Asteroids!
Real Asteroids Impact
1AC
Srsly, extinction fam
Brownfield 4 (Roger, Gaishiled Project, “A Million Miles a Day”, Presentation at the Planetary Defense Conference: Protecting
Earth From Asteroids, 2-26, http://www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=406&gTable= Paper&g ID=17092//cc)
Once upon a time there was a Big Bang... Cause/Effect - Cause/Effect -Cause/Effect and fifteen billion years later we have this
chunk of cosmos weighing in at a couple trillion tons, screaming around our solar system, somewhere, hair on fire at a million miles
a day, on course to the subjective center of the universe. Left to its own fate -- on impact -- this Rock would release
the kinetic energy equivalent of one Hiroshima bomb for every man, woman and child on the planet.
Game Over ... No Joy... Restart Darwin's clock… again. No happy ever after. There is simply no empirical logic or
rational argument that this could not be the next asteroid to strike Earth or that the next impact event
could not happen tomorrow . And as things stand we can only imagine a handful of dubious undeveloped and untested
possibilities to defend ourselves with. There is nothing we have actually prepared to do in response to this event. From an empirical
analysis of the dynamics and geometry of our solar system we have come to understand that the prospect of an Earth/asteroid
collision is a primal and ongoing process: a solar systemic status quo that is unlikely to change in the lifetime of our species. And
that the distribution of these impact events is completely aperiodic and random both their occasion and magnitude.
From abstracted averaged relative frequency estimates we can project that over the course of the next 500 million years in the life of
Earth we will be struck by approximately 100,000 asteroids that will warrant our consideration. Most will be relatively small,
100 to 1,000 meters in diameter, millions of tons: only major city to nation killers. 1,000 or so will be over
1,000 meters, billions of tons and large enough to do catastrophic and potentially irrecoverable damage to the entire
planet: call them global civilization killers. Of those, 10 will be over 10,000 meters, trillions of tons and on impact massive enough
to bring our species to extinction. All these asteroids are out there, orbiting the sun... now. Nothing more needs to happen for them
to go on to eventually strike Earth. As individual and discrete impact events they are all, already, events in progress. By any
definition this is an existential threat. Fortunately, our current technological potential has evolved to a point that if we choose to do
so we can deflect all these impact events. Given a correspondingly evolved political will, we can effectively manage this threat to the
survival of our species. But since these events are aperiodic and random we can not simply trust that any enlightened political
consensus will someday develop spontaneously before we are faced with responding to this reality. If we would expect to
deflect the next impact event a deliberate, rational punctuated equilibrium of our sociopolitical will is required now .
The averaged relative frequency analysis described above or any derived random-chance statistical probabilistic assessment, in
itself, would be strategically meaningless and irrelevant (just how many extinction level events can we afford?). However, they can
be indirectly constructive in illuminating the existential and perpetual nature of the threat. Given that the most critically relevant
strategic increment can be narrowly defined as the next “evergreen” 100 years, it would follow that the strategic expression of the
existent risk of asteroid impact in its most likely rational postulate would be for one and only one large asteroid to be on course to
strike Earth in the next 100 years... If we do eventually choose to respond to this threat, clearly there is no way we can address the
dynamics or geometry of the Solar System so there is no systemic objective we can respond to here. We can not address 'The
Threat of Asteroid Impact' as such. We can only respond to this threat as these objects present themselves as discrete impending
impactors: one Rock at a time. This leaves us the only aspect of this threat we can respond to - a rationally manifest first-order and
evergreen tactical definition of this threat Which unfortunately, as a product of random-chance, includes the prospect for our
extinction. Asteroid impact is a randomly occurring existential condition. Therefore the next large asteroid impact event is inevitable
and expectable, and that inevitable expectability begins... now. The Probability is Low: As a risk assessment: “The
probability for large asteroid impact in the next century is low”... is irrelevant . Say the daily random-chance
probability for large asteroid impact is one in a billion. And because in any given increment of time the chance that an impact will not
happen is far greater than it will, the chance that it will happen can be characterized as low. However, if we look out the window and
see a large asteroid 10 seconds away from impact the daily random-chance probability for large asteroid impact will still be one in a
billion... and we must therefore still characterize the chance of impact as low... When the characterization of the probability can be
seen to be tested to be in contradiction with the manifest empirical fact of the assessed event it then must also then be seen to be
empirically false. Worse: true only in the abstract and as such, misleading. If we are going to respond to these events,
when it counts the most, this method of assessment will not be relevant. If information can be seen to be irrelevant
ex post it must also be seen to be irrelevant ex ante. This assessment is meaningless. Consider the current threat of the asteroid
Apophis. With its discovery we abandon the average relative frequency derived annual random-chance probability for a rational
conditional-empiric probabilistic threat assessment derived from observing its speed, vector and position relative to Earth. The
collective result is expressed in probabilistic terms due only to our inability to meter these characteristics accurately enough to be
precise to the point of potential impact. As Apophis approaches this point the observations and resulting metrics become
increasingly accurate and the conditional-empiric probability will process to resolve into a certainty of either zero or one. Whereas
the random-chance probability is unaffected by whether Apophis strikes Earth or not. These two probabilistic perceptions are
inherently incompatible and unique, discrete and nonconstructive to each other. The only thing these two methodologies have in
common is a nomenclature: probability/likelihood/chance, which has unfortunately served only to obfuscate their semantic value
making one seem rational and relevant when it can never be so. However, merely because they are non rational does not make
averaged relative frequency derived random-chance probabilities worthless. They do have some psychological merit and enable
some intuitive 'old lady' wisdom. When we consider the occasion of some unpredictable event that may cause us harm and there is
nothing tangible we can do to deflect or forestall or stop it from happening, we still want to know just how much we should worry
about it. We need to quantify chance not only in in case we can prepare or safeguard or insure against potentially recoverable
consequences after the fact, but to also meter how much hope we should invest against the occasion of such events. Hope
mitigates fear. And when there is nothing else we can do about it only then is it wise to mitigate fear... “The probability for large
asteroid impact in the next century is low” does serve that purpose. It is a metric for hope. Fifty years ago, before we began to
master space and tangibly responding this threat of asteroid impact became a real course of action, hope was all we could do.
Today we can do much more. Today we can hold our hope for when the time comes to successfully deflect. And then, after we
have done everything we can possibly do to deflect it, there will still be of room for hope... and good luck. Until then, when
anyone says that the probability for large asteroid impact or Extinction by NEO is low they are offering nothing
more than a metric for hope -- not rational information constructive to metering a response or making a
decision to do so or not. Here, the probability is in service to illusion... slight-of-mind... and is nothing more than comfort-food-forthought. We still need such probabilistic comfort-food-for-thought for things like Rogue Black Holes and Gamma Bursts where we
are still imaginably defenseless. But if we expect to punctuate the political equilibrium and develop the capability to effectively
respond to the existential threat of asteroid impact, we must allow a rational and warranted fear of extinction by asteroid impact to
drive a rational and warranted response to this threat forward. Forward into the hands and minds of those who have the aptitude
and training and experience in using fear to handle fearful things. Fear focuses the mind... Fear reminds us that there are dire
negative consequences if we fail. If we are going to concern ourselves with mounting a response and deflecting these objects and
no longer tolerate and suffer this threat, would it not be far more relevant to know in which century the probability for large asteroid
impact was high and far more effective to orient our thinking from when it will not to when it will occur? But this probabilistic
perspective can not even pretend to approach providing us with that kind of information. As such, it can never be
strategically relevant: contribute to the conduct of implementing a response. The same can be said when such abstract
reasoning is used to forward the notion that the next asteroid to strike Earth will likely be small... This leads us to little more than a
hope based Planetary Defense. If we are ever to respond to this threat well then we must begin thinking about
this threat better. Large Asteroid Impacts Are Random Events. Expect the next one to occur at any
time . Strategically speaking, this means being at DefCon 3: lock-cocked and ready to rock, prepared to
defend the planet and mankind from the worst case scenario, 24/7/52... forever. Doing anything less by
design, would be like planning to bring a knife to a gunfight. If we expect our technological abilities to develop and
continue to shape our nascent and still politically tacit will to respond to this threat: if we are to build an effective Planetary Defense,
we must abandon the debilitating sophistry of “The probability for large asteroid impact in the next century is low” in favor of rational
random inevitable expectation... and its attendant fear.
Internal Link
Detection Key
Detection is key – it’s a prereq to successful deflection
Swanson, 15
Ana Swanson, reporter for Wonkblog specializing in business, economics, data visualization and China,
citing 2 professors of economics at George Mason University, “The greatest threat of planetary extinction
that we’re all not talking about,” The Washington Post, 6/30/15,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/06/30/the-greatest-threat-of-planetaryextinction-that-were-all-not-talking-about/ // IS
Asteroid defense is a particularly pernicious example of a public good, since neither the market nor the
government is yet providing it, says Tabarrok. Tabarrok argues that the easiest way to guard against
asteroids is just by improving our tracking of them. If an asteroid is headed straight for Earth, humans
ultimately have three options, he says: "You can blow it up , you can kick it , or you can tug it . The one
Hollywood likes, the Armageddon proposal, is to put a nuclear weapon up there and blow it up. However,
that’s what we should do at the last minute. If we discover it earlier, then you can just make tiny pushes or
pulls would be enough to knock it off course.” Now that humans have successfully landed a probe on a
comet, we know that we have the technology to do this. NASA has put some effort into mapping
asteroids whose orbits bring them within approximately 31 million miles of Earth's orbit around the sun
through the Near-Earth Object Camera, and has discovered many of the largest asteroids out there. But
there are still many that measure between 50 and a few hundred meters in diameter, large enough to
wipe out a city. According to an Asteroid Day Declaration signed by scientists including Bill Nye and
dozens of NASA scientists and astronauts, we've discovered fewer than 10,000 of the estimated million
asteroids that could strike the Earth, or less than 1 percent.
AT: SSA
SSA fails – litany of deficits
Weeden and Cefola, 10
Brian C. Weeden and Paul J. Cefola, *Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation, **Consultant in
Aerospace Systems, Spaceflight Mechanics, and Astrodynamics; Adjunct Professor, Department of
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University at Buffalo “COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND
ALGORITHMS FOR SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: HISTORY AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT,”
2010,
http://swfound.org/media/15742/computer%20systems%20and%20algorithms%20for%20space%20situat
ional%20awareness%20-%20history%20and%20future%20development.pdf // IS
Although all the currently existing SSA systems have algorithmic and computer systems limitations, the
systems used by the USG have the most acute, and documented, issues. The following list capabilities
and shortcomings are not addressed in
Observation
compression concepts are not available for either radar or optical sensors Fast and accurate orbit
propagator concepts are not available Fast and accurate state transition matrix concepts are not
available
-based sensor
Realistic process noise and measurement error models are
not employed
The processes developed by the AF Space Command for real time
tracking of the atmospheric density variations are limited and narrow in scope There is no process for
re-acquiring a significant portion of the catalog, as would be required in the event of a major geomagnetic storm
There is no mathematically ‘strong’ theory for the general concept of
observation association There is no concept for taking advantage of frameworks that can be massively
parallelized on distributed computing clusters
There is no web services-based architecture for SSA
There is no capability for organizing the very large databases that will result from large catalogs and
improved sensors
There is only a limited cooperative, positive relationship between the U.S. military
SSA community and the broader international astrodynamics research community
and operational requirements resulting from the NORAD ITW/AA certification process
Squo Solves
Status quo UN policies solve
Moskowitz, 10/28/13 – Associate Editor at Scientific American, covering space & physics (Clara,
“United Nations to Adopt Asteroid Defense Plan,” Scientific American,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/un-asteroid-defense-plan/)// IS
The U.N. plans to set up an “International Asteroid Warning Group” for member nations to share
information about potentially hazardous space rocks. If astronomers detect an asteroid that poses a
threat to Earth, the U.N.’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will help coordinate a mission
to launch a spacecraft to slam into the object and deflect it from its collision course. Lu and other
members of the Association of Space Explorers (ASE) recommended these steps to the U.N. as a first
step to address at the long-neglected problem of errant space rocks. “No government in the world today
has explicitly assigned the responsibility for planetary protection to any of its agencies,” ASE member
Rusty Schweickart, who flew on the Apollo 9 mission in 1969, said Friday at the American Museum of
Natural History. “NASA does not have an explicit responsibility to deflect an asteroid, nor does any other
space agency.” The ASE advocates that each nation delegate responsibility for dealing with a potential
asteroid impact to an internal agency—before the event is upon us.
Status quo solves asteroids – plenty of time for solutions and low probability
Wall, 11/22/13 – Senior Writer at Space.com, former science writer for the Idaho National Laboratory
and has been. He has a Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia, a
bachelor's degree from the University of Arizona, and a graduate certificate in science writing from the
University of California, Santa Cruz (Mike, “How Humanity Could Deflect a Giant Killer Asteroid,”
Space.com http://www.space.com/23530-killer-asteroid-deflection-saving-humanity.html)// IS
Scientists hope Sentinel and other asteroid-hunting instruments will spot dangerous NEOs several
decades before they could potentially slam into Earth. That's enough lead time to mount a successful
deflection effort, which would likely involve launching two separate space missions, former Apollo
astronaut and B612 co-founder and chairman emeritus Rusty Schweickart told SPACE.com earlier this
year. The first mission, he said, would send a robotic probe on a collision course with the asteroid,
knocking it off course via kinetic impact. The second would follow up, launching a "gravity tractor"
spacecraft to fly along with the space rock, nudging it further via a tiny but consistent gravitational tug.
Such a strategy would probably work on asteroids up to 1,300 feet (400 m) wide, Schweickart said at the
Oct. 25 press conference. Anything bigger than that likely demands a different response, he added, such
as a series of kinetic impacts or blasting the asteroid with a nuclear bomb. Colossal asteroid impacts that
cause mass extinctions are extremely rare events. For example, strikes like the one that killed off the
dinosaurs (and roughly 80 percent of all Earth's species) 65 million years ago happen roughly once every
100 million years, Schweickart said. But smaller (and much more frequent) strikes can still be devastating.
In 1908, an object thought to be just 130 feet (40 m) wide, or perhaps even smaller, exploded above the
Podkamennaya Tunguska River in Siberia, flattening roughly 770 square miles (2,000 square km) of
forest. Impacts like the "Tunguska Event" — which would have destroyed New York City, Tokyo or any
other metropolis if they had been in the asteroid's crosshairs — occur once every 300 years on average,
Schweickart said. So it makes sense to focus on city-killers and other relatively small asteroids rather
than the behemoths when thinking about how to deflect space rocks — especially since the true giants
are so easy to spot. "We're not going to be surprised by something that large," Schweickart said of
asteroids like the dinosaur-killer. "We will have lots of time to worry about it, or mix our martinis, or
whatever we're going to do."
Impact Defense
Slayer
Low probability, long timeframe, and the status quo solves
Globus, 6/6/14 – has worked on the asteroid mining, space settlement, Hubble, ISS, X37, Earth
observation, TDRSS, cubesats, lunar teleoperation, spaceflight affects on bone, computational fluid
dynamics visualization, molecular nanotechnology and space solar power. He founded and has run the
annual NASA Ames Space Settlement Student Design Contest for 22 years. He currently sits on the
board of the National Space Society. (Al, “Understanding the Asteroid Threat,” Rooster GNN,
http://en.roostergnn.com/2014/06/06/understanding-the-asteroid-threat/128689/)// IS
What is the current probability of an asteroid striking Earth? Depends on the size. Little ones hit every
day. A city killer once or twice a century. Extinction event about every 100 million years (it’s been 66
million years). These, of course, are averages. We could get an extinction event tomorrow — or not for
200 million years. Fortunately, we know where almost all of the big asteroids (extinction event) that could
hit Earth are and none of them will hit us for at least 100 years. We don’t know where 90% of the
somewhat smaller asteroids are — ones that could devastate a region (say, the Eastern seaboard). We
only know the location of 1% of the city killers. Even better, if we detect an incoming asteroid in time we
could deflect it. Thus, if we were to mount a vigorous detection campaign we could make the probability
essentially zero. This would cost around 1% of our civil space program budget. See
http://space.alglobus.net/papers/PlanetaryDefensePolicy2014.pdf which is close to the NSS position on
the matter.
No impact
No impact and no timeframe
Bennett 10
James Bennett, Professor of Economics at George Mason, “The Doomsday Lobby: Hype and Panic from
Sputniks, Martians, and Marauding Meteors,” p. 144-145 // IS
It should be noted that the Alvarez et al. hypothesis was not universally accepted. As Peter M. Sheehan
and Dale A. Russell wrote in their paper “Faunal Change Following the Cretaceous–Tertiary Impact:
Using Paleontological Data to Assess the Hazards of Impacts,” published in Hazards Due to Comets &
Asteroids (1994), edited by Tom Gehrels, “many paleontologists resist accepting a cause and effect
relationship” between the iridum evidence, the Chicxulub crater, and the mass extinction of 65 million
years ago.15 For instance, Dennis V. Kent of the Lamont–Doherty Geological Observatory of Columbia
University, writing in Science, disputed that a high concentration of iridium is necessarily “associated with
an extraordinary extraterrestrial event” and that, moreover, “a large asteroid… is not likely to have had the
dire consequences to life on the earth that they propose.”16 Briefly, Kent argues that the Alvarez team
mistakenly chose the 1883 Krakatoa eruption as the standard from it extrapolated the effects of
stratospheric material upon sunlight. Yet Krakatoa was too small a volcanic eruption from which to draw
any such conclusions; better, says Kent, is the Toba caldera in Sumatra, remnant of an enormous
eruption 75,000 years ago. (A caldera is the imprint left upon the earth from a volcanic eruption.) The
volume of the Toba caldera is 400 times as great as that of Krakatoa – considerably closer to the effect
that an asteroid impact might have. Yet the sunlight “attenuation factor [for Toba] is not nearly as large as
the one postulated by Alvarez et al. for the asteroid impact.” Indeed, the Toba eruption is not associated
with any mass extinctions, leading Kent to believe that “the cause of the massive extinctions is not closely
related to a drastic reduction in sunlight alone.”17 Reporting in Science, Richard A. Kerr wrote that “Many
geologists, paleontologists, astronomers, and statisticians… find the geological evidence merely
suggestive or even nonexistent and the supposed underlying mechanisms improbable at best.” Even the
iridium anomalies have been challenged: Bruce Corliss of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute
argues that the major extinctions associated with the K–T event were not immediate and catastrophic but
“gradual and apparently linked to progressive climate change.”18 Others argue that a massive volcanic
event predating the Alvarezian killer asteroid created an overwhelming greenhouse effect and set the
dinosaurs up for the knockout punch. A considerable number of scientists believe that gradually changing
sea levels were the primary cause of the K–T Extinction. If either of these hypotheses is true – and a
substantial number of geologists hold these positions — then the “killer asteroid” is getting credit that it
does not deserve. Even if the K–T Extinction was the work of a rock from space, the Alvarez team credits
a “probable interval of 100 million years between collisions with 10-km-diameter objects.”19 The next
rendezvous with annihilation won’t be overdue for about 40 million years. We have time .
Real Asteroids Impact
Advantage CPs
Asteroids CP (New!)
1NC
The United States federal government should fund the SENTINEL space
telescope project.
The SENTINEL solves asteroids [ and the economy ]
Puiu, 12
Tibi Puiu, Managing Partner at Brown Bear Advertising, Blogging and Social Media, citing Ed Lu, Space
Shuttle, Soyuz, and Space Station Astronaut, now Chairman and CEO of the B612 Foundation, “First
private space telescope is set to safeguard humanity from asteroid threats,” ZME Science, 6/29/12,
http://www.zmescience.com/space/first-private-space-telescope-map-asteroids-solar-system-432143 // IS
There are millions of asteroids currently residing in our Solar System, of which some 500 thousand orbit
in the inner solar system, where our planet also lies. Space agencies in the world have only mapped so
far a mere 1% of these. Clearly, an asteroid impact with Earth poses a serious and realistic threat to
humanity, and based on this the B612 Foundation was founded and its most ambitious project to date
spurred. Thus, the B612 Foundation unveiled its plans to build, launch, and operate the first privately
funded deep space mission, dubbed SENTINEL, a space telescope to be placed in orbit around the Sun,
ranging up to 170 million miles from Earth, for a mission of discovery and mapping. “During its 5.5-year
mission survey time, Sentinel will discover and track half a million Near Earth Asteroids, creating a
dynamic map that will provide the blueprint for future exploration of our Solar System, while protecting the
future of humanity on Earth,” said Ed Lu, Space Shuttle, Soyuz, and Space Station Astronaut, now
Chairman and CEO of the B612 Foundation. The B612 Foundation is working with Ball Aerospace,
Boulder, CO, which has designed and will be building the Sentinel Infrared (IR) Space Telescope with the
same expert team that developed the Spitzer and Kepler Space Telescopes. The telescope is expected
to include a 20-inch diameter mirror and scan the entire night half of the sky every 26 days to identify
every moving object with repeated observations in subsequent months. Data collected by the telescope
will be relayed back to Earth where asteroid orbits can be precisely deducted using specialized software.
The asteroid map will be shared with universities and governmental space agencies, alike. While
Sentinel’s primary goal is that of mapping asteroids to predict potential threatening scenarios, its mission
could also pose an economic benefit. There are currently trillions of dollars worth of valuable material
present in asteroids in our solar system, and identifying those which are the most rich and easy to reach
by an expedition could prove to be highly important in the future.
2NC Solvency
SENTINEL telescope key to deflection – that solves
Cooper, 15
Keith Cooper, Editor of Astronomy Now, “How to prevent another Chelyabinsk,” Astronomy Now, 2/14/15,
http://astronomynow.com/2015/02/14/how-to-prevent-another-chelyabinsk/ // IS
Efforts are now being made to address this. The B612 Foundation, headed up by former NASA
astronauts Dr Ed Lu and Rusty Schweickart, is constructing the Sentinel Space Telescope mission, to be
launched before the end of the decade. Sentinel is a 0.51-metre aperture telescope that will orbit the Sun
inside Earth’s orbit, close to Venus, in order to look back at any objects that are in near-Earth space, and
capture those asteroids, like the one that exploded over Chelyabinsk, that come from the direction of the
Sun and would otherwise be unseen from our planet. “The week of 15th February is a good time to
remember the fact that asteroids do hit our planet,” said Ed Lu in a statement issued this week by the
B612 Foundation. “The fact of the matter is that asteroid impacts can be prevented using technology we
can employ right now. And unlike other potentially global scale catastrophic events, the solution is nearly
purely a technical one, and with a relatively small and known cost. So what do we need to do to protect
the Earth from asteroid impacts? The surprising answer is that we must find the asteroids that will hit the
Earth. As long as we know early enough about an asteroid that will hit the Earth (meaning many years
and hundreds of millions of miles away from hitting Earth), it is actually not that difficult to deflect that
asteroid. In most cases simply running into the offending asteroid with a small spacecraft is sufficient.”
Asteroid mining solves economic growth and the environment
Aziz, 13
John Aziz, economics and business correspondent, “How asteroid mining could add trillions to the world
economy,” The Week, 6/25/13, http://theweek.com/articles/462830/how-asteroid-mining-could-addtrillions-world-economy // IS
When Planetary Resources was founded in 2012, its founders boldly claimed the company could "add
trillions of dollars to the global GDP" and "create a new industry and a new definition of 'natural
resources.'" While neither company has gotten off the ground yet, Planetary Resources successfully
raised $1 million in crowdfunding to place a new telescope, ARKYD, in space to hunt for Earthlike
planets. Peter Diamandis, Planetary Resources' CEO, estimates that an asteroid 98 feet long could
contain as much as $50 billion in platinum, and might also yield water for human consumption, or for
producing hydrogen fuel. The potential benefits to asteroid mining reach far beyond just profit, economic
growth, and expanding Earth's resource base. While mining on Earth can be highly destructive to natural
habitats — resulting in deforestation, soil erosion, chemical contamination, and the pollution of
groundwater — mining in space doesn't damage any natural habitats. Even more significantly, less
resource bottlenecks means less potential for future resource wars between competing countries — a
frightening scenario which the Pentagon has begun planning to address if need be. In the long run, being
able to mine resources in space will help humans create space-based communities, and explore deeper
and deeper into the universe, eventually transitioning us away from an entirely Earth-based civilization.
AT: Squo solves
Squo SENTINEL funding isn’t enough
Aron, 15
Jacob Aron, Physical sciences reporter for New Scientist, citing Martin Rees of the University of
Cambridge, “Don’t fear apocalyptic asteroids: you’re safer than you think,” New Scientist, 6/24/15,
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22630273.600-dont-fear-apocalyptic-asteroids-youre-safer-thanyou-think/ // IS
Rees is supportive of B612’s Sentinel space telescope, which the foundation says will cost $450 million to
build, money it hopes to raise through private donations. Originally due for launch in 2017, the scope has
now been pushed back to 2019, Lu says. B612’s tax filings show the organisation has some way to go to
reach its funding target. In 2011, before it began seeking donations for the telescope, the Foundation
raised $90,000. That rose to $1.6 million in 2013, the latest year for which filings have been published.
Much of the 2013 funding went towards the salaries of Lu and Danica Remy, B612’s chief operating
officer, who received $240,000 and $204,279 respectively.
PTX NB
Asteroid defense is popular
GiveWell, 13
GiveWell, a nonprofit dedicated to getting support to other non-profit organizations, “Detection of NearEarth Asteroids,’ GiveWell, March 2013, http://www.givewell.org/labs/causes/asteroid-detection // IS
In 2005, Congress set an additional goal: identifying 90% of asteroids larger than 140 meters in diameter
by 2020.17 The National Research Council estimates that $50 million per year would be required to reach
the new 90% goal a decade late, by 2030, but current funding is only approximately $20 million per year,
and the goal is not expected to be met.18 Despite the lack of funding to date, it seems to us that this
issue continues to be on NASA and Congress' agenda to some extent. For instance, in February 2013,
two Democrats on the House subcommittee on space wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post calling for
more spending on asteroid risk mitigation, and the committee chairman, a Republican, announced a
hearing to discuss the risk.19 (Both were triggered by the coincidence of a meteor strike that caused
many injuries—but no deaths—in Russia and a near-miss of Earth by a 45 meter-wide asteroid on
February 15.) In addition, over the past decade, NASA has conducted multiple cost-effectiveness
analyses of further work to detect near-earth asteroids.20
Drone Strikes CP
Solvency mechanism
The United States federal government should:
limit the use of drones to high value targets
improve transparency in the drone program
develop internationally recognized norms for the use and sale of drones
through an international convention
Those legal norms set precedents which are key to check international drone
misuse
Boyle, 13
Michael Boyle, Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia and a Senior
Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,”
2013, Wiley // IS
In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course and establish a new drones
policy which mitigates these costs and avoids some of the long-term consequences that flow from them.
A more sensible US approach would impose some limits on drone use in order to minimize the political
costs and long-term strategic consequences. One step might be to limit the use of drones to HVTs, such
as leading political and operational figures for terrorist networks, while reducing or eliminating the strikes
against the ‘foot soldiers’ or other Islamist networks not related to Al-Qaeda. This approach would reduce
the number of strikes and civilian deaths associated with drones while reserving their use for those
targets that pose a direct or imminent threat to the security of the United States. Such a self-limiting
approach to drones might also minimize the degree of political opposition that US drone strikes generate
in states such as Pakistan and Yemen, as their leaders, and even the civilian population, often tolerate or
even approve of strikes against HVTs. Another step might be to improve the levels of transparency of the
drone programme. At present, there are no publicly articulated guidelines stipulating who can be killed by
a drone and who cannot, and no data on drone strikes are released to the public.154 Even a Department
of Justice memorandum which authorized the Obama administration to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American
citizen, remains classified.155 Such non-transparency fuels suspicions that the US is indifferent to the
civilian casualties caused by drone strikes, a perception which in turn magnifies the deleterious political
consequences of the strikes. Letting some sunlight in on the drones programme would not eliminate all of
the opposition to it, but it would go some way towards undercutting the worst conspiracy theories about
drone use in these countries while also signalling that the US government holds itself legally and morally
accountable for its behaviour.156 A final, and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences
of drones would be to develop internationally recognized standards and norms for their use and sale. It is
not realistic to suggest that the US stop using its drones altogether, or to assume that other countries will
accept a moratorium on buying and using drones. The genie is out of the bottle: drones will be a fact of
life for years to come. What remains to be done is to ensure that their use and sale are transparent,
regulated and consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards. The Obama
administration has already begun to show some awareness that drones are dangerous if placed in the
wrong hands. A recent New York Times report revealed that the Obama administration began to develop
a secret drones ‘rulebook’ to govern their use if Mitt Romney were to be elected president.157 The same
logic operates on the international level. Lethal drones will eventually be in the hands of those who will
use them with fewer scruples than President Obama has. Without a set of internationally recognized
standards or norms governing their sale and use, drones will proliferate without control , be misused
by governments and non-state actors, and become an instrument of repression for the strong. One
remedy might be an international convention on the sale and use of drones which could establish
guidelines and norms for their use, perhaps along the lines of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) treaty, which attempted to spell out rules on the use of incendiary devices and
fragment-based weapons.158 While enforcement of these guidelines and adherence to rules on their use
will be imperfect and marked by derogations, exceptions and violations, the presence of a convention
may reinforce norms against the flagrant misuse of drones and induce more restraint in their use than
might otherwise be seen. Similarly, a UN investigatory body on drones would help to hold states
accountable for their use of drones and begin to build a gradual consensus on the types of activities for
which drones can, and cannot, be used.159 As the progenitor and leading user of drone technology, the
US now has an opportunity to show leadership in developing an international legal architecture which
might avert some of the worst consequences of their use.
Transparency key
Transparency is the only way to solve legitimacy
Davis et al, 15
Lynn Davis, Michael McNerney, and David Byman, *Senior Political Scientist, **Associate Director,
International Security and Defense Policy Center; Senior Defense Research Analyst, ***Adjunct Political
Scientist, “Armed Drone Myth 2: It's Counterproductive to Develop International Norms,” RAND, 2/18/15,
http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/02/armed-drone-myth-2-its-counterproductive-to-develop.html // IS
Countries like China, Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Turkey, the UAE, Israel, and South Africa are
developing long-range armed drones of varying levels of sophistication. There is clearly a risk that these
countries or others will one day employ armed drones in ways that could cause concern, for example, in a
secretive fashion without clear legal foundations, against those not clearly identified as combatants in a
conflict, and in places outside the limits of national laws. U.S. use of armed drones has obviously faced
controversy on these very issues. Some argue that armed drones are inherently destabilizing and
illegitimate, and establishing standards for their use—norms—would create an aura of legitimacy where
none should exist. Others argue that armed drones are just like any other weapon, and attempts to
develop norms will only tie the hands of the United States, while doing nothing to constrain others. Like it
or not, this genie cannot be put back in the bottle. U.S. use is establishing precedents that other
nations might follow. While they may not transform warfare, armed drones provide the ability to identify
and kill an individual from a standoff distance in a way that is unprecedented and unsettling to many
Americans. It is easy to imagine drones being employed in ways that exacerbate regional tensions, that
undermine the laws of war (e.g., assassinating foreign leaders) or that threaten a nation's sovereignty and
domestic rule of law. The Obama administration, in fact, agrees that it has to reduce these risks by
becoming more transparent in how it is employing armed drones, especially in targeting individuals
outside traditional battlefields. The challenge in establishing international norms will be to define rules that
preserve the rights of countries to use these systems in legitimate ways against legitimate threats (senior
al Qaeda or Islamic State terrorists) while constraining illegitimate uses (political dissidents). The
international community has established norms, with and without U.S. leadership, through efforts like the
treaty banning antipersonnel landmines, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
prohibiting the use of lasers to cause permanent blindness. With determined, skilled leadership, such
efforts could establish standards that identify illegitimate uses while preserving military operational
flexibility.
Internal NB
The counterplan is the only way to solve credibility – any other approach fails
Boyle, 13
Michael Boyle, Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia and a Senior
Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,”
2013, Wiley // IS
If the US fails to take these steps, its unchecked pursuit of drone technology will have serious
consequences for its image and global position . Much of American counterterrorism policy is premised
on the notion that the narrative that sustains Al-Qaeda must be challenged and eventually broken if the
terrorist threat is to subside over the long term. The use of drones does not break this narrative, but rather
confirms it. It is ironic that Al-Qaeda’s image of the United States—as an all-seeing, irreconcilably hostile
enemy who rains down bombs and death on innocent Muslims without a second thought—is inadvertently
reinforced by a drones policy that does not bother to ask the names of its victims. Even the casual antiAmericanism common in many parts of Europe, the Middle East and Asia, much of which portrays the US
as cruel, domineering and indifferent to the suffering of others, is reinforced by a drones policy which
involves killing foreign citizens on an almost daily basis. A choice must be made: the US cannot rely on
drones as it does now while attempting to convince others that these depictions are gross caricatures.
Over time, an excessive reliance on drones will deepen the reservoirs of anti-US sentiment, embolden
America’s enemies and provide other governments with a compelling public rationale to resist a US-led
international order which is underwritten by sudden, blinding strikes from the sky. For the United States,
preventing these outcomes is a matter of urgent importance in a world of rising powers and changing
geopolitical alignments. No matter how it justifies its own use of drones as exceptional, the US is
establishing precedents which others in the international system—friends and enemies, states and nonstate actors—may choose to follow. Far from being a world where violence is used more carefully and
discriminately, a drones-dominated world may be one where human life is cheapened because it can so
easily, and so indifferently, be obliterated with the press of a button. Whether this is a world that the
United States wants to create—or even live in—is an issue that demands attention from those who find it
easy to shrug off the loss of life that drones inflict on others today.
Minimum Wage CP
Solves Econ
A minimum wage increase boosts the economy but current wages are hurting it –
best studies
Riker, 14
Dan Riker, graduate of The Johns Hopkins University and the University of Baltimore School of Law,
Basset Books LLC, Pocket Communications, Inc., MCI Communications, Inc., “Double the Minimum
Wage and set off an Economic Boom,” 8/2/14, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/08/02/1318650/Double-the-Minimum-Wage-and-set-off-an-Economic-Boom // IS
“We stand for a living wage. Wages are subnormal if they fail to provide a living for those who devote their
time and energy to industrial occupations. The monetary equivalent of a living wage varies according to
local conditions, but must include enough to secure the elements of a normal standard of living--a
standard high enough to make morality possible, to provide for education and recreation, to care for
immature members of the family, to maintain the family during periods of sickness, and to permit of
reasonable saving for old age.” - Theodore Roosevelt, National Progressive Party Convention, 1912
“When someone works for less pay than she can live on – when, for example, she goes hungry so that
you can eat more cheaply and conveniently – then she has made a great sacrifice for you, she has made
you a gift of some part of her abilities, her health, and her life. The 'working poor,' as they are approvingly
termed, are in fact the major philanthropists of our society. They neglect their own children so that the
children of others will be cared for; they live in substandard housing so that other homes will be shiny and
perfect; they endure privation so that inflation will be low and stock prices high. To be a member of the
working poor is to be an anonymous donor, a nameless benefactor, to everyone else.” - Barbara
Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed, 2001 Congress could do one single thing that would have a greater
positive impact on our economy, than any other. It could double the minimum wage and link it to the cost
of living. The result would be an economic boom unlike anything we have seen since the 1950s. Today
in the United States more than 3.8 million people are being paid the minimum wage of $7.25 an hour, or
less, an annual gross of about $15,000, or less. However, fully 25 per cent of all hourly workers are
classified as “low wage” workers, which means they are making less than two-thirds of the median hourly
wage, which was a little less than $17.00 in 2013. The average hourly wage for these “low wage” workers
is less than $12.00 an hour, or approximately $23,000 a year. For 2013 the poverty levels in the United
States were set at $11,490 for a single person, $15,510 for a two-person family, $19,530 for a three
person family and $23,550 for a four person family, The minimum wage and the “low wage” are not living
wages, but millions of impoverished Americans are trying to live on them, and the number is increasing
every year. No American who works full-time should live in poverty. There is no full-time job in existence
that has so little value that adults who do it should not be able to live decently. In fact, I think it honestly
can be argued that some of our lowest-paying jobs are among our most important – the jobs of taking
care of the elderly – our parents and grandparents - in nursing homes; the jobs of tending to our hospital
rooms to ensure they are sanitary; the jobs of cleaning our hotel rooms of the soil of others; the jobs of
cleaning, peeling and preparing for cooking, or eating, much of the food we buy in restaurants, coffee
shops, and fast food places, as well as in supermarkets and institutional cafeterias; all the jobs of people
who – often invisibly – do the tough, dirty, unhealthy, and often, dangerous, tasks in society that make for
a livable civilization. Whatever the costs to the rest of us, all of these people deserve to earn livings that
permit them and their families to enjoy decent lives and a reasonable share of that civilization they have
helped create. Far too many Americans work for the minimum wage, or for wages very close to it. For
example, the annual gross of the average worker at Walmart, is only about $16,000. before the
subtraction of Social Security and Medicare withholding of about 10 per cent. What is left is not a living
wage. The wage levels of most national retailers and fast food restaurants are similar. Today, at the rates
paid by these companies, a husband and wife both have to work to earn in inflation-adjusted dollars what
one Ford worker made in 1914. In 1914, Henry Ford decided to pay the workers on his assembly line
$5.00 a day. That was considered radical. It was, by far, the most money ever paid to industrial workers
up to that time. In today's money it amounts to $114.00 per day, or about $30,000 annually. Nearly 100
years ago Ford was paying almost twice in real dollars than America's largest employer, and one of the
most profitable companies in the history of the world, is paying its workers today. Henry Ford was very
clever. He said he wanted his employees to be able to buy his cars, so he paid them enough so they
could buy his cars, and they did. By the early 1920s Ford was the world's largest car maker and
extremely profitable. After World War I other companies followed Ford's example. They began to pay
more workers a living wage. They began to add fringe benefits. Productivity and profitability increased
significantly. The 1920s economy boomed, and a real middle class emerged, driving cars, and buying
homes in the new suburbs. Our major employers today seem to be ignorant of the lesson of Henry Ford,
or they just don't care. Their wages are so low that to support a family any worker has to have two jobs,
and probably has to have a spouse who also works, also maybe two jobs. Millions of Americans are
struggling to survive. They have no money to spend on anything other than the bare necessities. They
are not “bootstrapping” their way out of poverty. Most are locked into it. And most of these low wage jobs
have little or no vacation, or sick time. Until the Affordable Care Act, most had no health care, and some
still do not. Low wage workers in the United States have the fewest benefits of any low wage workers in
the industrialized world. Not only is this a national scandal for which we should be ashamed, it also is a
national economic emergency. We will not see sustained and substantial economic growth while so many
of our citizens are so underpaid. Most of the jobs created in the past 30 years have been in the low
paying service industries. Many people who lost their jobs that paid $20-30 per hour now are working for
wages less than half of that. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco early in 2013 reported that
since 2007 60 per cent of the job losses were mid-wage jobs, but only 22 per cent of jobs created were
mid wage. While 21 per cent of the job losses were low wage jobs, 58 per cent of jobs created were low
wage. The report said the effect of this was that “for many of the largest occupational categories in the
country median wages are significantly below the levels needed to cover essential household costs.”
