ramsey test of the acceptability of
conditionals. Moore’s paradox also poses a problem in social epistemology for proponents of
the equal weight view, one that may be overcome with a theory of belief-revision, the subject
of a later section. Hájek (2007) argues that the preface paradox actually includes Moore’s
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paradox, in the sense that anyone caught by the preface paradox is committed to making a
commissive Moore-paradoxical assertion. I examine this claim in a later section.
In addition, many philosophical positions appear to involve commitment to Moorean
propositions. Hájek (2007) argues these include eliminativist materialism, Kyburg-inspired
solutions to the lottery paradox, skepticism about higher-order beliefs, or about higher-order
probabilities (De Finetti 1972 and Savage 1954), dialetheism (Priest, 1987) expressivism
about moral discourse (Ayer 1946) and supervaluational approaches to vagueness. Likewise
the Nietzschean, the naïve pragmatist, the communitarian and the relativist about truth are
committed to Moorean propositions, as are those who argue that conditionals lack truthvalues although they may well be assertible (Adams 1975, Edgington 1995 and Bennett
2003).
In section 39 I investigate the question of whether these commitments are genuine
and if so, whether this is benign or fatal to the position so committed.
2. A rich diet of examples
There is evidence that Moore himself did not realize that his two examples are of different
syntactic forms. These are exemplified by the omissive
It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining
and the commissive
It is raining but I believe that it is not raining
Let us call these ‘Moore’s examples’. As Moore notes, to assert either would be ‘absurd’. So
would believing either be absurd. Let us call Moore’s examples ‘Moore-paradoxical’, since
the absurdity persists despite the possible truth of the contents of these assertions or beliefs.
At first sight Moore’s use of ‘paradox’ does not appear to fit Sainsbury’s orthodox
definition of a paradox as an argument with ‘an apparently unacceptable conclusion, which is
derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises’
(Sainsbury 1995, 1). But in fact Moore suggests two paradoxical arguments. First, ‘It is a
paradox that it should be perfectly absurd to utter assertively words of which the meaning
may quite well be true—is not a contradiction’ (Baldwin 1993, 209). In other words,
assertions of possible truths are not absurd (in a way that involves some contradiction-like
phenomenon) and Moore’s examples are assertions of possible truths, so these assertions
are not absurd (in a way that involves some contradiction-like phenomenon). Second, ‘… as
a rule, if it’s not absurd for another person to say assertively a sentence expressing a given
proposition to me or to a third person, it isn’t absurd for me to say assertively a sentence
expressing the same proposition” (Baldwin 1993, 208–209). In other words, assertions are
absurd (in a way that involves some contradiction-like phenomenon) only if non-first-person
transpositions of assertions of that same proposition are, but your assertion made of me ‘It is
raining but he does not believe that it is raining’ is not absurd in any way, so neither is my
own assertion ‘It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining’.
Let us also call assertions and beliefs the contents of which have the same syntax as
Moore’s examples, ‘Moorean’. It will turn out that not all Moorean assertions or beliefs are
absurd or even irrational and so are not Moore-paradoxical.
Wittgenstein makes the point that the absurdity is only present in speech when the
utterance is an assertion. No absurdity arises if I say ‘It is raining but I do not believe that it is
raining’ in order to test a microphone or say under duress ‘The train will arrive at 5 pm but
add ‘but personally I don’t believe it’. Nor does it arise when delighted by the imminent arrival
of a friend, I exclaim in amazement, ‘He’s coming to visit me but I still can’t believe it’.
No absurdity arises either if I sarcastically repeat your claim that the pubs are closed
and add, ‘I don’t think!’. A further case arises when you ask me whether the capital of
Thailand is Bangkok or Saigon. If I am a contestant in your quiz in which success is
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understood to be the mere utterance of the correct answer rather than the manifestation of
knowledge, no absurdity arises if I answer, ‘The capital of Thailand is Bangkok’ and then
truthfully add, ‘but actually I have no beliefs about this either way’. Nor is there absurdity in
Luis Bunuel’s ironic remark, ‘I’m still an atheist, thank God’, made as he was evicted from
Spain for attacking Christianity.
There are also non-verbal Moore-paradoxical assertions, as when you ask me if the
pubs are still open and I nod my head in emphatic agreement while saying, ‘I don’t believe
so’.
This shows the need for an account of the nature of assertion, as opposed to mere
utterance. Perhaps not unsurprisingly this is elucidated in terms of belief. Moreover it will
turn out that the notion of assertion is much messier than belief. I will give an analysis of
propositional belief in section 5 and an account of assertion in section 17. The best method
then to deal with Moore’s paradox is to first deal with it as it arises in belief and then turn to it
as it arises in assertion. This is not however to follow Shoemaker in endorsing the claim that
an explanation of the absurdity in belief will automatically or even easily translate into an
explanation of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. I will show that this ‘priority thesis’ of
belief over assertion is to be rejected, in section 22.
No absurdity or irrationality arises in assertions conjugated in what Turri (2010) calls
‘the eternal present’. Suppose that I am watching a video recording of myself sitting with my
back to a soundproof window. Rain begins to fall. I then say of my past self ‘It is raining but I
don’t believe that it is raining’.
Alexander Pruss (2012b) gives three ingenious cases of Moorean assertions that do
not seem absurd. In the first, an expert (perhaps my analyst) who knows both me and the
subject of p, correctly tells me: ‘p and you don’t believe that p. Work out the consequences
for yourself.’ I’m a little slow on my feet, but agree with what the expert said and make a
sequence of assertions (and one interjection): ‘p and I don’t believe that p. By conjunctionelimination, p. Oh, now I see! I didn’t believe that p, but now, thanks to your testimony, I do.’
The first assertion appears to be true, justified, sincere and non-absurd.
In the second case, I am bilingual in Polish and English, and I am in an earthquake
that causes me to lose my hearing, but not my ability to speak. However, I form the false
belief that I have also lost my ability to speak, based on the observation that people are not
reacting to what I say—though in fact, the reason they are not reacting is that they are too
busy dealing with those more seriously hurt than I. Then I see a sign that says that the
rescue organizers are looking for Polish speakers to assist with their efforts. Although I
believe that I am no longer able to speak Polish out loud, I realize that I could be wrong. So I
come up to one of the organizers, whom I happen to know to be unable to lip-read, and
attempt to assert in English: ‘I can presently speak out loud in Polish and I don’t believe that
I can presently speak out loud in Polish.’ And I succeed at my attempt. In so doing, I have
made an assertion that appears to be true, justified, sincere and non-absurd.
In the third case I have programmed a robot to bring me a drink whenever I utter the
sentence: ‘The robot will bring me a drink and I don’t believe that the robot will bring me a
drink.’ Jones, however, has a habit of interrupting me before I finish any sentence. I thus
form a justified belief that I will not manage to say to Jones any sentence that is this long,
and I try to assert to Jones ‘The robot will bring me a drink and I don’t believe that the robot
will bring me a drink’, expecting to be interrupted. While the robot does not care what speech
act, if any, I am engaging in when I make the requisite noise, I am really trying to assert the
sentence to Jones. And, surprisingly, I succeed, because the word ‘robot’ makes Jones pay
attention and refrain from interrupting. The robot then brings me the drink. Again, I have
made an assertion that appears to be true, justified, sincere and non-absurd.
Pruss’s first case has an affinity with a case like that given by Garvey (1977).
