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Introduction
In her book Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War
Annika Mombauer puts forward the thesis that the post-World War I mythology regarding the von Schlieffen Plan has distorted our view of
Helmuth von Moltke, who, in her view, was by no means a wimp or an inadequate but rather, was himself a major cause of the war, a key
warmonger.
It is the view of this writer that Annika Mombauer’s thesis is fundamentally flawed and not only lacks any real insight into the character of Helmuth von
Moltke but also fails to provide any solid, substantial and consistent evidence to uphold itself. This critical review will demonstrate the numerous weaknesses in Mombauer’s argument, an argument that is part of a wider movement among a group of historians today to recast our understanding of the First World War in such a way as to place the prime responsibility for
BOTH the catastrophic world wars of the 20 th century onto the German people, their society and culture. This attempted reinterpretation of such key events of the 20 th century is itself both a deeply flawed and disingenuous presentation of the history of the world wars in terms of Orwell’s “four legs good, two legs bad” (from his novel 1984 ), that is, the erroneous notion that
“the good” was represented in both conflicts by the English-speaking countries and their allies, while “the bad”, “the evil” was represented by the
German-speaking countries and their allies. This assertion, which amounts to a colossal lie in connection with the First World War, first came to prominence in association with the infamous “war guilt” clause of the
Versailles Treaty of June 1919. (Article 231 of the Treaty, penned by Philip
Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary and member of Lord Milner’s Round Table
Group).
In her first paragraph Annika Mombauer asserts the existence of a new consensus among historians that German militarism and hegemonic strivings lay at the root of World War One.
She denies that von Schlieffen would have fought a more successful war and claims that downplaying Helmuth von Moltke's responsibility implies the downplaying of German responsibility (p5). She claims that Helmuth von
Moltke's power came from his "special relationship of trust" with the Kaiser
(p6). She dismisses Thomas Meyer's book Light for the New Millennium -
Rudolf Steiner's Association with Helmuth and Eliza von Moltke: Letters,
Documents and After-Death Communications (1993, English transl. 1997) as professionally shoddy (p7) and "of little value to historians" yet admits it is

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"the most comprehensive collection of primary material pertaining to
Moltke." (p7). She passes over the story of how Steiner's 1919 memorandum about the events of July/August 1914 came to be shelved by him following a visit by General von Dommes, and notes that the German Foreign Office objected to it because of their stated fears for the safety of the exiled Kaiser in Holland if knowledge of the German intention to violate Dutch neutrality in 1914 got out (p8). She concludes by commenting on efforts of the post-war
Reichsarchiv to whitewash the German war effort and prepare for the next war. In other words, right from her introduction, her presentation is onesided and polemical.
Chapter One
She discusses military decision-making in Imperial Germany to set the context in which Helmuth von Moltke operated. She notes that the General Staff only became independent from the Ministry of War in the 1866-1871 wars (p25ff), and the key role of Waldersee (the Kaiser's favourite) in this. She comments on the Kaiser's will as Supreme Warlord to intervene in and dominate the
General Staff and on his inadequacy. She points out that the Military Cabinet was directly answerable to the Kaiser and became independent from the
Ministry of War in 1883. The Kaiser, she says, used it to escape from constitutionalism. She discusses conflicts between the Ministry of War, the
Military Cabinet and the General Staff.
Chapter Two
She writes that:
Helmuth von Moltke (the Younger) got on well with von Schlieffen, but von
Moltke's appointment was opposed and resented by not a few, not least because of his perceived Theosophical leanings. The Kaiser appointed
Helmuth von Moltke to be his personal aide-de-camp in 1891, from when he was in close daily contact with Kaiser. Helmuth von Moltke's character is recognised as exemplary (p50) but Mombauer claims that his letters attest to his being "anti-Semitic, xenophobic, nationalist, monarchist….bellicose" (p51)
[Nb the first adjective she chooses to list here - TB].
Despite Helmuth von
Moltke's early contact with Rudolf Steiner, Mombauer argues that von Moltke regarded his military career as being more important and dropped
Anthroposophy when necessary (p54). The Kaiser's nickname for von Moltke was Julius. (p55). She claims von Moltke was nervous about his new post but also ambitious. His letters to his wife show his self-confidence (p58). Prior to his appointment in 1906, he was the first in the post to speak frankly to the
Kaiser about the poor state of the army's unrealistic manoeuvres and recommended him to stay away; the Kaiser accepted this advice. She suggests Eulenburg's influence may have been behind von Moltke's appointment.
Terence Zuber's controversial article denying the existence of the Schlieffen
Plan is mentioned in note 126 (p74) but came too late for much discussion in
Mombauer's book. She repeats the traditional view of the Schlieffen Plan: von Moltke the Elder had planned to split the army 50-50 and go on the

3 offensive against Russia in the East but von Schlieffen had discarded this.
She states (p.79) that Germany never realised that her "enemies (post 1904)
were largely reacting to German provocation" [Nb the word "largely" here -
TB]
On p82 she notes the sour relations between the German and Austro-
Hungarian General Staffs: after 1896 there was merely only an exchange of
New Year greetings.
She writes (p83) that the German government learned of the German
General Staff's strategy only in Dec. 1912 [N.b. this is the same year that the British Cabinet learned of the clandestine meetings between the
British and French General Staffs – TB].
Von Schlieffen ignored the navy and left Britain out of his considerations. pp84-84: Here Mombauer presents her view of Schlieffen: a rigid technician, blinkered, obstinate, unrealistic, timid with the Kaiser, a poor strategic thinker who put all eggs in one basket, he simply did the best of a bad job, but this led him NOT to warn government of the risks of the German position.
Helmuth von Moltke, she says, essentially continued this technical view with a few strategic considerations relating to France, Holland, and the possibilities of a long war. General Staff confidence in the German Army's military skills led to overconfidence that Germany would win any war despite the difficulties. p88: She writes that no real change occurred after Helmuth von Moltke took over - apart from improving manouvres, which also became more secretive - until Dec. 1911 (Helmuth von Moltke's Memorandum). von Moltke, she writes, identified France as the military threat and recognised the new offensive spirit in the French Army (p91). He was, she says, determined to prevent any invasion of German territory from East or West (p93) hence he strengthened
German forces in Alsace- Lorraine and in East Prussia. [This is interesting in view of Rudolf Steiner's indications re. the stance of Pope Nicholas I in the C9th and the Pope’s determination to affirm the position of the Roman
Catholic Church toward both East and West– TB]
Helmuth von Moltke's reasons for respecting Dutch neutrality (cf. Schlieffen's view) were essentially military. Holland, he saw as necessary as Germany's
"windpipe" in a long war (p94), especially if Britain were to join the war. This position led to the decision to go through Belgium and Luxemburg only, rather than Holland, and to take the fortress of Liege (see Helmuth von
Moltke memoir in 1915, p96). Mombauer almost grudgingly recognises that some political and economic concerns did enter Helmuth von Moltke's thinking, unlike that of von Schlieffen. She avoids saying openly that von
Moltke was a better strategic thinker than Schlieffen but that is in fact the implicit thrust of her argument. p97: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg didn't find out about the Liege attack plan till 31 July 1914; Mombauer argues that this von Moltke plan "effectively precluded any last minute options for peace - as was indeed the case in
1914." After the war, she notes, many of those involved in the Plan blamed

