Enjoyment
Richard Warner, Sean Stidd, and Steven Wagner
Enjoyment is an intellectual height philosophers have failed to scale.
The path is plain. We must account for two facts: we feel enjoyment, and
we appeal to it in justifying and explaining action. The problem is that
philosophers routinely give pride of place to one fact while regulating the
other to a secondary role, if they give it any significant role at all. This is
unfortunate and surprising. It is unfortunate that we lack an adequate
account of a concept that plays a central role in evaluation and practical
reasoning. It is surprising that a central concept should go for so long so
inadequately analyzed. We seek to remedy this lack.
Our central idea is that enjoyment consists in a causal harmony: an
activity or experience causes you desire it and simultaneously causes you to
believe that that desire is satisfied.1 To capture the feeling of enjoyment, we
require that the desire be felt and the belief, occurrent. We address the
justificatory/explanatory aspect by noting that the belief/desire pair is
typically (but importantly not always) a reason to act in ways that ensure the
existence or continuance of the enjoyed experience or activity.
We construct our account by completing the following biconditional:
x enjoys φ if and only if ... ,
A similar idea appears in Kant: “The consciousness of the causality of a
representation in respect of the state of the subject as one tending to preserve a
continuance of that state, may here be said to denote in a general way what is called
pleasure.” Critique of Judgement, James Creed Meredith translation, Oxford
University Press, 1952.
1
Enjoyment
where φ is an individual, non-repeatable experience or activity. Our talk of
experiences and activities is just a convenient way to describe the range of
items that is our primary concern. We merely have in mind the rough and
ready distinction enshrined in ordinary talk and thought. Even so, the
restriction of values of ‘φ’ to experiences and activities may still seem
problematic since we obviously enjoy things that are not experiences and
activities: wine and works of art, for example. But, of course, you can enjoy
wine only if you taste it, and the painting, only if you look at it. In general,
where y is something other than an experience or activity, you enjoy y if and
only if you enjoy φ, where φ is a suitable experience or activity involving y.
Desire, Belief, and Quantification
To state our account, we need to quantifying over individuals and
properties in desire and belief contexts. To this end, we adopt the standard
Quinean convention. Where ‘[’ and ‘]’ are the left and right corner quotes, a
singular term [t] may be substituted salva veritate for a term [t'] in the
context [ ... desires (believes), of t, that . . .] given the true identity [t = t’].
We need one further refinement. Imagine you are enjoying the experience
of tasting bittersweet chocolate. The bitter sweetness pervades a gustatory
field that captures your attention, and it is this bitter sweetness you desire.
We will express this by saying that you desire, of the experience, under the
feature bittersweet, that it should occur. A similar point holds for activities.
We adopt the same conventions for belief for the same reason. When
one of believes that a particular ongoing experience or activity realizes a
2
Enjoyment
certain array of features, we will say that one believes, of the experience or
activity, under that array, that it is occurring.
Desire and the Need for More
We take it for granted that you enjoy φ only if you desire to have or
do φ.2 We understand ‘desire’ in the broadest possible sense to include such
diverse sources of motivation as values, ideals, needs, commitments,
personal loyalties, and patterns of emotional reaction.3
For discussion see, Richard Warner, Enjoyment,” Philosophical Review, 1980;
J.C.B., Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed, Oxford
University Press, 1969; Timothy Schroeder, “Pleasure, Displeasure and
Representation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31, 4:507-30 (2001). Compare
Leonard D. Katz, “Hedonic arousal, memory and motivation,” Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 5, 1:60 (1982) (arguing that desire is a contingent result of the experience
of pleasure).
2
The desire to φ need not exist prior to one’s enjoying φ. We conceive of a desire
as a state that not only causes one to seek what one lacks, but to persist once one
finds it. This will seem counterintuitive to those who see desire as related to a
"perceived lack," but it should cause no problems to those who think of desires as
states that move us to action. See, for example, Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2, p. 295f.: "A brief word on
desire. When action occurs, it is in the final analysis this phenomenon that underlies
all of the workings of the act generative mental machinery." Thus desire is what
explains my acting so as to maintain ongoing experiences and activities whose
occurrence I want, even when I know such experiences are occurring (compare
quotes from Hobbes below). O'Shaughnessy characterizes desire as a "striving
towards an act of fulfillment" (2, p. 296). In this, he agrees with Aristotle; the root
meaning of Aristotle's most general word for desire-'orexis'-is "a reaching out after."
