Capitalizing on labor mobility in Africa
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explore labor mobility as an intrinsic part of human capital development
and of regional integration. The focus is on international mobility within Africa. The paper underlines
how the specific impact of migration on development is influenced by contextual factors, both the
opportunities and agency of bottom-up self-help of migrants as well as the top-down issues, including
migration regimes in place. By focusing on skills and inclusive growth, the paper aims to address the
impact of labor mobility from individual and state perspectives. It aims to improve the understanding of
how labor mobility affects and challenges development in Africa from a human development perspective
of both individuals and states, as well as how regional integration, again, affects the impacts of labor
mobility on migrants, states and regional economic communities (RECs).
Introduction
Global migration policy has witnessed a shift from immigration control, and from a reduction in
migration being a criterion of development programs1 to migration management. This implies a shift from
reactive measures concerned with migrants already within or at the border of the receiving state, to proactive policies concerned with potential migrant populations and in collaboration with the countries of
origin. This has happened in parallel with the emergence of a new transnational paradigm focusing on
patterns of movement and communication, as well as the transfers of ideas, skills, goods and remittances
across national territories. The migration–development nexus has moved center-stage since 2001.
Nonetheless, migration has been regarded as a development problem, and a strong sedentary bias remains
in much of the development practice and literature.2 Instead of attempting to reduce migration, this
approach is based on leveraging migration for development, looking at better matching the supply and
demand of labor across borders.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, it will outline intra-African migration patterns through the
optic of the current challenges to skills and competitiveness while underlining the progress and challenges
in the respective subregions/RECs for free movement, which is part of creating a common market or
space. Still, the paper is shaped by the gap of structured information on this topic, with official statistics
being unreliable, inaccurate and sometimes nonexistent. Second, it will analyze the current impact of
labor mobility on inclusive growth and poverty reduction. Finally, the last section provides some policy
recommendations for improving benefits from labor mobility.
Leveraging intra-African migration for development
The country where a person is born strongly influences the opportunities for developing his or her human
capital, while the degree of regional integration affects that person’s chances of improving them
elsewhere. Mobility and migration have always been an intrinsic part of human capital development, and
migration can be considered as a capability-enhancing act in itself. A search for better or more secure
livelihoods is the main cause of migration.3 The absolute majority of Africans migrate within the
continent. Most people move to urban areas in their own country, while an estimated 31 million Africans
are international migrants— and at least half migrate within their subregion.4
In Africa migration represents a necessity for some, and an opportunity for others. In some cases people
move due to stress factors such as climate change, war and poverty. Migration is also a response to
relative deprivation, and can represent a livelihood strategy and investment or insurance function for
1
income diversification.5 Instead of categorizing different segments of migrants, this paper will instead
look at all as potential labor migrants. For example, the growing numbers of unemployed youth in Africa
are looking for jobs and opportunities across borders. Hein de Haas (2009) also underlines that rather than
applying classifications such as forced and voluntary migration, it is more appropriate to conceive of a
continuum running from low to high constraints under which migration occurs, and in which all migrants
deal with structural constraints to varying degrees.
Recent literature shows that most migration—internal or international—leads to higher incomes, better
access to education and health, and improved prospects for migrants’ children. Since 2000 there has been
a resurge of optimism over the benefits of migration on development. The Human Development Report
2009 outlined evidence about the positive impacts of migration on human development, such as increased
household incomes via remittances and improved access to education and health services – mainly from
north-south migration flows. More than three-quarters of migrants travel to countries with a higher level
of human development than their country of origin.6 In an African context most movements occur
between countries with contiguous borders and small differences in income. As a majority of these
migrants moving to another country are poor, even small increases in income can have significant impacts
on their human development and that of their family.7
Intra-African migration can have a great impact on reducing inequalities and poverty. Some studies show
that regional migration, which is less costly and thus more accessible, may have a greater impact on
poverty reduction than migration out of Africa.8 When poor households receive remittances, this can for
example have a large effect on social inclusion.9 Intercontinental migration, which requires more social
and economic resources, yields greater increases in income and livelihood security than intra-African
migration10 and thus tends to exacerbate household inequalities.11 Wealthier people and societies are
therefore also generally more mobile than relatively poor people and societies: Emigration rates as a share
of population are around 2.1% in low-income countries and 3.6% in high-income countries.12 Those
receiving remittances from outside Africa are in the top consumption quintiles, and were already wealthy
to a degree relative to the general population before migrating.13
South–South migration (understood as migration between developing countries) is indeed larger than
migration from the South to high-income countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). Africans account for merely 5% of the foreign born in OECD countries, less
than any other region except Oceania.14 Around twice as many migrants move across borders within the
global South than from South to North, and this trend is likely to increase.15 Sub-Saharan Africa accounts
for 63% of intraregional flows and the numbers are even higher for subregions.16 Migrants mainly stay
within their subregions, as in West Africa, where about 7.5 million migrants move within the region,
accounting for 71%–86% of total emigration.17 However, while remittances have become “the new
development mantra,”18 few attempts to integrate migration concerns in development policy have been
successful.
