Séminaires ADA&LACTO Séance du 23 octobre : Argumentation

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Séminaires ADA&LACTO
Séance du 23 octobre : Argumentation, Interpretation and the interface
Pragmatics and Semantics.
Les présentations se feront en français ou en anglais.
MATIN : 9h-13h
- Cédric Patin :
« Aussi: does prosody matter? »
(joined work with Sandra Benazzo & Laetitia Batjom)
Additive items like Fr. aussi share the possibility to occupy different
positions in the sentence and to semantically affect different elements of
it (König 1991). Their syntactic mobility partly indicates a variation in
the particle scope, but does not always suffice to determine which element
of the utterance is actually affected by the additive meaning: for
instance, aussi placed after the finite verb can mark an addition on the
object (Jean parle aussi [chinois]) as well as an addition on the subject
([Jean] parle aussi chinois). The aim of our study is to determine whether
and to what extent prosody contributes to discriminate the meaning of
sentences with aussi in structurally ambiguous positions in a more
controlled context.
The talk will be held in French, but the slides are in English.
- Bert Cappelle :” Conceptual blending: The apparent paradox paradox”
Our use of expressions such as apparent paradox, false teeth, fake orgasm
and the like seems to imply that there are objects which are and are not a
certain thing. It will be argued that this apparent paradox paradox is only
an apparent one. Drawing on insights from mental space theory, polyphony,
conversational pragmatics and frame semantics, I will adopt and adapt a
recent proposal of how best to deal with privative adjectives like fake,
false and fictitious. A central notion in my account is that of
perspective-taking, which may help us to solve a wide range of puzzling
phenomena, including the problem of negative existentials, as in “Unicorns
do not exist”, and possibly even the most fiendish of all paradoxes, the
Liar paradox: “This statement is not true”
- Mohammad Shafiei :"A Phenomenological study of 'Necessity' and a
Dialogical
Semantics for it”
According to Husserl, modalities, like necessity and possibility, are first
constituted as modifications of truth judgment. On the basis of this
constitution, modal propositions can be formed. So, the question is what is
the nature of such modifications and what is the intention involved in
modal propositions. Necessity is in general conceived in contrast to
possibility. Investigating the phenomenol- ogy of possibility, one can see
that there are different meanings of this notion. However, in this
presentation I am to claim that there is one basic meaning of necessity. In
order to explain this, I will use the Leibnizian distinction between
necessary and contingent truths.
Leibniz says that necessary truths are those that are derivable, through
finite steps, from the fundamental truths; while the steps of derivation
for the contingent truths are infinite. In this talk, I am to go to explain
necessity as finitely derivable from a set of canonical truths. Using this
explanation I will give a dialogical semantic rule for necessity which
leads in a logical system equal to intuitionistic S4. At the end, I briefly
discuss the philosophical differences, and perhaps the potential
advantages, of the introduced semantics and explanation in comparison to
the well-known possible word semantics.
- Matthieu Fontaine Contradiction et negation dans le contexte d'une
dialogique adaptive
(présentation tirée d’un travail réalisé avec Mathieu Beirlaen (Ruhr
Universität Bochum))
Les logiques paraconsistantes sont des logiques qui ne supportent pas
l’explosion. Ces logiques présentent un certain intérêt pour l’analyse du
discours scientifique et l’argumentation en général. Effectivement, des
incohérences, ou contradictions, peuvent apparaître dans des théories ou au
cours d’un processus argumentatif, sans que cela ne constitue une raison
suffisante pour abandonner ces mêmes théories ou le processus
d’argumentation en cours. L’apparition de telles incohérences ne constitue
pas non plus une raison suffisante pour inférer n’importe quoi. Comment
peut-on adapter le discours scientifique et l’argumentation à l’apparition
d’incohérences ? Au cours de cette intervention, sera présentée la logique
dialogique IAD (inconsistency adaptive dialogical logic), une logique
paraconsistante non monotone fondée sur la logique dialogique
paraconsistante de Rahman & Carnielli (2000) et les logiques adaptives de
Batens (2000). En plus de la présentation des règles, on discutera les
avantages de IAD par rapport à d’autres approches des logiques
paraconsistantes.
Références
- Batens, D. 2000. “A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics”. In Batens,
Priest and Van Bendegem (eds), Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic. Baldock:
Research Studies Press, King’s College Publications : 49-73.
- Rahman, Sh. & Carnielli, W. 2000. “The Dialogical Approach to
Paraconsistency”. Synthèse, 125(1-2) : 201-32.
APRÈS-MIDI : 14h-17h30
- Gerhard Schaden : Communication, conventions and higher-order
intentionality
- Pierre Cardascia : Titre : "Do you have a method ? --- No, I have a
strategy !"
In GS, there is a classic motto ``sense is produced by the strategies''.
However, out GS, there is not a lot of people outside GS (and even among
the philosophers) to link philosophy and strategy. No, the common sense
sees them as men of method. Our talk will explore the tension between the
two notions, in order to make more explicit some requirements of our
framework. In fact, a very common misunderstanding made about GS and about
dialogical logics is that these theories doen't fulfill their claims of
dynamicity at the very level of semantics. To try to clean this
interpretation, we have to refine the notion of strategy into two
definitions (which can coincide in the case of the dialogical logic of
matrices). The first one enables the connexion with the now-classical
semantic proves by Nicolas Clerbout. The second one reaffirms the
importance of dynamics in the dialogical analysis.
- Ilse Depraetere : presentation of 'Drawing a line: perspectives on the
semantics-pragmatics interface' (editors: Ilse Depraetere and Raf Salkie,
Springer, to appear) (English)
In this talk, I will present the volume of papers, 'Drawing a line:
perspectives on the semantics-pragmatics interface' (Springer, to appear),
co-edited by Ilse Depraetere and Raf Salkie. This will involve an overview
of the structure of the book and a presentation of the aims and some of the
major findings that have emerged from the papers.
- Cristina Barés Gómez :
Titre: The concept of Evidentiality
Résumé: This talk focuses on a grammatical category called Evidentiality.
The aim here is to conduct a conceptual study of evidentiality in which use
is made of formal tools. Evidentiality is a dynamic notion to be analysed
through the use of knowledge by the agents, a knowledge in action, which
involves an in-coming state and an out-coming state that is typical of the
transmission of information. I will begin with an overview of some wellknown approaches. Then, I will discuss their advantages and their
limitations. Thereafter, I will propose my own approach in which the
dynamics of knowledge in action is grasped in the context of a Dynamic
Epistemic Logic (DEL).
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