Plato is one source of the "perceived lack" view (see Symposium, for example). This
view is indefensible as a general characterization of desire. The problem is revealed
by Hobbes. In Leviathan, Hobbes characterizes desire as an "endeavour . . . toward
something which causes it," but he restricts the use of 'desire' to cases in which the
object of desire is absent. However, he then notes: "that which men desire, they are
also said to LOVE: and to HATE those things for which they have aversion. So that
desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the
absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same. So also by
aversion we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object" (Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William
Molesworth [London: John Bohn, 1939]). Surely, Hobbes is right. If desire requires
the absence of the object, we need a word for that attitude that is just like desire
3
3
Enjoyment
It is clearly not a sufficient condition for enjoying φ that you desire to
φ. Suppose you desire to undergo dental treatment. In our canonical form:
you desire, of your current experience, under the feature needed dental
treatment, that it should occur. However, dental treatment is for you an
ordeal of discomfort and anxiety. You desire to undergo your current
experience only as a means to the end of adequate dental health, and you
most certainly do not enjoy the experience. The obvious response is to
distinguish between desiring something for its own sake and desiring
something only as a means to an end. To desire that p for its own sake is to
desire that p and not to desire it merely for the sake of some other end q.4
To desire that p merely for the sake of q is to desire that p, and desire that
q, where one would not desire that p if one did not desire that q or believe
that realizing p was a means to realizing q.5
except that its object is present-the attitude that explains why one would resist
removal of the object. Remove the object and this attitude is 'desire'. But then why
not just say that 'love' and 'desire' are just the same state-whether the object is
present or absent? Or at least say that 'love' and 'desire' are instances of some
single generic desire-state? As Hobbes says, "love and desire are the same thing."
What does it mean to say that one desires, of φ, under A, that it should occur for
its own sake? What is the “it”? Our answer: φ’s realization of A. What one wants
for its own sake is that φ should realize A.
4
The definitions have to be applied with some finesse, as the following example (due
to Sean Stidd) shows. A romantically inclined charlatan is infatuated with a woman
and desires to marry her for its own sake. He also desires to marry as a means to
getting money from her grandfather. Depending on the grandfather’s ultimate
opinion of him, he will pay him a sizable sum either as a dowry or to disappear. The
charlatan woos the woman, but finds the wooing boring and desires to do it only for
the sake of marrying her and getting the money. So: the charlatan does not desire
to woo the woman for its own sake; however: he desires to woo her, and desires
the money, but it is not true that he would not desire to woo her if he did not desire
the money. He would woo her for the sake of marrying her. The example shows we
need to be careful in applying the definition. It is true that the charlatan, and he
desires to woo her, and desires to get the money and/or marry her, and would not
desire to woo her if he did not desire the disjunctive state of affairs of marrying her
5
4
Enjoyment
Simplicity argues for the following account: one enjoys φ under A if
and only if one φ’s, and one desires, of φ, under A, that it should occur for
its own sake.6 The condition is not sufficient, however, as the following
example shows.7 You have never been deep-sea fishing, but have long had a
desire to do so for its own sake, and are now in fact engaged in that very
activity, and you of course believe that you are. That belief combines with
your standing desire to go deep sea fishing to yield the desire, of your
present activity, under deep-sea fishing, that it occur for its own sake. You
are not, however, enjoying the activity under the feature deep-sea fishing.
You find the activity distasteful. You get seasick; you are disgusted by the
crowded, noisy deck from which you must fish; you are repelled by the
necessity of barehandedly catching the small, live fish used for bait, and you
are even more repelled by the fact that, once you have succeeded in
or getting the money, or did believe that wooing her was a means to that disjunctive
state of affairs. A more precise approach: using ‘desires φ/A’ as short for
‘desires, of φ, under A’, we have
x desires φ/A merely for the sake of ψ1/A1 or . . . or ψn/An if and only
(1) x desires φ/A and desires each of ψ1/A1 . . . ψn/An; (2) x believes
that φ’s having A is a means to ψ1’s having A1, and . . . and ψn’s
having An; (3) x would not desire φ/A if x did not desire at least one of
ψ1/A1 . . . ψn/An or did not believe that φ’s having A was a means to at
least one ψi ‘s having Ai.