Combine this with the impact of the dramatic decline in housing values – but increases in rents - and it
should be obvious why the American economy is stalled. The vast majority of Americans either have very
little money to spend on anything other than necessities, if they even have enough for those. This is a
huge drag on the economy . The lack of demand is why companies are not expanding, not creating
more jobs. While this has been happening, most of the major corporations in the nation have operating
profits, and some have record profits. The number of billionaires has increased dramatically. The disparity
between the rich and everyone else has reached record highs. Why do we permit enormous wealth to be
earned by the owners and executives of corporations when the products and services of those
corporations – what they sell to make enormous profits – are the result of virtual slave labor, the payment
of wages that do not permit the workers to have decent lives, that require many to work two jobs, and
many to seek public assistance? In fact, the American taxpayer is subsidizing these enormously profitable
corporations through the food stamp, Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC), and other aid programs these
employees qualify for because they are being paid so little. In 2004, a study published by the University of
California-Berkeley Labor Center found that Walmart employees in California were receiving $86 million in
public assistance. A documentary also was made, based on the study. Walmart attempted to refute the
study by arguing that the reliance on public assistance by their workers was not substantially different
from that of the employees of their competitors. Of course, their market dominance almost certainly has
had a deflationary effect on wages throughout their industry as many competitors keep prices and wages
low in order to compete. Subsequent to the Berkeley study, there were studies in other states showing
similar levels of reliance on public assistance by Walmart employees. A 2004 Congressional committee
staff report estimated that the total amount of public assistance received by Walmart employees each
year could have been as much as $1.5 billion. A 2014 report said the amount of government aid to
Walmart employes had reached $6.2 billion. Walmart’s low-wage workers cost U.S. taxpayers an
estimated $6.2 billion in public assistance including food stamps, Medicaid and subsidized housing,
according to a report published to coincide with Tax Day, April 15. Americans for Tax Fairness, a coalition
of 400 national and state-level progressive groups, made this estimate using data from a 2013 study by
Democratic Staff of the U.S. Committee on Education and the Workforce. In 2009, the maximum eligible
family income under the EITC program was raised to $50,000 and $60 billion in tax credits was paid to 27
million families that year. Today, billions of dollars in government aid are going to impoverished workers
of many the nation's largest and most profitable corporations, including the most profitable corporation in
the world, because they are not paying their workers a living wage. Instead, the American people are
being taxed by these huge corporations to support their workers and to maintain their high profits. This is
both shameful and insane. That these low wages have no business justification is demonstrated by the
fact that while Walmart, (along with many other major retailers), pays an average of less than $9.00 per
hour to its employees – not a living wage – CostCo has become a hugely successful, multi-billion dollar
corporation, offering many of the same products and services, while paying its workers an average hourly
wage almost exactly twice as much. Trader Joe's is another very successful chain that pays decent
wages. Walmart has successfully prevented unionization, and despite enormous publicity over quite a few
years about their meager wages, the corporation has done nothing to improve its workers lives.
Meanwhile, the heirs of Sam Walton collectively are worth nearly $100 billion, as much as 30 per cent of
all Americans. There are four obvious conclusions from this. First, no matter how much bad publicity
companies like Walmart receive, they will not voluntarily raise wages to living levels. Second, There are
no third parties, such as unions, in these businesses and industries, positioned to force the corporations
to improve their wages. Third, state and federal governments could save tens of billions of dollars if it
were not for the huge, and growing number of low wage workers receiving public assistance and EITC
payments in the U.S. The amount of money such workers are receiving is close to the amount dictated to
be cut from the federal budget in 2013 by the “sequester.” And, fourth, only the government can solve the
problem. And the problem can be solved by raising the minimum wage substantially. The current
minimum wage dates to 2009, but in real terms it has been declining in value for many years because it
has not been indexed to inflation. Nine developed countries have minimum wages higher than the U.S.:
Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Belgium, Australia, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and
Luxembourg. Oregon and Washington have minimum wages nearly $2.00 more than the national wage.
Several other states and cities have raised the minimum wage above the federal level, but most have not.
While it seemed unlikely that the Republican-controlled House of Representatives would even vote on
President Obama's request to raise the minimum wage, what he originally asked for, $9.00 an hour was
inadequate. A minimum wage of $9.00 per hour would yield an annual gross of about $18,000. That still is
not a living wage. The President subsequently endorsed a bill in the Senate that would raise the minimum
wage to $10.10 over three years. That still is not enough and some states and localities are raising their
local minimum wages well above the national minimum. Seattle has set the pace with a $15.00 minimum
wage, to be phased in over several years. It is time to do something dramatic to change the lives of
millions of Americans and end our economic emergency. And it would take just one act. Congress should
double the minimum wage through a series of increases over a five year period, and index it for inflation.
This would propel millions of people out of poverty and generate enormous economic activity that would
spur the economy into dramatic growth . A limited exemption,or time extension, may be necessary for
very small companies, say, under 10 employees. Care also would have to be used to insure that
companies did not try to evade the increase by significantly increasing the number of part-time
employees. The minimum wage should apply to permanent part-time, as well as, full-time employment.
Walmart’s annual profits are approaching $100 billion. If the company's average wage was raised to
$15.80 an hour, accounting for slightly higher pay for supervisors and managers, or annually, an average
of $30,576, that would be a living wage. Walmart’s profits would be reduced somewhere in the range of
$15 billion. And that only would occur if their employees didn't spend more money in their stores. But
history shows that is not what would happen. Some percentage of that increase would be returned to
Walmart through employee purchases. Imagine what would happen throughout the economy if every
major employer had to pay at least $14.50 per hour, twice the current minimum wage. There would be no
one left in the current classification of “low wage.”. Workers would spend that money to improve the lives
of themselves and their families. The economy would boom. Their employers would experience greater
growth, and probably recoup the additional expense in a relatively short time. And tens of billions of
dollars in public assistance and EITC payments would be saved. It will be argued, as it has in the past,
that increasing the minimum wage – especially an increase of this magnitude – would cost jobs and
increase unemployment because many employers would cut back to save money. Companies do not
routinely hire people they don't need. The bigger the company the more adept they are at calculating
exactly what they need, and hiring no more than that. For most of these large corporations, wages are not
their major expense. Most of the studies that have been done of this issue have concluded that increases
in the minimum wage have had little or no effect on employment. In June, 2014, more than 600
economists signed a letter to the Congressional leadership supporting an increase in the minimum wage
to $10.10 and stating: In recent years there have been important developments in the academic literature
on the effect of increases in the minimum wage on employment, with the weight of evidence now showing
that increases in the minimum wage have had little or no negative effect on the employment of
minimum-wage workers, even during times of weakness in the labor market . It is possible that with
an increase of this magnitude, that would drive up the wages of millions of workers, some jobs could be
lost. However, the economic boom that will occur will create many more jobs, and better-paying jobs. It
also will be argued that such an increase will be inflationary, that it will cause prices to rise. This probably
is true to some extent, especially if the minimum wage is doubled. Using Walmart as an example, actual
price increases should be minimal. Walmart's increased wage costs probably could be covered by price
increases of around 3 per cent, also spread over a five year period, hardly a major economic impact, and
a cost we should be more than willing to absorb for the enormous benefit that would result. Companies
that rely on domestic suppliers, rather than companies like Walmart that rely almost entirely on foreign
suppliers, might face higher costs. But, the overall impact of the influx of cash into the economy would
more than offset price increases. By spreading the doubling over a five year period, employers would
have time to adjust, as would the economy overall. There also are those who advocate expanding the
EITC program as a substitute for increasing the minimum wage. They argue that it would be less
disruptive to business, employment and inflation. However, the EITC program, which almost entirely
benefits families with children, is very complicated. It also is a publicly-funded program that simply
subsidizes major corporations indirectly. Corporations should have to bear the real costs of their
businesses, and their employees should receive living wages. The tens of billions of government dollars
currently going to public aid and EITC payments could be used far more effectively rebuilding the
highways and bridges, which also would generate a great deal more economic activity. There is another
substantial national economic benefit of doubling the minimum wage: substantially greater payments into
Social Security and Medicare. The elimination of nearly all “low wage” jobs and a higher percentage of
EITC payments could go a long ways towards easing the pressure on Social Security and Medicare. It is
in the national economic interest for all working Americans to have decent incomes and be able to
support families. It also is in our moral interest. Employers should not be able to exploit the desperation of
people to have some kind of income and force them to accept wages that will not provide for a decent life.
That is what existed for millions when Upton Sinclair's The Jungle was published in 1906. In many parts
of the country, and in many businesses, we have returned to conditions not significantly different from
what he described. How can anyone defend this? As a people, as a nation, we should insist that
businesses recognize that their employees are essential contributors to their profits, and deserve to earn
living wages. It is not right to argue that because a job does not require great skills it is not important, and
should not command a living wage. No pizza company can make any money without the people in their
restaurants who make the pizzas. McDonald's cannot make any money without workers who cook those
hamburgers, and take orders and payments from customers. Those tasks are essential to those
businesses. The people who perform those tasks are essential to the businesses. It doesn't matter if they
are easily trained, or easily replaced, or if the job has no educational requirements. Their value is in the
work they do, which is critically important to the success of those businesses. It is illegal for a business to
price its products so low that no profit can be made from them by it, or any competitor. Such a practice,
known as “predatory pricing,” occasionally is used by companies to monopolize a product by driving out
competition. It can be challenged under the antitrust laws. It doesn't happen very often, but the protection
exists for the unusual case. There is no such protection for the individual. Within the limits of the minimum
wage laws, people can work for wages that do not support them. And when they do, they effectively are
reducing the number of jobs that do offer living wages. We currently are experiencing a downward spiral
of wages because of the growth of minimum, and near-minimum wage jobs. A monopoly in a product is
viewed as a negative to the economy. Low wage jobs also are a negative to our economy. They reduce
the amount of spending by consumers. They increase government expenses. They reduce economic
opportunity. And they provide no benefit to the nation. This must end. Wages must be set at a level that
sustains life. And since businesses will not do this voluntarily, governments must require it. Communities
across the nation, and especially state and local government officials, should consider whether those big
box stores, which may have received some financial incentives to locate in their areas, really are a benefit
to their communities. Their poorly-paid employees are likely to seek public assistance just to survive. If
these giant stores don't drive out the local competing businesses, whose profits stay in the community,
those businesses may be forced to lower prices to compete, and also to pay lower wages. Local officials
should insist, before granting any special considerations, that any major business located in their areas
pay living wages to their employees, and certainly no wages so low that employees need, and can qualify
for, public assistance. In his 203 book, The Unwinding, George Packer wrote (p. 105): It was only after his
death, after Wal-mart's down home founder was no longer its public face, that the country began to
understand what his company had done. Over the years, America had become more like Wal-Mart. It had
gotten cheap. Prices were lower and wages were lower. There were fewer union factory jobs, and more
part-time jobs as store greeters. The small towns where Mr. Sam had seen his opportunity were getting
poorer, which meant that consumers there depended more and more on everyday low prices, and made
every last purchase at Wal-Mart, and maybe had to work there, too. The hollowing out of the heartland
was good for the company's bottom line. And in parts of the country that were getting richer, on the coasts
and in some big cities, many consumers regarded Wal-Mart and its vast aisles full of crappy, if not
dangerous, Chinese-made goods with horror, and instead purchased their shoes and meat in expensive
boutiques as if overpaying might inoculate them against the spread of cheapness, while stores like
Macy's, the bastions of a former middle-class economy, faded out, and America began to look more like
the country Mr. Sam had grown up in. The huge growth of the American industrial base in World War II
led to the explosion of the middle class in the 1950s when, for the first time, the overwhelming majority of
Americans earned incomes that provided well for their families. Things began to change in the late 1970s,
and for the middle class, things have gotten steadily worse ever since. Real poverty has returned to a
level not seen since the 1960s. All of this is shameful, and unnecessary. Ensuring that all who hold fulltime jobs are able to make decent livings would create an economic boom that would be sustainable into
the foreseeable future. That can begin by doubling the minimum wage. Whatever its price, it is the price
of having a civilized and economically stable society that we cannot afford not to pay.
Solves HR
Raising the minimum wage is a human rights issue
Muhammad, 13
Dedrick Muhammad, Senior Director of Economic Programs, NAACP, “The Human Right of a Fair
Minimum Wage,” 12/10/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dedrick-muhammad/the-human-right-of-afair_b_4414333.html // IS
"Overcoming poverty is not a gesture of charity; it is an act of justice. ~ Nelson Mandela As the world
continues to reflect on the life, work and legacy of Nelson Mandela, it's fitting to remember one of his
greatest causes: eradicating economic inequality and bestowing on all people the fundamental human
right to live a life of dignity. On this International Human Rights Day, we must reaffirm the urgency in
addressing the injustice against workers across the globe who are denied this right and face persistent
barriers to economic opportunity and mobility. In every corner of the globe, children, the working class
and a growing segment of the middle class are experiencing the pains of poverty. One main culprit is
stagnant wages and the fact that workers' pay no longer rises with their productivity and hard work. And if
we, as a global society, fail to raise the wage floor, we put the economic future of generations, countries
and the international community at risk. The NAACP believes that every worker deserves a livable wage,
ensuring an existence worthy of human dignity for the labor and their family. The divide between rich and
poor in this country has grown astronomically over the last four decades. Today a CEO of a major U.S.
company earns about 273 times more than the average worker, according to a recent analysis by the
Economic Policy Institute. The earnings ratio between CEO and worker was about 20 to 1 in 1965. And
according to a study by the Alliance for a Just Society, there is a fundamental shift in our economy to low
wage non-sustaining jobs. We have to do better.
AT: Job Loss
This argument is laughable – it’s empirically false
Bachman, 14
Joseph Bachman, writer for the Wisconsin Rapids Tribune, “Minimum wage hike helps economy, workers:
column,” 8/22/14, http://www.wisconsinrapidstribune.com/story/opinion/2014/08/22/minimum-wage-hikehelps-economy-workers-column/14456327/ // IS
Myth No. 1: Raising the minimum wage causes job loss. Terribly false . Studies show that in 13 states,
raising the minimum wage has actually increased employment. This is due to the simple fact that
consumers tend to spend more money when making more money. It boosts the economy. In fact, every
time the minimum wage has been increased, a boost to the economy has followed, because those who
are making more money are paying their bills and putting that extra back into the economy. It's why over
600 economists have signed on to support a wage increase.
AT: Price Hike
Price increases are inevitable and the wage hike is a drop in the bucket
Bachman, 14
Joseph Bachman, writer for the Wisconsin Rapids Tribune, “Minimum wage hike helps economy, workers:
column,” 8/22/14, http://www.wisconsinrapidstribune.com/story/opinion/2014/08/22/minimum-wage-hikehelps-economy-workers-column/14456327/ // IS
Myth No. 2: The cost of goods will skyrocket! (Or, in many cases, the cost of burgers. Why do people
always use the burger argument, as if the price of a burger is the be all end all of your quality of life? I
don't say this because I'm a vegetarian, but eating McDonald's enough that the price of a burger matters
to you is extremely unhealthy.) False. Studies show that at $10 per hour the price of a burger will
increase by $0.10 per dollar. That's it. Not two or three bucks, but cents. If you want your heart attack in a
box bad enough, I think paying 30 cents or so more might be worth the economic benefit to everyone
else. In general, goods all around increase by cents, not dollars, and due to inflation, they already have
been! Isn't it time to catch up the workers' wages to meet it?
Advantage CP Answers
Asteroids CP
Squo solves
Status quo funding solves SENTINEL
Handwerk, 12
Brian Handwerk, Writing and Editing Professional, graduated from Bucknell in 1992, “Asteroid Hunter to
Be First Private Deep-Space Mission?” 6/30/12, National Geographic,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/06/120628-first-private-asteroid-mission-sentinel-b612nasa-space-science/ // IS
The first privately funded deep-space mission will launch an asteroid-hunting telescope in 2017 or 2018,
project managers announced today. The ambitious project is being developed by the B612 Foundation, a
nonprofit named for the asteroid home of the title character in Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's book The Little
Prince. Led by former astronauts and veteran NASA astronomers, the foundation today kicked off a
fundraising effort to build and launch the infrared telescope—dubbed Sentinel—which will create an
"asteroid map" of the inner solar system.
Squo solves – new funding sources
Williams, 12
Brian Williams, writer for Giant Freakin’ Robot, “The First Privately Funded Deep Space Mission Gets A
Boost,” Giant Freakin’ Robot 9/20/12, http://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/sci/privately-funded-deep-spacemission-boost.html // IS
The B612 Foundation started back in 2002 with the purpose of investigating ways to protect Earth from
asteroid impacts, namely through deflection by various means. After 10 years of working the problem,
they decided that deflecting an asteroid really isn’t a problem if you have enough time before it hits; the
problem is that we aren’t getting enough advance notice of possible impactors to do anything about them
(out of a million objects crossing the Earth’s orbital path, we’ve mapped only about 10,000 of them). So,
in 2011, B612 changed its focus to asteroid detection, and just this past June announced that they would
be trying to create the first privately funded deep-space mission in history to help solve this problem. The
Sentinel Mission is a plan to put an infrared space telescope in orbit around the sun, looking outward into
the inner solar system and hopefully able to find any hidden asteroids waiting to smack into Earth. The
B612 Foundation says the Sentinel space telescope will cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build over
the course of four and a half years. According to Parabolic Arc, they recently got a big boon of new
Founding Circle members from several notable corporations. Among the new circle of members, who not
only make financial contributions to the mission but science and technology contributions where possible,
are two Facebook engineers, the VP of Global Product Management at eBay, a Senior VP at Google, and
the CEO of Reddit, among others. While there’s no information on just what sort of financial or
technological contributions these new Founding Circle members have made, judging by their
occupations, I think it’s a safe bet that B612 just got a large wad of cash .
Squo solves – Asteroid mining
Squo solves their internal link to econ – Arkyd missions
Newitz, 15
Annalee Newitz, founder and editor-in-chief of io9, “This Spacecraft Will Hunt the Solar System for
Asteroids to Mine,” Gizmodo, 7/22/15, http://gizmodo.com/weve-taken-another-big-step-toward-asteroidmining-1719616539 // IS
The Arkyd 3, launched successfully last week from the International Space Station, begins a 90-day lowEarth orbit mission to test its software and control systems. If all goes well, it will be followed in December
by the Arkyd 6 spacecraft (pictured above), which will test a mid-wave infrared sensor, which could take
measurements from the surface of asteroids in order to detect metals and water. Of course, the Arkyds
aren’t just on the prowl for rare Earth metals like neodymium and yttrium. The Arkyd 6 will look for any
precious metal, and also water. If we can find water deposits locked up in local asteroids, it would be a
huge help for space vessels that need to stock up on the life-giving liquid (and fuel source) during long
journeys. The Arkyd 3 is also known as a “prospector” ship, and was created by Planetary Resources, a
private space agency funded in part by Larry Page, Richard Branson, and other techno-utopian
entrepreneurs. But the Arkyd missions are also part of an ongoing effort by public and private groups to
make asteroid mining a reality. Late last year, ESA’s Rosetta spacecraft landed the Philae probe on a
moving comet, which could be viewed as an early proof of concept for asteroid mining operations. The
Rosetta mission showed that it isn’t unrealistic for us to make plans to set up a mine on an asteroid, using
remote-controlled equipment. Planetary Resources co-founder Peter Diamandis said in a statement: The
successful deployment of the A3R is a significant milestone for Planetary Resources as we forge a path
toward prospecting resource-rich asteroids. Our team is developing the technology that will enable
humanity to create an off-planet economy that will fundamentally change the way we live on Earth.
Solvency deficits – Asteroids
Can’t solve – doesn’t get all the asteroids
Powell, 13
Corey S. Powell, Editor at Large at DISCOVER magazine, the nation's leading general-interest science
magazine, “Developing Early Warning Systems for Killer Asteroids,” Discovery Magazine, 9/14/13,
http://discovermagazine.com/2013/september/17-hunting-season-for-asteroids // IS
Sentinel is hardly the final word, however. Getting 50 percent of the city killers leaves plenty behind, and
even though it should find hundreds of thousands of Chelyabinsk-scale asteroids, its launch is still years
away. Tonry’s $5 million ATLAS remains important because it can provide early warning for the more
frequent, smaller impacts — the ones that could be handled with local evacuation or with simple “duck
and cover” precautions.
Solvency deficits – Econ
Asteroid mining has minimal economic benefits
Riederer, 14
Rachel Riederer, MFA in nonfiction from Columbia University, “Silicon Valley Says Space Mining Is
Awesome and Will Change Life on Earth. That’s Only Half Right.,” New Republic, 5/19/14,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117815/space-mining-will-not-solve-earths-conflict-over-naturalresources // IS
What’s misleading about these projects isn’t that they’re subject to budget problems and delays, but that
they come couched in overblown rhetoric about their potential to radically alter human life, to do away
with the notion of scarcity and deliver us to a future of plenty and peace. It’s a pattern that has become
familiar in Silicon Valley: develop a plan for a business that will do something cool and make a lot of
money, but describe it instead as something that will change the world. Return to that platinum asteroid
for a moment. There’s one that Planetary Resources has been tracking: It passes near the Earth’s orbit
every 23 months and is a half-kilometer by one kilometer in size. A spacecraft could travel to it in around
eight months. Diamandis estimates its total worth at between $300 billion and $5 trillion. If it were to be
mined at some point in the future, it would drive down the global price of platinum, which might make
some items more affordable—luxury jewelry, of course, but also catalytic converters for cars and hard
disks for laptops and DVRs—but it would primarily make the investors of Planetary Resources extremely
rich.
Asteroid mining violates international law
LiveScience, 12
LiveScience, “Does Asteroid Mining Violate Space Law?” LiveScience, 4/23/12,
http://www.livescience.com/33864-asteroid-mining-space-law.html // IS
Not everyone agrees. Frank Lyall, public law professor at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, and
director of the International Institute of Space Law, and Paul Larsen, a space law expert and adjunct
professor at Georgetown Law School, both interpret the OST as meaning that no one — neither a
government, nor a person — can claim title to an asteroid, or the precious metals therein. The point is
proven by a 2001 court case, they said. In 2000, an American man named Gregory Nemitz registered a
claim to the asteroid Eros. When NASA sent a satellite to investigate this asteroid soon after, Nemitz sent
a letter to NASA telling the space agency to pay parking fees for landing the satellite on his property.
"NASA declined and so did the U.S. Dept. of State," Larsen explained in an email. "The reason is that the
1967 Outer Space Treaty, Article II, specifically states 'outer space ... is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereign, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.'" [Photos:
Planetary Resources' Plan to Tap Space Rock Riches] Thus, as the international law on the matter now
stands, "an asteroid in outer space cannot be mined for the purpose of appropriation," Lyall wrote. "All the
states whose nationals might mine are part of the 1967 [Outer Space] Treaty agreement and hence their
national systems cannot provide the base of a title to the property.”
Asteroid mining isn’t viable now
Triple Helix, 15
The Triple Helix Online, ‘Space Gold: The Economic Feasibility of Asteroid Mining,” The Triple Helix,
3/29/15, http://triplehelixblog.com/2015/03/space-gold-the-economic-feasibility-of-asteroid-mining/ // IS
Even though the technology needed for asteroid mining at least partially exists, the process must become
faster and cheaper in order for it to be actually viable. The Rosetta mission had to use gravitational assist
two times from Earth and once from Mars to catch Churyumov–Gerasimenko. This illustrates the fact that
it was not even able to propel its own mass at the required velocity without gravity. So, what about having
to carry the mass of an asteroid? It is extremely costly in terms of energy to transport such a huge mass
in space back to Earth or even just the Earth’s orbit. Maybe our best bet is a small M-type platinum rich
asteroid that we could set into earth orbit and start mining there.
Natural Gas CP
Environment DA
Counterplan plan devastates all aspects of the environment --- spills, actual
drilling and transportation
Connors 9
Jill Connors, Staff Writer for Treehugger, “Offshore Drilling: Is Energy Worth the Ecological Disaster of Oil
Spills?” 2/18/2009, Treehugger, http://www.treehugger.com/clean-technology/offshore-drilling-is-energyworth-the-ecological-disaster-of-oil-spills.html // IS
When this post was first written fuel prices and the United States' future energy policy were the prime
reason offshore oil drilling made the headlines. Over a year later and it's the BP oil spill, resulting from an
explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. WATCH VIDEO: Offshore Oil Drilling Explained Taking a step
back from the emotional response of the recent environmental devastation, let's take a look at offshore
drilling more broadly: How much oil do we currently produce from offshore drilling, and how much might
we potentially recover? What's the status of the moratorium banning offshore drilling in various areas?
What are the environmental risks? And perhaps most importantly, what is the psychological impact of
thinking that offshore oil holds promise as a source of abundant, less-expensive oil when nothing could
be farther from the truth? photo: _J_D_R_ via flickr Offshore Oil Then & Now The term offshore drilling
refers to the extracting of oil from fields that lie beneath the ocean floor, anywhere from a few hundred
feet to 200 miles off the coast. As easily recoverable oil reserves, both onshore and offshore dwindle,
exploration is increasingly turning to deepwater locations a mile or more beneath the ocean's surface.
The first offshore well was drilled in 1887 from a wooden wharf off Summerland, California; technology
improvements have made it possible to drill in deeper water and farther from shore ever since. Today,
some 4,000 platforms operate in the U.S. federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico, primarily off the coastlines
of Louisiana and Texas, and off the coast of Alaska, producing approximately 565 million barrels of oil per
year, according to the Energy Information Agency. US offshore oil production of 565 million barrels per
year equates to roughly 1.5 million barrels per day (30% of total US oil production); contrast that figure
with U.S. current oil consumption of 21 million barrels per day. The debate about offshore drilling stems
from questions over how much oil potentially could be recovered from underwater fields versus the time
and cost, both in dollars and environmental impact, related to that process. Political posturing
notwithstanding, offshore drilling will not eliminate US demand for foreign oil or really even make
significant strides into reducing that dependency. At current consumption, the US uses about 8 billion
barrels of oil per year; conventionally recoverable oil from offshore drilling is thought to be 18 billion
barrels total, not per year. What's more, offshore oil drilling will not guarantee lower fuel prices--oil is a
global commodity, and US production is not big enough to influence global prices. image: Architecture
2030 Oil Spills Impact Humans, Non-Humans Alike With the BP oil spill forcing the worst of the
environmental risk associated with offshore drilling to the fore, let's take a step back for a second and
examine some of the less flashy aspects of the potential problems. Recent research suggests that
transporting the oil poses greater threats than the drilling process itself. In Louisiana, the 10,000
miles of canals dug to transport oil and lay pipelines contribute to coastal erosion because the canals
crisscross the state's coastal wetlands. While technology improvements have lessened the occurrence of
oil spills in the last 40 years, the Mineral Management Service a bureau in the U.S. Department of the
Interior that manages the nation's natural gas, oil and other mineral resources on the outer continental
shelf, projects about one oil spill per year of at least 1,000 barrels in the Gulf of Mexico over the next 40
years. Every three to four years, it says, a spill of at least 10,000 barrels can be expected. As the BP spill
illustrates, these spills could potentially hit the beaches of western Florida, Alabama, and Texas. In
Louisiana, it's not just beaches, but wetlands that can affected--destroying critical wildlife habitat,
hurting tourism and ruining the livelihoods of fishermen throughout the region . Additionally, out to
sea the impact on wildlife is dramatic. Beyond killing adult animals, the spawning grounds of endangered
bluefin tuna and other iconic species is contaminated. The BP oil spill is unprecedented in scale in the
United States, and recent simulations show that once a spill reaches this size it can be picked up by
ocean currents and be dragged far away from the initial spill area. In the Gulf of Mexico, should a spill get
into the Loop Current it can easily be taken all the way to Florida, through the Florida Keys (impacting
Cuba and other Caribbean islands in the process), up the East Coast as far as North Carolina and then
out into the Atlantic. photo: Marine Photobank via flickr Expanded Offshore Drilling's Uncertain Future
Rights to U.S. offshore areas are shared between the states and the federal government according to
various acts passed over the years. Specifically, the states have jurisdiction over any natural resources
within 3.45 miles of their coastline (except Texas and the west coast of Florida where the jurisdiction
extends to 10.35 miles), and the U.S. has rights up to 200 miles off the coastline. Offshore drilling has
been banned in various areas thought to be particularly environmentally sensitive over the years. An
offshore oil moratorium that had been in effect since 1981 expired October 1, 2008. With the lifting of the
ban, areas in the Gulf of Mexico can be opened up for drilling by the federal government. Additionally,
areas off the coasts of California, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia can be opened up
if those states approve. By November 12th, 2008, the MMS began the process for approving leases off
the coast of Virginia. However, offshore drilling in new areas won't deliver a drop of oil for ten years,
according to numbers cited by the Bush administration last year. In fact, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration recently did a detailed study of the likely outcome of offshore drilling for their Annual
Energy Outlook 2007, and concluded that increased access would not have a significant impact on
domestic crude oil production or prices before 2030. photo: Jim Snenddon via flickr Just a few weeks
prior to the BP oil spill, President Obama announced that more areas would be opened up for offshore
drilling, though a compromise was made which kept several areas the oil industry wanted access to off
limits. Post-disaster, the Obama administration halted this process, and several politicians on both sides
of the aisle who had previously expressed support for greater drilling reversed their position. As it stands
as the start of June 2010, expansion of offshore drilling in US coastal waters remains on hold pending
investigation of the causes of the BP oil spill. Given that President Obama and other members of his
administration have continued to express support for offshore drilling, provided that additional safeguards
are put in place to prevent a repeat of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, once the gushing oil is stopped
there remains a possibility of expanding offshore drilling once again. Even if it is not expanded, it is not so
much a question of if more oil spills happen, but when. As the BP oil spill makes clear, even something
short of a worst-case scenario--scary to think that this isn't the largest spill in history--has catastrophic
impacts on the ecosystem and its inhabitants, human and non-human alike. So why do we keep drilling?
Oil addiction pure and simple--and energy addiction in general. "Thinking that there is more oil to be
drilled offshore gives people a false sense of hope that there's actually enough oil out there to make us
energy independent," says Jonathan Dorn, staff researcher at the Earth Policy Institute. "Nothing could be
farther from the truth."
The counterplan risks spills – those threaten the environment and the economy
Melina, 10
Remy Melina, staff writer for LiveScience, Hofstra graduate, “Why Is Offshore Drilling So Dangerous?”
LiveScience, 5/28/10, http://www.livescience.com/32614-why-is-offshore-drilling-so-dangerous-.html // IS
The Gulf of Mexico oil leak has fired up arguments against offshore drilling. After decades of heated
debate, this incident shed light on its dangers and impact on the environment. Offshore drilling, the
process of extracting oil and gas resources from underwater locations, including lakes, has been
conducted at increasingly deeper and farther off shore sites in recent years, as shallow fossil fuel
reserves and near-shore drilling locations have become exhausted. But with deeper drilling depths comes
increased danger including higher risks of accidents, spills and fires, according to the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). "Big Oil has perpetuated a dangerous myth that coastline
drilling is a completely safe endeavor, but accidents like this are a sober reminder just how far that is from
the truth," said Democratic Senator Robert Menendez in a press statement. "The fact is that 509 oil rig
fires have broken out in the Gulf of Mexico since 2006." Why is it so dangerous? One reason for this
increased danger is the complex equipment needed to drill at such depths. As offshore drilling continues
to be pushed to new depths, with oil companies continuously drilling in deeper waters and penetrating
further underground, the technology needed to achieve these feats is extremely complex and not entirely
invincible. This is a pretty frigging complex system, said Robert Bea, an engineering professor at the
University of California, Berkeley, in an interview with Yale Environment 360, a publication of Yale
University. You've got equipment and steel strung out over a long piece of geography starting at surface
and terminating at 18,000 feet below the sea floor. So it has many potential weak points. Just as Katrina's
storm surge found weaknesses in those piles of dirt the levees gas likes to find weakness in anything we
connect to that source. Another reason for the danger is the harsh offshore environments that pose
engineering challenges to offshore drilling equipment. Severe weather, ice and storms pose risks to the
functionality of the rigs, and their distance from land make it harder for additional rescue personnel to
promptly reach the areas in emergency situations. The inexperience of oil companies at operating at
these depths is a third issue. BP Chief Operating Officer Doug Suttles acknowledged that many of his
company's efforts to stop the oil leak failed because they had never had to plug a well at such depths and
were therefore unprepared for the conditions that foiled their attempts including ice formation inside of the
original containment dome due to freezing deep water temperatures. The Deepwater Horizon oil rig had
drilled the world's deepest offshore well before it exploded and sank on April 20, according to the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE). The Deepwater Horizon drilled the well to 35,055 feet (10 kilometers) or
more than six miles, operating in 4,130 feet (1 kilometer) of water, according to BP. The first rig to attempt
such depths, the well's pipes had been cemented for only 20 hours before the rig went up in flames,
according to oil services contractor Halliburton Inc. "The bottom line is that when you drill for oil, there is
always a risk that not only puts lives on the line, but a risk that puts miles of coastline and the economy
on the line as well," Menendez said.
Minimum Wage CP
Solvency deficit
Can’t solve – studies and automation
Gillespie, 14
Nick Gillespie, editor in chief of Reason.com, citing economist David Henderson, “Labor Day Confidential:
The Misguided Logic Behind Minimum-Wage Hikes,” 8/31/2014, http://reason.com/blog/2014/08/31/laborday-confidential-the-misguided-log // IS
Hikes in the minimum wage are routinely sold as a quick and easy way to increase the income of the
working poor, but it's actually a really rotten way to do that. That's partly because so few people earn the
minimum wage (only 3 percent of all workers) and they rarely earn it for very long (most min wage
workers earn more after a year on the job). And then there's the simple fact that people earning the
minimum wage aren't necessarily poor (in fact, a sizable chunk belong to households making north of
$100,000). As economist and Reason contributor David Henderson has noted, a study of the effects of
minimum-wage hikes between 2003 and 2007 found no evidence that the increases "lowered state
poverty rates."¶ If you are interested in using government intervention to raise the income of poor
people, the most-direct way is to give them money. That goes directly to their bottom lines and doesn't
distort labor markets or make low-skilled employees more expensive. More from my Time column:¶
University of California sociologist Lane Kenworthy, a progressive who has called for a more generous
social safety net, argues that virtually all increases in income for poor families in the U.S. and other
wealthy countries since the late 1970s have been a function of “increases in net government transfers —
transfers received minus taxes paid.” That’s partly because workers in poor households often have
“psychological, cognitive, or physical conditions that limit their earnings capability” and partly because
today’s “companies have more options for replacing workers, whether with machines or with low-cost
laborers abroad.”¶ To be sure, arguing that you want to increase direct aid to poor families doesn’t give a
politician the same sort of photo-op as standing with a bunch of union leaders on Labor Day and
speechifying about the urgent need to make sure an honest day’s work is rewarded with a living wage.¶
But making just such a case could have the benefit of actually helping poor people in the here and now.
Certainly a savvy politician could sell that to voters who know the value of hard work — and the limits of
economic intervention.
AT: PTX NB
PC is a precondition to minimum wage
Tech Times, 14
The Tech Times, “Obama pushes for higher minimum wage,” 9/2/14,
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/14619/20140902/obama-pushes-for-higher-minimum-wage.htm //
BGHS IS
President Barack Obama faced a union crowd in Milwaukee and delivered a message on Labor Day,
signaling the start of the autumn campaign for the midterm congressional elections. He aggressively
stressed the country's recent economic gains and touched on the topic of minimum wage. The latter has
always been a controversial subject and has gained increasing attention over the past couple of months.
By saying that the people of America deserve a raise, there's no doubt that Obama had once again added
fire to the wage debate. In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Fair Labor Standards Act. It
established the law that industries had to pay a minimum of 25 cents per hour for a work week of 40
hours. The act had brought stability to the U.S.' work industry. Seventy-six years later, the topic on raising
the federal minimum wage is brought up once again with the rate set at $10.10. Currently, the level is at
$7.25. While the public agrees on the idea, many people understand that the raise is only applicable to
deserving employees. "Some people don't deserve a pay raise and some people, they deserve it. So, you
give the pay raise based on merit. Not because the government says you have to do it," says Danny
White, owner of Race City Amusement Park. Obama said that Congress needs a lot of catching up with
the businesses and other institutions. It also needs to catch up with the 13 states and the District of
Columbia which had already implemented the minimum wage raise. "The bottom line is, America
deserves a raise," says Obama. "But until we've got a Congress that cares about raising working folks'
wages, it's up to the rest of us to make it happen ."
Nuclear Power CP
Nuclear Power Bad
Nuclear power is bad – litany of warrants
Kukreja, 15
Rinkesh Kukreja, Senior Software Engineer at InterGlobe Technologies “Nuclear Energy Pros and Cons,”
Conserve Energy Future, 3/7/15, http://www.conserve-energy-future.com/pros-and-cons-of-nuclearenergy.php // IS
Cons of Nuclear Energy 1. Environmental Impact : One of the biggest issues is environmental impact in
relation to uranium . The process of mining and refining uranium hasn’t been a clean process. Actually
transporting nuclear fuel to and from plants represents a pollution hazard. Also, once the fuel is used, you
can’t simply take it to the landfill – it’s radioactive and dangerous. 2. Radioactive Waste Disposal: As a
rule, a nuclear power plant creates 20 metric tons of nuclear fuel per year, and with that comes a lot of
nuclear waste. When you consider each nuclear plant on Earth, you will find that that number jumps to
approximately 2,000 metric tons a year. The greater part of this waste transmits radiation and high
temperature, implying that it will inevitably consume any compartment that holds it. It can also cause
damage to living things in and around the plants. Nuclear power plants create a lot of low-level
radioactive waste as transmitted parts and supplies. Over time, used nuclear fuel decays to safe
radioactive levels, however this takes a countless number of years. Even low level radioactive waste
takes hundreds of years to achieve adequate levels of safety. 3. Nuclear Accidents: The radioactive
waste produced can pose serious health effects on the lives of people as well as the environment. The
Chernobyl accident that occurred on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine was
the worst nuclear accident in the history. Its harmful effects on humans and ecology can still be seen
today. Then there was another accident that happened in Fukushima in Japan. Although the casualties
were not that high, but it caused serious environmental concerns. 4. High Cost : At present, the nuclear
business let waste cool for a considerable length of time before blending it with glass and putting away it
in enormous cooled, solid structures. This waste must be kept up, observed and watched to keep the
materials from falling into the wrong hands and causing problems. These administrations and included
materials cost cash – on top of the high expenses needed to put together a plant, which may make it less
desirable to invest in. It requires permission from several international authorities and it is normally
opposed by the people who live in that region. 5. Uranium is Finite: Just like other sources of fuel,
uranium is also finite and exists in few of the countries. It is pretty expensive to mine, refine and transport
uranium. It produces considerable amount of waste during all these activities and can result in
environmental contamination and serous health effects, if not handled properly. 6. Hot Target for
Militants: Nuclear energy has immense power. Today, nuclear energy is used to make weapons. If these
weapons go into the wrong hands, that could be the end of this world . Nuclear power plants are prime
target for terrorism activities. Little lax in security can be brutal for humankind.
Solvency deficits
Double bind – lack of waste storage either means they can’t solve or they link to
politics
Gilmour, 15
Jared Gilmour, staff writer, citing government officials, “As world expands nuclear power, US grapples
with decades of waste,” The Christian Science Monitor, 3/25/15,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy/2015/0325/As-world-expands-nuclear-power-USgrapples-with-decades-of-waste // IS
“If we want to continue to have low-cost, clean power from nuclear reactors, which today produce about
60 percent of our country’s emission-free electricity, then we have to have a place to put the used
nuclear fuel,” Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) of Tennessee said in a statement Tuesday, after reintroducing
a bill to create a nuclear waste management agency. “That means we need to end the stalemate over
what to do with our country’s nuclear waste by finding a way to create both temporary and permanent
storage sites that would complement other solutions.” By law, the federal government must develop a
long-term strategy for disposing of used nuclear fuel from commercial reactors and defense activities. But
delays and political in-fighting have held up such a project for decades. In the meantime, most used
uranium fuel is stored in lined concrete pools filled with water, or in airtight steel or concrete-and-steel
containers onsite at nuclear reactors. Combined, the nation’s 99 reactors make up about 20 percent of
US electricity production. Ultimately, the friction over nuclear waste comes down to one proposed project:
Yucca Mountain. The Nevada nuclear waste repository has been in limbo for 30 years and is opposed by
Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D) of Nevada and President Obama. There’s plenty of local
opposition, too, as many in Nevada say the proposed site, which was designed to store both commercial
and defense waste, was forced on them.