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Helmuth von Moltke for its failure, ignoring their own complicity; von Moltke was "a convenient scapegoat". He was later blamed for losing Germany the war because he "tampered" with the Schlieffen Plan. Mombauer is evenhanded here, recognising that it was "….his right, even his duty, to adapt
the war plan to changing circumstances." (p98) "….it is also difficult to see how von Moltke could have fulfilled his role as Chief of the General Staff had he not adapted and updated Germany's strategic plan on an annual
basis."(p100)
But Mombauer says Helmuth von Moltke "boasted" that the Liege plan had been his, yet in the quote she cites there is no whiff of a boast; this is an example of her consistent anti-von Moltke prejudice. p99: General Groener later claimed there had been a "deep mental rift" between von Moltke and von Schlieffen, so von Moltke didn't consult von
Schlieffen after 1906. Mombauer doesn't think this unreasonable. (p99)
Von Moltke, she says, saw war on two fronts as inevitable, so the alternative
Ostaufmarschplan (March East Plan), in which the bulk of the army would fight in the east he abandoned as unrealistic; but this left Germany with only one plan - a grave error, according to Swiss historian Adolf Gasser
(Preussische Miltärgeist und Kriegsentfesselung 1914. 1985): "With no other plan of action, and in the certain knowledge that the Schlieffen Plan would eventually 'expire' [because of Russian rail development], Germany's military planners must have decided on a war in the near future, when they decided to scrap any alternatives to the Schlieffen Plan. This was proof, in Gasser's view, that in Dec. 1912 Helmuth von Moltke had decided on a 'preventive'
war in the near future." (Gasser p5-7)
Then comes a very important statement on p104:
"The scrapping of the plan for an attack in the East was almost certainly partly a result of the war council meeting of Dec 1912, held in response to the bad news from London which shattered the illusion that Britain might remain neutral, at least in the initial stages of a war arising from a Balkan conflict…..Unlike the Chancellor…..the military decison-makers believed in neither French nor British neutrality after the clear warning from Lichnowsky [ German ambassador in London - TB] in Dec. 1912."
[Note the words 'almost certainly'; this is not evidence but speculation –
TB] p105 April 1913 - Plan 2 was definitely dropped - "damning evidence [N.b.
Mombauer's choice of adjective - TB] that Germany's military decisionmakers were unwilling or unable to develop military strategies for all political contingencies." "The lack of any alternative to an all-out war scenario suggests that within the General Staff there was certainly no desire to avoid a war on two fronts - perhaps even, as Gasser suspects, an explicit
desire to ensure that only such a war could occur…" [emphasis TB; note these phrases]

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Mombauer's conclusion on p105: "It can certainly not be denied that a military leadership that was determined to keep peace would have struggled to develop alternative plans, no matter how slim the chance that they could ultimately be implemented." This is an absurd argument.
What military leadership in the world does this ? Their task is to prepare to fight a war, not to keep the peace - that is the job of diplomats. Did the
British, French, Russian military develop plans to keep the peace !? This is another example of how Germany is judged by a different standard from other nations.
Chapter 3
p106: "During these years [1908-1914] Moltke became convinced that war was unavoidable, even that it was a necessity for Germany, and he continually
advocated it." Mombauer has offered no evidence for this assertion at this point. But in her next paragraph she writes, almost in contradiction of her previous statement :
"…before 1911 the General Staff did not exert any real pressure to
push for army increases."
If the General Staff, led by von Moltke, were as keen on an all-out war on two fronts as she claims, would they not have exerted "real pressure to push for army increases"?
She then introduces without further discussion the convenient label applied by historian Stig Forster - 'doppelte Militarismus' [dual militarism]. This refers to the differing views of the General Staff and the Ministry of War. Her use of Forster's term merely serves to reinforce the view of German society as especially militaristic. p107: Re. casus belli: "Germany's decision-makers knew that the perfect set-
up would be a Balkan crisis." This is a prejudicial term used by Mombauer, who claims that the "decision-makers" had no doubt that great efforts would have to be made to make Germany look innocent and offers as evidence a quote by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria – but was he a "decision-maker"?
Hardly. Again, she says: "Due to Moltke's close relationship with the Kaiser,
he was able to impress his sense of urgency on the Kaiser…" but she offers no evidence of this. p108: Mombauer claims that Tschirsky (of the Foreign Office) said to
Bernhardi that "he was quite willing to go to war" but the Mombauer quote following this is not evidence of this fact but of something else altogether.
Mombauer writes that following the army bill of 1 Oct. 1913, the idea of waging 'a preventive war' began to take shape in Moltke's mind." But she gives no evidence for this. In the following paragraph she says:

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"A picture thus emerges in these crucial years of Moltke as an
advocate of war as soon as possible….."
But this is not a question of years but of months, by her own admission. In footnote 6 she defines preventive war as:
"not in the sense of pre-empting an attack from one of G's possible future enemies, but of preventing a situation in which G would no longer herself be able to launch an attack successfully."
Yet she gives no evidence that Moltke himself thought of it like this.
On p109 she uses the prejudicial term "M's push for war" and on p110 writes that:
"The fact that Moltke so frequently and vociferously demanded war must not be overlooked."
After 110 pages she still has offered no real evidence of this, only repeated assertions!
Despite severely criticising von Schlieffen and his Plan, Mombauer here essentially accepts the 'Schlieffen School' line:
"The decisions that Moltke took in the years 1908 to 1914 resulted in crucial changes to Germany's military planning and led to Germany's
military defeat in the First World War." (p110)
Importantly, she says:
"While it is true to say that Moltke played no decisive part in developing military doctrine, and that as Chief of the General Staff his scope for commanding troops and imparting his strategic ideas at ground level were rather limited, his importance lay rather in the
political sphere."
This is a not unimportant admission on her part, since it significantly weakens her argument about Von Moltke's central role and responsibility.
Yet again she repeats:
"…due to his close personal relationship with the Kaiser, Moltke's influence cannot therefore be described as negligible."
And yet again, after 110 pages, she still gives no real evidence of this !
She then describes the background to the Bosnian crisis of 1908 without mentioning the fact that at the Congress of 1878, it was agreed - following a
British suggestion (by Disraeli and Lord Salisbury) that AustriAustria-
Hungaryungary should administer BosniAustria-Hungaryerzegovina for 30 years