This chapter combines the perspective of individual gains of labor mobility with those of states. It will
thus go beyond “methodological nationalism,”19 which focuses on nation-states’ priorities, and will
instead combine them with the implications of migration for the well-being of individuals, families and
communities. The analysis of mobility and development will therefore be based on a broader, more
inclusive and agency-oriented concept of human development as put forward by Amartya Sen (1999). Sen
defined development as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy, using the
concept of human capability, in order to underline agency and enhance choices.
That being said, all migrants face structural constraints, which limit the opportunities for social mobility
and to bring about structural change in receiving and sending communities. The free movement of people
in Africa remains one of the least elaborated policy areas of regional integration. Beyond high
2
immigration restrictions and selectivity, Africa also remains one of the regions in the world with the
stiffest visa requirements. Consequently, large numbers of migrants are in irregular situations. When the
poorest migrate, they often do so in conditions of vulnerability that reflect few resources or choices.
Constraints to labor mobility in African subregions and reduced opportunities to exercise agency thus
have negative impacts on migrants’ well-being as well as on the poverty- and inequality-reducing
potential of migration. In Africa, preferential access to migration is therefore likely to reinforce structural
inequalities between rich and poor.20
Many economists favor relaxing restrictions on immigration.21 While the liberalization of free trade has
been pushed forward in the last decades, international migration remains the weakest link in globalization.
Nonetheless, one of the most important economic arguments for open borders is that enhanced labor
mobility would considerably increase world gross domestic product (GDP) and lead to a more equitable
distribution of wealth.22 Also, liberalized movement of workers could significantly reduce world
poverty,23 mainly achieved through an income increase of the people who move, as well as an increase in
remittances to be sent to countries of origin.24 There are diverging opinions on the exact benefits of freer
movement of people—for example, the effects of low-skilled versus high-skilled immigration in the
country of destination.
The extent of regional integration and free movement therefore condition the micro and macro levels of
labor mobility and heavily affects human capital development. Migration remains a key livelihood
strategy for Africans. Nonetheless, the social mobility of migrants is not facilitated in Africa and migrants
have only few opportunities for breaking their low career ceiling and reducing intergenerational poverty.
Without a conducive environment to safe and rights-based migration processes the benefits of labor
mobility are low. The specific impact of migration on development is influenced by contextual factors,
including bottom-up self-help of migrants as well as top-down migration regimes in place (table 1). The
current situation of restricted movement signals a critical lack of coordination and collaboration on youth
employment, labor market flexibility, innovative cross-border social safety nets and social policy reforms.
Such efforts require strong commitment, political will and ownership from African countries.
