Conceptual Design for a Severe Accident Heat Removal System in a Pressurized Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plant by Daniel C. Flahive An Engineering Project Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Fulfillment of the Requirements of the degree of MASTER OF ENGINEERING IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING Approved: _ Ernesto Gutierrez-Miravete, Project Adviser Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Hartford, Connecticut May, 2015 © Copyright 2015 by Daniel C. Flahive All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT In response to the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi site in March of 201l, nuclear power plants around the world have been asked to address the potential for an event outside of the plants design basis. These scenarios include other external hazards such as flooding, seismic, terrorist attack. In all the postulated events the site needs coping strategies to protect the plant without the normally relied on safety equipment. This report proposes a new system that can be put in place to remove heat from the containment in a severe accident condition. In the event of fuel and reactor vessel failure, the last line of defense is the containment building. This system can remove heat from containment and maintain the pressure within the containment design limits. This report does present a conceptual design for this system. The design would need to be altered (i.e. pump size, heat exchanger size) but the general concept could be implemented in an existing PWR plant. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. iv LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ iv LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... v SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS LIST ............................................................................. vi 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 2. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 2 2.1 Fukushima Event ................................................................................................ 2 2.2 INPO Lessons Learned ...................................................................................... 3 2.3 PWR Postulated Event ....................................................................................... 5 2.4 Molten Core Concrete Interaction ...................................................................... 8 2.5 Flooding to Cool Corium ................................................................................. 10 2.6 Concern with Hydrogen ................................................................................... 16 2.7 System Design .................................................................................................. 17 3. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................... 18 4. GROUNDRULES...................................................................................................... 19 5. EVENT PROGRESSION .......................................................................................... 20 6. CONCEPTUAL LAYOUT ....................................................................................... 22 7. EQUIPMENT ............................................................................................................ 25 7.1 Pumps ............................................................................................................... 27 7.2 Valves............................................................................................................... 27 7.3 Heat Exchanger ................................................................................................ 28 7.4 Piping ............................................................................................................... 28 8. FUNCTIONS ............................................................................................................. 30 8.1 System Standby/Containment Isolation ........................................................... 30 8.2 Containment Flooding...................................................................................... 31 iv 8.3 Containment Sump Cooling ............................................................................. 31 8.4 Electrical System .............................................................................................. 31 9. HEAT TRANSFER ................................................................................................... 33 10. HEAT EXCHANGER SIZING ................................................................................. 35 11. HYDRALIC MODEL ............................................................................................... 37 11.1 Flooding Case .................................................................................................. 38 11.2 Cooling Case .................................................................................................... 39 12. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 41 13. REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 42 APPENDIX A – FATHOM CODE FILES ..................................................................... 43 A.1 Flooding Case .................................................................................................. 43 A.2 Cooling Case .................................................................................................... 52 v LIST OF TABLES Table Page Table 1 Valve List 28 Table 2 Fluid Properties 33 Table 3 Heat Transfer Calculation 34 Table 4 Heat Exchanger Sizing 35 Table 5 Heat Exchanger Parameters 36 Table 7 Hydraulic Model Junctions 38 Table 8 Hydraulic Model Piping 38 Table 9 Cooling Case Performance 40 iv LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page Figure 1 Melted Corium in Concrete 9 Figure 2 Predicted Ablation from MCCI – Dry Cavity 12 Figure 3 Predicted Ablation from MCCI – Flooded Cavity 13 Figure 4 Reactor Vessel Location in Containment 22 Figure 5 Containment Sump/Pool Cooling System Configuration 24 Figure 6 Pipe and Instruments Diagram – System Standby 25 Figure 7 Pipe and Instruments Diagram – Containment Flood 26 Figure 8 Pipe and Instruments Diagram – Containment Cooling 26 Figure 9 Hydraulic Model 37 Figure 10 Flooding Case Model 39 Figure 11 Cooling Case Model 40 v SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS LIST Symbol/ Meaning Abbreviation A AC Area m² Alternate Current ANS American Nuclear Society BOP Balance of Plant CFR Code of Federal Regulation Cp Heat Capacity dP Pressure Differential EDG HX kJ/kg-K Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operation LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident ṁ Mass Flowrate kg/s MCCI Molten Core Concrete Interaction MWe Megawatt Electric MWt Megawatt Thermal NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PWR Pressurized Water Reactor q RCS SAMG SG Units heat transfer kW Reactor Coolant System Severe Accident Management Guidelines Steam Generator T Temperature °C, °F U Heat Transfer Coefficient υ Specific Volume kW/m²-K lbm/m³ vi 1. INTRODUCTION In March 2011 the Fukushima Daiichi experienced a loss of all site backup AC power following an earthquake and seismic induced tsunami at the site. The site is designed to withstand expected external events however this event was beyond the design bases of the plant. Both the earthquake and tsunami exceeded what the site was designed to. Globally nuclear power plants are now assessing their capability to cope with events beyond the design basis of the plant similar to the event at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Regulators are requiring that sites evaluate their existing design basis and develop coping strategies without relying on currently installed safety equipment. In some extreme cases, regulators are asking sites to rely on no existing equipment or piping outside of containment. This project will develop a system that can remove decay heat from the reactor within containment. The only interaction would be a water supply to remove the heat from containment (i.e. river or ocean). No existing pumps or heat exchangers would be credited. The challenge of this design will be minimizing the system design as space is typically limited. The Fukushima nuclear accident was initiated by the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 and the ensuing tsunami. There were 11 operating reactors and 3 shutdown reactors across 4 sites in the region affected by the tsunami. The operating reactors (Units 1, 2 and 3) shutdown following the earthquake, as designed. earthquake registered at 9.0 and exceeded the plant design based. The Investigations following the event suggest that the plant survived the earthquake with no appreciable damage and no loss of function to the plant safety systems (Reference 1). 