7 under nominal Turkish suzerainty – that AustriAustria-Hungaryungary should eventually take over full control of Bosnia. p111: She says that Moltke and Bulow "changed the [Dual] Alliance agreement
from a defensive to an offensive one" because Moltke assured the Austrian,
Conrad, that Germany would support Austria-Hungary if Russia attacked
Austria-Hungary as a result of an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. She fails to mention the long string of terrorist assaults on Austria-Hungary, assaults that had emerged from Serbia (the Black Hand secret society etc.). An
Austro-Hungarian punitive attack could therefore certainly be described as
'defensive'.
Again and again, as here, she refers to Moltke's awareness of the importance of public opinion; he wrote:
"…peace prevailed in 1909, because the current political situation in
Germany was not suited to a bellicose foreign policy. Public opinion
would probably not have supported a war over a Balkan issue."
Yet Germany is always said to have been a militaristic autocracy, an impression she herself does nothing to dispel; rather, the opposite. p112: Here at last, she finally presents some kind of evidence that would seem to point to Moltke's desire for a war - his letter to Conrad of Sept. 1909
- but she doesn't say what kind of opportunity Moltke was referring to: war for Germany or war just for Austria-Hungary. p113: Here is one of the various references to Moltke's personality by contemporaries, all of which are positive - his "open and honest personality…his calm, clear judgment…" But Mombauer ignores the sense of these and prefers to imply that he was some kind of warmongering demon. p114: Here she writes: "Notwithstanding the fact that Moltke's letters did not
always accurately portray his true intentions…" Although she has just referred on the previous page to his "open and honest personality", she now implies that Moltke was a liar or deceiver: "…..his bellicose statements…."
Were his statements bellicose in the same way as Kaiser Wilhelm's ? Not at all, yet she uses the same word. This is unfounded prejudice.
"That war was not only inescapable, but also desirable was a notion that Moltke shared with most of his military contemporaries…"
Mombauer omits to see the force of this point, namely, that throughout
Europe military men held this view, and not just in Germany, as she implies.
Yet she and numerous other historians, whose arguments in this regard are equally prejudiced, only tend to focus on German military men in this regard.
The question is did Mooltke look forward to war with relish ? Was he a real warmonger, wanting war for its own sake? She never distinguishes this

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motive from that of the soldier doing his duty as he saw fit, so on p115 she says of Conrad that he "hardly needed Moltke's encouragement - he was
himself an outspoken warmonger", the word 'himself' implying that von
Moltke was also such a warmonger. She notes "Serbian provocation" against
Austria-Hungary and refers to "the troublesome Serbian neighbour" but does not comment on Serbian responsibility.
She cites von Moltke, on 21 Jan 1909 writing:
"…none of the great states will, because of Serbian ambitions, light the torch of war that could set alight the roof of all Europe. That
Russia, motivated by such considerations, will stay quiet in a warlike conflict between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Serbia does not
seem at all unlikely to me."
So how then can Moltke be seen as wanting war against Russia out of a quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia?
There follows a whole paragraph of mere unsupported assertion that von
Moltke never conceived of any alternative to threatening escalation and never felt deterred by "the increasing likelihood that war could result from any localised European conflict." p117 Re. naval race with Britain: "An honorable agreement, for example , on the basis of a reduction in the speed of building, thus seemed desirable to
him [von Moltke] too." This is hardly the view of an irresponsible warmongering fanatic, as Mombauer makes him out to be in this book. p118: here is a quote which shows that von Moltke took the views of the people into account and was no haughty arrogant militarist, but Mombauer does not draw this conclusion.
[N.b. Interesting in view of Steiner's indication about von Moltle's earlier incarnation as Pope Nicholas I, who had a connection with the region of
Alsace and the Odilienberg, that his friendly colleague was named Colmar von der Goltz]
Finally, after 117 pages, a quote in a letter to Conrad Sept 1909 which does seem to show that von Moltke would have been prepared to see a general war over the Bosnian question in 1908.
"I am firmly convinced that it would have been possible to localise the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and the monarchy would have been stabilised within and strengthened without as a result of the war's victorious completion and could have won a preponderance in the Balkans that would no longer be rocked so easily. Even if Russia had become active and a European war had developed, the conditions for Austria and Germany could now have been better than they will probably be in a few years' time."

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But note that he says "Even if Russia....", so this does not necessarily imply he was expecting and wanting a war with Russia, but rather one between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
The mending of the rift with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was von
Moltke's work; von Schlieffen had ignored Austria-Hungary. p119 Mombauer claims that von Moltke tried to hide from Austria-Hungary the fact that Germany's main force in the East was against Russia because
"The knowledge that Germany would only deploy the most minimal forces in
the East might have resulted in Austria deciding not to attack Russia….."
This is nonsense, because the Austro-Hungarian General Staff could see only too well that German deployment was very small in the East. von Moltke, she says, "relied on an alliance war motivated by
'Nibelungentreue' (the faithfulness of the Nibelungs i.e. tribal loyalty) but she gives no evidence of von Moltke using this phrase in letters to Conrad or anyone else. p121 The Agadir Crisis of 1911 "The dispatch of the German gunboat
Panther to ….Agadir….marked the beginning of the second Moroccan Crisis."
No, it was the French colonialist actions in Morocco that initiated the dispute and prompted the dispatch. Then, 3 sentences later, she recognises that
"Germany felt provoked by French military intervention in Morocco" [N.b. the mild word 'intervention'] and admits "Germany's reaction is perhaps understandable in the light of the rules of imperialism that applied at the
time." In a footnote she describes Geoffrey Barraclough's account of the
Agadir Crisis as "perhaps too sympathetic to German intentions" without any discussion of it though says he is accurate in his description of it as bungling and muddled i.e. she allows her readers to perceive nothing but negativity about German actions. p122 At the height of the Agadir Crisis von Moltke's mood she describes as
"pronouncedly bellicose". She writes that he is said to have called for a
"reckoning with England" Yet despite this seemingly important quote, she offers nothing more extensive nor any further discussion of the statement.
She quotes a long section of a letter by von Moltke to his wife, which seems more ironical than "pronouncedly bellicose" (p124). Rather than actually calling in a bellicose manner for war, the passage from letter simply seems to express his despair at the German government's habit of making demands and then not being prepared to follow them up with action – a typical attitude for a military man, this passage does not strike one as the ranting of a warmonger. p125 An extremely weak piece of ‘argumentation’ here as Mombauer tries to disagree with those who say that von Moltke's statements at this time were all but the talk of a weak man and that too much shouldn't be placed on them. Mombauer argues with no evidence that his statements during this period show that von Moltke was aiming at war before too long and that his injured pride and uneasy feeling hid a desire for Weltpolitik.