Relations – Asia
Solvency deficits
Doesn’t include our Asian power
ASEAN, 14
ASEAN, “ASEAN Member States,” ASEAN, 2014, http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-member-states // IS
Brunei Darussalam Head of State : His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah
Capital : Bandar Seri Begawan Language(s) : Malay, English Currency : B$ (Brunei Dollar) Ministry of
Foreign Affairs & Trade of Brunei Darussalam Website: www.mfa.gov.bn Cambodia Head of State : His
Majesty King Norodom Sihamoni Head of Government : Prime Minister Hun Sen Capital : Phnom Penh
Language : Khmer Currency : Riel Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation of Cambodia
Website: www.mfaic.gov.kh Indonesia Head of State : President Joko Widodo Capital : Jakarta
Language : Indonesian Currency : Rupiah Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Website:
www.kemlu.go.id Lao PDR Head of State : President Choummaly Sayasone Head of Government :
Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong Capital : Vientiane Language : Lao Currency : Kip Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Lao PDR Website: www.mofa.gov.la Malaysia Head of State : His Majesty The King
Almu'tasimu Billahi Muhibbuddin Tuanku Al-Haj Abdul Halim Mu'adzam Shah ibni Almarhum Sultan
Badlishah Head of Government : The Honourable Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak Capital :
Kuala Lumpur Language(s) : Malay, English, Chinese, Tamil Currency : Ringgit Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Malaysia Website: www.kln.gov.my ASEAN-Malaysia National Secretariat Website:
www.kln.gov.my/myasean Myanmar Head of State : President Thein Sein Capital : Nay Pyi Taw
Language : Myanmar Currency : Kyat Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar Website: www.mofa.gov.mm
Philippines Head of State : President Benigno S. Aquino III Capital : Manila Language(s) : Filipino,
English, Spanish Currency : Peso Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines Website:
www.dfa.gov.ph Singapore Head of State : President Tony Tan Keng Yam Head of Government : Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong Capital : Singapore Language(s) : English, Malay, Mandarin, Tamil Currency :
S$ (Singapore Dollar) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore Website: www.mfa.gov.sg Thailand Head
of State : His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej Head of Government : Prime Minister General Prayut
Chan-o-cha Capital : Bangkok Language : Thai Currency : Baht Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand
Website: www.mfa.go.th Viet Nam Head of State : President Truong Tan Sang Head of Government :
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung Capital : Ha Noi Language : Vietnamese Currency : Dong Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam Website: www.mofa.gov.vn
SCS DA
ASEAN is driving SCS tensions
Tiezzi, 15
Shannon Tiezzi, research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, ,A.M. from Harvard University
and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary, “China 'Gravely Concerned' by ASEAN Statment on
South China Sea,” The Diplomat, 4/29/15, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/china-gravely-concerned-byasean-statment-on-south-china-sea/ // IS
The resulting ASEAN statement criticized land reclamation activities as having the potential to “undermine
peace, security, and stability in the South China Sea.” ASEAN members also “reaffirmed the importance
of maintaining peace, stability, security and freedom of navigation in and over-flight over the South China
Sea” and urged the speedy conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Those words,
though tougher than past statements, are still relatively toothless. As The Diplomat’s Prashanth
Parameswaran put it, “the South China Sea question received significant attention but saw little
progress.” But even that scant progress has earned China’s wrath . When asked about the ASEAN
statement in a press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said, “The Chinese
side is gravely concerned about the statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit on the South China Sea
issue.” China’s main complaint has always been that ASEAN summits are not a proper place to discuss
the South China Sea, as only four of the ten ASEAN nations have claims to disputed islets in the area.
The South China Sea “is not an issue between China and ASEAN,” Hong reiterated. China’s “dual-track
approach” to the South China issue (described here by my colleague Prashanth) means resolving the
disputes through bilateral negotiations with the other claimant countries even while working with ASEAN
to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea. Hong mentioned both these elements in his press
conference. However, because China resolutely rejects the idea that its actions have jeopardized “peace
and stability” in the region, it also rejects the need for ASEAN to become involved to uphold those
principles. China, Hong said, “has exercised great restraint on the relevant issue.” The implication is that
there’s no need for ASEAN is get involved at all. For starters, Hong argued, “There has never been any
problem concerning the freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea that all countries
are entitled to under the international law. Nor will there be any in the future.” China also rejects the idea
that its land reclamation and construction activities are destabilizing. “Relevant construction is lawful,
justified and reasonable and thus beyond reproach,” Hong insisted. Instead, China views the recent
ASEAN statement not as an indication of genuine concern for regional security, but as an example of “a
few countries’ taking hostage the entire ASEAN and China-ASEAN relations for their own selfish gains.”
*AT: ASEAN Solves SCS
No risk of ASEAN solving SCS conflict
Conklin, 15
Amanda Conklin, Fulbright in Macau from 2012-2013, “Why ASEAN Can't Stand Up to China,” 7/1/15,
The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-asean-cant-stand-china-13238 // IS
Nonetheless, China has exploited divisions among ASEAN members and applied economic pressure,
both positive and negative, to keep countries from coming to a consensus on maritime security in their
own backyard. Moreover, weak leadership on political and security issues has left ASEAN without a
united approach on China’s aggression in the South China Sea. This is a major reason why ASEAN
remains divided on China—there is no leading nation to overcome economic, political, and cultural
differences and forge an overarching consensus. Leadership in ASEAN after the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis has been absent or very weak. ASEAN lacks a leader like the EU has in Germany. Singapore and
Thailand have provided limited leadership on economic issues, but Thailand’s ability to perform this role
has weakened due to its internal troubles. The absence of a core leader, especially without strong internal
mechanisms to mitigate differences among members, has been particularly problematic for security
issues.
AT: PTX NB
CP requires reconciliation with Myanmar
Task Force on Multilateral Engagement in U.S.-East Asia Relations 11, (“U.S.–East
Asia Relations: A Strategy for Multilateral Engagement”)
ASEAN can serve as a foundation. ASEAN’s role in building a more integrated regional society based on
shared norms and values should be fully recognized and supported. Asia currently faces tensions
between two competing trends: Asia as a community of norms and values, and Asia as a region shaped
by power relations, given the presence of the United States and China. Although ASEAN is not
considered an emerging power, the group of ten medium and smaller-sized countries has promoted
modes of cooperation through its own example of developing a community. In the ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation and other efforts and practices in regional diplomacy, ASEAN’s role in engaging the
emerging powers of Asia deserves recognition and support. Deeper ASEAN engagement with the United
States can reinforce ASEAN’s role in promoting values and building norms. This may be a more
productive focus for U.S.–ASEAN relations, rather than simply seeking to use U.S.–ASEAN ties as a
means of balancing rising regional actors such as China. 6. Recognize that integration on different
economic and security issues will continue at different speeds in the region. Each side has a different
tenor that should be noted. With economic ties, many in Asia seek to become closer to China, though
there is some wariness over issues such as cheap goods. On security ties, however, there are questions
about China and its future intentions. Many recognize the need for a future place to integrate. With the
East Asian Summit, some are leaning toward one place to integrate, while others are talking about
network diplomacy. Integration on different issues will continue at separate speeds, and this may signal a
need for more network diplomacy. 7. A new U.S. diplomacy with ASEAN is needed. There is a need and
an opportunity for the United States to engage with ASEAN more closely as a hub for a wider Asia.
Building on the newly established U.S.–ASEAN Summit and the appointment of Ambassador David
Carden as the first U.S. resident representative to ASEAN in March 2011, the United States should
continue to deepen its understanding of ASEAN and seek out like-minded countries in the grouping. This
should not be limited to its allies—the Philippines and Thailand—but also should include ties with
Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia and cross-border projects such as the Greater Mekong
Subregion. In this context, challenges in relations with Myanmar have to be addressed.
That’s massively unpopular
Hudson, 14
John Hudson, senior reporter at Foreign Policy, “Too Soon to Celebrate? Congress Slams Myanmar
Ahead of Kerry Visit,” Foreign Policy, 7/9/14, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/09/too-soon-to-celebratecongress-slams-myanmar-ahead-of-kerry-visit/ // IS
Citing a growing list of human rights violations in Myanmar, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on Wednesday called for a range of new punitive measures against the government of
President Thein Sein, including visa bans, an end to U.S.-Myanmar military cooperation, and a serious
look at whether to impose economic sanctions on the former international pariah. The call for swift action,
echoed by some committee Democrats, underscores the extent to which Myanmar, a country President
Barack Obama recently touted as a foreign-policy success, has backslid into a routine of authoritarianism
and oppression. "It is time that we take off the rose-colored glasses and see the situation in Burma for
what it is," said Chairman Ed Royce (R-Calif.). "We cannot continue to lavish more incentives on the
government of Burma in hopes that it will do the right thing."
McConnell is acting against them right now
Lesniewski, 7/9
Niels Lesniewski, B.A. in government, “McConnell Criticizes Lack of Constitutional Overhaul in Myanmar,”
Roll Call, 7/9/15, http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/mcconnell-criticizes-lack-of-constitutional-overhaul-inmyanmar/?dcz= // IS [isn’t it weird the Hudson card is from exactly 1 year before this card? 2spooky]
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell took to the Senate floor Thursday morning to express frustration about
the pace of change in Myanmar. The Kentucky Republican warned he would push for delays in furthering
trade relations with the country, which is also known as Burma, after a bid to overhaul the Southeast
Asian nation’s constitution was thwarted. “Those of us who’ve followed Burma also know that, given its
history, the military fears change, ethnic unrest, and the uncertainty that more democratic government
might bring. That’s well-acknowledged. But improving relations with the United States meant both sides
would have to take some risks. This was a moment for the military to take another important step on its
end, and this was a missed opportunity,” McConnell said.
Relations – Germany
Solvency deficits
CP can’t solve German surveillance – German intel will give us info
Washington Post, 15
The Washington Post, “Germans, still outraged by NSA spying, learn their country may have helped,” The
Washington Post, 5/1/15, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nsa-scandal-rekindles-ingermany-with-an-ironic-twist/2015/04/30/030ec9e0-ee7e-11e4-8050-839e9234b303_story.html // IS
Outrage in Germany over American snooping erupted in 2013, after data released by whistleblower
Edward Snowden disclosed U.S. surveillance of friendly European targets up to and including Chancellor
Angela Merkel. But fresh revelations suggest that the Bundesnachrichtendienst — Berlin’s foreign
intelligence arm, also known as the BND — may have separately aided U.S. agents with snooping on
hundreds of European companies, regional entities and politicians. The targets, according to a report in
the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung on Thursday, included French and European Commission
officials. The new disclosures center on a list of 2,000 suspicious “selectors” — including phone numbers,
IP addresses and e-mails — provided by the United States and plugged into German intelligence data
systems that the Germans later determined exceeded the operation’s mandate. The German government
has privately acknowledged the existence of the list to select lawmakers but has not clarified the targets,
according to one of the parliamentarians briefed on the issue but who spoke on the condition of
anonymity because the briefing was classified.
Relations – EU LNG
Solvency deficits
Can’t solve – capacity costs, oil prices, market competition, and financing
Boersma et al, 15
Tim Boersma, Charles K. Ebinger and Heather L. Greenley, members of the Brookings Institute, *a fellow
and acting director; **a senior fellow, ***senior research assistant “An Assessment of U.S. Natural Gas
Exports,” Brookings, July 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/07/usnatural-gas-exports/lng_markets.pdf // IS
Yet the success of U.S. projects is not guaranteed. First, capacity costs are not fixed and can rise with an
increased demand for material and skilled labor, as the overall economy improves.24 Second, the oil
price level plays an important role. Leonardo Maugeri of Harvard’s Kennedy School makes a compelling
case that U.S. LNG projects are likely less competitive at an oil price (Brent) level of $80/bbl compared to
$100/bbl. With other LNG projects indexed to the price of crude, the current price level would make LNG
from Australia more competitive vis-à-vis U.S. LNG in Asia.25 It is worth noting that Australian projects
that are competitive are not per definition profitable. Some estimates suggest that Australian LNG
projects break even at around $85/bbl, though of course every case is unique.26 Third, with respect to
Europe in general, LNG producers have to wonder what will be the absorptive capacity of the market. In
Europe, LNG competes with cheap coal, support mechanisms for renewables, and very competitive
pipeline gas from Russia, Norway, and Algeria (notwithstanding declining domestic production from the
Netherlands, for example). It is not unlikely that, even if large amounts of U.S. LNG make it to the
European market, traditional suppliers would start a price war rather than give up market share.27 There
is some empirical evidence that U.S. LNG could be very competitive in the more liquid parts of the
European market, in particular the UK and Netherlands. Fourth, given all these uncertainties, possible
constraints, and the fact that a significant amount of projects are permeating the market in the coming
years, it may be increasingly difficult to finance additional projects going forward.
Can't solve Europe - prices will be too high
Doder, 6/26/14 - writer for Voice of Russia (Marko, "No viable alternative to the South Steam pipeline
project," Voice of Russia, voiceofrussia.com/us/news/2014_06_27/No-Viable-Alternative-to-The-SouthStream-Pipeline-Project-4351/)// IS
One of the major challenges for the LNG exports to happen is the South Stream pipeline project, as there
is simply no sufficient demand to cover both supply sides. In addition, the million dollar question is
whether US companies would be able to keep the prices of LNG in Europe low, stay competitive and
ultimately achieve profitability. Goldman Sachs analysts believe that LNG exports to Europe would cost
around 35-40% percent more in comparison to the Russian gas that is currently selling in Europe. Such a
large price differential is primarily driven by high LNG production, transportation and infrastructure costs.
Besides the high cost challenge, one should be aware that there are complex bureaucratic procedures
from both the US government and European countries that slow down the potential process of exporting
LNG to Europe. In particular, the US Department of Energy (DOE) have been criticized in the past years
for the slow-process of issuing permits to gas companies, while the EU countries impose high standards
that need to be met in order to facilitate the LNG exports. However, the bureaucratic hurdles could
possibly be eliminated with the free trade agreement between the US and the EU in place, but until then
LNG will likely not be coming to Europe anytime soon. Finally, the likely outcome of the South Stream
project in the following months is that the EU will seek to find a compromise with the Russian side, rather
than fall down under the political pressures from Washington. President Vladimir Putin’s visit on June 24
to Austria, the country that has a major stake in the project, is a win and a clear step forward for the South
Stream project. During his visit, Putin got the approval from the Austrian government for the project to be
finished, as the Austrian gas company, OMV, and the Russian Gazprom signed an agreement to build a
branch of the South Stream to Austria. Putin’s visit to Austria is a huge knockout for the EU officials and
American politicians, which slowly closes the door for American gas companies to enter the EU gas
market.
---AT: Solves econ
Economic benefits are small and studies are flawed
Ebringer and Avasarala, 13– *the director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, which is
housed within the institution’s Foreign Policy program. Previously, Ebinger served as a senior advisor at
the International Resources Group where he advised over 50 governments on various aspects of their
energy policies, specializing in institutional and economic restructuring of their utility sectors. ** graduated
with a degree in Economics from the University of Mary Washington, researcher for Brookings. (Charles
and Govinda, “The Case for U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports” The Brookings Institute,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/02/us-lng-exports-ebinger-avasarala) // IS
In addition to the economic benefits of more domestic natural gas production, LNG exports may have
additional macroeconomic benefits, including to the balance of payments and foreign exchange. In
December 2012 NERA, an economic consultancy, released a report commissioned by DoE modeling the
macroeconomic implications of LNG exports under a variety of scenarios. The study found that in each
scenario ‘the US would experience net economic benefits from increased LNG exports.’ To be sure, these
are net economic benefits, and certain segments of the population are projected to be adversely affected
by LNG exports. Both the benefits and the costs, however, are marginal. Welfare, represented in NERA’s
report as the amount that households are made better or worse off over the time horizon modeled, is
estimated to increase between 0.004 percent and 0.03 percent, depending on the scenario. The greatest
achievable net increase in GDP as a result of exports is 0.26 percent of GDP. Opponents of LNG exports
were quick to dismiss NERA’s long-awaited report. Mr Liveris of Dow argued that the report ‘fails to
consider the tremendous competitive advantage that affordable, abundant domestic natural gas offers to
the nation’. In an official letter to Secretary Chu, Senator Wyden expressed concern that the model uses
2010 EIA demand data, which do not reflect new forecasts for greater industrial sector natural gas
demand. While this is true, the model also uses 2010 supply data, which has been subsequently revised
dramatically upward to illustrate the increases in domestic gas production.
Squo solves
The counterplan is the squo
Evans-Pritchard, 15
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor, Houston, “US to launch blitz of gas exports,
eyes global energy dominance,” The Telegraph, 4/26/15,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/11563761/US-to-launch-blitz-of-gas-exportseyes-global-energy-dominance.html // IS
The United States is poised to flood world markets with once-unthinkable quantities of liquefied natural
gas as soon as this year, profoundly changing the geo-politics of global energy and posing a major threat
to Russian gas dominance in Europe. "We anticipate becoming big players, and I think we'll have a big
impact ," said the Ernest Moniz, the US Energy Secretary. " We're going to influence the whole global
LNG market." Mr Moniz said four LNG export terminals are under construction and the first wave of
shipments may begin before the end of this year or in early 2016 at the latest. “Certainly in this decade,
there’s a good chance that we will be LNG exporters on the scale of Qatar, which is today’s largest LNG
exporter,” he said, speaking on the margins of the IHS CERAWeek energy summit in Texas. Qatar
exports just over 100 billion cubic meters (BCM), though Australia is catching up fast as the offshore
Gorgon field comes on stream. It may pull ahead of Qatar later this decade. Mr Moniz said the surge in
US output from shale fracking has already transformed the global market. "We would have been
importing a lot of LNG by now. Those cargoes would have gone elsewhere and have in fact had a
significant impact in the European market,” he said.
Russia Econ DA
Russian exports are the lynchpin of its economy
Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor,
November 2011, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?”, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-wemanage-a-declining-russia_152701899417.pdf, JHR)
Europe is an unavoidable partner. The European market consumes 90% of Russia's total gas exports and
60% of its crude oil, which make up only 25 and 15% of Europe's total demand, respectively. Russia
presently does not have any viable alternative markets remotely equal in size to Europe. Dependence is a
two-Way phenomenon. "40% of Russian public money” comes from the sale of oil and gas to Europe, and
at least 75% of Russian export revenues are linked to the EU's energy market in general. Without any
extant alternative markets to exploit in the near-term, Moscow requires European gas revenues to
preserve its own financial solubility. Energy overshadows other concerns. Paillard believes that while the
energy trade has, in the past, been "part of a game of blackmail, lies and fear" between Europe and
Russia, its new status as a "question of life or death for Russian revitalization" and its importance to
Europe's economic growth mean that neither side can afford to use gas supplies as leverage in other
international concerns. In Paillard's estimation, Brussels and Moscow both regard issues such as human
rights or the Chechen conflict as not being worth risking the energy trade over. Therefore, Russian and
the European Union are inextricably bound to one another by their mutual dependence on the energy
trade. Russia cannot absorb the financial consequences of interrupting the EU revenue stream, while the
European Union cannot do without Russian gas supplies. Europe has few alternative suppliers, and
cannot develop alternative energy sources in the near term. Russia, meanwhile, is unlikely to be able to
diversify its economy or target new markets any better than it has in the past.
US Econ DA
The US needs LNG that it will be exporting – resulting price changes will hurt
manufacturing and the economy
Tverberg, 3/31/14 – has an M. S. from the University of Illinois, Chicago in Mathematics, and is a
Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries. She
frequently asses graphs produced by others involved in the oil market. Former editor of TheOilDrum.com
until the site was shut down. (Gail, “The Absurdity of US Natural Gas Exports,” OurFiniteWorld.com,
http://ourfiniteworld.com/2014/03/31/the-absurdity-of-us-natural-gas-exports/) // IS
Quiz: 1. How much natural gas is the United States currently extracting? (a) Barely enough to meet its
own needs (b) Enough to allow lots of exports (c) Enough to allow a bit of exports (d) The United States is
a natural gas importer Answer: (d) The United States is a natural gas importer, and has been for many
years. The EIA is forecasting that by 2017, we will finally be able to meet our own natural gas needs.
Figure 1. US Natural Gas recent history and forecast, based on EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014 Early
Release Overview In fact, this last year, with a cold winter, we have had a problem with excessively
drawing down amounts in storage. Figure 2. US EIA’s chart showing natural gas in storage, compared to
the five year average, from Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report. There is even discussion that at the low
level in storage and current rates of production, it may not be possible to fully replace the natural gas in
storage before next fall. 2. How much natural gas is the United States talking about exporting? (a) A tiny
amount, less than 5% of what it is currently producing. (b) About 20% of what it is currently producing. (c)
About 40% of what it is currently producing. (d) Over 60% of what it is currently producing. The correct
answer is (d) Over 60% what it is currently producing. If we look at the applications for natural gas exports
found on the Energy.Gov website, we find that applications for exports total 42 billion cubic feet a day,
most of which has already been approved.* This compares to US 2013 natural gas production of 67
billion cubic feet a day. In fact, if companies applying for exports build the facilities in, say, 3 years, and
little additional natural gas production is ramped up, we could be left with less than half of current natural
gas production for our own use. *This is my calculation of the sum, equal to 38.51 billion cubic feet a day
for Free Trade Association applications (and combined applications), and 3.25 for Non-Free Trade
applications. 3. How much are the United States’ own natural gas needs projected to grow by 2030? a.
No growth b. 12% c. 50% d. 150% If we believe the US Energy Information Administration, US natural
gas needs are expected to grow by only 12% between 2013 and 2030 (answer (b)). By 2040, natural gas
consumption is expected to be 23% higher than in 2013. This is a little surprising for several reasons. For
one, we are talking about scaling back coal use for making electricity, and we use almost as much coal as
natural gas. Natural gas is an alternative to coal for this purpose. Furthermore, the EIA expects US oil
production to start dropping by 2020 (Figure 3, below), so logically we might want to use natural gas as a
transportation fuel too. Figure 3. US Annual Energy Outlook 2014 Early Release Oil Forecast for the
United States. We currently use more oil than natural gas, so this change could in theory lead to a 100%
or more increase in natural gas use. Many nuclear plants we now have in service will need to be replaced
in the next 20 years. If we substitute natural gas in this area as well, it would further send US natural gas
usage up. So the EIA’s forecast of US natural gas needs definitely seem on the “light” side. 4. How does
natural gas’s production growth fit in with the growth of other US fuels according to the EIA? (a) Natural
gas is the only fuel showing much growth (b) Renewables grow by a lot more than natural gas (c) All fuels
are growing The answer is (a). Natural gas is the only fuel showing much growth in production between
now and 2040. Figure 4 below shows the EIA’s figure from its Annual Energy Outlook 2014 Early Release
showing expected production of all types of fuels. Figure 4. Forecast US Energy Production by source,
from US EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014 Early Release. Natural gas is pretty much the only growth
area, growing from 31% of total energy production in 2012 to 38% of total US energy production in 2040.
Renewables are expected to grow from 11% to 12% of total US energy production (probably because the
majority is hydroelectric, and this doesn’t grow much). All of the others fuels, including oil, are expected to
shrink as percentages of total energy production between 2012 and 2040. 5. What is the projected path of
natural gas prices: (a) Growing slowly (b) Ramping up quickly (c) It depends on who you ask It depends
on who you ask: Answer (c). According to the EIA, natural gas prices are expected to remain quite low.
The EIA provides a forecast of natural gas prices for electricity producers, from which we can estimate
expected wellhead prices (Figure 5). Figure 5. EIA Forecast of Natural Gas prices for electricity use from
AEO 2014 Advance Release, together with my forecast of corresponding wellhead prices. (2011 and
2012 are actual amounts, not forecasts.) In this forecast, wellhead prices remain below $5.00 until 2028.
Electricity companies look at these low price forecasts and assume that they should plan on ramping up
electricity production from natural gas. The catch–and the reason for all of the natural gas exports–is that
most shale gas producers cannot produce natural gas at recent price levels. They need much higher
price levels in order to make money on natural gas. We see one article after another on this subject: From
Oil and Gas Journal; from Bloomberg; from the Financial Times. The Wall Street Journal quoted Exxon’s
Rex Tillerson as saying, “We are all losing our shirts today. We’re making no money. It’s all in the red.”
Why all of the natural gas exports, if we don’t have very much natural gas, and the shale gas portion
(which is the only portion with much potential for growth) is so unprofitable? The reason for all of the
exports is too pump up the prices shale gas producers can get for their gas. This comes partly by
engineering higher US prices (by shipping an excessive portion overseas) and partly by trying to take
advantage of higher prices in Europe and Japan. Figure 6. Comparison of natural gas prices based on
World Bank “Pink Sheet” data. Also includes Pink Sheet world oil price on similar basis. There are several
catches in all of this. Dumping huge amounts of natural gas on world export markets is likely to sink the
selling price of natural gas overseas, just as dumping shale gas on US markets sank US natural gas
prices here (and misled some people, by making it look as if shale gas production is cheap). The amount
of natural gas export capacity that is in the approval process is huge: 42 billion cubic feet per day. The
European Union imports only about 30 billion cubic feet a day from all sources. This amount hasn’t
increased since 2005, even though EU natural gas production has dropped. Japan’s imports amounted to
12 billion cubic feet of natural gas a day in 2012; China’s amounted to about 4 billion cubic feet. So in
theory, if we try hard enough, there might be a place for the 42 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas to
go–but it would take a huge amount of effort. There are other issues involved, as well. The countries that
are importing huge amounts of high-priced natural gas are not doing well financially. They aren’t going to
be able to afford to import a whole lot more high-priced natural gas. In fact, a big part of the reason that
they are not doing well financially is because they are paying so much for imported natural gas (and oil). If
the US has to pay these high prices for natural gas (even if we produce it ourselves), we won’t be doing
very well financially either. In particular, companies who manufacture goods with electricity from highpriced natural gas will find that the goods they make are not competitive with goods made with cheaper
fuels (coal, nuclear, or hydroelectric) in the world marketplace. This is a problem, whether the country
produces the high-priced natural gas itself or imports it. So the issue is not an imported fuel problem; it is
a high-priced fuel problem. Another issue is that with shale gas, we are the high cost producer. There is a
lot of natural gas production around the world, particularly in the Middle East, that is cheaper. If we add
our high cost of shale gas to the high cost of shipping LNG long-distance across the Atlantic or Pacific,
we will most definitely be the high cost producer. Other producers with lower costs (even local shale gas
producers) can undercut our prices. So at best those shipping LNG overseas are likely to make mediocre
profits. And there would seem to be great temptation to stir up trouble, to encourage Europe to buy our
natural gas exports, rather than Russia’s. Of course, our ability to provide this natural gas is not entirely
clear. It makes a good story, with lots of “ifs” involved: “If we can really extract this natural gas. If the price
can really go up and stay up. If you can wait long enough.” The story makes the US look more rich and
powerful than it really is. We can even pretend to offer help to the Ukraine. Perhaps the best outcome
would be if virtually none of this natural gas export capacity ever gets built–approval or no approval. If it is
really possible to get the natural gas out, we need it here instead. Or leave it in the ground.
Relations – EU Gitmo
Squo solves
Obama is closing Gitmo now – most recent ev
Olorunnipa, 7/22
Toluse Olorunnipa, reporter for Bloomberg News, “Obama's Guantanamo Prison Closing Plan in Final
Drafting, Earnest Says,” Bloomberg, 7/22/15, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-0722/guantanamo-prison-closing-plan-in-final-drafting-earnest-says // IS
The Obama administration is nearing completion of a plan to close the U.S. military prison at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that it will then send to Congress, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest
said. The plan will shutter the facility in a safe and responsible way, Earnest told reporters on
Wednesday. President Barack Obama, who leaves office in less than 18 months, has battled for years
with lawmakers over his pledge to close Guantanamo by bringing to trial some detainees and holding
others in the U.S. as prisoners of war, while arranging to send the least dangerous ones home or to third
countries. In recent months, the administration has sent several detainees from Guantanamo to countries
including Oman and Qatar, and the U.S. is seeking additional options for transfering more prisoners,
Earnest said at the White House.
Terror DA
Released detainees return to and facilitate terrorism
Rose, 14
Norvell Rose, veteran radio and TV journalist, writer, producer and director with five regional Emmy
Awards to his credit, “Bombshell Report Confirms Released Gitmo Prisoners Return To Terrorism,”
Western Journalism, 10/30/14, http://www.westernjournalism.com/breaking-bombshell-report-confirmswhat-so-many-feared-about-obamas-failed-gitmo-policy/ // IS
Fox News is now reporting that a number of the released Gitmo detainees are suspected of returning to
the battlefield, joining forces with and fighting for ISIS and other terrorist organizations in Syria…this on
Obama’s watch. As many as 20 to 30 former Guantanamo Bay detainees released within the last two to
three years are suspected by intelligence and Defense officials of having joined forces with the Islamic
State and other militant groups inside Syria, Fox News has learned. The development has cemented
fears that the U.S. military would once again encounter militants taken off the battlefield. Defense officials
also tell Fox News that some former Gitmo prisoners don’t take up arms per se, but support the Islamic
State in other important ways. A number of former detainees also have chosen to help these groups from
outside the country, financing operations and supporting their propaganda campaigns.
We have statistics
Carroll, 15
Lauren Carroll staff writer, B.A. in Political Science from Duke, “McCain: 30% of past Guantanamo
detainees 're-enter the fight',” PolitiFact, 1/15/15, http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2015/jan/15/john-mccain/mccain-30-past-guantanamo-detainees-re-enter-fight/ // IS
Here’s what we do know: At least every six months, the Director of National Intelligence, an Obama
appointee, publishes a Congress-mandated report detailing the number of former Guantanamo detainees
who have re-engaged in terrorist or insurgent activity since the prison opened in 2002. The latest report
was published in September 2014 and has data from July 2014. A quick scan of these numbers shows
problems with the 30 percent re-engagement claims. Total detainees held since 2002: more than 750
Detainees released: 620 Former detainees confirmed of re-engaging: 107 (17.3 percent) Former
detainees suspected of re-engaging: 77 (12.4 percent)
AT: PTX NB
The CP is politically infeasible
Savage, 7/22
Charlie Savage, Washington correspondent for The New York Times, received a Pulitzer Prize for
National Reporting in 2007, graduated summa cum laude with a degree in English and American
Literature and Language from Harvard College in 1998, earned a master’s degree from Yale Law School,
“Obama’s Plan for Guantánamo Is Seen Faltering,” The New York Times, 7/22/15,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/us/politics/obamas-plan-for-guantanamo-is-seen-faltering.html // IS
WASHINGTON — President Obama is enjoying a winning streak lately, with the Supreme Court
reaffirming his signature health care law and Iran agreeing to curbs on its nuclear program. But one
longstanding goal continues to bedevil him: closing the wartime prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The
administration’s fitful effort to shut down the prison is collapsing again. Ashton B. Carter, in his first six
months as defense secretary, has yet to make a decision on any newly proposed deals to transfer
individual detainees. His delay, which echoes a pattern last year by his predecessor, Chuck Hagel, is
generating mounting concern in the White House and State Department, officials say. Last week, Mr.
Obama’s national security adviser, Susan E. Rice, convened a cabinet-level “principals committee”
meeting on how to close the prison before the president leaves office in 18 months. At that meeting, Mr.
Carter was presented with an unsigned National Security Council memo stating that he would have 30
days to make decisions on newly proposed transfers, according to several officials familiar with the
internal deliberations. But the meeting ended inconclusively. Mr. Carter did not commit to making a
decision on pending transfer proposals by a particular date, including the repatriation of a Mauritanian
and a Moroccan. Nor was it clear whether he accepted the 30-day deadline, those officials said. The
approval process is complicated by statutes restricting the transfer of detainees. They ban bringing
detainees to a prison inside the United States and require the defense secretary to notify Congress, 30
days before any transfer, that its risks have been substantially mitigated. The law effectively vests final
power in the defense secretary and makes him personally accountable if something goes wrong. “The
chances of getting it done on Obama’s watch are getting increasingly slim,” said Robert M. Chesney, a
University of Texas law professor who worked on detainee policy for the administration in 2009.
Closing gitmo costs a ton of PC
Schanzer, 13
David Schanzer, Associate Professor of the Practice, Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University,
Director, Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, “Guantanamo’s Collapse,” The Huffington
Post, 5/8/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-schanzer/guantanamo-closing_b_3232362.html // IS
Fixing Guantanamo -- which is what Obama clearly wants --- will require him to take risky unilateral action
and dedicate a great deal of political capital.
First, Obama will need to stick his neck out by restarting the transfer process under the national security
waiver provisions in current law. If he believes that the stain of Guantanamo is truly harming our national
security, and the risk of sending some detainees abroad is not too severe, then duty requires him to
approve some transfers. To do this, he will also need some help from allies in the Middle East or
elsewhere that have facilities that can handle these individuals and programs that might make
resettlement a legitimate option. If the Administration is unwilling to take the political heat for authorizing
transfers, then it has to admit that it no longer intends to even attempt to close Guantanamo.
Second, the Administration needs to clearly state where it intends to incarcerate those detainees who are
either convicted in military commissions or will be held indefinitely under the law of war. Closing
Guantanamo will be beneficial, because it would eliminate having a concentrated mass of detainees in
one place, where they can take joint action and focus the attention of the world. Building a new detention
facility for all of the same people in the United States will achieve nothing, as it will quickly be labeled
Guantanamo North and cause all the same problems we have currently with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Instead, we could disburse the population to other detention facilities, including military jails and supermax prisons in the United States where the detainees will be isolated and quietly reach old age over the
next decades . The so-called blind sheik - Omar Abdel-Rahman - who was convicted of conspiring to
bomb multiple sites in New York City, is serving a life sentence in a medium security medical prison in
anonymity less than 25 miles from my office. Who knew?
Finally, we need to come to terms with creating a solid legal framework for the extremely rare cases when
dangerous individuals are captured, but for a variety of reasons, cannot be tried in our criminal justice
system or military commissions. There are many proposals for how this could be accomplished in a
constitutional manner, but it will require hard bipartisan legislative work and a de-politicization of the
detainee issue. It is hard to see how this might occur in our current political posture, but perhaps this
would be a worthy project after the 2014 elections for a lame duck president and members of Congress
who recognize that our current terrorist detention system is both unsustainable and damaging to our
national security.
Relations – France Counterterror
Solvency deficits
Can’t solve – doesn’t assume surveillance
AP, 15
The Associated Press, “Anger, no surprise as US newly accused of spying in France,” Associated Press,
6/24/15, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/7b487071205543d9a96e60fe795a3bd0/french-president-calls-usspying-revelations-unacceptable // IS
If not a surprise, the latest revelations put both countries in something of a quandary. France's
counter-espionage capabilities were called into question at the highest level. The United States,
meanwhile, was shown not only to be eavesdropping on private conversations of its closest allies but also
to be unable to keep its own secrets. "The rule in espionage — even between allies — is that everything
is allowed, as long as it's not discovered," Arnaud Danjean, a former analyst for France's spy agency and
currently a lawmaker in the European Parliament, told France-Info radio. "The Americans have been
caught with their hand in the jam jar a little too often, and this discredits them."
Squo solves
The squo is the counterplan
Tinti, their author, 14—Peter is an independent journalist who has written for Foreign Policy, the
New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and many other publications. (“The US and France Are
Teaming Up to Fight A Sprawling War on Terror in Africa” September 15, 2014
https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-and-france-are-teaming-up-to-fight-a-sprawling-war-on-terror-inafrica)//JLee
In July of this year, France launched Operation Barkhane, an ambitious counterterrorism initiative spread
across five countries in Africa's Sahel and Sahara regions. The mission seeks to build upon the success
of the French military intervention that drove al Qaeda-linked jihadi militants from northern Mali in 2013,
and comes at a time when the US is expanding its own counterterrorism operations on the continent,
setting the stage for what some analysts consider a burgeoning Franco-American alliance in Africa. "This
is a new chapter in French-American relations," Michael Shurkin, a former CIA analyst who is now a
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, told VICE News. " There is an unprecedented level of
cooperation going on." In an August 11 memo to US Secretary of State John Kerry and US Secretary
of Defense Chuck Hagel, President Barack Obama, citing an "unforeseen emergency," authorized the
transfer of up to $10 million "to assist France in its efforts to secure Mali, Niger, and Chad from terrorists
and violent extremism." The move hints at a division of labor in which the US foots the bill for a cashstrapped French military that is both logistically and politically better placed than the US to engage in
combat operations in the Sahel. An even more striking example of US-French counterterror cooperation
in Africa may have taken place earlier this month, when US airstrikes in Somalia killed Ahmed Godane,
co-founder of the al Shabaab Islamist group. Subsequent reporting by French magazine Le Point
suggests that the actionable intelligence leading to Godane's death came from the French, an indication
that the two nations already have mechanisms in place for tight cooperation at a highly sensitive level.
AT: Terror NB
French counterterror fails and is counterproductive
Foley, 15
Dr. Frank Foley, Lecturer in International Relations at King’s College, “Charlie Hebdo attack: is France’s
counter-terrorism model still the example to follow?” The Telegraph, 1/13/15,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11341186/Charlie-Hebdo-attack-is-Francescounter-terrorism-model-still-the-example-to-follow.html // IS
British, US and other government delegations used to visit Paris to learn from how the French were
combating jihadist networks. But France no longer appears to offer a model of successful
counterterrorism – and not just because of last week’s attacks in Paris. French jihadists have carried out
three significant terrorist attacks in the last three years in France and Belgium. A reassessment of the
French approach is long overdue. Intelligence gaps and rivalries France has long had powerful
intelligence agencies, and in recent decades, these services have developed extensive coverage of
terrorist networks and a deep knowledge of jihadism both at home and internationally. After 9/11, the
French provided the United States with an in-depth understanding of al-Qaeda along with a range of
useful intelligence on terrorists linked to the organisation. However, on three occasions since 2012,
jihadists known to the French authorities have slipped through the net to commit terrorist attacks. Two of
perpetrators of last week’s attacks were not only on France’s intelligence radar, but they had also been
convicted of terrorism-related offences and had served prison sentences. In May of last year, French
citizen Mehdi Nemmouche killed four people at a Jewish museum in Brussels. French intelligence knew
that he had gone to fight in Syria and had returned to Europe – but they were unable to help their Belgian
counterparts stop this attack. France’s domestic intelligence agency also knew of and interviewed French
citizen Mohamed Merah, suspicious about his extremist tendencies and travels in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. However, in a series of attacks in March 2012, Merah evaded detection as he killed three offduty French soldiers at various locations, as well as a rabbi and three children at a Jewish school. All
intelligence agencies have to make difficult choices about which individuals to prioritise for intrusive
surveillance from the potentially thousands of people that could be suspected of involvement in terrorist
networks. All have made mistakes, including the British in the case of London bomber Mohammed
Siddique Khan. But in the case of France, there is a strong rivalry between its main counterterrorist police
and intelligence units, which does not help matters. Indeed, the French agencies’ failure to share
promptly their information on Merah was likely an important factor in their failure to prevent his final and
most deadly attack. It remains to be seen whether such breakdowns in communication were present in
the case of last week’s attacks. My book, which compares French and British counterterrorism, shows
that France’s security agency rivalries are deeply entrenched, in contrast to the British case, where police
and intelligence agencies have a much better functioning relationship on terrorism investigations.
Relations – France Space
Squo solves
The CP is the squo
White House, their card, 14—The White House is the house where President Barack Obama lives
in. (“FACT SHEET: U.S.-France Cooperation on Science and Technology” February 11, 2014
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/11/fact-sheet-us-france-cooperation-science-andtechnology)//JLee
The United States and France have long collaborated on science and technology, which enhances
the well-being of our citizens, promotes commercial innovation and economic growth, and advances the
human condition not just for our citizens, but for people across the globe. In 2008 , the United States and
France signed agreements on science and technology, including in the area of homeland security.
