Round 8 Texas
1AC
1AC – Plan
The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States. The
process of legalization should include at least the United States limiting the
United States Congress’ commerce clause authority to prohibit marihuana.
1AC Prohibition
Contention 1 is Prohibition
Scenario 1 is Harm Reduction:
The prohibitionist model remains the global norm for drug policy—this prevents
effective Federal legalization sends a global signal in favor of ending drug
prohibition—causes a shift in other countries towards harm reduction strategies
Joshua D. Wild 13, “The Uncomfortable Truth about the United States’ Role in the Failure of the Global War on Drugs and How It
is Going to Fix It,” SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW v. 36, Summer 2013, p. 437-446
The War on Drugs' demise started when the bellicose analogy was created. n77 The correct classification of the global drug
problem was and still is as a set of interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, not a war
to be won. n78 The U.S. has worked strenuously for the past fifty years to ensure that all countries
adopt its rigid, prohibitionist approach to drug policy, essentially repressing the potential for
alternative policy development and experimentation. n79 This was an expensive mistake that the U.S.
unfortunately cannot take back. n80 The current emergence from the economic recession of 2008-2009 has set the stage for a
generational, political and cultural shift, placing the U.S. in a unique moment in its history; the necessary sociopolitical context to
revoke its prohibitionist ideals and replace them with more modern policies grounded in health, science and humanity. n81 The
U.S. can remedy its mistake by using its considerable diplomatic influence and international
presence to foster reform in other countries. n82 One way to do this is by capitalizing [*438] on this unique moment
in its existence and experimenting with models of legal regulation, specifically with marijuana because nearly half
of U.S. citizens favor legalization of it. n83 This will help redeem our image internationally and help repair
foreign relations because the monumental scope of the international marijuana market is largely created by the exorbitant
U.S. demand for the drug which partially stems from the illegality of the market. n84 B. Step 1: Recognize the Ineffectiveness of The
Global War on Drugs and Consider Alternatives An objective way to gauge the effectiveness of a drug policy is to examine how the
policy manages the most toxic drugs and the problems associated with them. n85 With that in mind, at the global level,
having one in five intravenous drug users have HIV and one in every two users having Hepatitis C
is clearly an epidemic and not the result of effective drug control policies. n86 The threat of arrest and
punishment as a deterrent from people using drugs is sound in theory, but in practice this hypothesis is tenuous. n87 Countries
that have enacted harsh, punitive laws have higher levels of drug use and related problems than
countries with more tolerant approaches. n88 Additionally, the countries that have experimented with
forms of legal regulation outside of punitive approaches have not seen rises in drug use and
dependence [*439] rates. n89 Therefore, one sensible first step in placing this issue back into a manageable position is for
national governments to encourage other governments to experiment with models of legal regulation of
drugs which fit their context. n90 This will in turn, undermine the criminal market, enhance national security, and allow other
countries to learn from their application. n91 1. Easier to Say Than Do - A Suggestion for Overcoming Difficulties Associated With
Legal Regulation For this movement to be successful and effectively manage the epidemic at hand there must be a broad
consensus around the world that the current drug control policies are morally harmful. n92 This consensus however is precluded by
the stigma and fear associated with more toxic drugs such as heroin. n93 This note does not propose that heroin and other toxic
drugs should be legalized but instead suggests that society and drug policies tend to consolidate and classify all illicit drugs as
equally dangerous. n94 This in turn restrains any progressive debate about experimenting with the regulation of different drugs
under different standards. n95 [*440] Regardless of these false dichotomies, which often restrain progressive debate, it is difficult
not to give credence to the idea of marijuana being socially acceptable when it has been by far the most widely produced and
consumed illicit drug. n96 There is between 125 and 203 million users worldwide and no indication of that number declining. n97
With this many users, it is reasonable to conclude that if the international community could reach a consensus about the moral
noxiousness of any drug control policy, the repression of marijuana would likely be it. n98 Marijuana, arguably socially
acceptable, represents a simple mechanism to enter into the experimentation process with the
legal regulation of drugs. n99 Without advocating for the UN to adopt new commissions or encouraging drastic moves such
as the decriminalization of all illicit substances, the global decriminalization of marijuana would be a relatively minor adjustment
compared to the monumental impact. n100 If national governments were to decriminalize marijuana, the scope of this movement
would essentially eradicate the public health problem of marijuana abuse and the associated criminality because of its illegal status.
n101 Public health problems can be remedied because it will afford governments the ability to regulate the market and control the
quality and price of the drug, essentially removing toxic impurities and setting a price that will diminish an illegal market. n102 This
will in turn diminish the criminal market [*441] by eradicating the need for users to commit crimes to procure marijuana and removing
the economic incentive for other countries to get involved in the drug's market. n103 Without arguing that this is the panacea for the
global war on drugs, proponents of legalization can aptly point to the archaic drug control policies in place and this macro approach
as an effective way to tackle the problem now. n104 C. Step 2: Real Reform - the U.S. Needs to Stand at the Forefront
of Drug Policy Reformation The U.S. wields considerable influence over the rest of the world, so it
is no surprise that its call for the development and maintenance of prohibitive, punitive drug
policies resulted in a majority of the international community following. n105 Conversely, if the U.S.
leads the call for the development and maintenance of more tolerant drug policies grounded in
health, humanity and science, a majority of the international community will also follow. n106 Cultural
shifts do not take place overnight, and the idea of complete U.S. drug policy reformation is too aggressive and stark in contrast to
succeed against modern bureaucracy and political alliances. n107 On the other hand, a more moderate, piecemeal approach could
effectively act as a catalyst for this transformation while simultaneously serving as a case study for opponents of legal regulation.
n108 [*442] If the U.S. is serious about addressing the ineffectiveness of the War on Drugs, then the
federal government must remove marijuana from its list of criminally banned substances. n109 The
tone of the Obama administration is a significant step in this direction. n110 President Obama has explicitly acknowledged the need
to treat drugs as more of a public health problem, as well as the validity of debate on alternatives, but he does not favor drug
legalization. n111 This progressive rhetoric is a significant step in the right direction, but until there is
some real reform confronting the issue, reducing punitive measures and supporting other countries to develop drug
policies that suit their context, there is still an abdication of policy responsibility. n112 1. Starting Small - Potential
Positive Effects of Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana in the U.S. If marijuana was legal in the U.S., it would function similarly to
the market of legal substances such as liquor, coffee and tobacco. n113 Individual and corporate participants in the market would
pay taxes, increasing revenues and saving the government from the exorbitant cost of trying to enforce prohibition laws. n114
Consumers' human rights would be promoted through self-determination, autonomy and access to more accurate information about
the product they are consuming. n115 Additionally, case studies and research suggest that the decriminalization or legalization
[*443] of marijuana reduces the drugs' consumption and does not necessarily result in a more favorable attitude towards it. n116
The legal regulation of marijuana would relieve the current displaced burden the drug places on law enforcement, domestically and
internationally. n117 In the U.S., law enforcement could refocus their efforts away from reducing the marijuana market per se and
instead towards reducing harm to individuals, communities and national security. n118 Abroad, U.S. international
relations would improve because of the reduced levels of corruption and violence at home and
afar. n119 The precarious position repressive policies place on foreign governments when they have to destroy
the livelihoods of agricultural workers would be reduced. n120 Additionally, legalization and regulation
would provide assistance to governments in regaining some degree of control over the regions
dominated by drug dealers and terrorist groups because those groups would lose a major source
of funding for their organizations. n121 2. Health Concerns? - Marijuana in Comparison to Other Similar Legal
Substances The federal government, acknowledging the risks inherent in alcohol and tobacco, argues that adding a third substance
to that mix cannot be beneficial. n122 Adding anything to a class of [*444] dangerous substances is likely never going to be
beneficial; however marijuana would be incorrectly classified if it was equated with those two substances. n123 Marijuana is far less
toxic and addictive than alcohol and tobacco. n124 Long term use of marijuana is far less damaging than long term alcohol or
tobacco use. n125 Alcohol use contributes to aggressive and reckless behavior, acts of violence and serious injuries while
marijuana actually reduces likelihood of aggressive behavior or violence during intoxication and is seldom associated with
emergency room visits. n126 As with most things in life, there can be no guarantee that the legalization or decriminalization of
marijuana would lead the U.S. to a better socio-economical position in the future. n127 Two things however, are certain: that the
legalization of marijuana in the U.S. would dramatically reduce most of the costs associated with the current drug policies,
domestically and internationally, and [*445] if the U.S. is serious about its objective of considering the costs
of drug control measures, then it is vital and rational for the legalization option is considered . n128
D. Why the Time is Ripe for U.S. Drug Policy Reformation The political atmosphere at the end of
World War I and II was leverage for the U.S., emerging as the dominant political, economic and military
power. n129 This leverage allowed it to shape a prohibitive drug control regime that until now has
remained in perpetuity. n130 Today, we stand in a unique moment inside of U.S. history. n131 The
generational, political and cultural shifts that accompanied the U.S. emergence from the "Great
Recession" resulted in a sociopolitical climate that may be what is necessary for real reform. n132
Politically, marijuana has become a hot issue; economically, the marijuana industry is bolstering a faltering economy and socially,
marijuana is poised to transform the way we live and view medicine. n133 The public disdain for the widespread problems
prohibition caused in the early 20th century resulted in the end of alcohol prohibition during the Great Depression. n134 If history
does actually repeat itself than the Great recession may have been much more telling than expected. n135 V. Conclusion The U.S.
and its prohibitionist ideals exacerbated the failure of both the international and its own domestic drug policies. n136 As a result,
the U.S. should accept accountability for its mistakes by reforming its drug policies in a way that
will help [*446] place the global drug market back into a manageable position . n137 Marijuana is an
actionable, evidence based mechanism for constructive legal and policy reform that through a domino effect
can transform the global drug prohibition regime . n138 The generational, political and cultural shifts that accompanied
the U.S. emergence from the "Great Recession" have resulted in a sociopolitical climate ready for real reform. n139 The U.S.
will capitalize on this unique moment by removing marijuana from the list of federally banned substances, setting the
stage for future international and domestic drug policies that are actually effective. n140
Global prohibition has massively undermined public health efforts to deal with
the spread of diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis
Steven Rolles 12, senior policy analyst, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, founder, and Jane Slater, Transform
Drug Policy Foundation, THE ALTERNATIVE WORLD DRUG REPORT: COUNTING THE CSTS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS, 2012,
p. 9-12.
5. Threatening public health, spreading disease and death While the war on drugs has primarily been
promoted as a way of protecting health, it has in reality achieved the opposite. It has not only failed in its key aim of reducing or
increased risks and created new health harms – all while establishing political
obstacles to effective public health interventions that might reduce them. • Prevention
and harm reduction messages are undermined by criminalisation of target populations, leading to
distrust and stigmatisation • Criminalisation encourages high-risk behaviours, such as injecting in
unhygienic, unsupervised environments, poly-drug use and bingeing • Enforcement tilts the market towards more
potent but profitable drug products. It can also fuel the emergence of high-risk , new “designer” drugs, or domestically
manufactured drugs (“krokadil”, for instance) • Illegally produced and supplied drugs are of unknown strength and purity,
increasing the risk of overdose, poisoning and infection • The emotive politics of the drug war, and
stigmatisation of drug users, has created obstacles to provision of effective harm reduction, which despite
proven cost-effectiveness remains unavailable in many parts of the world. This contributes to increased overdose
deaths, and fuels the spread of HIV/ AIDS , hepatitis , and tuberculosis among people who inject drugs • The
growing population of people who use drugs in prisons has created a particularly acute health
crisis, as prisons are high-risk environments, inadequately equipped to deal with the challenges they face • The development
impacts of the war on drugs have had much wider negative impacts on health service provision • Drugwar politics have had a chilling effect on provision of opiates for pain control and palliative care,
with over five billion people having little or no access There is an absence of evidence that either
supply- or user-level enforcement interventions have reduced or eliminated use. Instead, drug-related risk is
eliminating drug use, but has
and practical
increased and new harms created – with the greatest burden carried by the most vulnerable populations.
Unchecked AIDS spread causes extinction
(WAIF) 4 Washington AIDS International Foundation, staff, 2004. Available from the World Wide Web at: www.waifaction.org/,
accessed 5-27-09.
Virtually every
nation in the world has been severely hit by the plague of AIDS; we are experiencing an
extinction-causing event. There are no vaccines, no cures, and no group that is not vulnerable .
And, because it is spread largely by sex and by mother-to-child contact, and to a smaller degree by blood contact, it is hitting those
of childbearing age the hardest. This is a silent killer. Without testing, it can go undetected for many years, even as the
carrier transmits it to others. Unfortunately, we know only the most advanced cases in most of the countries of the world. Many
millions of others may be infected, but in the latent stage. WAIF is committed to educate the public about the emergency of the AIDS
epidemic.
Tuberculosis causes extinction—mutations and empirics
Ethan Huff 2/3/14 “Sudden collapse of Harappan civilization may foreshadow superbug threat to modern humans”
http://www.naturalnews.com/043757_harappan_civilization_superbugs_antibiotic_resistance.html#
The mystery surrounding the sudden collapse of the ancient city of Harappa, a major urban center that was a prominent feature of
the now defunct Indus civilization, recently became a little bit less mysterious thanks to new research out of Appalachian State
University. An international team of climatologists, archaeologists and biologists found that rampant disease, among other things,
played a major role in the swift decline of this primordial people group -- and the same thing could happen to modern humanity as a
result of antibiotic-resistant "superbugs," believe some. What exists from the historical record shows that Harappa flourished even
before the Indus civilization as a whole reached its peak, spanning 1 million square kilometers in what is now Pakistan and India.
Scholars say the city thrived primarily between the years of 2600 and 1700 B.C. but suddenly collapsed for reasons that up until
now have remained elusive due to a lack of reliable records and other concrete evidence. But we now know that the
uncontrolled spread of disease played a significant role in the downfall of Harappa, as did the violence
and chaos that erupted as a result of a widening social hierarchy. Specifically, the new research found that a combination of
socioeconomic inequality and disease -- tuberculosis and leprosy, which were new at the time, are believed to
have spread quickly during the final days before the collapse -- were largely to blame for the city's
ultimate demise. "In this case, it appears that the rapid urbanization process in Indus cities, and the increasingly large amount of
culture contact, brought new challenges to the human population," says Gwen Robbins Schug, one of the lead researchers involved
with the project. "Infectious diseases like leprosy and tuberculosis were probably transmitted across an interaction sphere that
spanned Middle and South Asia." Rapid urbanization spawned disease spread that killed
off entire
civilization A recent exhumation of remains from Harappa revealed that, toward the end of the city's existence, violence and
disease had reached epic proportions. Because of this, Harappa was essentially being evacuated in droves by its residents during
the final days leading up to its collapse, a previously unknown fact about the civilization that came as a surprise to historians. "The
collapse of the Indus civilization and the reorganization of its human population has been controversial for a long time," says Schug.
