Supplementives, the coordination account, and conflicting intentions
There appears to be a lot of contextual sensitivity in natural language. Aside from
obviously contextually sensitive expressions like ‘I’, ‘now’, ‘here’, ‘she’ and so on,
quantifiers, conditionals, modals, possessives like ‘Annie’s book’, relational expressions
that take implicit arguments like ‘ready’, gradable adjectives and so on are all good
candidates for being contextually sensitive. It appears that expressions like ‘I’, whose
meaning alone suffices for it to have a semantic value in context, are the exception when
it comes to contextual sensitivity. Much more common seem to be expressions or
constructions whose meanings must be supplemented in some way in context to have
semantic values.1 I call such expressions supplementives to highlight their need for the
supplementation in question. It is plausible that in addition to demonstrative expressions,
including demonstrative pronouns, all the less obviously contextually sensitive
expressions mentioned above—modals, conditionals, gradable adjectives and so on--are
supplementives in my sense.
The question arises as to what is the nature of the supplementation required by
supplementives in order that they have semantic values in context; and whether all
supplementives require the same mechanism—supplementation of the same nature—to
have semantic values in context. Following Glanzberg [2013], let’s say that in specifying
the mechanism by means of which a supplementive has a semantic value in context one is
giving the metasemantics for the supplementive in question. In King [2013a], I defended
a certain metasemantics for demonstrative expressions and hypothesized that it was the
1
If one thinks of the required supplementation as itself part of the context, as I am sometimes inclined to do,
this is not the best way to put the point. A better way might be to say that certain expressions only have
semantic values if the context is a certain way (i.e. it includes the required supplementation), whereas e.g.
‘I’ always has a semantic value in context (assuming every context has a speaker).
1
proper metasemantics for all supplementives. In King [2013b], I gave a partial defense
of this latter claim. In the present work I want to return to the case of demonstrative
expressions and consider the more detailed and sophisticated version of my
metasemantics that I have settled on since writing King [2013a, 2013b]. I want to show
how the view teases apart various interesting cases that it appears should be teased apart.
This will help explain and motivate certain features of the view. I then want to turn to
some cases involving what I will call conflicting intentions. I’ll sketch two versions of
my metasemantics that handle cases of conflicting intentions differently. I won’t try to
adjudicate between the two versions here and so will leave it as an open question which
version is preferable.
Turning to demonstratives and demonstrative pronouns, which I’ll call
demonstrative expressions, let me register a few caveats.2 First, in the case of both
expressions, I’ll talk of their having objects as semantic values in contexts on the uses
we’ll be looking at. This will make it sound as though I take the relevant expressions to
be expressions that refer to those objects in context. But I am not assuming that; and in
the case of demonstratives, simple and complex, I myself do not think these expressions
refer to the objects that I will say are their semantic values in context.3 Whatever the
precise semantics of demonstrative expressions, on the uses we are interested in an object
must be secured in context for the use to be felicitous. I am calling that object the
semantic value of the expression in context and the metasemantic account I give specifies
the mechanism by means of which the semantic value is secured. But I mean to stay
neutral beyond this on the exact semantics of the expressions in question. Second, I’ll
So on this usage, ‘demonstratives’ is used for simple (‘that’) and complex demonstratives—singular or
plural—and ‘demonstrative expressions’ is used for demonstratives and pronouns (used demonstratively).
3
See King [2001]
2
2
suppress reference to the gender, person and number constraints pronouns put on their
semantic values and just assume these constraints are satisfied in the relevant cases.
Before formulating the metasemantic account I endorse, let me briefly mention
three other accounts that have loomed large historically. First, there is the view of the
Kaplan of Demonstratives according to which the semantic value of a demonstrative in a
context is given by what object the speaker demonstrates. The difficulties with this view,
some of which Kaplan noted himself, are, first, that demonstratives seem sometimes to
have semantic values even though the speaker did not appear to demonstrate anything.
Second, often a demonstration is vague in the sense that no single thing is demonstrated,
yet despite this the speaker manages to secure a semantic value for her demonstrative.
And third, even very precise demonstrations often demonstrate more than one thing, but
again in many such cases the speaker nonetheless secures a unique semantic value for her
demonstrative. Next, there is the view that it is the intentions of the speaker that
determine the semantic value of a demonstrative expression in context. The main
problem with this view is that it predicts that demonstrative expressions have a semantic
value as long as the speaker has the relevant intentions. This results in the theory
entailing that demonstrative expressions have semantic values in cases in which they
intuitively don’t seem to. Finally, there is the view on which demonstrations together
with speaker intentions determine the semantic value of a demonstrative expression in
context. This view inherits at least some of the problems of the views it combines.
The second and third views of the metasemantics of demonstrative expressions
just discussed err by making it too easy for a speaker to secure a semantic value in
context for a demonstrative expression. They don’t require the speaker to rise to the
3
standard of being understandable by her audience. This suggests that we should
somehow build into the conditions required for a speaker to secure a semantic value for a
demonstrative expression in context that the speaker is understandable to her audience in
the sense that she enables her audience to see what the semantic value of the expression
in context is. Here is my suggestion as to how to do that:
Coordination Account Metasemantics
A speaker S’s use  of a demonstrative expression in context c has o as its semantic value
iff 1. S intends o to be the semantic value of  in c; and 2. a competent, reasonable,
attentive hearer H who knows the common ground of the conversation at the time S utters
, and who has the properties attributed to the audience by the common ground at the
time S utters  would recognize that S intends o to be the semantic value of  in c in the
way S intends H to recognize her intention.
In the interest of brevity, I’ll sometimes abbreviate the second condition here by saying
that it requires that an ideal hearer would know that S intends o to be the semantic value
of  in c. Note that what the coordination account essentially says is required for o to be
the semantic value of  in c is that the speaker intends it to be and makes his intention
recognizable by an idealized hearer. The account correctly leaves open the means by
which the speaker does this. Sometimes pointing will do; in other cases this won’t be
required, as when a gorilla walks into the room and I say ‘That is one large monkey.’
Still other cases are discussed below. However, because it will be relevant in what
follows, I want to emphasize that on the coordination account metasemantics, the
function of demonstrations is always simply to help make a speaker’s intention in using a
demonstrative expression recognizable to her hearer.
4
There are various features of this account whose motivations are likely unclear
and which will be discussed subsequently. But it should already be clear that if the two
conditions mentioned are satisfied, the speaker in using the demonstrative expression has
put his audience in a position to see what he intends to be the semantic value of his use of
the expression. Hence, we are already in a position to say something about the point of
the notion (S’s use  of a demonstrative expression in context c has o as its semantic
value) we have just characterized. In constructing a semantic theory for a language with
demonstrative expressions and wishing to define the notion of a use of a demonstrative
expression having o as its semantic value in context c, it seems reasonable to require in
that definition that the speaker did what was required for successful communication with
a demonstrative expression. After all the purpose in using a demonstrative expression is
to communicate something about its semantic value. It seems plausible to say that a
speaker succeeded in securing a semantic value for her demonstrative expression in
context just in case she did what is required for its serving its purpose. And that in turn is
a matter of doing enough to allow her audience to recognize what she intends to be the
semantic value, since this is what is required in order that the speaker communicate
something about the value by means of her demonstrative expression. But this is just
what the coordination account requires for a speaker to secure a semantic value for her
demonstrative expression in context. In this way, the coordination account’s notion of
securing a semantic value for a demonstrative expression in context can be seen as
characterizing what must happen on the speaker’s side in order for communication to
succeed. That seems to me to be a theoretical virtue and makes clear the point of the
coordination account’s notion of a use of a demonstrative expression having a semantic
5
value in context.