And:
x desires φ/A its for the sake if and only if x desires φ/A and x does
not desire φ/A merely for the sake of some ψ1/A1 or . . . or ψn/An.
See Richard Brandt, “Hedonism” in Donald Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Gale 2005, and Chris Heathwood, “The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to
Desire,” Philosophical Studies 2007, vol. 133; pp. p. 32 (“a sensation S, occurring at
time t, is a sensory pleasure at t iff the subject of S desires, intrinsically and de re,
at t, of S that it be occurring at t”).
6
The example is adapted from Richard Warner, Freedom, Enjoyment, and
Happiness: An Essay on Moral Psychology, Cornell University Press, 1987, and
Richard Warner, “Enjoyment,” The Philosophical Review, October 1980, 507-26.
7
5
Enjoyment
grabbing the bait, you have to impale the struggling fish by the gills on your
hook. But your desire to fish survives this initial shock, and you continue to
fish even though you admit to yourself that you are not enjoying it. You only
continue to fish in the hope that you will enjoy it. In the present, however,
your desire to fish is waning. It persists, but it persists despite your
reactions, and it is only the hope that things will change that keeps it alive.
It easy to construct similar examples. You just need (1) a preexisting
desire to have a type of experience or engage in a a type of activity for its
own sake; (2) the belief, of a particular instance of the experience or activity,
under an array of features A, that it is now occurring; and (3) the resulting
desire, of the experience or activity, under A, that it should occur for its own
sake, where (4) the desire in (3) persists for a while in spite of, not because
of the particular experience or activity. These examples to show that it is not
sufficient to count as enjoying φ, under A that one φ’s and desires, of φ,
under A, that it occur for its own sake. The examples are convincing because
the relevant desire persists, in spite of, not because of, the experience or
activity.
Transforming this feature into its opposite transforms the example into
one of enjoyment, and generalizing from transformation yields an account of
enjoyment. Thus: suppose a large fish suddenly strikes your line, and all of
your attention is immediately focused on the fight to land it. Your seasick
feeling, your impinging awareness of the crowded deck, and your qualms
about catching the live bait are instantly eclipsed by the excitement of the
fight; moreover, after you have landed the fish, you find that you are no
6
Enjoyment
longer seasick. The deck no longer seems inhospitably crowded but full of
cooperative people who are congratulating you on your catch. Even catching
and hooking the live bait now seems just one of those necessities which
disquiet only the uninitiated. You find now that you want to fish not in spite
of, but because of your experiences. You are—as you now realize—enjoying
it.
We interpret the “not in spite of, but because of” causally. This appeal
to causation is to be understood in the context of everyday causal
explanations. The identification of causes in such explanations is highly
pragmatic. For example, when eight-year-old Sally asks her mother why the
mill wheel turns, her mother replies that the wheel turns because the water
trikes it. When Sally, now an undergraduate, is working on a similar
homework problem for her Physics course, her answer includes a calculation
of the friction in the mill’s system. With causation so understood, we suggest
that after the large fish strikes your line, but not before, there is an array of
features A meeting these conditions: your activity of deep-sea fishing causes
you to believe, of that activity, under A, that it is occurring; and, to desire, of
that activity, under A, that it should occur. Thus, the activity not only causes
you to desire it for its own sake, it also ensures the—at least apparent—
satisfaction of that desire by causing you believe that you are getting exactly
what you want.
Generalizing, we have
x enjoys φ under A if and only if
(1) x φ’s;
7
Enjoyment
(2) x's φing causes x
(a) to believe, of φ, under A, that it occurs, and
(b) to desire, of φ, under A, that it occur for its own sake. 8
Note that (b) reads “occur” not “continue to occur.” To see why, consider
enjoying writing the last word of an essay. Writing the last word is
necessarily an activity that occurs in a relatively short time span; if it takes a
year for one to “write the last word,” then whatever one is doing, it is not, in
any normal understanding of the phrase, writing the last word. Thus, when
one enjoys writing the last word, one does not desire the impossible: that
one’s writing the word should continue beyond writing the last word; one
simply desires that it happen.