Table 1. Factors influencing the economic and developmental impact of migration
Micro
Macro















Short term
Wages and (un)employment
Job search
Skills development
Access to services and housing
Effects on other consumption
Migrants’ human capital investments, savings
Social security
Population size, composition
Labor market participation
Geographic distribution of human resources
(urbanization)
Cost of travel documents
Health and education expenditures
Unemployment,
wage
levels,
income
distribution
Level of banking, costs of remittances
Regional integration (visas/free movement of
people/transfer of services)
Long term
 Labor market flexibility
 Business practices, right to establishment
 Innovation and entrepreneurship
 Migrant geographical and social clustering
 Networks
 Social mobility across generations
 Remittances
 Labor market demands and supply
 Fertility and population aging
 Sectoral composition of the economy
 Public and private infrastructure
 Technological change
 International trade/migration patterns
 Social inclusion
 Cohesion, cross-border relations and crime
 Environmental challenges
 Migration management, skills pooling
3
Labor mobility and skills development in Africa
The issue of skills and competitiveness is inherent through Africa, and is closely associated with the
development causes and consequences of labor mobility for individuals and states. To profit from
emerging industries such as banking, extractive industries and information and communications
technology (ICT), African countries require high-skilled innovative entrepreneurs for economic
transformation. Even with entrenched unemployment and underemployment, African economies face
labor skills shortages. Further, the workforce is often inadequately educated, and skills shortages in Africa
represent the most important labor market issue for investors.25 There is thus a pressing need to train,
retain and attract skilled professionals within the continent, and ensure geographic equity between poorer
and richer areas. This section will therefore address two key issues: First, that emigration creates a lack of
workers in poor countries and regions; second, that restrictions on mobility reversibly impede access to
foreign professional services.
In 2015, 61% of Africans will be under 25; and by 2035 56%, a growth opportunity as these young
populations enter their productive years. The rising number of African youth is increasingly educated and
mobile—and ever-more unemployed or underemployed, exacerbated by the disconnect between labor
market needs and the skills produced by the education sector. This has broad regional implications,
including for migration. People migrate to obtain and build skills, or to achieve further value and income
for skills already acquired. Beyond the large numbers of student migrants, youth unemployment
represents a strong push factor. Migrants in developing countries are mainly young men—and increasing
numbers of women26— below the age of 30 looking for jobs (figure 1).
Figure 1. International migrations per age group in country development groups (%)
25
20
15
0-14
10
15-24
5
25-34
0
Developed
Developing
Least
developed
Source: UNDESA 2011.
High cross-border movements persist without labor market coordination of supply and demand of skills.
A total of 80% of South–South migration occurs between countries with a common border, compared
with 20% of South–North migration.27 Almost all African countries are today migration destinations
(figure 4). The main African bilateral corridors are Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe–South Africa,
Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso, Uganda–Kenya and Mozambique–South Africa. Slow regional integration
hampers migration management and thus productivity. There is a strong relationship between African
firms’ access to services and their productivity.28 Nonetheless, the private sector cannot quickly access or
move the talent it needs as it faces long procedures for work permits, challenging its growth and
competitiveness. Onerous visa requirements, lack of mutual recognition of qualifications and restrictions
on movement all curtail free movement. With restrictive immigration laws,29 regional skill pooling is
limited throughout Africa.
4
Figure 4. Major destination countries of African migrants, 2010
Figure 7. Percentage of African migrants moving
within their subregion
66
71
52
23
6
Source: Ratha 2011.
Source: Ratha 2011.
Little harmonization of professional qualifications impedes growth. Trade barriers, regulatory
requirements and immigration policy impede the supply of services by foreign professionals under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4 of movement of natural persons. Agreements
by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and ECOWAS include a national
treatment obligation clause that applies to all service activities covered by these agreements. (Mutual
recognition is not yet in force in ECOWAS.) Further, heavily regulated professions, such as engineering,
and medical and pharmaceutical professions, demand commonly accepted standard examinations before
accreditation to practice. Data suggest that—with the exception of accounting technicians in Kenya—East
Africa also has a middle-level skills need.30 Beyond accreditation, legal challenges can include
restrictions on rights to establishment, as with Tunisian doctors in Algeria.
The lacking migration management in Africa amongst other leads to brain drain. The highest levels of
brain drain occur in least developed countries, and insufficient pull mechanisms in underserved areas are
negatively affecting human capital development of those left behind. There is a continued existence of
“the two Africas” with Intra-African migration mainly taking place from the inland to coastal hubs in
Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Gabon, Kenya and Libya, even though new destination cities are rapidly
emerging. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, regional GDP
per capita masks intraregional differences and a wide gap between relatively high urban incomes (and
migrant destinations) and very low rural incomes (which often export cheap labor). This has broad
implications, amongst other for health services, where the mobility of health workers affects quality of
service delivery in origin countries, creating mobility toward medical hubs. Poor regions remain
understaffed, exacerbated by the overall lack of skilled workers and too few incentives “pulling” workers
to underserved areas.