I now turn to motivating various features of the coordination account
metasemantics by showing how they handle certain cases that would otherwise present
problems. First, why does the account require that an idealized hearer would recognize
that S intends o to be the semantic value of  in c in the way S intends H to recognize her
intention? Why not require merely that an idealized hearer would take S to intend o to be
the semantic value of  in c? Suppose I am looking out a window at a ship, the S.S.
Perry, that is clearly visible to me. Pointing out the window at it, I say ‘That is a large
ship.’ intending the Perry to be the semantic value of my use of ‘That’. Because of the
way I am oriented relative to my audience, they quite reasonably take me to be pointing
out a different window through which, as it happens, the S.S. Perry is clearly visible to
them unbeknownst to me. In such a case, the speaker intended the Perry to be the
semantic value of his use of a demonstrative and an idealized hearer would take him to
intend the Perry to be the semantic value of his use of the demonstrative.4 So on the
weaker version of condition 2 above, the Perry would be the semantic value of the use of
the demonstrative. However, in such a case an idealized hearer presumably would not
recognize that S intends o to be the semantic value of  in c in the way S intends H to
recognize her intention. After all, I intended you to recognize my intention by attending
to the window I was looking through and seeing the S.S. Perry. Hence condition 2 above
is not satisfied and the coordination account metasemantics predicts that the use of the
4
Note that since the common ground will attribute to the audience the property of being oriented relative to
the speaker as they in fact are (assuming all conversational participants presuppose that the audience is
oriented relative to the speaker as they in fact are, they presuppose that other participants presuppose it,
etc.), the idealized hearer would be oriented to the speaker as the audience in fact is.
6
demonstrative does not have a semantic value.5 This seems to me the right result. In this
case, though I did in fact successfully communicate, it was just an accident that I did.
Intuitively, I did not do what was required to be understood by my audience, but was
bailed out by an overly cooperative world. In such a case, I shouldn’t be counted as
having successfully discharged my responsibility to be understandable, and so given the
motivation for the coordination account metasemantics, we should say I did not
successfully secure a semantic value in context. And this is what the account predicts.
Let me turn now to the requirement in condition 2 that the idealized hearer knows
the common ground of the conversation at the time of utterance. What work is this
requirement supposed to do? First, it readily handles certain cases of so-called deferred
ostension. Suppose it is common ground that we are standing in front of our colleague
Mary’s empty office and that she is on vacation. An oppressive amount of work has just
5
Condition 2 has evolved over time. In King [2013a], I used the weaker formulation just discussed and
rejected in the text. In King [2013b], based on examples like the S.S. Perry example, I strengthened the
condition to: 2. a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of the
conversation at the time of utterance would know that the speaker intends o to be the value of  in c.
However, John Hawthorne and David Manley pointed out that this formulation is subject to the following
worry. Suppose we're both listening to a male lark song, we are mutually aware that we are, and I say ‘He
is a happy lark’. Suppose that just before the lark sang an impostor was getting ready to play a fake
(synthesized, not recorded!) lark song, but stopped because a real lark actually sang. Nonetheless, it seems
as though I secured the lark, o, as the semantic value of my demonstrative expression. But would a
competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation at the time of
utterance know that I intend o to be the value of  in c? In the actual world, the idealized hearer believes
that I intend o to be the semantic value of my demonstrative. But in the close possibility in which the
synthesized song is played, the idealized hearer presumably would believe the gappy proposition that I
intend__ to be the semantic value (or perhaps the proposition that I intend the synthesizer or the person
playing it to be the semantic value). If this undermines the safety of the idealized hearer’s belief that I
intend o to be the semantic value in the actual world and safety is required for knowledge, then the
idealized hearer doesn't know that I intend o to be the semantic value. But that would mean that condition
2 as formulated above would not be met and the coordination account would predict counterintuitively that
I did not secure a semantic value for my demonstrative expression in this case. I take it, though, that
condition 2 as formulated in the text is met: an idealized hearer would recognize my intention that o be the
semantic value in the way I intended her to recognize it.
7
been dumped on us and we are complaining about how horrible it will be to complete it.
I point in the direction of Mary’s office and say ‘Boy, I wish I were her right now.’
intending Mary to be the semantic value of ‘her’. Presumably in such a case, a
competent, reasonable, attentive hearer who knew the common ground of the
conversation at the time I uttered ‘her’, and who has the properties attributed to the
audience by the common ground at the time I uttered ‘her’ would know that I intend
Mary to be the semantic value of ‘her’. Obviously, what is doing the work in such a case
is that the idealized hearer knows the common ground of the conversation. A nice feature
of the coordination account here is that it makes cases of deferred ostension look
completely unexceptional. As indicated above, condition 2 of the coordination account
essentially says that the speaker must make her intention in using a demonstrative
expression recognizable to an idealized hearer. Cases of so-called deferred ostension
show only that I can make an idealized hearer recognize my intention that o be the
semantic value of my demonstrative by indicating something other than o. This, it seems
to me, is a rather unremarkable fact.
A second reason that we should consider idealized hearers who know the common
ground of the conversation in determining when a demonstrative expression has a
semantic value concerns the apparent differences between cases in which the common
ground contains a lot of information and those in which it contains much less. Speakers
often exploit their knowledge of the common ground to get hearers to see what they
intend to be the semantic values of demonstrative expressions they employ. When they
do so in appropriate ways, it seems clear that they secure semantic values for their
demonstrative expressions in context precisely because they have allowed their audiences
8
to recognize their intentions, where an idealized hearer who didn’t know the common
ground of the conversation would not know what the speaker intended to be the semantic
value. In order that the coordination account predicts that speakers do succeed in
securing semantic values for their demonstrative expression in such cases, in condition 2
we need to appeal to idealized hearers who know the common ground of the conversation
at the time of utterance. To take a case, suppose it is common ground between you and
me that Shaun White is the best snowboarder in the world in the half pipe. We are
watching a half pipe event in which he is competing and which he wins. After the event,
White and other competitors are milling around talking and laughing. We are looking at
them and mutually recognize that we are. I shake my head and say ‘He is so much better
than the other boarders.’ intending White to be the semantic value of ‘He’. Without
missing a beat you know exactly whom I intend, whereas an idealized hearer without
knowledge of the common ground would not have. In this case, the common ground
contained lots of information because we know each other well, know each other’s views
on snowboarding prowess well, etc. But similar examples can be constructed in which
the common ground contains lots of information simply because we have been talking for
a while.6
Finally, let’s turn to the requirement in condition 2 that the idealized hearer has
6
In condition 2 of the coordination account metasemantics, I separate out that the idealized hearer is
competent, reasonable and attentive from the requirement that she has the properties attributed to the
audience by the common ground. That is due to my thinking that in cases where the common ground is
relatively austere (e.g. I approach a stranger on the street), whether I succeed in securing a value for my
demonstrative expression would seem to depend in part on whether a reasonable, competent, attentive
hearer would know what I intend to be the semantic value, but presumably in such a case the common
ground does not attribute these properties to my de facto audience. This does raise a worry about cases in
which it is common ground that my audience is unreasonable or inattentive. I don’t address this worry
here.