Though the exact cause of all the violence and corresponding disease that ravished Harappa is still somewhat shrouded in mystery,
experts now know that a period of rapid urbanization definitely precluded its undoing. Much like what appears to be occurring in
modern society, Harappa "advanced" too quickly and eventually imploded on itself. "The evidence from Harappa offers insights into
how social and biological challenges impacted past societies facing rapid population growth, climate change and environmental
degradation," adds Schug, as quoted by Science Daily. "Unfortunately, in this case, increasing levels of violence and disease
accompanied massive levels of migration and resource stress and disproportionate impacts were felt by the
most vulnerable members of society." Drug-resistant 'superbugs' threaten to kill off modern civilization There is a tendency when
looking at ancient history through the lens of today to assume that what happened to them could never happen to us. Modern
humanity is simply far too advanced to ever just collapse in on itself, goes the assumption. And yet history also has a seemingly
sinister way of repeating itself when you least expect it, in modern times with the threat of drug-resistant "superbugs"
brought about as a result of so-called advancements in medicine.
China needs to shift to a harm reduction model to avoid economic and social
instability—acting now is key
Verity Robins
20-14.
11, “China’s Flawed Drugs Policy,” Foreign Policy Centre, 6—22—11, http://fpc.org.uk/articles/514, accessed 12-
China has woken up to its drug problem, but it is failing woefully in trying to tackle it. Nestled between two major heroin-producing
regions, the Golden Triangle (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam) and the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran), China has
long been a transit path for drugs headed toward the rest of the world. Along an ever-expanding network of routes that lead to
China's international seaports, domestic heroin use is soaring. No longer just a transit country, it now has a sizable user population
of its own. The
rise in domestic heroin addiction has had disastrous social consequences, with an
increase in Chinese drug cultivation and organised criminal activity, as well as a rise in intravenous
drug use and a spiralling HIV/AIDS epidemic. China's role as a drugs conduit has increased considerably over the
past two decades. Throughout the 20th century, opium and later heroin, from the Golden Triangle, was smuggled to Thailand's
seaports and then on to satiate drug markets throughout the world. More effective law enforcement and a stricter drug policy in
Thailand in the late 1980s and early 90s reduced the state as an effective trafficking route. Concurrently, Burmese drug lord Khun
Sa, the prime heroin producer and distributer along the Thai-Burmese border, surrendered to the Burmese authorities. With the
collapse of Khun Sa's army, Burma's foremost heroin trafficking route into Thailand was disrupted. Consequently, China's role as a
narcotics conduit became even more crucial. Well over half the heroin produced in the Golden Triangle now travels through China,
wending its way through southern provinces Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong towards Hong Kong. This shift in regional drug trade
routes coincided with rapid economic development in China's southwest. More robust roads allow for faster and easier
transportation of illicit drugs, while an increased fiscal and technological ability to refine heroin locally has driven down its market
value and increased local consumption. By 1989, the HIV virus was detected amongst injecting drug users in China's most southwesterly province Yunnan. Needle sharing drove the epidemic, and HIV/AIDS rapidly spread to drug users in neighbouring
provinces and along trafficking routes. At the turn of the century, HIV infections had been reported in all 31 provinces, autonomous
regions and municipalities, with drug users accounting for 60-70 per cent of reported cases. While the Chinese government was
slow to engage substantively with a generalised AIDS epidemic in the country, a new administration taking office in 2003 under
President Hu Jintao accelerated the commitment to and implementation of evidence-based HIV policies. Having woken up to the
seriousness of its HIV/AIDS epidemic, the Chinese government sought increasingly progressive means to combat the crisis, calling
on a range of outside actors to implement new and innovative pilot projects. During the 2000s, the government seemingly revoked
its zero-tolerance attitude towards drug users, introducing needle exchange programmes and controlled methadone maintenance
treatments in the most affected areas. While the Chinese government continues to take a pragmatic approach to its
HIV/AIDS crisis, the good work of these projects is offset by the 2008 Narcotics Law that vastly
emphasises law enforcement over medical treatment in the government's response to drug use. This law calls for
the rehabilitation of illicit drug users and for their treatment as patients rather than as criminals, yet the law also allows for the
incarceration - without trial or judicial oversight – of individuals suspected by police of drug use for up to six years in drug detention
centres. To allow for this, the 2008 Narcotics Law considerably enhances police power to randomly search people for possession of
drugs, and to subject them to urine tests for drug use without reasonable suspicion of crime. The law also empowers the
police, rather than medical professionals, to make judgements on the nature of the suspected users' addiction, and to
subsequently assign alleged drug users to detention centres. According to Human Rights Watch, whilst in detention
centres suspected drug users receive no medical care, no support for quitting drugs, and no skills training for re-entering society
upon release. In the name of treatment, suspected drug users are confined under "horrific conditions, subject to cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, and forced to engage in unpaid labour". Not only is this law ineffective in tackling China's
growing drug problem and rehabilitating its users, but incarceration of suspected addicts in
detention centres represents a serious breach of the basic human rights guaranteed by both China's
domestic and international legal commitments. Furthermore, the law is a counter productive policy for combating
HIV/AIDS in China. The threat of forcible detention only discourages users from seeking
professional help to tackle their addictions, and from utilising needle exchange programmes for fear of incarceration. The
result is to encourage "underground" illicit drug use that leads to needle sharing and hence the
spread of HIV/AIDS. Effective tackling of illicit drug use requires developing voluntary, outpatient
treatment based upon effective, proven approaches to drug addiction. Specific reform of the law should reverse the
expanded police powers to detain suspected users without trial, and implement specific procedural mechanisms to protect the
health and human rights of drug users in a standardised and appropriate way. The Chinese government has sought to work with
outside actors in combating its HIV/AIDS epidemic, particularly in its most affected province Yunnan. The UK Department for
International Development (DfID) has been engaged in HIV/AIDS prevention throughout southwest China since the launch of the
China-UK HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Programme in 2001. DfID's Multilateral Aid Review, published in March this year, cut all
future development aid to China. The discontinuation of DfID projects in southwest China will weaken efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS
and rehabilitate drug users in the region. It also lessens pressure on China to combat these issues in a reasonable and felicitous
way. The international donor community present in China must implement policies that reflect
realities on the ground by ensuring that the health care and treatment of drug users is at the core
of their HIV/AIDS policies. They should also use their position of influence to nudge Beijing to
rectify the flaws in the 2008 Narcotics Law with its negative implications for the human rights of suspected drug users, and
for combating the spread of HIV/AIDS. If the country's skyrocketing number of intravenous drug users and the
resultant HIV/AIDS epidemic are left to fester , it could result in severe health consequences,
economic loss and social devastation . China still has time to act, but it should do so now before it
is too late.
Instability causes diversionary wars in the South China Sea
Cole 14,
Taipei-based journalist and contributor to The Diplomat who focuses on military issues in Northeast Asia and in the
Taiwan Strait. He previously served as an intelligence officer at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Where Would Beijing
Use External Distractions?, J Michael, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/
Throughout history, embattled
governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive
population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned
against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities
through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of
domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go
down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability? Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the
extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where,
Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled. In past decades, the
CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external
opponents, namely Japan and the United States. While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese
manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s
focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s
second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military. Those impressive
achievements have, however, fueled Chinese
nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous
zone of hubris . For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be
met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and
East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be
dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have
told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and
you are smaller countries.” This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that,
in times of serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially
destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction . Doing so is always a calculated risk, and
sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease
mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking
attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other
words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a
domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for
the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for
External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take ,
given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater. With this in mind, we
can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it
to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a
possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang,
random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means
exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction. 1. South China Sea
The S outh C hina S ea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller
claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the
sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest ,” are
sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to
react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the
numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two
countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a
brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction,
these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests.
That goes nuclear
Goldstein 13 (Avery Goldstein, Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of
Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania, “China’s Real and Present Danger”, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2013,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger) gender edited
Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a crisis far more likely, since neither side knows
when, where, or just how hard it can push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to that of the
early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But
today’s environment might be even more dangerous.¶ The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and
the United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States.
the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces
would increase the temptation for Washington to threaten to or actually use force. Recognizing the temptation
Should Beijing and Washington find themselves in a conflict,
facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China
could not reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on the United States would be the best
way to get it to back off.¶ The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would help keep the situation in check, because both sides
would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese
crises would be very stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides’
conventional forces complicate
matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear deterrence . During a crisis, either side might believe that
using its conventional forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side’s fear of escalation through what the
economist Thomas Schelling calls a “competition in risk-taking.” In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued
what was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher level of risk. But because using
conventional forces would be only the
first step in an unpredictable process subject to misperception ,
missteps, and miscalculation, there is no guarantee that brinkmanship [ brinkspersonship] would end
before it led to an unanticipated nuclear catastrophe .¶ China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear
deterrence opens the door to the safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear exchange, the
Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by
contrast, indicated that they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came -- which is one reason why war never
came. In addition, China’s official “no first use” nuclear policy, which guides the Chinese military’s preparation and training for
conflict, might reinforce Beijing’s confidence that limited war with the United States would not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a
result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued,
China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot .¶ Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given
recent developments in technology that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional military
capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side that attacks first, something that was generally not true of
conventional military operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover, because the sophisticated
computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or
cyberattacks, today’s more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an adversary has struck or adopted
countermeasures. If peacetime restraint were to give way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States
could be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional weapons.¶ Under such circumstances,
Beijing and Washington would have incentives to initiate an attack . China would feel
particularly strong pressure , since its advanced conventional weapons are more fully dependent on
vulnerable computer networks , fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less
both
dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United States, however, might increase its temptation to
strike first, especially against China’s satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind.
Scenario 2 is the Environment:
Unregulated marijuana has a massive environmental impact—federal legalization
key
Zuckerman 13 (Seth, journalist, 10-31-13, "Is Pot-Growing Bad for the Environment?" The Nation)
www.thenation.com/article/176955/pot-growing-bad-environment?page=0,2
As cannabis production has ramped up in Northern California to meet the demand for medical and black-market
marijuana, the ecological impacts of its cultivation have ballooned. From shrunken, muddy streams to rivers choked
with algae and wild lands tainted with chemical poisons, large-scale cannabis agriculture is emerging as a
significant threat to the victories that have been won in the region to protect wilderness, keep toxic chemicals out of the
environment, and rebuild salmon runs that had once provided the backbone of a coast-wide fishing industry. River advocate
Scott Greacen has spent most of his career fighting dams and the timber industry, but now he’s widened his focus to include the
costs of reckless marijuana growing. Last year was a time of region-wide rebound for threatened salmon runs, but one of his
colleagues walked his neighborhood creek and sent a downbeat report that only a few spawning fish had returned. Even more
alarming was the condition of the creek bed: coated with silt and mud, a sign that the water quality in this stream was going downhill.