Enjoyment and Reasons for Action
We explain the explanatory-justificatory aspect of enjoyment by
focusing on the “of φ, under A” belief/desire pair: such pairs are typically
reasons to have or do φ. But isn’t this already to take a wrong step? When φ
is an activity, it makes sense to think of the belief/desire pair as a reason to
φ, but how are we to understand ‘reason to φ’ when φ is an experience?
Reasons for action guide our voluntary choices, but—so the objection goes—
we do not choose our experiences, we just have them. It is of course just
false that we do not choose our experiences. Having an experience is
This account is adapted from Richard Warner, Freedom, Enjoyment, and Ha,
Richard Warner, “Enjoyment.” Wayne Davis adapts and criticizes Warner in “A Causal
Theory of Enjoyment,” Mind, 91 (1982). pp. 240-256. For Warner’s response, see
Davis on Enjoyment: A Reply, Mind, October 1983, 568-72.
8
8
Enjoyment
typically under your voluntary control in two ways: you may be able to
determine both whether it occurs and how long it endures. You can control
whether you have the experience of tasting the wine by taking or not taking
a sip, and you can control the duration of your taste experience by how
deeply you drink. By ‘a reason to have an experience’, we mean a reason to
exercise control in one of the above ways.
But even if reason for action is the right concept, haven’t we chosen
the wrong belief/desire combination? If we want to illuminate the
explanatory/justificatory dimension of enjoyment, shouldn’t we be focusing
on the general desire for enjoyment and the various expectation that arise
that one will enjoy some particular experience or activity φ? That would be
mistake. To explain reason-providing role of the desire for
enjoyment/expectation of enjoying φ, we need to appeal to the reasonproviding role of the “of φ, under A” belief/desire pair involved in the
enjoyment itself. To explain why, we need an account of reasons for action.
We need the account in any case; otherwise, our suggestion that the
belief/desire pairs are typically reason is a mere gesture toward a possible
explanation of the explanatory/justificatory aspect of enjoyment. We sketch the
account we have in mind, beginning with the observation that ‘reason for
action’ is ambiguous.
Reasons may be belief/desire pairs that motivate a particular person to
act in a certain way, and that the person takes to justify, at least to some
degree, acting in that way. We label such reasons first-person reasons. A
first-person reason for a person to perform some action A is a belief/desire
9
Enjoyment
pair that plays, or in appropriate circumstances would play, a certain role for
that person in motivating and justifying doing A. First-person reasons
contrast with reasons that—even if they do not do so—should motivate a
person to perform an action, and that the person should regard as providing
at least some degree of justification for doing so. We will call such reasons
third-person reasons. Third-person reasons may be reasons for a particular
person, or group of persons, or all persons.9
We focus on first-person reasons. We take it to be clear that there is a
characteristic motivational-justificatory role is associated with first-person
reasons. We will not offer any further description of that role, except for the
following. We assume that a belief/desire pair is a first-person reason for
one to perform an action φ only if one believes it provides (at least some
degree of) justification for doing φ. We guide our actions by the light of the
justifications we take our first-person reasons to provide. We may lament
that the light is weak, all too subject to distorting factors such as prejudice,
and that such light as it does give is too frequently disregarded, but it is the
light by which we proceed nonetheless.
The link between first-person reasons and justification explains why
we described the “of φ, under A” belief/desire pairs as typically reasons to
have or do φ. The “typically” is required because you can enjoy φ when the
Our first-person/third-person reason distinction corresponds more or less to the
popular internal/external distinction. Debates about the objective or subjective
nature of reasons connects to two features in our account: the meaning of 'justified'
in the account of first-person reasons, and the meaning of 'should' in the definition of
third-person reasons. We take the agent-neutral/agent relative debate to be about
third-person reasons and what sorts of relativizations they permit.
9
10
Enjoyment
relevant belief/desire pair does not serve as a reason. A detailed canvassing
of the distinction between the two cases would illuminate the reasons for action
dimension of enjoyment. Here we consider just one example to show why
the belief/desire pairs do not always function as first-person reasons.
