Democratic Pluralism and Unconventional Political Participation: The Case of Africa
Jeff William Justice
Campbellsville University
jw_justice@hotmail.com
Samuel S. Stanton, Jr.
Grove City College
ssstanton@gcc.edu
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association
1-5 April 2009, Chicago, IL
Democratic Pluralism and Unconventional Political Participation: The Case of Africa
Russell Dalton’s Citizen Politics offers a wealth of theory regarding political culture and
mass political participation. Among these is an investigation into protest politics, including the
forms in which it may take and who is more likely than not to engage in such behavior. Among
other things, he noted that those who adhere to post-materialist politics are among those who are
most likely to protest. Other demographic factors affecting an increased likelihood of protest
behavior include ideological position (the left wing is more likely to engage than the right), age
(younger people are more likely, education (higher levels increase protest behavior likelihood),
dissatisfaction with government (higher levels lead to increased protest activity), and group
membership and party attachment (the presence of either increases protest likelihood).
While Dalton’s research on mass political behavior has spawned numerous papers,
articles, and books – including this one – we also note that his work limits its geopolitical
concentration primarily on developed states, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany. With some developing states attempting to re-establish themselves as
liberal democracies, it becomes useful to determine the utility of these models beyond the
industrialized states that they now cover. To be sure, even in areas where the population appears
to support democratization and democratic government, there can be groups that do not support
such governance and that may make efforts to derail it. Additionally, political cultures in those
areas might still find democratically-unconventional means of participation to be acceptable
alternatives as forms of public expression, especially if they do not have a long history of
democratic governance.
In this paper, we seek to extend these models to the politics of developing states, in this
case those found in Africa. We concentrate on protest politics in this article, focusing on the
forms of protest – or “unconventional” – political behavior, to see whether the model can be
extended into developing regions. Using the Afrobarometer, we examine several African states
in various stages of democratization and with varying degrees of democratic stability to test the
external validity of this work. Since the most recent wave of the Afrobarometer asks only about
protest marches, we will use this as our dependent variable in the models we test here.
Literature Review
In addition to the demographic factors noted above, Dalton’s findings illustrated one
other concept that we must address here, and that is the existence of post-materialist ideology.
Inglehart’s (1971, 1989, 1997, 2003); see also Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Abramson &
Inglehart, 1987, 1995; Inglehart & Abramson, 1999) pioneering work in this area is quite wellknown, suggesting that as those living in peaceful, materially-comfortable industrialized
societies are increasingly likely to adopt an ideological position that he termed “the new left,”
which would emphasize societal well-being, advancement of individual participation in society,
and other issues beyond the “material.”
Inglehart asserted that post-materialists would not generally be found in developing
societies, as those who were not materially well-to-do we were concerned with bread and butter
issues such as putting food on the table, keeping a roof over their heads, and so forth. He also
asserted that post-materialists would not be found within societies unless they had known peace
for at least a generation, which is to say that there would need to be a generation that had never
known times of struggle. Furthermore, he noted that post-materialists would always be a
minority within any given industrialized society.
Dalton (2008) asserted that post-materialists would be more likely to engage in
unconventional political participation than materialists, largely because of their minority
position. With materialists being in the majority, they should have full access to a democratic
political system and its institutions through linking institutions, to include political parties,
interest groups, and the media. Post-materialists, however, would have far greater difficulty
accessing the formal institutions of a given political system, owing to their minority position
within society. This would make it numerically difficult to gain representation in any democratic
institutions, such as national parliaments, even if they were to be represented through political
parties or other such linking institutions.
What is painfully obvious is that unconventional participation is not entirely driven by
post-materialist ideology, and there can be no doubt that such behavior does exist in developing
countries. For instance, the international press reported on a high level of social unrest and
violence in the wake of the disputed presidential election in Kenya in 2007, and we also have the
constant barrage of stories emanating from Zimbabwe relating to continued political unrest there
as a result of persistent allegations of rigging of democratic elections and political violence
directed at opposition party supporters. Despite multiple criticisms of Inglehart’s theory, Dalton
went with his version of it in his explanation for the factors that lead to unconventional political
participation. For sake of simplicity as well as replication, we will go with it as well. Hence, it
is our expectation that post-materialism will not drive the unconventional participation that does
exist in Africa, even if it is present all.