1 2. BACKGROUND 2.1 Fukushima Event The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant included six boiling water reactors (BWRs). On March 11th, 2011 Units 1, 2, and 3 were operating at full power and units 4, 5, and 6 were shutdown for refueling when a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred 112 miles (180 kilometers) off Japan’s east coast. The three operating units automatically scrammed on seismic reactor protection system trips. The earthquake caused damage to the offsite electric distribution to the site and lead to a loss of offsite power event. The available emergency diesel generators automatically started as designed and began to supply AC power to emergency systems at all units. Three minutes after the earthquake, the Japan Meteorological Association issued a major tsunami warning, indicating the potential for a tsunami at least 3 meters high. Workers were notified of the warning, and operators were instructed to report to the control rooms while non-essential personnel were evacuated to higher ground. Forty-one minutes after the earthquake, the first of a series of seven tsunamis arrived at the site. The maximum tsunami height impacting the site was estimated to be 14 to 15 meters, exceeding the site design basis tsunami height of 18.7 feet (6.1 meters) and site grade levels at units 1, 2, 3 and 4, 32.8 feet (10 meters). The tsunami flooded the emergency diesel generators and switchgear rooms for units 1 through 5. The seawater intake structure which serves as the ultimate heat sink for the site was severely damaged and was rendered nonfunctional. All DC power was lost on units 1, 2, and 4, while some DC power from batteries remained available on Unit 3 because some of those battery banks were not flooded. One air-cooled emergency diesel generator continued to function and supplied electrical power to Unit 6, and later to Unit 5, to maintain cooling to the reactors and spent fuel pools. The loss of AC power to units 1 through 4 meant the systems designed to remain decay heat when the units shutdown (either planned for an outage (Units 4, 5 and 6) or in response to an event (Units 1, 2 and 3). 2 With no core cooling to remove decay heat, core damage began on Unit 1 on the day of the event. Steam-driven injection pumps were used to provide cooling water to the reactors on units 2 and 3, but these pumps eventually stopped working. As a result of inadequate core cooling, fuel damage also occurred in units 2 and 3. After debris caused by the tsunami was removed, fire engines were moved into position and connected to plant systems to restore water injection. Connection points had been installed previously to support fire protection procedures, but the plant staff had difficulty locating them initially because of the debris and because drawings had not been updated to show their locations. During the event, containment pressure remained high for an extended time, contributing to hydrogen leakage from the primary containment vessel and inhibiting injection of water to the reactors using low-pressure sources. It is believed that hydrogen generated from the damaged fuel in the reactors accumulated in the reactor buildings either during venting operations or from other leaks and ignited, producing explosions in the Unit 1 and Unit 3 reactor buildings and significantly complicating the response. The hydrogen generated in Unit 3 likely migrated into the Unit 4 reactor building, resulting in a subsequent explosion and damage. The loss of primary and secondary containment integrity resulted in ground-level releases of radioactive material. Following the explosion in Unit 4 and the abnormal indications on Unit 2 on the fourth day of the event, the site superintendent directed that all nonessential personnel temporarily evacuate for their safety, leaving approximately 70 people on site to manage the event. 2.2 INPO Lessons Learned The Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) is an organization the sets industry performance objectives and guidance to promote safety, reliability and promote excellence in the operation of nuclear power plants in the US. The organization was formed in response to the accident at Three Mile Island. 3 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) requested INPO (along with the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) to conduct an independent review of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of the review was to identify and share operational and organizational lessons with the nuclear industry. From INPO Report, “Lessons Learned from the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.” (Reference 2): The following positive elements were critical to TEPCO’s response during the event: The seismically isolated emergency response centers at the Fukushima Daiichi and Daini nuclear power stations filled a vital need in protecting emergency response personnel and ensuring access to the site could be maintained during the accident. Emergency response personnel took innovative and resourceful actions to reestablish critical safety functions and plant monitoring capability. Actions to restore power and heat removal capability at the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station were particularly noteworthy. The response of TEPCO employees during and following the event reflected high levels of professionalism, courage, dedication, and personal ownership. The following are considered the most significant operational lessons from the event: When periodic reviews or new information indicates the potential for conditions that could significantly reduce safety margins or exceed current design assumptions, a timely, formal, and comprehensive assessment of the potential for substantial consequences should be conducted. An independent, cross-functional safety review with a plant walkdown should be considered to fully understand the nuclear safety implications. If the consequences could include the potential for common-mode failures of important safety systems, compensatory actions or countermeasures must be established without delay. Emergency and accident response strategies and implementing actions must give highest priority to maintaining core cooling. Emergency response centers must maintain continuous awareness of the status of core cooling; changes to the method of core cooling must be made deliberately and with a clear strategy to establish an alternate cooling method; and, when there is reason to question the quality or validity of core cooling information, deliberate actions must be taken immediately to ensure a method of cooling is established. Plans must address the immediate emergency response needs for human resources, equipment, and facilities in the first few hours of an event, as well as the need for a long-duration response capability. In addition, plans should 4 address how to engage the domestic and international nuclear industry to obtain needed support and assistance during an event. Training and periodic drills must be sufficiently challenging and realistic to prepare operating crews and emergency response personnel to cope with and respond to situations that may occur during a multi-unit nuclear accident, including a nuclear accident resulting from a natural disaster. Because the specific sequence of initiation events for beyond-design-basis events is unknown, emergency response strategies must be robust and provide multiple methods to establish and maintain critical safety functions using a defense-indepth approach. Optimum accident management strategies and associated implementing procedures (such as emergency operating procedures and accident management guidelines) should be developed through communications, engagement, and exchange of information among nuclear power plant operating organizations and reactor vendors. Decisions to deviate from these strategies and procedures should be made only after rigorous technical and independent safety reviews that consider the basis of the original standard and potential unintended consequences. Emergency response strategies for extreme external events should consider the traumatic human impact of such events on individual responders and leaders and provide for appropriate training, assistance, and contingency plans. Nuclear operating organizations should consider the safety culture implications of the Fukushima Daiichi event, focusing on strengthening the application of safety culture principles associated with questioning attitude, decision-making, the special and unique aspects of the nuclear technology, and organizational learning. The system designed in this report will focus on addressing the second bullet of the operational lessons from the event, designing a system focused on the highest priority of maintaining core cooling. More specifically establishing an alternate cooling method if the accident degrades to a severe accident with reactor vessel failure. 