1NC

Mark
, Adjunct Professor of the UBC School of Population and Public Health, “Illicit IV Drugs: A Public Health
Approach,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH VOLUME 93, NO. 6, http://journal.cpha.ca/index.php/cjph/article/download/390/390
The existing laws could be changed to remove legal sanctions.
With “decriminalization”, criminal prosecution is not an option
for dealing with drugs.
This term is often confused with the term “legalization” which specifies how drugs can be legally available
. The term
“decriminalization” is limited in its utility , as it only states what will not be done and does not explain what legal options are available
. Proponents of
“decriminalization” usually distinguish between personal use, and trafficking and smuggling. Those who profit from the black market would still be subject to criminal charges but personal use would not be subject to legal sanctions. Decriminalization, or benign neglect, means ignoring the problem and results in unregulated access to drugs of unknown purity and potency.
Charles D. “Cully”
is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal & Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; as a local, state, federal, and military prosecutor; and as a defense attorney and law professor. “Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No” Legal
Memorandum #56 on Legal Issues September 13, 2010. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/legalizing-marijuanawhy-citizens-should-just-say-no ac 6-18
Theoretical arguments in favor of marijuana legalization usually overlook the practical matter of how the drug would be regulated and sold .
It is the details of implementation , of course , that will determine the effect of legalization on families, schools, and communities. Most basically, how and where would marijuana be sold?

Nathaniel
, J.D. Candidate, “Initiative 502 and Conflicting State and Federal Law,” GONZAGA LAW REVIEW v. 49,
20
, LN.
Second, the U nited S tates could submit an amendment for the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances that would allow for possible recreational use of marijuana within the territory of state parties , but still require criminal enforcement against international trafficking . Each convention has a provision for amendments, which would allow the U nited
S tates to alter the treaty obligations of all parties such that non-enforcement against Washington recreational marijuana, and similar actions by other parties, is no longer a breach . 154 As other countries have begun to liberalize their drug laws, there may be support for such an amendment . 155 This must be paired with vigorous enforcement against international traffickers though, so the policy does not negatively affect supply or transit countries. Initiative 502 gives the federal government the opportunity to reevaluate the policies of the CSA and either renew efforts against recreational marijuana or allow state governments to control domestic regulation of marijuana
. It is important
, however, that in selecting an approach, the impact of the inconsistency between state and federal law be minimized to avoid a culture of rule-breaking, and that the United States work to bring itself into compliance with international law , either through enforcement or by amending existing treaties .

Josh
– Writes for Progressive Cynic, April
“Why Cotton and Not Hemp?” http://theprogressivecynic.com/2013/04/29/why-cotton-and-not-hemp/
When looking at what makes our clothing, we are struck with a choice between various plants and synthetics to choose from. Cotton may be the most common clothing fabric in the United States today, but it is not the only viable material to use in clothing. Numerous fabrics
—silk, hemp , polyester, and many more
— are all possible alternatives to cotton but , for a variety of reasons, none have replaced cotton as a more efficient material.
¶ The synthetics may be strong and do not require growing plants to form, but many are highly flammable and most require the extraction and refinement of petrochemicals.
As such, they aren’t really a good alternative to cotton in the long run.
¶ Animal fabrics, like leather and silk, are simply not easy to mass produce and all animal-skin products are simply far more inefficient than their plant-based alternatives.
¶ When we look at this situation and try to find a solid alternative to cotton, we find a precious few viable organic materials. One of these materials however is called Hemp and is created from the plant fibers of the Cannabis Sativa ¶ ¶ Hemp ¶
The plant fibers of the Cannabis
Sativa plant can be harvested to create very tough and efficient to create fabrics — alone or mixed with other fibers. Of the more common uses for hemp, Americans utilized the fiber in clothing and in the creation of sail canvas for boats.
Before the illegalization of Cannabis, and thus the outlawing of hemp production, hemp was recognized as one of the best materials for making fabrics . The United States had a long history of hemp production, and many of our founding fathers grew hemp on their farms as a staple crop.
¶ Through an outlook of sustainability, plant fibers from hemp are both very strong and far more water and efficient than cotton . According to a comprehensive study by the Stockholm Environmental Institute, hemp uses half of the land space required by cotton, and only a third of the water — in this, it is FAR more efficient to the grower and much less of a strain on the environment.
¶ Because of the lower requirements to produce hemp when compared with cotton, hemp is a viable alternative to cotton for small farmers looking to supply local clothing producers. The efficiency of hemp allows small farmers to grow much more substantial amounts of hemp with their available land and water resources.
¶ In addition to the efficiency and comparative strength of hemp over cotton, hemp requires far fewer pest control measures to be grown effectively. Unlike cotton plants, cannabis overshadows small weeds and strangles them, rather than the other way around. In dealing with insects and invasive fungi, cannabis has the natural pesticide THC, which kills or repels pest species. Unlike with cotton growing, where farmers favor large numbers of toxic pesticides, hemp produces its own pesticide and does not entice farmers to spray it with caustic chemicals.
¶ As hemp is stronger, more efficient, and requires fewer pesticides than cotton, one may wonder why it is illegal and in a massively subservient position to cotton in the global fabric markets.
This is a very easy question to answer: The natural pesticide THC repels insects and plant parasites, but it is the active ingredient that makes cannabis a narcotic.
¶ ¶ The War on Hemp/Pot ¶ Despite the history of American hemp production, hemp was made illegal in the early years of the 20th Century. Through a toxic combination of misguided prohibition, corporate cronyism, and racism, cannabis was made illegal and the American hemp industry was killed.
¶ In the early 20th Century, DuPont Chemical started developing chemical procedures to pulverize wood and turn it into paper and chemical pesticides in order to facilitate the growth of cotton. Hemp is a very strong plant material and DuPont wanted to sell its nylon material as a substitute for the natural fibers of hemp. In addition to this, hemp requires few pesticides and simply had no need for the new chemical pesticides that were being developed by DuPont; if hemp were to have overshadowed cotton as the primary textile fiber, DuPont’s new chemical pesticide industry would have been worth far less and their sales would have been drastically reduced. As such, hemp was a dual competitor with DuPont’s business and the company did everything in its power to kill the hemp industry.
¶ In order to kill the hemp industry, DuPont used its influence over the government. Throughout the 1920s, Andrew Mellon was US Treasury Secretary, the owner of DuPont’s primary financial backer, Mellon Bank, and a relative of Harry Anslinger, a high ranking official in the federal alcohol prohibition office. This trifecta of influence allowed DuPont chemical to push for the criminalization of cannabis after Harry Anslinger became the head of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics in 1930. From 1930 to 1937, Anslinger pushed a hard line anti-cannabis policy that eventually resulted in the criminalization of both hemp and cannabis for smoking.
¶ In order to facilitate the criminalization of cannabis, the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics utilized a combination of racism and disinformation. Cannabis was tarred as a dangerous and powerful narcotic that would turn people into psychotic killers. Here is a propaganda poster from this era: ¶ dope ¶ To further compound the propaganda around cannabis, many interests connected cannabis to racism against Black and Hispanic Americans in that era. Cannabis was proclaimed to be an invasive drug, brought in by Mexicans and offered to white Americans in a way that would translate the perceived “laziness and criminality” of Mexicans to the American population. It was also declared to be a major factor in Black
American’s committing crimes and harming white people. Obviously, none of these smears on racial minorities or cannabis are based in reality —the attacks on minorities were based in pure racism, while the attacks on cannabis were based in the economic interests funding the anti-cannabis movement.
¶ incarceration ¶ Since the mid-20th Century, the criminalization of cannabis has shifted from a move by rival textile and chemical giants, to profitization schemes by private law enforcement interests (ex. private prisons and security contractors) and general policy inertia. Fortunately, these bans

are lifting slowly, as the American population realizes that they have been deceived by anti-cannabis propaganda, and hemp may soon become an extremely viable crop again.
R. James
The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia “An
Arc of Instability? - Security Dilemmas in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya” http://www.internationalrelations.com/wbeurasia/WBEA-2003-Lec4.htm
Because of Soviet agricultural policies, large irrigation schemes have not aided this problem, but have helped destroy much land through salination, excessive use of fertilisers, and has also resulted in the almost complete destruction of the Aral Sea. This problem effected Uzbekistan as well, where cotton production rose from 2.24 to 9.10 million tons between 1940 and 1980 , though a poor Uzbek would be unlikely to pay the import cost of Russian manufactured cotton shirts
(Rashid 1994, p91). As of the mid-1990s, Uzbekistan produced 20% of the world's cotton (Jones 1995b) and with high prices in the mid-90s, hoped to maintain good cash flows into the country . However, poor crops
in 2000 reduced income
through 2001, with also increases in local food stuffs (DFAT 2001). As we have seen (lecture
3), problems in water usage, irrigation, and damage to the Aral Sea has had a negative impact the ability of the country to rely too strongly on cotton production.
¶ Aside from cotton, Uzbekistan does have a range of other natural resources which need further development. As noted by Ahmed Rashid: ¶ Uzbekistan has a large natural gas industry, which produced 41 billion cubic metres in
1991, much of it from the Mubarek gas fields. Uzbek gas is still exported along a pipeline that stretches from Bukhara to the Urals.
Uzbekistan's petroleum production in 1990 was 2.8 million tons and a large oilfield was discovered in the Ferghana valley in March
1992. (Rashid 1994, p94) ¶ Uzbekistan, however, like nearby Kazakhstan, has the problem of how to export its oil and gas onto the world market, and at present still relies in large part on older Russian infrastructure. At present, it produces more than enough oil for its own needs, and has large gas fields that would make the eight-largest gas producer globally (Feif 2002). It has had some problems in mobilising resources and investment for future modernisation of its fields, and through 2002 planned to sell 49% of it stake in Uzbekneftegaz, the state-own company that controls the petroleum sector (Feif 2002).
¶ The country also has some metallic resources, including sizeable gold reserves underground, and an industrial base which includes a quite well-skilled base of technicians and workers, although this has been eroded by some 1.7 million Russians leaving since 1988 (Rashid 1994, p95; literacy in the country verges on 100%). Another main problem had been the slowness of development of the private sector, with a mere 5-9% of gross national product accounted for in late 1992, though many joint ventures have been planned (Rashid 1994, pp95-6). Foreign investment has only begun in earnest in Uzbekistan during the last eight years, and the World Bank and the
International Monetary initially only pledged some $300 million in aid. The result was rather uneven economic development through the 1990s: "the government began a reform program in 1994, including tight monetary policies, privatisation of government-owned enterprises and improving the investment environment. Inflation continues to be a problem - it topped over 40 percent in 1996, although it has dropped to 23 percent in 1999. The country's GDP growth moved from an economic contraction of -1 percent in
1995 to marginal growth of 2 percent in 1999, with foreign debt still at high levels - close to 3 billion" (DFAT 2001). Foreign investment remains limited, in part through concerns over corruption, government control of resources, and concerns over an overly strong set level for the currency (the som), which makes it not freely convertible, e.g. held for a time at the official rate of 430 som per American dollar, compared to the black market rate of 1,200 in 2002 (Feif 2002; through early 2002 the som moved to around
960 to the dollar). Through 2002, however, there was a serious improvement in the rate of privatisation: 'A total of 1,912 enterprises were privatized in 2002, 30% more than in 2001' (Interfax 2003a). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) also announced that it 'plans to provide Uzbekistan with over $500 million in credits in 2003-2005 to implement 11 investment projects' (Interfax 2003b).
¶ The slow change-over to capitalism has resulted in early high unemployment rates - 22.8 percent in 1990. The government has attempted to pull back land under cotton production, and become more self-sufficient in food (Hans 2000, pp356-357), but as of
1994 there had been no serious attempt to reform land ownership, because the issue might have been explosive in the Ferghana valley region (Rashid 1994, p96). Plans were set up in 1995-6 to establish long-term private leases for up to 40% of the irrigated land. Aside from cotton, the country also exports tobacco, and can produce more food for internal consumption. However,
Uzbekistan must also face both relatively high population growth and the fact that a large number of young people will try to enter its work-force in the next decade (60% of the population are under 25 years of age). As a result, the economy must grow at a very fast rate to ensure social stability (Hanks 2000, p351). It is possible that by the year 2015 Uzbekistan might have a population of 36 million (Hanks 2000, p357). In large part, the country will rely on foreign direct investment (FDI) to stimulate such growth, but at present the geographical spread of such investment tends to be unbalanced, focusing on Tashkent region (Hanks 2000, p360).
¶ Reform in the economy is based on a kind of gradualism, characterised as the 'Uzbek Road': ¶
Stability, the early principal goal, is to be secured by proemployment economic policies , public education, child allowances, and welfare allotments to neighborhood associations
(mahallah) run by elders. Once self-sufficiency in energy and food has been secured, government guidance and investments will pursue growth by developing backward linkages into more extensive cotton processing, textiles, food processing, petrochemicals and plastics, and agricultural machinery. Imported equipment and technology are essential to this investment strategy, which if successful would increase exports of semi-fabricated and manufactured goods. (Spechler 2000) ¶ The main elements of this "Uzbek
Road" include: ¶ Gradual reform, while maintaining social and political stability ¶ State role preserved in shaping industrialization priorities ¶ Self-sufficiency in energy and food ¶ Legal basis established for reforms and private sector ¶ Social protection of rural, dependent, and low-income groups (Spechler 2000) ¶ Uzbekistan is one of the few states in the region that has ensured that it has a strong military presence, cooperating with Russia on CIS defence arrangements, then asserting a more independent posture since
2001. As noted by Rashid: ¶ <President> Karimov has created a National Guard of some seven hundred men and a new Ministry of
Defence, staffed largely by Russian officers. The National Guard is being rapidly expanded. In early 1992 the government began to take over Russian military installations in agreement with Moscow, and in May all Uzbek soldiers serving outside Uzbekistan were

recalled home to serve under a joint CIS-Uzbek military command which has 15,000 troops and 280 tanks as well as a large, modern air force. This command works closely with Moscow, as was seen by the military help given by Tashkent to pro-communist
Tajik forces who defeated the Tajik Islamic opposition in December 1992.
¶ While the civil war in Tajikistan preoccupied all Central
Asia leaders, Karimov publicly proclaimed that he wanted Russia 'to be the guarantor of security in Central Asia'. (Rashid 1994, pp102-3) ¶ In other words, Uzbekistan had favoured the CIS arrangement as a security guarantee, but it was reluctant to go all the way with Russia and has resisted initiatives for a new Eurasian Union. Uzbekistan has managed to build up a regionally-strong national force, as of 1995 including 20,000 in the army, a small but modern airforce including 32 MiG-29s and 32 Su-27s, plus paramilitary units of some 16,000 men, and Internal Security troops of 15,300 (Chipman 1995, pp166-7). By 1998, this has been strengthened further, with some 50,000 in the army, 17-19,000 Internal Security Troops, and 1,000 in the national guard (Chipman
1998, p164). Through 2002, there was an active defence force of 50-55,000, with 18-20,000 internal security troops (Chipman 2002, p137). In late 1999, Uzbekistan once again re-affirmed its military cooperation with Russia in a Russo-Uzbek military cooperation agreement designed to deepen coordination in a number of areas including military-technical cooperation. The agreement was signed for the 'sake of ensuring military security, fighting international terrorism, bolstering cooperation in the development and production of armaments and military equipment, and training military personnel for the Russian and Uzbek armed forces'
(ITAR/TASS 1999).
¶ Uzbekistan's importance was further increased strategically once the United States and its allies decided to engage in military action against the Taliban and Al-Quaeda bases in Afghanistan. After negotiations with both Uzbekistan and
Russia, bases and facilities in Uzbekistan were used to set up communication, command and control centres. As a result, this country in a sense became part of the 'front line' against terrorism , with its government also gaining de facto support for its hardline policies against Islam generally. Likewise, Uzbekistan hopes that its engagement as an ally of the United
States will also result in long term economic and diplomatic benefits. Through 2002-2003 this has resulted in increased military aid and cooperation, worth at $160 million in 2002 (Feif 2002). This has led to some Russian fears that Uzbekistan might become
'another Turkey', cooperating with the U.S. and NATO (e.g. through the Partnership for Peace program, with joint exercises in the region in 1998 and 2000), but this time in the heart of Eurasia (Feif 2002).
¶ Uzbekistan , then, remains a n important linchpin of Central Asia. Its progress towards economic and ethnic stability, or the lack of such progress, is crucial in determining the future of Eurasian stability.
In spite of government preference for a secular style of government, there is no doubt that faith in Islam is growing within the country - in 1993 the country only had some
200 mosques, in 1995 it could claim approximately 5,000 (Jones 1995b). Yet the opposition parties, Birlik (Unity) and Erk parties have been banned from participating in elections, with only the government People's Democratic Party and 'official' (co-opted)
Fatherland Progress Party holding most of the 250 seats in the Parliament (Jones 1995b).
(Paul, Georgian Daily, “Afghan Conflict Spreading into Central Asia, Russian Analyst Says”, 1-14, http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16458&Itemid=65)
Because NATO has chosen to supply its forces in Afghanistan via Central Asia and because its battles against the Taliban in the northern part of that country have led to a dramatic increase in the number of
Tajiks and Uzbeks in that radical group , the conflict in Afghanistan is spreading into portions of
Central Asia itself. Indeed, Moscow analyst Aleksandr Shustov argues in an essay posted online today, Central Asia now faces “the threat of Afghanization ,” something he implies both the leaders of the countries in that region and of Russia should take into consideration when deciding how much to support the US-led effort south of the former Soviet border. Shustov says that “ the increase in the transportation and communication role of the Central Asian republics
for the
US and NATO is being accompanied by a threat to their military and political stability ,” a trend exacerbated by recent changes in the composition of the Taliban itself (www.stoletie.ru/geopolitika/centralnaja_azija_ugroza_afganizacii_2010-
01-14.htm). In the course of the spring and fall of the past year, he continues, a wave of armed actions and clashes, connected by analysts with the penetration of illegal armed formations from Afghanistan and
Pakistan, has passed through the three republics of ‘the conflict t riangle’ of Central Asia, Uzbekistan ,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.” “The majority of these incidents, Shustov says, “ took place on the territory of the most explosive region of Central Asia – the Fergana Valley,” which is the most densely populated of that area and which suffers from high rates of unemployment and increasing problems with the supply of water and other government services. Shustov provides a detailed chronology of these attacks, linking them not only to the desire of the
Taliban to undermine governments who are providing assistance to its opponents but also to an increase in the number of clashes between the Taliban and NATO forces in the northern portion of
Afghanistan. Historically, the Moscow commentator says, the Taliban have been primarily a Pushtun organization, but in the north, a region populated largely by Tajiks and Uzbeks, the radical Islamist group has sought to recruit
from these two groups whose co-nationals form the titular people of two of the most important Central Asian countries. In the Kunduz province,
Shustov continues, “approximately 20 percent of the Taliban formations already consist of Tajiks and Uzbeks ,” at least some of whom are engaged in crossborder activities such as drug trafficking and who have an interest in undermining the
Central Asian states that they believe are helping the opponents of the Taliban.
Moreover, as NATO military operations in northern Afghanistan have increased, there has been a rising tide of refugees into the neighboring countries of
Central As ia, people who “ under the conditions of growing military-political instability fear for their lives” and often

support radical groups . Many politicians and experts are concerned that Tajikistan , which in comparison with neighboring Uzbekistan has extremely limited military possibilities also may be drawn in to the Afghan conflict as a result .” If that happens, Shustov argues, then “inevitably” Russia will be drawn in as well.

Alex
15, Journalist, “White House Gives Moderate Democrats Extra Attention on Free Trade”, National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/white-house-gives-moderate-democrats-extra-attention-on-free-trade-20150308
With the status of President Obama 's request for trade-promotion authority still murky on Capitol Hill, the White House is targeting a group of moderate House Dem ocrat s in hopes of finding support for the bill. Trade promotion
, also known as fast-track, has long been an object of skepticism among Democratic representatives; only 29 of them backed President Bill Clinton's push for the measure in 1998. This time around, much of the caucus has stayed in wait-and-see mode on the proposal, which would set parameters on trade deals negotiated by the White House but restrict congressional input on their passage to an up-or-down vote. In recent days,
Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker and U .S. Trade Representative Michael Froman have been pressing lawmakers on the deal, and Froman was joined by Jeff Zients, Obama's top economic adviser, to make the case at Tuesday's meeting of the House Democratic Caucus. The outreach also has focused on the New Democrat Coalition, a 46-member group of moderate Democrats . Zients, Pritzker, Labor Secretary
Thomas Perez, and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew have all addressed the caucus on the proposal. " There's been pretty fullcourt press from the administration," said an aide to a moderate Democrat who has been active in trade discussions . Republicans are seen as far more supportive of free trade, but some Democrats say they are skeptical that the party opposing Obama's authority at every turn on immigration will give him more authority on trade. So getting buy-in from moderate Dem ocrat s could be key. "We're going to continue to play a very important role in how do we shape a strong bipartisan agenda for trade as we move forward in this session," said Rep. Ron Kind, the New Democrats' chairman. " There's no question the administration's stepped up too, from the president on down, personally engaging individual members of Congress about the importance of this and the timing as well." Another aide, who works for a progressive Democrat who opposes TPA, said the measure is likely to pass with or without Democratic support. But, he added, the administration would rather not ram the legislation through on a party-line vote that relies on the GOP. "The White House sees that they need to make the case to Democrats," he said. Still, many Democrats have deep reservations about TPA, and earning substantial support
—even from moderates—could be an uphill battle for the White House. Democratic Rep. Gerry Connolly of Virginia, one of Kind's vice-chairs, said trade votes carry political risk and backing them will not insulate Democrats from being targeted by pro-business campaign groups. Meanwhile, several progressive groups have threatened to primary Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden in Oregon for his role in helping lead the
Senate's TPA negotiations (the challenger they've called for, Rep. Peter DeFazio, says he won't run). And just a year and a half ago,
151 House Democrats signed a letter pledging not to back an "outdated" fast-track agreement.
Despite all this
, much of the caucus has held its fire on Obama's forthcoming proposal, and party leaders say they want to give
Obama a chance.
"We're hopeful that the administration will take steps that will allow a significant number of the caucus to get to yes," House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer said last month. "We're working on those. Hopefully the administration will be able to get many to a path to yes, but that's yet to be determined." A House Democratic leadership aide added that Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi is "hoping we can get to some place where we can get to 150 Democrats for a bill." Still, he noted, "that's gonna take a lot of work."
Coletta A. Youngers 3-5-13 Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a Representative of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), and an independent consultant. “U.S. Elections and the War on Drugs”, NACLA, https://nacla.org/news/2013/3/5/us-elections-and-war-drugs
Now elected to a second term, Obama has the opportunity to join the presidents of countries like Guatemala, Colombia, and
Uruguay who are calling for reform . To do so would take firm political commitment and a willingness to stand up to accusations that would no doubt be hurled by his domestic political opponents of being “pro-drugs.”
Unfortunately, the president has given little indication that this is a battle he is going to stake political capital on in his second term. The Obama administration did implement modest but important changes to domestic drug policy, some of which might have been reversed had Mitt Romney won the election. The administration followed through with two of his three promises described above: At the end of 2009, Obama signed a law ending the prohibition on most federal funding for sterile needle-exchange programs, which have proved effecting in stopping the spread of HIV and other infections among injecting drug users; unfortunately, the U.S. Congress later reinstated the ban. He also encouraged legislation to reduce significantly the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine, which was passed in August 2010. In general, the Obama administration has shown greater interest than its predecessors in reducing incarceration rates. Perhaps the most noticeable advance, however, is the greater priority placed on reducing demand for illicit drugs, with modest increases in funding