Progress and challenges of free movement in African subregions
The free and regulated movement of people is one of the least developed policy areas in regional
integration. Migration has been on the agenda of the African Union (AU) and various RECs for many
years. Although the East African Community (EAC) and ECOWAS have made notable progress, most of
the REC initiatives suffer from slow ratification of protocols or relatively modest commitments toward
free movement by member states. In periods of rapid growth, African governments have welcomed labor
migrants but sometimes expelled them en masse during economic crises, of which there were 23 instances
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between 1958 and 1996.31 Migration streams between Tunisia and Libya, for example, have had three
periods of open access and eight of expulsion since 1969. Countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia,
Nigeria and Senegal have violated the guarantees provided in the ECOWAS Protocol by expelling nonnationals.
Article 71 of the Abuja Treaty (which established the African Economic Community in 1991) urges
member states to adopt policies that allow the free movement of people within the community. This
entails facilitating employment (of available skilled human resources of one member state in other
member states where there are shortages) as an essential component for promoting regional cooperation
and integration. The AU’s instrument for this process is the Minimum Integration Programme, which
covers regional integration in general, not just migration. The first phase of the Programme (2009–2012)
aims for the “total free movement of persons in the regions and partial free movement between the
regions” as a main objective,32 underlined in the AU’s Common Position on Migration and its Migration
Policy Framework, and in NEPAD’s vision on migration.
The management of labor mobility is hindered because most countries are members of at least two
regional organizations. Some are even members of four RECs. Beyond the eight RECs33 recognized by
the Abuja Treaty are 14 major regional economic groupings in Africa with wide membership overlaps.
The absence of physical infrastructure limits the potential human development impacts of regional
integration, and the linkages are further undermined by weak capacities, institutions and policies in the
respective subregions:
North Africa
Intraregional mobility is limited, and even fewer North Africans migrate to Sub-Saharan Africa.34 Libya
has been a magnet of migrants, and while it has hosted large numbers of Tunisians and Egyptians, it has
mainly looked beyond the region to Sub-Saharan Africa to fill labor gaps as part of its pan-African
policies. Sub-Saharan Africans are increasingly migrating to North Africa (figure 11). According to
various estimates, 65,000–120,000 Sub-Saharan Africans enter the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco and Tunisia) yearly.35 Some migrants use the region as a transit point to Europe, with several
tens of thousands of them trying to cross the Mediterranean each year. Some migrants end up staying in
migration hubs along the way36. Most major North African cities now have sizable communities of SubSaharan migrants that often lack legal status and are vulnerable to exploitation.
Figure 11. Estimates of Sub-Saharan immigrants in North Africa, 2006
4,000,000
1,500,000
100,000
Mauritania
100,000
Algeria
Libya
Egypt
Source: de Haas 2005
6
With a different demographic trend from that in Sub-Saharan Africa, long-term youth unemployment in
North Africa is a social emergency, and cross-country opportunities are not fully exploited. Political
disputes, among others on Western Sahara, have frozen the work of the Arab Maghreb Union. Trade is
one of the most powerful instruments to sustain growth and provide a path out of poverty, but the
challenges and opportunities of intraregional mobility in North Africa have been understudied.
West Africa
West Africans are more mobile than most Africans. The majority of migrants from ECOWAS countries
stay within the subregion, with coastal urban areas continuously attracting labor from landlocked rural
areas.37 The corridor from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire has the most important flows in Africa, even
after the violent conflict and increased discrimination since 2001. Even though Burkina Faso is the main
migrant-sending country in Africa, official remittances to Burkina Faso have declined since 2000, partly
because remittance fees from Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso are among the world’s highest (see above).