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Again she claims that the path from "Agadir to Armageddon" began with
Germany: "Arguably the most significant result was that Germany had clearly
identified herself as an aggressor and troublemaker." Yet the Agadir Crisis began with French aggression against Morocco! Judging from many western historians' discussion of the Agadir Crisis, it is as if they feel that the other
Powers were expected to simply accept the French takeover of Morocco.
When Germany challenged it, Germany was then and still is now regarded as a bully and dangerously aggressive warmonger! p126 "In France, Germany's aggressive and provocative behaviour led to a
revival of the revanche idea." No. It began with the Joan of Arc commemorations in 1909, stirred up by French warmongering rightwing chauvinists.
"A longterm consequence of German provocation was the Anglo-French naval agreement…."
" ….Germany, who by now had shown herself clearly as an aggressor."
Mombauer fails to contrast this one German gunboat, the Panther, with the
French attempt to annex a new colony! Then, on the very next page she says:
"Germany's political decision-makers….did not actually want war in
1911, although they were willing to threaten it to achieve foreign
policy gains."
[and what about Fashoda, just 13 years before, when France had come so close to war with Britain over yet another sordid colonial grab?] p130: Agadir frightened von Moltke into wanting the army kept prepared for war at all times, says Mombauer. But isn't this common sense for any army ? p132 An important von Moltke memo to Bethmann-Hollweg 2 Dec 1911:
"The equipping, perfecting and strengthening of her military power in all areas are making France an ever more powerful and dangerous opponent. All are preparing themselves for the big war that is widely expected sooner or later [i.e. everyone in Europe] .
Only Germany and her ally Austria-Hungary are not participating in these
preparations."
If even the Chief of the General Staff himself felt that Germany was insufficiently prepared for a war that is "widely expected", then this is not exactly convincing evidence that von Moltke had been pushing for war for years before. p135 1912 a marked changeover in favour towards the army from the navy and thus a certain lessening of tensions between Britain and Germany:
Mombauer writes: "Previously the General Staff had lacked self-confidence vis-a-vis the predominant navy and had received no support from other
military or civilian bodies." Yet we are always told by her and by other western historians that this was the most militaristic society on earth! Here

11 she is saying that "the most militaristic society on earth", the army that traced its traditions back to Frederick the Great and before lacked self-
confidence vis-a-vis the predominant navy, a body that hardly existed before the mid-1890s! p136 Mombauer notes that the Balkan War of 1912 was another pretext for a general war but that Kaiser was against it. Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen-
Wächter "tried hard to change the Kaiser's mind during those days", she writes but doesn't say that von Moltke tried to do so. Wilhelm II, she notes, only changed his mind " on account of the press and public opinion…" - yet elsewhere, she maintains, like so many others, that this was supposed to be an autocracy !
13 Oct 1912 At the Hubertusstock meeting the Kaiser called for army increases but "was opposed by his military advisers." We note that Mombauer implies that these included von Moltke because she writes that:
He was reassured by both Heeringen and Moltke that the German army was prepared for all eventualities, should the Balkan War escalate.
So von Moltke did not want more troops, but the next day he changed his mind. Mombauer tries to rationalise why but can only come up with
'possibilities' and 'suggestions':
"It is possible that Moltke realised….It has been suggested that this change of heart was due to Ludendorff's influence…." p137 von Moltke's niece wrote at the time : "he too thinks there is absolutely no reason for going to war and he said: "If only England and Germany would go together they would lead the world; this whole tension is the work of
King Edward [the King had died two years earlier but during his reign relations betwen England and Germany had badly deteriorated, not least due to his own personal sympathies and antipathies - TB] . He thinks the feeling in England against Germany is manufactured by politicians, the press
and the diplomats." Mombauer doesn't comment on the way these pertinent points contradict her own central argument.
"Moltke, who had known about Austria's bellicose intentions, had obviously
not travelled to Vienna hoping to restrain his Austrian colleague…" No evidence is offered for this statement.
1912 'War Council' p138: "….the news from London…..that Britain would not keep out of a war on the continent, but would come to France's aid. As a result, the Kaiser's peaceful attitude changed completely. At a meeting of 8
Dec 1912, the so-called war council which he called in response to this
news, the Kaiser was at his most bellicose." p.140: "At the meeting, the Kaiser, Moltke, and Muller were keen for war to result from the current crisis…..On this occasion Moltke was a

12 clear advocate of war now rather than later, as Admiral Muller noted in his diary: 'Gen.v. M: 'I consider a war unavoidable, and the sooner
the better.'"
Mombauer paints a picture of a man whose lips are slavering with desire for war, but von Moltke merely said war is unavoidable sooner or later and if so, then sooner rather than later. That doesn't mean he wanted it; to recall his words to his niece: "there may be war for the simple reason that everyone has prepared for it for so long and such tremendous armaments are always a
danger" (pp.136-7)
"The Bavarian military plenipotentiary Wenniger had received similar information about the meeting: 'Moltke was in favour of an immediate
strike…..the opportunity had never been more favourable.'"
Mombauer doesn't say where Wenniger had received this information. Moltke then speaks again about "Mombauer's bellicose words" [a favourite phrase of hers - TB] demanding no delay, but in the next paragraph notes Moltke's concern for public opinion "leading even him to suggest that a postponement of the war might be necessary. He suggested starting a campaign in the press to prepare the public to accept the necessity of a war against Russia".
Mombauer doesn't offer direct evidence for this seemingly important point, but only a footnote reference to a letter of Wenninger. p143 "M's request for war 'the sooner the better' was a serious demand…." but Mombauer to this point has offered NO evidence that he made any such request. p144 "The Balkan Wars of 1912/13 resulted in a complete upheaval of the
previous European balance of power." Yet all this was triggered by French actions in Morocco, as Mombauer herself charted. p145 Mombauer presents a long quote from von Moltke on the need for public opinion to get behind a war for the sake of an ally (with the implication that
Moltke was warmongering) but from a military point of view, this was actually common sense.
"Moltke depicted ….France, England, and Russia as having offensive aims in a future war and therefore being able to rally public support much more easily than Germany, whose aims he describes as
defensive, as merely to preserve the status quo."
Exactly! France wanted Alsace-Lorraine, England wanted Germany crushed for economic reasons and the Berlin-Baghdad railway terminated, and Russia wanted Constantinople. Germany had no war aims or desires before
September 1914, when some were hastily cobbled together. p146 "Because he was aware that the longer she waited before provoking a war, Germany would lose her edge over her future
opponents, Moltke's attitude was sooner rather than later…."

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But nowhere does Mombauer offer real evidence that he wanted to provoke a war! Neither does she take into account the perfectly reasonable argument that von Moltke was not some proto-Nazi warmonger or Prussian militarist lusting for conquest but was simply responding to the poisonous diplomatic situation that had developed between the two armed camps in Europe by
1912-14, a situation that was largely the responsibility of the chancellories and the media of Europe. Within that situation, for a military man tasked with defending his country and seeking to find the best means of carrying out his task, if he asked himself when would be the best time for us to fight, 'war sooner rather than later' would certainly be a sensible option from a purely military point of view, given Germany's situation.
Von Moltke, according to Mombauer, "advocated the introduction of universal military conscription, which in Germany had only ever existed on
paper. He wanted to match the percentage that France recruited…." So much for German militarism ! "However, it was a demand that was difficult to push
through the Reichstag." [ So much for German autocracy! - TB ] Nowhere does Mombauer actually give direct evidence that von Moltke called for conscription. [even if he did ! - TB] p147 She writes that Wandel (Minister of War) believed that von Moltke was under the control of "some restless and ambitious people….that he has no will of his own (that he is perhaps paralysed in his energy by a physical
ailment)." p150 "…until 1912 no press dept existed to promote the army in a similar way" [i.e. to the navy. So much for Prussian militarism ! - TB] p151 von Moltke letter to Conrad 10 Feb 1913:
"Moltke was certain that the German people would support Austria if she were attacked by Russia. However, if Austria were to provoke a conflict, it would be difficult to find support for this among the
German people."
So much for the provocative militarist!
In this important letter of 10 Feb. 1913 von Moltke urged Conrad not to be provocative, but Mombauer hardly quotes from this important letter - only this passage:
"As he explained to Conrad, he envisaged a racial struggle between
Germanic and Slavic races. The attack would have to come from the
Slavic side, but he considered it 'the duty of all states that carry the standard of Germanic culture (Geisteskultur) to prepare themselves for this."
Mombauer points out (p. 153) that other German leaders shared this
"Social Darwinist" vision. Yet such views had been prevalent throughout
Europe for decades – they were one of the main factors contributing to the poisonous relations between States - and they had originated in Britain !

