Ralph Soule, Senior Consultant, Spatial Integrated Systems. Inc. Greg Thomas, Senior Consultant, Exeter Group, Inc. Achieving Confidence in Fleet Readiness by Generating a Quality Culture ABSTRACT Engineered standards are the foundation of the high quality maintenance that supports affordable fleet readiness. For the “system of systems” that defines the fleet’s readiness for tasking, consistently meeting standards is essential. Adherence to engineered standards results from a deep commitment at all levels of an organization to meeting those standards. Commitment to standards, which enables work to meet customers’ requirements, requires an organization to adopt and maintain a quality culture. Building an environment that enables a quality culture and a commitment to standards is the responsibility of all levels of an organization’s leadership. This paper argues that a quality culture and the learning that sustains it are rooted in an organizations values and beliefs about the work it does and the people that do it. A quality culture is based on a work model consisting of a trained and qualified workforce, operating within an organization with well-defined and communicated roles and responsibilities for supervision, and relentless follow up, working to clear, unambiguous, and readily updated standards and processes, with leadership engagement in and oversight of work. The paper identifies the necessary characteristics, roles, and responsibilities of leadership to ensure the organization’s work model is understood, balanced, and effective and provides practical guidelines to enable an organization to measure and achieve progress towards developing a quality culture. INTRODUCTION Quality maintenance is an essential component of fleet readiness. That readiness is a system of systems that includes people, machines, doctrine, and engineered standards. This paper addresses maintenance, the people that do it, and the engineered standards and support that leaders need to provide to produce consistently high quality outcomes. Adherence to engineered standards results from the commitment of all engaged with planning and accomplishment of work performed to meeting those standards. Commitment to standards, which enables work to meet customers’ requirements, requires an organization to adopt and maintain a quality culture. Building an environment that enables a quality culture and a commitment to standards is the responsibility of all levels of an organization’s leadership and is accomplished by: (1) fostering a sense of responsibility to customers, measured by the quality outputs and relentless effort to understand all results, “lockin” good results, and correct poor results, and (2) maintaining the trust of the workforce by making sure they have the tools and processes to obtain quality results. An organization with an effective quality culture is one with a commitment to learning and a strong degree of ownership for quality demonstrated by all members the organization. Learning and ownership can be fostered by attributes included in some definitions of quality. Commitment to continuous improvement, a part of many definitions of quality, is a commitment to continuous learning; Commitment to elimination of waste, also a part of many definitions of quality, communicates ownership of all aspects of a process. A quality and learning culture is rooted in an organizations values and beliefs about the work it does and the people that do it. A quality culture is based on a work model consisting of a trained and qualified workforce, operating within an organization with well-defined and communicated roles and responsibilities for supervision, and relentless follow up, working to clear, unambiguous, and readily updated standards and processes, with leadership engagement in and oversight of work. performed. An organization’s beliefs are the foundation for its principles, and the attributes of how an organization goes about accomplishing its work are the manifestations of those principles. A quality organization believes the following: 1. It is the organization’s duty, obligation, and calling to produce quality products and services, free from defects, and without waste. 2. The organization’s people want to produce great products and services and be connected to and recognized for that greatness. 3. The organization owes its customers and owners rigorous and visible application of quality work principles regardless of the type contract associate with the work. 4. The organization is at its safest and most cost effective operating point when it is producing at its optimum quality point.1 ATTRIBUTES OF QUALITY WORK There are many different definitions of quality. The working definition for the purposes of this paper will be: quality is consistently delivering a product or service that does exactly what your customer wants and expects every single time. While this is relatively simple to state clearly, obtaining quality results is a multifaceted challenge, especially in work as complex as Navy ship repair and modernization. Simply stated, quality is low variation from your customers' expectations, every time. Special consideration for this definition is due for construction, modernization and repair of naval warships. The readiness of the U.S. Navy’s complex and high performance warships must be based on engineered standards and processes that produce consistent results because our nation expects the ship, its crew, and associated systems to perform effectively in combat. Some customers for ship material readiness may feel pressure from fiscal constraints to expect, explicitly or implicitly, that quality standards are goals and that meeting engineered standards for performance should be based on affordability of the means for achieving those standards. The benchmarking an organization should do to ensure its processes for achieving standards and customer alignment about meeting those standards are essential, but beyond the scope of this paper. High quality is the result of processes and a culture that is supportive of achieving it, not an aspiration unless it costs too much or something that can be achieved through