toward that end. The Obama administration’s annual drug-control strategy now emphasizes community-based prevention programs and integrating drug treatment into mainstream health care in order to expand access to such services. Of particular importance, drug treatment will be covered by health insurance under “Obamacare.” A reversal on that front—as would likely have occurred if
Romney had won the election
—would have been a major setback to efforts to ensure that problematic drug users had access to effective treatment programs. In regard to U.S. drug policy in Latin America, the administration has proved more diplomatic than its predecessors. Whereas in the past, the White House has been quick to criticize drug legislation or other actions not to its liking, the
Obama administration has for the most part remained silent. Apart from diplomacy, however, U.S. drug policy remains on autopilot.
When Obama took office, expectations ran high among drug-policy activists that at the least the new administration would discontinue spraying dangerous herbicides over the Colombian rain forest. Not only has aerial spraying continued, but forced eradication of coca and poppy, used to manufacture cocaine and heroin, remains at the center of U.S. drug policy, despite overwhelming evidence that it fails to reduce cultivation, generates violence and social conflict, and pushes some of the wor ld’s poorest farmers deeper into poverty. Plan Colombia, touted by the U.S. government as a major success story, has wound down, but in its wake came the Merida Initiative in Mexico, which —as with the Andean Initiative launched in 1989—was front-loaded with U.S. military and police assistance. U.S. anti-drug aid to Central America’s security forces has steadily increased through the Central
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). A cornerstone of U.S. drug policy toward the isthmus is the DEA’s Foreign-Deployed
Advisory Support Team, or FAST. Initially operating in Afghanistan to disrupt the poppy trade, FAST teams are now deployed in
Honduras, along with U.S. Special Forces, whose Green Berets have been training Honduran Special Operations forces. The dangers of further militarization in a region with a tragic history of internal conflict, violence, and extremely weak institutions was made painfully clear on May 11, 2012, when Honduran forces accompanied by DEA agents on an anti-drug mission near the town of Paptalaya opened helicopter gunfire on a boat that police initially claimed was carrying illicit drugs, killing four people
—two women (one of them pregnant), a 14-year-old boy, and a 21-year-old man. All had legitimate reasons for being on the river early that morning. Investigations into the killing are moving at a snail’s pace. Three key factors help explain why continuity has prevailed over change in U.S. drug -control policies , and each presents a possible impediment to a change in course during
Obama’s second term.
First , for the most part drug “warriors” on Capitol Hill continue to have the upper hand on drug-policy issues debated in the U.S. Congress
. As the elections reaffirmed the status quo in
Washington, there is no reason to expect that to change. Second, the drug-war bureaucracy remains bloated, firmly entrenched, and extremely resistant to change . Apart from a few notable exceptions at ONDCP , the same officials continue to be the driving force behind U.S. drug policy, in some cases for decades. And over the years, the drug-policy bureaucracy has obtained a great deal of autonomy from the broader official policy-making community. Finally, because of these dynamics, high-level and committed leadership from the President is needed to begin to change the status quo . Yet the Obama administration is engaged in major debates on a range of salient issues that continue into its second term. Based on his comments following his reelection, the president’s political capital will more likely be spent on [other] issues such as climate change and immigration reform.
*Global trade order collapsing – TPA key to avoid protectionism and war
(Stephen, Senior Analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), with a focus on innovation policy, international information technology competitiveness, trade, and manufacturing and services issues, 10-29, http://www.innovationfiles.org/trade-promotion-authority-a-vital-component-of-u-s-trade-policy/,)
1. Regarding the first point, make no mistake: there is currently a fight for the soul of the global trading system
. The years since the Great Recession have seen a dramatic increase in countries’ use of innovation mercantilist policies
—such as forcing local production as a condition of market access, subsidizing exports, stealing intellectual property, or manipulating currencies and standards— which
seek to favor domestic enterprises at the expense of foreign competitors.
Viewing with envy
China’s rapid economic growth, dozens of other countries
—from Brazil and India to Malaysia and South Africa— have enacted similar mercantilist policies
, giving rise to an emerging “Beijing Consensus” (i.e., innovation mercantilism). In fact, as evidence of this, the W orld
T rade
O rganization reported
that the number of technical barriers to trade reached an all-time high in 2012
. And as this emerging “Beijing Consensus” gains strength, it comes at the expense of the long-dominant, but now exhausted, “Washington Consensus” which has believed in the unalloyed benefits of free trade
, even when it is one-sided, and that has fretted that robust enforcement of trade rules may ignite a trade war
. As such, we need a new consensus
, one that holds that trade and globalization remain poised to generate lasting global prosperity
, but only if all countries share a commitment to playing by a strong set of rules that foster shared, sustainable growth. And that’s what the U nited
S tates is doing in seeking to negotiate TPP and T-TIP agreements as model, 21st century compacts that set the bar and lay the foundation upon which a stronger set of future global trade rules can be built
.
If America doesn’t successfully conclude and pass through Congress these nextgen eration trade agreements —and let’s be clear, it will be
much more difficult, if not impossible
, to accomplish this without TPA — America risks losing out on the ability to set the agenda and standards for a more robust and liberalized global trade system
going forward. 2. The logic of
TPA is sound, and TPA actually helps make U.S. trade agreements better, in several ways. First, TPA is an effective mechanism for Congress to delegate its Constitutional authority to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” as stipulated by Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Through TPA, Congress outlines high-standard objectives and

priorities for U.S. negotiators to pursue in trade agreements, a process which helps build consensus on U.S. trade policy. Moreover, the TPA increases transparency in U.S. trade policy, for it establishes consultation and notification requirements for the President and USTR to follow throughout the trade agreement negotiation process
—ensuring that Congress, interested stakeholders, and the general public are closely involved before, during, and after the conclusion of trade agreement negotiations. In addition, having given USTR direction in its negotiation of U.S trade agreements, TPA expedites the process of Congressional debate on trade agreements, as each chamber suspends ordinary legislative procedures and considers implementing legislation subject to time-limited debate with no (or limited) amendments. And given the importance of the two massively transformational agreements currently being negotiated in the TPP and T-
TIP, it’s essential that we have a streamlined, easily managed framework for reviewing, analyzing, and ultimately approving these trade agreements quickly and efficiently. Yet perhaps even more importantly,
T rade
P romotion
A uthority recognizes that
U.S. trade partners would be reluctant to negotiate agreements that would be subject to unlimited Congressional debate
and amendments. As U.S.
Trade Representative Mike Froman wrote in a Foreign Affairs article, The Str ategic Logic of Trade, last week, “ By ensuring that
Congress will consider trade agreements as they have been negotiated by the executive branch, TPA gives U.S. trading partners the necessary confidence to put their best and final offers on the table .” And as Inside U.S. Trade wrote in an article on Friday, October 24, the timing of
Froman’s
Foreign Affairs piece calling for TPA is likely because he’s “ received a clear signal from
one or more
TPP countries that they need to see TPA passed before they will put their best offer on the table.
” In short, TPA helps make the trade agreements the U.S. signs better by compelling our trade partners to put their best offer on the table
.
Michael J. Panzner, Faculty
– New York Institute of Finance. Specializes in Global Capital Markets. MA Columbia,
Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition [Paperback], p. 137-138
Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill
.
Introduced at the start of the Great Depression
, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses
, which
many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster .
But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify .
Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly .
The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about
ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must
, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations
. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply
. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become
more commonplace
. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters , often with minimal provocation
. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences
. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures
. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks,
bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.
Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the
Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood.
Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly
, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts .
Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between
Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

John
, Phd Candidate, International History, Lon don School of Economics, “The State Department’s Move to a More
Diplomatic Policy on Drugs Is a Rational Approach to a Difficult Question,” London School of Economics,
—14, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-s-new-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-adifficult-question/, accessed 1-2-15
The US State Department recently restated a major shift in US drug diplomacy . At its core is the idea of allowing greater variation in international policies and the opportunity to develop new national innovations. Ambassador William
Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, recently summed up the idea: Things have changed since 1961. We must have enough flexibility to allow us to incorporate those changes into our policies … to tolerate different national drug policies, to accept the fact that some countries will have very strict drug approaches; other countries will legalize entire categories of drugs. This new ‘Brownfield Doctrine’ has provoked significant international policy discussion and debate. What is the Brownfield Doctrine? The Brownfield Doctrine is a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug policy in the short term . It’s based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy innovation via flexible interpretation of certain antiquated provisions of the international drug co nventions. It’s derived from US constitutional principles around ‘purposive’ interpretations of legal texts rather than maintaining strict legalistic or ‘originalist’ interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as viewing the treaties as ‘living breathing documents’ which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points: Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions. Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. Allow different national/regional strategies. Tackle organised crime. The international response The response has been tentative and mixed.
Member states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in many respects . For example the recent O rganization of A merican S tates Special General Assembly on Drugs invoked principles derived from the doctrine. It has become particularly controversial within some circles because it’s a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief proselytizer
and bully on international drug policy
– the United States. Regardless of who authored it, the four-point approach is on balance a sensible path forward for the immediate future and allows breathing room for innovation and changes in policy , which could become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform . If a Latin American or a European country had authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US.
Wells C.
, fellow, Brookings Institution and John Walsh, Washington Office on Latin America, “Marijuana Legalization Is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Trea ties,” Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, 10—
, p. 17-20.
Wherever the limits of the United States’ enforcement discretion under
the drug treaties
might be drawn precisely, we know that such discretion by definition cannot be
an across-the-board, categorical affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of regulated
, comprehensive marijuana markets established by state law. And that’s just it: if more states
take a legalizeand-regulate approach, a federal-level decision not to prosecute
similarly situated persons could
start to look like blanket non-enforcement
of implementing legislation —something that, in our view, the drug treaties do not contemplate. The prospect of future marijuana regulation raises a second, more fundament al reason to rethink things: the nation’s experiment with legalizing and regulating marijuana might actually go well. Suppose
Colorado and Washington both operate their regulated marijuana markets smartly, without offending federal enforcement prerogatives, and —most importantly — without compromising public health and safety. We don’t think this is a fanciful or improbable scenario. Our Brookings colleague John
Hudak was the first to examine Colorado’s implementation effort up close. And he tentatively concluded that so far, the state’s initial rollout has been imperfect but quite effective.39 If this path continues or even bends towards improvement, then other states may soon elect to follow Washington and
Colorado’s lead. And that, in turn, stands to exacerbate an already visible tension between obligations imposed by the drug treaties, and the federal government’s enforcement posture towards legalizing states. To put the point another way, if Colorado and Washington augur a real trend, then the costs
to the United States of treaty breach could
be swiftly ratchet ed up wards.
The INCB could raise
the volume and severity of its criticisms; we would n’t be surprised to hear protests from more prohibitionist countries about the United States’ treaty compliance, or to see
other nations
start push ing the limits of other no less important treaties to which the United States is party . When some or all of this happens, the United States won’t get very far in emphasizing the CSA’s theoretical application nationwide, subject to enforcement priorities enunciated in the Cole Memo; or in appealing to larger objectives woven throughout the drug treaties, and their conferral of policy flexibility. What if twenty or thirty states successfully establish, and police, regulated mark ets for marijuana production and sale? Having that scenario in mind, we lastly emphasize the United States’ unique relationship both to the drug treaties and to the wider international community.
The U nited
S tates was
a —if not the — key
protagonist in developing

the
1961, 1971, and 1988
Conventions
, as well as the 1972 protocol amending the 1961 Convention; the U nited
S tates has for decades been widely
and correctly viewed as the treaties’ chief
champion and defender
.40 That fact feeds back onto this one:
The
U nited
S tates also occupies a singular place
in international relations.
It can summon powers no other nation can
summon, but it also confronts risks no other nation confronts.41 For that oft-cited reason, the United States has a profound interest in ensuring
that counterparties perform
their treaty obligations. Reciprocity is always a big deal for any nation that trades promises with other ones —but it is perhaps uniquely so for ours .
These factors mean that caution is in order regarding internationa l law and the viability of the Cole Memo in the longer run. If the United States can “flexibly interpret” the drug treaties with regard to marijuana, then Mexico is entitled to no less—though it might view the limits of its flexibility differently, or apply it to another controlled substance within the treaties’ purview. Or imagine that a foreign nation’s controversial policy butts up against seemingly contrary language, in a treaty covering an extremely important global issue other than drug control. Likely the United States will have a tougher time objecting when, rather than conceding the problem or changing course, that nation’s foreign ministry invokes the need to “tolera[te] different national approaches;” or recasts the relevant treaty as a “living document” subject to periodic, unilateral reinterpretation. This is not to suggest that compliance challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to reshape the United States’ treaty commitments. Practice and prudence both support a more nuanced, case-specific approach than that. Sometimes the United States has sought to make significant adjustments to multilateral frameworks or even quit them; other times, the United States has weighed costs and benefits, and pressed on within the treaty despite consequential breaches —in situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that regarding marijuana. But in those instances, the United States’ compliance failures often have come despite some hard striving by the federal government. The State Department, to name one well known example, tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations— notwithstanding some repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and Arizona.42 In this case, though, no external factors —federalism, say, or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court—have frustrated a strong push by the executive branch to vindicate the drug treaties; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama administration. Given the circumstances, we believe it was the correct decision. The
Cole
Memo nevertheless establishes
at least some friction
with a treaty obligation, by holding back on CSA enforcement, so as to accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the reasons why are entirely understandable: given the incipient nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo was reacting, the U nited
S tates essentially opted to
take a wait-and-see approach as to how problematic the treaty questions might become. So far as we are aware, this strategy is without precedent in
U.S. treaty practice. The U nited
S tates should approach it carefully
and deliberatively, given the country’s outsized interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations. That depends in part on being able to credibly call out other nations
for treaty failings —something which in turn depends on
strictly performing our own obligations
, or at least making a good show of trying hard to do so before coming up short. Again, we think the U nited
S tates can sustain the status quo in the short term .
But today’s model likely won’t hold up year in and year out, for the reasons we describe above. The government therefore ought to start thinking about some of the fundamental treaty reforms that its public statements seemingly have downplayed. Better to have weighed such options early on, should existing policy’s downsides start to overtake its upsides—as we predict they could.
Graeme P.
, Head, International Security Programme, Geneva Center for Security Policy, “Great Powers: Toward a
‘Cooperative Competitive’ Future World Order Paradigm?” GREAT POWERS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, 20
, ed. G.P. Herd, p. 197-198.
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic catastrophe that could trigger US precipitous decline), and the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great Powers ? Will global order be characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world system, in which shared strategic threats create interest-based incentives and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers ? This pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda based on nascent similarity across national policy agendas . In addition. Great Powers would seek to cooperate by strengthening multilateral partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional variants), regimes (e.g., arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms, including international law. Alternatively, Great Powers may rely less on institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their order-producing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within their near neighborhoods.
Under such circumstances, a redivision of the world into a competing mercantilist nineteenth-century regional order emerges 17 World order would be characterized more by hierarchy and balance of power and zero-sum principles than by interdependence. Relative power shifts that allow a return to multipolarity - with three or more evenly matched powers - occur gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment in the post-Cold War has been crowned, according to Haass, by an era of non-polarity, where power is diffuse — "a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power"18 Multilateralism is on the rise
, characterized by a combination of stales and international organizations, both influential and talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of global governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as groups with no formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and immediate reactions to crises, while formal treaty-based

institutions then legitimize the results.'9 As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble: Global cooperation is the only way to master the new, asymmetric global challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on its own, nor can the entire international community do so without the help of non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first century.20 Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined as "multipolarity in an age of interdependence" — Grevi suggests that managing existential interdependence in an unstable multipolar world is the key .21 Such complex interdependence generates shared interest in cooperative solutions , meanwhile driving convergence, consensus and accommodation between Great Powers .22 As a result, the multilateral system is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a global age - the rise of emerging powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a complex balance between multiple states."23 The G20 meeting in London in April 2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial architecture so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more participative, transparent and responsive manner: all countries have contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24

By Nick
Nick Miroff is a Latin America correspondent for The Post, from the U.S.-Mexico borderlands to South
America’s southern cone. He has been a staff writer at Washington Post since 2006. January 11 at 9:33 PM “Losing marijuana business, Mexican cartels push heroin and meth” Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/losingmarijuana-business-mexican-cartels-push-heroin-and-meth/2015/01/11/91fe44ce-8532-11e4-abcf-5a3d7b3b20b8_story.html
SAN YSIDRO, Calif.
— Mexican traffickers are sending a flood of cheap heroin and meth amphetamine across the U.S. border , the latest drug seizure statistics show, in a new sign that America’s marijuana decriminalization trend is upending the North American narcotics trade.
¶ The amount of cannabis seized by U.S. federal , state and local officers along the boundary with Mexico has fallen 37 percent since 2011, a period during which American marijuana consumers have increasingly turned to the more potent, higher-grade domestic varieties cultivated under legal and quasi-legal protections in more than two dozen U.S. states.
¶ Made-in-the-USA marijuana is quickly displacing the cheap, seedy, hard-packed version harvested by the bushel in Mexico’s Sierra Madre mountains. That has prompted Mexican drug farmers to plant more opium poppies, and the sticky brown and black “tar” heroin they produce is channeled by traffickers into the U.S. communities hit hardest by prescription painkiller abuse, off­ering addicts a $10 alternative to $80-a-pill oxycodone.
¶
“ Legalization of marijuana for recreational use has given
U.S. consumers access to high-quality marijuana , with genetically improved strains, grown in greenhouses ,” said Raul Benitez-Manaut, a drug-war expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University. “That’s why the Mexican cartels are switching to heroin and meth.”
¶ U.S. law enforcement agents seized 2,181 kilograms of heroin last year coming from Mexico, nearly three times the amount confiscated in 2009.
¶
Heroin seizures along the U.S.-
Mexico border have nearly tripled since 2009, while seizures of meth have quintupled . VIEW GRAPHIC ¶
Methamphetamine, too, has surged, mocking the Hollywood image of backwoods bayou labs and “Breaking Bad” chemists. The reality, according to Drug Enforcement Administration figures, is that 90 percent of the meth on U.S. streets is cooked in Mexico , where precursor chemicals are far easier to obtain.
¶
“ The days of the large-scale U.S. meth labs are pretty much gone, given how much the Mexicans have taken over production south of the border and distribution into the United States,” said Lawrence Payne, a DEA spokesman. “ Their product is far superior, cheaper and more pure.”
¶ Last year, 15,803 kilograms of the drug was seized along the border, up from 3,076 kilos in 2009.
¶
“ Criminal organizations are no longer going for bulk marijuana ,” said Sidney Aki, the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection port director here at the agency’s busiest crossing for pedestrians and passenger vehicles, just south of San Diego. “ Hard drugs are the growing trend , and they’re profitable in small amounts.”
¶ Voters in the
District of Columbia and 23 U.S. states have approved marijuana for recreational or medical use, with
Colorado, Washington state, Alaska and Oregon opting for full legalization. Estimates of the size of America’s marijuana harvest vary widely, and DEA officials say they do not know how quickly it may be increasing as a result of decriminalization.
¶
Mexican cartels continue to deploy people as “mules” strapped with 50-pound marijuana backpacks to hike through the Arizona borderlands and send commercial trucks into Texas with bales of shrink-wrapped cannabis so big they need to be taken out on a forklift.
¶ But the profitability of the marijuana trade has slumped on falling demand for Mexico’s “brick weed,” so called because it is crushed into airtight bundles for transport across the border. Drug farmers in the Sierra Madre say that they can barely make money planting mota anymore.
¶ ¶ U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agents share a fist bump after a dog identified a vehicle as potentially carrying hidden narcotics. (Nick Miroff/The Washington Post) ¶ The cartels, and consumers, are turning away from cocaine, too. Last year, U.S. agents confiscated 11,917 kilograms of cocaine along the Mexico border, down from 27,444 kilos in
2011.
¶
This reflects lower demand for the drug in the United States, experts say, as well as a cartel business preference for heroin and meth . Those two substances can be cheaply produced in Mexico, unlike cocaine, which is far pricier, and therefore riskier, because it must be smuggled from South America.
¶ The Sinaloa cartel, considered
Mexico’s most powerful drug trafficking organization despite the capture last February of leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, remains the dominant criminal power along Mexico’s Pacific Coast. Its territory spans the entire western half of the
U.S.-Mexico boundary, from Ciudad Juarez, opposite El Paso, to Tijuana, on the Pacific Coast.
¶
At harvest time, the cartel’s middlemen make their rounds to remote Sierra Madre stream valleys in pickup trucks and four-wheelers, armed with guns and cash.
They buy sticky balls of raw opium from hardscrabble farmers and deliver them to crude heroin kitchens that prepare the drug for shipment. The U.S. interstate highway system is less than a day’s drive away.
¶ He roin and meth are far easier to transport and conceal than marijuan a. Especially worrisome to U.S. officials is a growing trend of more border-crossing

pedestrians carrying the drugs strapped under their clothing or hidden in body cavities.
¶
“The criminals are trying to blend in among the legiti mate travelers, who are 99 percent of the individuals crossing through here,” said Aki, the San Ysidro port director. “That’s the hard part for us.” ¶ At the San Ysidro crossing, soon to expand to 35 lanes, U.S. agents with drug-sniffing dogs and foot-long screwdrivers weave among the lines of cars that back up into Mexico.
¶ Agents say the screwdrivers, some so old their handles are worn to a nub, are their most valuable investigative tool. Agents knock them against tires and gas tanks for a quick sonic impression.
¶
“If you tap a tank with something solid inside, there’s a thud,” one inspector said. “It’s like hitting concrete.”
¶ Harder to detect are “deep-concealed” drugs buried in fake engine cylinders, dashboard panels, even acid-proof capsules inside car batteries.
One vehicle seized here last year carried liquid meth in its windshield-wiper reservoir.
¶ Finding small packages in the river of cars and trucks coming across is akin to a game of “Where’s Waldo?” for U.S. inspectors. Vehicles that arouse the suspicions of border agents or get their dogs barking and lunging are sent to a secondary inspection station with giant X-ray machines and larger teams of ¶ screwdriver-wielding inspectors.
¶
If drugs don’t appear, the agents may drive the vehicles into garages to open their engines, pry apart interior panels and search for any signs of suspicious alterations. Traffickers will sometimes mist decoy vehicles with marijuana oil or resin to provoke the dogs and draw agents into a fruitless search.
¶ “It’s like a fish fry,” Aki said. “The fish is gone, but the scent is still there.” ¶ With the dogs and agents tied up inspecting the decoys, the traffickers may try sneaking meth and heroin through.
¶
In recent years, Mexican cartels also have begun producing higher-value “white” heroin, typically associated with traffickers from Colombia or Asia , according to DEA officials.
¶
“The Mexicans are evolving in their production abilities and getting more sophisticated ,” said Payne, the DEA spokesman.
“It’s not just black tar anymore.”
¶
Colombian and Caribbean traffickers once controlled heroin distribution east of the Mississippi River, but Mexican criminal groups now dominate the entire North
American market , he said.
¶ The United States has an estimated 600,000 heroin users, Payne said — a threefold increase in the past five years. But that number is dwarfed by the estimated 10 million Americans who abuse prescription painkiller s.
¶ Those addicts are the prime target for the booming heroin business.
A U.S. crackdown on prescription opiates has driven up the price for drugs such as OxyContin and Percocet, enticing desperate addicts to switch to cheap heroin to fend off withdrawal symptoms.
12/8 /
(Sean, Nearshore Americas, Special Analysis: The Rise and Fall of Violent Crime in Latin America")
After Brazil, Mexico has the highest number of murders in Latin America, though in per capita terms its homicide rate is well below that of Honduras, Venezuela, and many other countries in the region. Englishlanguage news coverage of Mexico has tended to paint the violence as nationwide , creating a sense north of the border that the country is lawless ; the government in Mexico City an observer to the mayhem all around. This was never the case .
As The
Economist’s Mexico correspondent advised business travelers to the country back in 2010: “ Once you avoid the hotspots, it’s downright safe .” For sure, the states of Sinaloa and Guerrero remain dangerous to travelers and Mexicans alike, but “hot spots” like those are shrinking
, and throughout most of Mexico things are calm.
Ciudad
Juarez, the world’s murder capital three years ago, is undergoing something of an urban renaissance , its bars and nightclubs now crowded on the weekends.
Chad
, Ashlee Jackson Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden Elliott School of International Affairs/Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report April 26, 2011 “Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and
Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization”
Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime . Perhaps the most obvious shortterm effect of marijuana legalization is that this would rob the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of up to half of their total revenue .117 The economic strain placed on the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel may not necessarily help Mexico in the short term .
The short-term effects of legalization could very well create chaos for Mexico. “The cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into other criminal activities-- kidnapping , murder-for-hire, contraband , illegal ¶ 29 ¶ immigrant smuggling , extortion, theft of oil and other items, loan-sharking, prostitution , selling protection, etc .”118 This means that if the social and economic environment remains the same then “they are not going to return to the licit world .”119 If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion, it could lead to a spike in violence that would prove to be destabilizing in those organizations‟ areas of operation.
¶ The
Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel might splinter into smaller groups. In addition, the loss of more than 40% of revenue

would probably force them to downsize their operations. Like any large business going through downsizing, employees will likely be shed first in order to maintain profitability.120 These former
DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers. Therefore it is possible that the legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel to become more violent than they are today. This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico .121
By Mark
Professor of Public Policy at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los
Angeles. “Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars” Smarter Policies for Both Sides of the Border” Foreign Affairs,
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011 ISSUE, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68131/mark-kleiman/surgical-strikes-in-the-drug-wars ac 6-24
Full commercial legalization of cannabis, or some alternative short of full commercialization, such as lawful production for personal use or by user cooperatives, would shrink the revenue of the Mexican trafficking organizations by approximately one-fifth , according to Beau Kilmer and his colleagues at the RAND Corporation: not a dramatic gain but certainly not trivial. Whether trafficking violence would be reduced by a comparable amount is a question for speculation, with no real evidence either way.
Mexican drug traffickers would be left with plenty to fight over and more than enough money to finance their combat.