2.3 PWR Postulated Event The Fukushima nuclear power plant units were BWR design while the focus of the system designed within this report are for a PWR design. The PWR design still is susceptible to external events and could have led to a severe accident if exposed to similar environment conditions that occurred at Fukushima on March 11, 2011. 5 There is a lot of uncertainty of the progression of a severe accident and no perfect event timeline could be developed that would encompass all PWR designs. The description he is a general progression of events for a PWR if the site were to experience a loss of all AC power (off-site and onsite emergency power) similar to happened at Fukushima. When the event initiates the reactor is expected to scram as normally designed. This is an automatic response by the plant due to a number of different events (e.g. seismic event, loss of offsite power). In a pressurized water reactor (PWR) control rods will remain above the nuclear fuel during power operation. They are held in place by powered drive mechanisms designed to release on a variety of signals, operator action or in the case of a loss of power. The control rod drive mechanisms are powered to hold the rods in place and on a loss of power release. On a loss of power the control rods rely only on gravity to insert them into the core and shutdown the reactor. They are composed of a material (typically boron) that will quickly add negative reactivity to the reactor. At this point the reactor is shutdown however the principle decay heat from the reactor remains and needs to be managed. These control rods rapidly introduce negative reactivity and the critical reaction is shutdown in a fraction of a second. In the two most significant accidents at light water reactors (Fukushima & Three Mile Island) the reactors effectively shutdown as designed. The accident eventually developed because the residual decay heat could not be managed. The PWR control rods drop into the core halting the chain reaction. Within a few seconds of scramming the reactor decay heat of the core is less than 1% of the normal operation heat load. 1% of the normal operating heat load still represents a significant amount of heat. In this report, considering a nominal reactor size, 1% is 30 MWt. After the initial drop in reactor power, decay heat in the reactor drops at a much lower rate. Without backup AC power onsite the auxiliary feedwater system will refill the SGs. The auxiliary feedwater system typically consists of two pumps, one AC motor driven and the other steam driven. Given the loss of site AC power, the motor driven pump would be unavailable. The steam turbine driven pump is supplied steam from the steam 6 generators to drive the pump. The initial heat removal mechanism for the reactor is to boil water in the steam generators and release the steam to the atmosphere. This steam in separated from the reactor coolant and therefore does not release radiation to the atmosphere, only steam. A portion of the steam produced by the steam generator is diverted to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Controls on this system are battery powered in most plants so in the event of a loss of offsite power and the emergency diesel generators (EDS) the system can still operate. The pump runs on a steam supply and controls for this system rely on backup batteries. This system will temporarily remove heat from the RCS. Most plants have sufficient battery power for several hours before needing to be recharged by the EDGs onsite. In the case of Fukushima the all except one of the site EDG were flooded by the tsunami. Assuming that SG cooling is lost, the water in the SGs would continue to boil and its level would decrease. Eventually the SG will boil dry and the steam generators will cease to remove heat from the RCS. Without SG heat removal temperature and pressure will increase in the RCS. The pressure relief valves for the reactor will lift and water volume in the RCS will boil away. The water volume in the reactor will eventually drop and the fuel rods will become uncovered. Without water over the fuel it will over heat and begin to melt. Once the reactor is completely dry and the fuel has melted in the bottom of the reactor the fuel could melt through the bottom of the reactor and present the ex-vessel core severe accident the system proposed in this document is designed to address. The molten core will mix with the metal mass of the fuel assemblies and reactor internal structures and form a molten substance referred to as corium. The corium could continue to melt through the reactor vessel and breach the reactor vessel, falling to the floor of the reactor vessel cavity. When the core is ex-vessel many plant have strategies to flood containment to cover the melted core. Flooding the core provides several benefits: Cooling of the molten core 7 Mitigate interaction with the concrete Provide some amount of radiative scrubbing The system proposed in this document will be capable of flooding the containment if necessary. Some plants may accomplish this function with current installed systems and procedures. If not, the first function of the system will be to flood the containment vessel and cover the molten core. The external pump will be used to deliver water into containment. The same piping used to deliver to the heat exchanger will be used and a motor operated valve inside containment will be used. 2.4 Molten Core Concrete Interaction In the most severe of severe accidents, the nuclear fuel in the reactor would melt and the molten core or corium can melt through the reactor vessel and fall to the reactor cavity floor. On the concrete floor of containment the core will begin to melt through the concrete floor. This process is known as Molten Core Concrete Interaction (MCCI). Within the concrete floor of containment is a steel liner which is the containment pressure boundary. If sufficient concrete melt occurs and the steel liner is met by the corium, the containment boundary would be breached. The core of a nuclear reactor consists of uranium dioxide in the fuel, zirconium in the fuel rod cladding and carbon steel and stainless steel in other structures. At high temperatures zirconium is oxidized by water vapor, so the main constituents of core melt, or corium, are UO2, ZrO2, Zr, Fe, Cr and Ni. The melting point of the pure oxides is around 2700°C, while the metals melt at 1350-1900 °C. Mixtures of different species do not have single melting points. Instead, they change from solid to liquid over a range of temperatures, between so-called solidus and liquidus temperatures. The density of corium is around 6000-7000 kg/m3. (Reference 3) 8 Figure 1 Melted Corium in Concrete (Reference 3) The molten core, concrete interaction (MCCI) is illustrated in Figure 1. The solid concrete and the molten corium pool may be separated by a thin layer of partly molten concrete. The concrete melt will travel upwards because it is less dense than the overlying core melt. The melting core will produce gas bubbles to rise around and through the corium. The bubbles will be highly radioactive, non-condensable gasses. Mitigation of MCCI will not only protect the integrity of the containment boundary, it will reduce the release of these gases from the concrete and improve the coping capability of the plant with the event. The oxides in corium and concrete are miscible with each other, but the metallic species are immiscible with the oxides. Because the metals are lighter than the corium oxides, a metallic layer can form on the surface of the corium pool. When concrete oxides are added to the melt, its density decreases eventually below the density of the metals. After this, the metallic layer may relocate to the bottom of the pool. On the other hand, intense stirring of the pool by the rising gas bubbles may cause the metals and the oxides to be mixed with each other. (Reference 5) The melting of the concrete