Significant work has been carried out under these agreements, and the United States remains firmly
committed to collaborating with France over a wide range of disciplines – including civil space, global
health, innovation and research exchanges, the environment, and protecting our citizens. Hallmarks of
our bilateral cooperation include: Civil Space The United States and France have a strong partnership in
civil space activities, including human space flight, space science, and Earth observation. In human
space flight, the French Space Agency (CNES) has been indispensable to Europe’s partnership on the
International Space Station, and the Government of France was a key participant in the recent
International Space Exploration Forum, where spacefaring nations renewed their commitment to
cooperative exploration of the solar system. CNES has been a key partner with the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) in Mars exploration over the past 20 years and continuing into the
future with the MAVEN mission that will arrive at Mars later this year. The United States and France are
signing an agreement for the Mars Insight mission planned for launch in 2016 and are continuing to
negotiate an agreement on solar activity and space weather, both of which will push the boundaries of
scientific exploration. Earth Science collaboration with France on a series of currently operating missions
is improving life on Earth by enhancing our ability to observe changes in the Earth’s systems, which
provides such benefits as more accurate weather forecasting and increased understanding of global
climate change. Global Health In 2014 and 2015, the United States and France will both host events
building on the G8 Summit on Dementia, hosted by the United Kingdom in 2013. The United States and
France partner on HIV/AIDS research, as well as on neurological aspects of substance abuse. The
United States also continues to work jointly with France on computational neuroscience, which is part of
President Obama’s Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative.
Cooperation between the U.S. government and French and American NGOs includes work to prevent
meningococcal meningitis in Africa. Nearly 300 French researchers were involved in National Institutes of
Health (NIH) supported grants in FY 2013. Innovation and Research Exchanges The U.S. National
Science Foundation (NSF) currently supports several hundred research projects involving U.S. and
French investigators. This includes 13 bilateral research projects in the areas of nanomaterials,
nanochemistry, and joint multi-million dollar investments on supercomputing research infrastructure.
France hosts 16 NSF Graduate Research Opportunities Worldwide (GROW) graduate research fellows,
the largest number in GROW’s first year, which expands international research opportunities and furthers
collaborative research between our two countries. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has worked with French partner institutions on nanometrology, metals speciation, fire
research, information technology, optical lattices, and muonic hydrogen with visiting researchers from
each country working in the other. Environment The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s Office
of Research and Development and a French cosmetics firm are investigating new screening methods that
are faster, cheaper, and reduce the use of laboratory animals and, if successful, could be used to
evaluate thousands of chemicals found in commonly used products. EPA collaborated with another
French firm to evaluate nitrogen and ozone air sensor performance, which contributes to efforts to
advance low-cost sensor technology for monitoring air quality. Additionally, work between NIST and the
University of Pau has advanced understanding of measurement of metal species, particularly in situations
associated with environmental contamination.
Relations – Russia
AT: PTX (Losers Lose) NB
Obama is committed to sanctions
Wolfgang, 14
Ben Wolfgang, covers the White House for The Washington Times, “Obama: Putin hasn’t ‘rolled me,’
economic sanctions on Russia have worked,” The Washington Post, 12/21/14,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/21/obama-putin-hasnt-rolled-me-economic-sanctionson-/ // IS
President Obama doesn’t believe that he’s been “rolled” by Vladimir Putin, rejecting the idea that the
Russian president has outmaneuvered the U.S. in a geopolitical chess match. In an interview with CNN,
the president said economic sanctions on Moscow are working, crediting the American-led effort with a
downturn in Russia’s economy and the decline of its currency. Even though Russia has yet to pull back
from its aggressive posture in Ukraine, Mr. Obama denied that his policy has been ineffective, saying that
his slow and steady course is better than the notion of “shooting first and thinking about it second.” “This
was said about Mr. Putin, for example, three or four months ago. There was a spate of stories about how
he was the chessmaster, and outmaneuvering the West and Mr. Obama and this and that and the other.
And right now he’s presiding over the collapse of his currency, a major financial crisis and a huge
economic contraction. That doesn’t sound like somebody who has rolled me or the United States of
America,” Mr. Obama said. “There is this knee-jerk sense, I think, on the part of some in the foreign policy
establishment that shooting first and thinking about it second projects strength. I disagree with that.”
AT: PTX (PC) NB
...those sanctions are literally unanimous…
Lakshmanan, 14
Indira Lakshmanan, senior correspondent for Bloomberg News, graduated magna cum laude from
Harvard University, where she was a National Merit Scholar and a Radcliffe National Scholar. She
attended Oxford University as a Rotary Scholar, “Congress Passes Tougher Russia Sanctions But Gives
Obama Leeway,” Bloomberg, 12/12/14, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-12-12/congresspasses-tougher-russia-sanctions-but-gives-obama-leeway // IS
(Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Congress has voted for tougher sanctions to punish Russia for its intervention in
Ukraine, moving beyond steps the White House and European Union have been willing to take while
giving President Barack Obama leeway in applying most of the provisions. The Ukraine Freedom Support
Act of 2014, which passed the Senate and House unanimously, authorizes -- but doesn’t require -providing lethal assistance to Ukraine’s military as well as sweeping sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.
The measure mandates sanctions against Rosoboronexport, the state agency that promotes Russia’s
defense exports and arms trade. It also would require sanctions on OAO Gazprom, the world’s largest
extractor of natural gas, if the state-controlled company withholds supplies to other European nations.
AT: Russia Econ NB
No impact to sanctions
VanNess, 15
Alex VanNess, manager of public information for the Center for Security Policy, “Cut Russia's Power
Line,” US News and World Report, 7/1/15, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economicintelligence/2015/07/01/us-and-eu-must-do-more-to-sanction-russian-energy-sector // IS
Western sanctions along with sliding oil prices helped, for a while, to slow investment in Russia and slide
its economy into a recession. In 2014, Russia suffered $150 billion in net capital outflow and Russia's
central bank is forecasting a loss of $100 billion this year. While Russia's central bank sees sanctions
staying well into 2018, Russian officials are not worried over new sanction threats, stating that the worst
of Russia's economic worries is over. Are they right? Most likely. Even though Russia's central bank
expects a 3.2 percent contraction of the Russian economy, Russia's inflation rate has dropped by 1.1
percent from its April high of 16.9 percent. The central bank recently reduced its main interest rate and
the ruble's exchange rate has risen to approximately 54 to the dollar.
No risk of offense – EU sanctions still exist
Al Jazeera, 6/22
Al Jazeera, “EU extends sanctions on Russia over Ukraine conflict,” Al Jazeera, 6/22/15,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/22/eu-extends-sanctions-on-russia-over-ukraine.html // IS
The European Union has extended economic sanctions against Russia until January to keep pressure on
Moscow over the conflict in eastern Ukraine. An EU statement confirmed Monday that the decision was
taken by foreign ministers at a meeting in Luxembourg without debate, in response to "Russia's
destabilizing role in eastern Ukraine." The sanctions include limits to access on some financial markets, a
ban on certain technologies and exchanges between the bloc and Russia in energy and defense sectors.
Enacted last July and reinforced in September, the sanctions had been due to expire in July. They are
now expected to expire on Jan. 31. In response, Russia is expected to extend its ban on the import of
many agricultural products from the EU, which was imposed as a countermeasure to the EU sanctions.
State Budgets
AT: PTX NB
Unpopular – key Republican opposition
DelBianco, 14
Steve DelBianco, executive director of NetChoice, a trade association of eCommerce businesses and
online consumers, “The Marketplace Fairness Act: Too Close A Call,” Forbes, 12/11/14,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/12/10/the-marketplace-fairness-act-too-close-a-call/ // IS
As you break out your credit cards this holiday season, you might not know how close we came to a law
that would have put Internet retailers and their customers at a permanent disadvantage. Luckily, two
Congressional leaders protected us from a radical new tax regime for online purchases. Prior to the
November elections, supporters of the so-called Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA) declared their intent to
leverage the unique pressures and chaos of the lame duck session to ram through their increasingly
unpopular Internet tax bill. All that stood between the bill and the President’s pen were timely
interventions from Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas)—who called out fellow Senate republicans for backroom
deals with Democrats on the bill—and House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio)—who said the House
would not consider the MFA this year.
Opposition is bipartisan
Fricke, 15
Peter Fricke, Reporter for The Daily Caller, “Conservatives Worry Congress Will Trade One Internet Tax
For Another,” The Daily Caller, 6/24/15, http://dailycaller.com/2015/06/24/conservatives-worry-congresswill-trade-one-internet-tax-for-another/ // IS
“Keeping tax off the Internet is a clear example of a strategy that is open to bipartisan support ,” Steve
Forbes argues in an op-ed for Fox News. “It is backed by many Republicans, but was originally endorsed
by President Clinton during his second term.” There are two major efforts currently underway in Congress
related to Internet taxation: one would permanently extend a temporary ban on state and local Internet
access taxes known as the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), and another enabling states to collect sales
taxes on Internet purchases residents make from out-of-state sellers, known as the Marketplace Fairness
Act (MFA).
Small Business DA
Counterplan kills small business
DelBianco, 14
Steve DelBianco, executive director of NetChoice, a trade association of eCommerce businesses and
online consumers, “The Marketplace Fairness Act: Too Close A Call,” Forbes, 12/11/14,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/12/10/the-marketplace-fairness-act-too-close-a-call/ // IS
Under current law, retailers—both online and off—are required to collect sales taxes in every state where
they have a physical presence. That way, a retailer’s sales tax burdens scale-up gradually as they add
locations in new states. By the time a company is legally required to remit sales tax to thousands of tax
jurisdictions nationwide, it is large enough to afford the compliance burdens. Take Amazon.com, for
example, who now collects sales taxes for over half of all American households as a result of their
expanding network of distribution centers. The MFA legislation would have turned that equation on its
head, forcing single-location, family-run businesses that are only a fraction of Amazon’s size to follow
thousands of jurisdictions and face audits from 46 state tax authorities. While big box stores love that
proposal—and devoted massive resources to pushing it through Congress—small Internet sellers and
their customers rightly worried that it would make it even harder for them to compete with national chains
and online giants.
States Islamophobia
AT: PTX NB
CP is super unpopular
Khan and Beutel, their author, 14 - Co- Principal Investigator, ISPU Fellow and Lecturer in∂ the
Department of Near Eastern and Asian Studies at Wayne State University, Co-Principal Investigator and
Project Manager for Islamophobia: A Threat to All Study, ISPU Policy and Research Engagement Fellow
Saeed Khan and Alejandro Beutel, 2014, “Manufacturing Bigotry:∂ A State-by-State Legislative Effort to
Pushback Against 2050 by Targeting Muslims and Other Minorities”, 7/15/2015, \\BD
With regard to anti-sharia specifically,∂ iv. 630 of the total 3813 (16.5%) Republican state legislators have
sponsored or co-sponsored an anti- sharia/anti-”foreign law” bill.∂ v. And 80% of the 102 anti-sharia bills
were sponsored or co-sponsored by an overlap legislator, or legislator who sponsored or co-sponsored a
restrictive law in another of the six issue areas.∂ vi. It is critical to note that the greatest overlap with antisharia/anti-”foreign law” legislation is not with anti-immigration laws as might be thought but with strict
Voter ID laws and Right-to-Work laws. Both of these types of laws negatively and disproportionately
impact African-Americans, women and Latinos. Thus, if a lawmaker wants to support legislation marginalizing the most
people at one time, anti- sharia along with Voter ID and/or Right-to-Work would help to achieve that end.∂ vii. Although the
linkage between anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim advocacy is very strong, research indicates that antiimmigration law proposals are limited in number because of the high political and ∂ financial costs of
implementing legislation that faces widespread opposition from religious groups and business interests
alike5.
Space Debris – Elevator
Squo solves
Squo solves – Japan
CNBC, 14
CNBC, “Japanese firm to build space elevator by 2050,” CNBC, 9/22/14,
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/22/travel-to-space-via-elevator.html // IS
Japanese construction firm Obayashi says it will have an elevator to space in operation by 2050. ABC
News Australia reported that Obayashi's space elevator will reach 96,000 kilometers (59,652 miles) into
space. People riding the elevator will be inside robotic cars powered by magnetic motors. It will be able to
carry around 30 people at a time and will take seven days to finish its journey.
Solvency deficits
Space elevators can’t solve
BBC, 15
BBC, “Should we give up on the dream of space elevators?” BBC, 2/19/15,
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150211-space-elevators-a-lift-too-far // IS
Safety issues The sticking point is how you would actually build it. “To begin with it would need to be
made of an as yet non-existent extremely strong yet flexible material with the right mass and density
characteristics to support the vehicles, and capable of withstanding an incredible array of sheering
forces,” says Fong. “I would imagine it would require the most ambitious series of low- and high-Earth
orbital missions and space walks in the history of our species.” Then there are the safety issues, he adds.
“Even if we could overcome the considerable engineering challenges involved in building this thing, it
paints a rather terrifying picture of a giant cheese wire scything through space taking out space vehicles
and being itself hit by all the space debris already up there.”
Space Debris – EUSO
Solvency deficits
Squo solves EUSO but not the laser cannon – CP doesn’t fix that
The Universe, 7/16
The Universe, “The Problem with Space Junk,” 7/16/15, http://is-universe.com/post/124255254963/theproblem-with-space-junk-the-increasing // IS
The Extreme Universe Space Observatory (EUSO), scheduled to be set up on the ISS by 2017, was
created for the purpose of detecting ultraviolet light produced by cosmic rays as they penetrate Earth’s
atmosphere. Due to its powerful optics and broad range of view, this telescope could also be used to
detect high-speed orbital debris. Researchers have suggested that the EUSO could be fitted with a
Coherent Amplification Network (CAN) laser, designed to vaporise a thin layer of matter from the surface
of incoming debris. This would result in high-speed plasma which behaves similar to a rocket plume, and
the space junk would spiral down into the Earth’s atmosphere where it will burn up. The CAN laser
system is still in its conceptual stage, however, if a working version can be set up on the ISS successfully,
researchers can develop a satellite whose sole function is to bring down orbital debris. This satellite’s
orbit would take it over both of the Earth’s poles, starting at an orbit of 1000km and descending at 10km
per month. If it can blast one piece of debris every five minutes, as predicted by researchers, then
100,000 pieces of debris could be destroyed each year. While the greatest obstacle to this project is
funding , it offers a feasible solution to the growing problem of space junk.
AT: PTX NB
EUSO is unpopular – concerns of militarization
Steinbuch, 15
Yaron Steinbuch, Reporter at New York Post, citing Don Kessler, former NASA employee, “Astronomers
want to zap space junk with lasers,” 5/12/15, The New York Post,
http://nypost.com/2015/05/12/astronomers-want-to-zap-space-junk-with-lasers/ // IS
Some folks are a bit uneasy with the idea for the Extreme Universe Space Observatory. “The problem
with it is mostly political,” said Don Kessler, who spent more than 30 years at NASA’s Johnson Space
Center and studies orbital debris. “Everyone is afraid you are going to weaponize space.” Kessler came
up with the “Kessler syndrome,” a scenario in which objects in low Earth orbit collide and cause a
cascade of more collisions and more debris. Attaching a laser to the ostensibly neutral space station –
which already is maneuvered to avoid tracked space debris – could be a way to make the plan politically
appealing. The ISS plan is not the only one in the works to tackle space debris. The European Union is
pursuing project Stardust, which may also settle on lasers as the way to clean up the heavens. In the US,
NASA is thinking of employing a ground-based laser for the task. For now, Kessler is worried that there
isn’t much support for orbital cleanup projects.
TTIP
Generic
Solvency Deficits
Can’t solve and it’s bad – EU opposition and human rights abuses
Robert, 15
Aline Robert, editor-in-chief of EurActive, “European Parliament backs TTIP, rejects ISDS,” EurActive,
7/9/15, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/european-parliament-backs-ttip-rejects-isds316142 // IS
Not everyone agrees. Developing countries today benefit from preferential access to European and US
markets, but this may be eroded by an EU-US agreement, according to a study by Belgian NGO CNCD.
Danish MEP Jeppe Kofod, from the Industry Committee, told his peers that an outright rejection of TTIP
was not a viable solution, but that the EU needed a strong declaration of its position. The Environment
Committee expressed concerns over health and environmental aspects of the deal, as well as the
arbitration system. "We have certain concerns over standards: for beef, cloned meat, concessions on
water and public health, ISDS. The proposed compromise is not enough!" Green MEP Bart Staes said.
Jerzy Buzek said that a successful treaty would see energy prices converge on both sides of the Atlantic.
"We need liquefied natural gas from the United States," the MEP said. But he accepted that Europe's
carbon restrictions may hinder international competitiveness. Finally, the Agriculture Committee agreed
that TTIP would improve access to American food markets, but stressed that European standards must
not be compromised. Despite broad support for TTIP in the committees, many MEPs are less enthusiastic
about the trade deal. Left Front MEP Patrick Le Hyaric asked on Tuesday 7 July for the negotiations to be
suspended in the wake of the latest revelations of NSA spying on European leaders. He also bemoaned
the continued inclusion of ISDS in the latest version of the Lange report, arguing that this would lead
business rights to “triumph over human rights”. Arbitration debate rumbles on The issue of dispute
settlement between investors and states, which has been the most contentious point in the negotiations,
was finally adopted by 447 votes for to 229 against, with 30 abstentions. The final compromise calls for a
new public legal structure to replace the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. Gianni Pittella, the
leader of the S&D group in the European Parliament, said "ISDS is dead. It must be replaced by a new
public and transparent system of investment protection, in which private interests cannot undermine
public policy and which is subject to public law." But opinions are divided on the subject. Within the S&D
group, but also among the Greens and GUE/NGL, many MEPs believe the new text, which suggests
establishing a specific arbitration court for EU-US conflicts, is insufficient.
Hurts rights
TTIP hurts social rights, inflates lobby power and threatens consumer protection
Meyer 6/16 (Arthur, reporter at the Market Mogul, 2015, “TTIP: Bad for Europe?”,
http://themarketmogul.com/ttip-bad-for-europe/)//cc
However, some state that the TTIP could on the contrary weaken the EU and its already established
social rights. Moreover, it would enfeeble the democracy by empowering the lobbyists. The TTIP plans to
settle conflicts with private chambers of arbitration and payments should be made with public money (that
is to say with taxes); there is also the fact that representative of big firms are consulted by the European
Commission to discuss the implementation of the TTIP. Consequently, there is a fracture between the
European people and the SMEs that are supposed to gain from the TTIP, given its technocratic nature. In
fact, the different negotiations about the treaty seem to be secrets and subject to important lobbying by
larger firms. Europeans are also under the impression that this treaty is going to “Americanize” their way
of life and that the EU is clearly the big loser of the TTIP agreement. Firstly, Western European
employees will have to cope with pressure coming from a more competitive labour supply, especially in
the agriculture sector where the European subsidies may disappear. Secondly, the EU exposes itself with
the obligation to accept some hazardous methods and products that it has refused up till now (fracking
and GM crops for instance). Food quality standards and consumer protection may be opposed to
American norms. Now, Europeans can have the right to believe that they need superior rather than
inferior protection concerning clean energy, intensive farming and pesticides’ implementation.
AT: PTX NB
Even with TPA the CP causes fights
Duesterberg, 14
Thomas Duesterberg, Executive Director of the Manufacturing and Society in the 21st Century program at
the Aspen Institute. He recently retired as President and CEO of The Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, an
economic research and executive education organization based in Arlington, Virginia with more than 500
manufacturing firms as members. Previous positions include: Director of the Washington Office of The
Hudson Institute, Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy at the U.S. “Prospects for TTIP in
2015: a view from the United States,” Aspen Institute, Nov 2014,
http://aspen.us/journal/editions/novemberdecember-2014/prospects-ttip-2015-view-united-states // IS
The hard work of resolving tough issues such as government procurement, financial services, various
agriculture issues, regulatory convergence, data movement and privacy, and investor state dispute
resolution remains even if TPA can be achieved . The window for completing the negotiation with any
hope of passage likely closes early in 2016, when presidential politics begin to dominate the landscape.
Recent polling data indicate that the broad American electorate is lukewarm at best toward trade
agreements, and the courage of members of Congress begins to wither as elections draw near. Clear and
persistent leadership can overcome these obstacles, but more focus and urgency on both sides of the
Atlantic than we have witnessed since early 2013 will be needed to accomplish this.
Econ
Solvency Deficits
TTIP will reduce trade effectiveness
Atlantic-Community 13 – (“TTIP: Not Like Any Other Regional Free Trade Agreement”, AtlanticCommunity, 7-26-13, http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/ttip-not-like-any-other-regional-free-tradeagreement) //AD
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
is the latest attempt at a comprehensive trade
agreement between the two economic powerhouses of the EU and the US. As more details emerge, it is becoming ever
clearer that these negotiations will have far more reaching implications than the two regions involved. To what
extent will the partnership affect multilateral relations, from which the EU has benefited so much, and how is it being
received across the world? The first round of talks, from July 8 to July 11, was held in Washington . The scale of the
agreement, should it be finalised, has sparked debate as to the benefits and risks of the partnership to both
European and global trade. The implementation of TTIP will bring major economical benefit to both the
EU and US economies, while also contributing to the wider global economy, but some are wary of the
geoeconomic implications of the EU-US agreement. The press commentary this week looks at how TTIP is
viewed worldwide. Commentators are looking further down the line at a harmonization between TTIP and
other free trade agreements such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while TTIP could be used as
an influential stick to force China to adopt western standards. While these may be positive feats, others
are worried about the damage that TTIP will cause to multilateralism and the World Trade Organization
( WTO ).
TTIP will fail – increases trade deficit and rapid unemployment
Moody 13– (Glyn, “Trade Agreements With Mexico And South Korea Turned Out To Be Disasters For
US: So Why Pursue TPP And TAFTA/TTIP?”, Tech Dirt, 8-1-13,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130731/08404024018/trade-agreements-with-mexico-south-koreaturned-out-to-be-disasters-us-so-why-pursue-tpp-taftattip.shtml) //AD
Two massive
trade agreements currently being negotiated -- TPP and TAFTA/TTIP -- could potentially affect most
people on this planet, either directly or indirectly through the knock-on effects. Like all such agreements, they have been
justified on the grounds that everyone wins: trade is boosted, prices drop, profits rise and jobs are created. That's why it's
been hard to argue against TPP or TAFTA -- after all, who doesn't want all those things? But given their huge impact, and the
fact that trade agreements are also used to impose a range of policies on countries that are certainly not in
the public interest there -- for example making it harder for generic drug manufacturers to offer low-cost medicines -- it seems
reasonable to ask what the evidence is that entering into these agreements really does deliver all or even
some of those promised benefits. An article in US News provides statistics that show that two major trade agreements -- the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) -- have not only
failed to deliver, but have been disastrous for the US. As regards NAFTA, for example, here are figures from a Reuters
column it cites: The United States ran a $1.6 billion trade surplus ($2.6 billion in today's dollars) with Mexico in 1993,
the year before NAFTA. Last year [2011], the United States ran a $64.5 billion deficit. That might have been a
one-off, were it not for the following facts about KORUS, reported here by the Economic Policy Insitute (EPI) In the
year after [KORUS] the agreement took effect (April 2012 to March 2013), U.S. domestic exports to South
Korea (of goods made in the United States) fell $3.5 billion, compared with the same period in the previous year, a decline of
8.3 percent. In the same 12-month period, imports from South Korea (which the administration consistently declines to discuss)
increased $2.3 billion, an increase of 4.0 percent, and the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with South Korea increased $5.8 billion, a
whopping 39.8 percent. But maybe the trade agreements are generating jobs at least. Nope . Here's what
happened with NAFTA: Bill Clinton (1993) and his supporters claimed in the early 1990s that the North American Free Trade
Agreement would
create 200,000 new jobs through increased exports to Mexico. In fact, by 2010, growing trade
deficits with Mexico had eliminated 682,900 U.S. jobs Well, what about KORUS? When the U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement (SKFTA) was completed in 2010, President Obama said that it would increase U.S. goods exports by
"$10 billion to $11 billion," supporting "70,000 American jobs from increased goods exports alone" Here's what actually
happened: Using the president's own formula relating changes in trade to jobs, the growth in the trade deficit with South Korea in
the first year since KORUS took effect likely cost more than 40,000 U.S. jobs So where does this leave TAFTA/TTIP? Well, the
European Commission's FAQ on the subject refers to some research it commissioned: One of the studies on which the
Commission's impact assessment was based was an independent report commissioned by the EU from the London-based Centre
for Economic Policy Research. The study, entitled 'Reducing barriers to Transatlantic Trade', outlines the economic effects of a for
both the EU and the US. It suggests the EU's economy could benefit by €119 billion a year -- equivalent to an extra €545 for
a family of four in the EU. According to the study, the US economy could gain an extra €95 billion a year or €655 per American
family. But the EPI is doubtful: A much more likely outcome, based on North American experience under NAFTA, is that
production workers in all the member countries will suffer falling wages and job losses (Scott et al.
2006), while U.S. and EU investors will profit handsomely, reinforcing the rapidly rising share of profits in
corporate and national income that has taken place over the last decade in the United States (Mishel 2013).
Relations
Solvency Deficits
TTIP doesn’t solve EU relations---their ev’s exaggerated
Theodore R. Bromund 14, Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations at Brookings, with
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D. and Luke Coffey, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): The
Geopolitical Reality”, 9/17, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/the-transatlantic-trade-andinvestment-partnership-ttip-the-geopolitical-reality
Obama called for a free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union.
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The President’s announcement has
been taken by politicians and commentators on both sides of the Atlantic as an effort to reinvigorate U.S. trade
diplomacy, as the answer to the woes of the transatlantic relationship, as a solution for the EU’s economic difficulties, and as heralding the creation of a new institution
that will give renewed purpose to the Western alliance.¶ The reality is more complex . An agreement that reduces barriers to trade between the U.S. and
the EU, thereby empowering individuals on both continents, would be beneficial. No U.S.–EU agreement, however, can do all that has
been claimed for the TTIP, and there are good reasons to believe that the TTIP’s economic and
geopolitical benefits have been oversold by its proponents. This Backgrounder—the second of two—will assess the geopolitical case for
In his February 2013 State of the Union Address, President Barack
This proposed agreement is now known as
and against the agreement. The first Backgrounder[1] examined the benefits that would flow from a U.S.–EU agreement that genuinely advances economic freedom while
considering the risks that such an agreement would not achieve this objective.¶ The United States should look favorably on all measures that would promote growth and
employment by genuinely increasing economic freedom, but it should not accept any agreement that could mandate the international harmonization of rules and thereby
increase government regulation in the name of promoting free trade. Nor should it accept any agreement that would create a transnational regulatory body that could infringe on
The geopolitical case for a TTIP is weak.
U.S. sovereignty. ¶
On its own, it cannot generate enough growth to be a major factor in the economies of
either the U.S. or the EU. There is also no basis for accepting the existence of its purported spillovers into the military realm. In the context of U.S. policy toward Russia, the
. The TTIP’s potential contributions to U.S.–EU relations
have been exaggerated. Nor will it create a reliable mechanism to reform or constrain China economically
or politically. Most important of all, the geopolitical arguments for a TTIP rest on a combination of declinism and misplaced nostalgia for the post-1945 era. ¶ A freeTTIP offers nothing that cannot be achieved more rapidly by the executive branch
market TTIP would undoubtedly be good for the U.S. and the EU alike, but it cannot take the place of U.S. political leadership that advances a broader strategy of promoting
a TTIP is unlikely to come into existence at all, unlikely to be
a free-market instrument if it is negotiated, and unlikely to make a significant contribution to the prosperity
and freedom of the democratic world.
economic freedom at home and abroad. In the absence of this leadership,
TTIP insufficient to solve
Theodore R. Bromund 14, Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations at Brookings, with
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D. and Luke Coffey, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): The
Geopolitical Reality”, 9/17, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/the-transatlantic-trade-andinvestment-partnership-ttip-the-geopolitical-reality
The first Backgrounder assessed the TTIP’s potential economic benefits. While recognizing that many
imponderables remain and that the agreement cannot be fully assessed until it is concluded, most
analysts have concluded that if a TTIP had been finalized in 2013, by 2027 it would have been worth
between four and six months of growth in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and employment at the
modest levels achieved in 2013. To put it another way, a TTIP would be like adding approximately $100
billion to U.S. GDP, which is currently about $15.7 trillion, over the next 15 years. While this would be a
good thing, it would not be revolutionary. On the other hand, there is a serious risk that a TTIP will be
based on regulatory harmonization between the U.S. and the EU, which could greatly reduce a TTIP’s
benefits and even damage the U.S. economy.¶ Many TTIP advocates have oversold its potential
benefits. On the economic side, many leaders have gone from defending the TTIP as a modest
contribution to long-term economic growth to touting it as a near-term mechanism for ending the EU’s
economic and financial crisis. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht has said, “We are convinced that
this trade agreement will result in more jobs and more growth—and that will help to get us out of the
economic crisis.”[2] During a 2013 trip to Paris, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “I believe, as
does President Obama, that this [TTIP] may be one [of] the best ways of helping Europe to break out of
this cycle, have growth.”[3] And former British Prime Minister Tony Blair supports a TTIP in part because,
he argues, it will meet the “immediate challenge” of fighting the EU’s “economic malaise.”[4] ¶ Although an
agreement that reduces trade barriers and increases economic freedom in the United States and the EU
would boost economic growth in both regions, it would not be a miracle cure for the economically
oppressive growth of government or for errors of economic, monetary, or fiscal policy in either region. In
the United States, economic freedom has declined for seven straight years,[5] and most people living in
the EU have even less economic freedom. A good TTIP would boost economic freedom, but it would not
replace the need for other policy changes on both sides of the Atlantic.¶ It is important to have a balanced
perspective on the potential gains from a TTIP. All economic gains are valuable, as are all advances in
economic freedom, but even a TTIP that did not result in increased regulation in the U.S. and so harm its
economy would merely be a modest economic positive on both sides of the Atlantic. It would not be
transformative; it would merely be one of many factors acting on the American and EU economies, and it
would not be among the most important of those factors . Claims that a TTIP is of great significance
cannot rest on its economic value to the U.S. or to the European Union.¶ Moreover, the gains from a TTIP
alone would not be enough to end the EU’s economic crisis. Even if a genuinely beneficial TTIP were
concluded in the near future, the gains from it would materialize over many years, not immediately.
Economic freedom in general and free trade in particular are valuable, but they are not a rapid-fire cure
for deeply rooted problems. Freedom works because it allows individuals to make decisions about their
own interests, and those decisions take time to play out. Leaders or commentators who attempt to sell the
TTIP as a short-term cure for the EU’s malaise are playing politics, not making a sensible economic
argument .
Warming
Solvency Deficits
Carbon tax can’t solve – no spillover and US not key
Knappenberger, 12
Paul C. Knappenberger, Assistant Director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute, “A
U.S. Carbon Tax Wouldn't Slow Down Global Climate Change,” 12/7/12, US News and World Report,
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-a-carbon-tax-a-good-idea/a-us-carbon-tax-wouldnt-slow-downglobal-climate-change // IS
A carbon tax will not achieve the goal of substantially mitigating global climate change. There is one, and
only one, reason for instituting a carbon tax: to attempt to mitigate the impacts of climate change induced
by humankind's use of fossil fuels for the production of energy. And about the only thing that a carbon tax
in the United States will not do is mitigate global climate change in any meaningful—scientifically, or
otherwise—manner. Why? Because, based on mainstream estimates, of the approximately 3°C of global
warming that is being projected to occur between now and the end of the century as a result of
anthropogenic carbon (dioxide) emissions, the U.S. contribution will only be about 0.2°C, or about 7
percent of the total warming. And this is assuming that no carbon tax is put in place. Carbon dioxide
emissions from the rest of the world—primarily driven by rapid emissions growth in developing countries
like China and India—will be responsible for the other 93 percent of temperature rise. [See a collection of
political cartoons on energy policy.] The best that any carbon tax in the United States could ever hope to
achieve would be to reduce the amount of global warming across the 21st century from about 3.0°C down
to about 2.8°C. And that tiny, inconsequential reduction would only occur if all greenhouse gas emissions
from the United States were halted forever, starting tomorrow, which isn't the plan. The emissions
reductions under any sort of carbon tax will be realized slowly, reducing the magnitude of the global
temperature rise that the tax would avert. For example, a carbon tax designed to smoothly reduce our
greenhouse gas emissions from their current level to zero by the year 2100 would result in only about
0.1°C of global temperature "savings"—an amount, on its own, not worth pursuing. [See a collection of
political cartoons on the budget and deficit.] Any perceived utility of a carbon tax does not lie in domestic
reductions, but in the hope that it will spur technological innovations for cheap, reliable, nondangerous,
environmentally friendly, zero-emissions energy production which would then be freely shared with, and
quickly adopted by, the rest of the world. That seems wishful thinking on the time scales that matter.
Carbon tax can’t solve warming – US isn’t key
Pyle, 12
Thomas J. Pyle, the president of the Institute for Energy Research, holds a B.A. in Political Science from
the University of Southern California, “Carbon Tax's Impact on Global Warming Would Be Negligible,” US
News and World Report, 12/9/12, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-a-carbon-tax-a-goodidea/carbon-taxs-impact-on-global-warming-would-be-negligible // IS
Lastly, some people argue we should impose a carbon tax to address climate change. This argument is
almost always disingenuous. Reduction of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions alone cannot have a
meaningful impact on global climate. As climate researcher Paul Knappenberger recently explained:
Using assumptions based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment
Reports, if the U.S. as a whole stopped emitting all carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions immediately, the
ultimate impact on projected global temperature rise would be a reduction, or a "savings," of
approximately 0.08°C by the year 2050 and 0.17°C by the year 2100—amounts that are, for all intents
and purposes, negligible. Yes. You read that correctly. If America magically reduced our carbon dioxide
emissions to zero overnight, the world would be 0.08°C cooler by 2050. The reason is simple—the
majority of new carbon dioxide emissions will come from developing countries. A U.S.-only carbon tax
would have no noticeable impact on global temperature.
Perm
Multiple strategies are key
ESMAP, 99
ESMAP, a joint UNDPV World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme, “The Effect of
a Shadow Price on Carbon Emission in the Energy Portfolio of the World Ban,” ESMAP, February
1999, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/05/06/000094946_00042105321
924/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf // IS
Issue: How should market transformation be treated in the context of assessing low-carbon performance
alternatives? Recommendation: The sectoral strategy process should focus on removing barriers to the
penetration of low-carbon energy technologies. Shifting to a lower-carbon emissions trajectory means that
the barriers to energy efficiency and renewable energy need to be systematically removed. Financing
isolated projects is not enough . To this end, the ESW should include a strategy for building the local
market for low-carbon technologies, for example, seeding ESCOs. A first step in many countries, even
those where conditions are not yet right to support private sector ESCOs, would be to encourage
borrowing governments to convert the energy management of their public sector facilities (for example,
office buildings, public housing) to energy contracting (EPC).4 Experience with ESCO-like approaches,
such as EPC, would begin to lay the groundwork for private sector expansion later on.
Carbon Tax Bad
Carbon tax adversely impacts the poor and kills competitiveness
Pianin, 15
Eric Pianin, the Washington Editor and D.C. bureau chief of The Fiscal Times. A veteran journalist who
spent over 25 years as an editor and reporter for The Washington Post, he has covered D.C.
government, congressional budget and tax issues, environmental policy, homeland security and national
politics. He served as The Post’s domestic policy editor and congressional editor and spent two years as
a national political editor for washingtonpost.com. A native of Detroit, Pianin graduated from Michigan
State University and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, “A Carbon Tax to Combat
Global Warming is Getting a Fresh Look,” The Fiscal Times, 7/5/15,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/07/05/Carbon-Tax-Combat-Global-Warming-Getting-Fresh-Look // IS
Yet moving a carbon tax from a white board to reality will be challenging . And the proposal is sure to
draw strong opposition from utility and business leaders who have argued that a coal tax would hurt the
economy and cost jobs. Moreover, critics warn of adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax, depending
on how policy makers decide to deploy the revenue. A carbon tax unquestionably would be regressive,
meaning it would hit the lowest quintile of taxpayers much harder than it would harm wealthier Americans.
As a rule, lower income households spend a much larger share of their disposable income on carbonintensive products like gasoline, home heating oil and electricity. Unless Congress were to approve coal
tax rebates or other forms of tax relief to compensate low and middle-income Americans for their higher
fuel costs, a coal tax would pose an extreme hardship on them. That was a point made by House Ways
and Means Committee Chair Paul Ryan (R-WI) in an interview earlier this year with the Madison State
Journal. Ryan said he doesn’t like either cap and trade or a straight up carbon tax – even one that was
rendered “revenue neutral” by providing rebates or other compensatory tax break to lower income people.
“I think these tax-and-spend ideas are the wrong way to go,” Ryan said. “They hurt economic growth.
They’re very regressive. They hurt people who rely on disposable income solely — the poor. And they
make our manufacturing industry much less competitive.”
AT: PTX NB (Neutral)
A carbon tax is incredibly unpopular and hurts the economy
Prandoni, 12
Christopher Prandoni, federal affairs manager of Americans for Tax Reform and handles energy policy,
“A Carbon Tax Makes the Democrats' Overspending Problem Worse,” US News and World Report,
12/7/12, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-a-carbon-tax-a-good-idea/a-carbon-tax-make-thedemocrats-overspending-problem-worse // IS
Creating an entirely new revenue stream, a carbon tax would be a boon for Democrats looking to sustain
inordinately high levels of federal spending. While many carbon tax proponents argue for a "revenueneutral" carbon tax—where the federal income tax or payroll tax is reduced by an identical amount—
such a bill is unlikely to ever emerge from the halls of Congress. Even if an ostensibly "revenueneutral" carbon tax were to become law, it would only be a matter of time before tax and spend politicians
ratcheted up the carbon tax, payroll tax, and income tax. Opening up another front in the battle to restrain
growth of government would be disastrous. [See a collection of political cartoons on energy policy.] With
the economy crawling along at 2 or 3 percent growth and the unemployment rate stuck around 8 percent,
a carbon tax would only exacerbate our economic hardship . Knowing this, Republican Sen. David
Vitter of Louisiana and Republican Rep. Mike Pompeo of Kansas just introduced a resolution opposing a
carbon tax. Highlighting the undeniable damage a carbon tax would have on the American economy,
Vitter and Pompeo write: Energy costs affect the price of every product. Because a carbon tax would
jeopardize the affordability of the most widely used and available energy sources, the result would be a
ripple effect across the economy that would increase the cost of consumer goods for all Americans while
simultaneously decreasing the competitiveness of America's global exports. [See a collection of political
cartoons on the economy.] Luckily for the American people, congressional Republicans have rejected a
carbon tax. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky sponsored the Vitter resolution and
House Energy and Commerce Chairman Fred Upton of Michigan is introducing his own resolution
opposing a carbon tax. Enabling Democrats' penchant to overspend through a carbon tax revenue does
nothing to address the problem at hand—America has an overspending problem.
Conservatives hate the carbon-neutrality
Taylor, 13
James M. Taylor is vice president for external relations and senior fellow for environment and energy
policy at The Heartland Institute, J.D. from Syracuse University, “Conservative Legislators Soundly Reject
'Revenue Neutral' Carbon Tax,’ The Heartland Institute, 8/20/13, http://news.heartland.org/newspaperarticle/2013/08/20/conservative-legislators-soundly-reject-revenue-neutral-carbon-tax // IS
Conservative state legislators gathering earlier this month at the American Legislative Exchange
Council’s annual meeting overwhelmingly defeated a resolution supporting a “revenue neutral” carbon
tax. The resounding defeat reveals the mythical nature of a common media theme of late; that
conservatives can support, should support, and are supporting a carbon tax. Writing in the Daily Caller,
Michael Bastasch reports a think tank representative attending the ALEC meeting sought to attach an
amendment supporting a revenue-neutral carbon tax to an ALEC resolution. The ALEC legislators,
representing state legislatures throughout the nation, unanimously rejected the amendment. The private
sector representatives in attendance, consisting of conservative think tank representatives and
companies potentially affected by a carbon tax, also voted unanimously against the amendment, with the
lone exception being the person who proposed the amendment. Earlier this summer, I had the
opportunity to debate former Rep. Bob Inglis and R Street senior fellow Andrew Moylan on the carbon tax
issue. As I noted in the debate, no matter how a carbon tax is implemented, it would never be revenue
neutral. Moreover, there would be many severe negative consequences of a carbon tax even if it could be
implemented in a revenue-neutral way. As Bastasch points out, the ALEC vote illustrates conservatives’
consistent and well-reasoned opposition to a carbon tax. “This vote against a carbon tax in an ALEC
meeting in Chicago about two weeks ago comes after Republicans in both the House and the Senate
voted unanimously against a carbon tax earlier this year,” writes Bastach. The establishment media
continue to paint the narrative that conservative support is growing for a carbon tax. The establishment
media, however, appear to live in La-La Land.