9
the properties attributed by the common ground to the actual audience.7 Of course, there
is some vagueness here, since the common ground may attribute certain properties only
to the vast majority of the audience and so on, but let me put that aside. The leading idea
behind the requirement here is that when speakers use demonstrative expressions, the
standard they have to rise to in making their intentions recognizable may be affected by
what the audience is presupposed to be like. Say I am giving an address to the
Association for the Blind and that I am doing so is common ground. Presumably, if I use
pointings with my uses of demonstrative expressions I will not enable my audience to
determine what I intend to be the semantic values of those uses. I, of course, am well
aware of this. Given the motivations for the coordination account metasemantics, it
should say in such a case that I have failed to secure semantic values for my uses of
demonstrative expressions. And condition 2 as stated will not be satisfied in such a case,
since an idealized hearer who is blind (a property attributed to the audience by the
common ground) would not know what the speaker intended. Hence, the coordination
account metasemantics correctly predicts that the uses of demonstratives in such a case
lack semantic values. Similar cases can be constructed involving it being common
ground that I am talking to young children, people who are mentally impaired and so on.
Intuitively, the idea behind this feature of condition 2 is that how much a speaker
needs to do to secure a semantic value for a use of her demonstrative expression depends
on what her audience is like (or what the common ground says her audience is like).
Now consider the case of talking to oneself. Intuitively, one has to do very little to secure
semantic values for one’s uses of demonstrative expressions in such a case. Exotic cases
7
The common ground attributes the property P to the audience just in case that proposition that the
audience possesses P is in the common ground.
10
aside, one would seem to merely have to intend that o be the semantic value of a use of a
demonstrative expression in order for o to be its semantic value. Now if we assume in
such cases that it is common ground that the audience is the speaker, we get this result.
For in such a case the speaker intends o to be the semantic value and an idealized hearer
who is the speaker (a property attributed to the audience by the common ground) would
know that the speaker intended o. Some may balk at the very notion of common ground
in the case of talking to oneself. But I think the notion has real work to do here. First,
that I am presupposing that I am my audience, so that this is common ground, partly
explains why I behave as I do: it explains why I make no attempt to make my intentions
recognizable to other persons. Second, I can certainly engage in pretense when I talk to
myself. And it is natural to understand this to be a matter of my presupposing things that
I know to be false for the purpose of talking to myself, and so making them part of the
common ground. Third, consider a sentence that has presuppositions in the sense that its
felicitous use requires certain propositions to be in the common ground, such as ‘Even
Alan was promoted.’ Here the sentence requires the common ground to contain the
proposition that Alan was the least likely of the relevant candidates to be promoted. But I
can say such sentences to myself, and when I do so the sentences will only seem
felicitous to me if I am presupposing the relevant propositions to be true for the purpose
of conversing with myself. These last two points amount to claiming that we should
have uniform accounts of pretense and presupposition for normal conversations and
talking to oneself. Given how similar the phenomena are in the two cases, this strikes me
as immensely plausible
Let me now turn to another audienceless case that was formulated by Jeff Speaks
11
[2013], who thought it would produce problems for my account. We just saw that given
certain assumptions, the coordination account gets intuitively correct results for cases of
talking to oneself. Speaks considers a rather different case of a speaker without an
audience:
The sneaky students and the speckled hen
I teach Philosophy 101 in a large auditorium which darkens during the
lecture so that the students can better see the slides; in fact, though, it
becomes a bit darker than it needs to, to the point where I can’t see the
students during the lecture. The students have figured this out, and now,
very quietly, exit the room minutes after the lights go down, and return
minutes before the lights go back up. In the interim, I’m speaking to an
empty room. During the lecture, I might use plenty of demonstratives; and
it seems to me very clear that many of them might well have semantic
values. If, pointing clearly and carefully at the lectern, I say ‘That lectern
…’ it seems clear that the semantic value of ‘that lectern’ is, just as it
would be had the students not left, the lectern. During the lecture, I
discuss the example of the speckled hen, and show a picture of a manyspeckled hen on the screen. Carelessly gesturing toward the hen, intending
to single out one of the speckles, I say ‘That speckle …’
Speaks’ intuition about the case, which I share, is that the use of ‘that lectern’ has a
semantic value whereas the use of ‘that speckle’ does not. Speaks worried that the
coordination account didn’t have the resources to tease apart the uses of ‘that lectern’ and
‘that speckle’ in such a case. But I think that given certain assumptions, the coordination
account makes predictions that accord with Speaks’ and my intuitions about the case.
First, assume that once the students leave the room, they are no longer participants in the
conversation. This seems plausible, as they are no longer tracking what the speaker is
saying, and so are not updating the context with the speaker’s assertions, have no
intention of contributing to the conversation and so on. Given this plausible assumption,
it seems as though the common ground of the conversation is completely determined by
the presuppositions of the speaker. The common ground will then consist of every
12
proposition P such that the speaker S presupposes P, S presupposes that all members of
his audience presuppose P etc. Assuming the speaker presupposes that his audience is a
group of normal students and that all members of his audience presuppose this etc., the
common ground will attribute to his audience the property of being a group of normal
students. This means that the coordination account predicts that his utterance of ‘that
lectern’ has the lectern o as its semantic value iff S intends o to be its semantic value and
an idealized hearer who has the property of being a normal student would know that S
intends o to be its semantic value. Since these conditions are met, the coordination
account predicts that ‘that lectern’ has o as its semantic value. By similar reasoning, ‘that
speckle’ has o’ as its semantic value just in case S intended o’ to be the semantic value
and an idealized hearer who had the property of being a normal student would know that
S intended o’ to be its semantic value. The second condition here is not met by any
speckle, and so the coordination account predicts that ‘that speckle’ has no semantic
value. Hence, we arrive at the predictions that Speaks and I both thought intuitively
correct.
Above we saw that the coordination account made the intuitively correct
predictions regarding a speaker addressing the Association for the Blind. Speaks raises
the following rather different case involving a blind audience:
Sudden blindness
I’m having a beer with a friend at a bar, and, pointing to his glass, say
‘That beer looks flat.’ Unfortunately, he was struck blind moments before
my utterance, and hence was unable to discern the object of my referential
intention.