exhortation. It is the result of focused attention by an organization on deep knowledge of the work and how it is An organization’s efforts to achieve its optimum quality point are the way it produces consistent, affordable results that meet engineered standards. While this paper argues that effectively achieving this result is based on 1 The Taguchi loss function is a depiction of a process’s loss function. This figure, as shown in M.W. Kim and W.M. Liao, “Estimating Hidden Quality Costs With Quality Loss Functions” ((Accounting Horizons (March 1994): 8-18) graphically portrays the loss function concept: adherence to fundamental principles, there is no single way to do so. Maintenance organizations and their customers must be mindful of performance incentives and constraints, real or imagined, associated with the types of contracts the U.S. Navy uses for ship construction, modernization, and maintenance. Deciding the definition that will be used to assess “optimum” quality must be based on mutual, explicit, and unequivocal understanding between maintenance providers and customers, contract type, and financial risks. The understanding could be documented in some combination of memoranda of agreement, contract provisions, or policy statements. Principles of quality assurance are founded on these beliefs and these principles have been delineated in various forms, from Department of Energy directives to management textbooks. These principles are2: 1. An organization’s quality program policies and objectives must be documented, understood and accepted. 2. Roles and responsibilities for quality within the organization must be specified, documented, understood and accepted. 3. Expectations for quality must be documented and communicated, resources to achieve are identified and allocated, and performance evaluation and recognition systems are tied to quality achievements. 4. The organization must continually strive to improve, the essence of proactivity. 5. All members of the organization must be learning to improve the work they do, and afforded the support to do so. 6. Members of the organization must have access to information that provides clear data on the results of their performance. 7. The organization seeks and uses relevant experience. “Underlying Quality Principles “, developed by the Department of Energy’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security, http://www.hss.doe.gov/nuclear safety/qa/principles.html 2 8. All work is planned and controlled commensurate with the risks involved. 9. All members of the organization have the right material, tools, and processes, and any changes to them are appropriately controlled. 10. Work and processes are frequently and proactively assessed to ensure they meet expectations and workers have the support for executing them. 11. Risks and errors are proactively identified, remedied, and shared without punishing the workers that identify report, and commit them. 12. Management Processes are reviewed and assessed to sustain relevance and improve effectiveness and efficiency. The attributes of an organization grounded in these quality program principles will be evident during every engagement with the organization, from visits to the organization’s work and briefing sites, to attendance at its meetings, to using its delivered products or service. Several of the principles use the term proactively, as in “essence of proactivity,” “proactively assessed” and “proactively identified.” This is an important note. It is not enough to have documented processes, striving to improve, or identify risks. Quality organizations go looking for problems to identify error likely and poor quality inducing situations before they cause work problems. An example of the manifestation of this principle for work procedures would be for engineers or operations managers to specifically consider where the workers might stumble or could get confused by work instructions and build appropriate measures into the work document. Quality organizations also look for processes they follow that are consistently producing quality work, study these processes, and apply what they learn to lock-in the good results. QUALITY WORK MODEL One of the best tools a Quality organization has to influence the distribution of work performed is to give its members some simple mental models and tools for understanding the key elements of producing high quality work and how those elements function as a system Quality organizations have an operational work model that supports producing quality products and services. In Quality organizations this model is understood and diligently used (figure 1). For example, Naval Shipyards frequently refer to this model in training on quality work (cf., Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Code 200Q training material, “Event Investigation, Causal Analysis, Corrective Actions”, April 2002) Leaders must energetically, earnestly, and persistently apply- and inspire application- of this model to all forms of work. Thoughtful, perseverant, and pervasive application of the model is a precursor to becoming a quality organization. organization, and actions to minimize the size of the deviations from expected behaviors and standards (figure 2 In any kind of work environment, it is reasonable to expect that the quality of work output is produced within some normal distribution. How narrow the distribution is reflects the standards, processes, support, and work ethic of the people doing the work. Figure 2 Understanding normal behaviors Figure 1. Quality work model The quality work model communicates two concepts: (1) all work is performed using a balance among a trained and qualified workforce, a work process, and supervision (the three vertices of the triangle) and (2) work is overseen, when and as appropriate, by agents not directly involved with performing the work, i.e., quality assurance and safety inspectors. Leaders, managers, and workers in Quality organizations know that there is no substitution for direct observation of in process work to understand the state of “balance,” of their work models. These observations enable re-balancing the model, a