Special Committee on Transportation Security Snapshot Strategic Assessment1 Joe Crossett, High Street Consulting Group Summer 2008 SCOTS Meeting Discussion Theme in a Nutshell – Security AND Emergency Management More DOTs are recognizing the interrelationship between security and emergency management requirements that are critical to safe and efficient operation of a resilient transportation network across the United States in the 21st Century – Something every state DOT CEO should have near the top of their priorities list. With investment in the right tools (people, planning, partnerships, infrastructure, and technologies) DOTs can be well prepared to neutralize unexpected interruptions to transportation networks before they have a dramatic ripple effect on travel across a wide region. Forces Shaping State DOTs’ Security and Emergency Management Practices Strengths 1. Building, Maintaining and Operating “Resilient” Transportation Networks Has Eclipsed Terror Threats as the Driving Force for DOTs’ Transportation Security Programs In the last several years, state DOTs have continued broadening use of the term “transportation security” to mean their capability to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from a wide range of natural or human disasters that pose threats to the resiliency of the nation’s transportation network. Transportation security is now part of a broader set of emergency management capabilities that DOTs are adopting to ensure resiliency of their transportation networks. Anecdotal evidence suggests several important factors are at play in creating the surge of interest in emergency management as a day-to-day function within state DOTs: Even Small Events Pose Threat of Great Consequences - The impact of any disaster is magnified when a transportation network is operating at or past its capacity – as is the case in portions of many states as travel demand on their transportation networks grows. DOTs Have Institutional “Heft” to Solve Problems - Surface transportation agencies are recognizing that they are uniquely positioned in terms of their broad policy responsibility, public accountability, large and distributed workforces, heavy equipment, communications infrastructure, and ability to directly and swiftly take action (akin to the private sector). This institutional heft provides a stable base for a campaign to systematically reduce risk exposure over time through hazards capital budgeting. AND no-one else will do it for the DOTs. Risk of Natural and Man-made Events Growing More Common - Natural or man-made disasters – ranging from floods to infrastructure failures – are possibly on the rise – with climate change one likely cause, but other pressures including terrorism and aging infrastructure. 1 This snapshot is based on discussion among the approximately 14 states that attended AASHTO’s SCOTS meeting in Washington DC, August 26 & 27, 2008. It is intended as an initial “policy thought piece” for the SCOTS leadership team, not a final public document. September 23, 2008 1 2. A Steadily Growing Set of DOTs are Making “24/7” All-Hazards Emergency Management a Distinct DOT Function In some DOTs, emergency management has emerged as a distinct agency function alongside traditional DOT roles like planning, design, construction engineering, traffic operations, or maintenance. Examples of DOTs with distinct all-hazards emergency management capabilities include: Virginia DOT, Iowa DOT, Kansas DOT, Maryland DOT, Michigan DOT, North Carolina DOT, Washington State DOT, West Virginia DOT, and Wisconsin DOT. Characteristics of all hazards emergency management roles within these agencies typically include: Dedicated Staff - A small contingent of dedicated emergency management staff housed at the DOT; Investment in Capital Facilities - Emergency response trailers, interoperable communications, and 24/7 combined operations centers that combine traffic management and emergency response capabilities, etc; All Hazards Emergency Preparedness Planning – Development of clear agency-wide protocols for handling a range of emergency situations; Situational Awareness – Training for all DOT staff to increase situational awareness about how to handle emergency situations; This appears to represent a significant shift among DOTs towards a more aggressive emergency management role; it contrasts with strong sentiment after 9/11 among DOTs and their outside partners that transportation agencies had a modest supporting role to play in emergency management. It also reflects a shift away from the abstract concept of transportation security, which has largely failed to provide sufficient credibility to motivate executive decision-makers to act. 3. DOTs With Strong Security and Emergency Management Capabilities are Speaking a Common Language and SCOTS is Their Emerging Forum Among the DOTs identified in #2 above, emergency management staff and their leaders now share a similar language, easily using terms like “risk management,” “fusion centers,” “all hazards,” “first responders,” “DHS grants,” “HSAS,” etc; and talking about common themes and challenges, such as extracting security information from Traffic Management Centers, getting on-board with statewide interoperable communications, and partnering with first responders, etc. This shared experience points to the emergence of emergency management as a credible discipline with DOTs that AASHTO needs to recognize. Weaknesses 1. Too Many State DOT CEOs Overlook the Vital Link Between Emergency Management and Higher Profile Issues Like Climate Change or Economic Stability Many DOTs are finding that emergencies – whether flooding in Iowa, Tornados in Kansas, hurricanes in Florida, drought-related wildfires in California, or unpredictable winter storms in Washington – are becoming more “routine.” (Missouri, for example, has had a major road closed somewhere in the state every day between April and August 2008.) In a “just in time” economy heavily dependent on travel, disasters that hit the nation’s overloaded transportation network can have huge economic and social costs when transportation resiliency breaks down. State DOTs are only beginning to understand the connection between strong emergency management capabilities and their efforts to manage the impact of climate change on transportation and preserve economic stability. September 23, 2008 2 2. Critical Transportation Infrastructure Resiliency Gap is Enormous The cost of hardening critical transportation infrastructure to provide greater resilience to human and natural disasters is huge and will require large investments by states in coming years. Blanket protection by state DOTs of all transportation assets is neither feasible nor warranted. Much of the nation’s transportation system is characterized by features, such as physical robustness, ease of replacement, system redundancy, and limited potential for mass casualties that make it a relatively unappealing as a terrorist target and of no major consequence in a natural disaster. Some individual transportation facilities, however, are critical to protect and may be attractive targets for terrorists. These include facilities where users are concentrated in small areas; or that span large natural barriers such as rivers, bays or mountains; or that serve unique regional or national transportation and economic functions; or that have a symbolic role. A combination of risk management and countermeasure development and deployment is necessary to protect these assets. 