ECOWAS has a 90-day visa-free movement policy, but this is not enough to reap long-term benefits of
labor mobility. Language differences, as well as failure to harmonize community immigration procedures,
documents and fees, have held back fulfillment of treaties and protocols. The Treaty of ECOWAS (1975),
for example, aimed to eliminate all obstacles to the free movement of people, goods, capital and services
and to guarantee the right of entry, residence and establishment among the 15 member states, while the
Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment, ratified in 1980,
agreed to free entry of Community citizens without a visa for 90 days as a first phase, and the right of
residence as a second phase scheduled for 1986. Although a biometric ECOWAS passport was introduced
in 2000, which can also be used for travel to third countries, many ECOWAS nationals do not possess
any travel documents or birth certificates to take advantage of it.
Central Africa
The least integrated region on the continent, Central Africa has weak basic infrastructure and multiple
overlapping memberships in regional organizations. Peace and security remain a concern with hotbeds of
tension and insecurity in Chad, the DRC and Central African Republic, leading to cross-border refugee
flows and camps. Gabon is traditionally the main receiving country. Even though a third of the population
lives below the poverty line, the World Bank estimated that in 2010 nearly 19% of the population were
migrants attracted by oil production, numbering 284,127 that year (including refugees).38 Yet Gabon faces
declining oil production, the backbone of its economy since it gained independence.
Free movement without a visa has been delayed in key countries. Community regulations are needed to
harmonize immigration laws and achieve common modalities for free movement of people in members of
the Economic Commission of Central African States (CEMAC). ECCAS provisions on free movement
were first introduced in 1983. Under the Protocol on Freedom of Movement and Rights of Establishment,
implementation was to be phased in over 12 years to provide for ECCAS nationals to move and reside
freely in any ECCAS member state. The bloc has a common travel document for intraregional travel, the
CEPGL card, but fees for obtaining the card differ among member states. In April 2009, the CEMAC
biometric passport came into effect, but for the time being is recognized only in Africa.
East Africa
Migration in this region is largely affected by forced displacement in Somalia and the DRC. Kenya is a
critical hub for mixed migration in the region, including that by involuntary migrants, economic migrants
and bona fide refugees, particularly from south-central Somalia. Kenya hosts the largest refugee
population of Somalis (more than half a million) as well as many Ethiopians. Kenya is also a regional hub
for smuggling and for obtaining false documentation for new identities or visas. Most emigration involves
educated Kenyans leaving for educational or business opportunities in COMESA, EAC, North American
and European countries.
7
Rwanda’s migration policy stands out in Africa: it has abolished work permit requirements for all EAC
citizens and introduced entry visas for all Africans arriving at Rwandan borders, combined with biometric
border management and e-visas. Kenya, too, has abolished work permits for EAC citizens. Easing labor
mobility in Rwanda has allowed the country to attract skills from Kenya and other countries that were
previously unavailable locally. Rwanda has a liberal policy of the GATS Mode 4 cross-border services
aspect, while neighboring Tanzania and Uganda impose severe entry restrictions in engineering and legal
services.39 Rwanda imposes no restrictions to the practice of foreign law and only a few on that of
domestic law. In Kenya and Tanzania de jure or de facto nationality requirements to practice domestic
law exclude foreign professionals. Rwanda (and Uganda) also automatically recognize academic and
professional qualifications as well as licenses obtained in other jurisdictions. In Tanzania, in contrast,
recognition is on a case-by-case basis, whereas in Kenya only academic and professional qualifications
are automatically recognized.
Implementation challenges remain for the free movement of people in the EAC. This is mainly due to
conflicting legal interpretation of the provisions on free movement of workers and services providers. The
EAC Common Market Protocol (Article 10) guarantees free movement for citizens to work and reside
within the five partner states using a common passport. Free movement commitments will be phased in
up to 2015, while negotiations continue on liberalizing labor markets. The Protocol commits partner
states to harmonize and recognize academic and professional qualifications granted in other partner states.
To this end, two annexes on mutual recognition are being negotiated. Partner states are also exploring
regional portability and harmonization of social security benefits.