“The problem with the weed industry is that its impacts are severe, it’s not effectively regulated, and it’s growing so rapidly,”
says Greacen, executive director of Friends of the Eel River, which runs through the heart of the marijuana belt. That lack of
regulation sets marijuana’s impacts apart from those that stem from legal farming or logging, yet the 76year-old federal prohibition on cannabis has thwarted attempts to hold its production to any kind of
environmental standard . As a result, the ecological impact of an ounce of pot varies tremendously, depending on whether it
was produced by squatters in national forests, hydroponic operators in homes and warehouses, industrial-scale operations on
private land, or conscientious mom-and-pop farmers. Consumers could exert market power through their choices, if only they had a
reliable, widely accepted certification program, like the ones that guarantee the integrity of organic agriculture. But thanks to the
prohibition on pot, no such certification program exists for cannabis products. To understand how raising some dried flowers—the
prized part of the cannabis plant—can damage the local ecosystem, you first have to grasp the skyrocketing scale of backwoods
agriculture on the redwood coast. Last fall, Scott Bauer of the California Department of Fish and Wildlife turned a mapping crew loose on satellite photos of two adjoining creeks. In the Staten
Island–sized area that drains into those streams, his team identified more than 1,000 cannabis farms, estimated to produce some 40,000 small-tree-sized plants annually. Bauer holds up the maps, where each
greenhouse is marked in blue and each outdoor marijuana garden in red, with dots that correspond to the size of the operation. It looks like the landscape has a severe case of Technicolor acne. “In the last
couple of years, the increase has been exponential,” Bauer says. “On the screen, you can toggle back and forth between the 2010 aerial photo and the one from 2012. Where there had been one or two sites, now
there are ten.” Each of those sites represents industrial development in a mostly wild landscape, with the hilly terrain flattened and cleared. “When someone shaves off a mountaintop and sets a facility on it,”
Bauer says, “that’s never changing. The topsoil is gone.” The displaced soil is then spread by bulldozer to build up a larger flat pad for greenhouses and other farm buildings. But heavy winter rains wash some of
the soil into streams, Bauer explains, where it sullies the salmon’s spawning gravels and fills in the pools where salmon fry spend the summer. Ironically, these are the very impacts that resulted from the worst
logging practices of the last century. “We got logging to the point that the rules are pretty tight,” Bauer says, “and now there’s this whole new industry where nobody has any idea what they’re doing. You see guys
building roads who have never even used a Cat [Caterpillar tractor]. We’re going backwards.” Then there’s irrigation. A hefty cannabis plant needs several gallons of water per day in the rainless summer growing
season, which doesn’t sound like much until you multiply it by thousands of plants and consider that many of the streams in the area naturally dwindle each August and September. In the summer of 2012, the two
creeks that Bauer’s team mapped got so low that they turned into a series of disconnected pools with no water flowing between them, trapping the young fish in shrinking ponds. “It’s a serious issue for the coho
salmon,” Bauer says. “How is this species going to recover if there’s no water?” The effects extend beyond salmon. During several law enforcement raids last year, Bauer surveyed the creeks supplying marijuana
farms to document the environmental violations occurring there. Each time, he says, he found a sensitive salamander species above the grower’s water intakes, but none below them, where the irrigation pipes
had left little water in the creek. On one of these raids, he chastised the grower, who was camped out onsite and hailed from the East Coast, new to the four- to six-month dry season that comes with California’s
Mediterranean climate. “I told him, ‘You’re taking most of the flow, man,’ ” Bauer recalls. “’It’s just a little tiny creek, and you’ve got three other growers downstream. If you’re all taking 20 or 30 percent, pretty soon
there’s nothing left for the fish.’ So he says, ‘I didn’t think about that.’ ” While some growers raise their pot organically, many do not. “Once you get to a certain scale, it’s really hard to operate in a sustainable
way,” Greacen says. “Among other things, you’ve got a monoculture, and monocultures invite pests.” Spider mites turn out to be a particular challenge for greenhouse growers. Tony Silvaggio, a lecturer at
Humboldt State University and a scholar at the campus’s year-old Humboldt Institute for Interdisciplinary Marijuana Research, found that potent poisons such as Avid and Floramite are sold in small vials under
the counter at grower supply stores, in defiance of a state law that requires they be sold only to holders of a pesticide applicator’s license. Nor are just the workers at risk: the miticides have been tested for use on
decorative plants, but not for their impacts if smoked. Otherwise ecologically minded growers can be driven to spray with commercial pesticides, Silvaggio has found in his research. “After you’ve worked for
months, if you have an outbreak of mites in your last few weeks when the buds are going, you’ve got to do something—otherwise you lose everything,” he says. Outdoor growers face another threat: rats, which
are drawn to the aromatic, sticky foliage of the cannabis plant. Raids at growing sites typically find packages of the long-acting rodent poison warfarin, which has begun making its way up the food chain to
predators such as the rare, weasel-like fisher. A study last year in the online scientific journal PLOS One found that more than 70 percent of fishers have rat poison in their bloodstream, and attributed four fisher
deaths to internal bleeding triggered by the poison they absorbed through their prey. Deep in the back-country, Silvaggio says, growers shoot or poison bears to keep them from raiding their encampments. The
final blow to environmental health from outdoor growing comes from fertilizers. Growers dump their used potting soil, enriched with unabsorbed fertilizers, in places where it washes into nearby streams and is
suspected of triggering blooms of toxic algae. The deaths of four dogs on Eel River tributaries have been linked to the algae, which the dogs ingest after swimming in the river and then licking their fur. The
cannabis industry—or what Silvaggio calls the “marijuana-industrial complex”—has been building toward this collision with the environment ever since California voters approved Proposition 215 in 1996,
legalizing the medicinal use of marijuana under state law. Seven years later, the legislature passed Senate Bill 420, which allows patients growing pot with a doctor’s blessing to form collectives and sell their
herbal remedy to fellow patients. Thus were born the storefront dispensaries, which grew so common that they came to outnumber Starbucks outlets in Los Angeles. From the growers’ point of view, a 100-plant
operation no longer had to be hidden, because its existence couldn’t be presumed illegal under state law. So most growers stopped hiding their plants in discreet back-country clearings or buried shipping
containers and instead put them out in the open. As large grows became less risky, they proliferated—and so did their effects on the environment. Google Earth posted satellite photos taken in August 2012, when
most outdoor pot gardens were nearing their peak. Working with Silvaggio, a graduate student identified large growing sites in the area, and posted a Google Earth flyover tour of the region that makes it clear that
the two creeks Bauer’s team studied are representative of the situation across the region. With all of the disturbance from burgeoning backwoods marijuana gardens, it might seem that raising cannabis indoors
would be the answer. Indoor growers can tap into municipal water supplies and don’t have to clear land or build roads to farms on hilltop hideaways. But indoor growing is responsible instead for a more insidious
brand of damage: an outsize carbon footprint to power the electric-intensive lights, fans and pumps that it takes to raise plants inside. A dining-table-size hydroponic unit yielding five one-pound crops per year
would consume as much electricity as the average US home, according to a 2012 paper in the peer-reviewed journal Energy Policy. All told, the carbon footprint of a single gram of cannabis is the same as driving
seventeen miles in a Honda Civic. In addition, says Kristin Nevedal, president of the Emerald Growers Association, “the tendency indoors is to lean toward chemical fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides to stabilize
the man-made environment, because you don’t have the natural beneficials that are found outdoors.” Nevertheless, the appeal of indoor growing is strong, explains Sharon (not her real name), a single mother
who used to raise marijuana in the sunshine but moved her operation indoors after she split up with her husband. Under her 3,000 watts of electric light, she raises numerous smaller plants in a space the size of
two sheets of plywood, using far less physical effort than when she raised large plants outdoors. “It’s a very mommy-friendly business that provides a dependable, year-round income,” she says. Sharon harvests
small batches of marijuana year-round, which fetch a few hundred dollars more per pound than outdoor-grown cannabis because of consumers’ preferences. Sharon’s growing operation supports her and her
teenage daughter in the rural area where she settled more than two decades ago. Add up the energy used by indoor growers, from those on Sharon’s scale to the converted warehouses favored by urban
dispensaries, and the impact is significant—estimated at 3 percent of the state’s total power bill, or the electricity consumed by 1 million homes. On a local level, indoor cannabis production is blocking climate
stabilization efforts in the coastal city of Arcata, which aimed to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent over twelve years. But during the first half of that period, while electricity consumption was flat or
declining slightly statewide, Arcata’s household electrical use grew by 25 percent. City staff traced the increase to more than 600 houses that were using at least triple the electricity of the average home—a level
consistent with a commercial cannabis operation. The city has borne other costs, too, besides simply missing its climate goals. Inexpertly wired grow houses catch fire, and the conversion of residential units to
indoor hothouses has cut into the city’s supply of affordable housing. Last November, city voters approved a stiff tax on jumbo electricity consumers. Now the city council is working with other Humboldt County
local governments to pass a similar tax so that growers can’t evade the fee simply by fleeing the city limits, says City Councilman Michael Winkler. “We don’t want any place in Humboldt County to be a cheaper
place to grow than any other. And since this is the Silicon Valley of marijuana growing, there are a lot of reasons why people would want to stay here if they’re doing this,” he says. “My goal is to make it expensive
enough to get large-scale marijuana growing out of the neighborhoods.” A
tax on excessive electricity use may seem like an indirect way of curbing household
cannabis cultivation, but the city had to back away from its more direct approach—a zoning ordinance—when the federal
government threatened to prosecute local officials throughout the state if they sanctioned an activity that is categorically forbidden
under US law. Attempts in neighboring Mendocino County to issue permits to outdoor growers meeting environmental and publicsafety standards were foiled when federal attorneys slapped county officials with similar warnings—illustrating, yet again, the way
prohibition sabotages efforts to reduce the industry’s environmental damage. Indeed,
observers cite federal cannabis
prohibition as the biggest impediment to curbing the impacts of marijuana cultivation , which
continues to expand despite a decades-long federal policy of zero tolerance. “We don’t have a set of best management practices for
this industry, partly because of federal prohibition,” says researcher Silvaggio. “If a grower comes to the county agricultural
commissioner and asks, ‘What are the practices I can use that can limit my impact?’, the county ag guy says, ‘I can’t talk to you
about that because we get federal money.’ ”
Lack of industry regulation causes widespread use of banned pesticides
Gabriel et al 13 (Mourad, Greta Wengert, Mark Higley, Shane Krogan, Warren Sargent, and Deana Clifford, 4-11-13, "Silent
Forests? Rodenticides on Illegal Marijuana Crops Harm Wildlife" Wildlife Society News) news.wildlife.org/twp/2013-spring/silentforests/
Problem Spreading Like Weeds Illegal marijuana growing is not just a problem for wildlife. The High Sierra Volunteer Trail
Crew is a nonprofit trail-maintenance crew that has spent the past seven years maintaining and cleaning trails throughout the Sierra
Nevadas’ national forests. In the mid-2000s, the group realized that risks associated with large-scale marijuana production
throughout most, if not all, California national forests threatened backcountry use of public lands. Since then, the trail crew’s
Environmental Reclamation Team (ERT) has remediated more than 600 large-scale marijuana cultivation sites on
public lands. The numbers are daunting, especially when considering that these 600 sites were in only two of
California’s 17 national forests and may constitute only a fraction of the actual marijuana cultivation sites that exist in these
forests. Tommy Lanier, Director of the National Marijuana Initiative, a White House supported program, states that “60 percent to 70
percent of the national marijuana seizures come from California annually, and of those totals, about 60 percent comes from public
lands.” Based on data from ERT-remediated sites, at least 50 percent of them have SGARs. Beyond finding anticoagulant
rodenticides, the team and other remediation groups frequently find and remove restricted and banned pesticides
including organo- phosphates, organochlorines, and carbamates as well as thousands of pounds of nitrogenrich fertilizers. Many of the discovered pesticides have been banned for use in the U.S., Canada, and the European Union,
specifically certain carbamates, which gained notoriety worldwide after an explosion of public awareness about their use to kill
African wildlife. Unfortunately, these same malicious uses are occurring in California, where marijuana cultivators place pourable
carbamate pesticides in opened tuna or sardine cans in order to kill black bears, gray foxes, raccoons, and other carnivores that
damage marijuana plants or raid food caches at grow-site encampments. In many cases, law enforcement officers approaching
grow sites observe wildlife exposed to what officers call “wildlife bombs” due to their high potential for mass wildlife killing. For
example, as federal and state officers approached a grow site in Northern California, they discovered a black bear and her cubs
seizing and convulsing as they slowly succumbed to the neurological effects of these pesticides. Because toxicants are usually
dispersed throughout cultivation sites, it is remarkably difficult to detect and remove all pesticide threats.
Those cause endocrine disruption
Cappiello et al 14 (A, LC-MS Laboratory, DiSTeVA, University of Urbino, Piazza Rinascimento 6, 61029, Urbino, Italy, G
Famiglini, Palma P, V Termopoli, AM Lavezzi, L Matturri, May 2014, "Determination of selected endocrine disrupting compounds in
human fetal and newborn tissues by GC-MS." www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24633505
Endocrine disrupting compounds (EDCs) include organochlorine pesticides (OCPs), organophosphate
pesticides (OPPs), carbamate pesticides, and plasticizers, such as bisphenol A (BPA). They persist in the
environment because of their degradation resistance and bioaccumulate in the body tissues of humans
and other mammals. Many studies are focused on the possible correlation between in utero exposure to EDCs and adverse health
hazards in fetuses and newborns. In the last decade, environmental pollution has been considered a possible trigger for Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) and Sudden Intrauterine Unexplained Death Syndrome (SIUDS), the most important death-causing
syndromes in fetuses and newborns in developed countries. In this work, a rapid and sensitive analytical method was developed to
determine the level of OCPs and OPPs, carbamates, and phenols in human fetal and newborn tissues (liver and brain) and to unveil
the possible presence of non-targeted compounds. The target analytes where selected on the basis of their documented presence
in the Trentino-Alto Adige region, an intensive agricultural area in northern Italy. A liquid-solid extraction procedure was applied on
human and animal tissues and the extracts, after a solid phase extraction (SPE) clean-up procedure, were analyzed by gas
chromatography coupled to a quadrupole mass spectrometric detector (GC-qMS). A GC-TOFMS (time-of-flight) instrument, because
of its higher full-scan sensitivity, was used for a parallel detection of non-targeted compounds. Method validation included accuracy,
precision, detection, and quantification limits (LODs; LOQs), and linearity response using swine liver and lamb brain spiked at
different concentrations in the range of 0.4-8000.0 ng/g. The method gave good repeatability and extraction efficiency. Method
LOQs ranged from 0.4-4.0 ng/g in the selected matrices. Good linearity was obtained over four orders of magnitude starting from
LOQs. Isotopically labeled internal standards were used for quantitative calculations. The method was then successfully applied to
the analysis of liver and brain tissues from SIUDS and SIDS victims coming from the above mentioned region.
Extinction
Togawa 99 (Tatsuo, Institute of Biomaterials and Bioengineering – Tokyo Medical and Dental University, Technology in
Society, August)
Advanced technology provides a comfortable life for many people, but it also produces strong destructive forces that can cause
extinction of the human race if used accidentally or intentionally. As stated in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955, hydrogen
bombs might possibly put an end to the human race.1 Nuclear weapons are not the only risks that arise from modem technologies.
In 1962, Rachel Carson wrote in her book, Silent Spring [2], that the amount of the pesticide parathion used on California farms
alone at that time could provide a lethal dose for five to ten times the whole world's population. Destruction of the ozone layer, the
greenhouse effect, and chemical pollution by endocrine destructive chemicals began to appear as the result of
advanced technology, and they are now
considered to be potential causes of extinction of the human
race unless they are effectively controlled.
1AC Federalism
Contention 2 is Federalism
Raich represented the biggest ever expansion of Congress’ commerce powers,
destroying federalism, judicial review and allowing for state control of police
powers
Brandon J. Stoker 9, J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “Note and Comment: Was
Gonzales v. Raich the Death Knell of Federalism? Assessing Meaningful Limits on Federal Intrastate Regulation in Light of U.S. v.
Nascimento”, 23 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, lexis
When the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Raich2 in 2005, it marked the first occasion in over a decade that
the Court broadly construed the Commerce Clause to permit federal regulation of intrastate activity. More
importantly, Raich signaled an abrupt end to the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” by circumscribing three
recent cases delineating meaningful limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.3
It represents the boldest
assertion of congressional power to “regulate commerce . . . among the several states” in the history of the
Court .4 Indeed, Raich and its progeny threaten to undermine the delicate balance of federal and state
power structurally imbued in our constitutional republic by acquiescing to the unbridled exercise of federal power.