Suppose that I am reading a self-help booklet that lists five warning signs of alcoholism. The
first is that I come from a family of heavy drinkers. I think ‘That’s true, but I still don’t believe
that I am an alcoholic’. The next three signs on the list are that I occasionally drink alone,
that alcohol interferes with my work, and that it damages my personal life. As I read each
one I again think each time, ‘That’s true, but I still don’t believe that I am an alcoholic’. The
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final sign of the list is that I do not believe that I am an alcoholic. I read this and think ‘That’s
true’ and then in dawning realization of the horrible truth, finish my thought with ‘and I am an
alcoholic!’ My conscious and newly formed belief
I am an alcoholic and I don’t believe that I am
seems neither irrational nor absurd, at least not at the instant that I form it. A commissive
version of this is related to ‘assertion-behavior dissonance’ cases (to be discussed later in
section 24) in which someone sincerely asserts that p, while her overall automatic
behavior suggests that she believes that not-p. Schwitzgebel (2011) gives the example of
Juliet, the implicit racist. She sincerely asserts that other races are not intellectually inferior,
yet her behavior is evidence that she really believes that they are. As an embellishment of
the example, suppose that she behaves as if other races are not intellectually inferior
because this is what she believes, yet she sincerely asserts that other races are not inferior
because her belief is unconscious or repressed. Once forced to look honesty at the way she
behaves, she now becomes aware of this belief, and sincerely asserts
‘Other races are not intellectually inferior but I believe that they are’
This seems neither irrational nor absurd, at least not at the instant that she asserts it. Indeed
it might be a rational insight into her own irrational prejudice. The same kind of insight is
exemplified by the following case (Williams 2013, 1130). Suppose that I have the belief that
people are following me. Recognizing that my belief is irrational yet still unable to rid myself
of it I visit you, my therapist. You bring me to the understanding that the belief is false, yet
still I find myself unable to discard it. Then I realize that I have the strange belief that I
believe mistakenly that people are following me. Wishing to communicate this fact to you, I
sincerely assert
‘People are not following me but I believe that they are’.
Since the point of my assertion is to get you to help me rid myself of the irrational belief that
people are following me, my assertion seems neither irrational nor absurd. As an
embellishment, suppose that you reassure me of what I have already accepted—that people
are not following me. But this does not help me to rid myself of the irrational belief that they
are following me, so in exasperation, I make the stronger sincere assertion to you
‘Look, I jolly well know that people aren’t following me, but still I can’t help thinking
that they are!’
No irrationality—or even absurdity—seems to attach to this assertion, nor to my belief in its
content.
As a further variant (inspired by Young’s 2008; 2012 work in psychiatry) suppose that
I am suffering from a psychiatric condition known as ‘thought insertion’ in which I believe that
some of the thoughts I entertain are projected into my mind my another thinker. I now
sincerely assert to you, my therapist, the omissive
‘It is raining, but I don’t believe that it is raining (someone else is projecting that belief
into my mind)’
Is my assertion—or my belief in its content—irrational or absurd? If so, what is the
explanation of this?
There is also a class of partly non-assertoric utterances discussed by Shoemaker
(1988) that have an air of Moore-paradoxicality, such as
‘What time is it? But I don’t want to know what time it is’
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and
‘Shut the door! But I don’t want you to shut it’.
Other case of assertions or beliefs that intuitively share the absurdity and indeed
irrationality found in Moore’s examples include (see Sorensen 1988, Chapter 1)
I have no beliefs now
and
Although you think all my opinions mistaken, you are always right
On the other hand there is a class of absurd—indeed irrational—assertions or beliefs that
are clearly not Moorean, such as
It’s raining and not raining
or
2+2 = 5 but I do not believe that 2 + 2 = 5.
In this category also seems to fall
It’s raining but I believe that it is raining without the least justification (compare Adler
1999)
although a foundationalist might argue that there is nothing irrational in asserting or believing
the syntactically similar
I am now experiencing appearances of a tree but I believe that I am now
experiencing appearances of a tree without the least justification.
While it would be absurd—and indeed irrational—of me to assert
I am asserting nothing now
this need not be an absurd or irrational thing to believe.
Other cases are harder to decide. Suppose that I assert or believe that
It is raining and the only reason I would have to believe that it is raining is nonepistemic. (Jones 2002).
This seems absurd and indeed irrational. But is the absurdity Moorean? Other such cases
include
All my present beliefs are mistaken.
and
I never hold any true beliefs.
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It has also been claimed (Sorensen 1997, discussed by Conee 1987 and Kroon 1993) that a
belief of something of the form
p just in case I do not accept that p
has affinities with Moorean absurdity.
There is no absurdity or irrationality in asserting or believing
Luang Prabang is in Laos but yesterday I did not believe that Luang Prabang is in
Laos
Nor, despite dissent (Bovens, 1995), need there be any in
Tomorrow I will mistakenly believe that Big Brother is not a fiction
This suggests that the absurdity only arises in assertions or belief the contents of which are
in the grammatical present-tense. It also suggests that for absurdity to arise it is necessary
and that these contents must be in the grammatical first-person. But assertions or beliefs
that intuitively share the absurdity and indeed irrationality found in Moore’s examples include
Sorensen’s (1988)
God knows that we are not theists
and the commissive
God knows that we are atheists
As another case, suppose that I am looking at myself in a mirror. If I know that I am looking
at myself, the same irrationality is found in my assertion or belief (as I stare at my reflection)
that
It is raining but you do not believe that it is raining
or in my belief that
It is raining but he does not believe that it is raining (Williams 2011a).
On the other hand you will not judge that I am irrational if I assert or believe
The non-theism of my mother’s nieceless brother’s only nephew angers God
(Sorensen 1988).
if you know that I reasonably fail to see that I am my mother’s nieceless brother’s only
nephew. However, this does seem to be in some sense an absurd thing to assert or believe.
The same is true of the following case given by Chan (2010). Suppose that I am having a
debate with John Smith on MSN Messenger, trying to convince him that the Earth is well
over 5,000 years old. My screen is divided into halves, labelled with my name and his. After
a while I notice that whatever I type appears on his upper half. Thinking that Smith is
mimicking my words, I try to catch him out by typing
The person actually typing these very words now here on the upper half of my
screen does not believe that the Earth is well over 5,000 years old, but of course
it is.
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These words then appear on John Smith’s screen. But unknown to me, I am the person
typing the words on his screen, because the system is malfunctioning. Compare this with a
case in which I enter a shopping mall and spot someone with bad posture on a closed-circuit
TV screen. Failing to recognize this person as myself, and reasoning that someone who is
aware of bad posture would correct it, I sensibly assert or believe
He has bad posture but he does not believe that he has bad posture.
Another case of an apparently Moorean assertion or belief that is not Moore-paradoxical is
raised by Crimmin’s (1992) as discussed by Hájek and Stoljar (2001). For example,
Superman informs me that I’m acquainted with him when he is disguised as some other
person, whom I think idiotic. However, he does not tell me who this other person is.
Moreover, I accept his words on the strength of his reliability and intelligence. I now seem
compelled to acknowledge my acceptance of his news with the commissive reply
I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot.
There are also ‘self-referential’ cases of Moorean belief or assertion, as when I believe or
assert
I don’t believe that this sentence expresses a truth
or
I believe that this sentence expresses a falsehood.
Then there are cases of belief or assertion the contents of which contain iterated beliefoperators, such as
It is raining but I don’t believe that I believe that it is raining,
and
It is raining but I believe that I believe that it is not raining
These are discussed by Sorensen (1988) and Williams (2007). Such beliefs or assertions
seem less absurd than their non-iterated counterparts. An interesting question is whether
subsequent iterations decrease the absurdity further.
Stevenson holds that there is a ‘typically ethical’ sense in which in asserting that it
was right of Brutus to stab Caesar, one thereby asserts that one approves of Brutus’s action
(Moore 1942, 540). Moore objects that
… a man would only be implying this, in a sense in which to say that he implies it, is
not to say that he asserts it nor yet that it follows from anything which he does assert
(Moore 1942, 540).
Moore adds that
… the sense of ‘imply’ in question is similar to that in which, when a man asserts
anything that might be true or false, he implies that he himself, at the time of
speaking, believes or knows the thing in question—a sense in which he implies this,
even if he is lying (Moore 1942, 541, my italics).
He goes on to say that this sense of ‘imply’, ‘arises from the fact, which we all learn from
experience, that in the immense majority of cases a man who makes such an assertion as
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this does believe or know what he asserts’ (Moore 1942, 542-3) and adds that ‘Similarly, the
fact that, if you assert that it was right of Brutus to stab Caesar, you imply that you approve
of … this action … simply arises from the fact, which we have all learned by experience,
that a man who makes this kind of assertion does in the vast majority of cases approve of
the action which he asserts to be right’ (Moore 1942, 543).