is limited by the heat transfer from the corium to the concrete. The thermal conductivity of the concrete is very low and therefore a lot of heat 9 goes into heating and melting the concrete. While melting of concrete is not desirable in a severe accident, the process does remove substantial heat from the corium. Upon vessel failure, there may be jet of corium leak through the failure region of the vessel. Some initial erosion of the concrete may take place in the region of contact on the concrete floor. This initial erosion will likely last only a short time period before is crusts over preventing further ablation of the concrete. Significant concrete melt would not be likely until the pool of corium has collected on the concrete floor. However, the rapid initial impingement heat transfer may initiate a sustained concrete spalling. Spalling means that cracks form in the concrete and break off into pieces instead of simply melting the concrete. The cracks could for from rapid evaporation of water within the concrete. Pieces of the cracked concrete could float to the surface of the corium. These pieces could melt more rapidly and further spalling could occur in the concrete below the pieces that had cracked and broken free of the floor. This process could continue and become self-sustaining more rapidly ablating the concrete. Heat is also transferred from the ex-vessel corium pool to the fluid above the material (air or water in a flooded cavity) by thermal radiation and convection. Without action to flood the reactor vessel cavity, usually there is air above the pool surface. Cooling by air is limited compared to the presence of water. 2.5 Flooding to Cool Corium The system designed within the report will utilize the cooling of water over the pool of corium. Once the core is flooded, natural circulation will carry hot water surrounding the corium up, transferring heat to the entire water volume of the flooded containment. To aid in the function of this system, the piping of the system designed within this report can support discharging cooled water to various location in the flooded lower containment. The necessity for this feature and the specific pipe routing would be addressed on a plant by plant basis. 10 The rate of concrete ablation is limited by the heat transfer from the melt to concrete. If sufficient cooling can be provided by water in lower containment ablation of the concrete could be halted. If concrete ablation can be halted and continuous heat removal from containment can be sustained, containment integrity should be maintained. The impact of flooding the reactor cavity on MCCI has been analyzed and results have shown its effectiveness. Even in the cases where there is no flooding of the corium in the reactor cavity, the ablation of the concrete is expected to halt prior to breaching the containment vessel. Figure 2 shows the concrete ablation approximately 160 cm in depth into the concrete. This result is dependent on the corium mass and the geometry of the reactor vessel cavity but uses the limiting (smaller) diameter cavity of the cases analyzed in Reference 5. Therefore while less ablation of the concrete would be preferred, it is not expected the corium would melt through the concrete floor of lower containment and breach the containment vessel liner. The ablation of the concrete will introduce gases into containment that could be just as significant to the breaching of containment as containment pressure increases and a potential combustion of the gases could challenge containment integrity as well. The melting and oxidation of fuel cladding and other structural materials in the reactor will produce hydrogen. Following the vessel breach, MCCI will generate hydrogen and carbon monoxide be released into the containment atmosphere. If sufficient concentrations of these gases collect in containment, relative to the proportion of steam and oxygen are present the containment atmosphere will become flammable. If a weak ignition source exists, such as a spark from electrical equipment, combustion of these flammable gases will begin. Depending on the concentration of flammable gases, highspeed flames could occur and possible lead to an explosion. The dynamic loads from an explosion could induce loads on the containment structure leading to failure and therefore a breach of the containment. 11 The secondary containment failure at Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 3, and 4 were due to a distinct hydrogen ignition events. Mitigation strategies have been developed by nuclear power plants to control the concentration of such gases by intentionally igniting the gasses if the concentration of gases is flammable but not explosive. In some PWR designs, igniters are permanently installed inside the containment vessel and powered to provide an ignition source. This actions mitigates the risk of such gases reaching explosive levels. To limit the MCCI and volume of combustible gases in containment, the reactor cavity flooding effectiveness is shown in Figure 3. The system designed within this report will be capable of flooding the reactor cavity within the one day specified in the worst case for Figure 3 or sooner. The required flooding time would be dependent on the availability of the portable pump and site operators. To provide the most effective coping capability for the system equipment could be staged at the first signal there could be in issue. The action to flood the reactor vessel cavity could be initiated at the first sign of fuel damage. If these two steps are taken, the reactor vessel core should be flooded prior to a reactor vessel breach. In that case the MCCI concrete ablation could even improve on the results in Figure 3 for the flooding after 10 seconds case. Figure 2 Predicted Ablation from MCCI – Dry Cavity (Reference 5) 12 Figure 3 Predicted Ablation from MCCI – Flooded Cavity (Reference 5) Flooding the ex-vessel corium provides several benefits to mitigate MCCI. First, flooding will provides a cooling mechanism. A pool in lower containment will absorb the decay heat from the corium up to the point where boiling occurs. Once the pool begins to boil it will continue to remove heat from the corium however the quantity of available water will decrease. Boiling will also increase the pressure in containment so this would not be a sustainable heat removal mechanism. Removing the heat from the pool is the only mechanism to continuously remove the heat from the corium. The system designed within this document will be capable of this function. Flooding the ex-vessel corium also limits the release of gases and radiation from the fuel and concrete interaction. The corium interaction with concrete will produce gasses as previously discussed in this report. If the gasses are generated beneath a sufficient level of water in the reactor cavity, rather than being released into the containment atmosphere, they will be absorbed by the water. If these gases, which are flammable and 13 in a large concentration, explosive, are retained within the water volume, the potential for an explosive atmosphere in containment will not develop. 2.5.1 Uncertainty in Response to Flooding the Reactor Cavity There is potentially and significant phenomenological uncertainty for the action of flooding the reactor cavity. The amount and rate of steam production when the corium beaches the reactor vessel and initially interacts with the water outside of the vessel is difficult to predict. The timing of when water is added to the reactor vessel cavity, when reactor vessel failure occurs, and the rate at which the corium exits the reactor vessel will influence the steam generation. The following three conditions can: Molten core debris is discharged into water Water is sprayed on the upper surface of the molten pool Water is added to solidified debris The rate of steam generation will directly influence the containment pressure response. Rapid steam generator would be much greater if the reactor vessel failure occurs after the reactor cavity has been flooded than is it is added following vessel failure and corium discharge onto the concrete floor. The containment’s pressure response on the containment shell integrity would depend on the containment conditions (i.e. pressure, temperature) at the time of the steam generation. Even in the case where the corium discharges into the already flooded reactor vessel cavity, the pressurization rate is much less than the containment design-basis, a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). In a large break LOCA, the RCS is assumed