by Martín
·El Paso News February 28,
“George Friedman: Mexico is not a Failed State” http://elpasonews.org/2014/02/george-friedman-mexico-failed-state/ ac 8-27 ableist edited
A failed state read the headlines. Doom and gloom, Mexico was about to implode led the news cycles starting around 2008.
A revolution as about to start south of the US border, it was just a matter of days. Fast forward to today and the notion that Mexico is on the verge of becoming a failed state is as [not smart] idiotic today as it was then . The news reporters happily interviewed the dubious characters predicting
Mexico’s failures because to lead with Mexico’s imminent demise was an easy sell for the US appetite for sensational headlines .
¶
I understand that the news media has to attract eyeballs in order to stay in business. Eyeballs sell advertising and the more eyeballs the more financially stable the news outlet is.
Most of the time when I am discussing the state of the news media with a reporter and news outlet executive the topic of tabloids leads to heated discussions about ethics in journalism. That discussion invariably leads to how blogging has destroyed the profession of the professional news outlet . I always counter that the demise of the newspapers and news outlets to Internet delivered news is a direct result of the failure of the traditional news outlets adhering to the basics of fair and ethical news reporting.
¶
The demise of the traditional news media came about when sensationalism became the accepted practice rather than th e exception. I don’t blame the socalled experts on everything drug cartel related because they are nothing more than individuals looking to make a quick buck by proclaiming themselves experts on the drug traffickers in
Mexico.
¶
The notion of the imminent failure of Mexico was started by information peddler George
Friedman in May of 2008 with his self-serving, make-another-dollar opinion that was nothing more than another charlatan peddling his goods to those willing to buy. The problem with people like
Friedman is that the news media is too happy to label them “experts” in order to ply their sensational headlines to their audience.
¶
George Friedman’s company and raison d’ete is his company Stratfor. Stratfor peddles “strategic analysis” about geopolitics
. In essence, the company has self-proclaimed itself as an expert in global security in order to sell its publications to individuals and governments. It peddles self-proclaimed expertise in security. The problem though is that thei r security “expertise” apparently doesn’t include their own operations because in 2011, the hacker group Anonymous broke into their systems. In February 2012, Wikileaks began publishing the stolen emails.
¶
Friedman’s Stratfor has taken the position that you can’t trust the released emails because they will not confirm which ones are authenticate and which ones may be doctored after they were stolen. To me, this position is nothing more than a desperate attempt to discount the theft of their emails. Regardless, for a socalled expert on “security” the theft of their emails shows a distinct failure in their ability to protect themselves and thus the security of their clients.
¶ For his part, George Friedman, born in
Budapest Hungary is a former professor and now an author and owner of Stratfor. He peddles information to those willing to buy it. I am sure you are all aware of the famous phrase; “those who can’t, teach”. Most appropriate for Friedman.
¶
A Failed State is generally defined as a country that has lost some or all control over its sovereignty. The fact is that Mexico, even at the height of the Mexican Drug War never relinquished control over its sovereignty . I am sure some of you will argue that there were and are pockets of criminality in Mexico that seem to surpass the government’s ability to maintain control. However, all of that rhetoric ignores a fundamental reality; a failed state has a failed economy and an ineffective government. So, let’s take a look at those two functions.
¶ Has the Mexican economy faltered?
¶
The World Bank ranks Mexico’s economy as the second largest economy south of the Rio Bravo (Rio Grande), behind Brazil . This month Moody’s rated Mexico as
A3, the first time the country has received an “A” rating in its entire history. Keep in mind that the rating is derived from actions taken by two administrations under two different political parties.
¶ I wish George Friedman would explain to everyone how it is that a country on the verge of collapse is able to attain an A rating for its economy
.
Somehow, I don’t expect he will, as it isn’t something he can sell to the news outlets and his subscribers looking for doom-andgloom coming from Mexico.
¶ Somehow, a country on the verge of collapse, according to George
Friedman is on the road to becoming the United States’ number one automobile exporter this year.
Again, how is it that a country on the verge of collapse continues to build enough automobiles to outpace Canada and Japan?
¶ Clearly , the Mexican economy is not on the verge of collapse and therefore the country’s government is in full control. So, let’s a take a look at the transition of

power.
¶
On December 1, 2012 , President Enrique Peña Nieto took office. Mexico had effectively transitioned power from one government to another. Former President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, who initiated the Mexican Drug War, democratically relinquished power in a transition from one party to another . Both US president Barack Obama and leftist president Hugo Chavez both agreed that the transfer of power was properly completed.
¶ In other words, two opposing political ideologies both agreed that Mexico’s electoral process was completed properly under the law . In fact, Mexico has now transitioned power from one party, to another and back to the original party making Mexico a two-party country.
¶
So much for the notion that Mexico was on the verge of collapse.
¶
The problem of the drug cartels is a significant problem for Mexico but it is a geopolitical problem with many facets at work at the same time. For the most part Mexico has risen to the occasion and has demonstrated that far from being a failed state, it is in fact an economically growing country in full control of its sovereignty.
As much as the naysayers want it to be, the facts are that Mexico is not some backwards country on the border holding the US back. Rather it is a country that the US should be proud to call a friend .
¶
Unfortunately, for people like George Friedman and those who subscribe to his voodoo research the facts are just inconvenient things that should be ignored .
Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint?
Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316
–332, EBSCO
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of
U.S. activism and international stability . In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true . During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially . By 1998, the
United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990 .51 To internationalists, defe nse hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U nited S tates cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U nited S tates military , or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief . No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished . The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.
However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends , then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the U nited S tates cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined . Grand strategic decisions are never final ; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled . If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem . As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained
United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending .

Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone .

By Anahi
and Michael O'Boyle (Reuters) “Mexico president vows probe of his home purchases, contractor deals” https://uk.news.yahoo.com/mexico-president-vows-conflict-interest-probe-home-deals-191146903.html#SsRDWdv
MEXICO CITY (Reuters) - Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto on Tuesday ordered an investigation of home purchases by himself, his wife and his finance minister from government contractors but he fell short of demands for an independent probe into possible corruption.
¶ Pena Nieto named a former election official to head the Public
Administration Ministry (SFP) and investigate whether he and Finance Minister Luis Videgaray had steered big government contracts towards businessmen who had sold them homes.
¶ The post had been empty since Pena Nieto took office over two years ago, when he proposed replacing the SFP with a more independent anti-corruption body that has yet to take shape.
¶ "I am conscious that these accusations have created the appearance of something improper, something that really did not happen," Pena
Nieto said.
¶ However, the man named to lead the probe, Virgilio Andrade, said minutes after Pena Nieto's announcement that he would only be looking into the contractors' deals with the federal government rather than the house purchases, which began before the president took office.
¶
Mexico's government has struggled to mount convincing investigations of corruption allegations in the past.
¶ A Reuters report last month detailed how investigators at state oil company
Pemex [PEMX.UL], in probes managed by SFP officials, disregarded more than 200 cases in which congressional auditors recommended punishment for alleged contract irregularities.
¶ A scandal erupted late last year when it emerged that Pena Nieto's wife was acquiring a multimillion dollar home in Mexico
City from a subsidiary of Grupo Higa, which was part of a Chinese-led consortium that won a $3.75 billion (2.47 billion pounds) rail contract,
which has since been shelved.
¶ Videgaray also bought a home and received a loan from the same company and it emerged that Pena Nieto himself bought a home from a different government contractor.
¶ Both Pena Nieto and Videgaray say they did nothing wrong under Mexican law.
¶ Andrade said on Tuesday that neither Pena Nieto nor Videgaray were directly involved in awarding any contracts and that his investigation will be limited in scope.
¶ "It will not review the purchases of the houses, but the group of contracts agreed between private individuals and the federal government," he told local radio.
¶
Andrade's brief includes overseeing ethical guidelines for public servants and establishing protocols governing the relationship between contractors and public servants.
¶ The economy ministry, where Andrade worked previously, said the president's office was handling requests for interviews with him.
¶ Opposition lawmakers and experts have long argued that Mexico needs to establish independent prosecutors to deal with deeply ingrained corruption.
¶ The scandal has stoked Pena Nieto's deepest crisis since he took office in late 2012.
¶
He was already grappling with the fallout of the abduction and almost certain massacre of 43 trainee teachers in southwest Mexico last year amid spiralling drug gang violence.
¶ Pena Nieto made light of the pressure on
Tuesday when his announcement was met with silence from assembled journalists.
¶ "I know they don't clap," he said to his spokesman as he left the podium. Within minutes, his words had gone viral on Twitter as the top trending topic in Mexico,
#YaSeQueNoAplauden.
¶ Analysts say the housing scandal could further undermine implementation of major economic reforms seen as key to helping stem a slide in domestic oil output and bolster economic growth.
¶ " There is a sensation of distrust around tenders in which Grupo Higa is immersed, and there are also serious worries and doubts about the president and finance minister with certain players
," said Eduardo Bohorquez, director of the Mexican unit of Transparency International.
Joseph
, MPA, Columbia University and PhD Candidate, “Shale Boom: Impacts int eh U.S. and Beyond,” ENERGY
COLLECTIE,
—15, http://theenergycollective.com/jnyangon/2195001/impacts-shale-boom-us-and-beyond, accessed 3-14-
15.
The unconventional oil and gas boom has shaken up energy markets in the U.S. and beyond. Across many America n states, the energy sector is experiencing a number of changes far larger than in its history including improvements in policies , business models , tech nologies, and investment options to make energy cleaner, more plentiful and diversified , cheaper to store and capable of handling increased demand more intelligently. Tech nological advances have significantly enhanced production of oil and gas from shale, turning the U.S. into a major oil producer , with most of the new production coming from unconventional sources. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates a drop in the producer price index for natural gas of nearly 57% between 2007 and 2012 because of increased supply from

unconventional oil and gas sources.[1] Unlike other countries with abundant shale resource potential in Europe, Asia and Latin
America, the U.S. enjoys some big advantages, such as solid financial foundation for risky projects, open access, a well-developed supply chain built upon many years of serving communities and rewarding shareholders. This is allowing sufficiently robust domestic supplies to meet even significant growth in demand across major sectors of the economy for example transportation, electric power generation, and manufacturing. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates the growth in natural gas in the U.S. will increase by an average of 1.6% annually between 2012 and 2040.[2] This is more than double EIA’s projected 0.8% annual growth rate in consumption over the same period. Yet the long-term trend in shale boom is clear . The projection by EIA points to a continuing supply growth for oil and gas out of the shale regions in the U.S., with composition of shale energy expected to reach 56% of total production by 2040.[3] Because of the big shifts in production now underway, the industry is continuing to attract more domestic and foreign private investment, which is introducing strong competition in a sector that only a decade ago was deemed obsolete and high cost. A declining trend in U.S. power generation emissions attributed to fuel switching from coal-fired power plants to natural gas systems provides conditions, economic and environmental, that enable electric utilities to improve their operations because shale can come online and offline more quickly. This enhances the capacities of utilities to implement demand-side management strategies more effectively. Consider the following recent developments: 1. Since 2007, annual production of shale gas in the U.S. ha s increased by nearly 51% and technically recoverable reserves have grown five-fold, according to EIA.[5] In particular, increased drilling in the Marcellus Shale has stimulated economic growth in places like Pennsylvania, traditionally a coal-producing state. At the same time, hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal drilling have caused concerns about their impact on the environment.
2. The EIA predicts that liquefied natural gas (LNG), as a share of U.S. natural gas consumption will grow to 12.4% by 2030 from current levels of around 3%. As energy consumption in general has grown, so has the demand for natural gas. Investment in new
LNG gasification terminals will continue to become attractive because of the rising shale boom, flexible contracting arrangements, and falling liquefaction and shippi ng costs making LNG shipments more responsive to natural gas prices. 3. Promising oil “plays”
(i.e. a commercially exploited energy deposit) in the Niobrara in Northern Colorado and parts of Kansas, Nebraska and Wyoming have revived big local economic gains. Introduction of advanced technologies in oil and gas extraction has led to significant rise in production in the Barnett Shale in Texas since 2003.[6] Drilling has also expanded in other areas, such as the Haynesville and
Fayetteville shale plays in Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. 4. For now, rising U.S. shale supply is exerting pressure on global energy markets, pushing oil and gas prices to record lows. The upside of the falling oil prices is that it provides the U.S. with a unique opportunity to reform its energy policy towards a path of low-carbon future our society so clearly needs. Globally, more effective management of supply and demand is required to catalyze further investments and competition in energy markets, especially in Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa. So far, the expansion in production points to continued market stability and economic gains in the long term . Domestically, more U.S. output will likely shield the country from
frequent price spikes and
seasonal price volatility
. In the short term, a shortage of skilled engineers, seismologists, geologists and other experts may hamper production though, forcing energy companies to increase specialized training in oil and gas operations.

Ratings
[Fitch Ratings' Report at Reuters 12-11-2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/11/fitch-ma-drivesnegative-global-pharma-r-idUSFit86078120141211]
(The following statement was released by the rating agency) Link to Fitch Ratings' Report: 2015
Outlook
: Global
Pharmaceuticals
(Strategic Industry
Evolution to Continue; M&A Reduces Rating Headroom) here LONDON, December 11 (Fitch) Fitch Ratings believes
20 15 will be a transitional year for global pharma companies as they continue to evolve their business models
and position themselves for structural changes in the industry. Accordingly, we have revised the rating outlook to negative as we expected rating headroom for Fitch-rated pharmaceutical companies
to remain under pressure in 2015
. This is reflected in the Negative Outlook on 28% of the Fitch-rated global pharma universe (Amgen, BMS, Merck,
Bayer). There was one downgrade in the sector during 2014 (AstraZeneca). Financial flexibility has been eroded during 2014 on the back of a sharp rise in debt-funded M&A activity as companies focus on boosting scale in therapeutic areas and consumer healthcare. They are also improving R&D productivity to manage increasing costs and risks of bringing new drugs to market.
Fitch's sector outlook remains stable
, reflecting
that underlying long-term growth drivers remain intact
, characterised by an ageing
and growing world population leading towards
an increase of chronic and lifestyle diseases
, ongoing
emerging-market investments in healthcare
, and
treatment and tech nology advances
. However, we also factor in the intensifying efforts of healthcare authorities to reduce costs, improve outcomes and focus on patient value. As a result, we
expect stable operating performance in 2015
. Continued M&A, pressure towards increasing shareholder returns (particularly for US players), as well as the growing exposure to potentially rising interest rates as a result of increased debt levels across the sector are key rating risks. In addition, the industry's focus on scale in selected therapeutic areas over diversification, the execution and integration of recent corporate activity, as well as risks and costs bringing the competitive late state R&D pipeline to market may lead to pressures on the business risk profile of individual players. In aggregate, we expect global pharma sector to continue to display a strong investment grade credit profile, supported by favourable underlying demographics
, emerging market growth
, and anticipated innovation in specialist treatment areas
, with rating underpinned by strong and above average profitability and cash generation. Fitch believes that stretched rating profiles could be repaired assuming a careful focus on capital allocation in the sector. The full report, '2015 Outlook: Global
Pharmaceuticals' is available at www.fitchratings.com or by clicking the link above.
Donald W Light professor, Joel R Lexchin professor 1Department of Psychiatry, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2250 Chapel Avenue, Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, USA; 2York University, School of Health Policy and Management, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 8/11, http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf
Pharmaceutical research and development: what do we get for all that money? Data indicate that the widely touted
“innovation crisis” in pharmaceuticals is a myth.
The real innovation crisis , say Donald Light and Joel
Lexchin, stems from current incentives that reward companies for developing large numbers of new drugs with few clinical advantages over existing ones. Since the early 2000s, industry leaders, observers, and policy makers have been declaring that there is an innovation crisis in pharmaceutical research. A 2002 front page investigation by the Wall Street Journal reported, “In laboratories around the world, scientists on the hunt for new drugs are coming up dry . . . The
$400 billion a year drug industry is suddenly in serious trouble.”1 Four years later, a US Government Accounting Office assessment of new drug development reported that “over the past several years it has become widely recognized throughout the industry that the productivity of its research and development expenditures has been declining.”2 In 2010, Morgan Stanley reported that top executives felt they could not “beat the innovation crisis” and proposed that the best way to deal with “a decade of dismal R&D returns” was for the major companies to stop trying to discover new drugs and buy into discoveries by others.3 Such reports continue and raise the spectre that the pipeline for new drugs will soon run dry and we will be left to the mercies of whatever ills befall us.4
The “innovation crisis” myth The constant production of reports and articles about the so called innovation crisis rests on the decline in new molecular entities (defined as “an active ingredient that has never been marketed . . . in any form”5 ) since a spike in 1996 that resulted from the clearance of a backlog of applications after large user fees from companies were introduced (fig 1 ⇓ ). This decline ended in
20 06, when approvals of new molecular entities returned to their long term mean of between 15 and
25 a year (fig 2 ⇓ ).6 Even in 2005, an analysis of the data by a team at Pfizer concluded that the innovation crisis was a myth “which bears no relationship to the true innovation rates of the pharmaceutical industry .”7 So why did the claims and stories not abate? A subsequent analysis also concluded that the innovation crisis was a myth and added several insights .8 Based on US Food and Drug
Administration records, Munos found that drug companies “have delivered innovation at a constant rate for almost 60 years .” The new biologicals have been following the same pattern “in which approvals fluctuate around a constant , low level.
”8 These data do not support frequently heard complaints about how hard it is to get any new drug approved. They also mean that neither policies considered to be obstacles to innovation (like the requirement for more extensive clinical testing) nor those regarded as promoting innovation (like faster reviews) have made much difference. Even the

biotechnology revolution did not change the rate of approval of new molecular entities , though it changed strategies for drug development.9
Meanwhile, telling “innovation crisis” stories to politicians and the press serves as a ploy, a strategy to attract a range of government protections from free market, generic competition.10

Daniel W.
, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of
Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-
Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
Prior to 2008 , numerous foreign policy analysts had predicted a looming crisis in global economic governance . Analysts only reinforced this perception since the financial crisis, declaring that we live in a “G-Zero” world.
This paper takes a closer look at the global response to the financial crisis. It reveals a more optimistic picture. Despite initial shocks that were actually more severe than the 1929 financial crisis, global economic governance structures responded quickly and robustly . Whether one measures results by economic outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional flexibility, global economic governance has displayed
since 2008. Multilateral economic institutions performed well in crisis situations to reinforce open economic policies , especially in contrast to the 1930s. While there are areas where governance has either faltered or failed, on the whole, the system has worked
. Misperceptions about global economic governance persist because the Great Recession has disproportionately affected the core economies – and because the efficiency of past periods of global economic governance has been badly overestimated. Why the system has worked better than expected remains an open question. The rest of this paper explores the possible role that the distribution of power, the robustness of international regimes, and the resilience of economic ideas might have played.