Two points emerge from this. First, there appear to be ethical Moorean beliefs or
assertions. That is, it would be absurd in the relevant sense of one to believe or assert
It is right of Brutus to stab Caesar but I don’t approve of Brutus stabbing Caesar
or
It is right of Brutus to stab Caesar but I approve of Brutus’s refraining from stabbing
Caesar.
Second, there appears to be a ‘knowledge’ version of Moore’s paradox. In other
words, to believe or assert
It is raining but I don’t know that it is raining
is absurd in the same way as Moorean omissive or commissive examples. This is the
subject of recent controversy. Some are unconvinced that an assertion of this form need be
absurd (Williams 1994; Weiner, 2005). Others agree that it is, and seek to explain the
absurdity in terms of one of a number of ‘knowledge norms’ of assertion (Benton 2001;
Blaaw 2012) for example that one should make an assertion only if one represents oneself
as knowing its content (Williamson 2000; DeRose 2002, 2009). A third camp finds absurdity
in the assertion but remains unconvinced that its source is the violation of a knowledge norm
of assertion (Turri, 2010, 2011; McKinnon & Turri, 2013). A relatively neglected question is
whether there is Moore-paradoxical absurdity in the corresponding silent belief of the content
of the assertion and if so what gives rise to it.
Most recently again, Turri (2010a) has given an interesting example of Ellie, an
eliminativist who, impressed by arguments given by philosophers such as Paul Churchland,
holds that there are no contentful mental states such as beliefs. She joins our table for lunch
and rehearses these arguments to us. Although we are not persuaded, we do not thereby
judge her irrational. Ellie now makes apparently sincere omissive assertions such as
‘The waiter brought the wrong dish but I do not believe that he did’.
Such cases were earlier discussed by Williams 2006c and 2000. It does seem that Ellie is
not irrational in making such an assertion. But isn’t there still a pre-theoretical sense in which
making it strikes us as ‘absurd’? Nor does Ellie seem irrational if the sincerity of her
assertion is taken folk-psychologically, or as we might prefer to put it, commonsensically, as
requiring her to believe its content. In that case we will judge her to unwittingly have a
mistaken but not irrational belief in the content of her assertion. But again isn’t there a sense
in which her unwitting belief ‘absurd’? Williams (forthcoming) takes up these questions and
asks whether there is there a commissive assertion or belief that is likewise not irrational—
and perhaps not even absurd. Following Hajek (2007) here is one candidate. Suppose that
Di now joins our table for lunch. Di is a kind of dialetheist who, impressed by arguments
given by philosophers such as Graham Priest, holds that some, but not all propositions—
dialethias—are both true and false, for example
The set of all sets that do not include themselves, includes itself
or equivalently,
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The Russell set includes itself.
Di now rehearses the arguments for dialetheism to us. Although we are not persuaded, we
do not thereby judge her irrational. Di now asserts
‘The Russell set includes itself but I believe that it is not the case that the Russell set
includes itself’.
We would not judge Di’s assertion to be irrational. Nor would we judge her belief in its
content to be irrational. I conjecture that in contrast to Ellie, we would find no absurdity either
in her belief or assertion.
Other candidates for beliefs or assertions that share the absurdity of Moore’s
examples—or that exhibit a related absurdity—may be generated by replacing belief with
degrees of psychological certainty to give assertions or beliefs such as
It is raining but I am convinced that it is not raining
or
It is raining but I am not convinced that it is raining
or
It is raining but I am not all sure that it is not raining.
Relatedly, one may conceive of belief along the lines of Hajek (2007) by claiming that
assigning a numerical probability above a threshold to a proposition is what it means to
believe that proposition. On this view of belief candidates for Moore-paradoxical beliefs or
assertions include
It is raining but I assign a low probability to the proposition that p
and
It is raining but I assign a high probability to the proposition that not-p
Finally, it is worth noting that one might construct syntactic analogues of Moorean belief in
terms of other propositional attitudes. For example one might fear that
The police will search me but I do not fear that they will
or suspect that
My wife is unfaithful but I do not suspect that she is not.
Adler and Armour-Garb (2207) argue that only cases involving belief generate Moorean
absurdity. Yet in discussing what he calls ‘Moore’s paradox’, Wittgenstein says that “If there
were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first person present
indicative” (1953, II, §X, 190). He immediately adds that it is ‘a most remarkable thing, that
the verbs “believe”, “wish”, “will” display all the inflexions possessed by “cut”, “chew”, “run”’
(1953, II, §X, 190). His remark, albeit unclear, prompts the conjecture that analogous
absurdity may be found in terms of desire (see Wall 2012; Williams 2013b). For example,
suppose that as we approach a bar you ask me what I want to drink. I report my desire by
answering
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‘I want to drink stout while wanting not to drink it’.
Any satisfactory account of Moore’s paradox should accommodate all the examples we have
considered so far—no mean feat. This is the main objective of what follows. Let us
provisionally divide the example as Moore’s examples in belief, Sorensen’s examples in
belief, the rest of the examples in belief, Moore’s examples in assertion, Sorensen’s
examples in assertion and the rest of the examples in assertion. Of course this is in line with
Shoemaker’s method, although not for his reasons.
In dealing with each of these six types of example, we will need to ask two questions,
namely “Is it in some sense, ‘irrational?’” and “Is it in some sense, ‘absurd?’” If the answer in
either case is a yes, then a further question will be ‘Should one change one’s beliefs or
intentions, and if so, how?’ This will lead us into a theory of rational belief-revision and into a
theory of rational intention-revision.
4. Significant past approaches—and their limitations
In this section I rewrite some of the material from Green and Williams 2007, but categorize
the approaches differently, in terms of a distinction between epistemic rationality (as
opposed to Green and Williams’ ‘theoretical rationality’) and practical rationality. One might
say that one’s belief that p is epistemically rational just in case one knows that p provided
one’s belief is true and not Gettierized. In contrast, the rationality of one’s speech-act of
assertion is the rationality of action. This may be seen, contrary to a rival view (Green and
Williams 2007) roughly as one’s acting in a way that an epistemically rational believer,
similarly placed, would believe best promotes one’s interests by satisfying one’s desires and
fulfilling one’s intentions. The practical rationality of one’s belief would be a matter of how
well one’s acquisition or maintenance of it best promotes one’s interests—as would be
judged by an epistemically rational believer, similarly placed—by satisfying one’s desires
and fulfilling one’s intentions. There also seems to be a sense in which an assertion might be
said to be ‘epistemically rational’. If you tell me that it will snow in Singapore I may reply that
this is a silly thing to say, but I do not judge it silly for the same kind of reason that I would
judge it silly of you to try to compliment a friend by telling him that he is stupid. Rather, I
judge you irrational insofar as I take you to have an epistemically irrational belief, under the
assumption that you are sincere.
I first deal with arguments that Moore-paradoxical assertion is practically irrational
given by Moore himself (1942, 1944, 1993). In dealing with the omissive assertion he holds
that
If I assert that p then I imply that I believe that p
Where ‘imply’ has ‘the sense that in the immense majority of cases a man who makes such
an assertion as this does believe or know what he asserts’ (Moore 1942, 542-3). ). In dealing
with the omissive assertion he holds a second principle that
If I assert that p then I imply that I don’t believe that not-p.
I show that Moore’s account fails. I then consider Wittgenstein’s explanation of the practical
irrationality of Moore-paradoxical assertions. Wittgenstein conceives of the paradox in yet
another way, observing that (1974, 177) that
It makes sense to say ‘‘Let’s suppose: p is the case and I don’t believe that p is the
case’’ whereas it makes no sense to assert ‘‘|-p is the case and I don’t believe that p
is the case’’.
He also says that
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The paradox is this: the supposition may be expressed as follows: ‘‘Suppose this
went on inside me and that outside’’ – but the assertion that this is going on inside
me asserts this is going on outside me. As suppositions the two propositions about
the inside and the outside are quite independent, but not as assertions. (1980a,
§490).
He adds that ‘One might also put it like this: ‘‘I believe p’’ means roughly the same as ‘‘p’’’
(1980a, §472). He may be plausibly seen as appealing to the principle that
If I assert that I believe that p then I assert that p
in order to explain the irrationality or absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertions. There is a
family of such ‘Wittgensteinian’ solutions to the paradox, which include those propounded by
Malcolm (1995), Linville and Ring (1991), (Heal 1994) and Goldstein (1993). I show that
these accounts fail (see Williams 1998; 2006b).