to have a large RCS diameter pipe (diameter 30 inches to 42 inches) break at normal operating temperature and pressure. In this accident a greater amount of steam is released into containment than the conditions for the accident being considered in this report. Provided the containment pressure can be maintained near normal operating conditions prior to the reactor vessel failure, the containment pressure response would not threaten the containment. However, if the containment pressure was elevated (due to hydrogen burns, MCCI, and so on), or the containment heat removal systems were not operable, or 14 the pressure suppression function is not available, the pressurization due to steam generation might challenge containment integrity. In this case it would be important that the system designed within in the report would be available by this time to begin removing heat from containment. Another concern in a nuclear accident after the reactor has shutdown is for the core to return to re-criticality. The design of the fuel is specifically configured to provide a core geometry that can go critical in the right operational conditions. The amount of fuel and spacing of the fuel in the fuel assemblies are needed in order for a critical reaction to occur. Once the core debris has deformed (melted) and relocated to the bottom of the reactor vessel and even more so, relocation external to the reactor vessel, there is an extremely low probability of re-criticality occurring. The response and recovery of the corium in this event is also an uncertainty. Once the core has been badly damaged the geometry of the fuel would be significantly different than the fuel pin arrangement of the designed fuel assembly. The change in geometry will likely be less favorable to cooling than the pre-damaged fuel assembly. In the case of the Three Mile Island accident, after losing level and uncovering the fuel inside the reactor, the core was re-flooded approximately 200 minutes into the accident. Despite be re-flooded portions of the molten core did not solidify immediately and remained in a molten state and drop in the lower plenum of the reactor vessel approximately 30 minutes after re-flooding of the core. This example from Three Mile Island occurred with the core remaining in the reactor vessel and core debris was consolidated in a limited volume. In an ex-vessel event, which is the basis for the system designed in this report, the core debris will have move area to disperse in the reactor vessel cavity and corium geometry would likely improve from a coolability standpoint. 2.5.2 External Vessel Cooling without Reactor Vessel Failure If the action is taken to flood the reactor vessel cavity prior to reactor vessel failure, the vessel will be surrounded by water which could provide some cooling before the vessel fails. The amount of cooling would vary between different plant designs dependent on the configuration of insulation on the reactor vessel. If there is sufficient cooling it is 15 possible that the reactor vessel integrity could be preserved the though damaged, the core would remain within the reactor vessel. While the core remains in its design location even when fuel damage begins, cooling through the reactor vessel from flooding will be limited. The fuel will be separated from the reactor vessel wall and the only effective way to cool the core in this location is to provide water directly to the RCS. As the event progresses, the molten core will fall to the bottom of the reactor vessel. The core material, once relocated to the lower plenum region, flooding the reactor cavity can removed a significant fraction if not all of the decay heat. In contact with the metal of the reactor vessel, conduction through the vessel can remove heat from the molten core. The system designed in this report could function by removing heat while the molten core remains in the reactor vessel. In this case, instead of directly removing heat from the corium in the reactor vessel cavity, the heat conducted from the reactor vessel would heat the flooded lower containment and the system would function otherwise as designed. 2.6 Concern with Hydrogen The build-up of hydrogen in containment is known concern during a severe accident. Hydrogen is generated first, in the melting of the fuel, and second, in an ex-vessel severe accident, through MCCI. In a PWR design hydrogen would be released into the containment atmosphere. The light gases such as hydrogen have a tendency to stratify and collect at local high points such as ventilation ducts or under ceilings at various levels in containment. The stratification and local buildup of hydrogen and other gases could reach flammable or explosive concentrations. In addition to hydrogen, carbon monoxide gas is generated during MCCI. Unlike hydrogen, carbon monoxide has approximately the same density as steam and is less susceptible to stratification. The system designed in this report will not specifically address the hydrogen, carbon monoxide or other combustible gasses generated in containment during a severe 16 accident. Nuclear power plants have existing systems (e.g. igniters) to address the buildup of hydrogen inside containment. This system will however provide two benefits related to hydrogen in containment. First, the mitigation of MCCI will reduce the total volume of gases generated. Second, the flooded level in containment will retain some of the gases generated during MCCI. 2.7 System Design The system designed within the report will used the flooding method to cool the exvessel corium. The behavior of corium has been studied and analyzed to determine how it will behave during a severe accident however with limited opportunities for testing there is still uncertainly in the results. The common approach that the industry favors, despite the uncertainty is to flood the cavity to provide some cooling of the molten, exvessel corium. The system designed within this report provides that function of flooding lower containment. Once flooded, the system can cool the flooded pool to remove the decay heat from the corium. 17 3. METHODOLOGY This project develops a feasible design for an in-containment decay heat removal system. This system will focus on the pressurized water reactor (PWR) designed plants. Ground rules to bound the event and heat removal requirements will be determined. Heat transfer calculation and a hydraulic model will be used in the design process. The ground rules for designing this system will assume conditions about the affected units. A nominal reactor size will be selected. The design would need to be adjusted if implemented at a plant to the specific plant power but the general concept could be used. The plant will shutdown normally and initial decay heat removal will be performed through the installed SGs. While the Fukushima plant does not have SGs however this response is consistent with the Fukushima event following the earthquake but prior to the tsunami. The design will focus on addressing the most severe accident where fuel failure has occurred and breached the reactor vessel. A conceptual design has been created consisting of two pumps and a heat exchanger. To prove the feasibility of the design the heat transfer and hydraulic performance of the system will be proven sufficient to remove the required decay heat from the reactor. 18 4. GROUNDRULES The concepts of the design within this project could be used as a defense in depth for most pressurized water reactor designs with some alterations. To bound the scope of the design the follow assumptions will be used. Initial heat removal through SG boiloff – Pressurized water reactor designs transfer heat to a steam generator during normal operation. In an accident these SGs are full or water that can be boiled-off and steam released to the atmosphere for initial heat removal in the event. Because of this initial heat removal it is assumed that heat in the first hour of the event is removed from the SGs. This assumption is consistent with what happened during the Fukushima event. Cooling for all units at Fukushima lasted at least the first hour after the earthquake. Sized for nominal reactor size 1 MWe, 3MWt (assuming 33% thermal efficiency). In the US operating PWR designs range between 502 MWe and 1336 MWe (www.nrc.gov). The 1 MWe was chose to prove the concept of the design. If this design is implemented in a nuclear power plant it would need to be modified to fit the specific unit. The heat removal this system will be designed for will be based on 3MWt and the 1979 ANS decay heat approximations. Focus on pressurized water reactor plant design – This design will focus on a severe accident heat removal. Installed plant systems are designed to remove heat from the nuclear fuel provided the core remains in a controlled geometry. This design will provide a heat removal capability without relying on the installed existing systems. The purpose of this design is to support a severe accident where there has been damage to the nuclear fuel. In this case it is assumed that not only the fuel in the reactor has melted but also melted through the bottom of the reactor. This is considered and exvessel core damage event. At this point the radioactive material has breach the first two of the three boundaries (the fuel cladding and the reactor vessel). The only remaining barrier is the containment. This systems objective is to remove heat and prevent over pressure of the containment. 