Speaks’ intuitive judgment about the case, which again I share, is that the sudden
blindness of his friend does not present my use of ‘that beer’ from having the relevant
13
beer as its semantic value. However, it seems to me that the coordination account
predicts exactly this. Presumably, prior to my friend being suddenly struck blind, it was
common ground that he is normally sighted: we both presupposed this, presupposed that
the other presupposed it etc. When my friend is struck blind moments before my
utterance, it is hard to see why it wouldn’t still be common ground. Consider what
Stalnaker [2002] says about the notion of speaker presupposition that is used to define
the common ground:
In the simple picture, the common ground is just common or
mutual belief, and what a speaker presupposes is what she believes to be
common or mutual belief. The common beliefs of the parties to a
conversation are the beliefs they share, and that they recognize that they
share: a proposition φ is common belief of a group of believers if and only
if all in the group believe that φ, all believe that all believe it, all believe
that all believe that all believe it, etc.
Common belief is the model for common ground, but discussions
of speaker presupposition have emphasized from the start a number of
ways in which what is presupposed may diverge from what is mutually
known or believed. One may make assumptions, and what is assumed may
become part of the common ground, temporarily. One may presume that
things are mutually believed without being sure that they are. That
something is common belief may be a pretense – even a mutually
recognized pretense.8
A bit later he continues:
The idea will be that the common ground should be defined in terms of a
notion of acceptance that is broader than the notion of belief.
Acceptance, as I have used the term is a category of propositional
attitudes and methodological stances toward a proposition, a category that
includes belief, but also some attitudes (presumption, assumption,
acceptance for the purposes of an argument or an inquiry) that contrast
with belief, and with each other. To accept a proposition is to treat it as
true for some reason.9
Picking up on the last line of this preceding quote, immediately after being struck by
blindness my friend does have a reason for treating true for the purposes of our
8
9
P. 704
p. 716
14
conversation the claim that he is normally sighted, taking me to treat it as true and so on:
he knows I am presupposing that he is normally sighted, that I presuppose that he
presupposes it etc. Hence, the only way to keep the context non-defective is for my
friend to continue to accept/presuppose that he is normally sighted, that I
accept/presuppose it and so on. But then that is a reason for treating it as true for the
purposes of our conversation, at least until he can manage to squeeze in an utterance of
‘I’ve just gone blind.’ Hence, it is reasonable to think that after my friend has gone
suddenly blind and I make my utterance, and before my friend is able to inform me of his
sudden blindness, the claim that my friend is normally sighted is still common ground. In
turn, this means that the coordination account predicts that the relevant beer o is the
semantic value of my use of ‘that beer’ iff I intended o to be the semantic value and an
idealized hearer who has the property of being normally sighted (a property that the
common ground attributes to my audience) would know that I intended o to be the
semantic value. These conditions are met and so the account predicts that the relevant
beer is the semantic value of my use of ‘that beer’, just as Speaks and I intuited. So in the
end, I don’t think Sudden blindness causes any problem for the coordination account.10
Finally, let me turn to cases that involve what I’ll call conflicting intentions. The
10
Speaks (p.c.) suggested a variant of Sudden blindness in which the friend falsely believes, perhaps even
justifiably, that the speaker has noticed his blindness. Hence, in such a case the friend will stop
presupposing that he is normally sighted and stop presupposing that I am presupposing it etc. But then the
common ground will not attribute normal sightedness to the audience. This threatens to have the speaker’s
use of ‘that beer’ have no semantic value in such a case. This case is sufficiently recherché that I am not
sure how bad this is. Since the intuition behind condition 2 is that it requires that “the speaker did enough”
to make her intentions recognizable to her hearers, if we were worried about getting the result in this variant
that ‘that beer’ has the relevant beer as its semantic value, we could alter condition 2 to say that the
idealized hearer has the properties the speaker justifiably takes the common ground to attribute to her
audience. The idea is that the speaker has “done enough” if she makes her intentions recognizable to an
idealized hearer who possesses the properties she justifiably thinks the common ground attributes to her
hearer. That she fails to make her intentions recognizable to an idealized hearer who possesses only the
properties the common ground in fact attributes to the hearer, when she justifiably thinks it attributes other
properties, as in this variant on Sudden blindness, does not mean that she has made any real error. So
perhaps she should not fail to secure a semantic value.
15
classic case of this in the literature is Kaplan’s famous Carnap/Agnew picture case.
Kaplan imagines that without turning around he points at a place on the wall behind him
that had been long occupied by a picture of Carnap. Unbeknownst to Kaplan, that picture
has been replaced by a picture of Spiro Agnew. As he is pointing, Kaplan says ‘That is a
picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.’. In such a case,
Kaplan appears to have at least two intentions, or at any rate it seems true to attribute two
intentions to him: he has the (de dicto) intention that the picture behind him be the
semantic value of his demonstrative and the (de re) intention that the picture of Carnap be
the semantic value of his demonstrative. Further, it appears that he has the former
intention because he has the latter intention and believes that the picture of Carnap is
behind him.11 For uniformity of representation let’s represent all such intentions as
intentions that the F be the semantic value of the demonstrative in question; in the de re
case where o is the object of the de re intention, we’ll let the F be the x: x=o. So in this
case, Kaplan has the (de re) intention that the F (the picture of Carnap) be the semantic
value of his demonstrative and the (de dicto) intention that the G (the picture behind him)
be the semantic value of his demonstrative, where the F  the G. It is in this sense that
his intuitions conflict. 12
It is worth noting that there at least two variants of Kaplan’s case here that are not
distinguished in the literature. In the first, which I think Kaplan intended, Kaplan’s
audience is not aware that there had been a picture of Carnap where there is now a picture
of Agnew. Let’s call this variant 1. In the second variant, Kaplan’s audience is aware of
the switch and, indeed, we can imagine it is common ground that there had long been a
11
This is noted by Reimer [1992]. I discuss this further below. See note 20.
I take this way of putting things from Speaks [2013]. I sharpen the notion of having conflicting
intentions below.
12
16
picture of Carnap hanging in the relevant spot. In this variant too, which we’ll call
variant 2, Kaplan will have the conflicting intentions that he had in variant 1.
Lest it be thought that these cases are so unusual, it is important to see that there
are much more ordinary cases of conflicting intentions. Suppose I form an intention to
say something about David Manley, whom I have met but don’t know very well (false,
but let it go) and whom I take to be at a conference I am attending. Looking across the
room, I spot Paul Elbourne, whom I take to be Manley. I say ‘He is smart.’ pointing at
Elbourne in broad daylight. It appears here that I have conflicting intentions: I intend the
x: x =Manley to be the semantic value of my demonstrative and I intend the x: x=o to be
the semantic value of my demonstrative, where o is the person I am currently perceiving
(=Elbourne). Obviously, the x: x=Manley  the x: x=o.
Perhaps there are other interestingly different cases of conflicting intentions, but I
shall stick to these cases and a couple more sketched below here.13 In what follows, I
consider two approaches the coordination account might take to these cases.