The lack of harmonization of immigration and labor legislation among COMESA member states has
impeded the different protocols’ objectives. COMESA has several legal instruments dealing with the free
movement of people, but only the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa
Requirements is in force (and at various stages of implementation in Member States). The Protocol on
Free Movement of Persons, Labour Services and the Right of Establishment and Residence (2006) has
been ratified by only one member country. Under the Model Immigration Law, member countries would
agree to introduce visa-free entry for a maximum of 90 days a year, subject to various requirements.
Southern Africa
South Africa is the largest net recipient of low-skilled migrants from the Southern African region, and is a
major destination for intra-African migration. In Southern Africa, the cross-border movement of people
has long been linked to work in diamond and gold mines, and in commercial farms and plantations in
South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa has been a net recipient of labor migrants not only
from immediately surrounding countries but also from the rest of Africa and abroad (figure 12).
According to the 2011 mid-Census estimates, South Africa received 1.4 million labor migrants in 1996–
2011. High immigration rates have led to a more restrictive migration policy as well as some xenophobia
in South Africa.
8
Figure 12. Arrivals in South Africa by main source, 2009–2010
2,000,000
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
2009
2010
Source: Statistics South Africa and South Africa Tourism.
The free movement regime is uneven in SADC. Without a formalized SADC protocol on free movement,
some countries (notably South Africa—box 1) have moved to grant selective visa-free entry. SADC first
produced a Draft Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in 1995, which was opposed by countries facing
high immigration. A new Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005) has not yet received
the required signatures from the nine member states to enable its entry into force. The Protocol would
oblige state parties to facilitate visa-free entry for all SADC citizens for a maximum of 90 days, and
provides rights to establishment, as well as permanent and temporary residence.
In Eastern and Southern Africa, the Tripartite Arrangement aims to expand intraregional trade, promote
inter-REC collaboration and facilitate joint planning, resource mobilization and project implementation.
The intention is that the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)-EAC-Southern
African Development Community (SADC) (or CES) will eventually merge into one REC.
The current effects of labor mobility on inclusive growth
This section will address the consequences of lacking migration management and regional integration on
inclusive growth; looking at the irregularity of migrants, lacking rights to land ownership, dual
citizenships and basic services, as well as social cohesion challenges, gender and remittances in Africa.
Much of intra-African migration is irregular and migrants face systemic disadvantages without access to
basic services, reducing the potential contributions of intra-African migration to development. High levels
of irregularity of African migrants stem in part from the restrictions on immigration and high costs of
travel documents combined with porous borders. Globally, an estimated 50 million people are today
living and working abroad in an irregular condition. Sub-Saharan African economies are mainly built on
informal sectors, and the majority of intra-African labor migrants remain employed in the informal
economy, often due to difficulties of obtaining legal residence status or work permits. South Africa, for
example, had an estimated 400,000 regular migrants and between 3 million and 6 million irregular
migrants in 2007. In 2009, Zimbabwe and South Africa concluded an agreement granting a 90-day visa
waiver for Zimbabweans travelling to South Africa. The high cost of Zimbabwean travel documents
means that many labor migrants remain undocumented and therefore unable to benefit from basic services.
But the conditions of temporary work permits generally force workers to stay with a single employer,
hindering vocational mobility. Although many migrants face systemic disadvantages, this is particularly
true for seasonal or irregular workers: for example, they often pay the same taxes as local residents but
without access to basic services, and may face risk of deportation. Great personal risks of migrants are
9
recurrent: Migrants risk family breakdown, financial loss and fragmentation of their networks,
discrimination, insecurity and stress.
Even within the RECs, social cohesion and inclusive growth is furthermore challenged by limited land
ownership rights for migrants, the non-recognition of qualifications and dual citizenship, and limited
opportunities for family reunification. Historically, agricultural labor migrants were given a land share to
cultivate their own crops as compensation for helping out on large farms, as in Côte d’Ivoire. Current
challenges include conflicts, immigration pressures and unequal rights, which exacerbate social exclusion.
Finally, few integration efforts have allowed xenophobia and social factionalism to gain ground. The
social costs of lacking integration include risks to health and social cohesions.