[Donald W. Light Lokey visiting professor at Stanford University and a professor of comparative health-care at the
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and Rebecca Warburton, associate professor and a health economist, specializing in the costbenefit analysis of health-related public projects at School of Public Administration, University of Victoria 2011 http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pharmamyths.
net%2Ffiles%2FBiosocieties_2011_Myths_of_High_Drug_Research_Costs.pdf&ei=7o26VL7IEIaSyQSqiYLAAw&usg=AFQjCNH0E
Mojy1ghTCzl6bWT0bIFZqj0sg&sig2=7AmvrPw2vDbJgGLgfdQmMA&bvm=bv.83829542,d.aWw]
In the undertaking of grand challenges and the search for vaccines and other magic bullets
to eradicate diseases of the poor, the very high costs
of pharmaceutical research appear everywhere
. When companies like GlaxoSmithKline announce they will lower prices to a fraction of what they charge in affluent countries, the initial high price is justified based on the high risks and costs of research and development (R&D). For decades, the very high costs of R&D have been the industry’s rationale for high prices in the developed world, and the basis for claims that companies cannot afford research into primarily developing-world diseases, where high prices cannot be charged. The few companies that did not abandon vaccine R&D because prices were s o low ‘solved’ that problem by charging 20
–40 times more than they used to, citing the high cost of R&D. When Michael Kremer’s version of an ‘advance market commitment’ (AMC) swept the policy world and was embraced by the G8 as a fiscal magic bullet that would result in new vaccines for malaria or AIDS, it was premised on meeting the allegedly high costs of
R&D for multinational corporations, whose innovative researchers would find a vaccine for malaria or AIDS, where public or university researchers had failed (Kremer and
Glennerster, 2004, pp. 10 –11; Farlow, 2005).
Industry executives
, well supplied with facts and figures by the industry’s global press network, awe audiences with staggering figures for the cost of a single trial
, like tribal chieftains and their scribes who recount the mythic costs of a great victory in a remote pass where no outside witnesses saw the battle.
Companies tightly control access to verifiable facts about their risks and costs, allowing access only to supported economists at consulting firms and universities, who develop methods for showing how large costs and risks are; and then the public, politicians and journalists often take them at face value, accepting them as fact. The global press network never tells audiences about the detailed reconstruction of R&D costs for RotaTeq and Rotarix that found costs and risks were remarkably low up to the large final trials, and that concluded the companies recovered their investments within the first 18 months (Light et al, 2009). The companies could now sell these vaccines for rotavirus for one-tenth their Western price and still earn profits.
Pharmaceutical companies have a strong vested interest in maximizing figures for R&D and supporting centres or researchers who help them do so.
Since the
Kefauver hearings in 1959
–1962, the industry’s principal justification for its high prices on patented drugs has been the high cost of R&D, and it has sought further government protections from normal price competition. These include increasing patent terms and extending data exclusivity, without good evidence that these measures increase innovation (National Institute for Health Care Management, 2000; European Commission for Competition, 2008 (28 November); Adamini et al, 2009).
Industry leaders and lobbyists routinely warn that lower
prices will reduce funds for R&D
and result in suffering and death that future medicines could reduce . Marcia Angell, the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, describes this as ‘y a kind of blackmail’
(Angell, 2004, pp. 38
–39). She quotes the president of the US industry’s trade association as saying, ‘Believe me, if we impose price controls on the pharmaceutical industry, and if you reduce the R&D that this industry is able to provide, it’s going to harm my kids and it’s going to harm those millions of other Americans who have lifethreatening conditions’. Merrill Goozner, former chief economic correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, points out that no other researchoriented industry makes this kind of argument
(Goozner, 2004).
In fact, they do the opposite: when profits decline
, they redouble their research efforts to find new products that will generate more profits
. Not to do so guarantees their decline. The industry’s view of European ‘price controls’ (actually, large-volume discounts) is that they do not allow recovery of huge R&D costs so that
Europeans are ‘free riders’ on Americans and force US prices higher to pay for unrecovered costs the ‘free riders’ refuse to pay. This claim has been shown not to be supported by industry and government reports and to be illogical as well (Light and Lexchin, 2005). The purpo se of this report is to sharpen readers’ critical skills in asking pointed questions about the seemingly insurmountable barriers of R&D, about the overpriced AMC that will result in most donations going to extra profits rather than more vaccinations
(Light, 2007), and about how much global pharmaceutical companies can afford to discount (Plahte, 2005). By demythologizing in detail the most widely cited estimate of pharmaceutical R&D, the report will provide lessons in how such estimates are constructed.
This
exercise in critical sociology and economics builds on
the substantial critiques of others
(Public Citizen, 2001; Love, 2003; Angell, 2004; Goozner, 2004) but adds several new points. The report will conclude that the bigger problems lie elsewhere
, with most R&D not being directed at
discovering clinically superior medicines
, even for affluent customers, because companies are
so generously rewarded for developing hundreds of new products little better than the ones they replace
.
Policy needs to move away from
decontextualized magic bullets
and towards context-sensitive, socioeconomic programmes of health in which medicines can play a critical role.
, over 25 years experience in marketing, business development, and product development in the medical products industry, graduate degree in Biochemistry/Endocrinology from a major US research university, “Medical uses of marijuana–hitting the bong of science (updated again),” www.skepticalraptor.com/skepticalraptorblog.php/medical-marijuana-hitting-bong-science/
For neurological disorders, there are some, but not broad, indicators that THC or its derivatives, could have benefits. But, it’s clouded by the extremely small size of clinical trials, a large potential placebo effect, bad trial design, and different kinds of bias
.
The systematic reviews tend to heavily qualify their conclusions, mainly because of the lack of large, gold-standard, clinical trials.
In other words, there isn’t enough, at this time, for a neurologist to say “this will help.”
We don’t know. Which, again, does not mean you can proclaim that if we don’t know, the we do know.
¶
Dr David
Gorski, a real oncology researcher, whose knowledge and expertise in these areas matter quite a bit , reviewed the research in many of the medical claims about marijuana and concluded that, ¶

There’s no doubt that what is driving the legalization of medical marijuana
in so many states has far more to do with politics than with science
. Right now, for all but a handful of conditions, the evidence is slim to nonexistent that cannabis has any use as a medicine
, and those conditions
, such as CINV and chronic pain, can often be treated more reliably with purified or synthesized active components.
Moreover, for one condition for which there is reasonably good evidence for the efficacy of cannabis and/or cannabinoids, namely chronic pain, politicians are reluctant to approve medical marijuana.¶ This is the same thing with a lot of science in this country.
Political expediency trumps real scientific research
. Anthropogenic global warming, which is backed by a wealth of evidence, is rejected because it’s a “liberal conspiracy” or some such nonsense. Well, now politicians want to allow marijuana because of medical benefits
, almost all of which are unsupported by real scientific evidence
, while ignoring some of the known risks of smoking the drug. If politicians want to make marijuana legal, do so because it’s a recreational drug, not unlike alcohol.¶ The world of medical marijuana is using the same weak evidence, the same ignorance of risks, and the same logical fallacies you hear from those who push “natural” herbs or supplements. And the more we look the more we find that there’s nothing there. We need t o separate recreational use of marijuana from medical use. They are not the same, and one shouldn’t support the other.¶ The TL;DR version¶ Marijuana prevents nausea in cancer treatment patients
–maybe, maybe not. No solid research in the area.¶ Marijuana cures cancer–no clinical evidence that it does.¶ Marijuana can treat neurological conditions
–not really, but some isolated cannabinoids may help ameliorate some symptoms of some conditions.¶ Marijuana has some risks that have not been fully explored.
But sta y tuned, I have more to write on this.¶ There is no global Big Pharma conspiracy to suppress clinical research on marijuana. If it could “cure” one cancer, they’d be all over it trying to find the right dose, delivery mechanism, and pretty advertising to m ake billions of dollars.¶ If you want to smoke marijuana (or eat it in a brownie–not sure that’s a thing anymore
, it was when I was in college) because it’s relaxing, or you need to blow off steam after a tough day, fine. Go for it. I absolutely do not understand why this usage is illegal. It’s costly to society. And banning it provides no benefit to society.¶ On the other hand, I find most, if not all, of the medical claims made about marijuana to be laughable.
The evidence is just so weak or non-existent
,
I actually have no clue why it’s part of the discourse, but then again people deny evolution, and we end up arguing that.
Yes, there are bits and pieces of intriguing evidence that a component of marijuana may have some benefits to human health. But we’re a long ways from testing that with real clinical trials, then getting it to market
. And trust me, when someday we have found some real clinically significant uses, it’s not going to be sold as a “joint.” It’s going to be developed into some sort of medical delivery formulation (like a pill or injectable solution) that gets the purified pharmacologically relevant compound to the physiological site where it would work. That’s how real medical science works.

George
is associate director of the Applied Research Center and co-director of the Energy Business Forum at
Florida International University. “Energy Security Achievable with Biofuels Made in the America” Ethanol Producer Magazine, http://www.ethanolproducer.com/articles/4466/energy-security-achievable-with-biofuels-made-in-the-americas/
Undoubtedly, the United States needs Latin America for energy security through diversification.
Conversely, Latin America needs the United States for capital and technology infusion to build or expand their cane ethanol (and, in the future, cellulosic ethanol) capabilities to satisfy their own energy needs and enter the U.S. market , the largest fuel market in the world (145 billion gallons per year of gasoline). ¶
This interdependence calls for closer collaboration within the Americas in the energy sector and by extension in agriculture, project financing, trade, immigration and poverty reduction. ¶ Biofuels Challenges in Latin America ¶ While conditions are favorable for biofuels production, Latin America faces a number of challenges that make foreign investors hesitant. Those issues need to be addressed on a hemispheric basis under the joint leadership of the two biofuels giants, the U nited S tates and Brazil. The challenges include political, economic, trade and social issues. Political instability and poor regulatory and legal frameworks need to be addressed. Latin American countries need to commit to protecting foreign investment, intellectual property and the sanctity of contractual agreements.
¶
For Latin America to realize its full biofuel production potential, significant investment will be needed. Joint ventures between
U.S. and Latin American investors, helped with debt financing from regional development banks, is the best means to fund local biofuel projects.
Tad W.
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The University of California, Berkeley June 3,
“Chapter 2: Can the Earth Deliver the Biomass-for-Fuel we Demand?” in Biofuels, Solar, and Wind as Renewable Energy Systems, http://gaia.pge.utexas.edu/papers/Chapter%2022.pdf **Suicide metaphor edited out
Physics, chemistry and biology say clearly that there can be no sustained net mass output from any ecosystem for more than a few years. A young forest in a temperate climate grows fast in a clear-cut area, see Fig. 2.16, and transfers nutrients from soil to the young trees. The young trees grow very fast (there is a positive NPP). but the amount of mass accumulated in the forest is small.
When a tree burns or dies some or most of its nutrients go back to the soil. When this tree is logged and hauled away, almost no nutrients are returned. After logging young trees a couple of times the forest soil becomes depleted, while the populations of insects and pathogens are well-established, and the forest productivity rapidly declines (Patzek and Pimemel. 2006). When the forest is allowed to grow long enough, its net ecosystem productivity becomes zero on the average.
¶ Therefore, in order to export biomass (mostly water, but also carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and a plethora of nutrients) an ecosystem must import equivalent quantities of the chemical elements it lost, or decline irreversibly .
Carbon comes from the atmospheric
CO2 and water flows in as rain, rivers and irrigation from mined aquifers and lakes. The other nutrients, however, must be rapidly produced from ancient plant matter transformed into methane, coal, petroleum, phosphates .17 etc ., as well as from earth minerals (muriate of potash, dolomites, etc.), - all irreversibly mined by humans.
Therefore, to the extent that humans are no longer integrated with the ecosystems in which they live, they are doomed to extinction by exhausting all planetary stocks of minerals, soil and clean water . The question is not if, but how fast.
¶ It seems that with the exponentially accelerating mining of global ecosystems for biomass, the time scale of our extinction is shrinking with each crop harvest. Compare this statement with the feverish proclamations of sustainable biomass and agrofuel production that flood us from the confused media outlets , peer-reviewed journals, and politicians.
¶ 2.5.3 Is There any Other Proof of NEP = 0?
¶ I just gave you an abstract proof of no trash production in Earth's Kingdom, except for its dirty human slums.
¶ Are there any other, more direct proofs, perhaps based on measurements? It turns out that there are two approaches that complement each other and lead to the same conclusions. The first approach is based on a top-down view of the Earth from a satellite and a mapping of the reflected infrared spectra into biomass growth. I will summarize this proof here. The second approach involves a direct counting of all crops, grass, and trees, and translating the weighed or otherwise measured biomass into net primary productivity of ecosystems. Both approaches yield very similar results.
¶ 2.5.4 Satellite Sensor-Based Estimates ¶ Global ecosystem productivity can be estimated by combining remote sensing with a carbon cycle analysis. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observing System
(EOS) currently "produces a regular global estimate of gross primary productivity (GPP) and annual net primary productivity (NPP) of the entire terrestrial earth surface at 1-km spatial resolution, 150 million cells, each having GPP and NPP computed individually"
(Running et al.. 2000). The MOD17A2/A3 User's Guide (Heinsch et al.. 2003) provides a description of the Gross and Net Primary

Productivity estimation algorithms (MOD17A2/A3) designed for the MODIS1* sensor.
¶ The sample calculation results based on the
MODI7A2/A3 algorithm are listed in Table 2.2. The NPPs for Asia Pacific. South America, and Europe, relative to North America, are shown in Fig. 2.17. The phenomenal net ecosystem productivity of Asia Pacific is 4.2 larger than that of North America. The
South American ecosystems deliver 2.7 times more than their North American counterparts, and Europe just 0.85. It is no surprise then that the World Bank19, as well as agribusiness and logging companies - Archer Daniel Midlands (ADM). Bunge. Cargill.
Monsanto. CFBC. Safbois. Sodefor. ITB. Trans-M. and many others - all have moved in force to plunder the most productive tropical regions of the world, see Fig. 2.18.
¶ According 10 a MODIS-based calculation (Roberts and Wooster, 2007) of biomass burned in
Africa in February and August 2004. prior to the fires shown here, the resulting carbon dioxide emissions were 120 and 160 million tonnes per month, respectively.
¶ The final result of this global "end-game" of ecological destruction will be an unmitigated and lightcning-fast collapse of ecosystems protecting a large portion of" humanity.20
¶ 2.5.5 NPP in the US ¶ The overall median values of net primary productivity may be converted to the higher heating value (HHV) of NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.19. In 2003. thus estimated net annual biomass production in the US was 5.3 Gt and its HHV was 90 EJ. One must be careful, however, because the underlying distributions of ecosystem productivity are different for each ecosystem and highly asymmetric. Therefore, lumping them together and using just one median value can lead to a substantial systematic error. For example, the lumped value of US NPP of
90 EJ. underestimates the overall 2003 estimate21 of 0.408 x 7444068 x 106 x 17 x 106 x 2.2 x 10"18 = 113EJ by some 20%.
¶ To limit this error, one can perform a more detailed calculation based on the 16 classes of land cover listed in Table 2.2 in (Hum et al..
2001). The MODIS-derived median NPPs are reported for most of these classes. The calculation inputs are shown in Table 2.3.
Since the spatial set of land-cover classes cannot be easily mapped onto the administrative set of USDA classes of cropland, woodland, pastureland/rangeland. and forests. Hunt et al. (2001) provide an approximate linear mapping between these two sets, in the form of a 16x4 matrix of coefficients between 0 and 1.1 have lumped the land-cover classes somewhat differently (to be closer to USDA's classes), and the results are shown in Table 2.4 and Fig. 2.20.
¶ The Cropland 4- Mosaic class here comprises die
USDA's cropland, woodland, and some of the pasture classes. The Remote Vegetation class comprises some of the USDA's rangeland and pastureland classes. The USDA forest class is somewhat larger than here, as some of the smaller patches of forest, such as parks, etc.. are in the Mosaic class. Thus calculated 2003 US NPP is 118 EJ yr"1, 74 EJ yr"1 of above-ground (AG) plant construction and 44 EJ yr in root construction. In addition 12/74 = 17% of AG vegetation is in remote areas, not counting the remote forested areas. Note that my use of land-cover classes and their typical root-to-shoot ratios yields an overall result (118 EJ yr~') which is very similar to that derived by the Numerical Terradynamic Simulation Group {113 EJ yr-1).
¶ Therefore, the DOE/USDA proposal to produce 130 billion gallons of ethanol from 1400 million tonnes of biomass (Perlack et a!., 2005) each year - and yearafter-year-, would consume 32% of the remaining above-ground NPP in the US. see Fig. 2.20. if one assumes a 52% energyefficiency of the conversion.~ At the current 26% overall efficiency of the corn-ethanol cycle (Patzek, 2006a), roughly 64% of all AG
NPP in the US would have to be consumed to achieve this goal with zero harvest losses.23 To use more than half of all accessible above-ground plant growth in all forests, rangeland. pastureland and agriculture in the US to produce agrofuels would be a continental-scale ecologic and economic disaster of biblical proportions.24
¶ 2.6 Conclusions ¶ I have shown that the Earth simply cannot produce the vast quantities of biomass we want to use to prolong our unsustainable lifestyles, while slowly [destroying our] committing suicide
as a global human civilization.
¶ In passing- I have noted that the "cellulosic biomass" refineries are very inefficient, currently impossible to scale, and incapable of ever catching up with the runaway need to feed one billion gasoline- and dieselpowered cars and trucks.

Dr. Ellis is research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. “A
NEW BEGINNING FOR THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA?” http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/a-new-beginning-forthe-united-states-in-central-america/?singlepage=1
The announcement by the White House on January 29 that it would ask Congress for $1 billion for
Central America in its FY2016 budget is welcome news for the region, and for the United States. The proposed request would triple the resources earmarked for Central America by the U.S. government in recent years, although the amount of money contemplated remains modest by comparison to the magnitude of problems that those countries face.
¶
The administration’s declaration on Central America, in combination with its restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba, creates the opportunity for the United States to forge a new relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean . With both initiatives, and the possibility of more surprises on Latin America policy yet to come , the upcoming Summit of the
Americas in April in Panama City could be one of the most productive multilateral engagements the U nited S tates has had with the region in years.

(Harold, “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions”, 9-1, http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac, ldg)
Overall, the probability of further nuclear proliferation in Latin America is low because the combination of both capability and intention
to develop nuclear forces is not found in any of the possible proliferato rs. The two countries that have the capability to pursue such a program,
Argentina and Brazil, gave up the pursuit
of nuclear weapons two decades ago
, and they are not likely to resume this path given their historical experience and the geopolitical threat environment
.
Venezuela
, whose intentions in the nuclear arena are suspected by some, lacks all indigenous capability
to pursue nuclear weapons development at this time.
Even with the assistance of outside powers
, the likelihood that it could put such a system in place undetected
within the next ten to twenty years is almost nil
. While Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela have been on friendly terms during the past decade, there is no indication that they have any interest in helping Venezuela obtain nuclear weapons. Moreover, the possibility that non-State actors (such as the private sector or organized crime) within Argentina and Brazil might form part of such a network without State knowledge, as has been detected in the former Soviet Union states and demonstrated by the A. Q. Khan network, is lower than in many other regions of the world because of two decades of nuclear mutual confidence-building and mutual inspection through permanent binational agency, Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e
Côntrole de Materiais Nucleares ( ABACC
). This agency monitors all nuclear stockpiles and facilities in these two countries, and it would be likely to detect theft of nuclear technology or materials.
For the foreseeable future,
Argentina and Brazil are unlikely to resume efforts to acquire nuclear weapons without some revolutionary change in the international system that would lead them to perceive an existential threat to the state. The initial rationale for abandoning the pursuit of nuclear weapons in Argentina and Brazil was to safeguard democracy. Nuclear development had been heavily influenced by the military in both countries, and civilian leaders of the newly democratic states stripped the armed forces of control of nuclear programs in the 1980s. These programs, some of which had the potential to lead to nuclear weapons, had been shrouded in secrecy and were unaccountable both under civilian governments and military dictatorships.3
The developing security community in the Southern Cone, taking the form of UNASUR in its latest evolution, means that any territorial defense or deterrence rationales for nuclear weapons acquisition have faded. The resolution of all territorial disputes between the major regional powers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and ongoing mutual confidence building measures, limit the possibility that new conflict dynamics will lead
States in the region to seek nuclear weapons
. Of the two powers with indigenous nuclear technology industries,
Brazil‟s constitution bans the development of nuclear weapons, an d both Argentina and Brazil are committed to sophisticated nuclear safeguards through the
ABACC
. 4

Also doesn’t solve disease
– quoting biogeography professor at London University who edits the Journal of Biogeography and a
Canadian co-founder of Greenpeace (6/9, Barry, New York Post, Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html)
"One of the simple, but very important, facts is that the rainforests have only been around for between 12,000 and 16,000 years . That sounds like a very long time but, in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick . "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "
The simple point is that there are now still - despite what humans have done - more rainforests today than there were 12,000 years ago." "This lungs of the earth business is nonsense ; the daftest of all theories ," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out . "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth . It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. " In terms of world systems, the rainforests are basically irrelevant . World weather is governed by the oceans - that great system of ocean atmospherics. " Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant ," he says. Both scientists say the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest plant or animal - while plausible - is also based on false science because the sea holds more mysteries of life than the rainforests . And both say fears that man is destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the rainforests are remarkably healthy. "
They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science ," Moore says.

2NC

- Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and Humanities, Swansea University,
UK (David, “Towards revision of the UN drug control conventions:
Harnessing likemindedness” International Journal of Drug Policy 24 (2013) 60– 68, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2012.09.001)
LMGs = Like Minded Groups of nations
Further complexity arises from the issue of sequencing . While, as Young suggests, the generation of like-mindedness can be a protracted affair across a variety of regimes, the construction of any meaningful LMG with the goal of revising the UN drug control conventions is likely to be more prolonged and fluid than in other issue areas. T he significant divergence of views among members of the global drug prohibition regime suggests that any formal change to the regime will come about in an incremental fashion rather than via a Kuhnian-like paradigm shift . This has much to do with the somewhat unique nature of drug policy itself. Approaches to domestic drug policy, and hence attitudes towards the current international control framework, are prone to change. National policies, to use the terminology of MacCoun and
Reuter (2001, p. 308), undergo both relaxations and tightenings.
Moreover, these processes occur at different rates depending upon specific national circumstances. Indeed, while recent years witnessed a clearly identifiable growth of pragmatic national policies, every soft defecting state has moved to ‘relax’ legislation or practice at its own pace . Both knowledge transfer and example-setting have played a role in influencing the direction of policy.
Nevertheless, policy shifts have been triggered predominantly by unique national, even local, circumstances. Work on bridging the gap between research and policy ably demonstrates that change in drug policy is a complex process involving many variables . Simon Lenton’s adaptation of John Kingdon’s classic multiple streams model shows how only when the
‘Problem’, ‘Policy’, and crucially ‘Politics’
, streams coincide with an infrequent window of opportunity will the conditions be ripe for a change in policy (Lenton, 2007). As Kingdon and others point out, policy changes can be regarded as rare punctuations in long periods of equilibrium where little happens (Baumgartner & Jones,
2009; Kingdon, 2003). Within the area of domestic drug policy, ‘The combination of high uncertainty about the outcome of a change, the partial irreversibility of any bad outcomes, and a pervasive tendency for decision makers to favor the status quo . . . pose steep barriers’ to change (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001, p. 373). In terms of tightenings, local circumstances also determine the timing of policy shifts; although these tend t o take place with greater speed. For instance, the political utility of being seen as ‘tough on drugs’ has resulted in the rollback of liberal approaches to cannabis possession in a number of states as administrations, or even individuals within governmental posts with a drug policy remit, have altered. A case in point is the rereclassification of cannabis in the UK in 2008 (Stevens, 2011, pp. 77 –83).
Such a situation has the potential to cause complications in not only the initial creation of a coalition of states working against or without the cooperation of a hegemonic state like the USA, but also – crucially – its subsequent maintenance during what, bearing in mind the diverging perspectives on the issue within the international community, would no doubt be a lengthy period of activity. The creation of any effective LMG is dependent on the willingness of a sufficient number of national administrations to expend diplomatic energy in the pursuit of the desired outcome within the international arena . Within the field of UN drug policy reform, achieving a critical mass of nations will be entirely dependent on the state of national drug policy among potential group members. In other words, the construction of a group of likeminded nations will only take place when an adequate collection of states have all reached a point where decision makers feel that , conscious of the potential costs of such a move, the only way to better address the drug issue within their own borders is to alter aspects of the international drug control treaties . Reaching a necessary commonality of position and hence of interest across a group of nations is likely to be both prolonged and unpredictable.