The first approach, which I endorsed in previous work, claims that in all cases of
conflicting intentions the speaker fails to secure a semantic value for her demonstrative
expression. The idea is that in cases of conflicting intentions, speakers have two
intentions in using demonstrative expressions that unbeknownst to them determine
Speaks [2013] considers the following case, which he takes to be a case of conflicting intentions: “We’re
at a carnival, and there’s a game where, for a fee, one can choose from among a large number of plastic
balls, one of which contains $100. The person running the game asks me which one I want and, pointing, I
say, “That ball.” I intend to refer to the ball at which I am pointing (say, ball #58), and of course also intend
to refer to the ball which contains $100. But it turns out that another ball — ball #113 — contains the cash.
Still, it is clear that the semantic value of my utterance of ‘that ball’ is ball #58.” Contrary to what Speaks
claims, I don’t think you intend to refer to the ball containing $100 any more than I can intend to win the
lottery in buying a lottery ticket. It seems to me that on the Bratman [1999] theory of intentions I invoke
below it won’t be true that you intend to refer to the ball containing $100, because the relevant
psychological state (hoping to refer to the ball containing $100?) won’t play the characteristic role played
by intentions in further planning and guiding actions. Hence, whatever other interest this case may have, I
don’t think this is a case of conflicting intentions.
13
17
different objects. But then we can’t unequivocally say which object the speaker intends
to be the semantic value of her demonstrative expression. This means that no object
uniquely satisfies condition 1 of the coordination account metasemantics: the speaker
intends that o be the semantic value of his use of the demonstrative expression. Put more
theoretically, on any theory that gives speaker intentions a large role in securing the
semantic value of a demonstrative expression, as the coordination account surely does,
two intentions that determine different objects in the way that they do in the present case
amounts to the case being one in which a significant mechanism for securing values of
demonstrative expressions has gone badly astray. When the two intentions don’t pull
together in having the same thing as their objects, it seems very natural to think that one
can’t say unequivocally what Kaplan intended to be the value of his demonstrative.14
This in turn suggests that in such a case, there is no one object that he intends to be the
value of his demonstrative. But then the first condition that an object must satisfy to be
the value of a demonstrative on the coordination account is not met by any object.
Call this the Bad Intentions version of the coordination account. Some people
think it is clear Bad Intentions can’t be right. They think it is just obvious that in the
Carnap/Agnew picture case (variant1), the picture of Agnew is the semantic value of the
demonstrative. Kaplan [1978] himself initially took this view, giving as his reason that
‘my speech and demonstration suggest no other natural interpretation to the linguistically
competent public observer.’15 That seems right, but it isn’t clear why the mere fact that
Kaplan is naturally interpreted by his audience as securing Agnew as the semantic value
14
Of course in some uses of demonstratives there will not be these two intentions. In some uses, e.g. I will
simply be perceiving something and intending that it be the value of my demonstrative as I utter ‘that’. So
here there can be no question of the two intentions determining different objects.
15
P. 396
18
of his demonstrative is by itself reason to think he has done so.16 Indeed, there is
evidence that the picture of Agnew is not the semantic value of the demonstrative in the
Carnap/Agnew case (variant 1). First, it would be odd in reporting the case to others
when apprised of all the facts to report Kaplan as having said that the picture of Agnew
was a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Surely, if that
is all that you say, the ascription seems infelicitous.17 But this is at least some reason for
thinking that Kaplan didn’t say that the picture of Agnew is a picture of one of the
greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. That Kaplan didn’t say this would be
explained on the hypothesis that he didn’t secure the picture of Agnew as the semantic
value of his demonstrative. Now as many have pointed out, the use of say ascriptions in
one context may not accurately track what was said in the context being reported. In
particular, suppose A utters S in context C. Suppose it seems true to report this in C’ by
saying ‘A said that S*’. It just doesn’t seem to follow that A in C asserted or said the
content of S* in C’. Say ascriptions just seem too lax.18 But the laxness of say ascriptions
doesn’t affect the point made here: for the relevant say ascription doesn’t seem true in
this case. So if anything, the laxness of say ascriptions strengthens the argument here.
Second, consider the use of agree ascriptions as employed by Cappelen and
Kaplan used the case originally to argue that it was the demonstration, not the “directing intention”, that
secured the semantic value of a demonstrative in context. He was trying to show that in cases where
demonstrated object and intended object diverge, it is the demonstrated object that is the semantic value.
Interestingly, Kaplan [1989] appears to retract his view that the Carnap/Agnew case shows this exactly
when he adopts the view that the directing intention determines the semantic value in context. In so doing,
he calls the Carnap/Agnew case ‘a rather complex, atypical case’ (p. 582 note 34)
17
Of course the ascription will seem felicitous to members of Kaplan’s audience who aren’t aware of the
switch. But not to those who are apprised of all the facts of the case, or so I have found.
18
Example: suppose not knowing who the mayor of New York is or even whether he/she is male or female,
but having somehow deduced that he/she is single, I say ‘The mayor of New York is unmarried.’ You meet
Mayor Bloomberg at a party and say to him ‘Jeff says that you are a bachelor.’ This seems true to most
people, but it is quite doubtful that I asserted that the mayor was a bachelor since I didn’t know he was
male. And, for example, had I been asked at the time, ‘Are you saying the mayor is a bachelor?’ I would
have demurred, not knowing the sex of the mayor.