Neutrality unpopular – government officials
Lee, 15
Marc Lee, research associates from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, “The case against a
revenue-neutral carbon tax,” Behind the Numbers, 1/16/15, http://behindthenumbers.ca/2015/01/16/thecase-against-a-revenue-neutral-carbon-tax/ // IS
The case for revenue neutral is often made on the grounds that people won’t support it otherwise. In
response, I note recent comments from Washington State Governor Jay Inslee, as the state looks at a
more aggressive climate action plan: My conclusion is that a revenue-neutral proposal does not give you
additional support either in the legislature or in the public. It actually has diminished support. That’s from a
guy who’s been in this business for 22 years, and both won and lost elections. It’s important to listen to
people, and I’ve listened to people and that’s the conclusion that I’ve reached.
Answers to Generic Ks
AT: Fiat K
We’re not roleplaying---we know we’re not the FG, just testing “should” claim
which maintains agency
Michael Eber 5, former Director of Debate at Michigan State University, “Everyone Uses Fiat”, April 8,
http://www.opensubscriber.com/message/edebate@ndtceda.com/1077700.html
It is shocking to me how, after literally a DECADE of debates, no one seems to understand what the hell fiat is. Policy
teams foolishly defend "role playing" even though they do not role play. And critique teams reject fiat even though almost every
single K alternative relies on a utopian imaginary that necessitates a greater degree of fiat than the reformist Aff. Debate is about opinion formation, not
role-playing. Affirmative policy teams do not pretend to BE the federal government. They merely
IMAGINE the consequences of the government enacting the plan as a means of determining whether it
SHOULD be done. All fiat represents is the step of imagining hypothetical enactment of the plan as
an intellectual tool for deciding whether WE should endorse it. "How should we determine whether
or not to ENDORSE lifting sanctions on Cuba?" "Well, what would happen if the government did that?"
"Let's IMAGINE a world where sanctions are lifted. What would that world look like? Would it be better
than the status quo?" "Is that world better than competitive alternatives?" This conversation does NOT posit the discussants AS
the federal government. They do not switch identities and act like Condaleeza and Rummy. They do not
give up the agency to decide something for themselves - the whole point is simply to use the imagination
of fiat to determine OUR OPINION. "I think sanctions should be removed [by the government] because IT
IS A GOOD IDEA. It would save lives." "I think sanctions should not be removed because that policy would help Castro and make things worse" It is
nonsensical to simultaneously say "Aff = fiat = bad" and then defend alternatives that are only
coherent/debatable/endorsable BY USING THE IMAGINITIVE TOOL OF FIAT. "Our alternative is revolution against capitalism"
"Why do that? How should we determine whether or not to ENDORSE revolution against capitalism?" "Well, what would happen if we did that?" "Let's IMAGINE a world of
It is NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, and certainly
irresponsible, to have a debate about whether to reject capitalism without imagining what would happen if
we did. It is also incoherent to say something like "we will defend the consequences of our plan, but not fiat." The imagination of "what would
happen if" IS FIAT. If you want to make framework debates better, then never again utter the stupid phrases "pre-fiat" and "post-fiat."
revolution against capitalism [or us demanding revolution, or whatever]. Would that be a good thing?"
AT: State Bad
The state must be engaged---action can be reoriented away from past abuses, the
alt goes too far
Williams and Krause 97 Michael, assistant professor of political science at the University of
Southern Maine and Keith, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute of International Studies,
associate professor of political science at York University, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases,
edited by Krause and Williams, p. xvi
Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action.
The task of a critical approach is not to deny the
centrality of the state in this realm but, rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities
for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation , and
In the realm of organized violence, states also remain the preeminent actors.
analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing
the
statist assumptions of orthodox
conceptions . To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays
inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions
simply
reverses the error of essentializing the state.
Moreover, it
loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in
contemporary world politics.
State institutions are inevitable---must work within them rather than the alt
Paul A. Passavant 7, Hobart and William Smith Colleges in New York, “The Contradictory State of
Giorgio Agamben”, Political Theory Volume 35, Number 2, April, SAGE
the state's institutions are among the few with the capacity to respond to the exigency of human needs
identified by political theorists. These actions will necessarily be finite and less than wholly adequate, but
responsibility may lie on the side of acknowledging these limitations and seeking to redress what is
Fourth,
lacking in state action rather than calling for pure potentiality and an end to the state . We may conclude that
claims to justice or democracy based on the wish to rid ourselves of the state once and for all are like George W. Bush claiming to be an
in the here and now,
there are urgent claims that demand finite acts that by definition will be both divisive and less than what a
situation demands.52 In the end, the state remains. Let us defend this state of due process and equal protection
against its ruinous other.
environmentalist because he has proposed converting all of our cars so that they will run on hydrogen.5" Meanwhile,
AT: Prior Questions
Prioritization claims are counter-productive---you should evaluate the veracity of
the 1ac’s claims about the world while embracing a plurality of (methods /
ontologies)
Andrew Bennett 13, government prof at Georgetown, The mother of all isms: Causal mechanisms and
structured pluralism in International Relations theory, European Journal of International Relations 2013
19:459
The political science subfield of International Relations (IR) continues to undergo debates on whether and in what sense it is a 'science,1 how it should organize its inquiry into
an 'inter-paradigm' debate, while less prominent than during the 1990s,
has continued to limp along among researchers who identify their work as fitting within the research
agenda of a grand school of thought, or 'ism,' and the scholar most closely associated with it, including neorealism (Waltz, 1979),
neoliberalism (Keohane, 1984), constructivism (Wendt, 1992), or occasionally Marxism (Wallerstein, 1974) or feminism (Tickner, 1992).
Scholars participating in this debate have often acted as if their preferred 4 ism' and its competitors were either
"paradigms" (following Kuhn, 1962) or "research programs' (as defined by Lakatos, 19701. and some have explicitly framed their approach as
paradigmatic or programmatic (Hopf, 1998).¶ A second level of the debate involves post-positivist critiques of IR as a "scientific'
international politics, and how it should build and justify its theories. On one level,
enterprise (Lapid, 1989). While the vague label "post-positivist, encompasses a diverse group of scholars, frequent post-positivist themes include arguments that observation is
theory-laden (Kuhn, 1962), that knowledge claims are always part of mechanisms of power and that meaning is always social (Foucault, 1978), and that individual agents and
social structures are mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1992). Taken together, these arguments indicate that the social sciences face even more daunting challenges than the
A third axis of contestation has been methodological
physical sciences.¶
, involving claims regarding the strengths and limits of statistical,
formal, experimental, qualitative case study, narrative, and other methods. In the last two decades the argument that there is 'one logic of inference1 and that this logic is
'explicated and formalized clearly in discussions of quantitative research methods' (King et al., 1994: 3) has generated a useful debate that has clarified the similarities,
These debates have each
proved fruitful, increasing the theoretical, epistemological, and methodological diversity of the field (Jordan el al., 2009). The
IR subfield has also achieved considerable progress in the last few decades in its theoretical and
empirical understanding of important policy-relevant issues, including the inter-democratic peace, terrorism, peacekeeping, international
differences, uses, and limits of alternative methods ( Brady and Collier, 2010; George and Bennett, 2005; Goertz and Mahoney, 2006).¶
in their own way
trade, human rights, international law, international organizations, global environmental politics, economic sanctions, nuclear proliteration, military intervention, civil and ethnic
Yet there is a widespread sense that this progress has arisen in spite of interparadigmatic debates
rather than because of them. Several prominent scholars, including Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, have argued that although research cast within the
framework of paradigmatic debates has contributed useful concepts and findings, framing the IR field around inter-paradigmatic debates is
ultimately distracting and even counterproductive (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; see also David Lake, 2011, and in this special issue, and Patrick
Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, 2009, and in this special issue). These scholars agree that IR researchers have misapplied Kuhn's notion of
paradigms in ways that imply that grand theories of tightly connected ideas — the isms — are the central
focus of IR theorizing, and that such isms should compete until one wins general consensus. Sil and Katzenstein
argue that the remedy for this is to draw on pragmatist philosophers and build upon an 'eclectic' mix of
theories and methods to better understand the world (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). In this view, no single grand theory
can capture the complexities of political life, and the real explanatory weight is carried by more finegrained theories about 'causal mechanisms."¶ In this article I argue that those urging a pragmatic turn in IR are
correct in their diagnosis of the drawbacks of paradigms and their prescription tor using theories about causal mechanisms as the basis for explanatory progress in IR.
Yet scholars are understandably reluctant to jettison the "isms' and the inter-paradigmatic debate not only because they
conflicts, and many other topics.¶
fear losing the theoretical and empirical contributions made in the name of the isms, but because framing the field around the isms has proven a useful shorthand for classroom
teaching and field-wide discourse. The 'eclectic' label that Sil and Katzenstein propose can easily be misinterpreted in this regard, as the Merriam-Webster online dictionary
defines 'eclectic* as 'selecting what appears to be best in various doctrines, methods, or styles,' as Sil and Katzenstein clearly intend, but it also includes as synonyms
"indiscriminate" and 'ragtag.'1 By using the term 'eclecticism' and eschewing any analytic structure for situating and translating among different examples of IR research, Sil and
Katzenstein miss an opportunity to enable a discourse that is structured as well as pluralistic, and that reaches beyond IR to the rest of the social sciences.¶ I maintain that in
order to sustain the genuine contributions made under the guise of the inter-paradigmatic debate and at the same time get beyond it to focus on causal mechanisms rather than
grand theoretical isms, four additional moves are necessary. First, given that mechanism-based approaches are generally embedded within a scientific realist philosophy of
science, it is essential to clarify the philosophical and definitional issues associated with scientific realism, as well as the benefits — and costs — of making hypothesized causal
IR theory cannot sidestep metatheoretical
debates. Second, it is important to take post-positivist critiques seriously and to articulate standards for
theoretical progress, other than paradigmatic revolutions, that are defensible even if they are fallible. Third, achieving a shift toward
mechanisms the locus of explanatory theories. As Christian Reus-Smit argues in this special issue,
mechanismic explanations requires outlining the contributions that diverse methods can make to the study of causal mechanisms. Finally, it is vital to demonstrate that a focus
on mechanisms can serve two key functional roles that paradigms played for the IR subfield: first, providing a framework for cumulative theoretical progress; and, second,
constituting a useful, vivid, and structured vocabulary for communicating findings to fellow scholars, students, political actors, and the public (see also Stefano Guzzini's article in
'structured pluralism' best captures this last move, as it conveys the sense that IR scholars can
borrow the best ideas from different theoretical traditions and social science disciplines in ways that allow
both intelligible discourse and cumulative progress .¶ Alter briefly outlining the problems associated with organizing the IR field around the
this special issue). I argue that the term
"isms/ this article addresses each of these four tasks in turn. First, it takes on the challenges of defining "causal mechanisms' and using them as the basis of theoretical
explanations. Second, it acknowledges the relevance and importance of post-positivist critiques of causal explanation, yet it argues that
scientific realism and
interpretivism are compatible
some approaches to
, and that there are standards upon which they can agree forjudging explanatory progress. Third, it very
briefly clarifies the complementary roles that alternative methods can play in elucidating theories about causal mechanisms. Finally, the article presents a taxonomy of theories
about social mechanisms to provide a pluralistic but structured framework for cumulative theorizing about politics. This taxonomy provides a platform for developing typological
theories — or what others in this special issue, following Robert Merton, have called middle-range theories — on the ways in which combinations of mechanisms interact to
produce outcomes. Here,
I join Lake in this special issue in urging that IR theorizing be centered around middle-range
theories, and I take issue with Jackson and Nexon's suggestion herein that such theorizing privileges correlational evidence, and their assertion that statistical evidence is
inherently associated with Humean notions of causation. I argue that my taxonomy of mechanisms offers a conceptual bridge to the
paradigmatic isms in IR. adopting and organizing their theoretical insights while leaving behind their
paradigmatic pretensions. The article concludes that, among its other virtues, this taxonomy can help reinvigorate dialogues
between IR theory and the fields of comparative and American politics, economics, sociology, psychology, and
history, stimulating cross-disciplinary discourses that have been inhibited by the scholasticism of IR's
ingrown 'isms.'
Prior questions fail and stymie politics
Owen 2 [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3
2002 p. 655-7]
‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this
philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and
Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that
epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation
involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that
such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to
it has an inbuilt
tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power
characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet,
consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that
as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive
power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a
criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example,
one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective
It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good
account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these
circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this
does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide
action are foregrounded.
the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms
of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the
only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of
ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven
rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always
a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the
most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this
standpoint,
‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the
description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The
justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because
general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms.
However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general
explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged
before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of
generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the
formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of
warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It
encourages this view because
the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can
only be one theoretical approach which gets things right , namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This
image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle
arises.
Prior questions will never be fully settled---must take action even under
conditions of uncertainty
Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology,
“Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272
To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist
debates continue, while we are still unsure as to
what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the
relationship between discourse and experience , it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with
analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for
all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences
climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/ political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot
afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered . Those answers may be
unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alt ernative institutional order to appear before an
emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which
comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible
institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination.
Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those
limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful
ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.
No prior questions---refuting assumptions is insufficent
Phil Arena 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at SUNY Buffalo, PhD from Penn State, “The
Role of Assumptions,” 12/13/2012, http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2012/12/the-role-ofassumptions.html
Now, you may think that I’m just knocking over a strawman. After all, Brian already acknowledged that objectivity is impossible. I
assume (heh) that he would be perfectly comfortable agreeing with me that we cannot know for a certainty that the past happened.
(Though I’d be interested to see where the conversation goes if I’m mistaken in that respect.) The real issue is not whether it is
possible to avoid making assumptions altogether, but whether
the types of assumptions typically made by game
theorists are so implausible as to render the models upon which they are built worthless . If I’ve understood
him correctly (and I will grant that I may not have), Brian contends that they generally are. My sense is that Brian sees value to
game-theoretic models rooted in psychology, as are often found in behavioral economics, but no others. If that is indeed his
position, it will surprise no one to learn that I disagree. But it may surprise you to know that the reason I disagree is not that I’m
willing to defend the truth-value of these assumptions. In some cases, I might actually be willing to argue that they’re less distorting
than is commonly thought, but I’m happy to admit that most mainstream game-theoretic models, including those I analyze in my own
work, contain a variety of assumptions that are patently false. The reason I disagree with Brian is that I reject the claim that
any theoretical model is only as good as its assumptions. As should you. Because that is not a
defensible position.¶ Those are strong words. I’m trying to avoid being as obnoxious as I was earlier today on Twitter, but I
are like maps.** They are objects that we use to help us get from where are (a state
of relative ignorance) to where we want to be (a state of slightly improved understanding). To ask whether
a map is “true” is as nonsensical as it is to ask whether a model, or the assumptions that comprise it, is
“true”. No one has ever thrown their Garmin out the window while screaming, “Damn you! Where’s the elevation? The world is not
stand by them.¶ Models
flat!!” Depending on what you wish to know about the world, you might very well require a map with topographical information,
however. When people like me say that we shouldn’t ask whether assumptions are true, only whether they
are useful, we’re not simply insisting on a new name for the same thing. Whether an assumption is useful
or not depends on the question you are asking. The simple bargaining models analyzed by Fearon 1995 are
quite useful for helping us address the question of “why war and not negotiation?” They are not very
useful for answering the question “how does the likelihood of war vary with the regime types of the
belligerents?” To answer that question, you would need to make different assumptions . Just as the map you
want when you’re driving through Boston is not the map you want when you’re exploring Boston on foot. If you’re on foot, you may
well want a subway map. And note that I’m not just talking about the fact that different maps make different decisions about what to
leave out. Many maps distort the relative size and shape of things. The information they do provide is often deliberately false.
eWhen’re not just talking about accidental errors.¶ Take, for example, Fearon 1995.*** Brian notes, correctly, that if states
were assumed to be risk-averse, the claim that there are always agreements both sides prefer to war
would no longer hold. There is no disputing this. What is very much open to dispute, however, is what we
should infer from this. As Brian would have it, “if [the assumption of risk-neutrality] turns out to be false, the model completely
falls apart.”¶ That’s true only if you take “completely falls apart” to mean “contains other outcomes in equilibrium in addition to those
that already exist.” And, yeah, the incentive to misrepresent private information, or rapid shifts in power, would still matter if we
allowed for the possibility of risk-acceptance. (If anyone is interested in seeing a formal proof of this claim, please say so in the
comments and I’ll be glad to write a follow-up post.) But Brian is absolutely right when he says “You don’t need any of that stuff
about incentives to misrepresent one’s reservation price to explain war. Some just prefer it to peace, costly as it is.”¶ I’m just not
sure that means what he thinks it means.¶ What Brian has argued (correctly) is that Fearon did not identify all possible
explanations for war, only those that satisfy certain properties. So what? Does that mean that his work “is
like a house with a rotten foundation . It will come crashing down”? Well, again, it depends on what one
means by “crashing down”. Models very similar to Fearon’s have been used to generate non-obvious
observable implications about war onset, duration, and outcome, and those implications have been
empirically corroborated (see this paper, which tests a key prediction of this paper, or perhaps this paper, among a variety of
others). That’s not my idea of “crashing down”.¶ If we stipulate that some leaders really enjoy taking risks, what does that
get us? Well, if we can’t point to any observable information that would allow us to distinguish ex ante between those leaders that
hold such preferences and those that do not, we’ve basically got a tautology. Why not just say that war is caused by
warmongerism? I will grant you that such explanations are logically consistent — which is a property I value a great deal. But I’m not
sure it’s particularly useful. I can point to observable factors that tell me when wars are more or less likely to happen if I focus on
information and commitment problems. I’m not sure I can do the same by focusing on risk-acceptance.¶ Until now, we’ve also
assumed that the only purpose of a model is to generate testable hypotheses about the world. Theoretical models can serve other
purposes. If a dozen or so publications appear claiming that X causes Y because of A, B, and C, then a theoretical model that
shows that premises A, B, and C do not logically imply a causal relationship between X and Y tells us something worth knowing. But
I’ll admit that the nature of this type of contribution is more modest. It is more akin to identifying a plank of rotting wood in the bridge
we’re trying to build than it is extending said bridge. I think that’s valuable, but I won’t try to sell it as something it’s not. ¶ To sum up,
there is no way to avoid making assumptions. If we were to literally assume nothing, our lives would be impossible. Scholarly inquiry
of every kind would have to be abandoned. If instead we read Brian a bit more loosely and simply seek to avoid assumptions
whose truth-value is highly suspect, things wouldn’t be quite so bad. But we’d still be giving up a lot more than
Brian appreciates. I’m not, by any means, arguing that everyone should formalize the arguments — only asking that those who tout
the virtue of pluralism practice what they preach.
AT: Epistemology First – Knudsen
Epistemology doesn’t precede our impacts—threats must be dealt with
Olav Knudsen 1, PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn University, “Post-Copenhagen Security
Studies,” Security Dialogue 32:3, September, http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/32/3/355
Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other
states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from
when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the
subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence or whatever is
perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or
mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians , and hardly most of the
time. During the cold War, threats—in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger—referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer
to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to
be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be
threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the
what happens
word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory
called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real—it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The
deliberate disregard for objective actors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Waever’s joint article of the same year. As a
consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma,
as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring
to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant
concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that
urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security
conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent
‘politics of panic,’ as Waever aptly calls it. Now, here—in the case of urgency—another baby is thrown our with the Waeverian
bathwater. When situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the
problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are
merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’
threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying
attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we
need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not
least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them. Drawing on the securitization concept, much research now
focuses on the process of defining something as a threat in order to put ‘new’ things on the political agenda. It should follow from
the above that I disagree with the level of emphasis thus placed on the subjective side. Such an emphasis means
that researchers are asked to distance themselves from the world of politics as it is and to shift their
attention one-sidedly towards the politics of ‘what could be’. This aspect of Waever’s approach is clearly not accidental; it is
intended to be that way. The problem here is that this serves to downgrade the significance of problems that
exist out there—not just in the heads of politicians and decision-makers but as challenges to their
experience and problem-solving efforts. The implication of the agenda-setting approach is that perceptions and images
are arbitrary, a stance which in itself may be ill-advised because it detracts from the significance of issues like crisis management in
Europe, which ought to have a fairly high priority. Yet, to be fair, the distance of theory from policy is not only a product of
the Copenhagen school; it is also an
referred to above.
effect of the excessive emphasis on epistemology and metatheoretical issues
AT: Ontology First
Don’t prioritize ontology---irresolvable and not relevant
John Gerring 4, Associate Professor in Department of Political Science at BU, "What Is a Case Study
and What Is It Good for?", May, American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2
To be sure,
there is no profit in dwelling on ontological differences
between case study and non-case study researchers.
Ontological debates are, by definition, irresolvable . Once one has defended one’s position as a matter of
ontology, further discussion is superfluous except as it might bear upon matters of logic and coherence. If social science is
understood as an evidence- based form of inquiry then matters of ontology are simply not relevant or are only
tangentially relevant. Nonetheless, insofar as our ontological presuppositions influence our construction of cases, we had best be cognizant of this fact. Indeed, the middlerange position of case study research on this crucial question may help to account for its ambiguous position in the social sciences. It is neither fish nor fowl, ontologically
speaking.
AT: Discourse First
One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process
Irina Ghughunishvili 10, “Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing
Muslims and Arabs as Enemies”, Submitted to Central European University Department of International
Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf
As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act , acceptance of the
audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way
relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the
speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the
one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be
more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three
factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them . 26 Among other
aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the
rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The
process of threat construction, according to
him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be
considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single
speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He
indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time,
will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it . In most cases a security
scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which
turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely
that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the
audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches .
Don’t prioritize discourse
Mike Reed 2K, Professor at Lancaster University, “The Limits of Discourse Analysisin Organizational
Analysis,” Organization 7(3), p524,
http://cc.scu.edu.cn/G2S/eWebEditor/uploadfile/20121216101345395.pdf
My purpose is to identify and evaluate what I see as the major limitations of Foucauldian discourse analysis as applied
to the study of organizational practices and forms. I intend to suggest that there are inherent ontological,
epistemological and theoretical weaknesses exhib-ited by the former and that these need to be ‘repaired’ by drawing on a number of core
ideas from critical realism.¶ Limitations of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis ¶ I intend to structure my critique of Foucauldian discourse analysisaround five interrelated themes:
constructivism, nominalism, determin-ism, localism and reductionism. Each of these, in my view, identifiesmajor limitations and weaknesses of the Foucauldian approach to
analys-ing organizational discourse. Subsequently, I will move on to outline howaspects of critical realism might be drawn on to provide a more incisiveanalysis of organizational
discourse in comparison to that provided byFoucauldian analysis.¶ 1. Constructivism Foucauldian discourse analysis, particularly as it has been practised in organizational
analysis, is grounded in a radical ontological constructivism in which reality is literally ‘talked and texted’ intoexistence. It asserts that there is nothing outside discourse but more
it tends to idealize meaning and to
marginalize the non-semantic aspects of economic and political reality in that it is ontologically
insensitive to material structuring and its con-straining influence on social action. Discourses are assumed to take on
discourse; all reality, natural and social alike, is discursively contingent and fabricated. As a result,
an‘object-constituting’ character in that they systematically determine theobjects of which they speak and cannot be penetrated by any ‘discourse-independent’ realities of a
social or natural kind. As Gergen puts it,radical constructivism asserts ‘whatever is, simply is’ (Gergen, 1994: 72).The relationship between discourses and that which they
represent isentirely arbitrary—even, indeed particularly, in relation to the physical, biological and social properties which they denote as ‘significant’ entities that have to be
recognized and acted upon and through in some ways rather than others.¶ 2. Nominalism Given the commitment to radical epistemological construct-ivism/relativism previously
outlined, then Foucauldian discourse analy-sis must restrict itself to ‘nominalist’ forms of conceptualization andexplanation. As constituent components of various discursive
forma-tions, explanatory concepts, models and theories are nothing more andnothing less than convenient ‘names’ or ‘fictions’ that represent the worldin particular ways rather
than others. These concepts exist and take onmeaning only insofar as they are created and sustained through discourse(i.e. through ‘talk’ and ‘text’). Any form of interpretation
or explanation isnecessarily relative to and constrained by the discursive framework andcontext in which it originates and becomes reproduced as ‘knowledge’.Explanation is
always framed and formed in the confluence of encountersand chances—even when it assumes some sort of temporary stabilizationand formalization as an identifiable
discursive formation with its ownrules, practices and powers (e.g. the medicalization of madness from thelate 18th/early 19th centuries onwards).¶ 3. Determinism Foucauldian
also downplays the role and signifi-cance of agency in the construction, reproduction and
transformation of discursive formations. The intentions and actions of agents are sub-ordinated to the
conception of discourse as consisting of determinate sets of rules and practices which account for the functioning and
analysis
The functioning of discourses is treated as largely
autonomous and independent of human agency. As Tim Newton has recently argued:¶ ... the problem is that Foucauldians have difficulty in
transforma-tion of bodies of knowledge and the disciplinary technologies they support.
explaining active agential subjects who manoeuvre and play with discourse and practice in the context of power relations which are often asymmetrical in character. Unless one
attends to such ‘play’ and to the power asymmetries that often exist between managers and other workers, it will remain difficult to explain why excellence discourse may have
more appeal to the former group than the latter.At the same time,
the language adopted by the Foucauldians often encourages an image of
passivity . (Newton, 1998: 428) ¶ This ‘backdoor determinism’ can be explained in relation to the assump-tion that the production and reproduction of discursive
formations has a logic of its own independent of the social action through which it is made possible. By denying any ontological or analytical differentiation between agency and
discourse analysis ends up with an explanatory theory that is unable to distinguish between whatDenis
Smith (1991) once called ‘open doors’ and ‘brick walls’ or to account for the complex points of intersection between agency and
structure; they disappear from view to be replaced by a form of discursive determinism which ‘flattens’ and
simplifies our social reality in such a manner that it is denuded of scale, continuity and durability.
structure, Foucauldian
AT: Root Cause
No root cause---particulars of each case must be accounted for
Azar Gat 9, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, “So Why Do People
Fight? So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War”, European Journal of
International Relations 2009 15: 571-599
This article’s contribution is two-pronged: it argues that IR
theory regarding the causes of conflict and war is deeply flawed,
ultimately futile debates over narrow, misconstrued concepts ; this conceptual confusion is untangled
and the debate is transcended once a broader, comprehensive, and evolutionarily informed perspective is adopted. Thus attempts to find the
root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all
these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into
pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power
and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature
(some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong
evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times , when all
the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed
within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature
of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation
for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce
resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes
of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows:
politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively
monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for
winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired
locked for decades in
goods.
No root cause of violence---proximate cause explanations are better
Hugh Mercer Curtler 97, Prof. Phil. At Southwest State U. “Rediscovering values: coming to terms with
Postmodernism”, Netlibrary, p. 164-165
At the same time, we
must beware the temptation to reject out of hand everything that stinks of modernism and
the Enlightenment. We must resist the postmodern urge to reject and reduce in the conviction that everything
Western humans thought prior to 1930 leads inevitably to the Holocaust and its aftermath and that every exemplary
work of art and literature diminishes the human soul. In particular, we must maintain a firm hold on our intellectual center and, while acknowledging the
need for greater compassion and heightened imaginative power, also acknowledge our need for reasonable solutions to complex issues. Indeed, the
rejection of reason and "techno-science" as it is voiced by such thinkers as Jean-François Lyotard seems at times little
more than resentment born of a sense of betrayal: "it is no longer possible to call development progress" (Lyotard 1992, 78).
Instead, modernism has given us Auschwitz. Therefore, we will blame reason and science as the vehicles
that have brought us to this crisis. Reason has yielded technology, which has produced nuclear weapons,
mindless diversions, and choking pollution in our cities while enslaving the human spirit. Therefore, we reject reason. This is odd
logic. Reason becomes hypostatized and is somehow guilty of having made false promises. The fault may not lie with our tools
or methods, however, but with the manner in which we adapted them and the tasks we demanded they
perform. That is to say, the problem may lie not with our methods but with ourselves. At times, one wonders
whether thinkers such as Lyotard read Dostoyevsky, Freud, or Jung, whether they know anything about
human depravity. Science is not at fault ; foolish men and women (mostly men) who have expected the
impossible of methods that were designed primarily to solve problems are at fault. We cannot blame science
because we have made of it an idol. Lyotard was correct when he said that "scientific or technical discovery was never subordinate to demands arising
from human needs. It was always driven by a dynamic independent of the things people might judge desirable, profitable, or comfortable" (Lyotard
1992, 83). But instead
of focusing attention on the "dynamic," he chooses to reject the entire technoscientific edifice. This is reactionary . We face serious problems, and the rejection of science and
technology will lead us back to barbarism, not to nirvana. What is required is a lesson in how to control
our methods and make them serve our needs. Thus, although one can sympathize with the postmodern attack on scientific myopia,
one must urge caution in the face of hysteria. There are additional problems with postmodernism, however.
AT: Rationality Bad
Even if our epistemology’s not perfect, it’s better to try and understand the world
through rationality than just give up on all meaning – it’s key to persuading
audiences
Rudra Sil 2k, assistant professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania, “Against
Epistemological Absolutism: Toward a “Pragmatic” Center,” in Beyond Boundaries ed Sil and Eileen M.
Doherty 2000 p160-161
An even stronger case is made by Paul Feyerabend who attacks the very idea that a paradigm might provide some conceptual coherence to a body of theoretical
the problem of incommensurable meanings in each and every theory, in each and every case, makes it
impossible to generate shared paradigms. Thus, Feyerabend's relativistic epistemology provides no criteria
whatsoever for the acceptance or refutation of theories, leaving social scientists with a growing body of
inconsistent and incommensurable theories. 85 Feyerabend's position is implicitly accepted by many interpretive theorists as well as
postmodernists. For relativists, it is not simply the "methodological immaturity" of the social sciences that produces debates over the relative merits of theories; the
very nature of social inquiry makes it impossible to achieve a uniform set of methods or criteria for the
evaluation of theory: 6 Postmodernists even make a virtue out of this criterionless social science where
"anything goes." Some of the less skeptical postmodernists proceed to emphasize intuition and empathy as substitutes for positivist method, but the most
extreme relativists can do no more than "deconstruct" texts to reveal hidden biases and challenge
hidden assumptions. In both cases, there is no basis for determining when an insightful narrative or an act of
deconstruction yields anything of significance to anyone other than author. ¶ Is there a position between Feyerabend's
literature; rather,
relativism, on the one hand, and Popperian conventionalism or Lakatos's sophisticated falsificationism on the other? To most social scientists in their everyday work, the
some have responded to the challenge of absolute relativism by
calling for the use of compelling arguments and empirical findings not to test or falsify theories but
to modestly engage in the "rational persuasion" of a given audience; thus, they posit a bounded
notion of "rationality," stripped of its absolute universalism and consistent with socially constructed
intersubjective realities. ¶ Others suggest that theories may initially be incommensurable, but that they can be
"translated" so as to enable at least a tentative comparison and evaluation on the basis of the
same kind of empirical tests." In these approaches, the result will not be definitive and theories will never become laws, but instead of
criterionless narratives, scholars can at least make an effort to persuade audiences by appealing to
their own commonsense version of "reason" by relating theories to compelling empirical observations.
¶ In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this
judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a
uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements —
whether we call it "data" or "narrative"—for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation more
plausible than the audience would allow at the outset. ¶ In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and
interpretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of "logically consistent" hypotheses "supported by data" and
the ordering of facts in a "thick" narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a
particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others. ¶ Social analysis is not about final
truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of
incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to
develop, evaluate, and refine general inferences—be they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or
interpretations—in order to render them more "sensible" or "plausible" to a particular audience. In the
absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of
international and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible . This does not
require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of
scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions
that are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme
epistemological positions.
latter seems unfeasible and the former unthinkable. Instead,
Rational argumentation key to problem-solving --- it’s the foundation for
ameliorating all social and political crises
Robert C. Rowland 95 is a Professor of Communication at the University of Kansas, “In Defense of
Rational Argument: A Pragmatic Justification of Argumentation Theory and Response to the Postmodern
Critique” Philosophy & Rhetoric Vol. 28, No. 4Oct 1, 1995, EBSCO
Conclusion—argument and empowerment¶ Discursive
reason and argument as a means of attaining rationality
are under strong attack. When viewed from a pragmatic perspective, however, rational argument is
easily defended . All aspects of a theory of argument can be tied to a rational problem-solving
purpose. Field-invariant and field-dependent standards for evaluation, particular field practices, and
the very defining characteristics of argument itself all are shaped by purpose . Defined in this manner, rational
argument is the most useful general problem-solving tool available to humans.¶ Modernism was based on optimistic
assumptions about what it means to be human. These assumptions related to the perfectibility of knowledge
and the possibility of progress toward a truly free and just society. Today, the modernist agenda stands in
tatters. We no longer believe that perfect knowledge is possible or that human civilization necessarily
will progress toward greater freedom and justice. A pragmatic theory of argument cannot be used to
rebuild modernism, but the tools provided by that theory can be used by each of us to further the aims
of modernism. If full knowledge is unattainable, a focus on pragmatically justifiable problem-solving
tools can help us to find the most effective solutions for any given problem . If no perfect society can be
created, then we may use argument to ameliorate societal problems. And if social structures
sometimes oppress the individual, then each of us may use argument as a tool for personal
empowerment .
AT: No Fact/Value Distinction
Rejecting the fact-value distinction makes effective politics impossible
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p. 58, google books
Contemporary critical and emancipatory approaches
reject the possibility of reaching an objective evaluation of the
world or social reality because they reject the possibility of differentiating between facts and values. For the
contemporary critical theorists, theory can only ever be for someone and for some purpose . As this is so then quite logically
critical theorists elevate their own values to be the most important aspect of critical theory. As a result of the rejection of the
fact/value distinction we see within the work of contemporary critical theorists a highly unreflective certainty
about the power of their moral position. Critical theorists argue that all theory is normative, they offer in its
place better norms: ones, as we have seen, that will lead to emancipation and will help the marginalised.¶ The claims
made for the central role of the values of the theorist reveal the theoretical limits of critical and emancipatory
theory today. Yet even good or critical theory has no agency, and only political action can lead to change.
Theory does of course play an important role in political change. This must be the first step towards a critical engagement with contemporary power
structures and discourses. In this sense, we can see that it is critical theory that really has the potential to solve problems, unlike problem-solving
theory which seeks only to ensure the smooth functioning of the existing order. Through substantive analysis the critical theorist can transcend the
narrow and conservative boundaries of problem-solving theory by explaining how the problematic arises. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory
makes claims to be able to explain why and how the social world functions as it does, it can go beyond the ‘given framework for action’.¶ The
critical theorist must therefore be able to differentiate between facts (or social reality) and values , this
ability is what marks the critical theorist apart from the traditional or problem-solving theorists, who cannot, because of their values and commitment to
If we cannot differentiate between our desires or values or
and actually occurring social and political and historical processes and
relationships, it is hard to see how we can have a critical perspective (Jahn, 1998: 614). Rather, through
abolishing this division we can no longer draw the line between what we would like and everything else,
and thereby contemporary critical theories are as much of a dogma as problem-solving theories.
Contemporary critical theorists are like modern-day alchemists, believing that they can transform the
base metal of the unjust international order into a golden realm of equality and justice through
their own words. For contemporary critical theorists, all that seems that the crucial step towards progress to a
better world order is for the theorist to state that their theory is for the purposes of emancipation and a just
the existing social world, go beyond the ‘given framework for action’.
norms (or our perspective, to put it in Cox’s terms)
world order.
This proves their method is bankrupt
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p. 59, google books
In his criticism of constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt, Neufeld argues that because of Wendt’s supposedly positivist and
objectivist commitments, Wendt’s theory may end up serving political agendas very different to those that Wendt might intend to
support. For Neufeld, Wendt cannot ask the crucial critical question, what and whom is Wendt’s constructivism for? (2001: 133).
However, Neufeld gets the problem exactly the wrong way round. The theoretical problem that Neufeld has identified in Wendt is
Because of the critical refusal to separate
facts and values and the conflation between theory and political action there is no room to consider
the way in which critical theory may serve political and normative agendas independent of their value
commitments.¶ Theorists, as human beings, naturally have certain values and normative commitments.
These values and normative commitments of course direct one’s questions and research but contemporary critical
theorists seem to assume that because their heart is in the right place their work is done. However,
values cannot be a methodology for critical engagement with social reality. The core of contemporary
critical and emancipatory approaches is an assertion of normative intent and a belief that this is a substantive
part of critical work. In light of this assumption, accusations of normative idealism or even fantasy
actually one that lies at the heart of critical and emancipatory approaches.
theory are reasonably justly earned . And whilst we might reject naïve empiricist claims that facts are just, to
paraphrase EH Carr’s witty critique of such approaches, like fish lying on a fishmonger’s slab, ready and accessible with their
meanings clear (Carr, 2001 [1961]: 18), none the less it must surely be fundamental to critical theory that it can go
beyond the ‘given framework for action’ to establish the ‘facts’ or the real social relations that lie behind
this framework that the problem-solving theorist takes to be a natural fact, an ontological reality. This entails an
engagement with and substantive analysis of contemporary power structures and discourse.
Means the K is just propaganda
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p. 55, google books
Potentially a critical and emancipatory approach to theory can go beyond a narrow traditional framework
to situate the given problematic in its broader social, political and economic context. This however
requires some kind of possibility of objective engagement with social, economic and political
relations. It is surely the distinction between facts and values which gives critical theory the potential of a
broader social and historical analysis. Potentially critical theory is not limited by its ‘values’ or its commitments to the
maintenance of the existing order. Critical theory therefore attempts to explain where the problematic actually
comes from and why the problematic is as it is (although because of the socially constructed nature of the social
world this explanation can only be historically specific, there are no ‘eternal’ truths, in the way that some traditional theorists
suggest, for example, Layne, 1995 [1994]: 292–293). If the distinction between facts and values is rejected, it is
hard
to see what advantage critical theory can have over problemsolving theory. Jahn argues that this rejection
renders post-Cox critical theory little more than propaganda (1998: 637).
AT: Sovereignty Bad
Rejecting sovereignty exacerbates inequalities and prevents emancipation
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p139, google books
Critics of critical and emancipatory theory have raised pertinent problems in terms both of the idealism of critical approaches and
their problematic relationship to contemporary liberal intervention. Critical theorists themselves are aware that their prescriptions
seem to be hard to separate from contemporary discourses and practices of power, yet critical theorists do not seem to be able to
the limitations to critical and emancipatory approaches
cannot be overcome by distinguishing themselves from liberal internationalist policy . In fact a closer
offer any understanding of why this might be. However,
engagement with contemporary security policies and discourse would show the similarities with critical theory and that both suffer
from the same limitations.¶ The limitations of critical and emancipatory approaches are to be found in critical prescriptions in the
contemporary political context. Jahn is right to argue that critical theory is idealistic, but this needs to be explained why. Douzinas is
right to argue that critical theory becomes a justification for power and this needs to be explained why. The reasons for this remain
undertheorised. I argue here that critical and emancipatory approaches lack a fundamental understanding of
what is at stake in the political realm. For critical theorists the state and sovereignty represent oppressive
structures that work against human freedom. There is much merit to this critique of the inequities of the state system.
However, the problem is that freedom or emancipation are not simply words that can breathe life into
international affairs but in the material circumstances of the contemporary world must be linked to
political constituencies, that is men and women who can give content to that freedom and make
freedom a reality. ¶ Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation
and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political
community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can
give real content to those wishes . There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that
the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by
powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten
any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the
limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in
which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives.