19 5. EVENT PROGRESSION The system designed within the report will not focus on the reason for the loss of core cooling but simply how the event progresses following the loss of core cooling. When the event initiates the reactor is expected to scram. This is an automatic response by the plant due to a number of different events (e.g. seismic event, loss of offsite power). The PWR control rods drop into the core halting the chain reaction. Within a couple seconds of scramming the reactor decay heat of the core is less than 1% of the normal operation heat load. Without backup AC power onsite a steam turbine driven pump (steam provided from the decay heat in the reactor and refill the SGs. They system in most plant designs does not require AC power. The pump runs on a steam supply and controls for this system rely on backup batteries. This system will temporarily remove heat from the RCS. Most plant have sufficient battery power for several hours before needing to be recharged by the emergency diesel generators EDG onsite. In the case of Fukushima the all except one of the site EDG were flooded by the tsunami. Assuming that SG cooling is lost, the water in the SGs would continue to boil and its level would decrease. Eventually the SG will boil dry and the steam generators will cease to remove heat from the RCS. Without SG heat removal temperature and pressure will increase in the RCS. The pressure relief valves for the reactor will lift and water volume in the RCS will boil away. The water volume in the reactor will eventually drop and the fuel rods will become uncovered. Without water over the fuel it will over heat and begin to melt. Once the reactor is completely dry and the fuel had melted in the bottom of the reactor the fuel could melt through the bottom of the reactor and present the ex-vessel core severe accident the system proposed in this document is designed to address. When the core is ex-vessel many plant have strategies to flood containment to cover the melted core. Flooding the core provides several benefits: 20 Cooling of the molten core Mitigate interaction with the concrete Provide some amount of radiative scrubbing The system proposed in this document will be capable of flooding the containment if necessary. Some plants may accomplish this function with current installed systems and procedures. If not, the first function of the system will be to flood the containment vessel and cover the molten core. The external pump will be used to deliver water into containment. The same piping used to deliver to the heat exchanger will be used and a motor operated valve inside containment will be used. 21 6. CONCEPTUAL LAYOUT Figure 1 shows a typical PWR containment. In this design, the reactor vessel is located in the lower containment. In the event of a break in the reactor coolant system (RCS), reactor coolant, water, will spill into a sump in the bottom of containment. Plant safety systems will deliver additional water to the RCS to cool the core which will spill into containment and flood the sump and lower containment. The design proposed in this report will take advantage of the lower containment. In this postulated accident in-place safety systems would have been unable to maintain core cooling (i.e. loss of emergency power). The core will have melted and broken through the reactor vessel wall. Figure 2 shows the postulated location of the core after this accident and a flood level of containment. Figure 4 Reactor Vessel Location in Containment (Image Reference) Flooding the lower containment in this case allows the fuel to remain under water. Many plants have this action as part of their Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). This system design could be adapted to include this function if necessary. 22 The fuel geometry will no longer support a critical reaction. Therefore the heat removal required will be limited to the decay heat. In this configuration the heat from the core will be transferred to the water. Steam bubbles will form some will collapse within the water, heating up the water. Others will transfer to the air volume of containment, filling containment with steam. Some heat in the water will be conducted through the containment steel liner and concrete to the earth and external air. Most of the heat however will generate steam in containment. If the heat cannot be removed, steam will continue to increase the pressure in containment and eventually above the design pressure. This design will use a two pump and a heat exchanger to remove heat from the water in containment. Details on pump type (electric/diesel) and will be discussed further in the equipment sizing section (Section 6)This approach will provide a continuous heat removal capability long after the accident until steps to cleanup and decommission the plant can be taken. 23 Core Figure 5 Containment Sump/Pool Cooling System Configuration 24 7. EQUIPMENT Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the components needed for the system proposed in this report. The general concept could be customized to meet the needs of other plants. The main components general specifications will be provided here, pumps, HX, valves and piping. Other components such as instrumentation would need to consider plant specific requirements. Figure 6 Pipe and Instruments Diagram – System Standby 25 Figure 7 Pipe and Instruments Diagram – Containment Flood Figure 8 Pipe and Instruments Diagram – Containment Cooling 26 7.1 Pumps This system will require two pumps. The first will be a portable diesel driven pump. The pump will be staged near a large volume water supply. It is typical for nuclear power plants to be located near a large body of water (i.e. river, ocean) which is used for balance of plant (BOP) heat removal during normal operation. Large hoses or temporary piping would be used to connect the pump discharge to the plant. The second pump will be an installed electric pump. An external generator will provide power to the pump inside containment. This pump will circulate water in the flooded containment sump through the heat exchanger. Both pumps will require the same flowrate, 130 kg/s. This flowrate was chosen to provide sufficient heat removal capacity with the heat transfer capability available given the heat exchanger design and temperature difference between two loops of the system. 7.2 Valves Valves that will need to be included in the design to support function of the system and containment isolation (more details of this requirement discussed in Section 8.1). The function of containment isolation is required as part of the design basis for nuclear power plant. One design goal of this system is to not impact the design basis of the plant (Section 3). The other valves in the system will support function of the system. Table 1 provides a list of valves shown in Figure 6 and valve types. The specific functions these valves support will be further explained in Section 7.0 27 Table 1 Valve List No. V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 Type Check Valve Gate Valve Check Valve Check Valve Motor Operated Gate Valve Check Valve Motor Operated Gate Valve Gate Valve Check Valve 7.3 Heat Exchanger The heat exchanger will be a plate design. This design has been chosen due to its large heat transfer area relative to the overall size of the heat exchanger unit. Plate heat exchangers consist of a series of plates stacked together channeling different fluids between alternating plates. The plates are often corrugated with a chevron pattern to provide flow distribution and to promote turbulence. The plates are typically 0.5 mm to 1.2 mm thick, and the gap between the plates is typically from 2 to 5 mm. Gaskets seal the plate edges to prevent the cold and hot fluids from mixing, while also preventing leakage to the environment. Plates are made from malleable corrosion-resistant materials, such as stainless steel and titanium, in a wide range of sizes. For the hot fluid channel, gaskets seal the cold fluid port; for the cold fluid channel, gaskets seal the hot fluid port (Reference 6). Section 10 provides details on sizing of the heat exchanger. 