determination of the “normal” behaviors of the It is management’s responsibility to understand the standard (the centerline of the distribution in Figure 3), to understand the margin the standard provides to the minimum acceptable requirement, and to establish understanding on the part of the workforce for their responsibilities for maintaining standards. Despite the presence of independent Safety and Quality oversight, inherent in the work model is the belief that workers have ownership and responsibility for safe performance of quality work. A key challenge for any organization committed to producing high quality results is attaining and sustaining commitment and desire of the workforce to perform their responsibilities as part of the work model. No two organizations will accomplish the same way especially because of differences in workforce composition, experience, and training. Leaders must address workforce acceptance and understanding of the model to benefit from its application. A traditional characterization of the work model shows the triangle at the center of figure 1. Quality organizations treat the functions in the vertices of the center triangle as work that is of greater importance than the physical work performed. They view supervision and developing procedures as work, with an analogous “work model” for that work that must be understood and “balanced.” For example, in Quality organizations, supervisors play a leadership role in ensuring that the central work model is balanced (e.g., processes are modified as appropriate not only for the risk inherent in the work but also to the skill level of the workers and the conditions under which they are working). Supervisors are not born knowing how to make the important judgment calls involved in balancing the work model, although many do an amazing job of acquiring the knowledge through trial and error. Organizations that aspire to Quality need to decide how to impart this knowledge to its supervisors since gaining experience through critiques and errors is not very efficient or cost-effective. Safely performing the “work” of front-line supervision with requisite quality requires supervisor training and qualification requirements of greater rigor than that of the workforce so supervisors understand how to make the important decisions necessary to balance the work model for the situations they are likely to encounter. There must be a set of processes for supervisors to follow, with engagement/supervision by managers to provide support and ensure that the supervisory contribution to the central work model is appropriate and balanced with the processes used by and skills of the workforce. In many organizations struggling with quality, failure to invest in supervisor development is a leading cause of poor results. A 2010 review of a shipyard struggling to meet standards revealed that less than 10% of front-line supervisors had completed the command’s first line supervisor development program. An example of the application of the work model is provided as Appendix A. In many situations, quality work is recognizable when observed, but only if senior leaders themselves have the experience and judgment necessary to recognize it. Essential attributes of quality work are: Free from un-documented, un-adjudicated defects when passed from production to inspection and test. Condition of inaccessible/not-visible attributes are of equal or greater quality than accessible/visible attributes. Variability between completed products produced to same standard is minimized, and reduced over time. Quantity of waste generated was accurately forecasted, minimized, and plans for its disposition upon work completion were developed and executed. All required in-process documentation was generated in stride during job performance. All unexpected events and conditions encountered during production are documented and receive appropriate review and adjudication as they are uncovered. Workers do not perform undocumented rework or procedure modification because they recognize this deprives the organization of vital information necessary to improve quality. In quality organizations execution preparation is treated as work just like changing the form, fit, or function of a component, and receives emphasis equal to that of the physical work. Quality organizations strongly believe all its workers intend to do a great job, that they want and have the will “to win.” Just as no coach enters a game without a game plan, Quality work is consistently produced by organizations with the “will to prepare to win.” Attributes of “preparing to win” at Quality work are shown in Appendix B. Attributes of winning at the execution of Quality work are shown in Appendix D. The attributes delineated in the Appendices flow directly from the most evident and pervasive attribute of an organization committed to quality: its overwhelming sense of purposeful service. Purposeful service embodies two principles3: 1. Purposeful4: The entire workforce understands the, “whys”, behind the work. Why must we do our work to these standards? Why is our work important? Why does this work need to be done? The book, “Serving Leader”, establishes ,“Run to Great Purpose”, as the foundation of leadership. 2. Service: Service is subordinating one’s own needs to the needs and requirements of others and committing to support these needs and requirements, vice merely complying with them. For naval ship work, the “others” are a broad range of stakeholders, including Sailors who serve on the ships, taxpayers, and the environment. Organizations with reputations for Quality are committed to purposeful service. The Apple© design philosophy,5 “Empathy, Focus, and Impute,” communicates its commitment to purposeful service. POOR QUALITY IS EXPENSIVE There may be a tendency for some experienced personnel engaged in Navy maintenance to roll their eyes during discussions of the principles of high quality work and leadership behaviors to support it. The source of this reaction is that all the behaviors and processes supporting the principles, engineer standards, maintain high quality work procedures and documents, train the workforce, conduct pre and post job briefs, hold critiques and write reports, to name but a few, sound like a lot of work. The authors are “Understanding Purposeful Service”, http://service.csumb.edu/understanding purposeful_service. 