Roger
, 12/6/
Honorary senior fellow, department of politics and international relations, university of Kent at
Canterbury and senior fellow in Eurasian military studies, Jamestown Foundation. “General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear
Conflict,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38748&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=dfb6e
8da90b34a10f50382157e9bc117.
In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed
Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17,
Russia’s Chief of the General Staff
, Army-General Nikolai Makarov , offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders
. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that the potential for armed conflict along the entire Russian periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November 28;
Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the D efense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to escalate into largescale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective . However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya
Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies . According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan ; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a
European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could und ermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18).
Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare . Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17).
The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia
.
From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation ; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria . Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes
Makarov’s comment s seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have few options at its disposal
(Interfax, November 17).
There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian
General Staff takes Central Asian security much more seriously in this regard . The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which may compel early nuclear first

use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders
. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General
Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention – especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities . Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders . In the coming decade and beyond,
Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context . Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

Jeff, managing editor of Energy and Capital and contributing analyst @ the Energy Investor, an independent investment research service focusing energy markets, “This is Better Than Drug Money!”, http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/investing-inhemp/4455
But while the ban obliterated hemp cultivation
except for a few special cases requiring federal permits, Americans were allowed to import hemp products, oil, and seeds. In 2011, the U.S. imported some $11.5 million worth of hemp products, oil, and seeds, much of which was further processed into cooking oils, animal feeds, even granola bars.
¶
A new farm bill enacted earlier this year would open up the field once again. “This is big!” exclaimed Eric Steenstra, president of advocacy group Vote Hemp. “ We've been pushing for this a long time .” ¶ Advocates estimate hemp could develop into a $100 million a year industry, which could grow into a $10 billion a year market if the loosening of hemp cultivation laws is a stepping-stone to the legalization of marijuana nationwide.
¶ Steenstra anticipates precisely that. “ This is part of an overall look at cannabis policy, no doubt ,” he affirms
.¶ Still, the heavy hand of the federal government will not move easily.
¶
As the
Associated Press reported last week, fed eral authorities ordered nearly 300 pounds of hemp
seeds from Italy detained by U.S. customs officials
in Louisville. In order to get the seeds released, Kentucky State agriculture authorities had to take their case to court, suing the Justice Department, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and even Attorney General Eric Holder.
¶ Also worth noting is that while fifteen states have availed themselves of the new farm bill by removing hemp production barriers, in only two states — Colorado and Kentucky — have farmers taken to cultivating it.
¶ The hemp industry is in for a period of slow growth as it awaits other federal agencies to loosen their restrictions
on seed imports.
¶
That being said, I'm...
¶ Bullish on the Return of Hemp ¶ As an industrial crop, it's quite impressive
. One acre of hemp can produce four times more paper than one acre of trees. Hemp fiber is ten times stronger than cotton, can be used to make clothing, and doesn't require nearly as much in the way of pesticides as cotton.
Hemp can serve as a substitute for wood in building materials. Not only is it stronger than wood, but it's cheaper to produce. Hemp produces more biomass than any other plant that can be grown in the U.S. Hemp can be grown anywhere in the United States, requires only moderate water, and is frost tolerant. When we think about the legalization of marijuana, we often think about the massive profit potential. And rightly so. With the legalization of marijuana will come an enormous opportunity for savvy investors and entrepreneurs. Yet when you step back and look at the big picture, you'll find that when it comes to cannabis, the real money's going to be in industrial hemp
.
¶ Unfortunately, with special interests controlling the federal government, it's going to take some time before hemp comes back strong
enough to be a safe investment.
That being said, the folks
in Kentucky and
Colorado who are actively moving forward with the cultivation of hemp are embarking on a journey that could ultimately prove to be insanely lucrative
. And I wish them well.
Doug
, investigative journalist, bestselling author, reported from five continents for The Washington Post, Wired, Salon,
The New York Times, Outside, National Public Radio, and U.S. News & World Report. His work from Burma was read into the
Congressional Record and he won more than a dozen Alaska Press Club awards for his radio reporting from the Last Frontier , LA
Times, 2014, Teach Your Regulators Well, Hemp Bound: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Next Agricultural Revolution, pg 93-
95
For hemp to once again take off in the U nited S tates, history tells us that two more elements have to fall into place.¶
First, the industry pioneers must work with regulators to craft domestic standards .
l learned this from the saga of American biodeisel pioneers Kelly antl Bob King. They were in biofuels so early, their
Pacific Biodiesel website is biodeisel.com.
¶
According to Business World Magazine, Pacific Biodeisel shared its pro-launch study results with regulators and even competitors because the world frankly didn't know how to make an industry of waste restaurant oil.
Today their oil fuels a good deal of Haw aii, and they consult the world over. You can fill up at gas pumps on two Aloha State islands, and municipalities use the fuel for backup generators.
¶ Similarly, the initial Canadian hemp players
, several of whom are still in the industry, worked with regulators on everythin g from fieldtesting hemp varieties to THC analysis, right from the beginning.
As we've discussed, this actually started several years before Canada's official 1993 reboot. ¶ As Hermann put it, " Even if President Obama and Congress legalize hemp tomorrow, there's still a lot of work ahead for the U.S. market and anyone who wants to be a player" ¶ The initial U.S. state hemp legislation generally nods toward the ¶ Canadian model; Colorado, in

addition to unlimited commercial ¶ cultivation for registered farmers who grow hemp with that inert 0.3
¶ percent THC limit, is making a vocal statement of top-level support ¶ by allowing those tenacre development test plots wherein THC levels won‘t be tested until a cultivar is ready for the commercial market. Similarly, Hawaii's step one looks to be a hundred-acre state-sponsored research project. Pacific Biodeisel's Kelly and Bob King are big supporters of that project, because, in the end, the french fries that today drive their business are finite. “Hawaii is close to legislation allowing for a test hemp plot that we hope will remediate a few centuries of sugarcane monoculture soil and provide energy feedstock," Kelly King told me.
¶ Now , patiently developing a regulatory framework and official cultivars would seem to be essential . But there is another fairly loud opinion out there, and I'd be remiss not to mention it. It goes like this; The original American hemp farmers planted what they had on hand in their wagons after crossing wild rivers and unnamed mountain passes, And they managed, before interstates, let alone
NAFTA to build a world-lending industry.
¶ In other words, some hemp activists make the case for starting now with that ditch weed (or, if you prefer, the "heirloom cultivars") easily found out by the railroad tracks in the heartland. This
Let Darwin choose what we want plant philosophy is running up against the We live in a lab coat-and-hairnet era because of uniformity and product safety demands line of thinking. ¶ Hermann's view on this comes with too much in-thefield experience to ignore
, and it's basically this: Once she's expanded beyondselling carrots at the farmer's market, any farmer has to be savvy about her choice of variety.
¶
“Every Walmart already carries hemp oil, Nature's Path hemp c ereal, and hemp twine,” she said. " A mature industry has to be ready for the professionalism that level of reach demands .”
¶ S he’s talking about standards, testing processes, and certification paperwork . Humanity's oldest plant is about to grow up. “
We have food and health inspectors certifying our industry in Canada." she reminded me. Burritos in Front of the Phish show this is not. Still, this first to-do item is standard business stuff . It can be easily checked off.

Emily
, staff, “Report: US Leads World in Advanced Biofuels Ranking,” FUELFIX, 10—15—
, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/10/15/report-two-thirds-of-advanced-biofuels-ventures-are-in-the-u-s/
The U nited S tates leads the world in creating companies that turn food waste and non-food materials to energy , according to a Navigant Research report released Tuesday morning. More than two-thirds of all global ventures in advanced biofuels are based in the U nited S tates, a testimony to the nation’s entrepreneurial environment and investment funding for new ventures. Advanced biofuels, made from waste, algae and other non-edible organic substances, are being developed around the world as a possible alternative to fossil fuels. Navigant analyzed the biofuel markets in six global regions
— including 69 countries — based on private investment, government policies, the availability of feedstocks, the demand for liquid fuels and other factors. While high demand for liquid fuels and hefty investments pushed North America to the top of the ranking, Europe scored higher on policybased market drivers. “Higher average scores across Western Europe reflect aggressive mandates currently in place among national governments across the region, as well as a strong commitment to sustainability and investment in innovation,” the report stated. A lack of infrastructure and financial resources put the Middle
East/Africa region at the bottom of the ranking. Navigant forecasts global growth in the biofuel industry will slow through 2015, as government investment and new infrastructure moderates from recent peaks. Still, the research firm expects another round of rapid growth of advanced biorefinery capacity will occur between 2015 and 2018 , as existing facilities are expanded and retrofitted. In the United States, advanced biofuels have struggled to reach economic viability and have fallen short of federally mandated production targets. Supporters hope that advanced biofuels could reduce the pressure on the world’s food supply from traditional biofuels made from corn, sugar cane or other food crops. Conventional biofuels, produced from corn, sugarcane and other food-based crops, make up about 5 percent of the liquid fuels used for transportation worldwide, according to Navigant. For now, though, the oil industry is pushing Congress to reduce target amounts of renewables that federal law requires in the fuel supply, saying biofuel makers don’t produce enough to make the mandates realistic. The U.S. advanced biofuels market has benefit ed from relatively high investment and good access to needed raw materials such as wood scraps. In Western Europe, investors have been more hesitant and source supplies are scarcer, but there is great market demand for the finished products, driven by an aggressive European Union target of 20 percent renewable energy by
2020, including 10 percent renewable transportation fuel.

By Yemeli
, AFP “Mexico's drug cartels adapt to US pot legalization” Yahoo News http://news.yahoo.com/mexicosdrug-cartels-adapt-us-pot-legalization-053118180.html
.
Mexico City (AFP) - The growing legalization of cannabis in the United States is forcing Mexico's drug cartels to rethink their illicit business model , turning to opium poppy plantations and domestic pot consumption , experts say .
¶ Americans have been legally allowed to light up joints in the US capital since late last month, joining Washington state and Alaska, while Oregon will follow suit in July.
¶ A total of 23 US states have legalized the drug for medical use, and opinion polls show that a slim majority of Americans favor legalization.
¶
The changes in the world's biggest drug market appear to have prompted the criminal organizations producing narcotics in Mexico to switch strategies
.
¶ "
As (US) domestic production increases, this will affect production in Mexico
," Javier
Oliva, a security expert at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, told AFP.
¶
Drug cartels "will seek to increase their exports to Europe and the opportunities for consumption within the country ," he said this week at a presentation of a report by the International Narcotics Control Board, a United Nations agency.
¶
With Americans now able to grow their own cannabis in many places, one market the cartels appear to be tapping is the growing consumption of heroin in the U nited S tates .
¶ Oliva said the number of opium poppy fields
has surged
by
300 percent in the last five years
in Mexico's southwestern state of Guerrero, one of the country's most violent regions, where 43 students were allegedly slaughtered by a police-backed gang in September.
¶ The scarlet blossoms are also popping up in the north, including in the state of Durango, which forms a "Golden Triangle" of drug plantations with the neighboring regions of Chihuahua and Sinaloa.
¶ Poppy fields outnumber marijuana plantations by three to one , said Adolfo Dominguez, a military commander in Durango.
¶ Heroin consumption in the United States has surged due to tighter controls of prescription opioid drugs , said Alejandro Mohar, a member of the
International Narcotics Control Board.
¶ " Opiate-dependent drug users are increasingly turning to heroin, which is typically easier to source and cheaper than prescription opioids, " the board's report says.
¶ "Law enforcement authorities in the region have also identified significant increases in heroin purity," it says.
¶ The US heroin market was worth an estimated $27 billion in 2010. But marijuana is a more lucrative business, worth $41 billion that same year, according to US government figures.
¶ - Local smokers ¶ America has a huge appetite for marijuana.
¶ More than 1,000 tonnes of marijuana are seized along the US-Mexico border every year, the report says, citing US Drug Enforcement Administration figures.
¶ And the cannabis confiscated by US customs authorities represented 94 percent of worldwide seizures in 2013.
¶
With Americans now able to grow their own, higher-quality marijuana in some places, Mexican drug cartels will look to sell their weed to local consumers , experts say.
¶ Cannabis now ranks third after alcohol and tobacco in a government ranking of "drugs of impact" that require some kind of medical treatment, said Raul Martin del Campo, representative of the National
Commission Against Addictions.
¶
Movements to legalize marijuana have also emerged in Mexico , including in the capital, with the backing of a former president, Vicente Fox.
January 21,
(Nicholas; DAVOS SOURCE: The US Is Growing So Much Weed Now, They're Burning Down
Their Crops In Mexico; http://www.businessinsider.com/davos-source-the-us-is-growing-so-much-weed-now-theyre-burning-downtheir-crops-in-mexico-2015-1#ixzz3PjrrOYGZ; kdf)
Tuesday night at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland , a source with knowledge of security issues along the United States-Mexico border shared this interesting tidbit : The supply of marijuana grown in the U nited S tates has become so abundant and cheap that in the regions of northern
Mexico, where it used to be grown, farmers have taken to burning their crops . Because of the increased domestic supply, it is no longer profitable for these Mexican farmers to grow, reap, and transport weed across the border . They've decided there is more money in burning down their crops down and planting something else instead. This makes sense. Medical marijuana is legal in 23 states, and recreational marijuana is legal in three and decriminalized in many more.
January 14, 20
(McCarton; Marijuana legalization sparks heroin, meth trade increase with Mexican Cartels; www.thefix.com/content/marijuana-legalization-sparks-heroin-meth-trade-increase-mexican-cartels; kdf)

The full-on, or quasi-legalization, of marijuana in 23 states and Washington, D.C., has indirectly sparked a radical shift in drugs entering the country from Mexico , with cartel members now pushing more heroin and meth than ever across the border. The latest drug seizure statistics show that while the amount of pot seized by U.S.
federal state and local officers along the borde r with Mexico has dropped by 37% since 2011 , heroin seizures rose to nearly 2,181 kilograms last year, nearly tripling the amount confiscated at the border in 2009.
Separate statistics from the Drug Enforcement Administration show that 90% of the meth on U.S. streets was cooked in Mexico.
Approximately 15,803 kilograms of meth was seized last year by border control officials, up from 3,076 kilograms in 2009.
“Criminal organizations are no longer going for bulk marijuana, ” said Sidney Aki, the
U.S. Cu stoms and Border Protection Port Director at a crossing just south of San Diego. “ Hard drugs are the growing trend, and they’re profitable in small amounts.”
Aki also cited that heroin and meth are also far easier to hide and transport than marijuana. That doesn’t mean the cartels are completely abandoning marijuana. Commercial trucks full of cannabis are still sent across the border, while drug mules attempt to hike into the Arizona wilderness with 50-pound backpacks full of pot.
However, drug farmers in the Sierra Madre have admitted that they can barely make any money planting pot these days. American interest in Mexican cocaine has also dwindled. U.S. agents confiscated 11,917 kilograms of cocaine along the Mexico border, down from 27,444 kilos in 2011. Although there is still somewhat of a demand for the drug, it’s far pricier to make it in Mexico and is a riskier operation for cartels because it must first be smuggled from South America. The cartels are hoping that their push for transporting heroin across the border will affect the more than 10 million Americans who abuse prescription painkillers. As the federal government has cracked down on prescription opiates and the prices for OxyContin and
Percocet have surged, more pain-pill abusers are switching to heroin for a cheaper high. A hit of heroin can cost as little as $10 on the streets, compared to up to $80 per pill for Oxycodone.
12/1/
—NPR (John, “Legal Pot In The U.S. May Be Undercutting Mexican Marijuana”, http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/12/01/367802425/legal-pot-in-the-u-s-may-be-undercutting-mexican-marijuana, dml)
Two years ago, the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness, in a study titled "If Our Neighbors Legalize," predicted the drug cartels would see their cannabis profits plummet 22 to 30 percent if the United States continued to decriminalize marijuana.
¶
At one time, virtually all the weed smoked in the States, from Acapulco Gold to
Colombian Red, came from south of the border.
¶ Not anymore.
¶ "We're still seeing marijuana . But it's almost all the homegrown stuff here from the States and from Canada. It's just not
the compressed marijuana from Mexico that we see," says Lt. David Socha, of the Austin Police Department narcotics section.
¶ A Preference For Grown In
America ¶
Socha's observation is confirmed by the venerable journal of the marijuana culture, High
Times Magazine.
¶ " American pot smokers prefer American domestically grown marijuana to Mexican grown marijuana. We've seen a ton of evidence of this in the last decade or so," says Daniel Vinkovetsky, who writes under the pen name Danny Danko. He is senior cultivation editor at High Times and author of The Official High Times Field
Guide to Marijuana Strains.
¶ U.S. domestic marijuana, some of it cultivated in high-tech greenhouses, is three or four times more expensive than Mexican marijuana. Vinkovetsky says prices for Mexican weed continue to slide because it's so much weaker.
¶ He says American cannabis typically has 10 to 20 percent THC — the ingredient that makes a person high — whereas the THC content of so-called Mexican brickweed is typically 3 to 8 percent.
¶ " Mexican marijuana is considered to be of poor quality generally because it's grown in bulk, outdoors; it's typically dried but not really cured, which is something we do here in the U.S. with connoisseur-quality cannabis," he says. "And it's also bricked up, meaning that it's compressed, for sale and packaging and in order to get it over the border efficiently." ¶ Reversing The Flow ¶ To service the U.S. market, police agencies report some Mexican crime groups grow marijuana in public lands in the West.
¶ And there's a new intriguing development.
¶ DEA spokesman Lawrence Payne tells NPR that Sinaloa operatives in the United States are reportedly buying high-potency
American marijuana in Colorado and smuggling it back in to Mexico for sale to high-paying customers.
¶ "It makes sense," Payne says. " We know the cartels are already smuggling cash into Mexico.
If you can buy some really high-quality weed here, why not smuggle it south , too, and sell it at a premium?" ¶ The big question is whether the loss of market share is actually hurting the violent
Mexican drug mafias.
¶ "The Sinaloa cartel has demonstrated in many instances that it can adapt . I think it's in a process of redefinition toward marijuana," says Javier Valdez, a respected journalist and author who writes books on the narcoculture in Sinaloa.
¶ Valdez says he's heard through the grapevine that marijuana planting has dropped 30 percent in the mountains of Sinaloa . But he says the Sinaloa cartel is old school — it sticks to drugs, even as other cartels, such as the Zetas of Tamaulipas state, have branched out into kidnapping and extortion
.
¶ "I believe that now, because of the changes
they're having to make because of marijuana

legalization in the U.S., the cartel is pushing more cocaine, meth and heroin. They're diversifying, "
Valdez says.
– Express staff writer
[David, "Grand Closing: America’s Pot Farmers Are Putting Mexican Cartels Out of Business," East Bay Express, 4-10-14, www.eastbayexpress.com/LegalizationNation/archives/2014/04/10/grand-closing-americas-pot-farmers-cut-out-cartels, accessed 6-
2-14]
Grand Closing:
America’s Pot Farmers Are Putting Mexican Cartels Out of Business For the first time in generations, farmers in central Mexico have stopped planting marijuana . Due to ample supplies up north, courtesy of medical and recreational cannabis legalization , cartel farmers can’t make any money off pot anymore, they told the Washington Post this week. The price for a pound of Mexican marijuana has plummeted 75 percent from $100 per kilogram to less than $25. " 'It’s not worth it anymore, '" said 50 year-old Rodrigo Silla, a lifelong cannabis farmer . He also told the Post he couldn’t remember the last time his family and oth ers stopped growing mota. “'I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization.'” For several years we have been writing about how researchers think that domestic cannabis legalization will seriously hurt Mexican drug cartels — who have murdered something like 60,000 people in the last decade. We've reported on how California cannabis has cut Mexican cartels out of the Golden State. That garbage goes east now. Researchers estimate legalization would cost the cartels billions, and a think tank in Mexico said that legalization in just one US state would cut cartels out of the US pot industry .
Those days appears to have arrived.
Farmers in the storied
“Golden Triangle” region of Mexico ’s
Sinaloa state, which has produced the country’s
most notorious gangsters and biggest marijuana harvests, say they are no longer planting the crop . ... increasingly, they’re unable to compete with U.S. marijuana growers . With cannabis legalized or allowed for medical use in 20 U.S. states and the
D istrict of C olumbia, more and more of the American market is supplied with highly potent marijuana grown in America n garages and converted warehouses — some licensed, others not. Mexican trafficking groups have also set up vast outdoor plantations on public land, especially in California, contributing to the fall in marijuana prices. So now we have both the DEA and cartel farmers both screaming bloody murder about legalization — sounds like we're on the right track.

(Alejandro, security policy analyst at IMCO, a Mexico City research organization, and former intelligence officer, 1-21-
14, "Legal U.S. Pot Won’t Bring Peace to Mexico" Bloomberg Review) www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-01-21/legal-u-s-potwon-t-bring-peace-to-mexico
So does this creeping legalization of marijuana in the U.S. spell doom for the Mexican drug cartels?
Not quite. The illegal marijuana trade provides Mexican organized crime with about $1.5 billion to
$2 billion a year. That’s not chump change, but according to a number of estimates, it represents no more than a third of gross drug export revenue. Cocaine is s till the cartels’ biggest moneymaker and the revenue accruing from heroin and methamphetamine aren’t trivial. Moreover,
Mexican gangs also obtain income from extortion, kidnapping, theft and various other types of illegal trafficking. Losing the marijuana trade would be a blow to their finances, but it certainly wouldn’t put them out of business. But surely Mexico would experience less violence if marijuana was legal? Yes , to some extent, but the decline wouldn’t be sufficient to radically alter the country’s security outlook .
In all likelihood, marijuana production and marijuana-related violence are highly correlated geographically. Marijuana output is concentrated in five states (Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa,
Michoacan and Guerrero) that accounted for approximately a third of all homicides committed in Mexico in 2012. Assuming improbably that half of all murders in those areas were marijuana-related, we can estimate that the full elimination of the illegal marijuana trade would reduce Mexico’s homicide rate to 18 per 100,000 inhabitants from 22 -- still about four times the U.S. rate.

By JOHN M.
January 06,
Dr. John M. Ackerman is a professor at the Institute for Legal Research of the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Editor-in-Chief of The Mexican Law Review, and a columnist for La Jornada newspaper and Proceso Magazine. “It's Time To Reset U.S.-Mexico Relations” Politico. Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/us-mexico-relations-reset-113998.html#ixzz3Paz3j8mM
In order to blaze a new path we first need to clear up some common misperceptions.
First, Mexico is not a failed state . To the contrary, it stands out as one of the Latin American countries with the most powerful and best-funded public institutions. The country has significantly strengthened its congress, judiciary, state governments and a series of specialized independent agencies in recent years. Mexico is also the 14th largest economy in the world and a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
¶ Second, Mexico is not Colombia . Organized crime is not linked to politicized guerrillas who want to take over state powe r from the outside. To the contrary,
Mexico’s organized criminals are “ rational” market actors in search of profits who operate by infiltrating and undermining government institutions from the inside. In addition, Mexico’s grassroots political opposition is a great ally in the struggle for peace since it is ideologically grounded in the democratic principals of the world-historical 1910
Mexican Revolution, which predates both the Russian Revolution and the Cold War .
Ted Galen
, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, “Watch Out,
America: Mexico May Be the Next Failed State” January 29,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/watch-out-americamexico-may-be-the-next-failed-state-12142?page=2**edited--illegal immigration was changed to undocumented**
The ensuing scandal is rocking Peña Nieto’s administration, as angry demonstrators in several cities have demanded his resignation.
Concerns that Mexico might become a “failed state”—which had gained traction during the most turbule nt years of Calderón’s presidency—are again on the rise. Such concerns are excessive , since Mexico has an array of powerful institutions ranging from the Catholic Church to well-organized political parties to a significant (and growing) legal business community.
Mexico is not Somalia , Bosnia, Yemen, Sudan or other failed states , where such stabilizing features are largely absent; nor is it fractured by bitter ideological or religious conflicts, as those countries have been.

finish s increased by nearly 51% and technically recoverable reserves have grown five-fold, according to EIA.[5] In particular, increased drilling in the Marcellus Shale has stimulated economic growth in places like Pennsylvania, traditionally a coal-producing state. At the same time, hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal drilling have caused concerns about their impact on the environment.
2. The EIA predicts that liquefied natural gas (LNG), as a share of U.S. natural gas consumption will grow to 12.4% by 2030 from current levels of around 3%. As energy consumption in general has grown, so has the demand for natural gas. Investment in new
LNG gasification terminals will continue to become attractive because of the rising shale boom, flexible contracting arrangements, and falling liquefaction and shipping costs making LNG shipments more responsive to natural gas prices. 3. Promising oil “plays”
(i.e. a commercially exploited energy deposit) in the Niobrara in Northern Colorado and parts of Kansas, Nebraska and Wyoming have revived big local economic gains. Introduction of advanced technologies in oil and gas extraction has led to significant rise in production in the Barnett Shale in Texas since 2003.[6] Drilling has also expanded in other areas, such as the Haynesville and
Fayetteville shale plays in Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. 4. For now, rising U.S. shale supply is exerting pressure on global energy markets, pushing oil and gas prices to record lows. The upside of the falling oil prices is that it provides the U.S. with a unique opportunity to reform its energy policy towards a path of low-carbon future our society so clearly needs. Globally, more effective management of supply and demand is required to catalyze further investments and competition in energy markets, especially in Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa. So far, the expansion in production points to continued market stability and economic gains in the long term . Domestically, more U.S. output will likely shield the country from frequent price spikes and seasonal price volatility . In the short term, a shortage of skilled engineers, seismologists, geologists and other experts may hamper production though, forcing energy companies to increase specialized training in oil and gas operations.
Charles L.
, Professor, Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “How Oil Influences
U.S. National Security,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 38 n. 2, Fall 20
, pp. 112-146, p. 144-145, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00137.
In addition, few plausible sustained oil disruptions would be nearly so large or prolonged. Moreover, because the U nited
S tates could use its s trategic p etroleum r eserv e, in coordination with other major oil-importing countries, to replace most or all of the lost oil , the costs should be much smaller . Existing oil reserves should be able to offset even a massive cutoff of oil for many months, thereby greatly moderating price increases and in turn reductions in U.S. GDP . Estimates of the probability of such a cutoff are highly subjective, but the scenarios that could generate costs in this range —which likely include only those involving large cutoffs of Saudi oil—suggest that the annual probability is low.
David
, David G. Victor is a professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and
Sustainable Development, November 12,
, What Resource Wars?, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020
RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be headed for a spate of “resource wars” —hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas . First is the rise of China , which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs —such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals—and has already “gone out” to the world with the goal of securing what it wants.
Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists . And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations.