Belgium
14
p154 "In a letter to Bethmann-Hollweg [Moltke] pleaded for more cooperation between the military and political spheres, and for a discussion
of military planning in a political context" and p155 "Bethmann-Hollweg….never socialised with the Chief of the General
Staff…..General von Moltke complained about this often and bitterly." [So much for the arrogant militarist ! – TB]
"By 1913, Moltke did not doubt that England would 'get actively involved in the war on our opponents' side, whether we march through Belgium or not."
p 163 "Would it be worth considering not marching through Belgium, if this made English neutrality possible ? This would indeed be the case, Moltke argued, if Britain had not made it absolutely clear that she would be actively involved on the side of Germany's opponents, whether or not Germany marched through Belgium…..[England] fears a defeat of [France] and a German hegemony and, true to her politics which are aimed at preserving the European balance of power, she will do everything to hinder an extension of power on Germany's side.
Therefore we will have to count England among our opponents."
This was a clear-eyed and spot-on observation by von Moltke and was borne out by Grey's stance in the Cabinet Meeting of 2 nd August 1914, demanding
British intervention for the sake of France, not Belgium. p160 Nevertheless, Mombauer notes that Moltke did consider alternatives to going via Belgium, which he was forced to reject as impractical. p161 Mombauer notes without comment that the military had NOT hidden their plans from the government (except for the attack on Liege). So much for militarism ! p162 Mombauer notes the "very real dangers" that motivated the General
Staff thinking over the Belgium route i.e. France might also invade Belgium or Belgium might join Germany's enemies. p165 "Moltke explained why he considered an offensive strategy necessary for Germany, and why that offensive had to launched against the West
first…." But the following quote introduced by Mombauer does NOT explain why Moltke considered such a strategy necessary. p166 Moltke, to the Belgian military attaché de Melotte:
"The war with France is inevitable and much closer than you might think. We do not want it. We have nothing to gain from it. But we have had enough of the continuous alerts which hinder our

15 development. It is absolutely essential that France stop obstructing and provoking us, otherwise we will have to confront them. The sooner, the better." It is hardly coincidence that Moltke repeated the bellicose words of the war council on this occasion."
Mombauer repeats the word 'bellicose' here.
Beyens, Belgian envoy:
"As the Kaiser is surrounded solely by generals who have no doubt been ordered to speak [by whom? - TB] the same language as the
Chief of the General Staff, they want to change H.M.'s peace-loving
attitude and to convince him of the necessity of this war."
[recorded by Beyens from info given by King Albert Nov 1913]
Future Allies
Mombauer mentions (p. 170) that the very pro-German Italian Chief of the
General Staff, Pollio, died on 28 th June 1914, "the very day of the
assassination at Sarajevo". How convenient that a key German military ally, regarded by most major military figures in Germany, including von Moltke, as an excellent and reliable man, should suddenly die on the day that Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, who wished to keep the peace with Serbia was assassinated!
But of course she doesn't say anything about the cause of death. In fact,
Pollio suffered a heart attack (!) on 28 th June and died on 1 and Herwig, Decisions For War 1914-1917, p.186) st July (Hamilton p172 von Jagow May/June 1914:
"In [Moltke's] opinion there was no alternative to making preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with
the aim of provoking a war in the near future." In view of this strong claim and KEY QUOTE, it is noteworthy that Mombauer doesn't draw attention to the possibility of Jagow seeking to exculpate himself after the event. p174 Mombauer disingenuously quotes Col. Edward M. House - ( The
Intimate Papers of Colonel House Vol. 1 p248) - as if he's talking about just Berlin, when in fact he's referring to the whole of Europe when he famously writes:
"It is militarism run stark mad."
Nor does she cite the context of the quote or the fact that House refers to war resulting from Britain's letting France and Russia loose on Germany.
House actually wrote:
"Whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on
Germany and Austria."
Army Increases Debate 1914

16 p175 [Tappen] remarked with scarcely hidden criticism that 'Moltke wanted to serve his country in his responsible position as long as this was possible
for him.' Why the assumption of criticism in these words ? No evidence is offered. p176 After 176 pages, at no time has Mombauer discussed whether there was substance to German fears about future French and Russian war plans.
Mombauer criticises Moltke for not instigating a change of strategy, but how long would a complete change of strategy have taken to work out and implement in 1913-14 ? Would it have been ready by 1916/17 ? She ignores this. Her whole argument proves nothing except that Germany was ready and willing to fight in August 1914, but who actually pushed the situation to war:
Russia and Austria-Hungary ! p177 "[Waldersee] was not suggesting of course that the politicians should be alerted to the flimsy basis for their bellicose foreign policy. What bellicose German foreign policy in 1912-14 ?
"The memorandum [Waldersee memorandum May 1914] is interesting not just because it confirms that the General Staff believed that a war would come in the near future….."
This doesn't mean they believed that Germany would start one ! p178 There is no direct connection between what Mombauer calls Waldersee's
"logical conclusion" and the paragraph quote that follows it.
"In the light of the recent revelations about secret Anglo-Russian negotiations on a naval agreement, Germany's complete 'encirclement' seemed unavoidable in future."
Nb Mombauer doesn't comment on the fact of Germany's complete
'encirclement', which the British and French had been compassing since
1904 at least.
8 July 1914 Falkenhayn to Bethmann-Hollweg: [Falkenhayn felt] ' that the army absolutely needed a period of quiet in order to come to terms with the
big army bill of 1913' So does that make Falkenhayn one of the
'warmongers' of 1914? p179 Mombauer refers to "an emotional plea" by Moltke in his letter to
Bethmann-Hollweg 18 July 1914 but there is nothing overtly emotional in the lengthy quote which follows. p180 Again Mombauer speaks of the pronounced desire for war on the part of
"Germany's military leaders" cited by the 'evidence' in her study, but the
German military leaders' feelings were based on fears for survival not lust for conquest. On the basis of just one flimsy quote by Falkenhayn she deduces that military leaders "both within the Ministry of War and the General Staff, the top military leaders shared the belief that the time was right for war in
the summer of 1914" [Falkenhayn was then the Minister of War].