Doesn’t cause emancipation
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p. 60, google books
The sovereign state as a form of political organisation is certainly limited and many of the critiques of the state are well
made. However, the emancipatory potential of non-state forms or international organisations is something that can
only be considered in a specific and social historical context, there is nothing intrinsically
emancipatory about any form of organisation. As radical commentators such as Costas Douzinas (2007) or Danilo Zolo (2002
[2000]) have pointed out, ‘human rights’ or other forms of supposedly cosmopolitan post-sovereign political
organisation can, in certain contexts, be used to enforce structures of power .¶ Within critical and emancipatory
approaches there is, to paraphrase Friedrich Kratochwil (2007: 36), a certain unrealised constitutive understanding
which is abstract and idealised. Critical and emancipatory approaches have an abstract and idealised notion
of emancipation and the political which is not, despite the claims of critical and emancipatory theorists whose main aim is
to engage with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power relations, grounded in the contemporary social
and political international context. Emancipation in itself as a word or a concept or as a good intention cannot
guarantee anything in the absence of political content . At worst it can empower precisely those practices
which critical theorists wish to resolve.
Causes intervention and inequality
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p138, google books
It seems clear that since
the 1990s and the shift away from formal framework for international affairs in terms of formal
sovereign equality and non intervention, weak and troubled states have become increasingly opened up
to interference and intervention by great powers. There is no global political constituency in existence and the world
order as it currently is one in which power is unevenly distributed. Shifting away from even formal prohibitions
against intervention and formal sovereign equality simply gives more powerful states greater power. This
cannot represent a step towards greater emancipation for the citizens of those states, in fact it represents
an increasing lack of freedom. For contemporary critical theorists, there is a failure to understand that
rights are not things in themselves that can create freedom. In certain concrete situations human rights
can easily become their opposite, a system in which external powers become sovereign. For this reason,
a critical approach must entail an engagement with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power
relations, but this is exactly what contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists are not doing.
Alt Fails
Alt Fails – Wright
The alt’s all-or-nothing choice fails --- small reforms like the plan are key to
institutional change and getting others to sign on to the alt
Erik Olin Wright 7, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin,
“Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April,
www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf
5. Waystations¶ The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The
central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that
embody emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often
depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us
in the right direction but only partially embody these values. Institutional proposals which have an
all-or-nothing quality to them are both less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose
more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in
the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. ¶ Waystations are a
difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have
very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income.
Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income
unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers
who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level ¶ earnings. There
may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore
might not function as a stepping stone.¶ What we ideally want, therefore, are intermediate reforms that have
two main properties: first, they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of
transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the
alternative is credible and desirable; and second, they enhance the capacity for action of people,
increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and
bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly
salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that are
possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the
same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.
Alt Fails – Micropolitics/Discourse Bad
The alt’s micropolitical move toward a politics of discourse fails---no real
grounding for resistance
Cloud 6, Professor of Communication Studies at Texas, December, Communication and
Critical/Cultural Studies, Online
Poststructuralist theory answers the question of instrumentality in a range of similar ways. The point, says Foucault, is ‘‘to arrive at an analysis which can account for the
One strong trend from this theoretical stance posits the constitution of subjects
in discourse to be the moment of politics. For example, Greene argues that we ought to replace a ‘‘logic of influence’’ with a constitutive model of
constitution of the subject within an historical framework.’’50
rhetorical ‘‘effectivity,’’ which describes the production of truths and subjects who, because there is no ‘‘outside’’ to truths regarded as ‘‘dominant,’’ have no authentic resources
for conscious instrumentality.51 In addition, because Greene believes that contemporary capitalism has taken complex transnational form, an instrumental politics founded on
the real relationship of class is no longer tenable.52 The idea that capitalism is no longer vulnerable to concerted, class-based, systemic attack also lurks behind a second
theories offering metaphors for agency that share an emphasis on
micropolitical techne. Foucault, suspicious of Stalinism*and therefore (albeit unnecessarily) of any desire to overcome the capitalist system in the whole*argues
tendency characteristic of the range of poststructuralist
that intellectuals and activists should give up a broader systematic struggle in favor of localized efforts in the ‘‘fine meshes of power.’’53 Following this line, other
poststructuralists argue that in our historical moment, there can be no systemic challenge not recuperated by the system, and no form of social discipline more knowably faithful
to our interests than the one in which we find ourselves. The only way forward is the sporadic, ironic, schizophrenic, localized and anarchic rejection of discipline itself.54 A brief
are reduced to
micro-strategies of discursive interruption, not anything like collective, willful political movement. For example,
survey of examples from recent theoretical work provides a sense of the possibilities for agency in poststructuralist thought. On the whole, they
Barbara Biesecker argues that the moment of political agency is ‘‘a ‘getting through’ or ad hoc ‘making do’ by a subject whose resources are necessarily located in and
circumscribed by the field within which she operates.’’55 Similarly, other major theorists abandon a reality-based agency in favor of strategizing ironically within and across the
constructs of social reality. Social theorists Hardt and Negri, resigned to the permanence of an ineffable Empire, suggest that we perform miscegenation.56 In this work and in
their sequel Multitude, Hardt and Negri describe the tropes of nomadism and miscegenation as features of ‘‘a space that is defined by the irrepressible movements (legal or
clandestine) of individuals and groups.’’57 Greene explains that Hardt and Negri describe a capitalism as ‘‘fully implicated in producing life and social being,’’ immanent in social
being without determination or motivation by economic interests beyond the production of society itself.58 In other words, community and economy are one, indistinct and
unmediated. Hardt and Negri write, ‘‘The passage to postmodernity and Empire immediately presents communication, production and life as one complex
Consequently, any dialectical tension between real social relations and consciousness of them is
impossible. This image is ultimately as mystical as Neo’s merger with the Matrix and its creators. Hardt and Negri’s theory is an ‘‘immaterial
paradigm’’ that describes capitalism as without ontological existence and, in Greene’s phrase, ‘‘a world without mediation.’’60 On this argument, there is no
real ground for resistance; thus, simply by coming into being, moving about, and forming relationships in daily life, ‘‘the multitude’’ (an amorphous and
whole.’’59
disorganized substitute for ‘‘class’’) may be disrupting the stability of Empire (but there is no way of knowing, really). Ellen Wood, in response to Hardt and Negri’s argument that
we are living in a new form of stateless power immune to broad-scale organized challenges, argues that ‘‘
such views not only miss something truly
essential in today’s global order but also leave us powerless to resist the empire of capital.’’61 Thus, she concludes that Empire
offers little beyond a picture of the world ‘‘in which the best we can do is go with the flow, lie back and think of Nike.’’62 On the gender front, similar approaches to agency hold
sway. Feminist scholar Judith Butler argues that the best we can do is to regard our actions as always-already scripted performances. Again, simply being gendered, but
conscious of it, is somehow a challenge to regimes of gender in capitalism. Likewise, queer theorist Michael Warner thinks disruptive cultural play, or romping, may be a good
rejecting the politics of advocacy in favor of revealing how the conditions of
constituted in discourse
metaphor for human agency. He aligns himself with Foucault in
politics
possibility for any such
are
formations.63 In Deleuze and Guattari, the metaphor for social disruption is schizophrenia, a
haphazard and inarticulate response to discipline.64 For them, there is nothing outside the cave of illusion, simply a deeper cave, in which ‘‘the very idea of a model or
lacks any concrete political aims
whatsoever, defining democracy not as material freedom or self-rule but rather as an amorphous ‘‘productive excess and joy’’ already present in capitalist society. The
privileged position is challenged and overturned.’’65 Following Deleuze and Negri, it seems, Greene’s most recent work
Matrix trilogy, particularly the Architect’s speech, echoes this note of resignation to the existing order of things. Neo accepts a tenuous peace in which the machines continue to
harvest the bio-power of humans to run their empire. He allows himself to be martyred in his final confrontation with the machines. His allies in the Matrix (such as The Oracle,
an elderly black woman whose wisdom guides the rebels and predicts Neo’s singular power) turn out to be errant computer programs who can disrupt the Matrix in small ways
The rebel people and
programs celebrate the peace that leaves them more or less where they were before they began to fight.
The Matrix , like the vision of society in much of poststructuralist theory, permits excess and aberration in the shape of Neo and other rebels. Even so, their actions
cannot and are not allowed to threaten the reality of machine power, a metaphor for the futility of struggle against a global capitalism
(for example, by conjuring the image of a beautiful sunrise at the trilogy’s maudlin end) while the Matrix itself remains intact.
posited as centerless, flexible, and invulnerable at the macroscopic level.
Alt Fails – Theorizing Bad
Theorizing can’t fix the world—we can’t end conflict, just manage it
Nik Hynek 13, Department of International Relations and European Studies and David Chandler,
Metropolitan University Prague AND Department of Politics and International Relations, University of
Westminster [CSS=Critical Security Studies, “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies”,
Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, 46-63
The double irony of the birth and death of CSS is not only that CSS has come full circle – from its liberal teleological universalist and emancipatory claims, in the 1990s, to its
this ‘critical’ approach to security has also
mirrored and mimicked the policy discourses of leading Western powers. As policy-makers now look
for excuses to explain the failures of the promise of liberal interventionism, critical security theorists are on
hand to salve Western consciences with analyses of non-linearity, complexity and human and nonhuman assemblages. It appears that the world cannot be transformed after all. We cannot end conflict or
insecurity, merely attempt to manage them. Once critique becomes anti-critique (Noys 2011) and
emancipatory alternatives are seen to be merely expressions of liberal hubris, the appendage of ‘critical’
for arguments that discount the possibility of transforming the world and stake no claims which are
unamenable to power or distinct from dominant philosophical understandings is highly problematic . Let
us study security, its discourses and its practices, by all means but please let us not pretend that study is somehow the
same as critique.
discourses of limits and flatter ontologies, highlighting differences and pluralities in the 2010s – but that
Alt Fails – Bottom Up Fails/Cede Political
The alt’s bottom-up approach devolves into individualized moralism --- cedes the
political to unaccountable elites
David Chandler 7, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for the Study of
Democracy, “Politics without Sovereignty: A critique of contemporary international relations”, p. 164-5
Conclusion¶ Global civil society theorists
focus their ire on what they understand to be the narrow, exclusionary
bias of the sovereign state. In turn, they view a wide constellation of transnational actors, from the global megaNGOs to local farming cooperatives, as representing a radical alternative that opens up the space for new kinds
of political organization and activity. In fact, what the celebration of ‘bottom-up’ politics and the critique of the
state really express is a deep disenchantment with mass society and the demands of formal accountability that
go along with representative democracy.72 A consequence of rejecting the political sphere is that it
leaves political struggles isolated from any shared framework of meaning or from any formal
processes of democratic accountability. The quest for individual autonomy and the claim for the recognition of separate
‘political spaces’ and the ‘incommunicability’ of political causes, each demonstrate the limits of these
radical claims for the normative project of global civil society ‘from below’. Far from reflecting the
emergence of new global political forces, the global civil society, by virtue of its social isolation, is
marked by political weakness . As such, the only strategy left to it is a retreat into elite lobbying and
individualized ethical postures. ¶ It is important to stress that I am not claiming that the key problem with
radical global civil society approaches is their rejection of formal engagement per se in existing political
institutions and established parties. The point I am making here is that the rejection of state-based politics,
which forces the individual to engage with and account for the views of other members of society, reflects a
deeper problem – an unwillingness to engage in political contestation per se. Proponents of global civil
society ‘from below’ therefore seek to legitimize their views as the prior moral claims of others.
This has the effect of transforming global civic actors into the advocates of those unable to make moral
claims themselves. Alternatively, they put themselves in harm’s way and would lead by inarticulate example. What they
avoid doing is pursuing their own interests or seeking to build political solidarity around shared interests.
What can actually be achieved through their chosen methods is limited. Radical lobbying and calls for
recognition may in some cases precipitate a generational turnover in the establishment. However, the rejection of social
engagement is more likely to lead to a further shrinking of the political sphere, reducing it to a
small circle of increasingly unaccountable elites. If the only alternative to the political ‘game’ is to
threaten to ‘take our ball home’ – the anti-politics of rejectionism – the powers that be can sleep
peacefully in their beds.
Alt Fails – Demystification =/= Action
Pure critique is politically infeasible---their impact overemphasizes human
agency and ignores the benefits of the plan
Jane Bennett 10—pol sci, Johns Hopkins, Vibrant Matter, xiv-xv
For this demystification, that most popular of practices in
critical theory, should be used with caution and sparingly ,
because demystification presumes that at the heart of any event or process lies a human agency that has
illicitly been projected into things. This hermeneutics of suspicion calls for theorists to be on high alert
for signs of the secret truth (a human will to power) below the false appearance of nonhuman agency. Karl
Marx sought to demystify commodities and prevent their fetishization by showing them to be invested with an agency that beto humans; patriotic
Americans under the Bush regime exposed the self-interest, greed, or cruelty inside the "global war on terror" or inside the former attorney general
Alberto Gonzales's version of the rule of law; the feminist theorist Wendy Brown demystifies when she prom ises to "remove the scales from our eyes"
and reveal that "the discourse of tolerance ... [valorizes1the West, othering the rest ... while feigning to do no more than ... extend the benefits of liberal
thought and prac tices."16 ¶ Demystification
is an indispensable tool in a democratic, pluralist politics that seeks to hold officials
accountable to (less unjust versions of) the rule of law and to check attempts to impose a system of civilizational, religiOUS, sexual, class)
domination. But there are limits to its political efficacy, among them that exposés of illegality, greed,
mendacity, oligarchy, or hypocrisy do not reliably produce moral outrage and that, if they do, this outrage
mayor may not spark ameliorative action . Brown, too, acknowledges that even if the exposé of the "false conceits" of liberal
tolerance were to weaken the "justification" for the liberal quest for empire, it would not necessarily weaken the
"motivation" for empireP What is more, ethical political action on the part of humans seems to require not only a vigilant
critique of existing institutions but also positive, even utopian alternatives . 18 Jodi Dean, another' advocate for
demystification, recognizes this liability: "If all we can do is evaluate, critique, or demystify the present, then what is it
that we are hoping to accomplish ?" 19 A. relentless approach toward demystification works against the
possibility of positive formulations . In a discussion of the Franc;ois Mitterand government, Foucault broke with his former
tendency to rely on demystification and proposed specific reforms in the domain of sexuality: "I've become rather
irritated by an attitude, which for a long time was mine, too, and which I no longer subscribe to, which consists in saying: our
problem is to denounce and criticize: let them get on with their legislation and reforms . That doesn't seem
I,· to me like the right attitude:'20 The point, again, is that we need both critique and positive formulations of
alternatives , alternatives that will themselves become the objects of later critique and reform .¶
What demystification uncovers is always something human, for example, the hidden quest for domination on
the part of some humans '\ over others, a human desire to deflect responsibility for harms or an unjust
distribution of (human) power. Demystification tends to screen from view the vitality of matter and to
reduce political agency to human agency. Those are the tendencies I resist.
Defenses of the Law
AT: Neocleous
Neocleous is ahistorical and makes the perfect the enemy of the good
Hilla Dayan 9, Phd Candidate @ New School for Social Research, "Critique of Security (review),"
Canadian Journal of Law and Society,
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy2.library.uiuc.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_law_and_society/v024/24.2.day
an.html
The book's main grievance is that the fetish of security—very broadly defined to include security both in the
economic and in the political sense—is the root of anti-democratic measures, massive repression, and socioeconomic injustice. In chapter 3, which deals with the relationship between social and national security, the
overriding argument is that liberal democracies are, almost by definition, security states in the worst
possible sense. The United States in particular is held responsible, given examples such as the New Deal and
the Marshall Plan, for enforcing economic security intertwined with political and military interests on "the whole
world, [which] was to be inclded in this new, 'secure' global liberal order" (p. 103). In this account, the desire
to sustain a capitalist socio-economic order is portrayed as not much different from either the security obsessions of,
for example, Israel and the apartheid regime of South Africa (p. 63) or the policies of any European welfare state. This is
a strikingly ahistorical approach that bundles up highly complex social, economic, and political systems into a generic
straitjacket. Because of this overly generalizing line of argument, Critique of Security does not add much to the insights of
critical theory dating back to the 1970s, which has already dealt extensively with authoritarian practices and
tendencies of liberal-capitalist orders.2 Moreover, it curiously ignores the fact that earlier post- or neoMarxist critiques of the liberal-capitalist order have been formulated primarily in the name of security—the demand to
secure and protect the status of workers, women, minorities, and the environment, for example.3 Especially under
the current conditions of insecurity generated by a global financial crisis, Neocleous' attack on welfare security seems
misplaced or incomplete. The interesting tension between popular and progressive demands for security
from the ravages of capitalism, on the one hand, and security as a project of protecting the capitalist
order, on the other hand, is not dealt with at all. Instead, the author pleads with us to simply eliminate the desire
for security from our lives, or, in other words, to [End Page 291] throw the baby out with the bathwater. Still,
Critique of Security serves as a useful reminder that demands for collective protection from the conditions
generated by the systemic failures of the capitalist system must be accompanied by a sober re-evaluation
of the limits and responsibilities of the state and its capacity to abuse power, especially in times of
economic and political crisis and insecurity. It is a timely contribution that raises questions about the
current responses by states to the global economic crisis. Now that all state resources are pulled and
stretched to put capitalism back on track, whose security is really protected?
AT: Agamben – Play With Law
“Playing with the law” is just as meaningless as it sounds
Alison Ross 12, Research Unit in European Philosophy @ Monash University, “Agamben’s Political
Paradigm of the Camp: Its Features and Reasons” Constellations 19 (3) p.429-431
Agamben responds to the criticisms that his account of law leaves little room for resistance with the
promise of the “deactivation” of law. In the State of Exception, he writes, “One day humanity will play with law just as
iv.
children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use, but to free them from it for good.” This new relation to law is one premised on its
“deactivation”: “What opens a passage toward justice is not the erasure of law, but its deactivation and inactivity.”44 These remarks draw on different sources. On the one hand,
Agamben promises that the semantic
and practical functions of law will be exhausted – as a shell of empty functions it will be a token for play. On
the other hand, he draws on messianic references to justice that pronounce a politics “free” of sovereign
power.45 Such remarks are suggestive and no doubt deserve further study for a better understanding of the influences on his thinking. The question that
needs to be asked from our perspective is, however, whether suggesting that law will become a tool for play helps
shed light on current political circumstances. How can the political significance of such a statement be
measured?46 Whatever its philosophical provenance, the notion of playing with law does not address any of the significant
shortcomings of Agamben’s political theory. 3. Agamben’s Political Paradigm of the Camp and the Tools of Political Theory Agamben’s
understanding of sovereignty is unacceptably beholden to his fascination with the camp. In Agamben, biopolitics reverts back to a totalizing
schema and relies on the philosophical canon and speculative schematism for its meaning. According to
the idea that law is deactivated draws on the Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of “accomplished nihilism.” In this vein,
Agamben’s quasi-historical schema, the camp is the situation in which “bare life” is completely in view. In fact, he says that the camp shows how sovereignty operates; it shows
the logical development of its internal logic. Moreover, he asserts that this logic is common to liberal and totalitarian states alike. Perhaps more important still is the fact that
Agamben’s examples always take him to cases that fall outside the ordinary settings of social institutions where force is not a one way relation but is inscribed in a thick web of
power relations that run in all directions and where various strategies are used by all involved.47 Agamben’s characterization of the sinister project of the legal machine that
the only
situation where his doctrine seems to work is the extermination camp where action meets, not other
actions, but bodies. The artificial radicalism of Agamben’s conceptual construction coincides with the
artificial situation where human life is reduced to bare biological functions under the constant threat of
extinction. Agamben holds to the artificial situation of his doctrine against the practices and realities – such as the ordinary perception of the experience of the legitimacy
of law – that are unresponsive to this doctrine’s guiding concepts and orientation. Agamben’s evaluative grid might be attractive to some. But this grid has two problems:
its totalizing sweep is too coarse to account for the interaction between specific institutional practices and
agents, and it refuses to consider the suitability of its concepts to circumstances. To be sure, arriving at a critical picture of
reaches its apogee in the camps misses out on the task of dealing with the complex structures and practices of liberal societies. Or, to put it differently,
liberal society is not an easy task. It is precisely this normative dimension that critics often found wanting in Foucault’s work. How does the microanalysis of power in a specific
institution build up to a picture of an entire social field? Foucault arguably tries to respond to this criticism in the first volume of the History of Sexuality when he describes the
coordination between specific institutional structures, such as the arrangement of sleeping quarters in boarding schools, that are also biopolitical (immanent to the social field).
Biopolitics describes the logic of the administration of life that underpins specific microdisciplines; but it escapes being a generalizing mode of explanation because it is arrived
at through an analysis of local aims of power whose effects are not confined to a specific locale. In this way, Foucault keeps in view the intelligibility of institutional practices. We
can also cite Discipline and Punish in this regard, where Foucault analyzes specific institutional practices from the perspective of the aims and intentions that ground them. To
arrive at his thesis of a disciplinary society, he needs to show that these local aims of power are not confined to their local origins but have a swarming effect as techniques that
can be taken up and used in other institutions and contexts. I do not wish to defend the proposition that Foucault keeps his analysis entirely free of speculative elements. I do,
however, want to draw attention to the range of factors that warrant the claim of explanatory adequacy, a range remote from Agamben’s narrow focus on the camp as the field
of legibility for the essence of law. In the case of the alternatives mentioned, we get a concrete image of the factors involved in the explanation of social organization. None of
Agamben’s
theory founders most especially because it does not adequately understand the force or impact of the
image of social organization it propagates. The picture that emerges from his work is that of a brutalizing
tyrant on one side and an innocent, totally passive victim on the other. This image doubtlessly has a particular way of ordering
these theories are flawless. But they do outline the stakes and elements involved in theoretical debates over the explanation of political realities. In contrast,
one’s mind in thinking about how issues are to be treated. Part of the work of theory is to come up with judicious images that can direct attention to salient issues. In such work,
ordinary perception of things cannot be dismissed as misguided. Both ordinary perception and critique grounded in a moral principle
must be kept in view. Against Agamben’s contention to articulate the problems of liberal societies in “fundamental” terms, I have argued that his conception of law
and sovereignty distorts the problems and elements involved in cogent political explanation. These distortions can
be seen by way of comparison with the complicated pictures of social organization present in alternative theoretical positions that encourage
attention to the diverse factors involved in social life. Agamben’s theory deprives itself of the possibility of
learning from the realities it tries to illuminate and thus of enriching itself in the process of explanation. The price is the impoverishment of theory.
Moralizing tone and “messianic hope” are no substitutes for the willingness to accept the test of reality in
all its complexity. What they do indicate is perhaps that his theory is too speculative, too ready to forgo the task of analyzing actual practices and institutions in its
“philosophical” attachment to articulate the “ultimate” or the “fundamental.”
AT: Agamben—Law K
The aff is not biopolitics—Agamben provides a monolithic version of law and its
officials and fails to substantiate his research
Bas Schotel 9, Assistant professor in legal theory, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, The
Netherlands. Ph.D. ¶ Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium; LL.M. Columbia University, United States, 2009,
DEFENDING OUR LEGAL PRACTICES: A LEGAL CRITIQUE ¶ OF GIORGIO AGAMBEN’S STATE OF
EXCEPTION, University Amsterdam, http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/viewFile/68/102
According to Agamben we are silent about the killing machine, which
legal culture is in radical decline, because we have
not come up with an adequate theory of the state of exception. We have been incapable of addressing
the two forces at work: law and life. We have not been able to create an open space where we can play with the elements and create
new meaning of life and law. These accusations do not hold . In earlier reviews it has been correctly pointed out that lawyers are
not silent and that especially in court lawyers have raised their voice, which Agamben totally omits in his thesis.
Reference to those excellent reviews should suffice, if they would not have conceded already too much to Agamben’s thesis.10 These
misrepresentations (or outright omissions) of what lawyers are doing are not harmless or innocent omissions. They
constitute a dangerous move away from a contextual understanding of law as practice of practical
reasoning. Instead Agamben moves us to a kind of ontological and even metaphysical notion of law. –¶ To appreciate my concern one may simply
ask one question: what is left – in concrete and practical terms - of the law if we adopt Agamben’s thesis? What
are lawyers doing when Agamben will have it his way? In spite of all his good intentions and legitimate concerns,
Agamben covertly advocates a ‘selling out’ of our legal practice. So rather than giving Agamben a charitable reading, and
Let us return to Agamben’s provocative questions directed at lawyers.
concerns us because it is inherently tied to law: the state of exception. Our
tolerate the ‘often alien tenor’11 of his work, I will show its fundamental I nadequacy to provide a plausible account of the current legal practice and law
in general. Both his methods to describe law as the descriptions of it are deeply flawed. ¶ VI.1 Law Has Normative Force ¶ At
the outset of his
thesis Agamben runs into fundamental difficulties. His concern is the impunity of violations of international law by governments
that nevertheless still claim to be applying law. If we take Agamben’s diagnosis and his solution seriously, there is
actually no way we can tell whether there are violations of international law in the first place. The only thing
Agamben can claim is that killings, incarcerations, infliction of hardship, in short violence acts are taking place. But under his theory there is
no legal standard available to qualify these acts as violations. This is probably the greatest danger of his theory. It cannot
identify outright abuse of the law and bad faith, while this is clearly what was going on with the Bush government.12¶ By giving too much credit to the
discourse of these governments and taking this discourse as his starting point, there is no concern for him to deal with. The simple fact that violence is
used could not concern him as such. It may only worry him if there is a normative standard according to which this violence is wrong, unjust illegitimate,
or illegal. In other words, Agamben is in blatant contradiction. The simple fact that he believes that governments are violating current international and
domestic law means that they have normative force. It means that they are supposed to be obeyed and that as such they constitute reasons for action.
If so, then already this simple but fundamental point makes Agamben’s enterprise practically obsolete. It seems that he realises this contradiction,
since he hardly ever speaks of violations, ¶ abuses and misuses of the law.¶ VI.2 Lawyers Are Not Silent ¶ Agamben’s
failure to recognise
his own need to rely on the normative force of existing law explains why he cannot or does not want to
hear the lawyers. Yet lawyers are far from silent. For sure, they may not engage in philosophical inquiry into the
genealogy and etymology (!) of obscure phenomena of Roman law, they have been raising their voice in the context of a particular practice, i.e. legal
practice. Just to take
the example of the treatment of Guantanamo detainees: lawyers of all ranks, affiliation
and function have been fighting the violations of international and domestic law. From the justices of US Supreme
Court and professional human rights, defence lawyers, law clinic students, to Pentagon officials, and former military defence lawyers. The lawyers
are equally talkative when it comes to theorising the state of exception. As Kanwar nicely shows, constitutionalist
produced “a great deal of legal writing” on the issue, they may not have ¶ reached “any consensus on these issues, but that is
not the same as remaining silent”16 In short, as long as the legal practice can assert that violations of law are taking place, the law has normative
force. In other words, Agamben’s ¶ philosophical concern seems to vanish and his first accusation has been ¶ proven false.¶ VI. 3 The Law is Being
Applied ¶ Agamben
may object to my previous points that all those lawyers that are raising their voice are
only referring to a law that is formally in force but not applied: “force-of-law”. Again, he is wrong from an empirical
perspective. The Supreme Court cases cited earlier show that gradually but progressively the
Guantanamo practices are invalidated.17 But let us, for argument’s sake, concede that gross violations are taking place with impunity
to the effect that the law is actually not-applied. This empirical claim raises important methodological and normative issues. What is the level of
compliance needed for a law to be qualified as ‘applied’? What do we measure: the quantity or the quality of the compliance? Or do we only measure
the violations? What
Agamben needs are standards to evaluate whether or not a law, a set of laws or even
the law itself, is bankrupt. But this means that he has to provide us with an account of the functions and
capabilities of law. Obviously, he fails to do so. This alone should already dismiss his claims. For it shows
a categorical refusal to account for even the most minimal features of a phenomenon he seeks to
criticise, even revolutionise.
AT: Sovereignty Bad
Rejecting sovereignty exacerbates inequalities and prevents emancipation
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p139, google books
Critics of critical and emancipatory theory have raised pertinent problems in terms both of the idealism of critical approaches and
their problematic relationship to contemporary liberal intervention. Critical theorists themselves are aware that their prescriptions
seem to be hard to separate from contemporary discourses and practices of power, yet critical theorists do not seem to be able to
the limitations to critical and emancipatory approaches
cannot be overcome by distinguishing themselves from liberal internationalist policy . In fact a closer
offer any understanding of why this might be. However,
engagement with contemporary security policies and discourse would show the similarities with critical theory and that both suffer
from the same limitations.¶ The limitations of critical and emancipatory approaches are to be found in critical prescriptions in the
contemporary political context. Jahn is right to argue that critical theory is idealistic, but this needs to be explained why. Douzinas is
right to argue that critical theory becomes a justification for power and this needs to be explained why. The reasons for this remain
undertheorised. I argue here that critical and emancipatory approaches lack a fundamental understanding of
what is at stake in the political realm. For critical theorists the state and sovereignty represent oppressive
structures that work against human freedom. There is much merit to this critique of the inequities of the state system.
However, the problem is that freedom or emancipation are not simply words that can breathe life into
international affairs but in the material circumstances of the contemporary world must be linked to
political constituencies, that is men and women who can give content to that freedom and make
freedom a reality. ¶ Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation
and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political
community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can
give real content to those wishes . There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that
the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by
powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten
any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the
limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in
which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives.
Doesn’t cause emancipation
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p. 60, google books
The sovereign state as a form of political organisation is certainly limited and many of the critiques of the state are well
made. However, the emancipatory potential of non-state forms or international organisations is something that can
only be considered in a specific and social historical context, there is nothing intrinsically
emancipatory about any form of organisation. As radical commentators such as Costas Douzinas (2007) or Danilo Zolo (2002
[2000]) have pointed out, ‘human rights’ or other forms of supposedly cosmopolitan post-sovereign political
organisation can, in certain contexts, be used to enforce structures of power .¶ Within critical and emancipatory
approaches there is, to paraphrase Friedrich Kratochwil (2007: 36), a certain unrealised constitutive understanding
which is abstract and idealised. Critical and emancipatory approaches have an abstract and idealised notion
of emancipation and the political which is not, despite the claims of critical and emancipatory theorists whose main aim is
to engage with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power relations, grounded in the contemporary social
and political international context. Emancipation in itself as a word or a concept or as a good intention cannot
guarantee anything in the absence of political content . At worst it can empower precisely those practices
which critical theorists wish to resolve.
Causes intervention and inequality
Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from
the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory
Approaches,” p138, google books
It seems clear that since
the 1990s and the shift away from formal framework for international affairs in terms of formal
sovereign equality and non intervention, weak and troubled states have become increasingly opened up
to interference and intervention by great powers. There is no global political constituency in existence and the world
order as it currently is one in which power is unevenly distributed. Shifting away from even formal prohibitions
against intervention and formal sovereign equality simply gives more powerful states greater power. This
cannot represent a step towards greater emancipation for the citizens of those states, in fact it represents
an increasing lack of freedom. For contemporary critical theorists, there is a failure to understand that
rights are not things in themselves that can create freedom. In certain concrete situations human rights
can easily become their opposite, a system in which external powers become sovereign. For this reason,
a critical approach must entail an engagement with the here and now and the exercise of contemporary power
relations, but this is exactly what contemporary critical and emancipatory theorists are not doing.
AT: Biopower Impact
No biopower impact---US democratic system prevents genocide
Edward Ross Dickinson 4, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, Central European
History, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 34-36
And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that
pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the continuities
between early twentiethcentury biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable .¶ Both
are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more
And it is certainly fruitful to view them
from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading ,
because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of
regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from
totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that
characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population
authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example.
management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. ¶ In those cases in which
the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But
again, there
are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are
very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require,
enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with
authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of
democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive
policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization . Despite limitations imposed by
political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and
welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems.
Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people
that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a
totalitarianism cannot
be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social
engineering. ¶ This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory.
Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century
totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But
they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a
universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders
are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying
degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the
various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different
strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a
structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern
condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least,
societies with quite radically differing potentials.91
Biopolitical control is no longer a threat---crisis of the sovereign state has caused
violence to be abandoned
Jonathan Short 5, Ph.D. candidate in the Graduate Programme in Social & Political Thought, York
University, “Life and Law: Agamben and Foucault on Governmentality and Sovereignty,” Journal for the
Arts, Sciences and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1
Adding to the dangerousness of this logic of control, however, is that while there is a crisis of undecidability in the domain of life, it corresponds to a
despite the new forms of biopolitical control in
operation today, Rose believes that bio-politics has become generally less dangerous in recent times than
even in the early part of the last century. At that time, bio- politics was linked to the project of the
expanding national state in his opinion. In disciplinary-pastoral society, bio-politics involved a process of social selection
of those characteristics thought useful to the nationalist project. Hence, according to Rose, "once each life has a value which
similar crisis at the level of law and the national state. It should be noted here that
may be calculated, and some lives have less value than others, such a politics has the obligation to exercise this judgement in the name of the race or
the nation" (2001: 3). Disciplinary-pastoral bio- politics sets itself the task of eliminating "differences coded as defects", and in pursuit of this goal the
most horrible programs of eugenics, forced sterilization, and outright extermination, were enacted (ibid.: 3). If Rose is more optimistic about bio-politics
this notion of 'national fitness', in terms of bio- political competition
among nation-states, has suffered a precipitous decline thanks in large part to a crisis of the
perceived unity of the national state as a viable political project (ibid.: 5). To quote Rose once again, "the idea of
in 'advanced liberal' societies, it is because
'society' as a single, if heterogeneous, domain with a national culture, a national population, a national destiny, co-extensive with a national territory
and the powers of a national political government" no longer serves as premises of state policy (ibid.: 5). Drawing on a sequential reading of Foucault's
theory of the governmentalization of the state here, Rose claims that the
territorial state, the primary institution of enclosure,
has become subject to fragmentation along a number of lines. National culture has given way to cultural
pluralism; national identity has been overshadowed by a diverse cluster of identifications, many of them
transcending the national territory on which they take place, while the same pluralization has affected the once singular conception of community (ibid.:
5). Under these conditions, Rose argues, the bio-political
programmes of the molar enclosure known as the nationstate have fallen into disrepute and have been all but abandoned.
AT: Rule of Law K – Mattei Wrong
Western rule of law promotion is good and Mattei is wrong– no colonialist
violence impact
Christopher May 10, The Rule of Law: its rhetoric and meaning in global politics, Professor of Political
Economy, Lancaster University, UK email: c.may@lancaster.ac.uk University of Sussex, March 15,
Department of International Relations Research in Progress seminar
This has not been passive nor reactive development but rather is linked to the professional project of lawyers to promote their expertise and skills (and
to reify the law, to ensure it needs interpretation). Working
in a long Western political tradition that has in one way or
another promoted law as a technical ordering device to promote the good political life, lawyers have
emphasised the specialist and technical character of their undertaking, and sought to maintain and increase social status by
closely guarding entry to the profession. The professional project of lawyering has involved both the careful fostering of a closed
group (the lawyers) alongside the promotion of their tool (law) as a solution to problems of order . Thus, one
element for understanding the rise of the Rule of Law norm is to attribute at least part of the cause to the number of lawyers entering politics alongside
a more general professionalization of the global polity which has moved legal forms of organisation to the forefront. The political selfmaintenance of the
legal profession alongside a trend towards professionalization in modern society have reinforced each other to prompt the increasing normative
deployment of the rule of law. However, the value of professions to politics is by no means uncontested; Perkin notes that the idea of a scarcity in
expertise and professional service (driving the increase of value of the profession’s work) was firmly rejected by the new right in the UK and elsewhere
in the 1980s (Perkin 1990: chapter 10). This gives one indication of why much of the work on Rule of Law has been driven by critical and oppositional
groups of one sort or another. While the neo-liberal/new right agenda saw law (to simplify a little) as merely a thin procedural mechanism to deliver the
the thicker Rule of Law was preferred as a
conception of legal development that supports the values of social justice and fairness that
continue to lie at the heart of the self-conception of various professions; self-conceptions maintained by the
professionals' representative bodies acting in a guild like manner. If we accept that professionalization has played some role
in the establishment of the rule of law as an overarching norm of politics, this cannot merely have
happened spontaneously across the world. And indeed, we know that there have been, and continue to be, extensive
programmes that seek to ( re)establish the rule of law in developing countries, in post-conflict societies and elsewhere.
order required for capitalist expansion, for those seeking to maintain professional norms
Only in the post-colonial period did the form of legal re-engineering move from forced and imposed legal structures to a mode of co-development and
assistance in the development of local legal regimes. Certainly, some
might still regard this as a form of imperialism ( see for
instance Mattei and Nader 2008), but there has been some semblance of political negotiation and flexibility, that
was mostly absent in the imperial period. Leaving aside the contentious history of law and development interventions in Latin America
(see Gardner, 1980; Trubeck, 2006) it is perhaps little surprise that when legal education once again moved up the international political agenda,
development and law assistance was relocated to a range of international organisations (including post-conflict UN Transitional Administrations), and
became a key (mostly, but not exclusively regional) activity of the European Union.
Bottom up legal development results in more violence and recreates state
hegemonies—only western legal norms provide room for counterhegemonic
struggles
Trevor Stack 10, Prof of Anthropology at University of Aberdeen, “Review Essay A Just Rule of Law”,
aura.abdn.ac.uk/bitstream/2164/2175/1/Trevor_Stack_Review_Essay_A_Just_Rule_of_Law_Social_Anth
ropology.doc Trevor Stack Review Essay A Just Rule of Law Social Anthropology.doc
Reading Mattei and Nader as well as Holston, I came to feel that I was wrong to advise the Citizen Power leader to take law more
seriously. In
showing how unjust the rule of law can be, however, the authors give all the more reason to take
it seriously rather than simply ignoring it. Their books also hint at the following paths towards a just rule of law:
Championing local or indigenous or popular law Mattei and Nader do not quite give up on the rule of law .