We are not of the opinion, despite our position on post-materialist values in the African
context, that it is totally invalid. We do believe – and the prior literature supports this – that
other factors that Dalton postulated as positively correlated to increasing the likelihood of
unconventional behavior will continue to hold true in developing areas. We do not necessarily
take the point that post-materialist attitudes are completely irrelevant, even if – as we expect –
they are nearly absent. One of Inglehart’s key positions that a person on his “new left” will hold
is a desire to increase people’s voice in their society. Democracy has the ability to do this,
seeing as it is a pluralistic form of governance, and so we will assert that the degree of pluralism
in a given polity will influence the likelihood of unconventional behavior. We will address this
matter first and then turn our attention to the thrust of Dalton’s theory.
Lijphart (1999) wrote that the most effective form of democratic government is one that
allows a wider variety of voices, opinions, and positions to be heard. Majoritarian systems tend
to stifle the people in that they only allow a scant few groupings to have access to representation
in democratic institutions. Anderson and Guillory (1997, see also Griffith, Plamenatz, &
Pennock, 1956; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001) built on this hypothesis and found that those who
are on the losing end of democratic processes can develop negative attitudes toward democratic
governance. Conversely, systems with more inclusive representational arrangements and more
opportunities for government-by-consensus tend to have higher degrees of supportive attitudes
toward democracy.
Gurr and Moore (1997) go so far as to suggest that the mere presence of democracy can
depress the likelihood of protest behavior, particularly if it is able to permeate throughout a given
society. Presumably, democracy gives groups with a grievance the means of air it. When
democracy is not present or it is present, but the group-at-hand does not have access to
representation in it, protest behavior becomes more likely. Lindburg and Moore (2008) note that
this is especially true in Africa. So long as a democratic regime is able to deliver good
government and, thus, gain legitimacy, it should not have to worry about coup attempts from the
military or others. Matlosa (2007) wrote that African democratization must co-exist with
development, and that the entire process must be pluralistic and de-politicized in order to have
any chance at success.
Not everyone agrees that democracy and pluralism can be used to foster peaceful
relationships. Inglehart counters the above to an extent in a work in which he notes that
democratization and democracy itself is not necessarily about the expression by the masses, but
rather it is a system established by and through political élites (2003). Bratton and van de Walle
(1992; see also Griffith, Plamenatz, & Pennock, 1956) similarly noted that élite behavior is what
drives protest politics among the masses. Whenever corruption exists among élites, it can be a
catalyst to escalation of protest behavior, particularly when a political system is orchestrated in
such a manner – such as a single-party system – to keep those who have political power in
power. Justice (2005) found that when groups lose confidence in democratic institutions and
find that they have no other way to make their voices heard, they will support political
organizations willing to resort to unconventional or even destructive means to promote their
political agenda, particularly those on the left wing and those with post-materialist leanings.
Saith (2007) also raised doubts about the benefits of democracy, asserting that there must
be a “reservoir of social capital” present in order for it to successfully exist and questioning
whether such a reservoir ever existed in Africa. Of particular note, Saith wrote that African
democracies were protected from neither internal nor external pressures that could serve to
destabilize them. Similarly, Sorenson (1993) collapsed Dahl’s eight classical criteria for
democratization to solidify into three broader criteria, among those being the need for high levels
of pluralism, respect for civil liberties involving free expression, and fair competition among
those involved in the process. Saith doubted that such conditions could be fulfilled, as African
political élites tended to exclude potential threats from political systems and stifled people’s
ability to speak freely.
Spiro (1994) also argues against democracy as a stabilizing force that brings peace,
suggesting that neo-Kantian literature saying that democracy does equate to peace is based on
flawed methodology that does not take into account a relative dearth of dyads controlling for
democratic-democratic state pairings. While Spiro takes his argument from a state-as-an-actor
perspective, one could draw from this the inference that having a democratic state does not
guarantee internal peace, either. Skocpol (1988) wrote on international implications of internal
conflict, postulating that revolutions and other forms of disruptive political participation can lead
to opportunities for neighboring states, not to mention their tendency to spill over national
borders.