Studies show that the more restricted the access is of the poor to social security, public services and
markets in national contexts, the more difficult the access of the poor is to non-exploitive forms of labor
migration. Addressing the gender dimension of all stages of migration can help empower traditionally
disadvantaged groups, socially and financially. Migration provides opportunities for demographic
transition and empowerment of women. When fathers migrate, women have new decision-making
responsibilities. Male labor migration has thus opened up opportunities for women in countries such as
Lesotho, with increased female representation in the workforce. However, for those left behind, migration
can entrench traditional roles and inequalities in the origin countries and produce negative social effects
on the children. And when migrating, women are especially vulnerable: they are more exposed to risks
during migration itself and when in the destination country, and face risks to their safety (such as human
trafficking).
In Africa high costs of sending remittances hamper the positive impact on financial inclusion and poverty
alleviation, as well as possible benefits to the health and schooling of children in low-income households.
n several fragile states, remittances are estimated to exceed 50% of GDP, while the need to tap on the
large African diaspora for skills is underdeveloped. Remittances from the African diaspora amounted to
nearly USD 40 billion in 2010 or 2.6% of the continent’s GDP—providing vital funds for investment and
household consumption.40 Money transfer fees for remittances in Africa are costly, indeed: Sub-Saharan
Africa has the highest fees in the world, and intra-African charges are especially high. For example, the
cost of sending USD 200 between Burkina Faso and Ghana is 16%, and between Burkina Faso and Côte
d’Ivoire 9%.41 A large share of remittances is therefore sent through informal channels. Africa loses an
estimated USD 15 billion a year because of the high fees, burdensome documentary requirements and
lack of competition in the money transfer market.42 An underdeveloped financial infrastructure and weak
regulatory environment are other factors. On the statistical front, remittance data fail to show intraAfrican trends.
Efforts to expand the rights of and involve the diaspora in local development are increasing throughout
Africa, though mainly focused on the diaspora in the global north. More than a dozen African countries
are elaborating migration policies—as well as two RECs—mainly to capitalize on migration (figure 9).
Among the initiatives to involve the diaspora are expansion of double nationality rights; the right to vote
for nationals abroad; the support of associations and entrepreneurs of the diaspora; and encouragement of
migrant investments. Such initiatives are backed by different councils or ministries for Africans abroad.
However, there is almost no consideration of the African diaspora within Africa itself.43 It is mainly in the
countries with large south–north migration patterns, such as Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal that have
benefited from support for co-development, circular migration and other bi- or multilateral agreements.
10
Figure 9. Migration policies being drawn up, early 2013
Policy Implications and Conclusion
As a resource, migration is unevenly distributed between countries, and within countries. People from the
global North enjoy increased freedom of movement, and progressively have the option not to migrate for
work or secure some services due to technological advances. Compared with most Africans, they have the
two freedoms of migrating legally (without heavy visa restrictions) and being able not to migrate and
instead work, communicate and access information from their computers at home. In Africa, migration is
still usually a necessity—or even a survival mechanism.
African countries and RECs can do more to ensure development results from migration, from high- and
low-skilled migrants. Africa’s low progress of regional integration leaves space for improving dimensions
that are important for human capital development, such as health and social protection. The issue of
overlapping memberships in regional organizations needs to be addressed in African subregions, to focus
efforts on regional integration. Immigrants affects both the demand for goods and services and the supply
side of the economy, and weak coordination of regional skills is hampering the drive toward diversified
economies
If supported by regional policies, migration can enhance human capital development of migrants, families
and communities, and contribute to national development. Regional integration can lead to better
migration management, protection of migrants’ rights and contributions of intra-African migrants to
origin and destination countries. This would help achieve inclusive growth, which heavily depends on the
capability of the most disadvantaged social groups to participate in building national and regional wealth
and to receive, in return, a rewarding share of that growth, thus spurring social mobility. When looking to
Latin America, Mercosur and the Andean Community have moved from operating narrow schemes that
encourage labor mobility for high-skilled workers to reducing the constraints to migration more broadly
in an attempt to enhance developmental benefits.