Though some have expressed skepticism about the ostensibly broad effect Raich might have on federalism jurisprudence, recent
circuit court cases decided pursuant to the standards set forth in Raich demonstrate federal appropriation of
“core” state powers,5 including, in particular, state police powers. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court
should limit Raich by reviving the limitation on congressional regulation of noneconomic
intrastate activity to circumstances where failure to regulate such activity would undermine a broader regulatory program. The
Court should also narrowly confine Raich’s definition of “economic activity” to prevent lower courts from “piling inference upon
inference” to demonstrate otherwise tenuous connections to interstate commerce. This approach would not require the Court to
overrule Raich, but merely to enforce the clear standards articulated in United States v. Lopez6 and United States v. Morrison.7 Part
II provides background on the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence between 1937 and 1994—a period of virtually
unchecked federal expansion—and the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” between 1995 and 2005 that
reestablished limits on federal commerce powers. This section examines in particular how United States v. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison limited the scope and nature of activity within Congress’s regulatory purview by (1) moving away from
the “rational basis” test when evaluating Commerce Clause challenges, (2) limiting regulation to quintessential “economic” activity,
and (3) enforcing the “essential” component of the broader regulatory regime exception. Part III explains how Raich largely
unraveled the progress made by the Rehnquist Court. First, the Court adopted a definition of “economic” that fails to limit the
scope of activity within Congress’s regulatory purview. Second, the decision opens the door to federal regulation of noneconomic,
intrastate activity that falls within a broader regulatory scheme regardless of whether such activity is “essential” to the larger
regulatory program. Finally, the Court reasserted a “rational basis” test that effectively eliminates judicial scrutiny of the actual
aggregate effect of a regulated activity on interstate commerce, inquiring rather “whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”8
These standards have reduced judicial review of Commerce Clause challenges to a rubberstamping exercise
where the regulated activity is rationally related to commerce. More important, they have rendered “as-applied” challenges to
otherwise valid statutes nearly impossible. Part IV considers one of the first casualties in the breakdown of meaningful limits on
federal commerce powers in Raich’s jurisprudential wake: appropriation of state police powers through RICO
prosecutions. This section contrasts two nearly identical cases in which federal prosecutors charged local street gangs members
with racketeering for engaging in intrastate, noneconomic criminal activity. The Sixth Circuit reversed the federal conviction in United
States v. Waucaush9 by applying the clear principles articulated in Morrison and Lopez without the encumbrances of Raich. The
First Circuit, however, affirmed the criminal convictions in United States v. Nascimento10 by taking Raich to its logical end, which is
to say, by not imposing meaningful limits on the federal government’s prosecutorial powers under RICO. These cases aptly
demonstrate how Raich encourages judicial acquiescence to federal appropriation of traditional state powers by narrowly
limiting the force of judicial review.
That trades off with effective counter-terrorism
Little 6
Erica
, Legal Analyst for Heritage, Brian W. Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies at Heritage, Federalizing “Gang Crime” is Counterproductive and Dangerous,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/wm1221.cfm
Congress should discontinue its habit of expanding federal criminal law. The phenomenon of
overfederalization of crime undermines state and local accountability for law enforcement, undermines
more cooperative and creative efforts to fight crime (that is, allowing the states to act as "laboratories of democracy"), and
injures America's federalist system of government. One of the more concrete problems that comes with federal
overcriminalization is the misallocation of scarce federal law enforcement resources , which results in selective
prosecution. New demands distract the F ederal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Attorneys, and other federal law
enforcers from national problems that undeniably require federal attention, such as the investigation and
prosecution of espionage and terrorism . Moreover, federal prosecution is more expensive than state-level prosecution.
More broadly,
Lone wolf terrorism poses a unique threat- we need to use more federal
resources to prevent attacks
Majoran 14, Andrew Majoran (MS from the Transnational Security Studies program at Royal Holloway, University of London in
the United Kingdom, specializes in international security, counter-terrorism, multilateral defense, and maritime security), The
Mackenzie Institute, “Wolves Among Us: The Dangers Of Lone Wolf Terrorism”, July 5, 2014, acc 12/19,
http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/wolves-among-us-dangers-lone-wolf-terrorism/
In conclusion, Western understanding of terrorism must evolve to ensure that the threat of lone wolf terrorism is contained. For too
long Western governments, media outlets, and general populations have stereotyped terrorism as large recognizable extremist
groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram. Although these terrorist groups do pose a threat to Western security, they
have been hindered in recent years by increased law enforcement, government presence, and counter-insurgency
efforts.23 On the other side of the terrorism spectrum, the societal focus on large terrorist groups has benefitted
the individual lone wolf terrorist efforts domestically and internationally. Lone wolves are difficult to detect due
to their isolationist nature and are seldom discovered until after their terrorist attacks have taken place. It is evident that lone wolf
terrorism is difficult to stop using traditional counter-terrorism tactics; however, this does not mean that
more cannot be done to prevent lone wolf terrorism from continuing to grow. Measures such as monitoring of the
internet, identifying overly aggressive political activism publically, enhancement of weapon identification
devices, the expansion of CCTV in public areas, and the use of advanced biometrics to simplify surveillance and gather
data must be taken.24 It is evident that lone wolves pose a significant threat to the security of the West, and they
will continue to do so as long as we remain complacent. Lone wolf terrorism can be fought effectively, but it requires us to move
away from associating terrorism with large international terrorist groups and practicing vigilance in our own communities.
They’ll use WMDs – causes extinction
Gary A. Ackerman 14 & Lauren E. Pinson, Gary is Director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Lauren is
Senior Researcher and Project Manager for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses of Terrorism, An
Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume
26, Issue 1
The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors come and
whether these are overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves and small autonomous cells has been
detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the potential use of CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular
features that either amplify or supplement the attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief
among these is the impact of rapid technological development. Recent and emerging advances in a variety of areas, from
synthetic biology 3 to nanoscale engineering, 4 have opened doors not only to new medicines and materials, but also to
new possibilities for malefactors to inflict harm on others. What is most relevant in the context of lone actors and small autonomous
cells is not so much the pace of new invention, but rather the commercialization and consumerization of CBRN weaponsrelevant technologies. This process often entails an increase in the availability and safety of the technology, with a
concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical knowledge required to operate it. Thus, for example,
whereas fifty years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical weapons might have been a dangerous
and inefficient affair requiring a large plant, expensive equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical
microreactors, 5 the same processes might be accomplished far more cheaply and safely on a desktop assemblage,
purchased commercially and monitored by a single chemistry graduate student.¶ The rapid global spread and increased
user-friendliness of many technologies thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively small scale of harm a single
individual or small autonomous group could historically cause. 6 From the limited reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and
bow, to the introduction of dynamite and eventually the use of our own infrastructures against us (as on September 11), the
number of people that an individual who was unsupported by a broader political entity could kill with a single action has
increased from single digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been asserted that “over time … as the leverage provided by
technology increases, this threshold will finally reach
its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare
war on the world and win .” 7 Nowhere is this trend more perceptible in the current age than in the area of unconventional
weapons.¶ These new technologies do not simply empower users on a purely technical level. Globalization and the expansion of
information networks provide new opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of the globe to become familiar with
core weapon concepts and to purchase equipment—online technical courses and eBay are undoubtedly a boon to would-be
purveyors of violence. Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes, people who would never be able to function socially as
part of an operational terrorist group, can find radicalizing influences or legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of virtual
identities on the Internet.¶ All of this can spawn, it is feared, a more deleterious breed of lone actors, what have been referred to in
some quarters as “super-empowered individuals.” 8 Conceptually, super-empowered individuals are atomistic game-changers, i.e.,
they constitute
a single (and often singular) individual who can shock the entire system (whether national,
regional, or global) by relying only on their own resources . Their core characteristics are that they have superior
intelligence, the capacity to use complex communications or technology systems, and act as an individual or a “lone-wolf.” 9 The
end result, according to the pessimists, is that if one of these individuals chooses to attack the system, “the unprecedented nature of
his attack ensures that no counter-measures are in place to prevent it. And when he strikes, his attack will not only kill
massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the financial, political, and social systems that govern modern life.” 10 It
almost goes without saying that the same concerns attach to small autonomous cells, whose members' capabilities and resources
can be combined without appreciably increasing the operational footprint presented to intelligence and law enforcement agencies
the most likely means by which
to accomplish this level of system perturbation is through the use of CBRN agents as WMD . On the motivational side, therefore,
seeking to detect such behavior.¶ With the exception of the largest truck or aircraft bombs,
lone actors and small autonomous cells may ironically be more likely to select CBRN weapons than more established terrorist
groups—who are usually more conservative in their tactical orientation—because the extreme asymmetry of these weapons may
provide the only subjectively feasible option for such actors to achieve their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the system. The
inherent technical challenges presented by CBRN weapons may also make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may
have a very different risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist organizations that might have to be concerned with a variety of
constituencies, from state patrons to prospective recruits. 11 Many other factors beyond a “perceived potential to achieve mass
casualties” might play into the decision to pursue CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives, 12 including a fetishistic
fascination with these weapons or the perception of direct referents in the would-be perpetrator's belief system.¶ Others are far
more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state actors in general) with respect to their potential for using
CBRN agents to cause mass fatalities, arguing that the barriers to a successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in
today's networked, tech-savvy environment. 13 Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown cells are “less
constrained” in motivations, more challenging plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability, 14 while Michael Kenney
cautions against making presumptions about the ease with which individuals can learn to produce viable weapons using only the
Internet. 15 However, even most of these pundits concede that low-level CBR attacks emanating from this quarter will probably
lead to political, social, and economic disruption that extends well beyond the areas immediately affected by the attack. This
raises an essential point with respect to CBRN terrorism: irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons or an actor's
capability (or lack thereof) to successfully employ them on a catastrophic scale, these weapons invariably exert a stronger
psychological impact on audiences—the essence of terrorism—than the traditional gun and bomb. This is surely not lost on those
lone actors or autonomous cells who are as interested in getting noticed as in causing casualties.¶ Proven Capability and Intent¶
While legitimate debate can be had as to the level of potential threat posed by lone actors or small autonomous cells wielding CBRN
weapons, possibly the best argument for engaging in a substantive examination of the issue is the most concrete one of all—that
these actors have already demonstrated the motivation and capability to pursue and use CBRN weapons, in some
cases even close to the point of constituting a genuine WMD threat. In the context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most
cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the perpetrator behind one of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in
living memory, the 2001 “anthrax letters,” which employed a highly virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only killed
five and seriously sickened 17 people, but led to widespread disruption of the U.S. postal services and key government facilities.
16¶ Other historical cases of CBRN pursuit and use by lone actors and small autonomous cells highlight the need for further
exploration. Among the many extant examples: 17¶ Thomas Lavy was caught at the Alaska-Canada border in 1993 with 130 grams
of 7% pure ricin. It is unclear how Lavy obtained the ricin, what he planned to do with it, and what motivated him.¶ In 1996, Diane
Thompson deliberately infected twelve coworkers with shigella dysenteriae type 2. Her motives were unclear.¶ In 1998, Larry
Wayne Harris, a white supremacist, was charged with producing and stockpiling a biological agent—bacillus anthracis, the causative
agent of anthrax.¶ In 1999, the Justice Department (an autonomous cell sympathetic to the Animal Liberation Front) mailed over
100 razor blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry.¶ In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was arrested for mailing
samples of the mineral monazite with trace amounts of radioactive thorium to several Japanese government agencies to persuade
authorities to look into potential uranium being smuggled to North Korea.¶ In 2002, Chen Zhengping put rat poison in a rival snack
shop's products and killed 42 people.¶ In 2005, 10 letters containing a radioactive substance were mailed to major organizations in
Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO headquarters, and the U.S. embassy in Brussels. No injuries were reported.¶ In 2011,
federal agents arrested four elderly men in Georgia who were plotting to use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice
Department officials, federal judges, and Internal Revenue Service agents.¶ Two recent events may signal an even greater interest
in CBRN by lone malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norway's Anders Breivik's treatise, his references to CBRN
weapons a) suggest that CBRN weapons could be used on a tactical level and b) reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed
audiences) that even low-level CBRN weapons could achieve far-reaching impacts driven by fear. 18 Whether or not Breivik would
actually have sought or been able to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following in several (often far-right) extremist circles and his
treatise might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released two issues of Inspire
magazine in 2012. Articles, on the one hand, call for lone wolf jihad attacks to target non-combatant populations and, on the other,
permit the use of chemical and biological weapons. The combination of such directives may very well influence the weapon
selection of lone actor jihadists in Western nations. 19¶
Judicial review is key to federalism and SOP
Brandon J. Stoker 9, J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “Note and Comment: Was
Gonzales v. Raich the Death Knell of Federalism? Assessing Meaningful Limits on Federal Intrastate Regulation in Light of U.S. v.
Nascimento”, 23 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, lexis
The political process was not, however, the sole mechanism envisioned by the Framers for warding off federal encroachment.
Indeed, they saw the Supreme Court as a final check on the national government, and frequently raised this
argument in ratification debates to ward off claims that the proposed constitution would facilitate a unitary government.20 Even the
early Court acknowledged the role of the judiciary in defining the limits of federal power vis-à-vis the
states.21 Historically, judicial intervention—rather than political safeguards—has been the surest check
on federal encroachment, though the Court’s willingness to impose limits on federal power fluctuates according to the
philosophical posture of the majority. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky explains that the Court vacillates between two views about the
underlying structure of American government: one that treats federalism as “empowerment” and another that treats federalism as a
fundamental limit on government power.22 The first model—federalism as empowerment—emphasizes the benefit of having
multiple levels of government deal with social and economic problems where the failures of one can be compensated by the
other.23 Those who view federalism as empowerment give the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment expansive
readings to facilitate federal action while leaving limitations on federal action to the political process and other constitutional
mechanisms, such as the separation of powers.24 Those who treat federalism as a limit on federal power, however, see it as the
Court’s responsibility to narrowly define the parameters of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.25
Since the Court plays an active role in safeguarding other aspects of our constitutional framework— namely,
separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review26—the responsibility to preserve balance
between federal and state power—an equally important component of the Framers’ design— is no less incumbent
upon the judicial branch.27 Indeed, proponents of limits see the Court’s failure to fulfill this responsibility as a
threat to our entire system of government,28 and thus read the Tenth Amendment broadly to protect the prerogatives
of state governments.29 The following provides a brief treatment of the vacillating trends in the Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. .¶ [FOOTNOTE n28 STARTS. Id. During the early twentieth century - a period of judicial limitation - the Court took
seriously its charge to limit federal commerce powers. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S, 295 U.S. 495, 548
(1935) ("[ Limiting federal
Commerce Clause powers is] essential to the maintenance of our constitution al
system. Otherwise , as we have said, there would be virtually no limit to the federal power , and for all practical
purposes we should have a completely centralized government."); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) ("The far
reaching result of upholding the act cannot be more plainly indicated than by pointing out that if Congress can thus regulate
matters entrusted to local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, all freedom
of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states over local
system of government be practically destroyed.") FOOTNOTE n28 ENDS].
matters may be eliminated , and thus our
SCOTUS key model
Michael P. Scharf 9 et al., Counsel of Record, Brief of the Public International Law & Policy Group as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Petitioners, Jamal Kiyemba, et. Al., v. Barack H. Obama, et al., SCOTUS, No. 08-1234, 12—09, p. 21-32.
III. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE CONFIRMS THIS COURT’S LEADERSHIP IN PROMOTING ADHERENCE TO RULE
OF LAW IN TIMES OF CONFLICT. PILPG’s on-the-ground experience demonstrating the leadership of this Court is confirmed by a
study of transnational judicial dialogue. Over the past halfcentury, the world’s constitutional courts have been engaged in a rich and
growing transnational judicial dialogue on a wide range of constitutional law issues. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms
and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487 (2005);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (2000). Courts around the world consider, discuss, and cite
foreign judicial decisions not out of a sense of legal obligation, but out of a developing sense that foreign decisions are valuable
resources in elucidating complex legal issues and suggesting new approaches to common problems. See Waters, supra, at 493-94.