4 “The Serving Leader”, Ken Jennings; http://theshipcompany.com/products-andservices/the-serving-leader-a-practical-guide/. 5 Walter Isaacson, Steve Jobs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011) 3 aware of a general feeling that only those with deep pockets and responsibility for nuclear ships can afford them. As will be noted in the section on Practical Guidelines that follows, none of these things have to be done in an expensive or complex way (that is driven by the nature of and risks associated with the actual work). Poor quality that results in rework, personnel injury, lost operational availability of Navy warships, and work stoppages is enormously expensive in terms of operational assignments missed, impact on workers’ lives, impact to other work, and an organization’s reputation. The authors suspect one problem many people have in implementing systematic processes for producing quality work, especially when many of them are new to an organization, is that they only think in terms of the near-term costs to change what they are doing and not the cost they are likely to pay if they have a substantial quality incident. LEADERSHIP MUST COMMUNICATE THE COST OF QUALITY An organization’s leadership must establish measures of the cost of quality to provide the financial imperative for being a quality organization. The foundations of a cost of quality system are costs of conformance to standards and costs of non-conformance to standards. The costs of conformance can be broken down into prevention costs and appraisal costs and the costs of non-conformance into internal failure costs and external failure costs. Examples of each cost category are6: Prevention Costs: Providing technical support for vendors, preventive maintenance on tools, and equipment, quality training of employees, and process engineering. Appraisal Costs: Inspection of materials, processes, and machines, quality audits of products and processes, vendor audits and sample testing, and process risk analysis 6 Financial & Managerial Accounting, Needles, Powers, and Crosson. Internal Failure Costs: Scrap and rework, reinspection and retesting of rework, failure analysis, and quality related downtime External Failure Costs: Lost sales, restoration of reputation, and investigation of defects. Leadership must establish measures of quality and communicate these to the organization. A standard set are: - Total costs of quality as a percentage of net sales Ratio of costs of conformance to total costs of quality Ratio of costs of nonconformance to total costs of quality Costs of nonconformance as a percentage of net sales Without an understanding of measures of quality, absent significant problems, organizations tend to focus only on costs of conformance. A healthy quality organization measures and tracks costs of quality as outlined above. For a detailed delineation of the four cost categories, see Appendix C. LEADERSHIP’S ROLE IN A QUALITY CULTURE For an organization to consistently produce quality results, its leadership plays a crucial role in creating a climate and infrastructure that supports achieving consistently high quality results. Leaders must model the principles of quality assurance, must notice and reward the behaviors that embody the principles of quality assurance, must be engaged in how work is actually done where it is done, must know their workforce’s “red lines” for producing quality work, must respond well to learning about problems and getting bad news, and need to relentlessly follow up on all performance, good and below standard, to understand why it is occurring and what has to be done to get more or less of it, respectively. An organization’s leaders are responsible for ensuring high congruence between their behaviors and the organization’s practices and the principles espoused to produce quality outcomes. Too often, an organization that purports to produce quality work is run by leaders that really want work done quickly and cheaply above all else. This is not to say that quality work is expensive or slow. In fact, high quality work is faster and less expensive than low quality work because no re-work, injuries, or system failures result from high quality work, all of which slow things down and cost enormous amounts of time and money to correct. Workers are more attentive than leadership often credits. They know perfectly well what is important to an organization’s leaders because of how bonuses, awards, and other forms of recognition are distributed. Publicly praising or awarding an abusive supervisor who gets results despite cutting corners on safety and ignoring the procedural problems encountered by those working for him sends a strong signal that safety and quality work are not as valuable to the organization as “shipping the product” or completing the work, regardless of quality, by the deadline. On the contrary, leaders that praise and single out workers that bring unsafe situations to light, do not proceed with a procedure because of a safety concern, or identify deficient procedures that will make accomplishing quality work more difficult, are sending a much clearer signal to those on the front line of producing quality outcomes of the type of on-the-job behavior that they value. [those on frontline need to understand why the standard is appropriate to the job at hand, embracing standard for the right reasons] The organization’s workers will be “on their own” all the time and facing dilemmas about how to proceed. An organization may do work that is too complex to be guided solely by the Nordstrom’s dictate, “Do what’s right for the customer,” but workers can be encouraged to take sanctioned, equivalent action such as “Sometimes, stop is good progress,” “Employ thinking compliance,” and … Taking the time to illustrate high quality behaviors and thought processes in action is crucial to support the workers in all the situations that leaders do not see or cannot