Turning now to the demographic features Dalton raised beyond ideology, much has been
writing about the impact that educational levels have on political behavior. He noted that the
presence of higher levels of education improved the likelihood of not only unconventional
participation, but of conventional means as well, and literature examining the impact of
education on political participation in developing states corroborates this theory. He also found
that protest behavior tends to be the purview of younger citizens and those who claim group
membership. Political efficacy, however, was not a consistently significant predictor of protest
behavior, according to his work.
As a point-in-case, Nayek (1970) examined the political situation in India during the
1960s, with an emphasis on the behavior of university students. He found that educational levels
do correlate to increased political awareness and desire to take the political initiative, and that
pluralistic, inclusive discussions regarding political institutions lessened the likelihood of protest
behavior among student populations. Speaking in the African context, Wade (2007) argued that
education is critical for democratic government to succeed, in that it builds a sense of trust in
others, which leads, in turn, to a greater faith in democracy and its institutions.
Hypotheses
Based on previous research on unconventional political behavior and consideration of the
African context, we offer nine (9) hypotheses. These hypotheses consider the dynamics of the
relationship between various factors of democratic pluralism and unconventional political
behavior. Pacific democratic society requires citizens understand democracy, participate in
democratic behaviors, believe in the efficacy of political competition, be generally satisfied with
democracy, and agree that laws are generally useful means of governing and solving societal
problems. So, in addition to offering a number of hypotheses, we group them according to these
principals.
As we mentioned earlier we are considering protest behavior as the primary means of
unconventional participation, and this serves as the dependent phenomenon in our hypotheses.
We fully recognize that other forms of unconventional political participation exist, upto and
including violent political behavior. However, we choose to focus our work on the highest form
of non-violent, unconventional political participation for two reasons. One reason is practical—
namely that available data lends itself to studying this form of unconventional behavior. The
second reason is we are not studying causes of violent behavior, which is studied in detail in the
conflict processes, particularly civil war and ethnic conflict literature.
Hypothesis one deals with understanding democracy. As people gain greater
understanding of democracy and realize that greater personal liberty comes with democracy we
should expect them to be more willing to engage in unconventional participation.
H1: As the level of understanding democracy increases, unconventional political
behavior increases.
Hypothesis set two (H2) deals with participation in democratic behaviors. The primary
form of participation in democracy by citizens is voting. We recognize in our hypotheses that
voting is often accompanied by perception of the fairness of the election, so we test both actual
voting and perception of fairness in elections. We generally regard unconventional behavior as
decreasing when political participation increases.
H2: Where voting increases, unconventional political behavior decreases;
H2a: Where fairness of elections increases, unconventional behavior decreases.
Hypothesis set three (H3) examines the perception of efficacy regarding democracy. We
consider the general support for democracy among people, the perception of democracy’s extent
in a country, the satisfaction with democracy, and perception of the relationship of party
competition to conflict in relationship to unconventional behavior. Our general proposal in this
area is when efficacy increases, unconventional behavior decreases.
H3: When support for democracy increases, unconventional behavior decreases;
H3a: When perceived extent of democracy increases, unconventional behavior
decreases;
H3b: When satisfaction with democracy increases, unconventional behavior
decreases;
H3c: When belief that party competition causes conflict decrease, unconventional
behavior decreases.
The fourth set of hypotheses (H4) considers the relationship between belief in laws as a
useful source of societal governance and unconventional participation. We regard increase in
belief in the usefulness of laws as causing a decrease in unconventional behavior. Two
treatments of this phenomenon are observed; one that people believe they must obey laws, and
also that people believe in increased solution to societal problems based on legal solutions.
H4: If people believe they must obey the law, unconventional political
behavior decreases;
H4a: When belief in lawful solutions increases, unconventional political
behavior decreases.
Data and Models
We apply a modified version of the Afrobarometer to test our hypotheses.1 This survey
includes 25,397 participants from 18 Sub-Saharan countries and was completed in the years
2000-2008.2 The probability of inclusion was weighted by proportionality of the population of
the country from which a respondent is drawn to the overall population of the 18 countries from
which the sample population is drawn.3
We create four sets of models each with the same dependent variable, but considering the
different sets of independent variables. Unconventional political behavior is represented by
participation in political demonstrations and protests and is measured in an ordinal scale. We
therefore apply ordered logistic regression modeling for the testing of our hypotheses. Before
further discussing the models we turn to the consideration of the variables used to test our
hypotheses.