7.4 Piping The pipe material is stainless steel. Stainless steel is commonly used in nuclear power plants due to its corrosion resistant properties. The water used in the reactor contains boron to control reactivity however it is highly corrosive. On the cooling side of the 28 system the water used can be from various sources such as lakes, rivers or oceans. Because of the uncertainty in water quality the corrosion resistance of stainless steel is used. Two pipe sizes will be used in this design. In choosing the piping size, the smallest piping is the most economical for a system design, therefore the smallest size, large enough to carry the required flowrate will be used. Both loops have relatively the same flowrate and therefore the same pipe size will be used. At 2500 gpm (the design flowrate plus some margin) 8 inch piping is the smallest piping that flow velocities and pressure losses are provided for (Reference 7). On the suction side of the two pumps minimizing piping losses is particularly important to maintain Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) for the pumps. The next standard pipe size, 10 inch nominal piping is therefore used. 29 8. FUNCTIONS 8.1 System Standby/Containment Isolation A requirement in nuclear power plants is to maintain containment integrity to prevent the release of radioactive material. This is even more so important in the event of a severe accident. 10 CRF 50 Appendix A (Reference 8) provides these requirements. From Reference 8: Criterion 56—Primary containment isolation. Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere and penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with containment isolation valves as follows, unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions for a specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on some other defined basis: (1) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment; or (2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment; or (3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment; or (4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside containment. Isolation valves outside containment shall be located as close to the containment as practical and upon loss of actuating power, automatic isolation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides greater safety. This system will required water going in and out of containment and providing electrical power to equipment inside containment. There will be two containment piping penetrations. The first will be the inlet water supply. On the outside of containment a manual valve will be located and on the inside of containment a check valve will be location (Appendix A). This configuration will meet the requirement or 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criterion 56. The second piping penetration will be the HX outlet. An automatic valve will be located inside containment and manual valve outside containment (Appendix A) 30 8.2 Containment Flooding The first function is the containment flooding capability. Some plants have this capability in their design already. If not, this feature could be implemented to flood the containment. The external diesel powered pump can flood water into containment. To initiate that the containment flood function the portable diesel driven pump will need to be connected to the system. Valve V2 and V5 should be open and V7 and V8 should be closed. Closing V7 or V8 will block the outlet flow path from containment. During the initial flooding stage, water will be directed into the containment building sump to flood containment and flood the ex-vessel corium. Flooding of containment will cool the ex-vessel containment and help retain the gasses released during MCCI as discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Once the containment is flooded the heat exchanger function can be employed to provide containment sump cooling as described in Section 7.3. 8.3 Containment Sump Cooling Once the containment is flooded the heat exchanger function can be employed to cool the flooded containment. This is the main function of the system. The in-containment, electric pump will circulated water through the heat exchanger. The external diesel driven pump will circulate water from the site ultimate heat sink (i.e. ocean, river) through the other side of the heat exchanger to remove heat from containment. 8.4 Electrical System To avoid impacting the existing plant electrical systems this system will be completely independent. Electrical power to the in containment components will be provided from a portable generator outside of the containment. These components include the in containment pump and two motor operated valves located inside containment. 31 A portable generator will be located outside of containment and connect to dedicated electrical penetrations to power the pumps and valves in containment. The dedicated electrical penetrations are pressure maintaining electrical conductors through the containment boundary. Providing dedicated electrical penetrations will ensure the existing systems in the plant are not impacted by the installation of this system. 32 9. HEAT TRANSFER Two components are evaluated for the heat transfer. First the two cooling loops must have sufficient flow and temperature differential to carry the required heat. Second, the heat exchanger needs to be sufficiently sized to transfer the required heat. The total heat transfer balance can be determined using the following inputs: Cooling loop temperature in and out Containment water in and out Flow rate of each loop The cooling loop assumes 80°F water temperature. This is a nominal high temperature. Most large volumes of water (e.g. lake, ocean) will remain less than 80°F. A lower temperature will provide additional cooling capacity for the system. A high water temperature would require some modification to the system design. The containment water temperature will rise due to the decay heat of the damaged nuclear core. The pool will rise in temperature to boiling and begin to produce steam in containment. The steam produced will begin to pressurize containment. A typical design pressure for containment is 45 psig or 59.7 psia. For this design it’s assumed the pressure increases to 50 psia. This increases the temperature of the water to 280°F, saturated temperature at 50 psia. The fluid properties for each loop are shown in Table 2. Table 2 Fluid Properties Loop Tin (°F) Tin (°C) Tout (°F) Tout (°C) Cooling Containment 80 280 26.56 137.7 180 180 82.11 82.11 Pressure (psia) 14.7 50 υ ΔT (°C) (ft³/lbm) 55.5556 -55.556 0.016071 0.017264 Cp (kJ/kg-K) 4.178 4.178 The coolant will need to transport the assumed 3 MW of heat (Section 3). Table 3 provides estimated temperatures in each loop and flowrates to demonstrate the capability to transfer the required heat. 33 𝑞 = 𝑚̇𝐶𝑝 ∆𝑇 [1] Table 3 Heat Transfer Calculation Loop Cooling Containment Tin Tin (°F) (°C) 80 26.56 280 137.7 Tout Tout (°F) (°C) 180 82.11 180 82.11 34 ΔT Flow Cp (°C) (kg/s) (kJ/kg-K) 55.6 130 4.178 -55.6 130 4.178 q (kW) 30175 -30175 10.HEAT EXCHANGER SIZING Using the flowrates and temperatures calculated above this section will size the heat exchanger needed to remove the required heat. A plate heat exchanger is expected to be used. This design provides a lot of surface area in a relatively compact design. This is an advantage as the system would have to fit into an existing containment. Most plants have limited free space available. 