16
19
Hawthorne [2009]. Suppose shortly after we experience Kaplan’s utterance, Harry, quite
ignorant and ill informed about philosophy, views the Agnew picture in excellent light
and recognizes it to be a picture of Agnew. Pointing at the picture, he says ‘That is a
picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.’ Knowing of
Kaplan’s earlier utterance and trying to say something about the relevant utterances of
Kaplan and Harry, someone present pointing at the Agnew picture says ‘So Kaplan and
Harry agree that that is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth
century.’ This hardly seems unproblematically true if uttered seriously. But then this
provides some evidence that Kaplan did not express the same content in uttering as he did
in his context as Harry expressed in uttering as he did in his. This, again, would be
explained by the claim that Kaplan did not secure the picture of Agnew as the semantic
value of his demonstrative expression in his context of utterance. In summary then,
contrary to what some have thought, the Bad Intentions version of the coordination
account’s treatment of cases of conflicting intentions is not obviously incorrect and has
some evidence in its favor.19
Remarks similar to those I’ve just made about the Carnap/Agnew picture case apply to the
Manley/Elbourne case. Here again it sounds infelicitous to those apprised of all the facts to say ‘Jeff said
that Elbourne was smart.’ Similarly, if shortly after I utter Manley points at Elbourne knowing him to be
Elbourne and says ‘He is smart.’ it would be odd to comment on our utterances by saying ‘King and
Manley agree that Elbourne is smart.’ John Hawthorne thought that if one uses a pronoun in the says report
it improves significantly at least in the Manley/Elbourne case. So suppose after I utter someone reports
what I said by pointing at Elbourne and saying ‘Jeff said that he is smart.’ I suspect Hawthorne is right
here (perhaps the same thing occurs in the agrees report as well, though this is less clear to me), but that
may have to do with the fact that it now sounds a bit like the person is parroting or imitating me by using
the very sentence I used demonstrating the same person. In any case, the fact that the original says report
sounds odd/infelicitous is enough to cast doubt on the claim that Elbourne was the semantic value of my
use of the demonstrative expression. That said, I find at least the says report in the Manley/Elbourne case a
bit better than the comparable report in the Carnap/Agnew picture case. Further, I find it more intuitively
plausible to say that I did secure Elbourne as the semantic value of my demonstrative expression than to
say that Kaplan secured the picture of Agnew as the semantic value of his. Indeed, cases of conflicting
intentions like the Manley/Elbourne case, which Francois Recanati first brought to my attention, got me
thinking about whether there was a version of the coordination account that would deliver the result that the
picture of Agnew was the semantic value of Kaplan’s demonstrative expression and Elbourne was the
19
20
Suppose, however, that we wanted to get the result that Kaplan did secure the
picture of Agnew as the semantic value of his demonstrative expression and similarly for
Elbourne in the Manley/Elbourne case. How might we go about this? Let’s begin by
rehearsing some of the features of the view of intentions that I favor: the view that
intentions are plans. Versions of the view have been articulated by Grosz and Sidner
[1986], Bratman [1990], Thomason [1990], Stone [2002] and many others. Here I will
hew most closely to Bratman’s view.20 The crucial feature of the view I want to focus on
is the claim that plans are formed out of hierarchically structured intentions, with plans
themselves being, as Bratman picturesquely puts it, intentions writ large. As such, in
what follows, I’ll use ‘plan’ and ‘intention’ interchangeably. The hierarchical nature of
plans is closely related to their at least initial partiality. To take an example, suppose I
intend to go to Los Angeles in June. My intention to go to LA is obviously a very partial
plan, as I have not yet settled on the means for going, exactly when I will go, etc. Hence,
at some point, I need to start filling in the details of my plan to go there. I need to fix a
time, decide on my length of stay, decide on the means to get there and so on. In this
way, more general intentions (go to LA in June) embed more specific ones (go to LA
from June 7 to June 21); and intended ends (go to LA in June) embed intended means (fly
there on Virgin America) and preliminary steps (look over flight schedules). The idea,
then, is that when one forms a general intention e.g. to go to LA in June, this will be the
input over time to means-ends reasoning and the formation of further intentions
concerning means and “preliminary steps”. Obviously, this means-ends reasoning and
semantic value of mine. As we’ll see in a moment, there is. Thanks to John Hawthorne for discussion of
these points.
20
In King [2013b] I noted in passing that I was sympathetic to Bratman’s view that intentions are plans and
understood the speaker intentions I was appealing to in this way. See note 23 of that work.
21
reasoning concerning preliminary steps will invoke beliefs about related matters (what
airlines at my local airport fly to LA, etc.).
Since the plans/intention I will consider in cases of conflicting intentions are quite
simple, with only this much of the view of intentions as plans on the tables, we can go
back and consider the Carnap/Agnew case variant 1. If we consider Kaplan’s plan in
securing a semantic value for his demonstrative, a toy version of it would seem to go
something like this. First, Kaplan forms the intention to say something about the picture
of Carnap. Then, engaging in means/ends reasoning, he forms the intention to use a
demonstrative expression to do so by making the picture of Carnap its semantic value in
context. His belief that because the picture is in the room he is in, he could reasonably
hope to secure it as the semantic value of a demonstrative will figure into this reasoning.
Again, engaging in means/ends reasoning in conjunction with the belief that the picture
of Carnap is behind him, Kaplan forms the intention to have the picture behind him be
the semantic value of his use of a demonstrative expression.21 He then utters ‘that’ with
this intention. Schematically, we can represent our toy version of Kaplan’s plan as
follows:
1. Int(say something about picture of Carnap) + Bel(can have picture of Carnap as
semantic value of demonstrative expression )—(means/ends reasoning)
2. Int(picture of Carnap be semantic value of use of demonstrative expression) + Bel
(picture of Carnap= picture behind me)---(means/ends reasoning)
3. Int(picture behind me be semantic value of use of demonstrative expression)
21
Earlier in discussing Bad Intentions, I said that Kaplan had the intention to have the picture behind him
be the semantic value of his demonstrative because he had the intention to have the picture of Carnap be
the semantic value of his demonstrative and believed the picture of Carnap was behind him. This further
cashes out the sense in which this is so. Kaplan forms the former intention because given his belief he sees
it as a means for executing the latter intention.
22
The intentions and beliefs involving the picture of Carnap are all de re. The intentions
and beliefs involving the picture behind Kaplan are all de dicto. Hence the belief in line
2 is de re with respect to the picture of Carnap and de dicto with respect to the picture
behind Kaplan. Now the crucial point is that the intention in line 3 is the one that
provides the means for executing the intentions in lines 1 and 2 (and the intention in line
2 provides what we might call the intermediate means for executing the intention in line
1). We might call the intention at line 1 the initiating intention and that at line 2 the
intermediate intention. Call the intention at line 3 the controlling intention. The thought
is that Kaplan utters ‘that’ with this intention controlling his use. After all, he has arrived
at this intention as the means for executing the others. Further, it seems clear that the
intention Kaplan is trying to get his audience to recognize in pointing behind him is in the
first instance the intention to have the picture behind him be the semantic value of his use
of the demonstrative. So the claim is that it is this intention, and this intention alone, that
is relevant to the satisfaction of conditions 1 & 2 in the coordination account
metasemantics. Given the hierarchical structure of the intentions on the present picture,
we have found a principled reason to single out the intention at line 3 as the unique
intention relevant to the satisfaction of conditions 1 and 2. Hence, the fact that the
intentions on e.g. lines 2 and 3 conflict is simply irrelevant to the question of whether
those conditions are satisfied.22
To implement this idea, we need to make some changes in the way we have
formulated the coordination account metasemantics. For that metasemantics assumed
that the intentions in question were all de re, whereas in the Carnap/Agnew case variant 1
we are now assuming the relevant intention of Kaplan’s is de dicto. So let’s define the
22
Relate this account of conflicting intentions to that of Speaks [2013].
23
object of an intention (of the relevant sort) as follows: the object of the (de re) intention
that o be the semantic value of a use of a demonstrative expression in context c is o; the
object of the (de dicto) intention that the F be the semantic value of a use of a
demonstrative expression in context c is the object o that is the unique F in c (if there
isn’t one, the intention has no object). We reformulate the coordination account
metasemantics as follows:
Coordination account metasemantics II
A speaker S’s use  of a demonstrative expression in context c has o as its semantic value
iff 1. o is the object of S’s controlling intention in using  in c; and 2. a competent,
reasonable, attentive hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation at the
time S utters , and who has the properties attributed to the audience by the common
ground at the time S utters  would know that o is the object of S’s controlling intention
in using  in c.