Their subtitle hints that the rule of law is not always illegal and may even be just . Firstly, although they spend
much of the book accusing the United States of using the rule of law as a means to the end of plunder,
both in colonial and post-colonial times and in recent years, they note that during the Cold War the United States did
stand for the rule of law and democracy, as a counter to Soviet totalitarianism and imperialism. In other
words, the Cold War was a kind of “special period” during which the United States showed the political will
required to hold itself and others to law (200-1). Secondly, Mattei and Nader contemplate the counter-hegemonic rule of
law. Their final chapter takes up the cause of the various non-imperial uses of law that I have already mentioned:
…it lies outside the purview of state law or cosmopolitan law. It might involve alliances or exploit counter-hegemony, but it remains a
different force not grounded, as is the imperial rule of law, in the needs of corporate capitalist development masked as efficiency…
Their efforts are legitimized by social necessity. Innovative legal restructuring may be what will allow us to pass this planet on to our
grandchildren (211). In other words, salvation may come from sources of law other than those of the imperial
state and its allies. For example, Mattei and Nader observe of the wave of protests in the Mexican state of
Oaxaca in August 2006 by a coalition of teachers, peasants, workers, directed at removing the state governor from office, that:
“People [in those protests] began to contemplate their relations with the state based on indigenous Oaxacan
understandings of collective responsibility and customary law” (205). Being local and/or collective is of
course no guarantee of being just. There are local hegemonies and states have sometimes undone
them, while local collectives often turn out to be complicit in state hegemony. Mexico’s agrarian
reform is an example. On the one hand, the federal government undid the local hegemonies of haciendaowners. On the other hand, it replaced those local hegemonies with corporatism : peasant collectives
were bound into the “peasant sector” of the ruling party, not least because they had only use rights to the lands,
which remained state property. More broadly, the political scientist José Antonio Aguilar has complained that the Mexican
state left power in the hands of all kinds of collectives, many of them local: it did so both by sins of commission,
preferring to work through often unscrupulous leaders, and of omission, by failing to provide public services
as well as security and justice. In this context, community autonomy has been used to justify a variety
of nefarious practices : imprisoning Protestant converts for not contributing to Catholic town festivals, for example
(Aguilar Rivera 2004). Seeking post hoc legalisation Holston observes that the illegal settling of São Paulo’s
peripheries helped to unsettle the hierarchy of Brazilian society. Citizens went beyond the law in order to
build (literally) a measure of autonomy or indeed to survive: “[t]he very illegality of house lots in peripheries makes
land accessible to those who cannot afford the higher sale or rental prices of legal residence” (207). Moreover, the never-ending
work of building their homes, known as autoconstrução, gave settlers a sense of entitlement – they had played their
part in building the city. That sense of entitlement made for a kind of “insurgent citizenship”, one that
challenged the inequality of “historical citizenship” and fuelled, for example, the election of Lula, who was from the
urban peripheries (5-6). If illegal residence is a road to justice, it is not the rule of law’s road to justice. Arguably
peripheral settlers were themselves profiting from illegality . But Holston notes that the urban poor had not
yet given up on law: residential illegality eventually prompts a confrontation with legal authorities in which
residents generally succeed, after long and arduous struggle, in legalizing their precarious land claims. Illegal
residence is, therefore, a common and ultimately reliable way for the urban working classes to gain
access to land and housing and to turn their possession into property. (207) The experience of “illegality”
pushed them back to national law, to “make law an asset”, even if simply to keep that law at bay
(207). That is classic counter-hegemony. However, Holston is ambivalent about post hoc legalisation. Legal limbo had
historically kept people unequal and, even when used by subalterns, could still mean violence and impunity (271-5). My fieldwork
in Mexico suggests likewise the need to distinguish between legalisation as a move toward a just rule of law
and legalisation that simply creates opportunities to profit from illegality. Elites were fully complicit in the
“informality” about which they liked to complain: they themselves hired workers without giving them legal benefits; politicians and
leaders lived off the protection they afforded to informal businesses; lawyers, of course, had a field day. Organised crime has been
parasitic on the informality of so many people’s livelihoods - the first to be charged protection by the formidable mafias were street
sellers of pirate music and imitation clothing. Recent attempts at a government crackdown on organised crime, itself bypassing law,
has unleashed an extraordinary wave of violence. In turn, lynch mobs in lower-class and rural areas as well as armed self-defence
groups in wealthy suburbs claim to dispense the justice that the government has failed to provide.
Impact Defense
War Down
War down---best data and no escalation
Steve Pickering 14, University of Essex, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Peace Research Institute
Oslo, "Wars are becoming less frequent: a response to Harrison and Wolf", February, Volume 67, Issue
1, pages 214–230
On the basis of our analysis, we
take issue with Harrison and Wolf's claim to find an increasing trend in
interstate wars. Indeed, we believe that a more reasonable review of the data suggests the opposite, and that
wars are becoming less frequent. We have detailed why we do not find the empirical material presented by Harrison and
Wolf to be compelling.¶ Harrison and Wolf proceed from their assertion that war is increasing to speculate on
the possible causes in the latter part of their article. We believe that their initial premise that such an increasing
trend exists is misguided, and Harrison and Wolf's arguments strike us as post hoc speculation to account for
the alleged trend, rather than being derived from any explicit theoretical justification. We also believe that many of
their claims ignore the potential ecological fallacies in assessing the generally dyadic arguments in existing research on interstate
conflict with aggregate global data.41¶ More generally, however, any effort to assess and account for global trends in warfare must
first start by recognizing what is encompassed by the available data, what sort of inferences they can and cannot support, and their
possible limitations. In our view, the most plausible interpretation of the available evidence suggests that wars
are declining, and that the possible increase in lower-level disputes (which may be an artefact of selection biases)
if anything goes together with a tendency for these to escalate to war less often. A more productive avenue for
research on trends in conflict would be to consider what factors may explain why we observe these trends. There is a large
literature on the thesis of the decline in violent conflict.42 We cannot aspire to provide new contributions within the
scope of this article or even to do full justice to the existing literature. However, we would like to offer some brief comments on why
some of the key features highlighted by Harrison and Wolf may actually contribute to the decline in conflict and its severity. ¶
Harrison and Wolf highlight the declining costs of destructive capacity and technologies as a permissive
condition for conflict. In our view, although military technology probably has become relatively cheaper, the
risk of war will depend on relative capabilities rather than the absolute costs of arms, and many of these
decreases in costs apply to all countries alike. The willingness to resort to war should depend on a country's prospects of
winning in a contest rather than just the costs of armaments per se. The likelihood of one country, A, prevailing in a dyadic contest
with another country, B, can be thought of as a function of the ratio of their military capabilities. Hence, the fact that military
capabilities become cheaper for A may not change the relative balance if they also become cheaper for B, and
most researchers dispute that there is any simple direct relationship between the costs of armaments and
the risk of conflict.43¶ Furthermore, Harrison and Wolf's discussion of the costs of war focuses solely on
expenditure on destructive capacity and completely neglects the costs of war in terms of the destruction
caused by war and the opportunity costs of violent conflict. Any serious analysis of conflict must consider how the full costs
of war shape the incentives of actors, and their incentives to reach alternative solutions to contentious issues without the use of
violence.44 From a bargaining perspective, all wars must eventually come to an end, and if war is costly then the parties should
have an incentive to reach an agreement reflecting the likely settlement after a war, without paying the costs of fighting the war.
There is no reason to suspect that states no longer have contentious issues—indeed, one might expect that these have increased
with greater interaction and globalization. However, development, democratization, and capitalism may have made
it easier for states to reach agreement, and avoid escalation to war, and more costly to fail to reach
agreement. For example, existing research at the dyadic level suggests that democratic states are more
likely to settle their disputes peacefully, possibly since they can externalize their internal dispute resolution mechanisms or
delegate dispute arbitration to international institutions.45 Moreover, states with more trade and more extensive
economic relations are likely to have higher opportunity costs from escalation to war and may have more
opportunities to signal intent and reach resolution by means other than military force.46 The trend towards a decline in war
may also be facilitated by important global macro-trends such as increases in education and urbanization,
which have been shown to foster attitudes that make people less likely to glorify violence and more likely to
seek rational compromise.47¶ We agree with Harrison and Wolf that much remains to be discovered about war and why it has
changed over time, and that much additional research is needed. However, it would be a mistake to start this line of research with a
false premise, misleadingly presented as an empirical fact.
Violence down now – the system is the reason
Azar Gat 13, DPhil in History (University of Oxford, 1986); Ezer Weitzman Professor of National Security, Political Science
Department, Tel Aviv University; recent books: War in Human Civilization (Oxford University Press, 2006); Victorious and
Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How It Is Still Imperiled (Hoover Institution, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010);
Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Is war
declining – and why? Azar Gat⇑ Department of Political Science, University of Tel Aviv azargat@post.tau.ac.il , March 19
When quite a number of scholars simultaneously and independently of one another arrive at very
similar conclusions on an issue of cardinal theoretical and practical significance, their thesis
deserves, and has received, great attention. The thesis is that war and violence in general have
progressively decreased in recent times, during the modern era, and even throughout history. Of
course, despite their unanimity, all these scholars could still be wrong. Indeed, each of them tells a similar story of
people’s disbelief at their findings, most notably that we live in the most peaceful period in human
history . Some of them even explain the general incredulity by the findings of evolutionary psychology
according to which we tend to be overly optimistic about ourselves but overly pessimistic about the world
at large. Having myself written about the marked decrease in deadly human violence (Gat, 2006), I agree
with the authors’ general thesis. However, their unanimity falters over, and they are less clear about, the historical trajectory of
and the reasons for the decline in violence and war, questions that are as important as the general thesis itself. Previous Section
Next Section Hobbes was right, and Rousseau wrong, about the state of nature Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature
(2011) towers above all the other books surveyed here in size, scope, boldness, and scholarly excellence. It has deservedly
attracted great public attention and has become a best-seller. Massively documented, this 800-page volume is lavishly furnished
with statistics, charts, and diagrams, which are one of the book’s most effective features. The book, spanning the whole human past
as far back as our aboriginal condition, points to two major steps in the decline of violence. The first is the sharp decline in violent
mortality which resulted from the rise of the state-Leviathan from around 5,000 years ago. This conclusion is based on the most
comprehensive studies of the subject published over the past 15 years (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2003; Gat, 2006), which
demonstrate on the basis of anthropological and archaeological evidence that Hobbes’s picture of the anarchic state of nature as a
very violent one was fundamentally true. Pinker rightly summarizes that violent mortality with the rise of states dropped from a
staggering estimated 15% of the population, 25% of the men, in pre-state societies, to about 1–5%. The main reason for this drop is
the enforcement of internal peace by the Leviathan, but also, less noted by Pinker, lower mobilization rates and a smaller exposure
of the civilian population to war than with tribal groups, as will be explained shortly. This conclusion regarding the dramatic drop in
violent mortality with the transition to the state is at odds with the claim made by Jack Levy & William Thompson in their book, The
Arc of War (2011). As the book’s title implies, Levy & Thompson posit a great increase in warfare during history, before a decrease
during the past two centuries. Thus, the book claims that mortality in fighting greatly increased, ‘accelerated’ in the authors’
language, with the transition to the state. They reach this conclusion by making several mistaken assumptions. First, although
professing ignorance about the distant past because of the lack of evidence on the behavior of hunter-gatherer societies before the
adoption of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, they cite and are heavily influenced by the old Rousseauite anthropology of the
generation after the 1960s, which recent studies have refuted. Obviously, one does not have to accept the above findings regarding
the pervasiveness and great lethality of prehistoric warfare. But Levy & Thompson simply do not engage with them. They accept as
true the Rousseauite premise that sparse human population could not possibly have had that much to fight about. However, recently
extant hunter-gatherer societies prove the opposite. Australia is our best laboratory of hunter-gatherer societies, because that vast
continent was entirely populated by them and ‘unpolluted’ by agriculturalists, pastoralists or states until the arrival of the Europeans
in 1788. And the evidence shows that the Australian tribes fought incessantly with one another. Even in the Central Australian
Desert, whose population density was as low as one person per 35 square miles, among the lowest there is, conflict and deadly
fighting were the rule. Much of that fighting centered on the water-holes vital for survival in this area, with the violent death rate there
reckoned to have been several times higher than in any state society. In most other places, hunting territories were monopolized
and fiercely defended by hunter-gatherers because they were quickly depleted. Even among the Inuit of Arctic Canada, who were
so sparse as to experience no resource competition, fighting to kidnap women was pervasive, resulting in a violent death rate 10
times higher than the USA’s peak rate of 1990, itself the highest in the developed world. In more hospitable and densely populated
environments casualties averaged, as already mentioned, 15% of the population and 25% of the men, and the surviving men were
covered with scars (Gat, 2006: chs 2, 6). We are not dealing here with a piece of exotic curiosity. Ninety-five percent of the history of
our species Homo sapiens sapiens – people who are like us – was spent as hunter-gatherers. The transition to agriculture and the
state is very recent, the tip of the iceberg, in human history. Furthermore, the human state of nature turns out to be no different than
the state of nature in general. Here too, science has made a complete turnabout. During the 1960s people believed that animals did
not kill each other within the same species, which made humans appear like a murderous exception and fed speculations that
warfare emerged only with civilization. Since then, however, it has been found that animals kill each other extensively within
species, a point pressed on every viewer of television nature documentaries. There is nothing special about humans in this regard.
Thus, lethal human fighting did not ‘emerge’ at some point in history, as Levy & Thompson posit. Previous Section Next Section
Violent death sharply decreased with the rise of the Leviathan As mentioned earlier and as Pinker well realizes, violent mortality
actually dropped steeply with the emergence of the state-Leviathan. Here is where Levy & Thompson make a second mistake. For
measuring the lethality of warfare they use evidence of battle mortality, but this is highly misleading for various reasons. First, prestate tribes’ main fighting modes were not the battle but the raid and the ambush – capturing the enemy by surprise and often
annihilating entire sleeping camps: men, women, and children. Second, the size of battles merely indicates the size of the states
and their armies, which are obviously larger than tribal groups in absolute terms. Yet the main question is relative
casualties, what percentage of the population died violently. And here the fact is that while states and their armies grew by a
relative casualties actually
decreased under the state, and not only because of internal peace. Indeed, casualties decreased precisely
factor of tens, hundreds, and thousands, giving a spectacular impression of large-scale fighting,
because states grew large. Take Egypt, for example, part of the ‘acceleration’ of war with the emergence of states in Mesopotamia,
Egypt, Greece, and China, according to Levy & Thompson. The size of the Egyptian army with which Pharaoh Ramses II fought the
Hittite empire at the Battle of Kadesh (commonly dated 1274 BCE) was 20,000–25,000 soldiers. This was a very large army by the
standards of the time. Yet the total population of Egypt was about 2–3 million, so the army constituted 1% of the population at most.
This was very much the standard in large states and empires throughout history because of the great financial and logistical
problems of maintaining large armies for long periods at great distances from home. Thus, in comparison to the high military
participation rates of small-scale tribal societies, participation rates, and hence war casualties, in large states’ armies were much
lower. Moreover, in contrast to the great vulnerability of women and children in small-scale tribal warfare, the civilian population of
Egypt was sheltered by distance from the theaters of military operations and not often exposed to the horrors of war. Such relative
security, interrupted only by large-scale invasions, is one of the main reasons why societies experienced great demographic growth
after the emergence of the state. It is also the reason why civil war, when the war rages within the country, tends to be the most
lethal form of war, as Hobbes very well realized. Warfare and feuds in the pre- and early-modern eras Levy & Thompson further
posit that between the 14th and early 19th centuries, Europe was the scene of a second ‘acceleration’ in the historical trajectory of
violence. This is very much in line with the prevailing perceptions regarding early modern European history, but these perceptions
are most probably wrong, and for the same reason as before: Levy & Thompson count absolute battle casualties, and obviously
states became more centralized during this period and armies grew in number, so battles also grew in size. Yet it was the anarchy
and feudal fragmentation in Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and 1200 that were responsible for the pervasive
insecurity and endemic violence that characterized the Dark Ages and resulted in, among other things, a sharp demographic
decline. Again, small-scale usually meant more, not less, violent mortality. The focus on early modern Europe is misleading also in
another way: in the late Middle Ages the Mongol conquests inflicted on the societies of China, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe
casualties and destruction that were among the highest ever suffered during historical times. Estimates of the sharp decline
experienced by the populations of China and Russia, for example, vary widely. Still, even by the lowest estimates they were at least
as great, and in China almost definitely much greater, than the Soviet Union’s horrific rate in World War II of about 15%. The
receding of medieval anarchy in the face of the growing European state-Leviathans was the first step towards a steep decline in the
continent’s violent mortality rate beginning in early modernity and continuing to the present day. The studies and data cited by
Pinker with respect to the domestic aspect of this trend are strikingly paralleled by those of Robert Muchembled’s History of
Violence (2012). The work of a historian, the book meticulously documents, on the basis of French legal records, a 20-fold decrease
in homicide rates between the 13th and 20th centuries. Earlier studies of other parts of Europe, starting with Gurr (1981), have come
up with similar findings. Like Pinker, Muchembled attributes the steep decline to the state’s growing authority, as its justice system
effectively replaced and deterred ‘private justice’, vendetta, and pervasive violence, all of them endemic in unruly societies.
Correspondingly, again like Pinker, Muchembled invokes Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘civilizing process’, whereby the defense of honor by
sword and knife, a social norm and imperative in most traditional societies, is gradually given up among both the nobility and the
general populace. The civilizing process is partly a function of the growing authority of the state’s rule and justice system. But there
were other factors involved, which Pinker excels in identifying and weaving together. Although he is not a historian, his historical
synthesis is exemplarily rich and nuanced. He specifies the growing humanitarian sensibilities in Europe of the Enlightenment, which
he traces to, among other things, the gradual improvement in living conditions, growing commercial spirit and, above all, the print
revolution with the attendant values and habits of reasoning, introspection, and empathy that it inculcated among the reading elites.
As Pinker points out, not only did homicide rates decline but also other previously common forms of violence, such as judicial
disembowelment and torture, were becoming unacceptable by the 18th century. This was the beginning of a continuous process
which during the following centuries would bring about, among other things, the abolition of slavery and the decline of capital
punishment, tyranny, and political violence in the developed world – most notably in the areas where the values of Enlightenment
humanitarianism triumphed. Both Pinker and Muchembled identify a change in the trend towards increased violence and homicide
rates in the United States and Europe from the 1960s on. They attribute this change (Pinker is particularly elaborative here) to the
erosion of public authority and some reversal of the ‘civilizing process’ with the cults of youth culture, defiance of authority, radical
ideologies of violence by the ‘oppressed’, and the fragmentation of the stable family structure. Pinker identifies a return to a
downward trend in violence from about 1990 on, which he attributes to an ebbing of much of the above through reasserted state
action and changes in the public mood. A last point worth mentioning in this context: Muchembled reveals that throughout the steep
decline in homicide rates, from medieval times to the present, 90% or more of all cases have been perpetrated by men, especially
between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. As Daly & Wilson (1988: 145–149) have shown, this ratio is found in each and every
society studied around the globe, from hunter-gatherers to agricultural and industrial societies, irrespective of the vastly different
homicide rates among them. Previous Section Next Section The decline of war and the three `Long Peaces' after 1815 We now
move to the decline of war, which is our main concern here. Most people are surprised to learn that the
occurrence of war and overall mortality in war sharply decreased after 1815, most notably in the developed
world. The ‘Long Peace’ among the great powers after 1945 is more recognized and is widely attributed to
the nuclear factor, a decisive factor to be sure, which concentrated the minds of all the protagonists
wonderfully. The (inter-)democratic peace has been equally recognized. But in actuality, the decrease in
war had been very marked before the nuclear era and encompassed both democracies and nondemocracies. In the century after 1815, wars among economically advanced countries declined in
their frequency to about one-third of what they had been in the previous centuries, an
unprecedented change. Indeed, the Long Peace after 1945 was preceded by the second longest peace among the great
powers, between 1871 and 1914, and by the third longest peace, between 1815 and 1854 (Gat, 2006: 536–537, 608). Thus, the
three longest periods of peace by far in the modern great powers system all occurred after 1815. Clearly, one needs to explain the
entire trend, while also accounting for the glaring divergence from it: the two World Wars. Previous Section Next Section Is modern
war more lethal and destructive than before? In his earlier works, Levy (1983) was among the first to document the much-reduced
frequency of war after 1815. But what brought about this change? Levy & Thompson assume – this is perhaps the most natural
hypothesis – that wars declined in frequency because they became too lethal, destructive, and expensive. Supposedly, a trade-off of
sorts was created between the intensity and frequency of warfare: fewer, larger wars supplanting many smaller ones. This
hypothesis barely holds, however, because, again, relative to population and wealth wars have not become more lethal and costly
than earlier in history. Furthermore, as Levy & Thompson rightly document, the wars of the 19th century – the most peaceful century
in European history – were particularly light, in comparative terms, so there is no trade-off here. True, the World Wars, especially
World War II, were certainly on the upper scale of the range in terms of casualties. Yet, as already noted, they were far from being
exceptional in history. Once more, we need to look at relative casualties, general human mortality in any number of wars that
happen to rage around the world, rather than at the aggregate created by the fact that many states participated in the World Wars. I
have already mentioned the Mongol invasions, but other examples abound. In the first three years of the Second Punic War, 218–16
BCE, Rome lost some 50,000 citizens of the ages of 17–46, out of a total of about 200,000 in that age demographic (Brunt, 1971).
This was roughly 25% of the military-age cohorts in only three years, the same range as the Russian and higher than the German
rates in World War II. This, and the devastation of Rome’s free peasantry during the Second Punic War, did not reduce Rome’s
propensity for war thereafter. During the Thirty Years War (1618–48) population loss in Germany is estimated at between one-fifth
and one-third – either way higher than the German casualties in World War I and World War II combined. People often assume that
more developed military technology during modernity means greater lethality and destruction, but in fact it also means greater
protective power, as with mechanized armor, mechanized speed and agility, and defensive electronic measures. Offensive and
defensive advances generally rise in tandem. In addition, it is all too often forgotten that the vast majority of the many millions of
non-combatants killed by Germany during World War II – Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Soviet civilians – fell victim to intentional
starvation, exposure to the elements, and mass executions rather than to any sophisticated military technology. Instances of
genocide in general during the 20th century, much as earlier in history, were carried out with the simplest of technologies, as the
Rwanda genocide horrifically reminded us. Nor have wars during the past two centuries been economically more costly than they
were earlier in history, again relative to overall wealth. War has always involved massive economic exertion and has been the single
most expensive item of state spending (e.g. massively documented, Bonney, 1999). Examples are countless, and it will suffice to
mention that both 16th- and 17th-century Spain and 18th-century France were economically ruined by war and staggering war
debts, which in the French case brought about the Revolution. Furthermore, death by starvation in premodern wars was
widespread. Previous Section Next Section Is it peace that has become more profitable? So if wars have not become more costly
and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world ? The
answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of
human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the
process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first
place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no
longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away
from a zero-sum game. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, instead having
become increasingly interconnected by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation
potentially depressed the entire system and was thus detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing. This reality,
already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism
of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic openness has decreased the likelihood of
war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty. It
is no longer necessary to politically possess a territory in order benefit from it. Of the above three
factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the
literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant. Thus, the greater the yield of
competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict
becomes. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, it is in fact peace that has
been growing more profitable. Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused
themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as
already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.
Best recent research supports war down
Steve Pickering 14, University of Essex, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Peace Research Institute
Oslo, "Wars are becoming less frequent: a response to Harrison and Wolf", February, Volume 67, Issue
1, pages 214–230
In their recent article, Harrison
and Wolf claim that interstate ‘[w]ars are becoming more frequent’.1 This is an
is also a highly surprising claim, since recent conflict research tends to
alarming claim deserving serious attention. It
find the opposite: the incidence of violent conflict is declining .2¶ We argue that Harrison and Wolf's claim is
incorrect. We first show empirically that interstate wars are in fact becoming less frequent. Moreover, we show
that other data on tensions between states below war, such as the Interstate Crises Behavior data ,3 also
suggest a decline in conflict between states. We then detail how Harrison and Wolf's analysis is
misleading, highlighting how their findings primarily arise as a likely artefact of their uncritical use of the
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data,4 and explaining why MIDs cannot and should not be interpreted as
‘wars’. Given that Harrison and Wolf's basic premise is wrong, and wars are not becoming more frequent,
we should be sceptical of their conclusions. We revisit their suggested explanations for why wars may become more
frequent in light of what we know about long-term trends in warfare and research on interstate war.
AT: Conventional Lash-Out
Impossible to mobilize support for lashout
Mandelbaum 11 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director,
Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on
Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)
http://www.cfr.org/publication/23828/cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on_renewing_america.html?cid=rssfullfeed-cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on011811&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+cfr_main+(CFR.org++Main+Site+Feed
HAASS: Michael, I think I know the answer to this question, but let me ask you anyhow, which is, the last 10 years of American foreign policy has been
dominated by two extremely expensive interventions, one in Iraq, one now in Afghanistan. Will this sort of pressure both accelerate the end, particularly
of Afghanistan? But, more important, will this now -- is
this the end of that phase of what we might call "discretionary American
interventions?" Is this basically over?¶ MANDELBAUM: Let's call them wars of choice. (Laughter.)¶ HAASS: I was trying to be uncharacteristically
self-effacing here. But clearly it didn't hold. Okay.¶ MANDELBAUM: I think it is , Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two
decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and
Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the
protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. ¶ Nation building has never been
popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again.
We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands
on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we
won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign
policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.
AT: Endless War
No risk of endless warfare
Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading,
graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the
International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A
Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of
In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless
warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for
the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi
experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by
public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of
misuse.
war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift
decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to
seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive,
though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger,
we ought not to endorse the argument
the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search
for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for
homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a
global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words,
constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does
have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option
might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the
many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government . It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and
dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this
rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized
and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must
be nothing if not pragmatic.
and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But
that
Democracy checks
O’Kane 97 – Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9)
bureaucracy is not 'intrinsically
genocidal
Modern
capable of
action' (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In
the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a
Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have
shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies,
system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As
however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to
power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just
political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist
democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their
own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open
scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial
but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern
genocides.
The impact is the exception not the rule
Abrahamsen 5 (Rita, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and
Fear, Alternatives 30:1)
The war on Iraq can be seen to demonstrate the willingness of the British government to engage in illiberal acts to defend the liberal values of the
"international community," but it is important to note that the process of securitization
does not automatically dictate such
spectacular responses. As argued above, the process of securitization is gradual and incremental, and an issue
can move along a continuum of risk/fear without ever reaching the stage of "existential threat" where it
merits "emergency action" (as with Iraq). Instead, most security politics is concerned with the more mundane
everyday management and containment of risk, and the securitization of Africa is thus entirely compatible
with the feeble response to the brutal and prolonged conflict in the DRC or the Sudan. Rather
than spectacular emergency politics
or military action, securitization is more likely to give rise to policies of containment or policing.
And be rational, just because we might justify genocide doesn’t mean we
guarantee it
Dunn 6 – PoliSci Prof at Hobart & William Smith Colleges (Kevin,
www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/APSA2006/Dunn_Historical_Representations.pdf)
Representations do not cause policies, such as intervention, nor do they explain choices, such as whether to intervene at
one time rather than another. This example underscores the point that structures of knowledge establish preconditions and
parameters for the possibility of action, rather than explaining why certain choices are made. For example, it helps a
researcher understand the range of options imaginable to President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, but it does not explain why he made specific decisions (Weldes 1999). To examine individual decision
making, one would need to employ other methods.
No risk of lash-out – institutional safeguards check
Allen Buchanan 7, Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke, 2007 (Preemption: military
action and moral justification, pg. 128)
the higher the stakes in acting and in particular the
greater the moral risk, the higher are the epistemic requirements for justified action. The decision to go to
war is generally a high stakes decision par excellence and the moral risks are especially great, for two reasons. First, unless one is justified in going to war, one's deliberate killing of
The intuitively plausible idea behind the 'irresponsible act' argument is that, other things being equal,
enemy combatants will he murder, indeed mass murder. Secondly, at least in large-scale modem war, it is a virtual certainty that one will kill innocent people even if one is justified in going to war and conducts the
war in such a way as to try to minimize harm to innocents. Given these grave moral risks of going to war, quite apart from often substantial prudential concerns, some types of justifications for going to war may
simply be too subject to abuse and error to make it justifiable to invoke them. The 'irresponsible act' objection is not a consequentialist objection in any interesting sense. It does not depend upon the assumption
that every particular act of going to war preventively has unacceptably bad consequences (whether in itself or by virtue of contributing lo the general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war); nor does it
assume that it is always wrong lo rely on a justification which, if generally accepted, would produce unacceptable consequences. Instead, the "irresponsible act' objection is more accurately described as an agent-
The 'irresponsible act' objection to preventive war is highly
plausible if— but only if—one assumes that the agents who would invoke the preventive-war justification
are, as it were, on their own in making the decision to go to war preventively. In other words, the objection is incomplete unless the context of decision-making is further specified.
Whether the special risks of relying on the preventive-war justification are unacceptably high will depend, inter alia, upon whether the decision-making process includes
effective provisions for reducing those special risks. Because the special risks are at least in significant part epistemic—due to the inherently speculative
character of the preventive war-justification—the epistemic context of the decision is crucial. Because institutions can improve the epistemic performance of
agents, it is critical to know what the institutional context of the preventive-war decision is, before we can regard the 'irresponsible agent' objection as conclusive. Like the 'bad practice' argument, this
second objection to preventive war is inconclusive because it does not consider— and rule out—the possibility that well-designed institutions for decision-making
could address the problems that would otherwise make it irresponsible for a leader to invoke the
preventive-war justification.
centered argument and more particularly an argument from moral epistemic responsibility.
AT: Structural Violence
The causality of their impact is backwards
Zack Beauchamp 12/11, “5 Reasons Why 2013 Was The Best Year In Human, Reporter/Blogger for
ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan’s The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast,
and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines, holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political
Science from Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of
Economics, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/11/3036671/2013-certainly-year-human-history/#
Between the brutal civil war in Syria, the government shutdown and all of the deadly dysfunction it represents, the NSA spying revelations, and massive inequality, it’d be easy
We have every reason to believe that 2013 was , in
fact, the best year on the planet for humankind. Contrary to what you might have heard, virtually all of the most important forces
that determine what make people’s lives good — the things that determine how long they live, and whether
they live happily and freely — are trending in an extremely happy direction. While it’s possible that this
progress could be reversed by something like runaway climate change, the effects will have to be dramatic to overcome
the extraordinary and growing progress we’ve made in making the world a better place. Here’s the five big reasons
why. 1. Fewer people are dying young, and more are living longer. The greatest story in recent human history is the simplest: we’re winning the fight against death. “ There
is not a single country in the world where infant or child mortality today is not lower than it was in 1950,”
writes Angus Deaton, a Princeton economist who works on global health issues. The most up-to-date numbers on global
health, the 2013 World Health Organization (WHO) statistical compendium, confirm Deaton’s estimation. Between 1990 and
to for you to enter 2014 thinking the last year has been an awful one. But you’d be wrong.
2010, the percentage of children who died before their fifth birthday dropped by almost half. Measles deaths declined by 71 percent, and both tuberculosis and maternal deaths
by half again. HIV, that modern plague, is also being held back, with deaths from AIDS-related illnesses down by 24 percent since 2005. In short, fewer people are dying
And that’s not only true in rich countries: life expectancy has gone up between 1990 and 2011
in every WHO income bracket. The gains are even more dramatic if you take the long view: global life expectancy was 47 in the early 1950s, but had risen
untimely deaths.
to 70 — a 50 percent jump — by 2011. For even more perspective, the average Briton in 1850 — when the British Empire had reached its apex — was 40. The average person
today should expect to live almost twice as long as the average citizen of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful country in 1850. In real terms, this means millions of fewer
dead adults and children a year, millions fewer people who spend their lives suffering the pains and unfreedoms imposed by illness, and millions more people spending their
twilight years with loved ones. And the trends are all positive — “progress has accelerated in recent years in many countries with the highest rates of mortality,” as the WHO
rather bloodlessly put it. What’s going on? Obviously, it’s fairly complicated, but the most important drivers have been technological and political innovation. The Enlightenmentera advances in the scientific method got people doing high-quality research, which brought us modern medicine and the information technologies that allow us to spread
medical breakthroughs around the world at increasingly faster rates. Scientific discoveries also fueled the Industrial Revolution and the birth of modern capitalism, giving us
more resources to devote to large-scale application of live-saving technologies. And the global spread of liberal democracy made governments accountable to citizens, forcing
them to attend to their health needs or pay the electoral price. We’ll see the enormously beneficial impact of these two forces, technology and democracy, repeatedly throughout
this list, which should tell you something about the foundations of human progress. But when talking about improvements in health, we shouldn’t neglect foreign aid. Nations
donating huge amounts of money out of an altruistic interest in the welfare of foreigners is historically unprecedented, and while not all aid has been helpful, health aid has been
a huge boon. Even Deaton, who wrote one of 2013′s harshest assessments of foreign aid, believes “the case for assistance to fight disease such as HIV/AIDS or smallpox is
strong.” That’s because these programs have demonstrably saved lives — the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 2003 program pushed by President
we’re outracing the Four
Horseman, extending our lives faster than pestilence, war, famine, and death can take them. That alone
should be enough to say the world is getting better. 2. Fewer people suffer from extreme poverty, and the world is
getting happier. There are fewer people in abject penury than at any other point in human history, and middle
class people enjoy their highest standard of living ever. We haven’t come close to solving poverty: a number of African countries in
Bush, paid for anti-retroviral treatment for over 5.1 million people in the poor countries hardest-hit by the AIDS epidemic. So
particular have chronic problems generating growth, a nut foreign aid hasn’t yet cracked. So this isn’t a call for complacency about poverty any more than acknowledging
: as a whole, the world is much richer in 2013 than it
was before. 721 million fewer people lived in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day) in 2010 than in 1981, according to
a new World Bank study from October. That’s astounding — a decline from 40 to about 14 percent of the
world’s population suffering from abject want. And poverty rates are declining in every national
income bracket : even in low income countries, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day in 2005 dollars) a day gone down from 63 in
1981 to 44 in 2010. We can be fairly confident that these trends are continuing . For one thing, they survived the Great
Recession in 2008. For another, the decline in poverty has been fueled by global economic growth, which looks to be continuing: global GDP grew by 2.3 percent in
victories over disease is an argument against tackling malaria. But make no mistake
2012, a number that’ll rise to 2.9 percent in 2013 according to IMF projections. The bulk of the recent decline in poverty comes form India and China — about 80 percent from
China *alone*. Chinese economic and social reform, a delayed reaction to the mass slaughter and starvation of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, has been the engine of poverty’s
global decline. If you subtract China, there are actually more poor people today than there were in 1981 (population growth trumping the percentage declines in poverty). But we
shouldn’t discount China. If what we care about is fewer people suffering the misery of poverty, then it shouldn’t matter what nation the less-poor people call home. Chinese
growth should be celebrated, not shunted aside. The poor haven’t been the only people benefitting from global growth. Middle class people have access to an ever-greater
stock of life-improving goods. Televisions and refrigerators, once luxury goods, are now comparatively cheap and commonplace. That’s why large-percentage improvements in
a nation’s GDP appear to correlate strongly with higher levels of happiness among the nation’s citizens; people like having things that make their lives easier and more worryfree. Global economic growth in the past five decades has dramatically reduced poverty and made people around the world happier. Once again, we’re better off. 3. War is
becoming rarer and less deadly. APTOPIX Mideast Libya CREDIT: AP Photo/ Manu Brabo Another massive conflict could overturn the global progress against disease and
poverty. But it appears
war, too, may be losing its fangs. Steven Pinker’s 2011 book The Better Angels Of Our Nature is the gold standard in this debate.
Pinker brought a treasure trove of data to bear on the question of whether the world has gotten more peaceful, and found that, in the long arc of human history, both war and
other forms of violence (the death penalty, for instance) are on a centuries-long downward slope. Pinker summarizes his argument here if you don’t own the book. Most eye-
the worldwide rate of death from interstate and civil war combined
has juddered downward…from almost 300 per 100,000 world population during World War II, to almost 30
during the Korean War, to the low teens during the era of the Vietnam War, to single digits in the 1970s
and 1980s, to less than 1 in the twenty-first century.” Here’s what that looks like graphed: Pinker CREDIT: Steven Pinker/The Wall
Street Journal So it looks like the smallest percentage of humans alive since World War II, and in all likelihood in human history, are living through the horrors of war. Did
2013 give us any reason to believe that Pinker and the other scholars who agree with him have been
proven wrong? Probably not. The academic debate over the decline of war really exploded in 2013, but the “declinist” thesis has fared pretty well.
popping are the numbers for the past 50 years; Pinker finds that “
Challenges to Pinker’s conclusion that battle deaths have gone down over time have not withstood scrutiny. The most compelling critique, a new paper by Bear F. Braumoeller,
argues that if you control for the larger number of countries in the last 50 years, war happens at roughly the same rates as it has historically. There are lots of things you might
say about Braumoeller’s argument, and I’ve asked Pinker for his two cents (update: Pinker’s response here). But most importantly, if battle deaths per 100,000 people really has
declined, then his argument doesn’t mean very much. If (percentage-wise) fewer people are dying from war, then what we call “war” now is a lot less deadly than “war” used to
be. Braumoeller suggests population growth and improvements in battle medicine explain the decline, but that’s not convincing: tell me with a straight face that the only
differences in deadliness between World War II, Vietnam, and the wars you see today is that there are more people and better doctors. There’s a more rigorous way of putting
that: today, we see many more civil wars than we do wars between nations. The former tend to be less deadly than the latter. That’s why the other major challenge to Pinker’s
thesis in 2013, the deepening of the Syrian civil war, isn’t likely to upset the overall trend. Syria’s war is an unimaginable tragedy, one responsible for the rare, depressing
increase in battle deaths from 2011 to 2012. However, the overall 2011-2012 trend “fits well with the observed long-term decline in battle deaths,” according to researchers at
the authoritative Uppsala Conflict Data Program, because the uptick is not enough to suggest an overall change in trend. We should expect something similar when the 2013
numbers are published. Why are smaller and smaller percentages of people being exposed to the horrors of war? There are lots of reasons one could point to, but two of the
biggest ones are the spread of democracy and humans getting, for lack of a better word, better. That democracies never, or almost never, go to war with each other is not
seriously in dispute: the statistical evidence is ridiculously strong. While some argue that the “democratic peace,” as it’s called, is caused by things other than democracy itself,
there’s good experimental evidence that democratic leaders and citizens just don’t want to fight each other. Since 1950, democracy has spread around the world like wildfire.
There were only a handful of democracies after World War II, but that grew to roughly 40 percent of all by the end of the Cold War. Today, a comfortable majority — about 60
percent — of all states are democracies. This freer world is also a safer one. Second — and this is Pinker’s preferred explanation — people have developed strategies for
dealing with war’s causes and consequences. “Human ingenuity and experience have gradually been brought to bear,” Pinker writes, “just as they have chipped away at hunger
and disease.” A series of human inventions, things like U.N. peacekeeping operations, which nowadays are very successful at reducing violence, have given us a set of social
War’s decline isn’t accidental, in other words. It’s by design. 4. Rates of
murder and other violent crimes are in free-fall. Britain Unrest CREDIT: Akira Suemori/AP Photos Pinker’s trend against violence isn’t limited just
tools increasingly well suited to reducing the harm caused by armed conflict.
to war. It seems likes crimes, both of the sort states commit against their citizens and citizens commit against each other, are also on the decline. Take a few examples. Slavery,
once commonly sanctioned by governments, is illegal everywhere on earth. The use of torture as legal punishment has gone down dramatically. The European murder rate fell
35-fold from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 20th century (check out this amazing 2003 paper from Michael Eisner, who dredged up medieval records to estimate
The decline has been especially marked in recent
years. Though homicide crime rates climbed back up from their historic lows between the 1970s and 1990s, reversing progress made since the late 19th century, they have
European homicide rates in the swords-and-chivalry era, if you don’t believe me).
collapsed worldwide in the 21st century. 557,000 people were murdered in 2001 — almost three times as many as were killed in war that year. In 2008, that number was
289,000, and the homicide rate has been declining in 75 percent of nations since then. Statistics from around the developed world, where numbers are particularly reliable,
show that it’s not just homicide that’s on the wane: it’s almost all violent crime. US government numbers show that violent crime in the United States declined from a peak of
about 750 crimes per 100,000 Americans to under 450 by 2009. G7 as a whole countries show huge declines in homicide, robbery, and vehicle theft. So even in countries that
aren’t at poor or at war, most people’s lives are getting safer and more secure. Why? We know it’s not incarceration. While the United States and Britain have dramatically
increased their prison populations, others, like Canada, the Netherlands, and Estonia, reduced their incarceration rates and saw similar declines in violent crime. Same thing
state-to-state in the United States; New York imprisoned fewer people and saw the fastest crime decline in the country. The Economist’s deep dive into the explanations for
crime’s collapse provides a few answers. Globally, police have gotten better at working with communities and targeting areas with the most crime. They’ve also gotten new toys,
like DNA testing, that make it easier to catch criminals. The crack epidemic in the United States and its heroin twin in Europe have both slowed down dramatically. Rapid
gentrification has made inner-city crime harder. And the increasing cheapness of “luxury” goods like iPods and DVD players has reduced incentives for crime on both the supply
and demand sides: stealing a DVD player isn’t as profitable, and it’s easier for a would-be thief to buy one in the first place. But there’s one explanation The Economist
dismissed that strikes me as hugely important: the abolition of lead gasoline. Kevin Drum at Mother Jones wrote what’s universally acknowledged to be the definitive argument
for the lead/crime link, and it’s incredibly compelling. We know for a fact that lead exposure damages people’s brains and can potentially be fatal; that’s why an international
campaign to ban leaded gasoline started around 1970. Today, leaded gasoline is almost unheard of — it’s banned in 175 countries, and there’s been a decline in lead blood
levels by about 90 percent. Drum marshals a wealth of evidence that the parts of the brain damaged by lead are the same ones that check people’s aggressive impulses.