DATA
Our dependent variable measures political protest behavior. Respondents were asked
about frequency of attending demonstrations or protests against the government. 86% of
respondents report that they have not attended a protest or demonstration against the government,
1
This data is available through www.afrobarometer.org.
See appendix 1 for list of countries and number of survey respondents from that country.
3
This method of data collection will necessitate the use of a weighting variable in the models.
2
hardly an unexpected figure given the political climate of much of sub-Saharan Africa. Even
when considering whether a person might attend, the number that have not attended a protest is
51.4% and only 34.6% say they have not but might attend a protest. The median score is 0. The
measurements are examined in Table 1.
What we are examining is an infrequent phenomenon. As demonstrated in our data, less
than 3500 respondents have ever engaged in unconventional behavior measured as protest
against the government. While this makes studying the phenomenon difficult, it adds to the
robustness of any results that we find.
Table 1: Did Respondent Attend Political Demonstration/Protest
Frequency
Valid Percentage
Never
No, might attend
1-2 times
Several times
Frequently
12698
8548
1862
1001
583
51.4
34.6
7.5
4.1
2.4
Cummulative
Percentage
51.4
86.0
93.6
97.6
100.0
There are 705 cases of missing data
The particulars of the independent variables are shown in Table 2. Each of these
variables is ordinal in measurement, so the central tendency shown is the median category. In
the measurement of free and fair elections and the respondent’s belief in lawful vs. immediate
action to correct grievances, the modal category is different than the median category, but for all
other independent variables the median and the mode are equal.
Understanding democracy was measured by asking the respondent if they knew what democracy
meant. A score of 0 indicates the respondent did not understand the word, a score of 1 means
that the person understood the word but had difficulty expressing a meaning. A score of 2
represents comprehension and definition.
Table 2. Independent Variables
Valid Cases
Variable
Understand
23990
Democracy
25278
Vote in Last Election
Free and Fair
23017
Elections
Support for
21414
Democracy
20748
Extent of Democracy
Satisfaction with
21287
Democracy
23966
Party Competition
24520
Obey the Law
Belief in Lawful
24960
Solutions
Central Tendency
Range
2
0-2
4
0-4
2(3)*
0-3
3
0-3
3
1-4
3
0-4
2
4
0-3
1-5
4(5)*
1-5
*mode is reported in parentheses
Voting in the last election was measured by asking a respondent about voting and
whether they were registered to vote. A score of 0 represents not even being registered to vote.
A score of 1 indicates a person was prevented from voting. A score of 2 shows a person did not
vote and gave a reason for not voting (such as difficulty finding the polling location, belief that
voting would not be safe, etc.). A score of 3 represents a person simply choosing not to vote. A
four represents having voted.
Were the last elections free and fair is measured on a 0-3 scale. 0 represents not free or
fair, 1 that they were free and fair, but had major problems, 2 that there were minor problems,
and 3 that they were totally free and fair without problems. While the overwhelming majority
answer is totally free and fair, the median response was free and fair with minor problems.
Support for democracy was measured on an ascending scale with 0 being not supportive
at all and 3 being totally supportive of democracy. Perception of democracy is measured on a
scale of 1-4, asking how democratic a respondent believes his/her country to be, with 1
representing not democratic at all and 4 representing fully democratic. Satisfaction with
democracy asks the respondent if they are satisfied with a democratic government on a scale of 0
to 4. 0 represented totally dissatisfied and 4 represents very satisfied.
Belief that party competition causes conflict is also measured in our model. On a scale of
0-3 with 0 representing never causes conflict and 3 representing always causes conflict, the
median and most frequent respondent says that party competition often causes conflict.
The final two independent variables consider the relationship of belief in laws (a
fundamental trait of pluralist democracy) and unconventional behavior. Most people agree that
they must obey the law on a scale of 1-5, where 1 represent strongly disagreeing with this
principle and 5 represents strongly agreeing with the principle of obedience to law. When asked
about their belief in immediate solutions versus finding lawful solutions the median response
was belief in lawful solutions, but the most frequent response is strongly believing in lawful
solutions.
As control factors in the models we consider the age of the respondent, employment
status of the respondent, gender of the respondent, and race of the respondent.4 The average age
was 36.62. The most frequent and median response to employment is not employed (again not
unexpected as sub-Saharan Africa is home to the largest concentration of poverty in the world).