As indicated, this account predicts that the picture of Agnew is the semantic value of
Kaplan’s use of ‘that’ in variant 1 of the Carnap/Agnew case. Call this version of the
coordination account Best Laid Plans. I assume that we can make sense of the idea of a
controlling intention and its object in more normal cases as well, so that the above
metasemantics will apply to all uses of demonstrative expressions. The controlling
intention will always be the one that the speaker sees as her intended final means of
executing the other intentions to talk about an object and have it be the semantic value of
her use of a demonstrative expression in her plan for using the demonstrative expression
in question and the intention that she is trying to get her audience to recognize in using
24
the demonstrative.23
Turning to the Elbourne/Manley case, we can schematically represent my plan in
using ‘He’ as follows:
1. Int(say something about Manley) +Bel(Manley is at the conference I am at)—
(means/ends reasoning)
2. Int(Manley be the semantic value of use of demonstrative expression)+ Bel(object o
(=Elbourne) I am perceiving= Manley)—(means/ends reasoning)
3. Int(o be the semantic value of use of demonstrative expression)
Here the intention at line 3 is the controlling intention since it is the means to execute the
initiating intention at line 1 and the intermediate intention at line 2. The intentions at
lines 1-3 are all de re.24 So o (Elbourne) is the object of my controlling intention in using
‘He’ as I did and a competent, reasonable, attentive hearer who knows the common
ground of the conversation at the time I uttered ‘He’, and who has the properties
attributed to the audience by the common ground at the time I uttered ‘He’ would know
that o is the object of my controlling intention in using ‘He’. Hence, o (=Elbourne) is the
semantic value of my use of ‘He’. Here, the intention on line 2 conflicts with the
intention on line 3, since Manleyo
Finally, consider variant 2 of the Carnap/Agnew picture case. Here Kaplan’s
controlling intention is just the same as it was in variant 1, and so the picture of Agnew is
23
In the case of many straightforward uses of demonstrative expressions, the plan for using the expression
will be very simple and there will be little doubt which intention is the controlling intention. E.g. I am
walking down Amsterdam and see a street vendor who is usually located a block over. Forming the
intention to say something about him (and not knowing his name), I form the de re intention that he (=the
man I am perceiving) be the semantic value of my use of a demonstrative expression as I utter ‘He is
usually on Broadway.’ This latter is the controlling intention of my use.
24
Reimer [1992] considers a case that I would describe as one of conflicting intentions in which both the
initiating intention and the controlling intention are de re (pp. 391-93). However, Reimer thinks of cases of
what I would call conflicting intentions somewhat differently than I do.
25
again the object of his controlling intention associated with his use of ‘That’. Further,
again as in variant 1, a competent, reasonable, attentive hearer who knows the common
ground of the conversation at the time Kaplan utters ‘That’, and who has the properties
attributed to the audience by the common ground at the time Kaplan utters would know
that the picture of Agnew is the object of Kaplan’s controlling intention in using ‘That’.
Hence, just as in variant 1, in variant 2 the semantic value of Kaplan’s use of ‘That’ is the
picture of Agnew according to Best Laid Plans.
Interestingly, the difference in the common grounds in variants 1 and 2 does not
make for a difference in semantic value. However, that it was common ground in variant
2 that a picture of Carnap had long occupied the spot in question, and not so in variant 1,
does play a role in explaining how it is that in making his utterance Kaplan may have
conveyed to his audience the claim that the picture of Carnap is a picture of one of the
greatest philosophers of the twentieth century in variant 2, whereas no such thing will
have been conveyed in variant 1.
In the Carnap/Agnew case the initiating intention was de re and the controlling
intention was de dicto. In the Manley/Elbourne case both intentions were de re. It is
worth considering the other two possible cases of conflicting intentions of the sort under
consideration: initiating intention de dicto and controlling intention de re; and both
intentions de dicto. Taking the latter first, suppose I form the de dicto intention to say
something about the IT Director at my university, whom I have never met but take to be
hostile to my department. I am in a room where a meeting is about to start, I know he
will be attending and there are name cards with titles in front of each seat. I spot a man
sitting at a seat whose name card reads ‘IT Director’ but who is actually the Dean of
26
Humanities. Forming the belief that the man is the IT Director, I form the intention to
make him the value of my demonstrative expression. He gets up from his chair and as he
is walking across the room, I whisper to a colleague and point at the man saying ‘He is
hostile to our department’. We can schematically represent my plan as follows:
1. Int(say something about IT Director) + Bel(IT Director is in the room I am in)—
(means/ends reasoning)
2. Int(IT Director be the semantic value of use of demonstrative expression)+Bel (object
o I am perceiving = IT Director)---(means/ends reasoning)
3. Int(o be the semantic value of use of demonstrative expression)
o is the object of my controlling intention (line 3). So here, assuming that a competent,
reasonable, attentive hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation and who
has the properties attributed to the audience by the common ground would know that o is
the object of my controlling intention in using ‘He’, o is the semantic value of my
demonstrative expression. Again here, the intention at line 3 conflicts with that at line 2,
since o the IT Director.
For the final case, where initiating intention and controlling intention are both de
dicto, suppose as in the previous case, I form the de dicto intention to say something
about the IT Director. Again, I am at a meeting that is about to start and that I know he
will attend. I receive a text from a colleague who is outside the room but sees me inside
saying ‘IT Director standing right behind you!’ I believe the text and without turning
around, I point behind myself and say to my colleagues ‘He is hostile to our department.’
In fact, the Dean of Humanities is standing behind me. We can represent my plan as
follows:
27
1. Int(say something about IT Director) + Bel(IT Director is in the room I am in)—
(means ends reasoning)
2. Int (IT Director be semantic value of use of demonstrative expression) + Bel (IT
director = the person standing behind me)—(means/ends reasoning)
3. Int (the person standing behind me be semantic value of use of demonstrative
expression)
All intentions and beliefs here are de dicto. The object of my controlling intention (line
3) is the Dean of Humanities = o. Presumably, a competent, reasonable, attentive hearer
who knows the common ground of the conversation and who has the properties attributed
to the audience by the common ground would know that o is the object of my controlling
intention in using ‘He’. Hence o is the semantic value of my demonstrative expression
here. Again, the intentions at line 2 and 3 conflict, since the IT Director  o.
For those who are convinced that in the Carnap/Agnew case variant 1 Kaplan
secured the picture of Agnew as the semantic value of his demonstrative expression, Best
Laid Plans is the way to go. Though I agree that it gives intuitively pleasing results in
this case as well as others we considered, particularly the Manley/Elbourne case, I am
still not sure whether to prefer it over Bad Intentions in part due to the bits of evidence I
gave earlier against the claim that the picture of Agnew is the semantic value of Kaplan’s
demonstrative expression in variant 1 of the Carnap/Agnew case, which Best Laid Plans
of course endorses. Hence, I leave it as an open question which version of the
coordination account is to be preferred.