I then examine and criticise accounts given by Jacobson (1996), Collins (1996),
Martinich (1980), Levinson (1983), Black (1952), Unger (1975), DeRose (1991), Williamson
(1996, 2000), Rosenthal (1995a, 1995b, 2002), Armstrong (1971), Deutscher (1965, 1967),
Wolgast (1977), Vanderveken (1980), Searle & Vanderveken (1985), Jones (1991),
Welbourne (1992) and Doran (1995).
I next deal with arguments that Moore-paradoxical belief is epistemically irrational
given by Almeida (2001, 2007), Heal (1994), Baldwin (1990), Kriegel (2004), Sorensen
(1988, 2000), Hintikka (1962) and Shoemaker (1995).
I survey work up until 2007 that was not surveyed by Green and Williams 2007. This
includes Albritton 1995, Åqvist, 1964, Bock 2007, Bouvens 1995, Castell 1994, Caton 1987,
Cohen L. J. 1950, Fernandez J, 2005, Forguson L, 1969, Goldstick 1967, Hambourger 1984,
Harnish 1980, Koethe 1978, Larkin 1999, Lee 2001, Lycan 1970, Schroeder S. 2006,
Szabo-Gendler 2001 and Willis, R. 1953.
I also discuss and criticize significant work that has appeared since 2007. These
include some of the contributors to Green and Williams 2007, namely Adler, J. & B. ArmourGarb, Atlas J., Baldwin T., de Almeida, Green, Hajek and Galllois, as well as Cave 2011,
Chan 2008, 2010, Cholbi 2009, Clark R., 1994, Borgoni, C. 2008, Brueckner 2009b, Dierg
2008, Engel P., 2009, Goldstein 2000, Huemer 2011, Kobes 1995, Koren 2007, Lawlor and
Perry 2008, Littlejohn 2010, Pagin 2008, Pfister 2008, Sedlar 2011a, Smithies forthcoming,
Stalnaker 2000 and Vahid 2008.
I also note the prevalent tendency to equate absurdity with rationality, although
following a seminal paper by Green (2007), these may be distinguished.
Part Two: The Paradox in Belief
5. A theory of propositional belief
I sketch an analysis of propositional belief that is inspired by, yet that differs from, Audi 1994.
I argue that belief is best thought of as a disposition to behave in certain ways, and for
human persons who have beliefs, also to form judgements. It has been objected that such
dispositional accounts are circular (Armstrong 1973; O’Connor 1968). I defend my account
against this objection. Judgement is itself one form of belief. I argue that there is no
circularity here either. I criticize rival accounts of belief, including functionalist and
probabilistic analyses.
One cannot form a judgement without being aware that one believes its content. In
contrast, one may or may not be aware, or conscious, of one’s beliefs per se, because one
may or may not be aware of one’s disposition to behave in ways indicative of these beliefs.
Even if one is aware of such behaviour, one still might not be aware, or fully aware, of what it
15
indicates, possibly because one suspects that reflection upon this matter might disturb one.
In such cases one has repressed beliefs.
Belief, at least in human persons, requires the believer to understand the content of
the belief. I argue for this claim and defend it against objections (Burge 1978; Routley, R &
Routley, V, 1975). The minimum condition for such understanding is the believer’s ability to
think the thought of the content (Searle 1992), which in turn requires her to possess the
concepts embedded in it, that is, to have the ability—and for human believers at least,
possibility to have the how-how or skill—to reliably distinguish instances of the concepts
from non-instances. Both beliefs and judgments may be held with varying degrees of
psychological certainty.
On this account a number of principles about belief emerge as not necessarily true,
including belief-collection:
If one believes that p and believes that q, then one believes that both p & q
and belief closure
If one believes that p and p entails q, then one believes that p.
On the other hand, the account provides some explanatory basis for belief-distribution
If one believes that (p & q) then one believes that p & believes that q.
This is a very plausible principle, one that is almost universally accepted by anyone who has
written about Moore’s paradox. A lone voice against it is Pruss (2011a). I show that Pruss’s
arguments against the principle are flawed. I go on to show that the principle is constitutive
of the very nature of belief. I then argue that one norm of belief—as opposed to a norm of
rational belief—is the norm of avoiding false beliefs. This is norm in being an imperative of
belief-formation and maintenance that would be endorsed by a community of believers.
Turning to conscious belief, understood as a belief one has that one is aware of having, I
defend the principle of conscious belief distribution and collection
One consciously believes that (p & q) just in case one both consciously believes that
p and one consciously believes that q.
That conscious belief collects as well as distributes over conjunction may be supported by
the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief (Williams 2012). I also
defend the principle
If one consciously has the first-order belief that p, then one both has the first-order
belief that p and one consciously believes that one believes that p
I distinguish this from related principles found in Rosenthal and Brentano.
6. A theory of rational belief
I then extend this to a sketch of a theory of epistemically rational belief. I argue that human
rationality is what should concern us, rather than the rationality of an ideal thinker who obeys
belief-closure. Thus epistemic rationality is to be conceived as a humanly achievable
standard. This account proceeds in terms of norms of epistemically rational belief. These are
imperatives of belief-formation and maintenance that would be endorsed by a community of
rational believers. From our perspective as members of such a community, someone who
violates these norms is thereby epistemically irrational, even if she does not recognize that
16
she has done so, or even if she does not acknowledge them as norms. They include the
norm of avoiding specific recognizably false beliefs:
Do not form—or continue to have—a specific belief that you can be reasonably
expected to recognize is your very own false belief.
and ipso facto, the norm of avoiding specific recognizably self-falsifying beliefs:
Do not form—or continue to have—a specific belief that you can be reasonably
expected to recognize is your very own self-falsifying belief.
Where a belief is ‘self-falsifying’ just in case its content is a possible truth, but only so long
as it is not believed. They also include the norm of avoiding overtly contradictory beliefs, the
norm of avoiding basing one’s belief upon another irrational belief and the norm of having
undefeated justification for one’s belief.
I also sketch a distinction between minimally internalist justification and minimally
externalist justification. Roughly, one’s possession of minimally internalist justification is
one’s possession of evidential justification. If I am evidentially justified in believing that p,
then for some evidence e, (i) I believe e (ii) I believe nothing that is counterevidence and (iii)
if I were to believe p on the basis of believing e then I would have a justified belief that p,
because believing e is part of the cause of my forming the belief that p—the other part
including my background knowledge and beliefs. I argue that internalist justification has to
be at least evidential. In contrast, one’s possession of minimally externalist justification is
one’s possession of reliable or truth-conducive process of forming true beliefs, a process of
which one need not be aware. Of course these do not exhaust the logical space of
internalist and externalist justification.
At this point I assume a distinction between being justified in believing that p, in other
words having justification for believing that p – which leaves open whether one actually has
the belief – and justifiably believing that p, where one’s belief is at least partly caused by the
justification for the belief, as originally explained by Roderick Firth (1978) in different
terminology. Given this distinction it is definitionally true of any form of justification that:
If one justifiably believes that p then one both believes that p and one is justified in
believing that p.
I also defend
If I believe that I do not believe that p then I am not justified in believing
that p
which seems to hold even for externalist justification, and justified belief distribution
If one justifiably believes that (p & q) then one justifiably believes that p and one
justifiably believes that q.
I likewise defend a principle apparently in Goldman (1986, 62, see also Bergmann 2005, 426)
If one is justified in believing that one is not justified in believing that p then one is not
justified in believing that p.
I investigate whether we should accept—as principles of rational human beings
If one believes that one does not believe that p then one does not believe that p.
and its counterpart
17
If one believes that one believes that not-p then one does not believe that p.
Turning to externalist justification, I examine the plausibility of
All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that
justify me in believing that I believe that p.
as well as that of its commissive counterpart
All circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p are circumstances
in which I am justified in believing that I do not believe that not-p.
I end by arguing that a treatment of Moore-paradox in terms only of systems of
doxastic logic is misplaced, because Moore-paradoxical beliefs cannot be characterised in
terms of the syntax of their contents.