Thomas Gouge’s intensely religious upbringing instilled in him the
conviction that a man should not feel erotic desire for another man. The
adolescent Gouge nonetheless enjoys looking at his best friend under an
array of features A indicative of sexual attraction. Thus, in terms of the
definition of enjoyment, he believes, of his experience of looking at his
friend, under A, that it is occurring, and he desires, of the experience, under
A, that it should occur for its own sake. Gouge’s religious convictions,
however, lead him to conclude that the belief/desire pair does not provide
even the most miniscule degree of justification for looking in a sexual way at
his friend; he views the desire as an alien invader to be resisted and
destroyed, not a citizen of the realm of desires capable of providing him with
a justification for action. Even though the relevant belief/desire pair does not
serve as a first-person reason for Gouge, he does enjoy looking at his friend
in a sexual way. He regards the enjoyment in the same way in regards its
constituent belief/desire: a temptation Satan has placed in his path. But he
enjoys nonetheless.
The example shows why we should reject the plausible view that the
desire for enjoyment and the expectation that you will enjoy φ under A is
always a first-person reason to φ. Unless you expect the relevant “of φ,
under A” belief/desire pair involved in an enjoyment of φ to function as a
11
Enjoyment
first-person reason, the desire to enjoy and the expectation of enjoyment will
not combine to serve as a first-person reason.
Call the enjoyments in which the belief/desire pair serves as a firstperson reason first-person-reason enjoyments. They figure prominently in
our lives because what is of actions generally is true of our enjoymentseeking actions: we try to perform those for which we find some at least
some degree of justification in our belief/desire pairs. First-person-reason
enjoyments merit detailed investigation, but our goal is to illustrate how our
account combines and explains both the felt and reason-for-action aspects of
enjoyment. Accordingly, we turn to enjoyment as a feeling.
In the definition of enjoyment that we gave earlier, we did not require
that the desire be felt or that the belief be occurrent. The consequence is
that the definition states a necessary but not a sufficient condition. To
explain why, we first need to explain what we mean by a felt desire and an
occurrent belief. We do so by examples.
Felt Desire and Occurrent Belief
Felt desire. Imagine quenching a demanding thirst with a drink of
water. Before you drink, you desire, of your future experience φ of drinking
the water, under quenching your thirst, that it should occur for its own sake;
moreover, you feel the desire as an insistent, attention-riveting craving to
drink. When you drink, you continue to desire, of your now presently
occurring experience φ, under quenching your thirst, that it should occur.
12
Enjoyment
Occurrent belief.
Occurent beliefs are those beliefs present to
consciousness in more or less the way your belief that you are now reading
this sentence is currently before your mind. Occurrent beliefs vary greatly in
the way they are present to consciousness, and the variation accounts in part
for the variations in the feeling of enjoyment. Imagine your belief that you
are experiencing the taste of the Kung Pao Chicken is before your mind as a
consciousness-gripping complex of sensations. Compare the belief that you
are experiencing understanding, insight, and affirmation as you read the
lines from Faust. The belief is before your mind with an assent-compelling
clarity, an experience that differs in feeling from the consciousness-gripping
sensations that comprise the Kung Pao Chicken belief. Like felt desires,
occurrent beliefs also vary in intensity. Suppose, for example, that early in
the day you receive some good news—that you do not need the operation
that your doctor first thought you would. For the rest of the day, the belief
that the operation is unnecessary lingers on the periphery of selfconsciousness. Although it is not always before your mind in the way that
your belief that you are now reading this sentence is currently before your
mind, you nonetheless have it "in mind" all day. It contrasts in this way with
your belief, for example, that your grandmother was not married to
Mussolini. You are never, during the entire day, aware even in the slightest
degree of that belief.
The Feeling of Enjoyment
13
Enjoyment
To motivate the felt desire/occurrent belief requirement, consider two
examples. The thirst quenching case is the first. As you drink, you continue
to have the felt desire, of your now presently occurring experience φ, under
quenching your thirst, that it should occur; however, the sensations
attendant on drinking the water transform the feeling of insistent craving into
a felt embracing of the watery relief, an embracing you desire for its own
sake, not just as a means of alleviating the urge to drink. The experience
makes you continue to want it, and it also makes you occurrently believe, of
the experience, that it is occurring. The experience makes you aware of the
complex of sensations comprising the experience of the watery relief. The
sensations are present to your consciousness in—more or less—the way that
your awareness that you are now reading these words is present to your
consciousness. In this way, you occurrently believe, of φ, under quenching
your thirst, that it is occurring.