In this transnational judicial dialogue, the decisions of this Court have exercised a profound — and profoundly positive — influence
on the work of foreign and international courts. See generally Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States
Constitution Abroad (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of
Rights, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 537 (1988). As Anthony Lester of the British House of Lords has noted, “there is a vigorous overseas
trade in the Bill of Rights, in international and constitutional litigation involving norms derived from American constitutional law.
When life or liberty is at stake, the landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States, giving fresh meaning to the
principles of the Bill of Rights, are studied with as much attention in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in Washington, D.C.” Id. at
541. This Court’s overseas influence is not limited to the Bill of Rights. From Australia to India to Israel to the United Kingdom,
foreign courts have looked to the seminal decisions of this Court as support for their own rulings
upholding judicial review, enforcing s eparation o f p owers, and providing a judicial check on the political
branches. Indeed, for foreign courts, this Court’s rulings in seminal cases such as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803),4 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 436 (1954),5 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),6 and Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 take on a special significance. Reliance on the moral authority of this Court can provide invaluable
support for those foreign courts struggling to establish their own legitimacy , to shore up judicial
authority against overreaching by powerful executives, and to develop a strong rule of law within their own national legal
systems. This Court’s potential to positively influence the international rule of law is particularly important in the nascent
transnational judicial dialogue surrounding the war on terrorism and the primacy of rule of law in times of conflict. As the world’s
courts begin to grapple with the novel, complex, and delicate legal issues surrounding the modern-day war on terrorism, and as
states seek to develop judicial mechanisms to address domestic conflicts, foreign governments and judiciaries are confronting
similar challenges. In particular, foreign governments and judiciaries must consider how to accommodate the legitimate needs of the
executive branch in times of war within the framework of the law. Although foreign courts are just beginning to address these
looking to the experience of the U.S., and to the precedent of this
Court, for guidance on upholding the rule of law in times of conflict. In recent years, courts in Israel, the
issues, it is already clear that they are
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have relied on the precedent of this Court in decisions addressing the rights of detainees.8
In short, as a result of this Court’s robust influence on transnational judicial dialogue, its decisions have proved
extraordinarily important to the development of the rule of law around the world. International
courts have similarly relied on the precedent of this Court in influential decisions. For example, in the
important and developing area of international criminal law, the international war crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda both
relied heavily on the precedent of this Court in their early opinions. In the first five years of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the first in the
modern iteration of the war crimes tribunals, the justices cited this Court at least seventeen times in decisions establishing the
fundamental legal principles under which the Tribunal would function.9 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda similarly
relied on this Court’s precedent, citing this Court at least twelve times in its first five years.10 The precedent of this Court has
provided a crucial foundation for international criminal law. The reliance on the precedent of this Court speaks to the Court’s
international leadership on the promotion of respect for the rule of law in times of conflict.
Specifically, South Sudan models U.S. federalism
Agok Manyang Agok 12-14, The New Sudan Vision, "Federalism: An Idea for South Sudan to Consider", 2014,
www.newsudanvision.com/sudan/2809-federalism-an-idea-for-south-sudan-to-consider
Nations which have attempted or adapted federalism include Canada, U nited S tates of America, Russia, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, South Africa, Australia, and Brazil among others. However, since South Sudan is a presidential system as
opposed to a parliamentarian, it’s imperative to examine the U nited S tates federal system . Scholars and experts on
governance tend to agree that the United States system is a cooperative federal system. Dual federalism holds that the federal
government and the state governments are co-equals, each sovereign. United States had shied away from dual federalism because
the system tends to creates power vacuum between the central government and the States. Cooperative federalism balances the
need for federal oversight without oppressive restraints on the individual state governments. In this model the federal government
and the states’ governments share some responsibilities and assume independence for others. The military for example is a federal
responsibility while the National Guard is the state’s responsibility.¶ With dual federalism, the federal government minimize its
support for local programs while continuing to levy income tax on its citizens. As a result, the State governments are usually forced
to raise taxes on individual incomes in order to fund local programs left unfunded by the federal government. Both systems,
however, have advantages and disadvantages.¶ The litmus test: U nited S tates versus other federal systems¶ Unlike most
federal systems, the U.S. federal system has a constitutionally spelled out system. It identifies responsibilities for both the central
government and the individual states. The express powers of the central government include the right to levy taxes, declare war,
coin money and regulate interstate and foreign commerce (Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution). In addition to the express
powers, the federal government has implied power to pass any law “necessary and proper” for the execution of its express powers.
Other powers called “inherent powers” include the ability of the federal government to acquire more territories whether through
peaceful or other means. The U.S. constitution also sets aside what it referred to as “reserved powers” (10th
Amendment to the US constitution) for the state governments. Additional shared powers between the federal and states
government includes borrowing money and enforcing laws.
Federalism prevents South Sudan collapse
Augustino Lucano 14, Upper Nile Times, "Federalism is Desirable in South Sudan", August 7,
upperniletimes.net/editorials/federalism-is-desirable-in-south-sudan/
South Sudan is highly diverse country with 64 tribes. There is a need for a fair system which helps to serve our
communities equitably. The current political crisis is disastrous with very poor governance in the country and
we need a better system. Doig (2012) explained that “Federalism is the most important political device for the regulation and
accommodation of the world’s most burning and devastating conflicts” (p. 1).¶ Federalism is desirable in South Sudan because it will
allow for sufficient growth in our country. We need a political system which allows the citizens and the government to resolve
problems. Nivola (2005) described that “Federalism is a political system permitting a large measure of regional self-rule and gives
the rulers and the ruled a ‘school of their citizenship’, ‘a preserver of their liberties’, and ‘a vehicle for flexible response to their
problems'” (p. 1). I believe that federalism will lead to political reformation by removing the national government and resolving some
of the contentious issues.
Federalism will allow the South Sudan government to achieve and maintain
stability. ¶ In addition, Doig (2012) described “Those who prefer a federal system of governance generally argue that this plan
reduces the dangers while increasing the benefits. Thus a federal system may be helpful in encouraging and preserving individual
liberty, since citizens who feel aggrieved can appeal to more than one final authority, and they may also be able to move to a
different state or province” (p. 2).¶ Federalism is desirable in South Sudan because it encourages
pluralism. Federal systems will allow the South Sudan government to develop at the national, state, and local levels, giving the
South Sudanese people more access to leaders and opportunities to get involved in their government. Doig (2012) illustrated that
“Federalism encourages each state or province to devise its own strategies for economic development — strategies which may be
more effective because they are based on a closer understanding of local culture, resources and skills, and which, through the
variety of different strategies tried by different states and provinces, may produce innovative programs whose success can then be
emulated by other regions & nations” (p. 2).¶ The South Sudanese people will benefit from federalism because it will ensure the
separation of powers and prevents tyranny in South Sudan. Even if one person or group took control of all the other
branches of the federal government, federalism ensures that governments would still function independently. Federalism, therefore,
fulfills the vision of a governmental structure that ensures liberty in South Sudan.
That escalates – every country has key interests at stake
Gaaki Kigambo 14, Ugandan journalist and a graduate of Carleton University and is currently a special correspondent for The
East African, Regional Tensions Complicate South Sudan’s Crisis, 2-28, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13597/regionaltensions-complicate-south-sudan-s-crisis
The deadly conflict in South Sudan, itself the culmination of a long-running power struggle within the ruling Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement, is increasingly drawing in neighboring countries driven by disparate security and economic
interests, further complicating the crisis and efforts to reach a resolution. ¶ The U.N. has accused both sides of South Sudan’s split
of committing human rights abuses in the conflict, which has so far claimed an unknown number of lives, displaced an estimated
900,000 people both inside and outside the country and shows no signs of letting up. An agreement to cease hostilities
was violated even before its ink dried, jeopardizing an already faltering mediation process led by the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. ¶ Uganda was the first of South Sudan’s neighbors to intervene
militarily, sending an estimated 4,500 soldiers to the country within four days of the outbreak of fighting there on Dec. 15. Uganda
was compelled, Kampala insists, by a distress call from South Sudan’s embattled President Salva Kiir and requests from the U.N.,
Washington and London to step in. ¶ One of the main aims of the intervention, Ugandan Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga told
parliament, was to urgently prevent a potentially genocidal situation from emerging out of the political fallout between Kiir and his
former deputy, Riek Machar. The conflict between their factions had rapidly manifested itself along an age-old ethnic fault line
between Kiir’s majority Dinka and Machar’s Nuer ethnic group. ¶ However, Uganda’s military presence in South Sudan
has unsettled its other neighbors, not least Sudan. There is no love lost between Museveni and longtime Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir, who have repeatedly accused each other of supporting rebel forces hostile to their governments. ¶
Bashir’s quick visit to Juba, South Sudan’s capital, three weeks after the conflict broke out was widely interpreted as a public
gesture that he was ready to cast his lot with South Sudan’s government. But Juba apparently spurned Khartoum’s suggestion to
set up a joint force to protect vital oil fields in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states in the north of South Sudan, which have borne the
brunt of the conflict. Instead, South Sudan preferred to give that role to the Ugandan army. Bashir is now believed to be backing
Machar, his longtime ally. ¶ Analysts say Khartoum fears Uganda’s military involvement will further damage
Sudan’s economic ties with South Sudan, which have been significantly reduced since the South’s independence. Uganda,
together with Kenya, has been pushing a $250 million infrastructure project known as the Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
(LAPSSET) corridor, which comprises a port, an oil pipeline, a railway line and a highway, and which will depend for its success on
South Sudan. Uganda needs the LAPSSET corridor to transport its newly discovered oil, as it would greatly reduce the distance the
oil, which must be heated at some expense for pipeline transit, would need to travel before it reaches the coast. ¶ Ethiopia, too, has
reason to object to Uganda’s military presence in South Sudan. Ugandan intelligence reports say Khartoum is now routing its
support for Machar through Eritrea, Ethiopia’s bitter rival, to cover up its involvement. Analysts say the Ethiopian government also
fears the South Sudan conflict could exacerbate tensions in Ethiopia’s Gambella region, which borders
Sudan and has a high concentration of Nuers, potentially resulting in a full-blown conflict. Indeed, the undercurrents of
such an outbreak are already perceptible. This explains why Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who is the
current chair of IGAD, asked Uganda to withdraw from South Sudan, saying its presence risked regionalizing the conflict
and pointedly declaring that “there are other interests also from other sides.”¶ Although Uganda has expressed willingness to
withdraw, even announcing a two-month withdrawal timeline, there is little appetite to actually do so in Kampala’s
policymaking circles. For one thing, Uganda perceives itself as the guarantor of state stability in South Sudan, which remains in
jeopardy. Renewed fighting has broken out in which Machar’s forces appear to be making gains, despite having initially been
pushed out of nearly all the major centers in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states by joint efforts of the South Sudanese and
Ugandan troops. ¶ Moreover, Uganda’s withdrawal is conditioned on the deployment of the African Union’s African Capacity for
Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), an outfit that is ideally supposed to rapidly respond to crises on the continent.
Unfortunately, the African Union Peace and Security Council has yet to meet to work out modalities for the deployment of ACIRC in
South Sudan. A tough task awaits them in finding countries willing to contribute troops to the mission. As it is, IGAD long ago
approved a force of 5,600 troops for South Sudan, but has received none to date from its eight members. Indeed, only Uganda
appears willing to contribute. The same is true of the U.N., which also agreed last year to augment its presence in this beleaguered
nation by 5,500 troops but has yet to implement its resolutions with more blue berets on the ground. ¶ Uganda’s continued
military presence in South Sudan is further polarizing both sides of the conflict and directly obstructing the
IGAD-led mediation, which holds the best hope for a long-term political solution. Kiir, who enjoys Uganda’s military support, has
demonstrated little interest in the Addis Ababa process, while Machar has preconditioned any progress in Addis Ababa on the
withdrawal of all foreign military forces as well as the release of all SPLM political figures detained since the outbreak of the conflict.
Meanwhile, Kampala is testing the patience of South Sudan’s other neighbors, who might soon feel the need to join
in the conflict in order to safeguard their own interests. ¶ To break the current deadlock, IGAD must clarify the
objectives of the current mediation and, together with the AU, pressure Uganda to withdraw its forces from South Sudan, while also
pushing both Kiir and Machar to engage meaningfully with the mediation process. In the absence of progress in Addis Ababa, the
risk of a regionalization of the conflict looms, further complicating any efforts to resolve the crisis.
Nuclear war
Caroline Glick 7, deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post, Senior Fellow for Middle East Affairs of the Center for Security
Policy, “Condi's African holiday”, December 11, http://www.rightsidenews.com/20071211309/editorial/us-opinion-and-editorial/ourworld-condis-african-holiday.html
The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily
escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which
controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global
conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers.
Synthetic biology makes bioterror inevitable- creates means and motive
Rose, 14 -- PhD, recognized international biodefense expert
[Patrick, Center for Health & Homeland Security senior policy analyst & biosecurity expert, National Defense University lecturer, and
Adam Bernier, expert in counter-terrorism, "DIY Bioterrorism Part II: The proliferation of bioterrorism through synthetic biology,"
CBRNePortal, 2-24-14, www.cbrneportal.com/diy-bioterrorism-part-ii-the-proliferation-of-bioterrorism-through-synthetic-biology/,
accessed 8-16-14]
synthetic biology has made bio-engineering
accessible to the mainstream biological community. Non-state actors who wish to employ biological agents
for ill intent are sure to be aware of how tangible bio-weapons are becoming as applications of
synthetic biology become more affordable and the probability of success increases with each scientific breakthrough.