17
She then tries to solve a conundrum, the contradiction that, as she claims, they were all for war, yet "even while the July Crisis was unfolding, military planners still kept an eye to the future, quarrelling over army increases that would only take effect in 1915 or even 1916. How can this apparent
contradiction be explained ?
Well, it can't, because there was NO real German will for war in summer
1914. p181 Given ….the many occasions in the past when the military had considered the opportunity for a strike to be present, but the civilians had
preferred to pursue a more peaceful policy….. i.e. the civilians had held back the military. How was this possible if Germany was supposed to be such a militarist autocracy ? Mombauer's argument is repeatedly hamstrung by such contradictions.
Chapter 4 July Crisis
p182 " Research into the July Crisis has established that the decision to use the assassination of the Archduke, supposedly by Serbian controlled terrorists, as an opportunity for settling Austria's Balkan
problems was arrived at as much in Berlin as in Vienna."
No evidence offered for this statement. p183 "While Austria-Hungary still wanted to punish the Serbs, Germany, by virtue of her military plans, wanted to begin hostilities against France and
Russia…." 'Germany', meaning who ?
A very important point: p185ff is Mombauer's claim of a holiday conspiracy that German leaders deliberately went on holiday in June -July as a pretence: but she offers no direct evidence of this at all, not even in a footnote at this point.
"…most were away on holiday, keeping a deliberately low profile….Until the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was delivered, the key decision-makers could afford to be absent from Berlin and their return to the centre of decision-making was carefully timed to ensure they had their say when it really mattered….." p192 The responsible political leaders, Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow, were also absent from Berlin, giving the crisis - quite deliberately - 'a
leaderless appearance'.
Again, no evidence of conspiracy or intention is presented whatsoever. It is mere assertion. p193 "…their absence helped to create the impression of calm that both
Berlin and Vienna wanted to convey to the outside world…" Again, no

18 evidence of conspiracy whatsoever. Such real evidence would be dynamite in support of her case, but she doesn't produce any. pp194-195
"On 11 July [Waldersee] requested information about Conrad's strategic intentions…Waldersee requested this information soon, in order to be able to advise Moltke accordingly It is clearly not true to claim as Turner does that Waldersee 'did nothing at all' during the crucial days of July…
Yet Turner was right; Waldersee DID nothing; he merely requested information. On this episode, see n43:
This was an unfortunate result of the plan to demonstrate outward calm by sending key men on holiday. Key decision-makers, such as
Conrad and Moltke, could not coordinate or confirm their strategies, and military discussions had to be conducted by less senior figures.
(emphasis – TB)
Mombauer fails to present ANY evidence at all for any of this. p196 Waldersee returned to Berlin on 23 rd July. Mombauer writes: "It would be more accurate to say that he returned when he knew to expect the
greatest political tension….." i.e. the day of the ultimatum. Maybe, but she gives no evidence for this assertion.
Moltke's return was also timed to coincide with the expected rising of
tension…. Again, no evidence from Mombauer. p197 Bethmann too had secretly travelled to Berlin….. This implies a conspiracy, but again, she presents no evidence thereof.
Mombauer denies that only the military were really guilty; she insists that the civilian government personnel were also (see p185). Why did civilians this time give way to the military unlike in previous crises? Because Russia was serious this time and the civilians in the government sensed that and feared it. Mombauer doesn't discuss this point. p186 Her thesis: to identify the degree of influence of the military in the July
Crisis. She writes: A detailed study of the available evidence demonstrates a much higher degree of involvement of key military men than has previously
been suspected.
So no-one else has made detailed studies….?
"However it is now possible to draw on a variety of materials…..that help to
shed light on [Moltke's] intentions…." Mombauer doesn't say here what

19 materials these are. She acknowledges the almost complete lack of personal papers due to the "almost complete destruction of Moltke's papers" [she doesn't say how they were destroyed - by relatives or by allied bombing] p191, p198-9 Mombauer mentions without comment that the Kaiser was for
European peace in the July Crisis both before and after receipt of Serbian note. p197 Only now did the Entente states realize the gravity of the situation; the 'softly softly approach' had worked [i.e. the supposed "conspiracy" by
Germany and Austria-Hungary - TB] in preventing Russia and France from
initiating any military measures before the ultimatum was delivered. No.
There was no such approach, rather was it a case of Austrian schlamperei
(slackness). Certainly Austria-Hungary had wished to wait till the Franco-
Russian talks in St Petersburg were over so that Poincaré and the Russians could not confer as to what to do about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and its likely consequences, but they had in all probability already conferred in talks during the French visit, of which no official records were made. p200 the 'new material' of Falkenhayn's diaries shows that on 28 July Molyke advocated a delay in mobilisation. Mombauer notes: "It is much more difficult to explain why Moltke opposed this measure. Falkenhayn seems to
have thought that Moltke still hoped for peace…" Mombauer doesn't go into this further, though the following quote from Falkenhayn diary tends to totally undermine her argument about Moltke's constant warmongering.
Mombauer speculates: "More likely, [Moltke] agreed with Bethmann's view that they should wait for as long as possible in order to let the Russians take the blame……It is also possible that Falkenhayn painted a deliberately
unfavourable picture of Moltke, for whom he had little respect" (emphasis –
TB). In which case, why trust anything else in Falkenhayn's diaries, if she does not trust this ? Mombauer then brings forward what she admits are "second-
hand opinions" that indicate Moltke had more aggressive views. p201 Mombauer discusses Moltke's memorandum of 28 July, also included in
Thomas Meyer's book. She omits Moltke's account of the causes of the crisis
(Serbian terrorism) and her discussion of the document completely ignores what it indicates about Moltke as an individual. p.202 n82: Albertini's discussion of the document is more even-handed:
"Though resolved to go to the ally's help, he [von Moltke] seems at the critical moment to have perceived the terribleness of the tragedy towards which events were moving and to have been somewhat more
cautious than the War Minister Falkenhayn" [who said 4 August: "Even if we perish over this, at least it will have been fun"] p203 Mombauer claims that Moltke insisted on German general mobilisation even before the Russian order for general mobilisation and that despite his insistence, the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg did NOT allow it.

20 p204: "There was only one reason why war would become unavoidable once
German mobilisation was declared: because German troops would have to
march into Belgium and take Liege immediately.”
This shows Mombauer's ignorance of military realities. In those years all
European general staffs had long recognised that mobilisation meant war, at least from the 1894 French and Russian Dual Alliance Military Agreement -
Generals Boisdeffre and Obruchev. Especially for Germany was this the case due to her geographical position. All military men knew this was the case for
Germany. Mombauer, however, puts too much emphasis on the Liege attack because of Moltke's role in planning it. p205 30 July Bethmann-Hollweg attempts to restrain Austria-Hungary – this is inconvenient for Mombauer's civilian lust for war thesis. p205ff Mombauer insists that Moltke wanted immediate general mobilisation and war because the Liege attack required that every hour counted. She gives no direct evidence of this and only asserts it. p207 Mombauer accepts Bethmann-Hollweg's July 1917 assertion to Theodor
Wolff that Moltke had been responsible for the declaration of war on Russia – which was certainly a major error on Germany's part. p208 The last days of July: Now the military came into their own…. [N.b.
Only now !! - TB] Falkenhayn in particular stands out as a belligerent
advocate of war…..and desired a war almost for its own sake.
N.b. nowhere in the book is Mombauer able to say this of Helmuth von
Moltke despite everything else she says about him.
There were times during the last days of July 1914 when Falkenhayn pushed
for war even more than the Chief of the General Staff. Mombauer doesn't go into this, which also undermines her thesis that Helmuth von Moltke was the main culprit. n104: The Italian historian of the war, Albertini, also noted that Moltke was more cautious than Falkenhayn in the last days before war broke out.
Mombauer claims that Falkenhayn didn't understand Moltke's mood swings because Falkenhayn didn't know about the impending attack on Liege, but again, this is mere unsupported speculation. Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, she writes, "led Moltke to join Falkenhayn in his vociferous
demands for mobilisation." Why did Moltke join Falkenhayn if Moltke was the main warmonger ? Why didn't Falkenhayn join Moltke ? p211: "Despite his bellicose words…." Again the repeated refrain.... p213 "Moltke's guilt lies as much in disguising his own doubts about
Germany's ultimate chances at victory as in constantly advocating a war.
Thus….German political decision-makers….completely overestimated
Germany's military strength". Moltke's guilt: disguise, deception, constant advocacy of war – Mombauer racks up her case, but it has been built on sand.