Having now discussed cases of conflicting intentions, it is worth clarifying what
we consider such cases to be. For all I have said to this point, cases of conflicting
28
intentions are cases in which it seems true to say that I intend the F to be the semantic
value of my use of a demonstrative expression and that I intend the G to be the semantic
value of my use of the demonstrative expression, where the F the G.25 But I actually
don’t think that is right. There will be some cases of a use of a demonstrative expression
by a speaker S, where it will seem true to say that S intended the F to the semantic value
of her demonstrative and that S intended the G to be the semantic value of her
demonstrative, where the F the G and yet I will not want to say that these are cases of
conflicting intentions. So it turns out that there are fewer cases of conflicting intentions
than one might have thought.
To see why this is so, suppose I am again attending a conference that Manley is
also attending. I am in the main conference room and believe Manley to be in the room
too. I intend to say something about Manley and then spot him. I now intend Manley,
the guy I am perceiving, to be the semantic value of a demonstrative expression.
Suppose further that I believe that Manley is the guy who punched me last night. Then I
think it will seem true to say that I intend (de dicto) the guy who punched me last night to
be the semantic value of the demonstrative expression in question, (note that if you ask
me whether I intend the guy who punched me last night to be the semantic value of my
demonstrative expression I will respond affirmatively). But now suppose that I was a bit
drunk last night and just got things wrong: Elbourne punched me. Then it seems true to
say that I intend (de re) the x: x=Manley to be the semantic value of my demonstrative
expression and to say that I intend (de dicto) the guy who punched me to be the semantic
I use the cautious formulation ‘it seems true to say…’ to avoid committing myself on the question of
whether the intention ascriptions in question really are true. This is essentially the account Speaks [2013]
gives of cases conflicting intentions. As I go on to indicate, I don’t think it is ultimately the correct
account.
25
29
value of my demonstrative, where the x : x=Manley  the guy who punched me last
night. But this need not be a case of conflicting intentions the way I understand the term.
For suppose my plan in using my demonstrative looks like this:
1. Int(say something about Manley) + Bel(Manley is in the same room as me)—(means/
ends reasoning)
2. Int(Manley be the semantic value of use of demonstrative expression)+Bel(object o I
am perceiving =Manley)—(means/ends reasoning)
3. Int(object o I am perceiving be semantic value of use of demonstrative expression)
As I’ve said, I think in such a case it seems true to say that I intend the guy who punched
me last night to be the semantic value of my demonstrative. However, this purported
intention played no role in my plan in using the demonstrative in question. Hence, when
you look at my plan for using the demonstrative expression in question, there just aren’t
any intentions that conflict. The intentions at lines 2 and 3 don’t conflict, since the object
o I am perceiving =Manley. I want to reserve the term case of conflicting intentions for
cases in which the plan for using the demonstrative expression does have intentions that
conflict, as was true in all the case of conflicting intentions previously considered. After
all, for a case to be a case of conflicting intentions regarding the use of a demonstrative
expression, we should want the intentions that conflict to be in some sense associated
with a single use of such an expression. Best Laid Plans suggests that the way to make
sense of two conflicting intentions being associated with the use of a demonstrative
expression is that the conflicting intentions must both be part of the plan for using the
demonstrative expression in question. Hence, the above case will not be a case of
conflicting intentions as we are understanding the term.
30
This is also the conclusion we reach when we think of things through the lens of
the Bad Intentions approach while maintaining the view that speaker intentions are plans
of the sorts I’ve been describing. Recall that Bad Intentions claimed that when speaker
intentions qua (part of the) mechanism for securing the semantic value for a
demonstrative expression are such that two of them have different objects, (part of) the
mechanism for securing a semantic value for the demonstrative expression has badly
misfired. That is the motivation for denying that any semantic value was secured in such
cases. But for speaker intentions to really be part of the mechanism for securing a
semantic value for a demonstrative expression, they had better be parts of the plan for
using the demonstrative expression in question. So again, we get the result that the cases
we are interested in are cases where two intentions that are both part of the plan for using
a demonstrative conflict. Hence, again, these are what we should call cases of conflicting
intentions.26
In conclusion, I have a formulated a detailed version of the coordination account
that I first outlined in King [2013a]. I have tried to motivate its various features by
means of showing how it handles a number of cases involving the use of demonstrative
expressions. Finally, I discussed two versions of the account that handle cases of
conflicting intentions differently. Let me close by reminding the reader that I take the
coordination account to apply to all supplementives, and not just the demonstrative
In note 12 I suggested that Speaks’ example of trying to pick out a ball containing $100 was not a case of
conflicting intentions because you do not intend to refer to the ball containing $100. I think the present
considerations may also tell against the view that Speaks’ case is a case of conflicting intentions. For even
if you could intend to refer to the ball containing $100, it seems to me doubtful that this intention would
figure in your plan for using the demonstrative ‘That ball.’ But then this intention would not be part of the
same plan in using ‘That ball as the intention to refer to ball #58 (the ball I am focused on). So the plan for
using ‘That ball’ would not contain intentions that conflict.
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expressions that I restricted myself to in the present work.27 28
References
Bratman, Michael, 1990, Intentions, Plans and Practical Reasons, CSLI Publications
Cappelen, H. and John Hawthorne, 2009, Relativism and Monadic Truth, Oxford
University Press, Oxford
Glanzberg, Michael, 2013, ‘Not All Contextual Parameters Are Alike’, unpublished ms.
Grosz, B. and Candace Sidner, 1986, ‘Attentions, Intentions and the Structure of
Discourse’, Computational Linguistics 12(3): 175-204.
Kaplan, David, 1978,‘Dthat’, in Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of
Language, French Uehling, Wettstein eds., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
Kaplan, David, 1989, Afterthoughts, in Themes from Kaplan, Almog, Perry, Wettstein
eds., Oxford University Press, New York
King, Jeffrey C., 2001, Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account, MIT Press
King, Jeffrey C., 2013a, ‘Speaker Intentions in Context’, forthcoming in Nous
King, Jeffrey C., 2013b, ‘The Metasemantics of Contextual Sensitivity’, forthcoming in
New Essays in Metasemantics, A. Burgess and B. Sherman eds.
Reimer, Marga, 1992, ‘Three Views of Demonstrative Reference’, Synthese 93:3, 373402
Speaks, Jeff, 2013, ‘Speaker and hearer in the character of demonstratives’, unpublished
ms.
Stalnaker, Robert, 2002, ‘Common Ground’, Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 701–721.
Stone, Matthew, 2004, ‘Communicative Intentions and Conversational Processes in
Human-Human and Human-Computer Dialogue’ in Approaches to Studying WorldSituated Language Use, John Trueswell and Michael Tanenhaus, eds, MIT Press
Thomason, Richmond, 1990, ‘Accommodation, Meaning and Implicature:
Interdisciplinary Foundations for Pragmatics’ in Intentions in Communication, Cohen,
Morgan, Pollack eds., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
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As argued in King [2013b].
Thanks to Josh Armstrong, Kelsey Laity-D’Agostino, Annie Papreck King and Jeff Speaks for helpful
discussion. A version of this paper was presented in March 2013 at the Workshop on Reference at Ohio
State University. I thank the audience for helpful discussion and comments.
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