Regularizing labor mobility could represent a short-term solution to addressing the mismatch between
labor market supply and demand, and regional skills pooling could be a strong incentive for investments
in Africa. Africa has a pressing need to train, retain and attract highly skilled professionals. There is a
strong relationship between African firms’ access to services and their productivity, but domestic
regulations on the entry and operations of professional service firms undermines competition through
11
lacking mutual recognition of qualifications that impedes access to high-quality services to the private
sector. Further, balancing human resources between urban and rural regions is critical for reducing
poverty and increasing human capital development and opportunities in the poorest areas. Moreover,
easing people’s mobility could offer access to medical care and quality education across borders. Finally,
there is a need for a liberal approach to multiple-entry visas and a right to change employer during
migration, to facilitate movement from lower- to higher-wage jobs and thus from less to more productive
employment.
Social cohesion can contribute to better economic outcomes; however, preferential access to migration is
likely to reinforce structural inequalities between rich and poor in Africa. Human development gains can
be maximized and sustained with regional social policies conducive to inclusiveness and social cohesion.
Social protection systems must play a key role in coping with shocks that a more open and competitive
regional market brings. Specific steps are thus needed to ensure maximum benefits of migration for
African youth. These include services on labor migration in subregions; skills recognition; right of
establishment; urban/territorial planning; cheaper remittance fees and better services (including mobile
banking and other new services); and structural legal changes allowing land to be owned by migrants.
Mobility demands attention to equitable mobile education, health and other basic services. Agricultural
labor migrants would need special attention, as would the gender dimension at all stages of migration.
There is also a need to involve the African diaspora more closely, while intra-African remittances need
more attention to improve their effect on financial inclusion and poverty reduction.
Further research and data generation is required, to link migration policies and programs to results.
Research on each of the economic aspects of migration, such as its impact on the labor market,
international trade, innovation and consumption patterns would add value to migration policies under
development. The main areas lacking analytical work are data—especially harmonized—on migration
(national and regional) as well as GATS Mode 4 service impediments (particularly for the extractive
industries, ICT and banking).
Finally, targeted policies to improve migration impacts are unlikely to succeed if not accompanied by a
more general process of structural political and economic reform.44 Such policies aimed at increasing
people’s welfare, creating functioning markets and improving social security and public services are
likely to enhance the contribution that migration and remittances can make to development. Investments
in education, health and legal and social protection should thus be part of a comprehensive migration
policy, as should investments in ICT.
12
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Notes
1
Black and others 1996; Hugo and Piper 2007; Ratha and Shaw 2007; Bakewell 2008.
Bakewell 2008.
3
De Haan 1999; Ellis 2000.
4
Ratha 2011.
5
Quinn 2006; Taylor 1999.
6
UNDP 2009.
7
Hampshire 1999; Woutersee 2006.
8
See, for example, Woutersee (2006).
9
Adams 2004.
10
de Haas 2009.
11
Woutersee 2008.
12
Bakewell 2008.
13
Hampshire 2002; Black 2005; Ratha 2011.
14
OECD 2004.
15
UNDP 2009.
16
Ratha 2011.
17
OECD-SWAC 2008. However, the “portability” of social security or pensions is not central to regional migration
regimes.
18
Kapur 2004.
19
Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002.
20
de Haas 2012.
21
Tabarrok 2006.
22
Clemens 2011; Rodrik 2005; Pritchett 2006.
23
Pritchett 2006; Tabarrok 2006.
24
World Bank 2006.
25
World Bank 2008.
26
Dodson and others 2008.
27
Ratha and Shaw 2007.
28
World Bank 2010.
29
The high costs of travel documents also hamper movement: one in 10 countries still have passport costs exceeding
10% of per capita income (UNDP 2009).
30
World Bank 2010.
31
Bredeloup 1995.
2
18
32
AU 2009.
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Communauté des États sahélo-sahariens (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS), Inter- governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC)
34
Data on intraregional migration are scarce, however.
35
de Haas 2005.
36
de Haas 2005.
37
Adepujo 2005.
38
World Bank Indicators.
39
World Bank 2010.
40
Ratha 2011.
41
Ratha 2011.
42
World Bank 2011.
43
Kleist 2007; Bakewell 2008.
44
de Haas 2009.
33
19