Compare Hannibal, a law professor, who is intentionally humiliating his
students by ridiculing their attempts to answer questions that even the best
of them have no hope of understanding. He desires to humiliate them for its
own sake, and the more he does it, the more that makes him want to. The
activity also causes him to believe that he is succeeding in humiliating them;
he monitors the students’ reactions, and that complex perceptions causes the
belief. Hannibal fulfills the definition: his questioning activity causes him to
believe, of that activity, under an array A including the feature humiliating
the students, that it is occurring, and to desire, of the activity, under A, that
it should occur for its own sake.
14
Enjoyment
Suppose however that the desire is not felt and the belief is not
occurrent. Hannibal is completely unaware of what he is doing. He tells
himself and others that he teaches in the traditional “Socratic” style, and that
he is raising the self-esteem of the students by leading them on a journey of
intellectual discovery. He thinks that he helps them see that they do not
understand and then leads them to understanding and that the achievement
gives them greater self-esteem. Does Hannibal enjoy humiliating the
students? We think not. This is not to deny that we might quite properly
answer, “Why does Hannibal humiliate his students?” with “He enjoys it.”
We would be ascribing the relevant belief/desire pair to him to explain his
behavior. However, the cases that lie at the core of our concept of
enjoyment are felt desire/occurrent belief cases. When we aim at
enjoyment, after all, we are aiming at experiencing the satisfaction of our
desires. We are not seeking the bloodless “enjoyments” that Hannibal
illustrates, “enjoyments” of which occur without our feeling them.
We submit that the feeling of enjoyment consists in all cases of having
the felt desire to φ for its own sake at precisely the same time that one
occurrently believes that one is φing. The variations how the desires feel
and how the beliefs manifest themselves account for the fact that there is no
one feeling F such that one enjoys something only if one feels F. The feeling
of enjoyment varies greatly. Compare the watery relief of satisfying an
urgent thirst; sexual gratification; a sudden whiff of perfume; learning that
one has received a fervently hoped for grant; the thoughts, associations, and
feelings aroused by reading the following lines from the end of Faust, spoken
15
Enjoyment
by the angels when they snatch Faust from Mephistopheles: “Wer immer
strebend sich bemüht,/Den können wir erlösen.”
Despite the variation, the temptation is strong to say that all
enjoyments somehow feel “the same.” Indeed, some insist acknowledge that
there is no one feeling F such that one enjoys something only if one feels F,
but they still insist that all enjoyments exhibit a particular felt quality, a
“hedonic tone.”10 The “tone” is supposed to be some more generic quality
that variety of feelings in enjoyment all instantiate. Hedonic tone theories
have a quite difficult time saying what that generic quality is beyond the
utterly unexplanatory “the generic quality all feelings of enjoyment exhibit by
virtue of being feelings of enjoyment.” Our account meets hedonic tone
theories halfway. There is a generic, feeling-related pattern all enjoyments
instantiate. They all exhibit a felt desire/occurrent belief combination playing
the required causal role. This generic pattern is not fully introspectible
however, as introspection will not reveal whether the causal requirement is
fulfilled.
Enjoyment and Value: Completing the Outline
As we have described them so far, enjoyments divide into two types:
those in which the belief/desire pairs serve as a first-person reason, and
those in which they do not. To complete our outline of the varieties of
enjoyment, we note that first-person-reason enjoyments subdivide into two:
C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956; Roger
Crisp, Reasons and the Good, Oxford University Press, 2006.
10
16
Enjoyment
those in which we value what we enjoy, and those in which we do not. To
see the point of the subdivision, recall that a belief/desire pair is a firstperson for someone only if that person believes it provides (at least some
degree of) justification for having or doing φ. We assume that we explain
and justify such beliefs by appeal to what we value. We do not however
think that if you believe a particular belief/desire pair provides (at least some
degree of) justification for having or doing φ, then you value your φing. The
link between justification and value is looser than that. Thus, we think it is
possible, for example, for you to first-person-reason enjoy the experience of
tasting the combination of canned tuna fish and catsup without valuing your
tasting it. Motivating and defending these claims requires a detailed
explanation of the notion of valuing we are invoking, and we defer that task
to another time. We conclude with our view of the basic typology of
enjoyments. A fully adequate account of enjoyment would examine the
elements of this typology in detail.
17
Enjoyment
18