21 p214 Contradiction: Mombauer claims Moltke was severely oppressed by
Austrian slowness: "Yet he did not get in contact with Conrad at any time in
July". This is contradicted on p195 when she discusses "the General Staff holiday conspiracy" and writes that in July: "Clearly, for the German military, there was no need to feel pressured by time." p215 "The one-sided nature of Germany's military planning began to impose restrictions not just on Germany's options, but also on Austria's. In fact, it
made a localised conflict impossible". So, Mombauer argues, the move from localised war to European war was because of Germany; Mombauer constantly ignores the role of Russia.
Mombauer now begins to lay it on thick: p216 "Military requirements made it impossible for the [German] politicians to react to Russia's reassurances that her mobilisation did not have to result in war….."
No. Mobilisation DID mean war for all countries and to suggest otherwise, as the Russians did, was deception.
Britain even suggested that in such a scenario she would not support
Russia if a conflict proved unavoidable despite a genuine Austrian
negotiation attempt.
What does this statement refer to ? Mombauer does not say. There was no way Britain would not have supported Russia when it came to the crunch.
Appeasement of Russia had become the "backbone" of British foreign policy by 1914, and Sasonov, well aware of this, even threatened to blackmail
Britain in July 1914 if British support was not forthcoming. Buchanan
(ambassador in St Petersburg), Nicholson (Permanent Under-Secretary at the
FO), and Grey (Foreign Secretary) were all petrified of this and were determined not to lose Russia's 'friendship' because of what that loss might mean for Britain's Asiatic possessions above all, notably India, and also because it might entail a return to the Franco-Russian alliance vs Britain scenario that had dominated European and global affairs until the Ententes of
1904 and 1907. p219 "Of all the men present at the Schloss (1 Aug) only Moltke knew how much each hour counted" [here Mombauer wants to imply: because of
Liege]
Mombauer gets the London telegram affair of 1 August 1914 completely wrong; she says, following Fritz Fischer, that the British had made an "offer" to guarantee French neutrality when in fact, Grey said no such thing. Grey was merely being incompetent and ignorant [?] of reality [the Franco-Russian
Alliance] even to raise the matter. p220 n143
"Thomas Meyer, one of Moltke's apologists, credits the Chief of the
General Staff with rather a lot of foresight when he claims that he had immediately recognised that the news [of the British offer] had to

22 be fake. In fact, Meyer tries to blame Britain for the outbreak of
war".
Yet Mombauer herself several times indicates how Moltke had with insight for years understood Britain's foreign policy, her balance of power position with regard to Belgium and northern France, her likely intervention to support
France etc. p221 Moltke was a realist in military terms - something Mombauer refuses to acknowledge in any generous way. That is why he had to reject the Kaiser's order to turn the army round on 1 st August, as the ignorant Kaiser simply did not comprehend what it meant to organise and direct a modern army in wartime. p223 One of the very few bits of "sympathy" Helmuth von Moltke gets from
Mombauer: "…even a layman can imagine Moltke's horror as he was faced with the Kaiser ordering a German deployment in the East…." p224 Mombauer quotes Adam von Moltke: "Eight years of difficult and well- thought out work were to be eradicated through a monarch's capricious
demand for power. But on p 220 she writes: "What had taken months to
perfect could not simply be changed at the last minute." She doesn't notice the error. p225 Criticising Moltke's failure to develop any alternative strategy,
Mombauer writes, with great naivete: "If France and Britain had decided not to support Russia, then a deployment to the eastern front and a defensive
stance could have prevented an escalation of the Austro-Serbian conflict"
But there was no way France and Britain would not have supported
Russia. Mombauer's view is based not only on her ignorance of diplomatic realities, but on her non-recognition of an Entente conspiracy: the French and Russian elites were determined on war eventually; it was, they felt, the only way they could realise their respective aims, the acquisition of
Alsace-Lorraine and Constantinople.
Chapter 5 The General Staff at war p247 Mombauer introduces more 'new material' - the Plessen diaries on the first weeks of the war. p253 She lightly passes over Kluck's responsibility for not enveloping Paris.
"When the German armies crossed the Marne to move towards Paris…." makes no sense, because the Marne is well south of Paris. Does she mean the
Aisne ? pp255-6 She notes the German tradition of giving freedom to local commanders rather than controlling everything rigidly from the centre, a tradition Moltke maintained. So much for the rigid "German military machine".

23 p257 She says that when Moltke sent Lt.Col. Hentsch to ascertain the situation of the 1st and 2 nd Armies on the ground, von Bülow was "optimistic
and there was no thought of retreat" when Lt.Col. Hentsch visited him on 8
Sept, but Keegan (The First World War, 1999) has the opposite on p132 of his book :
The result of their discussion was to be decisive for the outcome of
the campaign in the West. Bülow dominated …..[British exploitation of the 1 st -2nd Army gap would be] 'catastrophic'…. Bülow proposed to avert disaster by 'voluntary concentric retreat'.
Mombauer says:
Hentsch advised him that because of the seriousness of the situation of the First Army [which Hentsch had not yet visited (!); he went there the following morning] , both armies would have to retreat behind the Marne.
But Keegan has none of this and implies that retreat was Bülow's idea: Next morning, 9 th Sept., Hentsch again conferred with Bülow's staff officers, though not the General himself, and agreed that he would visit Kluck….to advise a retirement, which would close the menacing gap. While he was covering the 50 miles to First Army headquarters, Bülow decided to act on the conclusions arrived at by his juniors. He signalled Kluck that…..'Second
Army is beginning retreat'. p261 Mombauer describes Moltke and Ludendorff as "fellow conspirators" against Falkenhayn in the early months of his headship of the army, following Moltke's removal. Here she cites one letter from one source in connection with this for this, (Zechlin, Ludendorff) but this was merely a request from Moltke for a briefing from Ludendorff; it is hardly evidence of a
'conspiracy' against Falkenhayn, although Moltke was certainly critical of
Falkenhayn's strategy 1914-1916, and had good reason to be; Falkenhayn believed in a 'war of attrition'. The horrors of Verdun would result from his strategy. p263 Ludendorff later accused Hentsch of sabotaging the Marne Battle because he was a Freemason. Mombauer merely dismisses Ludendorff's
"allegations and conspiracy theories" and says they "cannot be taken
seriously" without investigation. Rubbish they may have been but it is hardly the mark of a responsible historian simply to dismiss something without having first disproved it. p264 Mombauer notes that in the middle of overseeing the campaign, on 26
August Moltke visited Rudolf Steiner who happened to be staying at
Niederlahnstein. Why did Moltke do this? p266 Another example of Moltke's prejudice: she says Moltke "clung to his position even when things were going so badly wrong. Given his ambition,