𝑞 = 𝑈𝐴∆𝑇𝑙𝑚 [2] The heat transfer coefficient selected was a typical value for plate heat exchanger (Reference 9). In the design phase identifying the specific heat transfer coefficient cannot be done without selecting a specific design and knowing the specific flow and temperature conditions in the system. Therefore the average of the range provided (1000 to 4000 W/m²-K) was assumed. Table 4 Heat Exchanger Sizing Tin (°F) Cooling Containment Tin (°C) 80 26.56 280 137.7 Tout (°F) Tout (°C) 180 181 Pres. (psia) 82.1 82.7 ΔTlm (°C) A (m2) (kW/m²-K) 14.7 55.8 50 -55.8 216 216 2.5 2.5 U Q (kW) 30150 -30150 Pressure drop in a plate heat exchanger consists of three components: (1) pressure drop associated with the inlet and outlet manifolds and ports, (2) pressure drop within the core (plate passages), and (3) pressure drop due to the elevation change. For the purpose of this report the pressure drop due the elevation change is ignored because both loops draw suction and discharge to the same location. The pressure drop on one fluid side in a plate heat exchanger is given by (Reference 9): ∆𝑝 = 1.5𝐺𝑝 2 𝑁𝑝 2𝑔𝑐 𝜌𝑖 4𝑓𝐿𝐺 2 + 2𝑔 𝑐 𝐷𝑒 1 1 1 𝐺2 𝑖 𝑐 (𝜌) + (𝜌 − 𝜌 ) 𝑔 ± 𝑜 𝑚 Where: Gp=ṁ/(π/4)Dp2 is the fluid mass velocity in the port, Dp is the port/manifold diameter, 35 𝜌𝑚 𝑔𝐿 𝑔𝑐 [3] Np is the number of passes on the given fluid side, and De is the equivalent diameter of flow passages (usually twice the plate spacing). Note that the third term on the right-hand side of the equality sign of Equation 13.35 is for the momentum effect which is generally negligible for liquids. Therefore: ∆𝑝 = 1.5𝐺𝑝 2 𝑁𝑝 2𝑔𝑐 𝜌𝑖 4𝑓𝐿𝐺 2 + 2𝑔 𝑐 𝐷𝑒 1 (𝜌) [4] 𝑚 Without selecting a specific heat exchanger for the conceptual design, nominal parameters are used to estimate the heat exchanger pressure drop for both loops in the system. Table 5 provides the heat exchanger parameters. Table 6 provides the calculated pressure drop using Equation 4. Table 5 Heat Exchanger Parameters Parameter Inlet/Outlet Port Diameter (Dp) Heat Exchanger Passes (Np) Plate Length Plate Width Number of Plates Plate Spacing De Value .203 m Notes Port diameter is the same size at the inlet piping, 8 inches (Section 7.4 1 2m 0.75 m 144 .002 m .004 m Required Surface Area/Plate Area Minimum Standard Gap (Section 7.3) Twice the spacing between the heat exchanger plates. Table 6 Heat Exchanger Pressure Drop Calculation Loop Cooling Containment Gp (kg/s∙m2) 814.6 814.6 Dp (m) 653.4 0.203 653.4 0.203 G (kg/s∙m2) Np De (m) (m) 1 0.004 1 0.004 f 0.1 0.1 ρᵢ ρₒ (kg/m³) (kg/m³) 996.7 927.8 970.3 970.4 dP (Pa) 983.5 34073 949.1 35333 ρm (kg/m³) To ensure the pumps are large enough to meet the required flowrates a bounding, high pressure drop for the plate heat exchanger will be assumed in the hydraulic model developed in Section 11. The model will use a second order quadratic resistance curve based on the pressure drop of 10 psid at 2000 gpm. 36 dP (psid) 4.942 5.125 11.HYDRALIC MODEL This design will require two loops, each loop containing a pump and a common heat exchanger. The first loop will be short to circulate water in the containment through the heat exchanger and discharging back to containment. Because the loop is short hydraulic resistance will primarily be the resistance through the heat exchanger. The second loop will use an external water source and deliver cool water to the outside of the heat exchanger. Most power plants are located near a large water source. This is necessary for heat balance during the normal operation of the plant. This design will utilize that water source (i.e. lake, river, ocean). A portable pump can be used to draw from this source. It’s likely that a long length of hose or pipe could be needed. 1000 ft of hose will be assumed. After exiting the plant 100 ft of host will be assumed to deliver the heated water to a dedicated location. This water could be drained back into the original water source but is not necessary. Figure 9 Hydraulic Model 37 Table 7 Hydraulic Model Junctions Junc. Description J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9 Containment Circulation Pump Heat Exchanger Containment Side Containment Water Cooling Water Supply Cooling Water Pump Heat Exchanger Cooling Side Cooling Water Discharge Tee Tee In the hydraulic model, piping includes inputs such as length, size and additional losses. Additional losses include valves and entrance and exit losses. Both loops will include entrance losses on the suction piping and exit losses on the discharges. The relative on the Table 8 provides the details on the piping in the model based on the In the piping, most of the piping is assumed to be 8 inches nominal diameter. This selection Table 8 Hydraulic Model Piping Junc. Dia (in) Length (ft) Valves/Losses P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 10 8 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 10 10 50 20 1000 1000 20 10 10 1 Entrance Loss 1 Check Valve 1 Check Valve, 1 Exit Loss 1 Entrance Loss 1 Gate Valve, 2 Check Valves 2 Gate Valves, 1 Exit Loss 1 Gate Valve, 1 Check Valves None None 11.1 Flooding Case The first action for the system will be to flood the lower containment. This system configuration will include one pump operating and delivering water to the containment sump. The system alignment for this condition is shown in Figure 7. 38 Starting with the base model, the pump J1 is turned off and closed to reverse flow. The check valve in pipe P2 would prevent any reverse flow through the pump. Pipe P6 is also closed to simulate the closed valves V7 and V8 in Figure 7. Figure 10 Flooding Case Model The output from this case shows that the system can be successfully aligned to flood containment and the reactor cavity at greater than 2000 gpm. The output file for this case is presented in Appendix A.1. 11.2 Cooling Case After the lower containment is flooded the system will be realigned to its cooling function. Figure 8 shows the valve alignment for this function. From the flooding function alignment, Valves V7 and V8 are opened, Valves V5 is closed and the pump inside containment is started. 39 Starting with the base model, pumps J1 and J5 remain on. Pipe P7 is closed to simulate the closing of Valve V5. This closes the flowpath for the external pump (J5) from delivering to containment. Figure 11 shows the model aligned for the cooling function. Figure 11 Cooling Case Model The output from this case shows that the system can be successfully aligned to provide the required cooling as described in this report. Table 9 summarizes the flowrates and heat removal in the Cooling Case. The complete output file for this case is presented in Appendix A.2. Table 9 Cooling Case Performance Mass Flow (kg/s) Flow (gpm) Inlet Temperature (°F) Outlet Temperature (°F) Heat Transfer (BTU/s) Heat Transfer (kW) Loop Containment Cooling 130 130 2216 2062 280 80 188 173.2 -28586 28586 -30158 30158 40 12. CONCLUSION This report provides a conceptual design for a severe accident decay heat removal system in a PWR nuclear power plant. In the most severe of severe accidents where the reactor vessel fails and failed fuel falls to the reactor cavity floor, this system can help the plant cope with the accident. The designed system consisting of two pump and a plate heat exchanger will first flood the reactor vessel cavity and the assumed ex-vessel corium to provide the initial cooling. Once the lower containment is flooded, the system will circulate the flooded pool in lower containment through a heat exchanger and remove heat from containment. The cases run within this report show the system can remove the required heat for the nominal conditions presented in this report. The system designed in the report does nominal inputs such as core power level. If this design is implemented in a PWR plant, the design will likely need to be altered to the specific plant design it is being implemented for. 41 13.REFERENCES 1. World Nuclear Association, Fukushima Accident, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident/ 2. INPO 11-005 Addendum August 2012, Lessons Learned from the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. 3. Sevón, T., (2005) Molten Core . Concrete Interactions in Nuclear Accidents. Theory and Design of an Experimental Facility. 4. Severe Accident Management Guidance Technical Basis Report, Volume 1: Candidate High-Level Actions and Their Effects. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2012. 5. Zhong, H., (2011) A Study on the Coolability of Ex-vessel Corium by Late Top Water Flooding. 6. Serth, Robert W. Lestina, Thomas G. Process Heat Transfer Principles, Application and Rules of Thumb, 2nd Edition, 2014. 7. Flow of Fluids through Valves, Fittings, and Pipe, CRANE Technical Paper No. 410, 1988. 8. 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-appa.html 9. Incorpera, DeWirr, Bergman, Lavine, Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer, 5th Edition; 2002 10. Kreith, Frank Goswami, D. Yogi. (2007), Handbook of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. Taylor & Francis. 42 APPENDIX A – FATHOM CODE FILES A.1 Flooding Case A.1.1 Flooding Case Input 43 44 45 46 47 48 A.1.2 Flooding Case Output 49 50 51 A.2 Cooling Case A.2.1 Cooling Case Input 52 53 54 55 56 57 A.2.2 Cooling Case Output 58 59 60