directly influence. It may seem like an overstatement to say that an organization’s leaders must be intimately involved with and understand how work for which they are responsible is actually done. It is amazing to the authors how many times in their careers they have seen leaders of organizations producing low quality work or with poor safety records shocked, just shocked at how far workers have strayed from authorized procedures while doing the work. Those familiar with the Navy Nuclear Power Program know the validity of the expression, “you get what you inspect, not what you expect.” Leaders must regularly get out of their offices or meetings or other activities and take the time to actually go to worksites and talk to workers, see what their working conditions are, look at their work documents, and assess their work practices. In nearly every case that leaders do these things, they are very likely to discover a gap between work as they imagined it and how work is actually done. How leaders act on this information is crucially important to producing quality work. If disciplining workers is the only response for deviating from management’s imagined work processes, leaders will likely drive indications of similar disparities “underground” so they are not as easy to identify. Workers are likely to become less forthcoming with managers conducting future worksite surveillances. A better response to significant gaps between work as performed and work as imagined that is congruent with the principles for producing quality work noted above is to ask “why?” Leaders need to understand why workers think what they are doing is appropriate and acceptable and what they, the leaders, have done, to send the signal that cutting corners and taking safety risks will be ignored or not noticed. Leaders need this kind of insight to understand the situation and begin to consider ways to change the signals the workers are getting. Merely writing a safety notice forbidding the discrepant practices, disciplining the workers (except for the most egregious kinds of safety or quality violations and even then with great care), or changing procedures will do little to impact the behavior that is likely occurring in many other parts of the organization unknown to leadership. By regularly visiting the worksites and understanding how work is actually performed, leaders will gain insight into what is actually needed by the workers to produce quality results. This goes beyond work documents, hospitable working environments, and job briefings, all of which are important in their own right. Do the workers have the training and experience to conduct effective pre-job briefs? Do the foremen know enough about teaching an important skill to workers (fundamentals of instruction)? Are the work documents clear and unambiguous, not according to the engineer that wrote them, but the foreman or mechanic responsible for executing them? Does the foreman or worker have enough time to accomplish the task at his/her skill level? Do the skills required for a particular job go beyond what might be expected for the “average” worker? Knowing the answers or range of acceptable answers to questions like these will help leaders develop organizational “red lines” for producing quality work. A quality red line can be thought of a limit beyond which workers should not be expected to perform without some form of additional support (more time, training, resources, or modified procedures). If workers struggle to produce quality outputs when regularly pushed beyond their “red lines” or leaderships have no idea what these red lines might be, it is a failure of leadership and not craftsmanship. A corollary to the need to respond well when they discover gaps between work as they have imagined it and work as actually performed, leaders that want to know what problems workers are having producing quality outcomes in order to have the information to correct them must respond appropriately to receiving bad news or learning from others about problems. The first time a leader does not accept information about a problem with grace, aplomb, and determination to address it swiftly and professional is the last time someone will bring bad news to them. “Shooting the messenger” may feel good or feed someone’s ego, but it is completely antithetical to producing quality results. This does not mean that a leader has to be happy hearing bad news or act as if nothing is wrong, far from it. They need to resolve to effectively deal with the problem. Similarly to responding professionally and effectively to problems, leaders need to be very responsive to requests for help from the workforce. Help requests are opportunities to evaluate and address assistance the workforce needs before quality problems develop. Leaders must relentlessly follow up and assess the results of the organization and its work units. Critiques and hot washes or after action reviews are high pressure, complicated, and time consuming and are only appropriate for significant deviations or poor results. Many other tools are available to leaders to understand how and why work is or is not going as expected. Simple conversations with workers at their worksites or after completing jobs, small group meetings at the end of a shift, or written “fact sheets” from participants followed by a brief training summary are all useful, low-cost, informal ways to assess performance to identify interventions to get more or less of it. Aviators engage in post flight debriefs, informal dialog among an aircrew about what went well and what needed to be improved after flying nearly every mission. The complex processes of ship maintenance and construction produce unexpected results all the time. No organization can systematically improve its ability to achieve the results that are important to it unless its leaders are relentless in trying to understand why they did obtained the results they did. PRACTICAL GUIDELINES FOR LEADERS AND WORKERS TO SUSTAIN A QUALITY CULTURE Taking concrete steps to influence an organization’s quality culture, especially one that is struggling to produce consistent quality, is a daunting task. It may