In Part I of this series, we examined how the advancement of
The willingness of non-state actors to engage in biological attacks is not a new concept; however, the past biological threat
environment has been subdued compared to that of conventional or even chemical terrorism. The frequency and deadliness of
biological attacks has, thankfully, been limited; much of which can be attributed to the technical complexity or apparent ineptitude of
the perpetrators developing biological weapons. Despite the infrequency and ineffectiveness of biological attacks in
the last four decades, the threat may be changing with the continued advancement of synthetic
biology applications. Coupled with the ease of info rmation sharing and a rapidly growing do-ityourself-biology (DIYbio) movement (discussed in Part I), the chances of not only , more attacks , but
more deadly ones will inevitably increase .¶ During the last half century terrorist organizations have
consistently had an interest in using biological weapons as a means of attacking their targets, but only few have
potentially
actually made a weapon and used it. The attraction is that terrorist activities with biological weapons are difficult to detect and even
more difficult to attribute without a specific perpetrator claiming responsibility. Since 1971 there have been more than 113,113
terrorist attacks globally and 33 of them have been biological. The majority of bio-terrorism incidents recorded occurred during the
year 2001 (17 of the 33); before 2001 there were 10 incidents and since 2001 there were 6 (not counting the most recent Ricin
attacks). The lack of a discernable trend in use of bio-terrorism does not negate the clear intent of extremist organizations to use
biological weapons. In fact, the capacity to harness biological weapons more effectively today only increases the risk that they will
successfully be employed.¶ The landscape is changing : previously the instances where biological attacks had the
potential to do the most harm (e.g., Rajneeshees cult’s Salmonella attacks in 1984, Aum Shinri Kyo’s Botulinum toxin, and Anthrax
attacks in the early 90’s) included non-state actors with access to large amounts of funding and scientists. Funding and a cadre of
willing scientists does not guarantee success though. The assertion was thus made that biological weapons are not
only expensive, they require advanced technical training to make and are even more difficult to
effectively perpetrate acts of terrorism with. While it is difficult to determine with certainty whether the expense and expertise
needed to create biological weapons has acted as a major deterrent for groups thinking of obtaining them, many experts would
argue that the cost/expertise barrier makes the threat from biological attacks extremely small. This assertion is supported by the
evidence that the vast majority of attacks have taken place in Western countries and was performed by Western citizens with
advanced training in scientific research.¶ In the past decade the cost/expertise assertion has become less
accurate. Despite the lack of biological attacks, there are a number of very dangerous and motivated
organizations that have or are actively pursuing biological weapons. The largest and most outspoken
organization has been the global Al Qaeda network, whose leaders have frequently and passionately called for the development (or
purchase) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The principal message from Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has included the call to use biological WMDs to terrorize Western nations. Al Qaeda has
had a particular focus on biological and nuclear weapons because of their potential for greatest harm. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman alZawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki have all called for attacks using biological weapons, going so far as to say that Muslims everywhere
should seek to kill Westerners wherever possible and that obtaining WMDs is the responsibility of all Muslims. Before the US-led
invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had spent significant funds on building a bio-laboratory and had begun collecting scientists from
around the world; however, the Afghanistan invasion and subsequent global War on Terrorism is thought to have disrupted their
capabilities and killed or captured many of their assets. Despite the physical setbacks, this disruption does not appear to
have changed the aggressive attitude towards obtaining WMDs (e.g., more recently U.S. Intelligence
has been concerned about AQAP attempting to make Ricin).¶ The emergence of synthetic biology
and DIYbio has increased the likelihood that Al Qaeda will succeed in developing biological
WMDs. The low cost and significantly reduced level of necessary expertise may change how
many non-state actors view bio logical weapons as a worthwhile investment. This is not to say
that suddenly anyone can make a weapon or that it is easy. To the contrary making an effective
biological weapon will still be difficult, only much easier and cheaper than it has been in the past.¶
The rapid advancements of synthetic bio logy could be a game changer , giving organizations
currently pursuing biological weapons more options, and encouraging other organizations to
reconsider their worth. Because the bar for attaining bio logical weapons has been lowered and is
likely to continue to be lowered as more advances in biological technology are made, it is important that the
international community begin to formulate policy that protects advances in science that acts to prevent the intentional misuse of
synthetic biology. Disregard for this consideration will be costly. A successful attack with a potent
biological weapon, where no pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will be deadly and the
impact of such an attack will reverberate around the globe because biological weapons are not
bound by international borders.
2AC
T
‘Legalization’ is a process that is just removing a legal prohibition while opening
up possibility for regulation
Rolles 9 [Stephen Rolles, Company Director of Transform Drugs Campaign Limited, “A Comparison of the Cost-effectiveness of
Prohibition and Regulation of Drugs”, April, http://www.tdpf.org.uk/sites/default/files/Cost-Effectiveness.pdf]
‘Prohibition’ is used in this paper to refer to the set of policies that formally prohibit—through the application
of legal sanctions —all production, distribution and possession of specific psychoactive drugs for non-medical use, as defined under the UN
drug conventions and the Misuse of Drugs Act 197137. Reduction in use, specifically the aim of a ‘drug free’ society, is often given as the primary goal.
‘Decriminalisation’, which is often confused with legalisation/regulation, is the reduction or abolition (actual or de facto) of criminal penalties in relation
to certain acts. While decriminalised acts are no longer crimes, they may still be the subject of regulation; for example, a civil or administrative penalty
‘Legalisation’, in contrast
to decriminalisation, is the process of removing a legal prohibition against something which is
currently illegal. ‘Legalisation’ describes a process or shift in legal status , rather than describing
a policy position or form of legal regulation.
(commonly a fine) in place of a criminal charge for the possession of a decriminalised drug for personal use.
CP
U.N. says no to the amendment
Rolles 9 senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Stephen, “After the War on
Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation,”
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFj
AC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEg
ia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg)
Article 3 of the Single Convention allows for the WHO or any Party state to initiate the modification
process that would reschedule a specified drug or delete it from the conventions at any time. For cannabis
and coca an amendment to the Single Convention would also be required as cultivation and
production of the plants is specifically prohibited, separately from the scheduling infrastructure-thus
drastically limiting the reform possibilities theoretically available for other scheduled drugs. The nature of the
Convention provisions renders this somewhat academic , as individual states have the power within
the system to easily block change . The WHO, whilst key to any modification process because of its advisory role, can
only make non-binding recommendations-the power to implement changes remains with the 53 member
Commission on Narcotic Drugs that operates within and determines policy for the UNODC. Within
the CND there exists a curious alliance of states (including Sweden, Japan, many ex-Soviet States,
most Arab nations and the USA) that are staunchly opposed to any revisions that would move the
treaty away from its punitive tenets. For these countries the conventions are based on the rigid and absolute position
that all (illegal) drug use is morally unacceptable-to the extent that the conventions have assumed a status more akin to religious
documents." In effect, unlike the statement in the 1997 UN world drugs report (above), for these countries the
conventions are, to all intents and purposes, indeed written in stone.
That solves—only the permutation maintains sufficient leverage to get
conservative nations on board
David R. Bewley-Taylor 12, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University Wales, and
founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, March 2012, “Towards revision of the UN drug control conventions: The
logic and dilemmas of Like-Minded Groups,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr19.pdf
However, in another scenario, an effective and strategically shrewd development of a cannabis regulation
group, might generate enough support for, or critically limit resistance towards, treaty
amendment. This would be more likely if the LMG contained a credible mix of nations, including
one or more ‘critical states’, which could withstand or pacify opposition from other sections of the
international community. In terms of process, it is worth pointing out that although strengthening the
prohibitive credentials of the regime, the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention is the
final product of numerous amendment proposals from the US with support from other states including the
UK.43 In this respect, the use of denunciation may also be appropriate, but here as a trigger for
treaty revision. By merely making moves to leave the confines of the regime, an LMG might be able
to generate a critical mass sufficient to compel states favouring the status quo to engage with the
process. Moreover, prohibition-oriented states , as well as those parts of the UN apparatus resistant
to change, might be more open to treaty modification or amendment if it was felt that such a
concession would prevent the collapse of the control system . By Lawrence Helfer’s analysis ‘withdrawing from
an agreement (or threatening to withdraw ) can give a denouncing state additional voice…by increasing
its leverage to reshape the treaty…’ (Emphasis added).44
“Resolved” doesn’t lock the aff into “certainty”
Merriam Webster ‘9 (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)
# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): resolved;
re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a
resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate
Neither does “should”
Encarta World English Dictionary 2005
(http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861735294)
used to express the conditionality of an occurrence and suggest it
is not a given, or to indicate the consequence of something that might happen ( used in conditional
expressing conditions or consequences:
clauses )
And resolved doesn’t mean immediate
Online Plain Text English Dictionary
‘9 (http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)
Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better
course of life.”
Amendments get crushed—causes a more restrictive treaty
Rolles, 9 – senior policy analyst for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation (Stephen, “After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for
Regulation,”
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.tdpf.org.uk%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FBlueprint.pdf&ei=xMcRVMEgia_IBL3xgtgE&usg=AFQjCNEzapo6rmX2drItTNAlEF
6SqJcDiw&sig2=vhMVPBlGoaWEJ9GB2HYbHg)
The obstacles
to modification render it an effectively worthless option, making the prospects for amendment
seem initially more promising. However, once again there is ample scope for opposing parties to block
changes. ' The possibility to amend is provided in Article 47 of the Single Convention. Article 30 of the 1971 Convention and
Article 31 of the 1988 Convention. Parties can notify the Secretary-General of a proposed amendment, including the reasoning
behind the move. The Secretary- General then communicates the proposed amendment and the reasons for it to the Parties and to
the Council. It is then the ECOSOC's decision to either call a conference to consider the amendment, or ask the parties if they
accept the amendment. In the unlikely event of no party rejecting the amendment within 18 months the amendment comes into
force. In the more likely event of objections being raised to ECOSOC, the council then can decide
whether or not to convene a conference to consider the amendment. Such a conference could usefully raise
there would be no guarantee of meaningful revisions. Prohibition
oriented states could even potentially exploit the event to move policy in the opposite direction. ""
the profile of the revision issue. but
Functional cost objections could also be made to such a conference-that is, that it would be too expensive.
Tons of countries say no—recent examples prove
Dave Bewley-Taylor, Professor, International Relation, Swansea University, Tom Blockman and Martin Jelsma, THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF CANNABIS PROHIBITION: THE HISTORY OF CANNABIS IN THE UN DRUG CONTROL SYSTEM AND
OPTIONS FOR REFORM, Transnational Institute, 3—14, p. 63-64.
The mechanisms available to modernize the UN drug control treaty regime via amendment procedures
or renegotiations among its parties have high built-in thresholds; invoking those mechanisms easily
runs into procedural and political obstacles. The only recent example of an attempt to use them has
been Bolivia’s amendment proposal in 2009 to delete the obligation of the 1961 Convention to
abolish coca leaf chewing.23 But even such a minor amendment to correct an outdated
requirement clearly in conflict with indigenous and cultural rights, recognized since the writing of
the Convention as part of the human rights regime, was blocked. Then, as mentioned above, a small but
powerful minority of 18 countries objected . The principal argument was most clearly spelled out in
the Swedish objection, that “the Bolivian proposal pose[d] the risk of creating a political
precedent and might directly infringe on the international framework for the fight against drugs
which would send a negative signal”. 24 In their objections most countries mentioned their full respect for indigenous rights, but as
Italy contended, “promoting respect for indigenous traditions should be fully coherent with and
preserve the integrity of the Single Convention”.25 The Single Convention’s requirement for the prohibition of some
of those traditions exposes the blatant contradiction underlying such a statement. Behind it lies the fear that accepting the validity of
Bolivia’s amendment might open a Pandora’s box. For those who regard the Single Convention as
sacrosanct, allowing any changes would jeopardize the integrity of the entire drug-control
system. Mexico’s objection clearly echoed that point of view, saying that it “deems it inadvisable to initiate a
process to amend the Single Convention of 1961”. 26
Only the plan gives the US leverage---its comparatively more effective than the
CP
Robin Room 12, Centre for Social Research on Alcohol & Drugs, Stockholm University, Reform by Subtraction: The Path of
Denunciation of International Drug Treaties and Reaccession with Reservations, International Journal of Drug Policy 23:401-406
The normality and banality of treaty reservations¶ As can be seen from the record summarized in Tables 1-3.¶ reservations to
the international drug control treaties are quite¶ numerous and varied, and have been made by
many countries.¶ Bolivia has a strong case that its reservation is within the range¶ of other reservations which already exist on
the treaties. It is thus disingenuous of the 1NCB to argue that actions such as Bolivia's¶ "would undermine the
integrity of the global drug control system".¶ Given the record of reservations to the treaties, it
would be an extraordinary act for a third or more of the parties to the 1961¶ treaty to object to the
reservation, thus disallowing Bolivia from reacceding with the reservation.¶ Such a result would
be contrary to a main goal of the inter-¶ national drug control system, the one goal on which it
can¶ be seen by all unambiguously to have succeeded. The system has prided itself on attaining
near-universality in accession
to¶ the treaties; the INCB annual reports each include a section¶ on the current status in this regard (e.g. INCB. 2012, p. 8).¶
Though those staffing and committed to the system in its present¶ form are no doubt extremely unhappy about a country imple-¶
menting a change in their situation in this manner, to deny reaccession would be a dramatic retreat from the
goal of univer-¶ sality that it is doubtful the international system would want to¶ take.¶ The main
disincentive to a country taking this path arises¶ less from a threat of exclusion than from pressures and¶ countermeasures outside
the drug control system, such as¶ economic sanctions, that could be threatened by the U.S.¶ and other main supporters of the
system. There would be¶ more safety in numbers against these pressures and threat-¶ ened countermeasures. which makes a
coordinated series of denunciations and reaccessions a path worth considering for like-minded countries wishing to move in the
directions we have outlined.¶ Conclusion: reform by subtraction The world today is governed by an international drug control system
which is not fit for purpose. It is a system which does not ensure that medications it controls get to those in need of them, and
which has largely failed in its strenuous efforts to reduce the illicit markets in drugs (Babor et al., 2010). Through its near-universal
application and its extraordinary intrusion into domestic laws and affairs, it has greatly limited experimentation in the global
community in alternative ways of limiting the harms from psychoactive substance use (Room & Reuter, 2012). ¶ This paper lays out
a path by which countries can open for themselves a path for experimentation, potentially reaching
beyond what can be done within the limited “wiggle-room” within the treaties (Jelsma & Bewley-Taylor,
2012). In principle, there are better ways to write or adapt international treaties than by
subtraction. In the current international political climate, however, such ways seem unlikely to be
implemented. Moving forward by subtraction may, therefore, be the most feasible way to advance
– whereby national parties, acting individually or in parallel, specify reservations to the treaties.