Most of this is bunk , and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world .
To be sure, resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere . Fixing them requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence.
When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn’t a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.
No LA prolif

[Jeffrey H. Birnbaum is an American journalist and television commentator. He previously worked for the
Washington Post and Washington Times. 9-29-2010 http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/92026:big-pharma-reports-of-itsdemise-have-been-greatly-exaggerated]
Big Pharma: Reports of
Its
Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated The past
decade has been tumultuous for the pharmaceutical industry . The news media generally paints "Big Pharma" with a broad brush, an unflattering portrait of corporate greed more concerned with short-term profits than supporting public health through access to better, "smarter" medications. A recent Huffington Post article is a striking example of such caricature: in a list of "10 American
Industries That Will Never Recover," pharmaceuticals is No. 4, flanked by realtors and newspapers. Chief amongst the reasons for its putative demise are mergers, layoffs , patent expirations with a diminishing pipeline of new drugs and a growing trend toward generic medications . Price controls and increasingly strict regulatory hurdles add to the pressure. Faced with such challenges , I believe this industry will thrive if they are willing to reinvent themselves, bearing in mind a basic principle set forth by George Merck in 1950: "We try never to forget that medicine is for the people. It is not for the profits. The profits follow, and if we have remembered that, they have never failed to appear."
[2014 Andrew, Financial Times “Drug development: Big pharma back in the game it made” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/83bf54da-1bcd-11e4-9db1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FBV21KiK]
Big pharma is back . That , at least , is the impression created by a wave of new cancer drugs rapidly approaching market.
After years of hand-wringing about an innovation drought, there is hope that this month’s US regulatory approval for a groundbreaking skin cancer medicine from Merck signals a revival in productivity . Keytruda, shown to extend significantly the lives of some people with advanced melanoma, the most deadly form of skin cancer, is first among a fresh class of treatments that harness the immune system to kill cancer cells. Bristol-Myers-Squibb, another big US drugmaker, is hot on Merck’s heels with its own melanoma medicine
, while Roche of
Switzerland and AstraZeneca of the UK are also in the mix. Cancer is not the only area where innovation has picked up . Hepatitis C has also seen advances that are producing big commercial dividends.
However, whereas Gilead Sciences, the relatively young Californian biotech company, has so far been the main beneficiary of the hepatitis C windfall, the breakthroughs in cancer are breathing fresh life into more established players.
Andrew Baum, analyst at Citigroup, predicts that annual revenues from so-called immuno-oncology drugs could climb as high as $ 35bn – outstripping the value of previous blockbuster categories such as cholesterol-lowering statins. Others are more cautious but few doubt that these products promise a shot in the arm for the industry . This optimism is reflected in Merck’s share price, which has gained more than a quarter over the past year in large part because of the prospects for Keytruda, which analysts predict will achieve $1.5bn in annual sales by 2017.
The drug is known as a checkpoint inhibitor which works by blocking a protein called programmed death receptor 1, or PD-1, which cancer cells latch on to in order to avoid detection by the immune system. By targeting this protein, Keytruda and similar drugs aim to unleash the body’s disease-fighting T-cells against tumours. Most people with advanced melanoma previously died within a year.
Recent data showed that, when treated with Keytruda, 69 per cent of patients were still alive after a year and 62 per cent after 18 months. Rival anti-PD-1 drugs have produced similar results but challenges remain. Although highly effective when they work, checkpoint inhibitors so far seem to benefit only a minority. Researchers are trying to find biomarkers that will identify those patients most likely to be responsive. Meanwhile, the drugs are being tested in combination with others with the aim of creating more potent and more broadly-effective treatments. Another priority is to extend the drugs beyond melanoma. Merck, for example, has been testing Keytruda on gastric and bladder cancer, with data expected in coming days at the annual conference of the European
Society of Medical Oncology in Madrid. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Roche and AstraZeneca will also issue updates on their progress in various tumour types. While the leading pack battle for early dominance, almost every big pharmaceutical company and a host of smaller biotech companies are looking for a share of the expected spoils from immuno-oncology . Pfizer is working with Merck on combination therapies, while Celgene has teamed up with Bristol-Myers Squibb . Novartis, Johnson & Johnson and others are quietly positioning themselves for the next generation of checkpoint inhibitors as the science becomes more sophisticated.

-- Magid Abou-Gharbia * and Wayne E. Childers, Moulder Center for Drug
Discovery Research, Temple University School of Pharmacy, Magid Abou-Gharbia received his B.Sc. in Pharmacy and his M.Sc. in Medicinal Chemistry from Cairo University in 1971 and 1974, respectively, and his Ph.D. in Organic
Chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania in 1979. Following an NIH postdoctoral fellowship at Temple
University, Magid joined Wyeth Pharmaceuticals in 1982, where he was ultimately promoted to Senior Vice President of Chemical and Screening Sciences. His team’s efforts led to the identification of eight marketed drugs and several clinical candidates. In 2008, Magid joined Temple University School of Pharmacy as Professor of Pharmaceutical
Sciences, Associate Director of Research, and Director of the Molder Center for Drug Discovery Research. Magid serves on the Scientific Advisory Board of several companies and professional societies and has adjunct professor appointments at several universities, Wayne E. Childers received his B.A. in Chemistry from Vanderbilt University in
1975 and his Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry from the University of Georgia in 1984. While pursuing his Ph.D. studies,
Wayne served as Assistant Adjunct Professor at Bucknell University from 1982 –1984. Following a postdoctoral fellowship at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Wayne joined Wyeth in 1987, where he led CNS-directed project teams that advanced four new chemical entities to clinical trials. In 2010, Wayne joined Temple University
School of Pharmacy to serve as Associate Professor of Pharmaceutical Sciences and Associate Director of the
Molder Center for Drug Discovery Research. Wayne’s research interests involve applying state-of-the-art techniques to the identification and development of new chemical entities for treating unmet medical needs, American Chemical
Society, 1/15, http://cdn-pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/jm401564r
The pharmaceutical industry is facing enormous challenges , including reduced efficiency, stagnant success rate, patent expirations for key drugs, fierce price competition from generics, high regulatory hurdle s, and the industry’s perceived tarnished image. Pharma has responded by embarking on a range of initiatives. Other sectors, including NIH, have also responded. Academic drug discovery groups have appeared to support the transition of innovative academic discoveries and ideas into attractive drug discovery opportunities .
Part 1 of this two-part series discussed the criticisms that have been leveled at the pharmaceutical industry over the past 3 decades and summarized the supporting data for and against these criticisms. This second installment will focus on the current challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry and Pharma’s responses, focusing on the industry’s changing perspective and new business models for coping with the loss of talent and declining clinical pipelines as well as presenting some examples of recent drug discovery successes.

(Alexander Chiejina, Bussiness Day, “Drug patent cliff to drive pharma firms into innovation, research”, http://businessdayonline.com/2014/01/drug-patent-cliff-to-drive-pharma-firms-into-innovation-research/#.VDA9ArXD9DU, January
24, 2014)
Multinational pharmaceutical firms such as Novartis, Sanofi, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, etc, are on the brink of a decline in revenues due to patent expiry dates as many are losing the exclusive rights to produce some of their blockbuster drugs. This situation, industry experts believe, could lead to new research and product innovation, with generic drug producers set to benefit hugely from the patent cliff. While pharma companies are set to lose more than $267 billion once a raft of patents have expired by 2016, the ongoing patent expiration is expected to force generic manufacturers to replenish product pipelines with new generic versions to expand markets globally, including the African pharmaceutical market.
As more drugs head towards their expiry dates, their original makers are likely to see their profits drop significantly, face stiff competition from other producers which who could begin to make cheaper, generic versions of their drugs. Drugs whose patent are expired or are heading towards expiry include drugs for ailments such as hypertension, osteoporosis, rheumatism, lung infections, glaucoma, cholesterol, leukaemia, etc. A report by the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics titled ‘The Global Use of
Medicines: Outlook through 2016’, reveals that patent expiries and the introduction of low-cost generics will reduce spending through the forecast period (2012-2016). The report note d that patent protected brand volume growth is expected to slow in advance of key patent expiries. “Patent expiries will reduce brand spending by $127bn through 2016. Overall, exclusivity expiries in one or more of the developed markets will impact 13 of the top 20 products, or 7 of the top 10 current leading medicines, including Lipitor, Plavix, Advair Diskus, Crestor and Nexium,” the IMS report stated.
Industry experts believe the patent cliff will lead to a focus on developing targeted treatments, which require companies to invent and bring more products into the pharmaceutical space to fill the pipeline and generate comparable revenue levels.
For a long time, pharmaceutical companies have relied on profits from their popular medicines to enable them to invest in developing newer drugs. Interestingly, the effort that goes into researching, clinical trials and marketing a new drug run into millions of dollars.
With further patents on commonly used drugs expiring, or heading towards expiry, their original makers are likely to see their profits drop massively. They will face greater competition from other producers, who could begin to make cheaper, generic versions of their drugs.
As tropical diseases are popular research areas, pharmaceutical institutes look set to tap into this area and research on tropical diseases such as lymphatic filariasis, Onchocerciasis, malaria, and Schistosomiasis.
Africa’s pharmaceutical industry is growing as most multinationals look toward the continent for their expanding global footprint. Tinotenda Sachikonye, an analyst at Frost and Sullivan, said that Africa’s focus is shifting from over-the-counter (OTC) medicines like painkillers (aspirin or ibuprofen) to treatments for diseases, like diabetes and cancer. “The local manufacturers in Nigeria contribute to about 30 percent of all manufacturing revenues in the country, so they’ve got quite a strong local manufacturing base. There is barely any research into new drugs in
Africa as generics represent as much as 70 percent of all th e drugs produced,” Sachikonye noted. A peep into the global generic drug market show that the market will be worth under $169 billion in 2014, according to a report from BCC Research.
The generic drug industry covers the marketing and sale of medication containing the same active ingredients and dosages as brand-name drugs manufactured by the pharmaceutical industry. Drugs can be prescribed under their chemical name without specifying a particular pharmaceutical brand or company. When brand-name drugs come off patent, the market is opened up to generic versions. Patent protection generally protects a drug’s intellectual property rights for about 20 years, but as the patent is effective from the clinical trial stage, the actual time the drug is on the market can be far less, often between 10 and 14 years. After a patent expires, pharmaceutical companies come under fierce pricing pressure due to competition from their less-expensive generic counterparts.

- Donald W Light professor, Joel R Lexchin professor 1Department of Psychiatry, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2250 Chapel Avenue, Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, USA; 2York University, School of Health Policy and Management, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 8/11, http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf
Myth of unsustainable research and development Complementing the stream of articles about the innovation crisis are those about the costs of research and development being “unsustainable” for the small number of new drugs approved. Both claims serve to justify greater government support and protections from generic competition, such as longer data exclusivity and more taxpayer subsidies. However, although reported research and development costs rose substantially between 1995 and 2010, by $34.2bn, revenues increased six times faster , by $200.4bn.25
Companies exaggerate costs of development by focusing on their self reported increase in costs and by not mentioning this extraordinary revenue return . Net profits after taxes consistently remain substantially higher than profits for all other Fortune 500 companies.
34 This hidden business model for pharmaceutical research, sales, and profits has long depended less on the breakthrough research that executives emphasise than on rational actors exploiting ever broader and longer patents and other government protections against normal free market competition .
Companies are delighted when research breakthroughs occur, but they do not depend on them, declarations to the contrary notwithstanding . The 1.3% of revenues devoted to discovering new molecules compares with the 25% that an independent analysis estimates is spent on promotion , and gives a ratio of basic research to marketing of 1:19.
- Donald W Light professor, Joel R Lexchin professor 1Department of Psychiatry, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2250 Chapel Avenue, Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, USA; 2York University, School of Health Policy and Management, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 8/11, http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf
Hidden business model How have we reached a situation where so much appears to be spent on research and development, yet only about 1 in 10 newly approved medicines substantially benefits patients? The low bars of being better than placebo, using surrogate endpoints instead of hard clinical outcomes, or being non-inferior to a comparator, allow approval of medicines that may even be less effective or less safe than existing ones. Notable examples include rofecoxib (Vioxx), rosiglitazone (Avandia), gatifloxacin (Tequin), and drotrecogin alfa (Xigris). Although the industry’s vast network of public relations departments and trade associations generate a large volume of stories about the so called innovation crisis , the key role of blockbuster drugs, and the crisis created by “the patent cliff,”28 the hidden business model of pharmaceuticals centres on turning out scores of minor variations, some of which become market blockbusters. In a series of articles Kalman Applbaum describes how companies use “clinical trial administration, research publication, regulatory lobbying, physician and patient education, drug pricing, advertising, and point-of-use promotion” to create distinct marketing profiles and brand loyalty for their therapeutically similar products .29 Sales from these drugs generate steady profits throughout the ups and downs of blockbusters coming off patents. For example, although Pfizer lost market exclusivity for atorvastatin, venlafaxine, and other major sellers in 2011, revenues remained steady compared with 2010, and net income rose 21%.
30 Applbaum contends that marketin g has become “the enemy of [real] innovation.”31 This perspective explains why companies think it is worthwhile paying not only for testing new drugs but also for thousands of trials of existing drugs in order to gain approval for new indications and expand the market.
32 This corporate strategy works because marketing departments and large networks of sponsored clinical leaders succeed in persuading doctors to prescribe the new products .33 An analysis of Canada’s pharmaceutical expenditures found that 80% of the increase in its drug budget is spent on new medicines that offer few new benefits .16 Major contributors included newer hypertension, gastrointestinal, and cholesterol drugs, including atorvastatin, the fifth statin on the Canadian market.

Anders Sandberg is James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin
School, University of Oxford, Phys.org, May 29, 2014, "The five biggest threats to human existence", http://phys.org/news/2014-05biggest-threats-human.html
Natural pandemics have killed more people than wars. However, natural pandemics are unlikely to be existential threats : there are usually some people resistant to the pathogen, and the offspring of survivors would be more resistant . Evolution also does not favor parasites that wipe out their hosts , which is why syphilis went from a virulent killer to a chronic disease as it spread in Europe.
Jesse
, Associate Professor, Emergency Medicine and Health Policy, George Washington University, “Should We Be
Afraid of the Superbug?” FOREIGN POLICY, 9—3—
, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/03/should_we_be_afraid_of_the_superbug, accessed 9-14-14.
For a few days this August, much of the news media in the West became convinced that we were headed back to the 1800s , medically speaking. A study in the September 2010 issue of British medical journal the Lancet argued that bacteria carrying genes for NDM-1, a gene that imparts resistance to a key family of antibiotics, had made their way through India and
Pakistan into Britain and were now threatening to derail medical treatment across the developed world. Linked with the always shady-sounding concept of "medical tourism" -- the practice of traveling to other countries for budget surgery -- the so-called
"superbug," able to breed vicious and deadly infections, became an instant media panic during a slow news month. The Drudge
Report and Andrew Breitbart's news website both featured it. A Guardian science columnist wrote, "Now, the post-antibiotic apocalypse is in sight." ¶ Er, not so much. As with most August stories, the reality of superbugs is a bit more complex than the media has portrayed it . Yes, antibiotic-resistant bacteria are a threat, as this week's news of an outbreak among premature infants in London reminds us. But no one yet knows how bad NDM-1-related infections could be. Not only is it far too early to say we're headed for apocalypse , we've also got a lot to learn from superbugs -- namely, how our own overuse of antibiotics is making it more likely that a superbug of the future could live up to this summer's hype.
¶ Alexander Fleming discovered the first antibiotic by accident in 1928, when he left out a bacterial culture for a month while on vacation and came back to find that some of the bacteria had been killed by a fungus named Penicillium. By the early 1940s, a commercial product, penicillin, was mass-produced to cure bacterial infections in humans, and medical practice hasn't been the same since.
¶ These days, antibiotics are a major weapon in medicine's war on disease, used to treat everything from life-threatening infections like meningitis to more run-of-the-mill ear infections. For more advanced medical technologies, like chemotherapy or organ transplantation, antibiotics are needed to prevent and treat infections while patients heal. Neither treatment would be possible without antibiotics.
¶ At this point, in fact, antibiotics are suffering from their own success. They are so engrained in the medical and social culture that overprescription is a major problem. Recent surveys have found that 70 to 80 percent of doctors' visits for sinus infections result in an antibiotic prescription. But most sinus infections are caused by viruses, and antibiotics don't cure viral infections.
¶ The medical sin of antibiotic overuse goes beyond mere ineffectiveness -- it actually can be harmful. Here's how it works: Bacteria are everywhere on our bodies, even when we are not sick. When we take antibiotics for a bacterial infection, they only kill certain bacteria (usually the ones making us sick). Then, as the body gets better, the surviving bacteria multiply and take over. Now and then a few remaining bacteria carry special resistance to antibiotics -- which is what kept them alive in the first place. With the other bacteria out of the way, the resistant bacteria (i.e., the superbug) can multiply and sometimes cause problems. For example, if one of those superbugs causes an infection, some antibiotics won't work anymore, and then you have an infection that is more difficult to treat.
¶ One of the prototypical superbugs caused by antibiotic use (and overuse) is Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). MRSA is resistant to many antibiotics, including penicillin, and causes a variety of problems in humans: mostly skin infections, but also more invasive diseases like pneumonia and bloodstream infections.
¶ Another superbug that's been around for a while but has also taken a recent media tour is Clostridium difficile (C. diff), which can be spread when antibiotics wipe out normal intestinal bacteria that keep C. diff in check. A recent study found C. diff infection occurred in 13 out of every 1,000 hospitalizations. C. diff causes diarrhea, and in some cases a particularly severe and sometimes lethal infection of the colon.
¶ Looking at bacteria carrying the NDM-1 gene,
C. diff, and MRSA, it's not surprising that people would panic over the possibility of these or other, even more resistant, bugs of the future making our advances in antibiotics worthless. And it's a legitimate fear. Although there are antibiotics and other treatments that work against all known superbugs, bacteria will continue to evolve, developing stronger antibiotic resistance in the future. It is conceivable that bacteria will someday outsmart our best medical technologies.
¶ But it is unlikely that it will happen any time soon . One reason is that there are many different classes of antibiotics , so while some don't work against superbugs, there are usually others that do . Antibiotics that have been shelved for years might even be re-introduced to fight superbugs , though obviously this would be less than ideal because of higher risk of side

effects. A better and more likely solution is for drug companies and other scientists to discover new classes of antibiotics . The financial incentives for heading off a true superbug-led medical catastrophe would be huge -- something that always drives medical innovation quite nicely, as it did with treatments for HIV in the 1990s.