be more constructive to think of improving an organization’s quality culture as a journey, because getting on “the path” is far more important than exactly which path one takes. There are many possible approaches an organization’s leaders can take, but the authors’ view is that the most effective approach involves more actions than words and these actions should be directly associated with the work being done. Tables 1 through 4 contain a list of basic steps leaders can take with respect to managing work for quality centered on: pre-job risk assessments, pre-job briefs, assessing work in progress, and post-action review and capture of lessons learned. The authors chose these activities for several reasons: they involve leadership engaging directly with front line workers for mutual benefit, they allow leaders to learn what the gap is between work as imagined and work as actually performed, and they enable leaders to gage how effectively their quality messages are permeating through the organization. These practical guidelines do not need to be transformed into detailed, exhaustive checklists. Recent literature7 suggests that the level of detail provided in tables 1-4 is sufficient for the majority of maintenance performed in the ship repair industry. CONCLUSION The U.S. Navy’s ability to project its influence wherever and whenever dictated by its National Command Authority depends on the effectiveness and quality of the Navy’s material readiness activities, a key component of the system of systems that support fleet readiness. To achieve material readiness, the Navy needs quality results from all facets of maintenance. Because of the complexity of Navy ships and their support systems, quality maintenance can only be achieved through an engineered approach to adhering to quality, worker support, and learning. Achieving appropriate quality is 7 Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto ( Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2009). not simple, but it does not have to be high cost either. An engineered approach to quality cannot be sustained merely with checklists or slogans. Rather, it must be deeply rooted in an organization’s culture. Because culture is resistant to overt, top-down intervention, organizations aspiring to do quality work must devote most of the attention to day to day application of seemingly small, but very high leverage activities on the part of workers and leaders. that are grounded in a set of beliefs and principles that communicate commitment to quality. Leaders concern themselves with the “details” of how work is done and relentlessly follow up on results. Finally, leaders must help their organization build and maintain a quality culture to get consistently high quality results. There are no shortcuts. ____________________________________ AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES Ralph Soule is director of ship modernization and maintenance for Spatial Integrated Systems, Inc., and a retired Engineering Duty Officer. He and his firm develop 3D data lifecycle management solutions for the Navy. He specialized in nuclear warship construction, modernization, and overhaul. As commanding Officer of Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Newport News, his team oversaw construction or overhaul and delivery of USS GEORGE HW BUSH (CVN 77), USS NORTH CAROLINA (SSN 779), USS NEW MEXICO (SSN 781), USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70), and USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65). He hold the dubious distinction of being the only Engineering Duty Officer to have served as Carrier Type Commander Ship Materiel Officer on both coasts. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree from the United States Naval Academy and Masters of Science Degrees in Electrical and Nuclear Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute Technology. His currently enrolled in the George Washington University’s Doctoral Program in Human Organizational Learning. Greg Thomas is currently a senior consultant at the Exeter Group, Inc., in Cambridge, MA. A retired Navy Captain, he served in a broad range of submarine, submersible, and surface ship design, construction, maintenance, and modernization billets. Tours include Design Manager for LSV-2 (CUTTHROAT), the world’s largest unmanned autonomous submersible, Repair Officer on the USS FRANK CABLE (AS 40), Material Readiness Officer at Commander Naval Submarine Forces, Operations Officer at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Shipyard Commander at Pearl Harbor and Norfolk Naval Shipyards, and tours at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair Offices in Groton and Newport News. His educational background includes a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the United States Naval Academy and Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Naval Engineers, and PhD in Hydrodynamics from the Massachusetts Institute Technology. Under his command Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard earned the Robert T. Mason award in 2010 as the Department of Defense top depot maintenance facility, the first NAVSEA command to ever win the award. His personal awards include the NAVSEA Association of Scientists and Engineers award for professional achievement, the ASNE Brand Award for academic excellence, and two Legions of Merit along with other personal and unit commendations. REFERENCES Gawande, Atul. (2009). The Checklist Manifesto. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC. Human Performance Improvement Handbook, Vol 1-Concepts and Principles. DOE-HPI-hdbk-1028, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 20585, available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/ns/techstds/ Isaacson Walter. (2011), Steve Jobs. New York: Simon & Schuster Jennings, Ken. (2004). The Serving Leader http://theshipcompany.com/products-and-services/theserving-leader-a-practical-guide/. Kim, M.W. and Liao, W.M. (1994). Estimating Hidden Quality Costs With Quality Loss Functions Kim, M.W. and Liao, W.M. (1994). Estimating Hidden Quality Costs With Quality Loss Functions Accounting Horizons (March 1994) Needles, Belverd, Powers, Marian, Crosson, Susan (2005). Financial & Managerial Accounting. Mason, OH: South-Western, Cengage Learning. Reason, James. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. Underlying Quality Principles, developed by the Department of Energy’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security. From DOEhttp://www.hss.doe.gov/nuclear safety/qa/principles.html Understanding Purposeful Service, http://service.csumb.edu/understanding purposeful_service. Table 1: Pre-job Risk Assessment What does job success look like? Job overview How will workers recognize success? Overview of the work and key points for success. How does this job fit within the context of the overall project? Why must this job be done now? Review past performance What happened the last time the job was done? Job frequency How long ago was "last time"? How often is this work done? Team Experience Is this the first time this team has done the job or just for some members? Experience necessary/desirable What qualifications and experience are necessary for this work? Adequacy of technical direction How stable is the technical direction for the work? Have there been recent changes that some might not know? Coordination challenges What coordination challenges exist (who has to be informed about what, when, to do what?) Relevance/context of the task to the overall project Why must this work be completed now? What are the consequences of success/failure? External pressures that might impact the work What pressures exist to do the job faster or cut corners? Supervision planning What is the role for enhanced supervision? List of Human and equipment risks What are some of the consequences for doing the job badly? Safety, quality, etc.? Most important risks to mitigate What are the top 3-5 risks and what are the most high leverage preventative measures? Need for outside assistance Does it make sense to ask for outside assistance? e.g., the Original Equipment Manufacturer Top 3 risks and the mitigation strategy Use checklist, if possible Workers understand the procedure, have the qualifications, know the risks, sufficient experience for the level of oversight, and can recognize appropriate system response Conditions for stopping and getting help as well as making the job site safe when doing so Tools, temporary services, documentation, safety equipment, and materials on hand (and knowledge of how to use them) Risks and Safety Additional applicable procedures Worker readiness Conditions for stopping Tools and other job support aids Table 2: Pre-job Brief Review procedure Conduct mutual introductions of all participants, their roles, and identify the person in charge Have man in charge or person doing the work explain the work Watch some or all of the work at the job site Review past problems Helpful if not familiar with the work, but not mandatory Explain why you are there, guides future comments. Discuss relevance of the job and how it fits into the overall project. Identify what the most important steps, notable risks (including safety that is task relevant), and how workers will assess success, and hold/stopping/check points- these points are not solely quality checks mandated by the Quality Organization. Learn how work actually gets done Ask about past problems workers have had so far in the job, the engineering support to date, and how they resolved any issues they have had Table 3: Work In Progress Audit Schedule Procedure Support Safe stopping point Surprises Preparation adequacy On, ahead, or behind schedule? Reasons for delays. Is the mechanic using the procedure to do the work? Can he show what he completed and what is next? Has the support by assist trades or technical personnel been sufficient? How could it be improved? Are enough people available to do the work to meet the schedule? Has the supervisor been informed? What is the next safe stopping point? Is it before shift change or after? What were the surprises and how were they identified? What do you know now that you wish you had known earlier? Brief ideas of what could be improved among prebriefs, procedure, training/qualifications.(save details for Post-Action Review) Table 4: Post-action review Outcome Assessment Things to do more often Things not to do next time Hazards caught Assess work process tools Surprises Things to do differently next time Was the desired outcome achieved? Top things that went well that should be duplicated next time Top things that did not go well that should be avoided next time Note which are still open items Assess effectiveness/utility of pre-briefs, procedure (especially things not covered, but should be), training/qualifications (sacred pact to follow up) What were the surprises and how were they identified? List of what should be done differently next time Applying the Work Model Recent efforts to improve quality of naval ship maintenance highlight challenges in applying the work model effectively. A persistent quality problem in ship maintenance is poor adherence to system cleanliness standards. Recognition of a non-compliant condition is a key to maintaining system cleanliness, and recognition is a function of worker experience, supervisor engagement, and the process used to perform work. To assist a worker with understanding and enforcing requirements, work procedures in shipyards will reference (using Naval Shipyards as an example) a Uniform Industrial Process Instruction (UIPI), with the following standard statement, “Maintain Cleanliness In Accordance With Reference (a)”, where reference (a) is the UIPI for cleanliness. The UIPI for cleanliness is approximately 100 pages long and is subject to revisions on a frequent basis. On the basis of attendance at more than150 pre-job/pre-shift briefs in three naval shipyards over the past 5 years, on greater than 50% of the jobs where this UIPI was referenced, workers and supervisors were willing to proceed without having consulted the UIPI, and on approximately 25% of those jobs when asked to explain the cleanliness standards appropriate to the system to be worked, workers and supervisors guessed wrong on the standards. Analysis of this problem revealed significant weaknesses application of the work model: 1. For a process to be an effective part of the model, the process must clearly and unambiguously communicate requirements, e.g., cleanliness requirements. In the case of communicating cleanliness requirements, the applicable system-specific cleanliness requirements within the naval shipyards’ 100 page UIPI are typically 1 to 2 paragraphs in length and should be cut and pasted into the document. 