The division between male and female is almost exact as 12702 men are included and 12695
women are included the data. Finally, as is expected most of the respondents are black Africans
(87.9% of respondents).
MODELS and FINDINGS
We offer four models that test the hypothesis sets that we believe tests the relationship of
democratic pluralism with unconventional political behavior in sub-Saharan Africa. Table 3
4
While we very much would like to include a measure of personal ideological preferences, such information is not
included in the datasets generated from the completion of the Afrobarometer surveys. We are concerned that lack of
this variable may cause inflated values of other variables in our models.
shows the results of the models. Models were tested for fit and for collinearity and no issues
were noted. Model 1, testing the understanding of democracy in relationship to protest, has an N
of 23032 and a Wald Chi-Square value of 614.59, probability of .0000. Model 2, testing the
relationship of voting and protest, has an N of 22081 and a Wald Chi-Square of 498.04,
probability.0000. Model 3, testing the efficacy of democracy and protest, has an N of 18643,
Wald Chi-Square 347.86, probability .0000. Model 4, testing hypotheses related to belief in law
and protest, has an N of 23320 with a Wald Chi-Square of 533.83, probability .0000.
Table 3. Models of Democratic Pluralism and Protest
Model 1
Model 2
.1860***
Understand
(.0168)
Democracy
.0646***
Vote in Last
(.0092)
Election
-.0098
Free and Fair
(.0125)
Elections
Support for
Democracy
Extent of
Democracy
Satisfaction
with Democracy
Party
Competition
Model 3
-.0025
(.0141)
.0018
(.0222)
-.0203
(.0190)
-.0471**
(.0153)
Obey the Law
Belief in Lawful
Solutions
Age
Employment
Gender
Race
-.0135***
(.0009)
.0805***
(.0158)
-.3549***
(.0269)
.0028
(.0064)
-.0158***
(.0009)
.0733***
(.0162)
-.3745***
(.0272)
-.0021***
(.0004)
Model 4
-.0129***
(.0010)
.0772***
(.0173)
-.3851***
(.0296)
-.0016***
(.0005)
-.0082
(.0121)
-.0459***
(.0109)
-.0136***
(.0009)
.0896***
(.0158)
-.4035***
(.0265)
-.0023***
(.0004)
Std. error in parentheses p>.05*, p>.01**, p>.001***
We find support in the model for three (3) of our hypotheses. Increased understanding of
democracy does lead to lower levels of protest. Decreased belief that party competition causes
conflict leads to lower protest. Increased belief in lawful solutions to problems does lead to
lower protest. However, a statistically significant relationship was found in relation to voting
and it is actually that increased voting leads to an increase in protesting. We address this last
finding first, then consider the other findings.
Increasing the value of voting by one (1) standard deviation (a value of 1.52) increases
the likelihood of protest increasing by 110.32%. The implication is people who believe they are
freer to vote and participate actively in politics will be more willing to engage in protest against
their government. The other possible implication is that protests later caused the government to
relent and allow elections. In sub-Saharan Africa both of these behaviors are noticeable. If you
as a black South African if he/she has ever engaged in protest, the answer is almost assuredly yes
if they are over the age of 30. Following protests in the 1980s and early 1990s black South
Africans were universally awarded the opportunity to vote and have voted in high numbers in
elections held since the protest years at the end of the apartheid era of South Africa. Since the
data do not ask what came first—voting or protesting—it is impossible to clearly tell which is
causal. They are, however, statistically significant in relationship to one another to a high degree
in the data we tested.
Not only does an increase in understanding democracy lead to decrease in protest, but it
has a 116.31% likelihood of decreasing protest when understanding democracy increases by one
(1) standard deviation (a value of .81). Understanding democracy is at the root of democratic
pluralism having the opportunity to grow. This is an important finding, but not one that was
unexpected.
Regarding the efficacy of democracy we are at a loss to explain how support for
democracy and satisfaction with democracy have no statistically significant relationship with
protest. The extent to which a person perceives his/her state to be democratic is even less
significant in relationship to protest. It is encouraging to see that when belief that multi-party
competition causes conflict decreases there is a decrease in protest that is statistically significant.
This finding bodes well for the future of pluralistic democracy.