7. A theory of absurdity in belief.
Starting from Mitchell Green’s seminal (2007) paper I first briefly review our papers on
absurdity as considered in relation to Moore’s paradox. The position I now take has changed
a little. Green is informed by Thomas Nagel’s characterization of absurdity as including ‘a
conspicuous discrepancy between pretension and aspiration or reality’ (1979, 13). Nagel’s
examples of this phenomenon are as follows:
… someone gives a complicated speech in support of a motion that has already been
passed; a notorious criminal is made president of a major philanthropic foundation;
you declare your love over the telephone to a recorded announcement; as you are
being knighted, your pants fall down (1979, 13).
Based on this, I propose that absurdity consists in a severe violation of a system of norms
such as those of etiquette and conversation—especially assertion and sensible assertion—
as well as belief and rational belief. One way to violate a system of norms severely is to be in
a position to recognize, without further empirical investigation, that one is doing so. However,
one need not be epistemically irrational, since that violation may be very difficult to
recognize. One may be in a position to recognize the violation without further empirical
investigation, yet fail to actually recognize it, even if one is a genius. In contrast, one’s
irrationality indicates one’s failure to live up to a humanly achievable standard.
This explains why irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs are absurd while also
acknowledging that absurd beliefs need not be irrational.
I also investigate other ways in which one may severely violate norms of belief and
norms of rational belief.
8. The self-falsification approach as applied to Moore’s examples in belief; irrationality and
absurdity
Given belief-distribution, if I believe that (p and I do not believe that p) then I believe that p.
But then my second-order belief is false, since its second conjunct is false. Although my
belief is not a belief in a necessary falsehood, it is self-falsifying in the sense that although
what I believe might be true of me and although I might believe it, it cannot be true of me if I
believe it. Timothy Chan (2010, 214–216) observes that believing a necessary falsehood is
not enough to make one irrational (see also de Almeida 2001, 39–43; 2007, 53–56). For
example, mathematicians before Gödel were not irrational in believing that arithmetic is
decidable, because they could not have been expected to recognize that it is necessarily
18
false that arithmetic is decidable. Analogously, one is not epistemically irrational in having a
self-falsifying belief if one may not be reasonably expected to recognize that it is selffalsifying. I am not epistemically irrational in believing
The non-theism of my mother’s nieceless brother’s only nephew angers God
if I reasonably fail to recognize that I am necessarily my mother’s nieceless brother’s only
nephew. Yet my belief is self-falsifying. I argue that the explanation of the irrationality of
Moore’s examples in belief is the violation of the norms of avoiding specific recognizably
self-falsifying beliefs and the norm of avoiding overtly contradictory beliefs. I also show that
these beliefs are absurd because they are epistemically irrational.
9. The self-falsification approach as applied to Sorensen’s examples in belief; irrationality
and absurdity
I next apply the same approach to Sorensen’s examples in belief:
I have no beliefs now
Although you think all my opinions mistaken, you are always right
The non-theism of my mother’s nieceless brother’s only nephew angers God
I show that some of these beliefs are absurd because epistemically irrational, while others
are absurd but not epistemically irrational.
10. The self-falsification approach as applied to the rest of the examples in belief; irrationality
and absurdity
I am sure that this will work, but I have not yet worked out all the details.
11. The non-circularity of the approach
Timothy Chan (2010) who also takes the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical beliefs to be a form
of irrationality, objects to my self-falsification approach by arguing that it is circular and thus
incomplete. This is because it must explain why such beliefs are irrational yet, according to
Chan, their grammatical third-person transpositions are not, even though the same
proposition is believed. But the solution can only explain this asymmetry by relying on a
formulation of the ground of the irrationality of Moorean beliefs that presupposes precisely
such asymmetry.
I reply (2011a) that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the irrationality that the
contents of Moorean beliefs be restricted to the grammatical first-person. What has to be
explained is rather that such grammatical non-first-person transpositions sometimes, but not
always, result in the disappearance of irrationality.
Describing this phenomenon requires the grammatical first-person/non-first person
distinction. The pragmatic solution explains the phenomenon once it is formulated in de se
terms. But the grammatical first-person/non-first-person distinction is independent of, and a
fortiori, different from, the de se/non-de se distinction presupposed by the self-falsification
approach, although both involve the first person broadly construed. Therefore my approach
is not circular. Building on the work of Green and Williams I also distinguish between the
irrationality of Moorean beliefs and their absurdity. I argue that while all irrational Moorean
beliefs are absurd, some Moorean beliefs are absurd but not irrational. I explain this
absurdity in a way that is not circular either.
19
12. The conscious belief approach and its application to Moore’s examples in belief
Here I draw upon my work in (Williams 2006a; 2010; 2012, see also 2011b). I first examine
Rosenthal’s position on Moore’s paradox. He propounds a higher-order principle of
conscious belief:
If one consciously believes that p then one consciously believes that p and one
believes that one oneself believes that p.
Although Rosenthal himself thinks that all that needs to be explained is the absurdity of
Moore-paradoxical assertion as opposed to belief, this suggests an explanation of the
irrationality of conscious Moore-paradoxical belief once conscious belief distribution is
added. Shoemaker observes that this cannot explain what is wrong with Moore-paradoxical
beliefs that are not consciously held, and so offers his self-intimidation thesis.
Both of these accounts are objectionable. Some objections are particular to each, but
the most serious objections afflict both. The Rosenthal-inspired account fails to account for
the fact that in becoming aware of having a belief, I not only become aware of that belief
itself but also become aware of myself as having it. Shoemaker’s account comes with two
problems of its own. The first is that a Moore-paradoxical belief remains absurd—even
irrational—when its believer does not consider whether he has it. The second is that there
are beliefs the absurdity—even the irrationality—of which Shoemaker cannot explain. In fact,
neither can explain the irrationality—let alone absurdity--of commissive Moore-paradoxical
beliefs.
My explanation is both simpler and complete. Using conscious belief distribution and
collection plus
If one consciously has the first-order belief that p, then one both has the first-order
belief that p and one consciously believes that one believes that p
the irrationality of both the omissive and commissive belief is explained; in becoming
conscious of my omissive belief, I become aware that I believe a self-contradiction and in
becoming conscious of my commissive belief, I become aware that I have contradictory
beliefs. I neutralize two objections to this account. How their absurdity is to be explained on
this approach however, is a matter for further investigation.
14. The conscious belief approach as applied to Sorensen’s examples in belief.
I next apply the same approach to Sorensen’s examples:
I have not yet worked all this out as carefully I would like. I think it will work.
15. The conscious belief approach as applied to the rest of the examples in belief.
Again, I have not yet worked all this out as carefully I would like. I think it will work.
16. An examination of the unity of the two approaches: belief-revision.
The unity of the two approaches surfaces once we start to think of processes that rational
human beings have for changing their minds, either as a result of acquiring new information,
or as a result of reflection upon what they know and believe. The literature on Moore’s
paradox has largely ignored this perspective, although there are important exceptions. I
sketch part of a theory of humanly rational belief-revision, in terms of principles or norms that
govern one’s maintenance or abandonment of one’s beliefs in the light of one’s acquisition of
new knowledge or belief. Both my approaches are needed to justice to this partial sketch.
20
The sketch in turn sheds light upon the epistemic Ramsey test and on ‘assertion-behavior
dissonance’ cases.
Part Three: The paradox in assertion
16. Expressing belief
Here I draw upon (Williams 2013c & 2006b (see also my 1994; 1996; 1998; 2012; 2013c).
I will use ‘express’ in the ‘factive’ sense in which it is impossible to express what one
does not have. This sense is true to its root as ‘press out’ as in ‘He expressed the oil of the
hop’. I ostensibly express N to you just in case I represent myself to you as expressing my N
to you. I manifest N just in case I behave in a way that affords you reason to think I have N.
By contrast, I express N just in case I behave in a way that offers you reason to think that I
have N, in other words, intentionally affords you that reason.
Expressing a belief always involves ostensibly manifesting it, but not conversely.