Raich’s key --- Swiss cheese precedents cause lower court confusion
Andrew Fan 6, UC-Irvine Law Forum Journal, "Raich v. Gonzales: Ramifications on Future Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and
Congressional Regulation", Fall, www.socsci.uci.edu/lawforum/content/journal/LFJ_2006_fan.pdf
Unfortunately, the
Raich Majority opinion is so lengthy and complex that future courts will struggle to
determine its specific meaning. In fact, it is possible that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
and Kennedy upheld the CSA for differing reasons, as did Justice Scalia, making this case even
more confusing as precedent for the future . ¶ Ultimately, the Court should have attempted to
consolidate the various considerations involved in deciding the Raich case. The Majority was undoubtedly
aware of the controversy that their decision would create in light of recent Commerce Clause
cases, and yet they were still unable to create a precedent that would be useful in determining
future Commerce Clause cases. Instead, the Majority seems to have tried to reconcile and incorporate the Wickard v. Filburn and U.S.
v. Lopez precedents with its own views on the effects test, even though these principles are arguably at odds with one another. In the end, the “new”
Raich Majority could have best served the law if they agreed that they wanted to do away with Rehnquist’s “economic in nature” test in favor of the
the need for clear
legal standards cannot be ignored . If the Supreme Court issues an unclear opinion, then lower
courts are left without guidelines to decide future Commerce Clause cases. In order to avoid
potential conflicting lower court opinions in the future, it would have been better for the Majority
to clarify exactly which test they wanted future courts to use, rather than forcing Congress and the
lower courts to guess as to where our Commerce Clause jurisprudence currently stands.
“economic in impact” test. Although the “economic in impact” test is more liberal in giving regulatory power to Congress,
Treaties DA 2AC
The UN Drug Conventions will collapse now
Martin Jelsma 14, co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis
Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform : Treaty reform options,”
http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf
Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy and policy experimentation have now reached
the point where de jure legal regulation of the whole cannabis market is gaining political
acceptability, even if it violates certain outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions
between countries seeking more flexibility and the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies, as well as with
countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, are likely to further increase . This seems
inevitable because the trend towards cannabis regulation appears irreversible and is rapidly
gaining more support across the Americas, as well as among many local authorities in Europe that have to face the
difficulties and consequences¶ of implementing current control mechanisms.¶ In the untidy conflict of procedural and political
constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a¶ modernized more flexible global drug
control regime, the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations and
questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And the situation is
unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-minded countries is ready
to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and
disputes. The question appearing on the international policy agenda is now no longer whether or not there is a
need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how . The
question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing tensions and to
transform the current system in an orderly fashion into ¶ one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and ¶ one that
is more compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon feel
forced to opt out of the current system’s strictures, and, using any of the available reservation,
modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue
the drug policy reforms they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people.
Court decision doesn’t link
David R. Bewley-Taylor 2, Department of American Studies, University of Wales Swansea, Challenging the UN drug control
conventions: problems and possibilities, International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171-179
Should Parties prefer not to follow the denunciation¶ route, they could
exploit what Webster has called an¶ "important
loophole" in the treaties. As Webster notes,¶ the United Nations Drug Control Programme¶ (UNDCP) (1997) World Drug Report slates:¶ .
.[none of the] three international drug Conventions insist on the establishment of drug
consumption per se as a punishable offence. Only the 1988 Convention clearly requires parties to establish
as¶ criminal offences under law the possession, pur-¶ chase or cultivation of controlled drugs for the¶ purpose of non-medical, personal
consumption.¶ unless to do so would be contrary to the constitutional principles and basic concepts
of their legal systems" (italics added) (Webster. 2001).¶ Thus, if the highest courts in signatory nations ruled
that prohibition of a single drug (cannabis for example)¶ or a selection of outlawed substances, was
unconstitutional then the Parties involved would no longer be bound by the limitations of the
Conventions with respect to those drugs. Such action would be perfectly legitimate according to
the provisions of the treaties themselves. Debate already exists with regard to the¶ value of challenging drug prohibition on the
grounds of human rights violations (Riley, 1998; Van Rcc, 1999).
Setting a precedent for withdrawal reinvigorates multilat
Curtis A. Bradley 10, Richard A. Horvitz Professor, Duke Law School and Mitu Gulati is Professor, Duke Law School,
“Withdrawing from International Custom,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 120, No. 2, November, pp. 202-275
A second set of concerns raised by the Mandatory View is that inefficient rules will be unduly perpetuated, something that is referred
to in scholarship on contract theory as a “stickiness” problem.'8' Although CIL rules may not be difficult to form in the first instance,
the Mandatory View makes it hard to change established rules by constraining nations from
withdrawing. Presumably, the key assumption underlying this regime is that, unless constrained, nations will engage in
excessive withdrawal from CIL rules. In fact, there are reasons to suspect that, even under a default approach to CIL, the system
will face the opposite problem: CIL rules will remain in place even after they are no longer socially desirable. If so, the
Mandatory View would be worsening an already present stickiness problem. ¶ First, consider the
assumption that a Default View will lead to excessive withdrawals. As discussed earlier, there was a significant period
of
time during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when commentators believed that nations
could unilaterally withdraw from at least some rules of CIL.'82 We have found no indication from
these commentaries, however, that this Default View led to excessive withdrawals. Nor have we
found suggestions that the shift from the Default View to the Mandatory View occurred because a
spate of withdrawals from CIL had undermined the system.¶ Second, in the modern era, nations are allegedly
able to opt out of CIL rules before they form through persistent objection. Nevertheless, nations rarely invoke this right. Although
there have been predictions that nations would begin invoking the persistent objector doctrine
more frequently, this prediction has not been borne out.183 Professor Byers suggests that part of the
reason for this is that there are significant nonlegal pressures, such as the reciprocal nature of
most interstate relationships, that result in even powerful nations such as the United States, Japan, and
the United Kingdom eventually backing away from their objections to CIL rules.184 Whatever the reason, the key
point is that the Mandatory View does not appear to be necessary to deter exit. ¶ Third, as seen from
Professor Heifer’s research, many treaties either have explicit withdrawal clauses or implicitly allow for withdrawal.,8s
Commentators have evinced few concerns, however, about excessive withdrawals from multilateral treaties.'86 Nor do
we
know of any evidence suggesting that nations have moved away from including withdrawal
clauses in treaties due to perceived abuses.187 While it could be argued that the Mandatory View of CIL is itself
deterring treaty withdrawals, we think this is unlikely. Treaties and CIL do not have identical content, and many treaties are
“progressive” in that they codify principles not contained in CIL.'88 Moreover, even when treaties and CIL contain substantively
similar rules, treaties tend to be more specific and are more likely to be connected to enforcement and adjudicative mechanisms. As
a result, if a nation no longer agreed with the provisions in a treaty, it would have an incentive to
exercise its right of withdrawal even if it could not also exit from substantively similar CIL. ¶ The
foregoing suggests that there is little reason to be concerned that a Default View would lead to excessive withdrawal. In fact, it is
possible that, even under that approach, there might actually be insufficient withdrawal. Drawing from scholarship on contract
theory, there are reasons to believe that nations will adhere to rules well beyond the point at which
they have become inefficient, even if nations had the ability to withdraw from them. Among the
theoretical reasons to expect stickiness in the CIL context are what are referred to as “network externalities,” “learning externalities,”
and “negative signals.” Network externalities can arise, for example, when members of a group use a common product, such as a
common contract term.'89 If all members of the group commit to using the same contract term, there are efficiency gains in that the
individual parties do not need to spend time negotiating new provisions; everyone can assume that everyone else understands what
the basic contract rules will be. A similar dynamic might operate with, for example, rules of diplomatic immunity. If nations can
assume that the same rules of diplomatic immunity apply, no matter where, then there will be no need to negotiate specific rules
every time a diplomatic mission is established in a new country. This benefit of standardization of rules comes with a cost, however,
in that individual nations may be slow to shift to new rules even when the old rules have become suboptimal for the system. ¶
Adding to the network effects, there may also be learning externalities, which arc the benefits that come from using
the same rules over a long period of time.190 The longer a rule or a contract provision is used, the better understood
it will be. In the CIL context, the primary' actors are government bureaucrats. One might expea that the government
bureaucrats responsible for international relations, once they develop expertise in operating with a certain set of
rules, will be reluaant to change.'9' Network and learning externalities will often operate in conjunction with each other
to erect barriers to change.'92 One can imagine, for example, lawyers in the various ministries of defense who are
specialists in the rules of war under some combination of CIL and the Geneva Conventions. Many of the existing
rules governing war are likely outdated, in that they were designed for different types of armed conflict than the types
of conflicts we see today.'9* Nevertheless, some combination of network and learning externalities probably produces
barriers to change.194¶ Finally, concerns about sending negative signals may add to stickiness. In settings where
reputations are important, and the parties have incomplete information about each other’s
intentions, parties will be concerned about sending the wrong signals to their counterparties. 195
Altering a standard contract term, for example, presents the risk that it will raise the suspicions of counterpanics that something is
amiss. The same dynamic may apply in the CIL context. Fearing a negative inference by others, nations may be unwilling to deviate
from long-established rules of interaction, even when those rules arc recognized as inefficient.196¶ The foregoing theoretical
conjectures are supported by empirical evidence from the field of sovereign debt contracts. The standard provisions in these
contracts arc distillations of norms of debtor-creditor behavior that have evolved over long periods of time (akin to customary norms)
and (unlike under the Mandatory View for CIL) are also defaults in that nations are free to alter them.197 Multiple studies show that
states, despite the option to alter provisions, adhere to inefficient contract provisions long after these provisions arc recognized to
have become inefficient.198 The evidence further suggests that among the reasons for this stickiness arc network effects and
concerns about negative signals.199 A caveat here is that the foregoing evidence draws on the behavior of officials in ministries of
finance rather than ministries of foreign affairs, and it is the latter who arc primarily involved in CIL matters. It is unlikely, however,
that officials in the ministries of foreign affairs will be less concerned about reputation and negative signals than their counterparts in
the ministries of finance.200 Again, one would expect this stickiness problem to be exacerbated by the
Mandatory View, which (unlike in the sovereign debt context) disallows unilateral opt-out.¶ Related to the
concern about stickiness is the concern that a disallowance of unilateral opt-out will cause
nations to act opportunistically and demand concessions before agreeing to any alterations of CIL
(even efficient ones). In other contexts, this is referred to as a “holdout” problem.201 As noted, the precise fraction or number of
nations whose approval needs to be obtained before an extant CIL rule can be altered is unclear. That lack of clarity makes
it difficult to describe the precise nature of the holdout problem under the current Mandatory
View. To be able to evaluate the potential holdout problem, therefore, we have to make a series of
assumptions about how the current system works. ¶ We assume that if a nation were to act in a fashion contrary to
existing CIL and if few other nations objected, a new CIL rule might gradually emerge, but that objections from even a minority of
nations likely would prevent this from happening.202 In voting terms, acquiescence (or nonobjection) is treated in the CIL process
as the equivalent of a vote of approval for the change. With that qualification, however, there is, in effect, a supermajority approval
requirement. Such a requirement creates a potential holdout problem because a small group of nations can threaten to object
vocally to, and thereby derail, attempts by other nations to deviate from existing CIL rules. ¶ In small, homogenous groups, where the
interests of members arc relatively uniform and where the members interact repeatedly, social and reputational pressures can serve
to alleviate holdout problems.103 That means that these small groups can often afford to require a high degree of consensus before
decisions are made. As groups get larger and more diverse, however, internal pressures become more diffuse, asymmetries of
information increase, and the threat of informal sanctions becomes less potent. Those factors increase the risk of holdouts.204¶
Applying this analysis to the modern international system, which is large, heterogeneous,
characterized by significant asymmetries of information, and has widely varying threats of
sanctions, suggests that the system is vulnerable to holdouts. This is particularly so in contexts involving
nations that have limited interactions with one another. Under such conditions, nations may be tempted to collude with others to
block alterations to CIL so as to extract concessions from the nations seeking change. This could happen even if the change at
issue would be value-enhancing for the group as a whole.¶ Such holdout problems are likely to dampen
cooperation in international lawmaking. Conversely, if there were a right of withdrawal, a nation
that found a CIL rule to be problematic could announce its reasons for withdrawal and propose a
new rule. If there were other nations that also derived benefits from the change, and relatively few
who suffered costs, this could be an occasion for a cooperative move toward a treaty. Along these
lines, allowing withdrawal could also enhance collaboration in innovation and experimentation in
lawmaking. Under the Mandatory View, when there arc suggestions of a new rule, some nations might be concerned that the
rules will turn out to have unforeseen negative consequences. If so, these nations with concerns will work hard to
prevent new CIL from forming out of a fear that, once it forms, it will be binding and hard to
change. By contrast, if a right of future withdrawal is permitted, it provides nations with a form of
insurance, in that they can experiment with how the rule works for them and then withdraw if its
negative effects outweigh the benefits .105
K
No coherent alternative—movements fail
Jones 11 [Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011,
author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change
nothing", 2011, www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing2373612.html]
My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The
turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager
growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling.
Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to
Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled.¶ Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the
world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to
the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did
lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the
movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after
Genoa.¶ Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the
West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes
a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it
succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US
billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're
winning."¶ The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who
– predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on
the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the tottering global
economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. ¶ Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead,
with no-one to administer the killer blow.¶ There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for
the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence
of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its
opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to
defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually
smothered out of existence . It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neoliberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement.¶ But, above all, it
was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter
triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye ." From the British Labour Party to the African National
Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the
left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an
age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.
Structural violence decreasing now
Goklany 9—Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its inception as an author,
delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property
and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical engineering,
Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, “Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being?” 2009,
http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE_INCREASES_IN_POPULATION_AFFLUENCE_AND_TECHNOLOGY_WORSENED_HUMAN_AND_ENVIRONMENTAL_WELL-BEING.pdf)
Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or
GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon
dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to
Neo- Malthusian
fears, average human well-being , measured by any objective indicator, has never been
higher. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254
Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide .
The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined
from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase
(Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic
hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations,
antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and
increase life expectancies . These improvements first became evident in today’s developed countries in the mid- to late1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing
countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy,
perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased
from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the
early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average annual per capita incomes tripled since 1950.
The proportion of the world’s population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute
poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell
from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007).
Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated . Child labor in low income countries
declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically,
economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own
rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less
likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has
never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of
birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their
leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of
population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has
multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold.
Yet its life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined
from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living
longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005
and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years
later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most
would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet
Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early
2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria,
and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a,
pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to
increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a;
World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted
downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the
unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which
exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data,
indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of
affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other
indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation
(see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).