-- UNC political science chair and professor, editor of the academic journal The Latin Americanist
[Gregory, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, "Is the US 'losing' Latin America?," www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/us-losing-latin-america-20149411713646156.html, accessed 10-26-14]
The assertion that the U nited S tates is "losing" Latin America is a persistent and bipartisan obsession. In an era of intense domestic polarisation, analysts - especially in the United States but elsewhere as well - of all different political stripes seem to find agreement. This line of reasoning gathered steam in the past decade in large part because of Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez's rise to power. It is a straightforward and tempting thesis, but it is also inaccurate and fosters problematic directions for US foreign policy. The basic argument goes like this: Presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama alike have focused on other parts of the world, primarily the Middle East. They have therefore responded to events in this hemisphere in a reactive and insufficient manner which allows adversaries - Venezuelans, Cubans, Chinese, Russians, Iranians, Hamas, among others - to throw their political weight around. The "losing" thus refers to a perceived loss of influence on a major scale. Some consider the trend positive because, they say, Latin American countries are enjoying more sovereignty. Others believe it to be negative because it entails a threat to US security. The argument is so pervasive that it has reached the level of conventional wisdom. The problem, though, is that evidence is hard to come by . The thousands of articles on the topic make reference to a variety of signs, but very rarely specify how they correlate to a substantive loss of US influence. So, for example, it should not be about Venezuela. A common argument is that President Hugo Chavez, and then to a lesser extent his successor Nicolas Maduro, would spread their
"21st century socialist" ideology to other countries. This most recently came from Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa. In fact, around Latin America few leaders have shown more than superficial interest in copying either Chavez's political or economic models, while Venezuelan foreign policy influence remains limited to the relatively few countries to which it gives highly subsidised oil. The "loss" seems to refer primarily to the fact that Venezuela has any influence at all. It should not be about the creation of new regional institutions that exclude the United States. In practice, they have been quite weak, which greatly limits their influence.
Summits and statements do not ipso facto translate to independence or power. They could well be more relevant in the future, but for now organisations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our America (ALBA) are tied largely to Venezuelan oil largesse. Meanwhile, the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) has more clout but its efforts at conflict resolution (such as in Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador) don't mark a sudden change. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias famously won a Nobel Prize for doing the same with Central America in the 1980s while leaving out a hostile US administration. Plus, in the most serious cases , such as the 2009 Honduran coup,
Latin American leaders still tend to look to the US to help find collective solutions. It should not be about trade
, which is booming and increasing annually
. Plus, in recent years the US has a trade surplus with Latin America . Thirteen of seventeen Latin American countries import more goods from the US than from anywhere else . In 2014 the Department of Commerce unveiled a new plan to continue that trend by identifying trade opportunities in South America . Even Latin American governments that are publicly critical of the US very quietly continue to look northward for trade and investment. Therefore it's hard to see where any loss of influence would result. It should not be about China. A popular argument is that China is trading more with
Latin America, thus decreasing the share of US trade, at times with dire forecasts about the trend continuing indefinitely. The conclusion is that the United States will not feel so at home in its "backyard". Yet the US remains the largest single source of foreign direct investment into Latin America. The economic presence of the US is still huge even with trade diversification. Most of the anxiety centres not on the present, but on a hypothetical future where China pressures Latin America to block US initiatives, such as in the United Nations. There's no evidence of that now, and it requires believing that Latin American independence is automatically robbed by other large countries. There is also a significant language barrier that does not exist with the US. It should not be about high-profile visits. Who the White House sends to an inauguration has no bearing on long-term relations, nor does the number of times a US president travels to the region. What matters far more are lower profile but critical engagements that occur on a daily basis but don't receive much media attention. Even more important slights, such as the wiretapping of Brazilian President Dilma
Rousseff, caused a brief row followed by a statement that she did not blame President Obama and wished to resume normal relations. In short, the US isn't "losing" Latin America . Governments in the region do engage with more international actors than in the past, but US influence is still considerable . The alarmism (or celebration, depending on your ideological perspective) is misplaced . Reality is far less interesting, namely that the US-Latin
American relationship has changed less than commonly believed, though it is slowly evolving in a way that involves greater (though by no means universal) acceptance of new regional institutions.
9/28 (HIS Jane’s Intelligence Review, worldwide intelligence reporting firm, “Key amigos - China's strategic partnerships in Latin America,” 9/28/14, http://www.janes.com/article/43790/key-amigos-china-s-strategic-partnerships-in-latinamerica)

However, any US fears of a direct challenge by China to its regional dominance in Latin America are perhaps premature . Xi is likely to have held several terse conversations during his tour. Frustrated with Cuba's slow pace of economic reform, and anxious about Venezuela's ability to repay its loans, Beijing probably harbours ongoing concerns regarding the dependability of its regional allies . For example, in 2010, China restricted imports of Argentine soybean oil, citing quality issues , although it is likely that this was in retaliation for Argentina imposing import taxes on Chinese goods. Conversely , concerns among
Latin American countries that China is undermining the economic competitiveness of domestic manufacturing firms by deluging the market with cheap imports have led countries such as Brazil and Mexico to impose barriers against Chinese firms . The most important component of China's ties with Latin America is likely to remain economic over the next several years. However, as China's influence grows, it will become increasingly difficult for Beijing to separate economic objectives from its geopolitical implications. Xi's July state visits underscored a new wave of Chinese multilateral diplomacy. IHS Jane's judges that Beijing will be hoping that regional initiatives will serve as vehicles to further its national interest by easing concerns about rising Chinese power and bolstering its legitimacy by forging consensus on a range of issues. Building on existing initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC), multilateralism has become a critical aspect of China's strategy in international affairs. Nevertheless,
China's economic relationship with Latin America is far from the point at which it could be considered a viable alternative to the US , and its trajectory in that direction is likely to face many challenges . Changes in the Latin American countries' political landscapes - such as leadership changes - and protectionist measures for domestic manufacturing will probably modify China's strategic policy debate in the decades to come.
Frank O.
, PhD in international affairs, Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center and Professor of international relations at FSU AND Patrick Duddy, an American diplomat, formerly United States Ambassador to Venezuela, 5/1/13,
"Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?," http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-usinfluence.html#storylink=cpy
Is U.S. influence in Latin America on the wane? It depends how you look at it.
¶
As President Obama travels to Mexico and Costa Rica, it’s likely
the pundits will once again underscore what some perceive to be the eroding influence of the U nited S tates in the Western Hemisphere. Some will point to the decline in foreign aid or the absence of an overarching policy with an inspiring moniker like “Alliance for Progress” or “Enterprise Area of the Americas” as evidence that the
United States is failing to embrace the opportunities of a region that is more important to this country than ever.
¶
The reality is a lot more complicated. Forty-two percent of all U.S. exports flow to the Western Hemisphere . In many ways, U .S. engagement in the Americas is more pervasive than ever , even if more diffused. That is in part because the peoples of the Western Hemisphere are not waiting for governments to choreograph their interactions.
¶
A morenuanced assessment inevitably will highlight the complex, multidimensional ties between the
United States and the rest of the hemisphere.
In fact, it may be that we need to change the way we think and talk about the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We also n eed to resist the temptation to embrace overly reductive yardsticks for judging our standing in the hemisphere.
¶ As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there has been an important change in power distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration.
¶
Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region . It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. Many observers who worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies and investors.
¶
While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the U nited S tates is by far the largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements.
¶
An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the
Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for
U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin
America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.
¶ From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four . Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.
¶ Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region . The power of national reputation,

popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify.

Cardenas , Brookings Senior Fellow, 3-17, 20 11 , ¶ (Mauricio, "Think Again: Latin America", Foreign Policy, PAS) www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america
Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability . The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism . No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries , on the whole , do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars . Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a
Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

11/16/
(Alex, Research Fellow @ Council on Hemispheric Affairs “The Unlikely Success: Latin America and
Nuclear Weapons” http://wasanchez.blogspot.com/2011/11/unlikely-success-latin-america-and.html
)
In addition, the lack of nuclear weapons programs in Latin America
, in spite of ongoing tensions is
an important case study. For example, regarding India and Pakistan, their violent history over the past decades, including statesponsored terrorism in each other’s country, has created a culture of mistrust and a continuous quest for more devastating weaponry so each military can feel they have a successful nuclear deterrent. In Latin America, the 1960’s to 1980’s saw a number of military governments come to power, and distrust was a key factor that brought about the nuclear weapons programs in Brazil and Argentina. Today, despite tensions and occasional incidents, the situation in the region is one of generally acceptable inter-state trust. Another example of this regional inter-state confidence is the planned nuclear-powered submarine that Brazil is currently constructing with French aid. (17) When it becomes operational, the submarine will arguably be the most advanced and deadly naval weapon in any Latin America naval arsenal. Nevertheless, regional states have not displayed concerns about this new development. This is not simply because the Brazilian government has stated that it wants the submarine for naval protection (as it recently discovered underwater oil reserves in its sea). There are several confidence building mechanisms at play here, like the creation of UNASUR (Union de Naciones Sudamericanas – South American Nations
Union), a South American political bloc, regular multi-national military exercises
, as well as
initiatives like economic integration and good diplomatic relations; all of these factors help make the Brazilian submarine not a concern for regional militaries. In talks with this essay’s author, military officials explained that the positive relations between the Brazilian government and the governments and militaries of other states are currently excellent , (18) which acts as a great confidence booster and decreases suspicions , that could include Brasilia using a nuclear-powered submarine against a militarily-weak neighbor like Uruguay. Conclusions Nuclear proliferation is a worldwide security problem, but these nuclear weapons are localized, thankfully, in less than a handful of states and there are a several NWFZs, including Latin
America and the Caribbean. This positive development has not occurred just due to the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but because of the decision by the signatories to adhere to it for decades. In spite of tensions, like ongoing inter-state border disputes and occasional incidents, which include short-lived wars and an ongoing arms race, regional governments do not feel the desire to pursue an active nuclear weapons program to achieve nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, Brazil, a regional military power, is building a nuclear-powered submarine which, if it’s ever commissioned, will be the most powerful submarine in the Western Hemisphere that does not belong to the U.S. or, arguably, Canada, however this is not a major source of concern. From Latin America’s success, nuclear states can learn that confidence building mechanisms and a sense of trust are critical for nonproliferation to succeed, as are the cases of Brazil and Argentina in the 1970’s to 1990’s.These tactics are currently working to prevent inter-state wars in Latin America, but it takes time to successfully implement them. The
Pakistan-
India situation, as well as Israel’s security issues, are two areas that can profit from learning about Latin America’s nuclear success, as they too are volatile hotspots. In addition, nuclear cooperation can unite countries, like Brazil and Argentina; this could be a lesson for France and the United Kingdom that no longer seeing each other as a security threat and can decide to further decrease their weapons of mass destruction by creating a bi-national nuclear command. While far from being a peaceful area, as demonstrated by ongoing asymmetric violence and occasional inter-state flare ups, Latin America is one of the lesser well-known, but more important, success stories of nuclear non-proliferation.

John Howard. July 2, 2000. Scoop Independent News. “A new kind of green-washing.” http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0007/S00005.htm
Another familiar claim of environmentalists is that the Amazon constitutes the "lungs of the earth." But according to Antonio Donato Nobre of the Institute for Research in Amazonia in Brazil, and other eco-scientists, the Amazon consumes as much oxygen as it produces and may actually be a net user of oxygen . " In fact, because trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out. It's only fast growing young trees that actually take-up carbon dioxide." they say. The tropical rainforests are also basically irrelevant when it comes to regulating or influencing global weather
. The oceans have a much greater impact
, the scientists say.
(Associated Press, 11/28, “Amazon deforestation hits record low”, The Guardian, http://www.guardi an.co.uk/environment/2012/nov/28/amazon-deforestation-record-low)
Deforestation in Brazil's Amazon rainforest has dropped to its lowest level in 24 years, the government said on
Tuesday.
Satellite imagery showed that 1,798 square miles (4,656 square kilometres) of the Amazon were deforested between August 2011 and July 2012, environment minister, Izabella Teixeira said, 27% less than the 2,478 sq miles (6,418 sq km) deforested a year earlier.
Brazil's National Institute for Space Research said the deforestation level is the lowest since it started measuring the destruction
of the rainforest in 1988.
Sixty-three percent of the rainforest's 2.4m sq miles (6.1m sq km) are in Brazil.
The space institute said that the latest figures show that Brazil is close to its 2020 target of reducing deforestation by 80% from 1990 levels. Up to July 2012 , deforestation dropped by 76%.
George Pinto, a director of Ibama, Brazil's environmental protection agency, told reporters that better enforcement of environmental laws and improved surveillance tech nology are behind the drop in deforestation levels.
Pinto said that in the 12-month period a total of 2,000 square metres of illegally felled timber were seized by government agents. The impounded lumber is sold in auctions and the money obtained is invested in environmental preservation programmes.
Amazon deforestation decrease
Teixeira said that starting next year,
Brazil will start usi ng better satellite monitoring tech nology to detect illegal logging and slash-and-burn activity and issue fines.
"Over the past several years Brazil has made a huge effort to contain deforestation and the latest figures testify to its success ," said Adalberto
Veríssimo
, a senior researcher at Imazon , an environmental watchdog agency. "The deforestation figures are extremely positive , for they point to a consistent downward trend."

1NR

- Linfa Wang and Gary Crameri of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation (March 22 2013, "First Hendra, now bat lyssavirus, so what are zoonotic diseases? Read more: http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/first-hendra-now-bat-lyssavirus-so-what-are-zoonotic-diseases-20130321-
2gisj.html#ixzz37mUXiSPU,"www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/first-hendra-now-bat-lyssavirus-so-what-are-zoonoticdiseases-20130321-2gisj.html, ADL)
Zoonotic diseases in humans can take several different courses. For some , like rabies and West Nile virus, humans are “dead-end” hosts
. That is, they transmit (spill over) from their animal reservoir (host) into humans but as there’s no subsequent human-to-human transmission, the disease is restricted from spreading. Others , such as SARS and avian influenza, spill over to humans, cause disease and are able to transmit from person to person before being eradicated or “ burn ing out ” from the human population, leaving no residual infection except in its animal host. The third are diseases such as HIV AIDS, which spilled out of primates decades ago and has persist ed in the human population ever since. And measles and mumps, which probably entered the human population thousands of years ago and are somewhat controlled but still circulating . It’s impossible to completely safeguard against zoonotic diseases but steps can and are being taken to limit the opportunity for spill-over events through monitoring and rapid response when and where they do occur . Controlling zoonotic diseases and protecting our animals, people and environment from increasing biosecurity threats will not only take a global effort but a multidisciplinary one. It cannot be addressed adequately with traditional human medical strategies where disease is fought in the human population only.

Heath
, MA, International Relations, Melbourne School of Government, 2/4/14, “Why Do States Mostly Obey
International Law?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/why-do-states-mostly-obey-international-law/
All states in the contemporary world, including great powers , are compelled to justify their behaviour according to legal rules and accepted norms . This essay will analyse the extent to which states comply and the reasons for their compliance. Essentially, the extent to which states follow their international obligations has developed over the past 400 years. From a historical perspective, international obligations and accepted norms were founded following two key developme nts in European history. In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War by acknowledging the sovereign authority of various European princes.[1] This event marked the advent of traditional international law, based on principles of territoriality and state autonomy. Then in 1945, again following major wars initiated in Europe, states began to integrate on a global scale.[2] The UN Charter became the international framework for which norms of sovereignty and nonintervention were enshrined. Now, as a result of modern technology, communication, transport, and more, the evolving process of
Globalisation , “The internationalization of the world”,[3] has provided an opportunity for international law and accepted norms to reach every corner of the globe .
¶ However, the development of international law and accepted norms has not compelled states to comply all the time. Instead, the trend over the past 400 years has shown that states have been mostly compelled to justify their behavior according to legal rules and accepted norms . The emphasis on mostly should be stressed. Even though the UN Charter does not permit violating sovereignty through the use of aggression, the extent to which states follow their international obligations varies. Louis Henkin’s book, How Nations Behave, articulates the extent of compliance.[4] He said, “ Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time ”.[5] As such, the trend in contemporary international relations is that war remains possible , but it is much less acceptable now than it was a century or even half a century ago.[6] The benefit of the trend is that almost full compliance is said to lead states into a pattern of obedience and predictable behaviour .[7] Therefore , conflict only arises when countries fail to comply
.
¶
States
attempt to manage
the friction with ongoing compliance through the principle of pacta sunt servanda – the adherence to agreements .[8] Over time, such agreements to norms and treaties have diminished sovereignty, increased international institutions, given rise to non-state actors, and rapidly developed the contemporary customary and treaty based rules system.[9] The evolution of the dispute-settlement procedures of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the establishment of numerous global treaties illustrate states agreeing voluntarily to give up a portion of their sovereignty.

, Amicus Brief in Carole Anne Bond v. United States of America,
SCOTUS 12-158, 8 —16—
, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-
158_resp_amcu_fsdl.authcheckdam.pdf
The Constitution reflects the Framers' recognition, based on experience under the Articles of Confederation, that the power to enter and implement treaties must rest with the national government in order for the U nited S tates to be an effective sovereign on the international stage . Those same imperatives pertain today. The power to make treaties and the need to implement them are inherently intertwined.
If Congress cannot fully implement a validly executed treaty , the U nited S tates may be unable to honor its international commitments . This would undercut the U nited S tate s' foreign policy priorities , diminish the
President's leverage to pressure nations to comply with their own obligations, and injure the U nited
S tate s' credibility as a world leader — not to mention undermine the efficacy of the treaty itself
.
Petitioner's position also would hinder the President's ability to negotiate new treaties that may serve the national interest. If our treaty partners perceive that the United States cannot guarantee enforcement of a treaty that may regulate "local" conduct, they may walk away from the negotiating table or try to extract otherwise unwarranted concessions.
Nor is petitioner's proposed limitation on the treaty power necessary to protect state interests. The treaty-making process is already designed to address federalism concerns, including through the requirement that two-thirds of the Senate give its advice and consent. Both the executive and legislative branches account for federalism concerns during the treaty-making process. The
President tailors negotiations to address important domestic policies. Once an agreement is reached, the President, the Senate, or both can set forth formal reservations, understandings, and declarations to clarify how the treaty will be implemented in the United
States consistent with our federal system. Where U.S. ratification of a treaty requires implementing legislation, Congress may pass a law that is necessary and proper to implement the treaty's terms under domestic law.
As a result of the careful attention paid to federalism in the treaty-making process, the federal government only joins treaties that strike the appropriate federal-state balance. A nebulous rule that limits the treaty power to certain subject areas would call existing treaties into question and prevent the United States from joining future treaties that advance national interests, without providing additional protections for federalism.
The debate over Congress's power to implement treaties that touch "local" concerns did not arise for the first time in petitioner's brief. Efforts to limit that power have been made and rejected at various points throughout the nation's history. Most notably, when
Congress failed to adopt the Bricker Amendment in the 1950s, it rejected the type of limitation that petitioner proposes because of the undesirable consequences that would result. Then-President Eisenhower vehemently objected that the Bricker Amendment would "restrict the authority that the President must have, if he is to conduct the foreign affairs of this Nation effectively." Dwight D.
Eisenhower, The President's News Conference of March 26, 1953, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1953, 132 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1954). This Court should not read into the Constitution a new limitation on the federal government's treaty power, especially where Congress has refused to amend the Constitution to add that limitation.
ARGUMENT
The treaty power is a central part of the President's constitutionally vested "lead role in foreign policy." Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491, 524 (2008) (citation omitted); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). The Constitution gives the President power "to make treaties," U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2, that are capable of confronting a 'Variety of national exigencies." The
Federalist No. 23, at 59 (A. Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981). While there may be superficial appeal to preventing Congress from implementing treaties that affect what petitioner believes to be purely "local" conduct, such a rule would be unworkable. It would frustrate the federal government's exercise of the treaty power, complicate the President's management of foreign affairs, and hobble the President's efforts to pursue the national interest on behalf of U.S. citizens.
I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT IMPOSE NEW CONSTRAINTS ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POWERS TO NEGOTIATE
AND IMPLEMENT TREATIES
A. Restricting Federal Implementation Would Impair the United States' Ability To Comply with Its Obligations and Would Complicate the President's Ability to Manage Foreign Affairs
1. The national government is responsible for the United States' compliance with all treaties. The Framers of the Constitution provided a centralized treaty power specifically to ensure that the United States would be capable of implementing and complying with its international obligations. See, e.g.. The Federalist No. 22, at 56 (A. Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) (without a centralized treaty power, "[t]he faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed"); The Federalist No. 42, at 264 (J. Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (The United States must "be one nation ... in respect to other nations.").
Petitioner's brief ignores the important role of treaty compliance in the President's management of foreign affairs. Unless the federal government has ample authority to ensure compliance with treaties, the President cannot effectively conduct foreign policy and present the United States as "one nation ... in respect to other nations." Id.

2. In order to fulfill its international obligations, the federal government must have the ability to implement treaties. Many treaties are not self-executing. States may fail to pass or enforce necessary legislation, and the federal government cannot require states to do so. As a result, the interest of full compliance sometimes compels the United States to implement a treaty through federal measures.
Nowhere is the importance of federal legislation more evident than in U.S. efforts to combat the international drug trade. Stopping the sale of illicit narcotics has been among the United States' most important foreign relations priorities for decades. In a concerted effort to limit the international production and supply of certain dangerous drugs, the United States joined the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1408, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 9725, 1019 U.N.T.S. 174; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, May 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95. Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA), Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), in large part to implement U.S. obligations under the 1961 Convention, see 21
U.S.C. § 801(7). Since then, Congress periodically has enacted new legislation to implement other obligations under subsequent conventions related to narcotics. See, e.g., Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). The
United States relies on these federal statutes to remain in compliance with international agreements.
Federal implementing legislation is particularly important in light of recent state referenda decriminalizing marijuana, a drug that is outlawed by international conventions. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Cannabis: A Short Review 22 (2012), available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-prevention-and-treatment/cannabis_review.pdf. The head of the International Narcotics
Control Board, which administers the drug conventions, has warned that state referenda may be inconsistent with the United States' treaty obligations. See Intl Narcotics Control Bd., Report of the International Narcotics Board 11-12,116 (2012), available at http://www.incb. org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2012/ AR_2012_E.pdf. Thus, federal implementing legislation serves as an essential backstop that saves the United States from non-compliance with its treaty obligations. Were the United
States to fail to comply with the international narcotics conventions that it has long championed, the United States would have little basis to complain if other countries failed to satisfy their own obligations.
Eyal, Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University, RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY: THE STRATEGIC USES OF
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS, 102 A.J.I.L. 241
Not so long ago the overwhelming majority of courts in democratic countries shared a reluctance to refer to foreign and international law. Their policy was to avoid any application of foreign sources of law that would clash with the position of their domestic governments. Many jurists find recourse to foreign and international law inappropriate. 1 But even the supporters of reference to external sources of law hold this unexplored assumption that reliance on foreign and international law inevitably comes into tension with the value of national sovereignty . Hence, the scholarly debate is framed along the lines of the well-known broader debate on "the countermajoritarian difficulty." 2 This article questions this assumption of tension. It argues that for courts in most democratic countries --even if not for U.S. courts at present-referring to foreign and international law has become an effective instrument for empowering the domestic democratic processes by shielding them from external economic, political, and even legal pressures . Citing international law therefore actually bolsters domestic democratic processes and reclaims national sovereignty from the diverse forces of globalization . Stated differently, most national courts, seeking to maintain the vitality of their national political institutions and to safeguard their own domestic status vis-avis the political branches, cannot afford to ignore foreign and international law
Chad
, Ashlee Jackson “Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S.
Legalization” Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden Elliott School of International Affairs/Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission: Capstone Report April 26, 2011
Relations between the U.S. and Mexico will deteriorate in the short-term if the U.S. legalizes marijuana. Relations between the United States and Mexico have improved over the last decade, and President
Obama and President Calderón continue to work diligently to maintain relations and combat drugs. However , this relationship is likely to decay even if the United States legalizes marijuana in only a de facto manner on the state level. Last year President Calderón openly expressed his distaste for Proposition 19 before it was defeated in November. He believes that any form of legalization of marijuana in the United States would be a sign of hypocrisy as evident when he stated, “I think they [United States] have very little moral authority to condemn a Mexican farmer who for hunger is planting marijuana to sustain the insatiable North American market for drugs.”86 Although President Calderón has acknowledged the fact that the drug policy debate needs to take place, he has been adamant that legalization in the United States is not the ¶ best policy . In addition, other Latin American leaders, such as Juan
Manuel Santos of Colombia, have expressed their support of President Calderón‟s position on the legalization of marijuana.
¶

President
Calderón and others believe that the legalization of marijuana in the United States would delegitimize the Mexican war on drugs .
Some scholars note that if the United States legalized marijuana, the Mexican populace would be left wondering, “What team are you [United States] playing for?”
87
Mexico has spent a lot of blood and treasure fighting against DTOs over the last few years, and some feel that the legalization of marijuana in the United States, no matter how well intentioned, would be negating those efforts.
Proof of the seriousness of Mexico‟s dedication to the drug war is evidenced by the recent tensions between the United States and Mexico.
¶ Relations between the two countries have been terse ever since Wikileaks revealed that Ambassador Pascual wrote that he did not believe that President
Calderón could win the war on drugs. This caused such strife that Ambassador Pascual resigned in March 2011. President
Calderón has been dedicated to helping Mexico combat drugs, and he was unwilling to allow a U.S. Ambassador to openly criticize his efforts. If President Calderón was this forceful of the Wikileaks incident, the legalization of marijuana in the U.S. would likely be trying on the bilateral relationship .
How far this distancing would go is up for debate, given
Mexico‟s dependence on U.S. trade and counter-narcotics aid programs.
¶ Were President Calderón no longer in office and U.S. states legalized marijuana, the effects would likely to be similar , although maybe not as severe.
If the PRI were to return to power, it is likely that they would begin to distance themselves from the U nited S tates, as they did in the past . The PRI preferred to handle DTOs through a series of tacit agreements that maintained order instead of collaborating with the U.S. In this sense, the fallout between the United States and
Mexico might not be as severe, but it is likely that Mexico would still publically reprimand the United States‟ actions. Either way, the legalization of marijuana in the United States would harm U.S.-Mexico relations and the United
States should consider the repercussions before initiating policy reform .
David P.
(“Emerging Trends in International Law Concerning Global Infectious Disease Control,” http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2958540/, accessed 7/23/2013, )
International cooperation has become critical in controlling infectious diseases . In this article, I examine emerging trends in international law concerning global infectious disease control.
The role of international law in horizontal and vertical governance responses to infectious disease control is conceptualized; the historical development of international law regarding infectious diseases is described; and important shifts in how states, international institutions, and nonstate organizations use international law in the context of infectious disease control today are analyzed. The growing importance of international trade law and the development of global governance mechanisms, most prominently in connection with increasing access to drugs and other medicines in unindustrialized countries, are emphasized.
Traditional international legal approaches to infectious disease control —embodied in the International Health Regulations—may be moribund.