Carrying an umbrella may manifest my belief that it will rain without expressing it, because
carrying the umbrella only affords you a reason to think that I believe that it is raining. Since I
have manifested my belief I have ipso facto ostensibly manifested it. However the converse
does not hold because knowing that you are watching me, I might carry the umbrella in order
to deceive you into thinking that I believe that it will rain. In contrast, if you contradict my
forecast of rain, I may express my belief that it will rain by defiantly shaking the umbrella in
your face, because then I deliberately offer you a reason to think that I believe that it will rain.
If I am sincere then I have manifested my belief that it will rain, otherwise I have only
ostensibly manifested it. In the light of all this, it is plausible that
I purport to express to you a belief that p just in case I offer you defeasible reason to
think that I believe that p
and
I express to you a belief that p just in case I really do believe that p and I offer you
defeasible reason to think that I believe that p.
This pair of definitions accommodates the fact that I may purport to express a belief without
expressing it. My offer of a reason to think that I believe what I assert is defeasible because
you may have grounds for thinking that I am insincere. Turning to verbal expressions of
belief, a prime way to purport to express a belief is to assert its content, since in making an
assertion I present it as evidence that I believe what I have asserted. This is because
sincerity is necessarily a norm of assertion. Otherwise the practice of insincerity could not
succeed, because liars and other practitioners of deception present themselves as sincere.
To succeed in such insincerity there must be a general presumption of sincerity, one we
would not hold if sincerity were not general. This holds even in a community of those who
practice deception more widely. Thus when I make an assertion to you it is practically
rational of you to assume that I am sincere unless observation suggests otherwise.
I might compare this analysis with rivals such as those propounded by Green (2007c) and
Bar-On (2004, 2010).
17. An analysis of assertion
An analysis of the term ‘assert’ may now be given in terms of expression of belief:
I assert that p just in case I purport to express a belief that p with the intention of
changing the beliefs or knowledge of my interlocutor—or of an actual or potential
audience—in a relevant way.
21
The mention of purported expression accommodates lies, which are surely genuine
assertions. (For dissent see Rosenthal 1995 and 2010 and my reply in Williams 2013a).The
change in your beliefs or knowledge that I intend to bring about depends upon the type of
assertion I make. Thus the change I intend to bring about is ‘relevant’ in the sense that the
proposition I assert forms the core of the description of that change. For example, in
informing you that p I intend to impart to you my knowledge that p. When I protest that I am
innocent of a crime yet know that I cannot convince you of my innocence, I might sensibly
aim to make you think that I am convinced of my own innocence. In lying to you that p I
intend to make you mistakenly believe that p. This is part of the concept of a lie, despite the
fact that there seem to be two concepts of a lie in ordinary speech.
The clause ‘or of a potential audience’ is needed to accommodate cases such as the
following. Suppose that I am brought before a judge who happens to know me very well.
Under oath I assert ‘I live on Carter Street’. I know that the judge already knows that I
believe that I live on Carter Street. So I need have no intention to change the judge’s beliefs
in any way via my assertion. But a central point of an oath is to make an assertion that is put
on public record so that any interested party may witness my testimony. My intention is
surely that such a person will believe that I live on Carter Street or at least that such a
person will think that I believe it. Likewise if I wear a billboard proclaiming ‘The end of the
world is at hand’ that counts as an assertion even in an empty street because I intend to
change the epistemic cognition of anyone who cares to take notice.
On this analysis, intention is doubly involved in assertion, first in expressing belief,
and second in the overall aim of the assertion. A second more direct way to express a belief
via assertion is to assert or report that one has the belief. In other words I may purport to
express to you a belief that p by telling you that I believe that p. Rosenthal (1995, 199)
argues against this claim. I defend it and fault his arguments.
18. Solving Moore’s paradox in assertion; the expressivist approach and its limitations
This account of assertion and expression of belief suggests the ‘expressivist’ approach to
solving the paradox in assertion (e.g. Heal 1994, Hajek and Stoljar 2001), namely that
Moorean assertions are absurd because they express absurd beliefs. I show how this works
(Williams 2013a) but argue that it has a limitation.
19. Solving Moore’s paradox in assertion; believing the speaker
In making an assertion one normally offers a reason to be thought sincere as part of an
attempt to make one’s interlocutor accept the truth of one’s assertion. This gives us an
account of assertion from the standpoint of the interlocutor in terms of believing the assertor,
as opposed to merely believing what she asserts. In most cases an insincere assertor does
not tell the truth. Yes, there are cases in which I insincerely tell the truth by asserting what I
have luckily guessed or by getting my facts backwards in an attempt to lie. But given that
you are not in a position to suspect that this is one of these rare cases, my assertion gives
you no reason to accept the truth of my assertion unless you think that I believe it myself.
Accepting that I am sincere in what I tell you grants me the minimal authority you need to
accept my testimony. Thus believing my assertion requires that you ‘believe me’, in the
sense that you believe that I am sincerely telling the truth. One could just stipulate this sense
of ‘believe me’. But it does seem to be used this way. If a parrot utters ‘I am a parrot’,
what you believe is not the parrot.
There are, however ‘deviant assertions’ (Williams 2007) in which one does not try to
make one’s interlocutor accept its truth or in which one attempts to be thought lying as a
double-bluff. I note these for later treatment.
22
20. The rationality and absurdity of assertion
The rationality of one’s speech-act of assertion is the rationality of action. It may be seen, as
one’s acting in a way that an epistemically rational believer, similarly placed, would believe
best promotes one’s interests by satisfying one’s desires and fulfilling one’s intentions. For
example, attempting to cross the Sahara desert on foot without water is irrational in this way.
Let us call this the ‘practical’ rationality of action. Examples of assertions that are practically
irrational might include confiding the details of one’s sexual history to one’s employer in the
hope of promotion.
There also seems to be a sense in which an assertion might be said to be
‘epistemically rational’. If you tell me that it will snow in Singapore I may reply that this is a
silly thing to say, but I do not judge it silly for the same kind of reason that I would judge it
silly of you to try to compliment a friend my telling him that he is stupid. Rather, I judge you
irrational insofar as I take you to have an epistemically irrational belief, under the assumption
that you are sincere.
Green and I (2011) hold that two norms of assertion are the norm of truth:
Do not assert what is not true
and the norm of sincerity:
Do not assert what you do not believe.
Norms of practically rational assertion include the norm that one should not make an
assertion if one should see that one cannot succeed in one’s overall aim of making it.
21. Believing the speaker: the irrationality and absurdity of Moore’s examples in assertion
When I make an assertion of the form p & I do not believe that p to you, I also assert that p,
because asserting a conjunction involves asserting its conjuncts. So I purport to express
belief that p. But I have also told you that I do not have the belief that I have purported to
express. So you have no reason to accept my assertion that p, since I have told you that I
am insincere in making it.
Moreover, you cannot believe me if you are epistemically rational. If you think that I
am sincere in asserting that p, then you believe that I do believe that p. But if you also think
that I am telling the truth in asserting that I do not believe that p, then you believe that I do
not believe that p. So you must have overtly contradictory beliefs if you believe me. On my
charitable presumption that you are epistemically rational, I am in a position to see that you
cannot believe me. Getting you to believe me is normally my aim in making the assertion. In
these cases I am practically irrational because I am trying to do what I should see will not
succeed.
This result may be strengthened by my theory of conscious belief. As a rational and
self-reflective thinker who has just formed the belief in the sincerity of my assertion
contemporaneously with the belief in its truth, you are in a position to be fully conscious of
each of these beliefs. Indeed I would expect you to be fully conscious of each belief. After
all, I cannot sensibly aim to make you accept either the truth of my assertion or my sincerity
in making it on the assumption that you are asleep or not fully concentrating on my
assertion. If you are indeed fully conscious of each belief then by conscious belief
distribution you are fully conscious of believing that I both do and do not believe that p. In
other words, you are now fully aware of believing a self-contradiction. As a rational
interlocutor, you have an excellent reason for refusing to believe me, because you are aware
of the dreadful epistemic position in which doing so puts you. I am in a position to see your
predicament for myself. On my charitable assumption that you are epistemically rational, I
23
should see that you will not believe me. Since making you believe me is normally my aim, I
am practically irrational in attempting the assertion
When I make an assertion of the form p & I believe that not-p to you, I assert that p,
so I purport to express belief that p. In other words, I offer you a reason to think that I believe
that p. But I have also told you that I believe that not-p. In most cases you will thereby have
some degree of evidence that I am lying in my assertion that p because from your point of
view, given that you have no clue of my overall intention in making the assertion, I have
satisfied one of the conditions needed for a lie, namely that I believe that what I have
told you is false. So you will have no reason to accept my assertion that p.