3. Situational Awareness Remains Weak Beyond Key DOT Staff Effective emergency management depends on strong situational awareness across a DOT. Many DOTs, however, consider security activities an ancillary responsibility for units with other primary responsibilities, such as intelligent transportation systems (ITS), traffic operations, or maintenance. For example, at many DOTs, emergency transportation operations (ETO) are conducted as a fragmented, part-time reactive activity at the district level with responsibilities divided among maintenance, traffic operations units, traffic management center (TMC) management, and ITS project staff. As a consequence, DOTs have experienced poorly managed emergencies where employees on the ground lacked the training and communication capabilities to respond effectively. In an emergency, district and field personnel may find themselves in the role of initial responders making critical decisions. 4. Emergency Management is not the same as Traffic Operations DOTs’ all-hazards emergency management functions share some overlapping capabilities with the traffic operations community, but the two topics are not the same, obvious differences include: Mitigation Strategies – Emergency management involves pre-event mitigation planning and post-event stabilization of transportation network; Infrastructure Resiliency Component – Emergency management includes a strong interest in infrastructure hardening, which includes risk management, and countermeasure development and deployment; Agency-wide Situational Awareness – Emergency management touches almost every DOT employee in ways that traffic operations does not – everyone has to acquire some basic situational awareness skills; Strong Cross-Disciplinary Focus – Emergency management depends on cross-disciplinary expertise that extends beyond the DOT to first responders. September 23, 2008 3 State DOTs’ Key Security and Emergency Management Challenges 1. Building New Institutions within DOTs Every DOT should be working to create and institutionalize an appropriately sized emergency management unit within their agency. (Two to 10 person units are typical.) Typically, the DOT’s emergency management group will include HQ and district components and a close link to executive management. Day-to-day responsibilities include regular communication with executive staff/management, training, partnering with other agencies, and developing emergency management plans 2. Investing in Emergency Management Capital Infrastructure/Technology Deployment From West Virginia to California, DOTs are starting to invest significant sums in emergency management infrastructure like 24/7 operations centers, emergency response trailers, and interoperable communications. Continued support and guidance on where and how to invest wisely in emergency management is needed. 3. Coordinating Among States Disasters do not always stay within state boundaries. State DOTs are finding that they need to get better at coordinating with each other when emergencies occur. In Washington State, for example, when severe winter snow storms shut down critical interstate routes and forced complex detours, truck traffic was affected as far away as Los Angeles. 4. Strengthening Risk Based Critical Infrastructure Protection DOTs still need to invest more in risk-based protection of critical transportation infrastructure including assessments of vulnerability and development and implementation of detection, deterrence, and hardening control measures. 5. Advancing Interoperable Communications Transportation agencies must participate in communications interoperability initiatives with first responders who have security responsibilities. This includes multiple means for disseminating emergency notifications, including web distribution, blast fax systems, radio codes, paging, and telephone calling lists, as well as development of an integrated communications system and establishment of mobile emergency response command centers to support various radio frequencies, including those for state DOT, state patrol, and local police and fire departments. 6. Taking on New Leadership Roles Outside the DOT Credible state DOT emergency management roles must include leadership within the broader emergency management community on issues like debris clearance, interoperable communications, or evacuation management. 7. Improved Evacuation Planning Transportation agencies must work more with personnel from city, and county, transportation, police, fire, and emergency management agencies, metropolitan planning organizations and major hospitals to develop plans for primary and alternative evacuation routes for major population centers. September 23, 2008 4 Next Steps for SCOTS 1. Renew Commitment to Keeping SCOTS, but with Realigned Focus? Discussion at summer 2008 SCOTS meeting justifies continuation of SCOTs, but with a realigned focus that includes a stronger emphasis on emergency management activities. Leadership team should get comfortable with the right balance between SCOTS’ emergency management role versus its transportation security role. Is it 70/30, 60/40, or 50/50, etc.? Make SCOTS a voice for DOTs that recognizes the interrelationship between security and emergency management requirements is critical to safe and efficient operation of a resilient transportation network across the United States in the 21st Century. 2. Time for a New and Improved Name? Special Committee on Emergency Management (SCEM) Special Committee on Transportation Security and Emergency Management (SCOTSEM) Special Committee on Transportation Network Resiliency (SCOTNR) 3. Re-engage DOTs via Membership Drive? Need to push harder to reach out to DOTs that are not participating; may be able to reach them more effectively with an emergency management focus once items #1 and #2 above are settled? 4. Re-Configure SCOTS Strategic Plan? With a renaming and refocusing of SCOTS, is it time to rework the SCOTS strategic plan and associated sub-committee structure? Joe’s Ideas for New SCOTS Initiatives 5. Use SCOTS as Platform to Build Economic/Social Case for Better Emergency Management Capabilities within DOTs? Quantify the economic impact of transportation-related components of recent natural disasters like Hurricane Ike or Mississippi flooding to help build the case for SCOTS/emergency management? 6. SCOTS Could Develop a Transportation Network Resiliency Self-Assessment Tool? Create a multi-criteria survey that DOTs can choose to use to rate their statewide transportation resiliency “index” using a mix of quantitative data from risk assessment materials; highway travel/infrastructure records; checklists of “good practices” like emergency response trailers and 24/7 emergency response trailers, and qualitative grades for factors such as partnerships with first responders, etc. 7. SCOTS Could House a Green Book Supplement for Transportation Security Design Practices? Compile a set of formal or informal materials to support states looking for guidance. September 23, 2008 5