2. The number of reviewers of a procedure in development is not an indicator of process accuracy/value. A recently reviewed cover sheet to an Enhanced Process Control Procedure showed a total of 7 required signatures to issue the document to the trade supervisor. Despite the number of reviewers, this procedure contained direction that would have resulted in significant cleanliness control problems and potential component damage if executed as written. 3. Interaction between worker and supervisor prior to starting work must focus on relevant quality issues and must include a discussion of the specific steps in the process that will be completed. This dialogue will ensure standards intended to be met by the author of the governing procedure are commonly understood by the supervisor and her/his worker. Supervisors require disciplined training in the conduct of pre-shift/pre-job briefs and in developing meaningful dialogue and relationships with workers; a sustaining/continuing training program must be part of this program. Additionally, the use of deck-plate coaching of supervisors is an effective element of supervisor development. Appendix A Preparing for Conduct of Quality Work : Work is preceded by an interactive brief commensurate with the experience of the workers, the complexity/risks of the job, the consequences of failure, and the local conditions led by the workers in the presence of the supervisor. Attachment 1 is a representative example of a pre-shift brief checklist. Interactive briefing areas are free from distracting clutter, well lighted, quiet enough to enable productive dialogue, and enable review of process paperwork, tools, materials, and safety equipment. The document that governs the work is used to guide the brief. Procedures contain minimal reference to source documents; instead, the processes contain only the relevant extracts from the source documents. Procedures provide relevant lessons learned and are always discussed, with the workers leading the discussion on how they have integrated the lessons learned into their thought process. Training and qualification status of workers and supervisors are confirmed prior to the brief and validated as part of the brief (Note 1) Safety hazards and risks relevant to the tasks to be performed are discussed by workers and the supervisor. Personal Protective Equipment must be discussed as well as job specific hazards and risks within the context of the work site conditions and other work/operations relevant to the tasks to be performed. To achieve this, workers and supervisor must have visited the work site prior to starting the brief. All tools and materials are at brief site, staged at job site, or are staged between brief site and job site. Use and risks of special tools are part of the brief. Workers and supervisors agree on “pause” and “stopping” points, beyond those specified in the procedure, to enable supervisor to worker dialogue at steps of shared concern. A communication protocol between worker and supervisor for emergent concerns is established. Expectations for progress are discussed along with remaining cost and duration budgets for the work. Standards for work performance are discussed as quantitatively as appropriate for the task. Any uncertainty uncovered during the interactive brief is resolved at the brief site with the author of the technical work document (this implies that there will be some kind of pre-pre-job review by the Supervisor and the worker for really complex/risky work). Pre-job/pre-shift briefs are subjected to surveillances and audits by line management, senior leaders, and oversight (i.e., Quality Assurance and Safety) organizations with as much rigor as other work. Authors of technical work documents actively and formally participate in the audit and surveillance program of pre-shift/pre-job briefs. Note 1: Training programs in organizations with healthy quality conduct periodic “cross” or “joint” training sessions, where members of the oversight groups, e.g., Quality and Safety, and the group developing the work processes, e.g., Engineering and/or Planning Departments train alongside the mechanics and supervisors responsible for the work. Appendix B Attachment 1 page 1 of 2 Attachment 1 page 2 of 2 From: Financial & Managerial Accounting, by Needles, Powers, and Crosson, Appendix C Performing Quality Work Work-sites are clean, well-lighted, comfortable (e.g., well-ventilated/cooled), and staged to maximize worker performance. The Technical Work Document governing the task is on-site and accessible, kept current with work in process, and used during job performance to guide work and to record all required documentation. Workers understand their responsibility for halting work when they identify unexpected conditions. Workers are comfortable with stopping work when they have questions. Quality inspectors and Supervisors do not merely reject incomplete work as “not inspection ready” because they realize that it represents an important learning opportunity. Supervisors visit work sites at agreed upon stopping points and at periodicities appropriate to the inherent risk of the work and the workers’ and supervisors’ experience levels. Inspectors assigned to view completed work will visit job sites at periodicity commensurate with risks associated with the work, in addition to visiting work sites at designated inspection points. Consistent with formal participation in audits and surveillance programs for pre-shift/pre-job briefs, authors of technical work documents should participate formally in audits and surveillances of inprocess work and should, on an informal basis, visit job sites were work is being performed using their process. Appendix D