24
this is hardly surprising…." Yet she gives hardly any evidence of personal ambition on his part. p273 N.b. Moltke fell seriously ill (gall bladder and liver problems) on 22 Oct
1914, the day after his interview with the Kaiser. 23 Oct Kaiser visited Moltke in hospital. p274 Was Moltke's article Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen. Die Schuld am
Kriege (Observations and Memoirs. The Issue of War Guilt, Nov. 1914 influenced by Rudolf Steiner ? p282 In a book about Helmuth von Moltke Mombauer writes nothing about the man in the last year of his life August 1915 - June 1916! p282 She concludes viciously:
"The war that he and his colleagues had conjured up was supposed to lead to the triumph of the stronger forces over the weaker, much in keeping with his own Social Darwinist beliefs…..the full extent of the disaster that resulted from his decision-making was worse than anything he could possibly have imagined."
Conclusion p283 "Far from being an ineffectual and reluctant military leader….through his constant advocacy of war 'the sooner the better' he did much to heighten the increasingly bellicose mood in Wilhelmine Germany."
"This study confirms the view that Moltke benefited from his close friendship
with the Kaiser…." But if it was so close, why didn't Kaiser stand by him in
1914 ?
"Moltke was an ambitious careerist…." Mombauer gives no real evidence of this. It is an overstated exaggeration that sullies what was an honourable career. p285 Mombauer claims Bethmann-Hollweg and Moltke basically had the same aims and the same desires: "Both believed in the inevitability of an armed conflict in the very near future, and both envisaged a racial struggle against the Slavs, emphasising racial differences which they considered
unbridgeable. Once again, she offers here zero evidence for this assertion. p286 She says it is immaterial who was in charge because they had the same views - if so, why did Bethmann-Hollweg hold out so long against general mobilisation; why did he continue to hope for friendship with Britain and
British non-involvement in the war while Moltke on the contrary did not share that view?
Mombauer herself says on the same page: "Only when it was certain that a localised war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary would escalate into a
European war did Bethmann lose his courage - unlike the military…"

25
"…this did not stop him, from actively endorsing a bellicose policy." This word 'bellicose' is used about Moltke many times throughout the book.
"The responsibility of the German military, and of Moltke in particular for demanding war cannot be denied."
It can be denied if by the accusation is meant some kind of lust for war. It is the job of any commanding officer in any army to determine when to fight so that his army has the best possible chance of success. p287 "Historians have perhaps too easily dismissed Moltke's importance due to his apparent interest in Spiritualism, his reputed 'softness', his alleged
reluctance to accept the influential office that he occupied…."
Note the order of those 3 points and the word 'apparent'. Mombauer has not adduced any evidence in this entire book for Moltke's interest in
'Spiritualism'. She clearly does not understand the very great difference between Spiritualism and Anthroposophy, or even between Spiritualism and
Theosophy. 'Spiritualism' does not even feature in the book's Index.
Mombauer again lays it on thick:
"Moltke was a hard-headed realist who had no qualms about pursuing and advocating war, whose decisions were based on his Social
Darwinist beliefs, who advocated a racial struggle and who was willing
to resort to ruthless intrigues to get rid of his successor Falkenhayn."
This makes von Moltke sound like a real proto-Nazi. But she has brought forward nothing solid as evidence of Moltke's so-called 'ruthlessness'; this is an unjustifiably emotive term. She utterly fails to make any such case that
"…he had steered Germany into this catastrophe…The evidence now available confirms without a doubt that Moltke and his colleagues wanted war….
Having said on p286:
"The responsibility of the German military, and of Moltke in particular for demanding war cannot be denied", she says on p287:
“Moltke was in many ways no better and no worse than his military contemporaries. Falkenhayn was the more bellicose of the two…."
But she does not in this book make the kind of systematic comparison between Moltke and his military contemporaries that would justify the sweeping statement above. p288
"He was not certain of victory but he believed that any delay in 'the big fight' would further decrease Germany's chances of victory. Soon,
Germany would no longer be able to fight a successful war; war itself

26 might become redundant. What would become of the 'warrior state' of
Prussia-Germany in such a world ? What would the prospects be for the military elite, the men whose job it was to prepare the future war? Would they not also become redundant, if war ceased to be an option for the continuation of policy with other means?
She is here implying that Helmuth von Moltke was just another Prussian warlusting militarist in the military Junker tradition going back to the time of
Clausewitz or Frederick the Great; Moltke becomes a mere label, a type, not an individual. Needless to say, she proffers no evidence that Helmuth von
Moltke actually thought the thoughts she implies he did here.
Building towards her climax, she writes of his "…almost criminal
irresponsibility" i.e. that by modern post-Nuremburg standards, he would be indictable as a war criminal:
"Moltke's main share of responsibility lies in encouraging, almost to the point of deception, an aggressive foreign policy…"Perhaps one of the most important conclusions to be drawn from this investigation is that war was not inevitable and that it certainly was no accident.
Until the very last moment, individual decision-makers could have
stopped an escalation of the conflict."
Quite so, Mombauer's excessively narrow focus on Germany and Helmuth von
Moltke prevents her from applying the same principle to the statesmen of the
Entente. Furthermore, she herself looks at Helmuth von Moltke, especially in her book's conclusion, merely as an example of a type, not as an individual.
Finally Mombauer ends her book by cleverly trying to use Helmuth von Moltke against himself, quoting a letter of 7 Sept 1914 to his wife:
"I am often overcome by dread when I think of this and I feel I should take responsibility for this horror; and yet, I could not have acted otherwise than I did.
The translation is rather different in Meyer p83:
"I am often overcome with horror when I think about it, and I feel as if I should answer for this appalling situation, yet I could have done no other than I have."
In her very last paragraph, Mombauer takes a swipe at Anthroposophy:
"His anthroposophical belief in karma would have made him anticipate an atonement for the wrongs he committed in his lifetime, which
must have made the burden of responsibility even harder to bear".
Again, she gives no evidence for this.

27
"His death in 1916 spared him the realisation of the full extent of the horrors of the war that he willed, let alone its poisonous legacy."
Moltke omits to mention that Thomas Meyer's book Light for the New
Millennium shows only too well how wrong this statement was and that, on the contrary, Helmuth von Moltke realised precisely after his death not only the full horrors of the war but also its future consequences.