Keith
, Professor of Psychiatry and Director of Mental Health Policy, Stanford University, 11/25/13, “Can the
United Nations Block U.S. Marijuana Legalization?,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-humphreys/can-the-united-nationsbl_b_3977683.html
1. Is the U.S. currently in violation of the UN treaties it signed agreeing to make marijuana illegal?
No .
The U.S. federal government is a signatory to the treaty, but the States of Washington and Colorado are not . Countries with federated systems of government like the U.S. and Germany can only make international commitments regarding their national-level policies . Constitutionally, U.S. states are simply not required to make marijuana illegal as it is in federal law . Hence, the U.S. made no such commitment on behalf of the 50 states in signing the UN drug control treaties .
Some UN officials believe that the spirit of the international treaties requires the U.S. federal government to attempt to override state-level marijuana legalization. But in terms of the letter of the treaties , Attorney General Holder's refusal to challenge Washington and Colorado's marijuana policies is within bounds .
Keith
, Professor of Psychiatry and Director of Mental Health Policy, Stanford University,
I got private pushback from some major players on both the left and the right of drug policy for my argument that U.N. drug control treaties are not relevant to the legalization of recreational marijuana in Washington and Colorado. The view I expressed in my editorial was that for nations with federalist government like the U.S., U.N. treaties traditionally apply only to federal policy . The U.S. federal government is thus bound by the U.N. drug control treaties it signed but its individual states did not .
A policymaker sympathetic to marijuana legalization directed my attention to Article 3 the 1988 United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The article includes an agreement to make a huge range of drug-related activities illegal , including manufacture, sales and transport. The article goes on to say: Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system [Emphasis mine], each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.
The “subject to its constitutional principles” phrase is the escape clause for federalist countries like the U.S. What the policymaker pointed out to me is that Article 3 invokes it for a subset of the activities covered by the treaty, e.g., possession, purchase and cultivation. This could be read as meaning that the “federalist escape clause” is not intended to apply to activities in the broader list that appears earlier in the same Article, e.g., production, manufacture and offering for sale. All of these are legal in Washington and Colorado, so one could argue from this Article that the U.S. is in violation of the 1988 treaty.

Joel P.
, Professor, International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, T ufts, “Reports of the Death of
Treaty Are Premature, But Customary International Law May Have Outlived Its Usefulness,” AJIL UNBOUND, American Society of
International law, 4 —29—
, http://www.asil.org/blogs/reports-death-treaty-are-premature-customary-international-law-may-haveoutlived.
Legal rules come and go. Methods of producing law may also flow and ebb. The authors of the call for papers in connection with this online Agora suggest that there is possible evidence that treaty as a method of producing international law is ebbing, and may be dying . I see no such evidence at present ; rather, I argue here that the dying source of international law is not treaty but custom . In the more distant future, however, treaty, too, may become obsolete or at least less salient. There are four categories of tools of international social cooperation: (i) international law produced through treaty (referred to herein simply as treaty); (ii) international law produced through custom, known as customary international law (CIL); (iii) international law produced through international organization decision-making (international legislation); and (iv) non-legal cooperative institutions (soft law). One of the signal characteristics of treaty is that no state is bound that has not explicitly and specifically consented. In order to sharpen the difference between treaty and international legislation, let us focus on international legislation produced by majority voting, which today is rare outside the European Union, but which may bind states without their specific consent. Each of treaty, CIL, international legislation, and soft law has its domain —particular social parameters determine which tool is used in particular contexts. As conditions change, it must be true that one’s domain would expand while the others’ would decline. The Vitality of Treaty Let’s begin with the facts about treaty. AJIL Unbound editors note that a few states have pulled out of BITs and ICSID, and other states are threatening withdrawal from those or from the ICC
.
The number of pullouts and threatened pullouts is rather small
, however, and the growth in BITs in preferential trade agreements , bilateral tax treaties, and adherences to trade, environmental, human rights, and other treaties has been enormous
over the past fifty years.
Even the few pullouts in the past few years are probably swamped by new treaty adherences over the same period . Moreover, there simply is no doubt that over any extended period for the past century, the trend has been positive .

(
Duncan, 4-29-14, "The End of Treaties? The End of History?" Opinio Juris) opiniojuris.org/2014/04/29/end-treatiesend-history/
AJIL Unbound
, the new on-line companion to the American Journal of International Law, has begun to publish short essays this week for its on-line Agora, The End of Treaties? (see the original call for papers here). So far, they have posts up by Tim Meyer (‘Collective Decision-making in International Governance‘) — and Joel Trachtman (‘Reports of the Death of Treaty Are Premature, but Customary International Law May Have Outlived Its Usefulness‘). Additional posts will be rolled out over the course of the week here. As for me,
I regard this ‘End of Treaties?’ idea as analogous to
Francis
Fukuyama’s famous
End of History thesis.
Like Fukuyama’s piece, I think the idea here is more an argument about the future of treaties as opposed to either an historical or empirical claim that treaties no longer matter much to international law. Just as it’s hard to argue that history ended with the Cold War, it ’s hard to make the cas e that we’re now witnessing the end of treaties.
On the contrary, there are more treaties in force today than ever before in human history
. The United States has more than 10,000 treaties in force and the UN Treaty Office has registered more than
64,000 treaties (this notwithstanding widespread noncompliance by States with their obligation to register treaty commitments). The breadth and depth of these treaty commitments is equally striking
— one is hard pressed to find an international law issue today where there is not some treaty that speaks, directly or indirectly, to the question.
Perhaps the “End of Treaties” idea should emphasize the decline in treaty-making as opposed to treaties themselves? Again though, I’m not sure there’s evidence to support the claim. True, the number of major multilateral treaty negotiations has fallen off in recent years (at least when compared to the late- and immediate- post Cold War periods) while other negotiations appear stalled. But it’s not clear to me that we’re heading to
some definitive end-point of obsolescence rather than witnessing an oscillation
over time in terms of when and how treatymaking gets done. Nor am I persuaded by the Senate’s recent recalcitrance on treatymaking. For starters, it’s actually a pretty small piece of U.S. treaty-making; I believe Senate advice and consent treaties in recent decades constitute only about 7% of the international agreements concluded by the United States. And, it’s not like the Senate has refused to give advice and consent entirely; 2013 saw 4 treaties get through. This is not to say that the Senate process is working well right now
— it’s clear not — but rather to suggest it may not yet be time to write that process off completely. Finally,
I do not think one has to find that treaties as a form of international commitment are necessarily weakened by the emergence
in recent years of all these new forms of what Tim calls ‘ collective decisionmaking’. I don’t accept the idea that we’re in a zero-sum game where every time we use a political commitment or code of conduct, there’s one less treaty
going forward. Instead, I wonder if the proverbial pie may be expanding with the expansion in forms of international cooperation
; the future (or indeed, even the present) may bear witness to more treaties AND more political commitments, international institutional norm-making, soft law or what have you. Thus, Tim and I may part ways a bit here as a descriptive matter since he’s inclined to think there’s been some decline in treaty usage. I’d concede though that there’s research that we could do to settle the trade-off questions.

German
10-2, Writing
Fellow, Vox, 10/2/14, “How much of the war on drugs is tied to international treaties?,” http://www.vox.com/cards/war-on-drugs-marijuana-cocaine-heroin-meth/war-on-drugs-international-treaties
Still, Martin Jelsma, an international drug policy expert at the Transnational Institute, argued that ignoring or pulling out of the international drug conventions could seriously damage America's standing around the world
. "Pacta sunt servanda (
'agreements must be kept') is the most fundamental principle of international law and it would be very undermining if countries start to take an 'a-la-carte' approach to treaties they have signed ; they cannot simply comply with some provisions and ignore others without losing the moral authority to ask other countries to oblige to other treaties ," Jelsma wrote in an email. "
So our preference is to acknowledge legal tensions with the treaties and try to resolve them ."
To resolve such issues, many critics of the war on drugs hope to reform international drug laws in
2016 during the next General Assembly Special Session on drugs.
"There is tension with the tax-and-regulate approach to marijuana in some jurisdictions," Malinowska-Sempruch said. "But it's all part of a process and that's why we hope the UN debate in 2016 is as open as possible, so that we can settle some of these questions and , if necessary, modernize the system ."
David R.
, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University Wales, and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, 2012, International Drug Control, Consensus Fractured, p. 315
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties ¶ or certain parts of them. In this way, they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the regulation of the cannabis market and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties , however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control . The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the
. As a consequence states may be wary of simply opting ¶ out. Drawing on provisions within the 1969 Vienna Convention on the ¶ Law of
Treaties, some international lawyers argue that all treaties can ¶ naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circum-
¶ stances has occurred since the time of signing or when an 'error' of ¶ fact or situation at the time of conclusion has later been identified by ¶ a party."" Both are lines of reasoning pursued in 1971 by Leinwand in ¶ relation to removing cannabis from the Single
Convention.
¶ Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in circumstances in the nature, ¶ extent and understanding of the 'world drug problem' since the 1960s, ¶ the fundamental change of circumstances approach could be applied to ¶ the drug conventions or parts thereof. It has been noted how this doc¶ trine of rebus sic stantibus has largely fallen into misuse, probably due to ¶ the general availability of the option to denounce. That said, the case ¶ for both this and 'error' at time of founding may be useful rationales for ¶ reform-minded states to note when pursuing the denunciation option.
¶ Once again the selective application of such principles alone would call ¶ into question the validity of many and varied treaties . This remains an area of concern for many, particularly European, states that in general maintain a high regard for international law .

Beth
, Department of Government, Harvard University, “Treaty Compliance and Violation,” ANNUAL REVIEW OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE v. 13, 20
, pp. 273-296.
The concept of audience costs has also been useful for understanding how formal agree-ments
can influence the duration of peace.
After years of war and mistrust, agreements to make peace are difficult to make credible.
Treaties
here again play an important role by raising ex post
international audience costs as well as by signaling intentions ex ante.
They can also reduce uncertainty about actions and in- tentions, thus helping to red uce belligerents’ incentives to rekindle their conflict. Fortna
(2003) suggests there is
some empirical basis for viewing peace agreements in this way. She finds that stronger peace agreements —by which she means ones that raise the costs of reneging by creating clear demilitarized zones, joint monitoring commissions, and third-party guarantees — lead to more a durable peace . Similarly, Mattes (2008) examines the role of “conciliatory” agreements in the resolution of territorial disputes and finds that those that re- duce uncertainty and raise costs ex post are likely to reduce the risk that disputing parties will resort to militarized conflicts. But these cases raise the problem of the endogeneity of treaties. It is highly likely that governments design strong and/or conciliatory agreements when they are especially motivated to settle the dispute. If so, is it the agreement or the underly- ing motivation to settle that drives the findings? Agreements that constrain military opera- tions in the heat of battle present the most significant challenges for international treaties. When independent state survival may be at stake, we have the most stringent test possi- ble for the power of treaty agreements to con- strain state behavior. The laws of war fighting are a good example. They embody norms to protect civilians and cultural property, to re- quire decent treatment of prisoners, to medi- cally treat wounded enemies, and so forth. Not only are there strong temptations to defect if banned practices might mean a military advan- tage; there is also the problem that atrocities can be committed by individual soldiers despite the policy of their government.
The protection of civilians may be the most difficult problem of all. Valentino et al. (2006) test the proposition that international treaties on the laws of war during the twentieth cen- tury (1900 –2003) have had a significant impact on the rates at which the militaries of war- ring states intentionally kill civilians. For each of 148 international conflicts of the past cen- tury, Valentino et al. coded whether the par- ties had ratified the 1899 Hague
Convention, the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1949 Geneva Convention, and the Geneva Convention Protocols of 1977. They found that the inten- tional killing of civilians was correlated with the strategy chosen to prosecute the war but was not influenced at all by ratification of the relevant treaty for the time period under question. They conclude that “international law provides little protection for civilian populations in times of war. Whatever pressures toward restraint these treaties may exert on their signatories appear to be overwhelmed by the strategic incentives that combatants face to prevail and limit the costs of war to their own citizens” (Valentino et al. 2006, p. 373). However, much more could be done to understand the indirect influence of these treaties on war fighting, including their possible influence on the choice of a strategy itself. If ratifiers are much less willing to lay siege to an enemy, causing the starvation of its population, there is some risk that the effect of the legal norm is being masked by the choice of strategy.
An
even more ambitious
effort to un derstand the dynamics of the laws of war is Morrow’s (2007) study of eight
differ- ent subissue areas
, including aerial bombard- ment, armistice/ceasefire, chemical and biolog- ical weapons, treatment of civilians, protection of cultural property, conduct on the high seas, treatment of prisoners of war, and treatment of the wounded. Using different data and meth- ods, Morrow does to some extent corroborate the findings of Valentino et al. in that he finds the treatment of civilian populations to be es- pecially problematic in wartime. This is not the end of the story, however. Morrow draws on s ignaling theory to argue, “ Treaties are a public signal that a state accepts a standard by rati- fying it, and so will live up to the standard of that treaty if it goes to war. . . .
Ratification
by both sides is necessary for them to understand that they intend to honor that standard to the best of their ability” (Morrow
2007, p. 561). Morrow is not explicit about why such a signal would be credible to an adversary, although he does suggest that in a democratic setting, au- dience costs help to hold governments to their international commitments. The model he pro- poses allows for an indirect role for treaty rati- fication: Treaties clarify what is and what is not acceptable behavior, which allows adversaries in war more precisely to respond to violations in kind.
This reciprocity, in turn, is associated with higher levels of compliance with the laws of war. Morrow’s key finding is that a state is more likely to violate the laws of war recipro- cally when it is clear the adversary has done so, when both have ratified the relevant treaty, or when both of these conditions hold (a triple in- teraction term). Merely to have ratified a treaty does not produce better compliance, but by fa- cilitating reciprocity, he argues, the treaty has made important
if indirect contributions to
the somewhat more humane conduct of war. Arguments for treaty compliance based on legal principles are by nature rare in the security area. As we have seen, theories of compliance or violation of international agreements in the se- curity area tend to be based on arguments about reciprocity, the ability to send credible signals, or the ex post costs associated with reneging. It is therefore quite refreshing to consider the results of a study by Kelley (2007) on states’ (un)willingness to renege on their formal le- gal commitments to the International Crim- inal Court (ICC). Kelley asks, why do states live up to their legal obligations to cooperate with the
ICC, especially in the face of pressures any realist might assume would cause them to violate? Between 2002 and 2006, the United States applied tangible forms of pressure —from diplomatic up to and including the threat of withdrawing military aid—to countries that re- fused to sign a mutual nonsurrender agreement with the United States. These agreements cre- ated bilateral obligations not to surrender one another’s nationals to the ICC.
The problem, however, is that such agreements conflict with the legal obligation of any ratifier of the ICC statutes to cooperate with that institution. It is a difficult dilemma: Should a state party fulfill its ICC obligations and risk U.S. sanctions, or should it stand up to the United States and stand by the
ICC? Kelley argues that despite the threats of the United States, some states resisted for very principled reasons. Some states had a strong affinity for the purposes of the ICC. She presents evidence from a cross-sectional pro- bit that democracies, the “like-minded coun- tries” (the hard-core ICC supporters during the negotiations), and states with sterling human rights records tended to ratify the ICC statutes. But even more revealing, states with a strong commitment to the rule of law refused to go back on their ICC commitments. The interac- tion of a strong commitment to the rule of law and a previous ratification was a strong predic- tor (again, in a cross-sectional probit model) that a state would refuse to ratify a mutual nonsurrender agreement with the United States. Four case studies —Botswana, Costa Rica, Estonia, and Australia—provide the con- text for these findings. Although
Botswana re- neged, the other three rebuffed the United States, stuck with the ICC, and cited the im- portance of consistency with their prior legal obligations as the primary reason. Kelley (2007, p. 15) conc ludes that “international agreements can be effective across a broad spectrum of issue areas, not just in cases with clearly identified material payoffs of iterated cooperation.” She argues that a strong commitment to the rule of law highly conditions any general claims about the overall “compliance pull” of treaties gener- ally. Consistent with normative theories of be- havior, the “tug” is strongest for polities that place the highest value on the rule of law.

Joel P.
, Professor, International Law, Tufts University, Review of “The Perils of Global Legalism,” 20
, http://www.globallawbooks.org/reviews/detail.asp?id=627
At the core of this book is Posner ’s argument that international law is
generally ineffective to address international collective action problems. He states (p. 39) that “ theory suggests that cooperation to solve global collective action problems will be limited .” Neither this book, nor his previous work, does much to develop this theory, and indeed, analysis shows that theory suggests no such thing .
For Posner, while world government is needed, it becomes less likely as the number of states in the world increases, and the number of states in the world seems to be increasing. Posner posits that there will be greater demand for cooperation as the number of states increases, because these states would necessarily be smaller and therefore unable to supply public goods at the optimal level when the optimal level is greater than their size. There may also be technological, social and economic reasons why more international law may become necessary. Yet for Posner the conundrum is that as the number of states increases, cooperation is less likely.
Why does an increased number of states mean that effective international law is less likely?
Although this assumption is central to Posner’s book, it is not supported , and in fact, while it is likely to be true in some particular circumstances, it cannot be generally true . Posner concedes (p. 90) that there is no basis for his assumption , stating that he “awaits proof” that compliance declines with the number of states, yet this assumption is central to his thesis .[4] Indeed, as Norman and Trachtman (2005) have shown in theory,[5] in response to earlier work by Posner and Goldsmith,[6] compliance with international law could either increase or decrease with the number of states involved, depending on other parameters. For example, in the case of public goods where the benefit from the public good increases with the number of states that contribute, cooperation will become more likely as the number of states increases . So, there will never be proof, along the lines Posner awaits, that compliance with international law generally declines with the number of states.
In fact, there may be reason to expect the opposite effect. Posner posits that greater demand for cooperation will arise from a larger number of states . This greater value of cooperation would systematically make cooperation more likely, not less likely . Furthermore, even if we provisionally accept Posner’s incorrect assertion that cooperation generally becomes more difficult with more states, he has no way to know which effect is greater: the increasing value of cooperation or the increasing difficulty of cooperation. So, even if we were to accept Posner’s notion that cooperation generally becomes more difficult as the number of states increases, this countervailing effect makes it impossible to draw the conclusion drawn by Posner: that cooperation becomes less likely.

David R.
, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and Humanities,
Swansea University, “Towards Revision of the UN Drug Control Conventions: The Logic and Dilemmas of Like-Minded Groups,”
SERIES ON LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF DRUG POLICIES n. 19, Transnational Institute, 3 —
, p. 1-2.
Secondly, and closely related to this point, it seems clear that as in other issue areas the success of any like-minded group would not only be dependent upon its size, scope and geopolitical muscle, but also the legal rigour of its revisionist case .
Any attempt to revise the drug control regime that ran counter to the principles of international law would lack legitimacy and immediately undermine the potential of the LMG to achieve its goals
. Furthermore, aware of the issue of sequencing discussed above, in order to maximize the chances of success, revisionist states consequently must also be prepared to engage in a degree of reciprocity . In this way support for any treaty revision that may not ostensibly appear to be within the national interest of a state may in fact be exactly that, since it would generate support in relation to more immediate issues of concern.47 Ironically, this was precisely the quid pro quo that the Bolivian delegation in Vienna was hoping for when it joined the Interpretative
Statement group in 2009.

2NR

Ilya
, Professor, Law, George Mason University, “Thoughts on Bond v. United States,’ WASHINGTON POST, 6—2—
, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/02/thoughts-on-bond-v-united-states/
Today’s Supreme Court decision in Bond v. United States largely avoids the big constitutional issue that was the original focus of the case: the scope of the treaty power . Carol Anne Bond had been prosecuted by the federal government for violating 18 U.S.C. Section 229, the federal statute implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the use of “chemical weapons.” Bond had tried to use toxic substances to harm another woman who had been having an affair with
Bond’s husband, by coating her mailbox and doorknob with them.
Theimplementing statute bans the use and possession of all “chemical weapons” and very broadly defines that category to include any
“toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quanti ty is consistent with such a purpose.”
The excepted purposes are
“[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity.”
Despite this extremely broad language, the Court avoided the issue of whether the law falls within the scope of the treaty power marked by concluding that Section 229 does not actually ban what Bond did. This enables the Court to avoid the difficult treaty power issue
: whether treaties can authorize Congress to legislate beyond the scope of its other enumerated powers.

Joshua
and Ashley S. Boyle, “The Strategic Context of Lethal Drones: A Framework for Discussion,” PERSPECTIVE,
American Security Project, 8 —16—
, p. 2-3.
Criticisms of US drone programs frequently center on questions of legality. Despite claiming the strikes are legally permissible, Administration officials have not yet directly cited any law in justifying the use of drones in extraterritorial targeted killings.12
Critics argue that this failure to provide legal justification implicates the US in violating international legal frameworks on interstate force and national sovereignty.13 Furthermore, critics claim that US drone programs in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen set a dangerous precedent that could lead to any nation with strike-capable drones employing simila r tactics in a “global drone war.”14
While laws governing the use of interstate force bar the use of force in another nation’s territory during times of peace, under
Article 51 of the U nited N ations Charter, a state has “the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
[sic]” until the UN Security Council takes action.15
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has affirmed that
Article 51 applies if either the targeted state agrees to the use of force in its territory by another nation, or the targeted state or a group operating within its territory, was responsible for an act of aggression against the targeting state.16
Only one of these conditions must be satisfied to justify a unilateral extraterritorial use of force by a UN Member. In the cases of Pakistan ,17 Somalia ,18 and Yemen ,19 both conditions are satisfied : all three countries have consented , explicitly or otherwise, to the US operating drones within their territories , and all three are
“safe havens” for groups that have launched violent attacks
against the US and US interests.
Therefore, while the US does not explicitly invoke Article 51, it is operating within its bounds under the international framework established by the UN – making any legal argument against drone programs challenging.
In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the US was already engaged in combat operations. The legal questions regarding the use of lethal drones do not apply to these conflicts.

BY LAUREN
, reporter, national security and foreign affairs, studied international relations at The George Washington
University and the London School of Economics. 11/13/
AT 5:30 PM U.S. Defends Alleged Abuses of Torture Treaty to U.N.
Body http://www.newsweek.com/us-defends-alleged-abuses-torture-treaty-un-body-284355
Representative for the U.S., Brigadier General Richard Gross, said that force-feeding, which U.S. officials exclusively referred to as
“enteral feeding,” was only used as a last resort to address medical issues such as malnutrition and was evidence of the U.S. holding to its value of preserving life in a humane manner. He added that indefinite detention of prisoners at Guantanamo is justified according to the l aws o f a rmed c onflict.
He said that since the U.S. is in conflict with armed groups like Al-Qaeda, the U.S. can legally hold detainees (without charge) until the end of hostilities .¶