Concerning law as a useful source of governance, it is understandable that an increase in
belief in obedience to law is not significant in relationship to protest. If democracy is evident in
a society, the ability to voice concern and demonstrate against the state is not illegal. More
important we did find a statistically significant relationship exists between increased belief in
lawful solutions and decrease in protest. When belief in lawful solutions increases by a value of
1.21 (one std. deviation) the likelihood of protest decreases by 94.58%.
None of the findings related to the controls are surprising. Protest in sub-Saharan Africa
is a young person’s game, so as age increases protest decreases in all of the models. People who
are employed tend to engage in protest more than those who are not employed. This is
understandable as they have more to lose from poor governance. The indication of the findings
related to gender is that men engage in protest more often than women. Regarding race, black
Africans protest more than other Africans—no surprise considering their high proportion in the
cases of the dataset used for the models.
Conclusions
Our findings as expressed in the hypotheses are illustrated in Table 4. The biggest
surprise in our findings was that there was no statistically significant relationship between a lack
of support for democracy and willingness to engage in protest politics. According to Dalton,
protest politics is a game played by those who feel the need to be empowered or to empower
others, usually by those who do not feel that they have the political efficacy to make change
happen through the normal course of the democratic political process. These people are usually
found on the traditional left and the post-materialist left, both of which are ideologies that seek to
change the balance of societal power to include those who are not presently part of the system. It
may well be a case that those who express dissatisfaction with democracy feel so alienated that
they feel that there is nothing to gain by engaging in any type of political behavior.
Table 4. Summary of Findings in Relation to Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Finding
Increased Understanding Democracy
Hypothesis supported
causes Increased Protest
Increased Voting causes Decreased
Hypothesis not supported
Protest
Increased Fairness of Elections
No statistically significant finding
causes Decreased Protest
Increased Support for Democracy
No statistically significant finding
causes Decreased Protest
Increased Extent of Democracy
No statistically significant finding
causes Decreased Protest
Increased Satisfaction with
No statistically significant finding
Democracy causes Decreased Protest
Decreased Belief that Party
Competition Causes Conflict causes
Hypothesis supported
Decreased Protest
Increased belief in Obedience to
No statistically significant finding
Law causes Decreased Conflict
Increased Belief in Lawful Solutions
to Problems causes Decreased
Hypothesis Supported
Protest
A second consideration stems from the fact that this particular data set did not allow for
consideration of either post-materialist or traditional left/right values. If we were able to do so,
there is a possibility that inclusion of such variables with this data might have yielded a different
result on this hypothesis as well as others. We would encourage the inclusion of such
ideological measurement and/or self-placement variables in future waves of the Afrobarometer.
This is of particular interest to scholars in the area of political values and how they translate to
political participation, particularly given the continued development of Africa and its growing
place on the global stage. This is speculation on our part, however. Nevertheless, prior research
(Opp, 1990) suggests that post-materialism has an additive and multiplicative effect on protest
behavior. If it is not present at all, we may well have to reconsider our earlier assertion that it is
not the main driving value system behind protest politics. We cannot doubt that other factors are
present and significantly impact protest behavior, and the data we present here demonstrates that
there certainly are others. However, this is an issue that future research in this area should
attempt to confront.
Voting, one of the most conventional aspects of democratic political participation, is
generally accepted as a low-impact political activity. Other forms of conventional behavior,
such as volunteering in a political campaign, require participants to spend more time and
monetary capital on their activities. Protest behavior, with its unconventional attributes, leaves
and even larger impact. It takes place outside the framework of normal institutional
arrangements, and its maverick reputation necessarily engenders a level of risk beyond the usual
political capital spent in actively participating in any organized activity. Our expectation was
that the presence of a lower capital activity would attract participants and draw them away from
activities that not only fall outside the mainstream but also entail higher levels of risk. We based
this on a simple matter of rational choice: achieving the best-possible result and the lowestpossible cost. The results of this study suggest otherwise. It may be true that the presence of
democratic norms in some political cultures lessens inhibitions against the sense of risk found in
unconventional behavior. Future studies in this area may wish to concentrate more on the
collective political cultural aspects of political participation of this type in developing areas.
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Appendix 1: Afrobarometer Countries and Respondent Numbers
Country
Benin
Botswana
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Number of Respondents
1198
1200
1256
1197
1278
1161
1350
1200
1244
1198
1200
2363
1200
2400
1304
2400
1200
1048