No root cause
Larrivee 10— PF ECONOMICS AT MOUNT ST MARY’S UNIVERSITY – MASTERS FROM THE HARVARD KENNEDY
SCHOOL AND PHD IN ECONOMICS FROM WISCONSIN, 10 [JOHN, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORAL ANALYSIS OF
MARKETS, 10/1, http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf]
The Second Focal Point: Moral, Social, and Cultural Issues of Capitalism Logical errors abound in critical commentary on
capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a
capitalist economy. Therefore capitalism causes X.” They draw their conclusion by looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one
system. Others merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The solution to such flawed reasoning
is to be comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a
number of issues—greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth,
have often been associated with capitalism, but
extreme form. I conclude with some
have
alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious participation—that
also been problematic in other systems and usually in more
evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear
The critical point is that
certain people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took
action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified. That
they failed to solve the problems, and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new problems,
implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of
communism or to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.”
Neoliberalism is self-correcting – consumer-induced responsibility and
regulations effectively limit plundering
Hollender and Breen 10 – * Founder of the American Sustainable Business Council, a progressive alternative to the
Chamber of Commerce, **Editorial Director of the Fast Company
Jeffrey Hollender, Bill Breen, “The Responsibility Revolution: How the Next Generation of Businesses will Win,” pg. xix
The responsibility revolution is about more than cutting carbon, reducing energy use, monitoring
factories, or donating to charities. It’s about reimagining companies from within : innovating new ways of
working, instilling a new logic of competing, identifying new possibilities for leading, and redefining the very purpose of business.
Consequently, we’ve drawn on the best thinking not only from the corporate responsibility arena, but also from the realms of
strategy, leadership, and management. Others, to whom we are indebted, have developed some of this book’s core principles.
(We will acknowledge them as we present their ideas.) Our intent is to show how an emerging breed of business
revolutionaries is turning theory into practice and building organizations that grow revenue by
contributing to the greater good . This is a book about change, but it seeks to help companies change on the
inside—change their priorities, the way they organize, how they compete, and the way they interact with the world. We fully
concede that many companies, perhaps even most companies, won’t willingly alter their behavior. But they will change
nonetheless, and it won’t be because they’ve suddenly seen the light. It will be because massive numbers of
consumers, a spreading swarm of competitors, values-driven employees, and even that laggard
indicator, the
federal government, makes them change. Change is under way . The responsibility
revolution spreads. Perhaps you’ve seen the insurrection begin to roil your industry, and you’re determined to get out in
front of it. If so, welcome to the cause.
Consumption practices are sustainable and prove no environment impact
Norberg 3 (Johan Norberg, Senior Fellow at Cato Institute, “In Defense of Global Capitalism”, p. 223)
It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we
would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological
footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so
much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world.
Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in present day quantities, would not suffice
for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting
as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough
stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw material consumption is not static. With more and more people
achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials.
Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously
inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it
possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw
materials. A century and a half ago, oil was just something black and sticky that people preferred not to step in and definitely
did not want to find beneath their land. But our interest in finding better energy sources led to methods being devised for using
oil, and today it is one of our prime resources. Sand has never been all that exciting or precious, but today it is a vital raw
material in the most powerful technology of our age, the computer. In the form of silicon—which makes up a quarter of the
earth's crust— it is a key component in computer chips. There is a simple market mechanism that averts
shortages. If a certain raw material comes to be in short supply, its price goes up. This makes
everyone more interested in economizing on that resource, in finding more of it, in reusing it,
and in trying to find substitutes for it.
Specificity matters—rejecting neoliberalism as a monolithic entity undermines the alt
Duffy and Moore 10
Article: Neoliberalizing nature? Elephants as imperfect commodities Author: Duffy, R Journal: Antipode ISSN:
0066-4812 Date: 2010 Volume: 42 Issue: 3 Page: 742
Note: from 1 September 2012 I take up the post of Professor of Conservation Politics at the Durrell Institute of
Conservation Ecology (DICE) in the School of Anthropology and Conservation, University of Kent.
I am Professor of International Politics, and I held posts at Edinburgh University and Lancaster University
before joining Manchester in 2005. I take a deliberately interdisciplinary approach to understanding
conservation; my work is located at the intersection between international relations, geography and sociology.
My work examines the debates on global environmental governance, especially the roles of international
NGOs, international treaties, international financial institutions and epistemic communities. I am particularly
interested in how global environmental management regimes play out on the ground, how they are contested,
challenged and resisted by their encounter at the local level. I focus on wildlife conservation, tourism and illicit
trading networks to understand the local level complexities of global environmental management. I have
undertaken a number of ESRC funded research projects on Peace Parks, gemstone mining and national
parks,and on ecotourism (more details are under 'research interests'. My most recent book, Nature Crime: How
We're Getting Conservation Wrong (Yale University Press, 2010) examines how global dynamics of wealth and
poverty shape conservation outcomes. More information is on my personal wesbite 'Conservation
Politics' http://conservationpolitics.wordpress.com/
However, it is critically important not to reify neoliberalism and ascribe it a greater level
of coherence and dominance than it really deserves (Bakker 2005; Castree 2008a; Brenner and
Theodore 2002; Mansfield 2004; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). Instead it is important to interrogate how
neoliberalism plays out “on the ground”, to probe its complexities, unevenness and messiness (see
Peck and Tickell 2002). In this paper we concentrate on comparing the practices of neoliberalism in order to
draw out these messy entanglements; this demonstrates how neoliberalism can be challenged,
resisted and changed by its encounter with nature (Bakker 2009; Castree 2008b:161). Therefore, we do
not rehearse the well worn debates on definitions of neoliberalism, but rather take up the challenge of
comparative research on “actually existing neoliberalisms”, which involves engaging with contextual
embeddedness in order to complicate neat theoretical debates. As Brenner and Theodore (2002:356–
358) suggest, to understand actually existing neoliberalism we must explore the path-dependent, contextually
specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent forms of neoliberalism. As such,
the neat lines and models generated via theoretical debates can be traced, refined, critiqued and
challenged through engagement with specific case studies (Bakker 2009; Castree 2008b).
1AR
Escape clause can be used for the plan’s legalization method – Arjun even
emailed Bewley-Taylor
Dave Bewley-Taylor 12/19, Professor or IR and Public Policy at Swansea University, Email exchange with Arjun
Vellayappan, http://northwesterndebate.blogspot.com/
Dear Mr. Jelsma and Mr. Bewley-Taylor,¶ My name is Arjun Vellayappan and I am a student at Northwestern University conducting an intercollegiate research
project regarding legalization of marijuana in the United States.¶ I have been reading about marijuana legalization and its
implications for the UN international drug conventions. I came across your article “Cannabis reforms: the scope and limits of treaty
latitude” and was particularly interested in the section about article 3 of the 1988 convention which allows for an “escape clause”.¶ I was curious if this optout clause could be applied more broadly than just “personal use” and be used as a justification
for U.S. recreational marijuana legalization if the Supreme Court decided to rule the current
prohibition unconstitutional?¶ Happy holidays and thanks in advance!
Hi,¶ Please accept my apologies for only getting to this now.¶ You might find these of interest.¶ http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dlr18.pdf and attached.¶ As
is potential to use Article 3 of the
1988 Convention along the lines you suggest , but as you know, these things are all open to different legal
you see from the Journal article,
interpretations.¶
I have thought that there
Best wishes¶ David R. Bewley-Taylor,¶ Professor of International Relations and Public Policy | Athro
*Only the plan’s Court based marijuana reform creates long-term stability for the
treaty system
Martin Jelsma 14, coordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, David R. Bewley-Taylor, University of Wales Swansea
and Tom Blickman, “Cannabis reforms: the scope and limits of treaty latitude”, March, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis
Prohibition, Transnational Institute, PDF
the 1988 Convention. Article 3 repeats in slightly broader language the
provisions of article 36 of the Single Convention and article 22 of the 1971 Convention . ¶ Paragraph 2 of
article 3 adds: Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each
party shall adopt such measures as may be seen necessary to establish as a criminal offence
under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961
Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.¶ Even though the language is more restrictive and might be regarded as reducing the flexibility
of the earlier treaties, a persuasive legal case can be made that article 3 , paragraph 2 still leaves significant
scope for deviation from the punitive approach. “Subject to its constitutional principles and basic
Circumstances became more complex with the introduction of
concepts of its legal system”, represents a clear “escape clause ”. It implies that “any latitude
existing under this Convention does not result exclusively from the Convention but also from the
constitutional and other legal principles of each country”. Therefore, “ Parties would not violate the
Convention if their domestic courts held criminalization of personal use to be unconstitutional ”,11
and consequently are not obliged to establish possession for personal use to be a criminal
offence. A strong case can also be made that a party need not make cultivation for personal use a criminal offense either.12 Further, the article allows for
alternatives to conviction or punishment for offences related to personal use and other offences
“of a minor nature”, albeit restricting and strongly discouraging national discretionary powers related to illicit trafficking offences of a more serious nature.13¶ As a
result, a country might rule that, in line with its own national circumstances, it is not within the interest of
society to prosecute for possession or cultivation for personal use ; that the right to privacy overrules state intervention
regarding what people consume or possess in their private homes; or that self-destructive behaviour, be it consumption of potentially harmful substances or other behaviour
These justifications have been argued and accepted respectively in
the Netherlands, Alaska and Germany with regard to possession of cannabis for personal use . More
recently, in Argentina the Supreme Court ruled that the section of the 1989 drug law criminalizing drug possession was unconstitutional.14 The existence of an
escape clause of this nature, based on constitutional principles as well as basic concepts of
national legal systems, is relatively rare in international law .15 It has been utilized by a range of
authorities to create more policy flexibility while remaining within the confines of the treaty
framework. 16 Thus, despite widespread acceptance of the 1988 Convention, significant room for
maneuver in relation to cannabis decriminalization has been retained since its enactment in 1990.
including suicide, shall not be subject to punishment.
Reform and flexible interpretation of treaty through the plan is vital for treaty
success---collapsing now
John Collins 12/1, PhD Candidate in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics, and
Coordinator of the LSE IDEAS International Drug Policy Project., The State Department’s move to a more flexible diplomatic policy
on drugs is a rational approach to a difficult question, blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomaticdoctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficult-question/
Thirdly, there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current ‘war on drugs’ approach. There are certain legislative actions which adherence to
the treaties require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation. The ‘war on drugs’ was a national and bilateral
creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the ‘war on drugs’ requires a rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and
evidence of efficacy around alternative
policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive model. In the future,
increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties unsustainable, and
that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable.¶ Fourthly, no member state is yet
advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation on any issue is hard to create. When
it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it, even in the face of variance in
implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is just the application of this fact to
the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy seems to me one which pushes the
doctrine as far as practicable and uses it to hold the US to a standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient
national level reforms have taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more
local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug treaties. Further,
apparent and practical, but there
needs to be a sequential action process here. ¶ What would
treaty reform look like?¶ I’ve never heard a treaty reform process elaborated convincingly . Some argue that an open
debate would provide the answers. Given the very real economic and structural interests underpinning the current system, that seems unlikely.
Many describe the treaty system as a ‘prohibitionist regime’. The implication is that it’s a
monolithic legal framework, created to enforce a global prohibitionist model and therefore treaty
reform is fundamentally required to change it. That’s a useful conceptual term, but it’s ahistorical and the
reality is far more complicated.¶ It’s a system which has overseen an array of regimes throughout
its history, often running concurrently. Some outlived their usefulness and simply died out. For example, in the 1930s the drug control system
encompassed many regimes, including a regime around regulating global drug manufacturing; one around minimizing illicit trafficking; another around
prohibiting opium smoking (which many states including Britain ignored out of deference to local security concerns in their colonies) and a regime
aspects
intersected in various ways at national, regional and international levels, but were far from
monolithic.¶ The implementation of the UN system from the 1970s onwards was overwhelmingly characterized by an extreme implementation of
around developing regulations on production (again happily ignored by many states when it conflicted with economic interests). These
prohibitionist aspects of the treaties. For certain states it was driven by the US outsourcing its control efforts, particularly in Latin America. But for many
others it was driven by state level responses to a domestic problem. For example, Asia was an epicenter for the prohibitionist model, not a recipient.
The colonial powers stalled implementing prohibition as long as they could, recognising the dangers of the illicit market as well as for fiscal reasons.
Post-colonial Asian elites associated opium and the opium monopolies with colonialism and cultural backwardness and enthusiastically embraced strict
prohibitionist models. These drives towards prohibitionist and repressive models were facilitated by the treaty system but not necessarily driven by it.
The implication is that they can be drastically rolled back without any treaty revision.¶ The weak regulatory ‘core’ of the treaty system ¶ The current
treaty system is essentially a regulatory framework for a global licit market in opioid medications (such as morphine) for the treatment of severe pain.
To enforce this market it mandates certain action around prohibiting non-medical production and manufacturing of these medicines. It was believed
that effective regulation of the licit market would squeeze out illicit supplies, leaving a minimal role for prohibitionist aspects and police enforcement.
This proved profoundly misjudged. When the failures of the regulatory approach to quell the illicit market became apparent, international policy path
determinacy fuelled an exponential growth in enforcement efforts, thereby creating the modern ‘war on drugs’. ¶ Ultimately the
core
represents a weak regulatory framework and will need to be updated. For example, it was based on postwar
principles of central economic planning that have since been discredited. As a result 83 percent of the world has virtually no access to essential pain
reforming this core is a very difficult question which we haven’t even started to
grapple with. The economic interests involved are legion also and unlikely to welcome a reopening of the
trading arrangements locked into the system. Focusing all efforts on reforming the language around the limbic prohibitionist aspects would, in
my opinion, be a wasted opportunity. Instead, the goal should be to roll back prohibition as far as possible and
develop our understanding of regulating previously illicit markets – as is happening with
medicines. However,
cannabis – via flexible interpretations and innovations . When the beginnings of a
consensus around reforming the core of the conventions becomes apparent, states can also put
the final nail in the coffin of the war on drugs by writing all remnants out of the international
treaties.
Raich does legalize – it held that the FG has the authority to make all marijuana
illegal
ASA 14, Americans for Safe Access, “Federal Marijuana
Law,” http://www.safeaccessnow.org/federal_marijuana_law
As of this printing, the federal government claims that marijuana is not medicine and in Gonzales
v. Raich (2005), the United StatesSupreme Court held that the federal government has the
constitutional authority to prohibit marijuana for all purposes . Thus, federal law enforcement
officials may prosecute medical marijuana patients, even if they grow their own medicine and even if they
reside in a state where medical marijuana use is protected under state law. The Court indicated that
Congress and the Food and Drug Administration should work to resolve this issue.¶ The Raich decision does
not say that the laws of California (or any other medical marijuana state) are unconstitutional; nor does it
invalidate them in any way. Also, it does not say that federal officials must prosecute patients. Decisions about
prosecution are still left to the discretion of the federal government.