Moreover, you cannot believe me if you think that I am epistemically rational. If you
think that I am sincere in asserting that p, then you believe that I believe that p. But if you
also think that I am telling the truth in asserting my second conjunct, then you believe that I
believe that not-p. So if you believe me this time, you must think that it is me that has
contradictory beliefs. Indeed since I aim to make you believe me consciously I aim to make
you become fully conscious of believing that I have contradictory beliefs. Thus you must
think that I am epistemically irrational. In most cases I will not want you to think that I am
epistemically irrational if I am practically rational myself. One exception is when I have a
motive for deceiving you into thinking that I am mad.
It is tempting at this point to think that any exceptions to this rule can be easily hived
off. This is far from the case. Indeed a careful examination of these exceptions is enough to
destroy Shoemaker’s influential priority of belief thesis:
22. The priority of belief thesis
Following Shoemaker’s considerable influence the current orthodoxy is that an explanation
of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in
belief has been explained then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in
assertion (there are many references to his followers). This assumption gives explanatory
priority to belief over assertion. I show that the translation involved is much trickier than
might at first appear. It is simplistic to think that Moorean absurdity in assertion is always a
subsidiary product of the absurdity in belief, even when the absurdity is conceived as
irrationality. Instead we should aim for explanations of Moorean absurdity in assertion and in
belief that are independent even if related, while bearing in mind that some forms of
irrationality may be forms of absurdity even if not conversely.
In particular, I show that none of the following claims need be non-vacuously true:
An explanation of the absurdity of Moorean belief will thereby explain the absurdity of
Moorean assertion.
If you have an explanation of why a putative content could not be coherently
believed, you thereby have an explanation of why it cannot be coherently asserted.
(Shoemaker 1995, 227, fn 1)
An explanation of the irrationality of Moorean belief will thereby explain the
irrationality of Moorean assertion.
If one’s Moorean belief that p is irrational, then so is one’s assertion that p.
If one’s belief that p is irrational then so is one’s assertion that p.
If one’s Moorean belief that p is absurd, then so is one’s assertion that p.
If one’s belief that p is absurd then so is one’s assertion that p.
If one’s belief that p is irrational then so is one’s purported expression of belief that p
24
If one’s Moorean belief that p is irrational then so is one’s purported expression of
belief that p.
23. Believing the speaker: the irrationality and absurdity of the rest of the examples in
assertion
I am sure that this will work, but I have not worked out the details.
24. Assertion-behavior dissonance: behaviour at odds with one’s sincere assertions
There are ‘assertion-behavior dissonance’ cases in which someone sincerely asserts that p,
while her overall automatic behavior suggests that she believes that not-p. These have
been analysed by Brie Gertler (2011), Tamar Gendler (2008) and Eric Schwitzgebel (2010,
2011), who gives the examples of Juliet the implicit racist and Ralph the sexist. Juliet for
example, sincerely asserts that other races are not intellectually inferior, yet her behavior is
evidence that she really believes that they are. Should she come to realize that this is what
she believes, it seems that she might sensibly assert ‘Other races are not intellectually
inferior but I believe that they are’
This raises the question of what psychological states are present in an assertiondissonance case, one that is important in psychology as well as philosophy. Gertler holds
that Juliet judges that other races are not intellectually superior, but does not believe this,
although she does believe that they are not. This presupposes that it is possible to judge that
p and yet fail to believe that p (Cassam 2010: 81-82).
A second approach is made by Gendler, who analyses such cases in terms of
‘aliefs’, which are associative, automatic and arational patterns of responses (Gendler 2008:
641). In another case (Gendler 2008) Jane takes a plane to Las Vegas to meet her friends
there. As she boards the plane she realizes that she forgot her wallet at home, which
terrifies her. Arriving in Las Vegas, without any cash or credit cards, Jane borrows cash
from her friends. With the cash in hand, she immediately searches for her wallet. She
probably wanted to keep the money in a safe place, but she borrowed the money because
she did not have the wallet with her! ‘How silly of me!’ she thinks. Gendler argues that Jane
believes that she does not have her wallet yet alieves that she does
The nature of such responses is controversial, especially in psychology. Evans
(2008: 256) advances the hypothesis that there i s a distinction between ‘processes that
are unconscious, rapid, automatic, and high capacity, and those that are conscious,
slow and deliberative’. There is some evidence for dual processing. For example, in the
experiment conducted by Epstein and Denes-Raj (1994) subjects consistently made t he
wor st choices, even while knowing that they were the worst. It is controversial in
psychology whether responsiveness to evidence is a characteristic of one system in
particular. (Blair 2002; Dasgupta and Greenwald 2001).
A third explanation of assertion-dissonance cases is that they involve self-deception.
For example, Juliet believes that other races are intellectually inferior but deceives herself
into thinking that they are not. A paradox emerges however if we model self-deception
upon the deception of others. I may deceive you into falsely believing that p when I know
that not-p. If deceiving myself is similar, then I deceive myself into believing that p while I
know that not-p. Competing resolutions of the paradox either accept that deception is
involved (Davidson 1982; Pears 1984; Sartre 1956) or reject this (Johnston 1988, Mele
2001).
A fourth explanation is that the belief indicated by the behavior that is dissonant with
the assertion is unconscious. I will show that the first three of these approaches are
problematic, while the fourth is satisfactory, once coupled to my theory of rational beliefrevision (explained in section 15)
25
Part Four: The epistemic approach to the paradox in belief
25. Justifying circumstances for internalist and externalist justification.
I have taken this approach in the past (Williams 2004, 2006c, 2007b, 2009, 2010). It has met
with controversy (Vahid 2005, Brueckner 2006, 2009a). I now reexamine it. I argued that Mooreparadoxical beliefs are epistemically irrational because they are impossible to justify. This
argument starts with the externalist syllogism:
(1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to
make me believe that p.
(2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify
me in believing that I believe that p.
So
(3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that
justify me in believing that I believe that p.
This explains why Moore’s omissive example is a belief that is impossible to justify. To
explain the epistemic irrationality of the commissive belief we need:
(3′) All circumstances in which I am justified in believing that p are circumstances
in which I am justified in believing that I do not believe that not-p.
(3′) follows from (3) for a subject with generally truth-conducive processes of forming beliefs.
Given
If one justifiably believes that p then one both believes that p and one is justified in
believing that p.
it is impossible actually to have an externalistically justified Moore-paradoxical belief.
Given my account of minimally internalist justification as explained in section 25, as
well as the principles associated with it that I have defended, it follows also follows that it is
impossible to have an internalistically justified omissive Moore paradoxical. I give a similar
argument for the impossibility of an internalistically justified commissive Moore paradoxical
belief. Assuming that these two types of justification are exhaustive, it follows that it is
impossible to have a justified Moore-paradoxical belief in any sense of justification.
26. Dealing with objections.
Here I investigate how well this approach stands up to objections (Brueckner 2006; 2009a;
Vahid, 2005; 2008).
27. The epistemic approach: the irrationality and absurdity of Sorensen’s examples in
belief
This will need investigation.
28. The epistemic approach: the irrationality and absurdity of the rest of the examples in
belief
This will need investigation.
29. A comparison with Fernandez’s extrospective approach.
I explain Fernandez’s extrospective approach and note salient commonalities and
differences with my own. I review the objections to his approach.
26
Part Five: The knowledge version of the paradox
30. Is the knowledge-version paradoxical?
Here I examine whether there really is an absurdity in asserting or believing something of the
form
p but I do not know that p.
I am still thinking about this, but provisionally, I will argue that there whether there is, will
depend upon the degree of psychological certainty with which one’s belief is held or which
one’s assertion expresses.
31. Norms of assertion
In this section I look at the literature on various norms of assertion that have been proposed
in order to explain the absurdity of assertions of the form ‘p but I do not know that p’ (e.g.
Benton 2011, Blaauw 2012) as well as the arguments that have been given for them
(DeRose 1996, 2002, Huemer 2007, Koethe 2009, Lackey 2010, Littlejohn 2010, Williamson
1996, 2000).
32. The knowledge-version in belief
The topic of the absurdity of believing something of the form p but I do not know that p has
been relatively unexplored. I investigate two approaches. One is my epistemic approach
elucidated earlier in Part 4. The other is de Almeida’s appeal (2007) to anti-incoherence:
If you believe that p and you believe that not-p you cannot know either, nor can you
be epistemically justified in believing either.
I examine arguments for this principle and defend it against the objection that it makes selfdeception impossible.
Part Six: Related Issues
33. The epistemic Ramsey test
Here I draw upon my 2011b and 2006a. Chalmers and Hájek (2007) argue that on an
epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty.
They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to
think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical
beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it
requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to think of anyone as
infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because
applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief (earlier discussed in
section 12). It is important to understand the nature of this supposition.
34. ‘Moorish’ assertions and beliefs
Here I revisit the case of one’s belief that
It’s raining but I believe that it is raining without the least justification (compare Adler
1999)
27
This belief seems both absurd and epistemically irrational, unless held by a foundationalist
(call such beliefs ‘foundationalist Moorish’ as opposed to ‘ordinary Moorish’). Such an
ordinary Moorish belief is unlike the beliefs in Moore’s examples, because the truth of the
contents of Moorean beliefs is not enough to make the believer epistemically irrational. In the
next three sections I concentrate on ordinary Moorish beliefs.
35. The surprise exam paradox
Here I draw upon my (2007c). One tradition of solving the surprise exam paradox, started by
Binkley and continued by Olin, Sorensen and Gerbrandy, construes surprise epistemically
and relies upon the epistemic irrationality of ordinary Moorish beliefs. Here I argue for an
analysis that evolves from Olin’s. My analysis is different from hers or indeed any of those in
the tradition because it explicitly recognizes that there are two distinct reductios at work in
the student’s paradoxical argument against the teacher. The weak reductio is easy to fault.
Its invalidity determines the structure of the strong reductio, so-called because it is more
difficult to refute, but ultimately unsound because of reasons associated with Mooreparadoxicality. Previous commentators have not always appreciated this difference, with the
result that the strong reductio is not addressed, or the response to the weak reductio is
superfluous. This is one reason why other analyses in the tradition are vulnerable to
objections to which mine is not. I go beyond my (2007c) in neutralizing an objection (D Cruz)
to my solution.
36. The equal weight thesis in social epistemology.
Here I investigate the question of whether the equal weight view in social epistemology—
roughly that once one learns that one’s epistemic peer believes that not-p and reflects upon
this fact, then it is no longer rational of one to continue to believe that p. (Feldman & Warfield
2010; Lackey 2010 and Sosa 2010)—is vulnerable to the objection that it may commit one to
holding an epistemically irrational ordinary Moorish belief. I think that my theory of rational
belief-revision will come in here. Ongoing work by de Almeida must be acknowledged.
37. Moore’s paradox in desire
Drawing upon my (2013b), I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic
counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires.
Next I discuss putative examples of rational and irrational desires, suggesting that there are
norms of rational desire. Then I examine David Wall’s groundbreaking argument that
Moorean desires are always unreasonable (2012). Next I show against this that there are
rational as well as irrational Moorean desires. Those that are irrational are also absurd,
although there seem to be absurd desires that are not irrational. I conclude that certain
norms of rational desire should be rejected.
38. Eliminativism, dialethism and Moore’s paradox.
Here I draw upon my (2013c forthcoming).
John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be ‘G.E. Moore’s view’
that omissive assertions such as ‘It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining’ are
‘inherently “absurd”’, that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks
that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the
sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. As suggested by Hajek (2007), a
commissive counterpart of Ellie is Di, a dialetheist who asserts or believes that
The Russell set includes itself but I believe that it is not the case that the Russell set
includes itself.
28
Since any adequate explanation of Moore’s paradox must handle commissive assertions
and beliefs as well as omissive ones, it must deal with Di as well as engage Ellie. I give such
an explanation. I argue that neither Ellie’s assertion nor her belief is irrational yet both are
absurd. Likewise neither Di’s assertion nor her belief is irrational yet in contrast neither is
absurd. I conclude that not all Moore-paradoxical assertions or beliefs are irrational and that
the syntax of Moore’s examples is not sufficient for Moorean absurdity.
39. Philosophical commitments to Moore’s paradox: benign or fatal?
Hájek (2007) argues that a wide variety of philosophical positions are committed to Moorean
beliefs. These include eliminativist materialism, Kyburg-inspired solutions to the lottery
paradox, skepticism about higher-order beliefs, or about higher-order probabilities (De Finetti
1972 and Savage 1954), dialetheism (Priest, 1987) expressivism about moral discourse
(Ayer 1946) and supervaluational approaches to vagueness. Likewise the Nietzschean, the
naïve pragmatist, the communitarian and the relativist about truth are committed to Moorean
propositions, as are those who argue that conditionals lack truth-values although they may
well be assertible (Adams 1975, Edgington 1995 and Bennett 2003).
I investigate the question of whether these commitments are genuine and if so,
whether this is benign or fatal to the position so committed.
Part Seven: Defining Moore-paradoxicality.
40. The preface paradox and its versions.
Moore-paradoxical belief has often been seen in terms of the believer’s commitment to
inconsistent belief. But the preface paradox is taken by some to show that one may be
epistemically rational in holding inconsistent beliefs. If so, a more nuanced definition of
Moore-paradoxicality is needed. Accordingly, I examine the preface paradox.
The original preface paradox (originating with Mackinson 1965) purports to be a case
in which one is justified in holding a set of inconsistent beliefs. This is paradoxical inasmuch
as it is a tenant of any orthodox theory of justification that one’s beliefs are rational only if
they are consistent. Call such theories ‘conservative’. The thought is that rationality cannot
allow you to hold inconsistent beliefs because rationality requires you to adopt a corpus of
beliefs that are truth-conducive (held by such venerable heavyweights as Chisholm 1989;
Hempel 1962; Lehrer 1974; Pollock 1983; Quine and Ullian 1970; Schick 1963 and Swain
1970). Call this initial version the ‘original preface-paradox’. This has been extended into a
more global version known as the fallibility paradox. Some take this as showing that any
‘knowledgeable’ person (one who knows what her beliefs are) may be rational in having
inconsistent beliefs (Evnine 1999; Klein 1985; Ryan 1970).
A third argument for the possibility of rational inconsistent belief is called the
epistemic probability argument (Campbell 1981; Lehrer 1975; Williams 1981; 1987).
In each case the argument is paradoxical inasmuch as it is a tenant of any orthodox
theory of justification that one’s beliefs are rational only if they are consistent. Some accept
that some or all of these three arguments shows that rationality may allow you to hold
inconsistent beliefs (Foley 1987; Klein 1985; Moser 1985 and my 1987) but most reject this
conclusion, instead seeking to fault the arguments (Lacey 1970; Olin 1989; 2003, New 1978;
Ryan 1991). By far the most and comprehensive and cogent among these is Doris Olin
(2003).
I argue for the following claims. None of the ways of reinterpreting the preface
scenario suggested in the literature succeed. Olin’s objection to the preface paradox fails.
Nor do her two attempts to block the fallibility paradox succeed. Rather, that paradox may be
blocked for different reasons.
Even if I am wrong about all this, there is an even more generalized version of the
fallibility paradox—call it the ‘minimal modesty paradox’—that escapes any objection so far
29
considered, one I am confident has never been considered in the literature. I will show that
the dire consequences Olin warns of in accepting the possibility of rational inconsistent belief
are either welcome or don’t really follow. I end by exploring the consequences of all this for
norms of rational belief.
41. Defining Moore-paradoxicality.
In the light of all that has gone before I give a definition of Moore-paradoxical belief and
Moore-paradoxical assertion, after reviewing past inadequate definitions.
30
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