Moreover, the timing matches up: crime shot up in the mid-to-late-20th century as cars spread around the world, and started to decline in the 70s as the anti-lead campaign was
succeeding. Here’s close the relationship is, using data from the United States: Lead_Crime_325 Now, non-homicide violent crime appears to have ticked up in 2012, based on
U.S. government surveys of victims of crime, but it’s very possible that’s just a blip: the official Department of Justice report says up-front that “the apparent increase in the rate
of violent crimes reported to police from 2011 to 2012 was not statistically significant.” So we have no reason to believe crime is making a come back, and every reason to
5. There’s less racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination in
the world. Nelson Mandela CREDIT: Theana Calitz/AP Images Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and other forms
of discrimination remain, without a doubt, extraordinarily powerful forces. The statistical and experimental evidence is
believe the historical decline in criminal violence is here to stay.
overwhelming — this irrefutable proof of widespread discrimination against African-Americans, for instance, should put the “racism is dead” fantasy to bed. Yet the need to
Over the centuries, humanity has made extraordinary progress in
taming its hate for and ill-treatment of other humans on the basis of difference alone. Indeed, it is very likely
that we live in the least discriminatory era in the history of modern civilization. It’s not a huge prize given how bad
the past had been, but there are still gains worth celebrating. Go back 150 years in time and the point should be obvious. Take four prominent groups in
1860: African-Americans were in chains, European Jews were routinely massacred in the ghettos and
shtetls they were confined to, women around the world were denied the opportunity to work outside the
home and made almost entirely subordinate to their husbands, and LGBT people were invisible. The
improvements in each of these group’s statuses today, both in the United States and internationally, are incontestable. On
closer look, we have reason to believe the happy trends are likely to continue. Take racial discrimination. In 2000, Harvard
combat discrimination denial shouldn’t blind us to the good news.
sociologist Lawrence Bobo penned a comprehensive assessment of the data on racial attitudes in the United States. He found a “national consensus” on the ideals of racial
equality and integration. “A nation once comfortable as a deliberately segregationist and racially discriminatory society has not only abandoned that view,” Bobo writes, “but now
overtly positively endorses the goals of racial integration and equal treatment. There is no sign whatsoever of retreat from this ideal, despite events that many thought would call
it into question. The magnitude, steadiness, and breadth of this change should be lost on no one.”
The norm against overt racism has gone
global. In her book on the international anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s, Syracuse’s Audie Klotz says flatly that “the illegitimacy of white minority rule led to South
Africa’s persistent diplomatic, cultural, and economic isolation.” The belief that racial discrimination could not be tolerated had become so widespread, Klotz argues, that it united
the globe — including governments that had strategic interests in supporting South Africa’s whites — in opposition to apartheid. In 2011, 91 percent of respondents in a sample
of 21 diverse countries said that equal treatment of people of different races or ethnicities was important to them. Racism obviously survived both American and South African
apartheid, albeit in more subtle, insidious forms. “The death of Jim Crow racism has left us in an uncomfortable place,” Bobo writes, “a state of laissez-faire racism” where racial
discrimination and disparities still exist, but support for the kind of aggressive government policies needed to address them is racially polarized. But there’s reason to hope that’ll
change as well: two massive studies of the political views of younger Americans by my TP Ideas colleagues, John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira, found that millenials were
significantly more racially tolerant and supportive of government action to address racial disparities than the generations that preceded them. Though I’m not aware of any
similar research of on a global scale, it’s hard not to imagine they’d find similar results, suggesting that we should have hope that the power of racial prejudice may be waning.
The story about gender discrimination is very similar: after the feminist movement’s enormous victories in the 20th century, structural sexism still shapes the world in profound
ways, but the cause of gender equality is making progress. In 2011, 86 percent of people in a diverse 21 country sample said that equal treatment on the basis of gender was
an important value. The U.N.’s Human Development Report’s Gender Inequality Index — a comprehensive study of reproductive health, social empowerment, and labor market
equity — saw a 20 percent decline in observable gender inequalities from 1995 to 2011. IMF data show consistent global declines in wage disparities between genders, labor
force participation, and educational attainment around the world. While enormous inequality remains, 2013 is looking to be the worst year for sexism in history. Finally, we’ve
made astonishing progress on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination — largely in the past 15 years. At the beginning of 2003, zero Americans lived in marriage
equality states; by the end of 2013, 38 percent of Americans will. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and, in
2011, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution committing the council to documenting and exposing discrimination on orientation or identity grounds around the world.
The public opinion trends are positive worldwide: all of the major shifts from 2007 to 2013 in Pew’s “acceptance of homosexuality” poll were towards greater tolerance, and
young people everywhere are more open to equality for LGBT individuals than their older peers. best_year_graphics-04 Once again,
these victories are
partial and by no means inevitable . Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination aren’t just “going away” on their own. They’re
losing their hold on us because people are working to change other people’s minds and because governments are passing laws aimed at promoting equality. Positive
trends don’t mean the problems are close to solved, and certainly aren’t excuses for sitting on our hands.
That’s true of everything on this list. The fact that fewer people are dying from war and disease doesn’t lessen the moral imperative to do something about those that are; the
But too often, the worst parts
about the world are treated as inevitable , the prospect of radical victory over pain and suffering dismissed as utopian fantasy. The
overwhelming force of the evidence shows that to be false. As best we can tell, the reason humanity is getting better is because humans
fact that people are getting richer and safer in their homes isn’t an excuse for doing more to address poverty and crime.
have decided to make the world a better place. We consciously chose to develop lifesaving medicine and build freer political systems; we’ve passed laws against workplace
discrimination and poisoning children’s minds with lead. So far, these choices have more than paid off. It’s up to us to make sure they continue to.
Squo is structurally improving---health, environment and equality
Bjorn Lomborg 10/16, Adjunct Professor at the Copenhagen Business School, "A Better World Is
Here", 2013, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/on-the-declining-costs-of-global-problems-by-bj-rnlomborg
For centuries, optimists and pessimists have argued over the state of the world
COPENHAGEN –
. Pessimists see a world
where more people means less food, where rising demand for resources means depletion and war, and, in recent decades, where boosting production capacity means more
pollution and global warming. One of the current generation of pessimists’ sacred texts, The Limits to Growth, influences the environmental movement to this day.¶ The
optimists, by contrast, cheerfully claim that everything – human health, living standards, environmental quality, and so on – is getting better. Their opponents think of them as
rather than picking facts and stories to fit some
grand narrative of decline or progress, we should try to compare across all areas of human existence to
see if the world really is doing better or worse. Together with 21 of the world’s top economists, I have
tried to do just that, developing a scorecard spanning 150 years. Across ten areas – including
health, education, war, gender, air pollution, climate change, and biodiversity – the economists all
answered the same question: What was the relative cost of this problem in every year since 1900, all the
way to 2013, with predictions to 2050.¶ Using classic economic valuations of everything from lost lives, bad health, and illiteracy to wetlands
“cornucopian” economists, placing their faith in the market to fix any and all problems.¶ But,
destruction and increased hurricane damage from global warming, the economists show how much each problem costs. To estimate the magnitude of the problem, it is
Consider
gender inequality. Essentially, we were excluding almost half the world’s population from production. In
1900, only 15% of the global workforce was female. What is the loss from lower female workforce participation? Even taking into account that
someone has to do unpaid housework and the increased costs of female education, the loss was at least 17% of global GDP in 1900. Today, with higher
female participation and lower wage differentials, the loss is 7% – and projected to fall to 4% by 2050.¶ It will
compared to the total resources available to fix it. This gives us the problem’s size as a share of GDP. And the trends since 1900 are sometimes surprising.¶
probably come as a big surprise that climate change from 1900 to 2025 has mostly been a net benefit, increasing welfare by about 1.5% of GDP per year. This is because
global warming has mixed effects; for moderate warming, the benefits prevail.¶ On one hand, because CO2 works as a fertilizer, higher levels have been a boon for agriculture,
which comprises the biggest positive impact, at 0.8% of GDP. Likewise, moderate warming prevents more cold deaths than the number of extra heat deaths that it causes. It
also reduces demand for heating more than it increases the costs of cooling, implying a gain of about 0.4% of GDP. On the other hand, warming increases water stress, costing
about 0.2% of GDP, and negatively affects ecosystems like wetlands, at a cost of about 0.1%.¶ As temperatures rise, however, the costs will rise and the benefits will decline,
leading to a dramatic reduction in net benefits. After the year 2070, global warming will become a net cost to the world, justifying cost-effective climate action now and in the
decades to come.¶ Yet, to put matters in perspective, the scorecard also shows us that the world’s biggest environmental problem by far is indoor air pollution. Today, indoor
pollution from cooking and heating with bad fuels kills more than three million people annually, or the equivalent of a loss of 3% of global GDP. But in 1900, the cost was 19% of
Health indicators worldwide have shown some of the largest
improvements . Human life expectancy barely changed before the late eighteenth century. Yet it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of
the gain since 1900: in that year, life expectancy worldwide was 32 years, compared to 69 now (and a projection
GDP, and it is expected to drop to 1% of GDP by 2050.¶
The biggest factor was the fall in infant mortality
of 76 years in 2050).¶
. For example, even as late as 1970, only around 5% of infants were
vaccinated against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. By 2000, it was 85%, saving about three million lives annually – more, each year, than world peace
would have saved in the twentieth century.¶ This success has many parents. The Gates Foundation and the GAVI Alliance have spent more than $2.5 billion and promised
In
economic terms, the cost of poor health at the outset of the twentieth century was an astounding 32% of
global GDP. Today, it is down to about 11%, and by 2050 it will be half that.¶ While the optimists are not entirely right (loss of
biodiversity in the twentieth century probably cost about 1% of GDP per year, with some places losing much more), the overall picture is clear . Most of
the topics in the scorecard show improvements of 5-20% of GDP . And the overall trend is even
clearer . Global problems have declined dramatically relative to the resources available to tackle them.¶ Of course, this does
not mean that there are no more problems. Although much smaller, problems in health, education, malnutrition, air pollution, gender inequality, and
trade remain large.¶ But realists should now embrace the view that the world is doing much better. Moreover, the
scorecard shows us where the substantial challenges remain for a better 2050. We should guide our future attention not on the basis of
the scariest stories or loudest pressure groups, but on objective assessments of where we can do the
most good.
another $10 billion for vaccines. Efforts by the Rotary Club, the World Health Organization, and many others have reduced polio by 99% worldwide since 1979.¶
The status quo is structurally improving
Dash 2/4 Co-Founder and Managing Director at Activate, a new kind of strategy consultancy that
advises companies about the opportunities at the intersection of technology and media co-founder and
CEO of ThinkUp, which shows you how to be better at using your social networks, publisher, editor and
owner of Dashes.com, my personal blog where I've been publishing continuously since 1999,
entrepreneur, writer and geek living in New York City (Anil Dash, 4 February 2013, “THE WORLD IS
GETTING BETTER. QUICKLY.,” http://dashes.com/anil/2013/02/the-world-is-getting-better-quickly.html)
The world is getting better , faster, than we could ever have imagined. For those of us who are fortunate enough to live
in wealthy communities or countries, we have a common set of reference points we use to describe the world's most intractable, upsetting,
unimaginable injustices. Often, we only mention these horrible realities in minimizing our own woes: "Well, that's annoying, but it's hardly as bad as
children starving in Africa." Or "Yeah, this is important, but it's not like it's the cure for AIDS." Or the omnipresent description of any issue as a "First
World Problem". But let's, for once, look
world-away displays of emotion,
at the actual data around developing world problems. Not our condescending,
or our slacktivist tendencies to see a retweet as meaningful action, but the actual
numbers and metrics about how progress is happening for the world's poorest people. Though metrics and measurements are always fraught and
flawed, Gates' single biggest emphasis was the idea that measurable progress and metrics are necessary for any
meaningful improvements to happen in the lives of the world's poor. So how are we doing? THE WORLD HAS CHANGED
The results are astounding. Even if we caveat that every measurement is imprecise, that billionaire philanthropists
are going to favor data that strengthens their points, and that some of the most significant problems are
difficult to attach metrics to, it's inarguable that the past two decades have seen the greatest leap forward
in the lives of the global poor in the history of humanity. Some highlights: Children are 1/3 less likely to die before age
five than they were in 1990. The global childhood mortality rate for kids under 5 has dropped from 88 in 1000 in 1990
to 57 in 1000 in 2010. The global infant mortality rate for kids dying before age one has plunged from 61 in 1000 to 40 in 1000.
Now, any child dying is of course one child too many, but this is astounding progress to have made in just twenty years. In the past 30 years,
the percentage of children who receive key immunizations such as the DTP vaccine has quadrupled . The
percentage of people in the world living on less than $1.25 per day has been cut in half since 1990, ahead of the
schedule of the Millennium Development Goals which hoped to reach this target by 2015. The number of deaths to tuberculosis has
been cut 40% in the past twenty years. The consumption of ozone-depleting substances has been cut
85% globally in the last thirty years. The percentage of urban dwellers living in slums globally has been
cut from 46.2% to 32.7% in the last twenty years. And there's more progress in hunger and contraception,
in sustainability and education, against AIDS and illiteracy. After reading the Gates annual letter and following up by reviewing
the UN's ugly-but-data-rich Millennium Development Goals statistics site, I was surprised by how much progress has been made in the years since I've
been an adult, and just how little I've heard about the big picture despite the fact that I'd like to keep informed about such things. I'm not a pollyanna —
there's a lot of work to be done. But I can personally attest to the profound effect that basic improvements
like clean drinking water can have in people's lives. Today, we often use the world's biggest problems as
metaphors for impossibility. But the evidence shows that, actually, we're really good at solving even the most
intimidating challenges in the world. What we're lacking is the ability to communicate effectively about
how we make progress, so that we can galvanize even more investment of resources, time and effort to
tackling the problems we have left.
AT: Scheper-Hughes
Scheper-Hughes is wrong---everyday violence doesn’t cause war and genocide
because of significant differences in the degree of intentionality
Bradby & Hundt 10 – Hannah Bradby, Co-Director of the Institute of Health at the University of
Warwick, Lecturer in Sociology at Warwick Medical School, and Gillian Lewando Hundt, Professor of
Social Sciences in Health at the University of Warwick, 2010, “Introduction,” in Global perspectives on
war, gender and health: the sociology and anthropology of suffering, p. 5-6
Scheper-Hughes (2002) views genocide as an extension of the dehumanising processes
daily interactions. Drawing on analysis of the holocaust as the outcome of the general features of modernity, Scheper-Hughes
posits a ‘genocidal continuum’ that connects daily, routine suffering and concomitant insults to a person’s humanity with
genocide (Scheper-Hughes 2002: 371). The institutional ‘destruction of personhood’, as seen in the withdrawal of humane empathy from the poor or the elderly, creates
the conditions which eventually make genocide possible. The argument that conditions of modernity including western rational legal
metaphysics facilitate genocide has been criticised as too unifying and as conferring ‘super-eminence’
on the holocaust (Rose 1996: 11). The holocaust has become a crucial emblem through which we have sought to understand subsequent violence, wars and
genocides. But the centrality of the holocaust in developing European thinking around conflict and suffering
has made the resultant theoretical perspectives difficult to apply in non-European settings and in instances
where conflict is less focussed around a clash of ideology. While the scale of the death toll of the holocaust should continue to
shock, as should the organised nature of the attempted destruction of Jews, Roma, Gays and the disabled, there is very little to be gained in
comparing scales or forms of suffering . It should be possible to use the study of the holocaust to inform understanding of
other genocides in the context of other wars, to interrogate the link between war and suffering and to think through gendered perspectives
without essentialising gender or making it the only explanatory variable . This collection does not primarily seek to add to the discussion of
Far from being a uniquely horrific activity
identifiable in many
the role of the holocaust in theories of human suffering. Our chapters are, however, an unfortunate witness to the fact that despite contemporary hopes and the scale of
combatant and non-combatants deaths, the two World Wars were not the wars to end all wars. Rather wars, and their associated suffering, have been ongoing ever since, both
While structural approaches can problematise a division between
intentional and unintentional suffering, intentionality is nonetheless crucial to the contradictory
relationship that war and medicine have with suffering. War is an organised conflict between two military groups and armed conflict is bound to
in Europe and beyond. War and Medicine
be accompanied by suffering. Although ‘rules of engagement’ and the rhetoric of ‘targeted interventions’ deploying ‘surgical strikes’ suggest that ‘unnecessary’ blood shed can
be avoided, war entails suffering, even if this is restricted to combatants. A limited, or targeted war is an oxymoron since war tends to be found in company with the other
horsemen of the apocalypse, that is, pestilence, famine and death. Moreover, while the effect of war on soldiers is closely monitored by both sides, the disproportionate way in
which the apocalyptic horsemen affect non-combatants and particularly those who are already disempowered such as women, the old and the young, has been less subject to
scrutiny.
Extinction Outweighs
Extinction outweighs structural violence
Bostrum 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and
winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're
Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”,
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-humanextinction/253821/)
human extinction risks are poorly
understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society . Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the
Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that
natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects
to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he
is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees
technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of
philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation
with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we
can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential
existential risk mitigation may in fact be
a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering . Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well
suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people.
risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that
You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental
moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something.
A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in
proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk
mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There
are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period
of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems,
and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a
very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh
even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria , which would be tremendous under ordinary
standards.
AT: V2L
“No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is
subjective and could improve in the future
Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University,
2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HStexter/shaltthou.pdf
I suppose it is correct to say that, if
Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to
utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each
of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be
applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit
suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that
people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe
that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It
is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living , they
believe they do . And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their
future lives will be better . They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future. ¶ From the
point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it
has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill
themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe
that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe
that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they
may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume
that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted
above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us . My conjecture is that we should
not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of
how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as
that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c)
the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in
those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶
The fact that all our lives lack meaning , if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They
will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an
obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives)
than I avoid (in my life).
Value to life is subjective --- life is a prerequisite
Lisa Schwartz, Chair at the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 2002
“Medical Ethic: A Case Based Approach” Chapter 6, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf
The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added
dimension. This assertion suggests that the
determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective
determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the
decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but
internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of
her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned
cannot give informed consent. Patients
must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they
think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their
freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the
deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.
Reps Don’t Cause War
Reps don’t cause war
Reiter 95 DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin
post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security
v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR
A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur.
However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less
Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have
to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, most skeptical view of preemptive war, because even
when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare
events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.¶ The rarity of preemptive wars offers
preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much
about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt
on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy
increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of
preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may
not be sufficient to cause war . In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to
stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are
present to a very high degree . This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces , as they are
associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. This reduces even further the
significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a
frequent.
hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of
X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the
risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not
demonstrated by the results of such a test.
Reps not first / discursive othering doesn’t cause violence
Rodwell 5—PhD candidate, Manchester Met. (Jonathan, Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard
Jackson, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)
analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand
American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. I do not wish to argue that language is not
important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or
one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there
In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural
is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when
able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq,
though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate
However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of
framework
his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem .[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position.
language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical
of
nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation,
is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which
the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible
interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in
effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within
post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics
and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and
utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-
discourse analysis is so capacious as to be
largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just
works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains
nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal
phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently
at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but
didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan
administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in
structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically
both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the
outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of
the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain
how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring
to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the
murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group
is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan.
Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have
happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to
justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could
have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by
Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time.
Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of
this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a
problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the
potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct
consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become
The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or
In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans
came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S.
militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example
that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’.
normalised and tolerated”[v].
antagonism.
Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear
of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go
towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.
No Securitization from Speech Act
One speech act doesn’t cause securitization
Irina Ghughunishvili 10, “Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing
Muslims and Arabs as Enemies”, Submitted to Central European University Department of International
Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf
As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act , acceptance of the
audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way
relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the
speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the
one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be
more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three
factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them . 26 Among other
aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the
rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The
process of threat construction, according to
him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be
considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single
speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He
indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time,
will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it . In most cases a security
scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which
turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely
that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the
audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches .
AT: Environment Impact
All environmental factors getting better
Lomberg 10—Ph.D in pol science (4/21, Bjorn Earth Day: Smile, don't shudder; Ignore doomsday environmentalists. Things aren't so bad.
And if rich countries would worry about the right things, all the better, USA Today, LexisNexis)
Given all the talk of impending catastrophe, this may come as a surprise, but as we approach the 40th anniversary of the first Earth Day, people who care about the
environment actually have a lot to celebrate. Of course, that's not how the organizers of Earth Day 2010 see it. In their view (to quote a recent online call to arms), "The world is
In virtually every developed country, the air is more breathable and the water is
more drinkable than it was in 1970. In most of the First World, deforestation has turned to reforestation.
Moreover, the percentage of malnutrition has been reduced, and ever-more people have access to clean
water and sanitation. Apocalyptic predictions from concerned environmental activists are nothing new. Until about 10 years ago, I took it for granted that these
in greater peril than ever." But consider this:
predictions were sound. Like many of us, I believed that the world was in a terrible state that was only getting worse with each passing day. My thinking changed only when, as
a university lecturer, I set out with my students to disprove what I regarded at the time as the far-fetched notion that
global environmental conditions were actually improving. To our surprise, the data showed us that many key
environmental measures were indeed getting better. ,
No impact to the environment and no solvency
Holly Doremus 2k Professor of Law at UC Davis, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse,"
Winter 2000 Washington & Lee Law Review 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis
Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little
we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it
seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions , n213
the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. n214 Life is remarkably robust. Nor is
human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment .
Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 One response
to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that
ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this
too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This
functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without
precipitating a collapse . n217 Another response drops the horrific ending and returns to a more measured discourse of
the many material benefits nature provides humanity. Even these more plausible tales, though, suffer from an
important limitation. They call for nature protection only at a high level of generality. For example, humaninduced increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels may cause rapid changes in global
temperatures in the near future, with drastic consequences for sea levels, weather patterns, and ecosystem services. n218
Similarly, the loss of large numbers of species undoubtedly reduces the genetic library from which we might in the future draw
useful resources. n219 But it is difficult to translate these insights into convincing arguments against any
one of the small local decisions that contribute to the problems of global warming or biodiversity loss .
n220 It is easy to argue that the material impact of any individual decision to increase carbon emissions
slightly or to destroy a small amount of habitat will be small. It is difficult to identify the specific
straw that will break the camel's back. Furthermore, no unilateral action at the local or even
national level can solve these global problems. Local decisionmakers may feel paralyzed by the scope of the
problems, or may conclude that any sacrifices they might make will go unrewarded if others do not restrain their actions. In sum,
at the local level at which most decisions affecting nature are made, the material discourse provides little reason to save nature.
Short of the ultimate catastrophe, the material benefits of destructive decisions frequently will exceed their identifiable material
costs. n221
AT: Necropolitics
Necropolitics thesis wrong and re-trenches power
Angela Mitropoulos 5, a graduate of La Trobe University’s Department of Sociology and
Anthropology. She currently writes on border policing. She has been published on several occasions –
"Necropolitics" October 16, http://archive.blogsome.com/2005/10/16/necropolitics-war/
Mbembe concludes the essay by arguing that the concept of biopolitics might be better replaced with
necropolitics, and he discusses suicide bombings at some length, in a pretty interesting way. But I am not sure I would follow him
there with respect to the question of bios versus necros. They don’t seem to me distinguishable. The nexus between
life and death politics is surely complicated not only by ‘the right to life’ (and the politics that attend it), but also by
the reorganisation of so-called health and welfare policies, pharmacapitalism and its geopolitics, the proprietisation of genes, and so
on. But, maybe more than that, I would be inclined to think the following (the transition between the territorial state to a mobile war
machine, as Mbembe puts it)through a more detailed discussion of the why and how of so-called ‘failed states’ in relation to their
inability to give effect to the control over populations (and not simply resources). He talks about the ‘erosion’ of their ability to control,
but there’s no discussion of what it was that eroded this. In that sense, it’s left open to characterise this erosion in terms
not of people’s struggles but of processes that occur ‘above their heads’ as it were. Thereby reducing them
to objects of the war machines’ movements, but not capable of movement themselves .
Agamben Answers
Cards
Agamben’s criticism does nothing—reformism is preferable to radicalism
Daly, 04 (Frances, Australian National University, “The Non-citizen and the Concept of Human Rights”, borderlands, Research
Fellow in Philosophy, http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm) //cc
It is always possible to suppose that a self-fashioned potentiality is simply available to us, and in some senses it is, but not because
a type of theory merely posits the social and the historical as completely open to our manipulation or 'perforation'. Likewise, we
cannot merely assume that changing 'forms of life' necessarily amount to types of refusal. Such a claim
would only make sense if it were put forward on the basis of an appreciation of an impulse to freedom
from particular types of constraint and oppression. It would also require a sense of how this impulse takes place within a
variety of conditions, some of which might be easily altered and some of which might not. In the absence of an engaged sense of
what this impulse means, and of the context in which elements of freedom and unfreedom do battle, it is impossible to
speculate on the nature of the subjectivity or potentiality which might be emerging or which might be in stages
of decomposition. Agamben merely presumes that a strategy by which we all identify as refugees will renew a politics and thereby
end the current plight of the refugee, as if no other reality impinges on this identification. This is also assumed on the basis
that the State – in Agamben's theorizing, the abstraction of an all-encompassing, leviathan State – is
equally, readily and easily liable to perforation. This contradiction is indicative of a wider problem where
what we encounter is a form of critique that is oddly inappropriate to the type of issue it addresses . 29.
Much can be said in criticism of the doctrine of right, of the limited nature of the understanding of freedom and rights in documents
on rights, of the assumption of the place of citizen rights as the locus of the fundamental rights of the human, and most significantly,
the absence of any sense of the undetermined nature of what being might mean. But what must be stated, I feel, is that it would be
a serious impoverishment of the ethical problem that we currently face to deny any potential value of rights in carrying forth traces of
an impetus towards human dignity, of the ideals of freedom and equality, and to thus reduce rights to what might be termed an
absolute politics. Rights cannot be reduced to citizenship rights as if the ideas of rights and citizenship are coterminus. What most
critically needs to be understood is, firstly, why values of freedom and equality have such a limited and fragile place within
conditions of such inordinate legalism, and, secondly, what the absence of freedom, which the cause of human rights inevitably
suggests, means for the installation of any such rights. Without such an understanding we are left with a gestural politics
that contains a posture of radicalism but one which fails to connect the aspirations of those who are
struggling to achieve elementary rights with a vision of a world that could accord them a degree of dignity.
To acknowledge this is not to be seduced by concepts of right or law, but is rather to refuse the denial of
a radical questioning of the possibilities with which a discourse presents us. Benjamin's understanding of a
genuinely messianic idea is something that is "not the final end of historical progress, but rather its often failed and finally
accomplished interruption" (Benjamin, 1974: 1231). We find this in values that resist exploitation and assaults upon human dignity.
And it is this realm that currently requires urgent, emphatic and significant renewal.
No impact to modern biopolitics—modern power is more nuanced and
responsible to the moral economy
Rabinow & Rose 03 (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @
the London School of Economics, “Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today,” December 10, 2003,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/ pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, accessed July
07, pg. 8-9) //cc
The interpretation of contemporary biopolitics as the politics of a state modeled on the figure of the
sovereign suits the twentieth century absolutisms of the Nazis and Stalin. But we need a more nuanced
account of sovereign power to analyze contemporary rationalities or technologies of politics. Since these authors
take their concept and point of reference from Foucault, it is worth contrasting their postulate of a origin and beneficiary of biopower
to Foucaultís remarks on sovereignty as a form of power whose diagram, but not principle, is the figure of the sovereign ruler. Its
characteristic is indeed ultimately a mode of power which relies on the right to take life. However, with the exception of certain
‘paroxysmal’ moments, this is a mode of power whose activation can only be sporadic and non-continuous. The totalization of
sovereign power as a mode of ordering daily life would be too costly, and indeed the very excesses of the
exercise of this power seek to compensate for its sporadic nature. Sovereignty, in this sense, is precisely a
diagram of a form of power not a description of its implementation. Certainly some forms of colonial power sought
to operationalize it, but in the face of its economic and governmental costs, colonial statecraft was largely to take a different form.
The two megalomaniac State forms of the twentieth century also sought to actualize it, as have some others in their wake: Albania
under Hoxha, North Korea. But no historian of pre-modern forms of control could fail to notice the dependence
of sovereign rule in its non-paroxysmal form on a fine web of customary conventions, reciprocal
obligations, and the like, in a word, a moral economy whose complexity and scope far exceeds the
extravagance displays of the sovereign. Sovereign power is at one and the same time an element in this
moral economy and an attempt to master it.
Turn: liberal democratic protections prevent military action and the slide to
totalitarianism—Agamben ignores the actual practice of humanitarianism
Heins, 05 (Volker, visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social
Research in Frankfurt, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598) //cc
According to this basic Principle of Distinction, modern humanitarian action is directed towards those who are caught up in violent
conflicts without possessing any strategic value for the respective warring parties. Does this imply that classic humanitarianism and
its legal expressions reduce the lives of noncombatants to the "bare life" of nameless individuals beyond the protection of any legal
order? I would rather argue that humanitarianism is itself an order-making activity. Its goal is not the preservation of life
reduced to a bare natural fact, but conversely the protection of civilians and thereby the protection of
elementary standards of civilization which prevent the exclusion of individuals from any legal and moral
order. The same holds true for human rights, of course. Agamben fails to appreciate the fact that human rights laws
are not about some cadaveric "bare life", but about the protection of moral agency.[33] His sweeping
critique also lacks any sense for essential distinctions. It may be legitimate to see "bare life" as a juridical fiction
nurtured by the modern state, which claims the right to derogate from otherwise binding norms in times of war and emergency, and
to kill individuals, if necessary, outside the law in a mode of "effective factuality."[34] Agamben asserts that sovereignty understood
in this manner continues to function in the same way since the seventeenth century and regardless of the democratic or dictatorial
structure of the state in question. This claim remains unilluminated by the wealth of evidence that shows how the
humanitarian motive not only shapes the mandate of a host state and nonstate agencies, but also serves
to restrict the operational freedom of military commanders in democracies, who cannot act with impunity
and who do not wage war in a lawless state of nature. Furthermore, Agamben ignores the crisis of humanitarianism
that emerged as a result of the totalitarian degeneration of modern states in the twentieth century. States cannot always be
assumed to follow a rational self-interest which informs them that there is no point in killing others indiscriminately. The Nazi episode
in European history has shown that sometimes leaders do not spare the weak and the sick, but take extra care not to let them
escape, even if they are handicapped, very old or very young. Classic humanitarianism depends on the existence of an
international society whose members feel bound by a basic set of rules regarding the use of violence—
rules which the ICRC itself helped to institutionalize. Conversely, classic humanitarianism becomes dysfunctional when states place
no value at all on their international reputation and see harming the lives of defenseless individuals not as useless and cruel, but as
part of their very mission.[36] The founders of the ICRC defined war as an anthropological constant that produced a continuous
stream of new victims with the predictable regularity and unavoidability of floods or volcanic eruptions. Newer organizations, by
contrast, have framed conditions of massive social suffering as a consequence of largely avoidable political mistakes. The
humanitarian movement becomes political, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt,[37] in so far as it orients itself to humanitarian states of
emergency, the causes of which are located no longer in nature, but in society and politics. Consequently, the founding generation
of the new humanitarian organizations have freed themselves from the ideals of apolitical philanthropy and chosen as their new
models historical figures like the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Jews during the Second World War.
In a different fashion than Agamben imagines, the primary concern in the field of humanitarian
intervention and human rights politics today is not the protection of bare life, but rather the rehabilitation of
the lived life of citizens who suffer, for instance, from conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. At the same time,
there is a field of activity emerging beneath the threshold of the bare life. In the United States, in particular, pathologists working in
conjunction with human rights organizations have discovered the importance of corpses and corporal remains now that it is possible
to identify reliable evidence for war crimes from exhumed bodies.[39]
Agamben’s methodology is flawed—his argument is a giant assertion with no
proof
Lewis, 99 (Stephen, “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Review)”, Modernism/Modernity 6.3, p. 165, Project MUSE,
Humanities Professor at Chicago,) //cc
There are a number of objections one could raise to specific aspects of the book, particularly its premise that concepts such as
"sovereign power" and "bare life" describe realities that remain more or less constant over twenty-four centuries of history. I will
focus here, however, on what I think is the most fundamentally objectionable aspect of the book: its methodology,
or the set of assumptions about what constitutes a good argument that governs its "historicophilosophical" approach to its subject matter. The best way to demonstrate these assumptions is by
considering Agamben's adoption of the term "biopolitics." He takes up the term from Michel Foucault with the intent of
moving beyond Foucault's thinking of the "double bind" exerted upon the political subject by, on the one hand, "subjective
technologies" and, on the other, "political technologies" (5-6). Agamben's claim is that his approach to biopolitics clarifies the precise
nature of this "point at which the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power" because he grounds it in
an analysis of the juridico-institutional structure of sovereign power, a realm of political reality that Foucault refused to take seriously
(119). Agamben's rhetoric when explaining why Foucault did not see the structural nature of modern power in the more complete
and illuminating way that Agamben does is interesting. For Agamben, any failings in Foucault's thinking arise not from a problem
with Foucault's methods of research or from deficits in his command of evidence, but, rather, from the assumption that Foucault
could not have thought otherwise than as he did because he was thinking at the very limits then of Western thought. The "blind spot"
in the "double bind" Foucault locates constitutes, says Agamben, "something like a vanishing point that the different perspectival
lines of Foucault's inquiry (and, more generally, of the entire Western reflection on power) converge toward without reaching" (6).
Unfortunately, yet perhaps unsurprisingly, Agamben intimates that he, too, is thinking at the very limits of current thought
(presumably he finds himself able to think beyond Foucault's horizon because he is alive and thinking now, after Foucault).
Agamben's use of what Thomas Pavel has called the "rhetoric of the end" calls attention to the problems that occur when a book is
structured by apocalyptic claims about the end (and thus the inaccessibility) of certain modes of being or of thought rather than by
empirically or historiographically grounded argument. 2 There is nothing inherently objectionable about claiming that the end of a
certain era has occurred; the point is simply that, to my mind, the reader ought to be able to decide from evidence-based
argumentation whether the claim is reasonable. 3 Agamben says that his intent in describing the hidden connection between
totalitarianism and democracy on an "historico-philosophical" plane rather than through detailed historiographical inquiry is not to
"[level] the enormous differences that characterize [the] history and [. . .] rivalry" of democracy and totalitarianism (10). Instead, his
intent is to make the structure of this hidden connection known so that it can one day be surpassed
through a new form of politics. The problem, however, is that the rhetoric of the end he employs in lieu of
historiographical argument prevents him from saying precisely what this new form of politics could be and
thus makes its attainment seem mysteriously difficult. Indeed Agamben tends to fall back on impossibleto-prove categorical assertions rather than reasonable explanations when he tells why, for instance, the
categories of classical politics, or, alternatively, religion-based ethical systems, cannot be "returned to" in
any sense. Functioning hand-in-hand with such categorical assertions about the inaccessibility of the past
are equally unsupported gestures towards a future politics articulated in what reads at times like a language of
secularized apophatism, which in the present book Agamben tends to employ in conjunction with discussions of Benjamin's
messianism.
AT: Bare Life
The concept of bare life over-determines the power of the state—theories that
emphasize resistance are more powerful
Cesarino & Negri 04 (Cesare, associate professor of cultural studies, Antonio, professor emeritus @ the
Collège International de Philosophie, “It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy,”
Cultural Critique, Vol. 57, Spring 2004, pg. 172-173)//cc
I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to Homo Sacer, and I feel that this new work will be resolutive for his thought—in the sense that
he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He
already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, this book is
extremely learned and elegant; it remains, however, somewhat trapped within Pauline exegesis, rather than constituting a fullfledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus, to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. I believe
that the concept of naked life is not an impossible, unfeasible one. I believe it is possible to push the image
of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [un povero Cristo] is crushed, to conceive of that
extreme point at which power tries to eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep
oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the
camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. But this is also the point at which this
concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way actually
ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology. Agamben, in effect, is saying that such is the nature of
power: in the final instance, power reduces each and every human being to such a state of
powerlessness. But this is absolutely not true! On the contrary: the historical process takes place and is
produced thanks to a continuous constitution and construction, which undoubtedly confronts the limit over
and over again—but this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and in which life
becomes increasingly fuller. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute pow-erlessness, especially when it
has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit
precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint
of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the
same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and
reiterate? Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those who are
not yet or not completely crushed by power, from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such
a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution, from the standpoint of power [potenza]?
AT: Totalitarianism
Agamben ignores the actual differences between democracy and
totalitarianism—his failure to engage in cost-benefit assessment means he’s a
fanatic who only thinks in absolutes.
Heins, 05 (Volker, visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social
Research in Frankfurt, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598)//cc
Agamben is not interested in such weighing of costs and benefits because he assumes from the outset that
taking care of the survival needs of people in distress is simply the reverse side of the modern inclination
to ignore precisely those needs and turn life itself into a tool and object of power politics . By way of conclusion,
I will indicate briefly how his view differs from two other, often no less shattering critiques of modern humanitarianism. Martti
Koskenniemi warned that humanitarian demands and human rights are in danger of degenerating into "mere talk."[47] The recent
crisis in Darfur, Sudan, can be cited as an example for a situation in which the repeated invocation of human rights standards and
jus cogens norms, like those articulated in the Genocide Convention, might ultimately damage those norms themselves if states are
unwilling to act on them.[48] This criticism implies that human rights should be taken seriously and applied in a reasonable manner.
Both David Kennedy and Oona Hathaway have gone one step further by taking issue even with those who proved to be serious by
joining treaties or engaging in advocacy. In a controversial quantitative study, Hathaway contended that the ratification of human
rights treaties by sets of given countries not only did not improve human rights conditions on the ground, but actually correlated with
increasing violations.[49] In a similar vein, David Kennedy radicalized Koskenniemi's point by arguing that human rights regimes and
humanitarian law are rather part of the problem than part of solution, because they "justify" and "excuse" too much.[50] To some
extent, this is an effect of the logic of legal reasoning: marking a line between noncombatants and combatants increases the
legitimacy of attacking the latter, granting privileges to lawful combatants delegitimizes unlawful belligerents and dramatically
worsens their status. On the whole, Kennedy is more concerned about the dangers of leaving human rights to international legal
elites and a professional culture which is blind for the mismatch between lofty ideals and textual articulations on the one side, and
real people and problems on the other side.[51] Whereas these authors reveal the "dark sides" of overly relying on human rights talk
and treaties, the moral fervor of activists or the routines of the legal profession, Agamben claims that something is wrong with
human rights as such, and that recent history has demonstrated a deep affinity between the protection and the infringement of these
rights. Considered in this light, the effort of the British aid organization Save the Children, for instance, to help children in need both
in Britain and abroad after World War I —faithful to George Bernard Shaw's saying, "I have no enemies under seven"—is only the
flip side of a trend to declare total war on others regardless of their age and situation. This assertion clearly goes far beyond the
voices of other pessimists. Agamben's work is understandable only against the backdrop of an entirely familiar mistrust of liberal
democracy and its ability to cultivate nonpartisan moral and legal perspectives. According to Agamben, democracy does
not threaten to turn into totalitarianism, but rather both regimes smoothly cross over into one another
since they ultimately rest on the same foundation of a political interpretation of life itself. [52] Like Carl Schmitt,
Agamben sees the invocation of human rights by democratic governments as well as the "humanitarian concept of humanity"[53] as
deceptive manouvers or, at least, as acts of self-deception on the part of the liberal bourgeois subject. The difference between
Agamben and Schmitt lies in the fact that Schmitt fought liberal democracy in the name of the authoritarian state, while Agamben
sees democracy and dictatorship as two equally unappealing twins. Very much unlike Schmitt, the Italian philosopher confronts
us with a mode of thinking in vaguely felt resemblances in lieu of distinctly perceived differences. Ultimately,
he offers a version of Schmitt's theory of sovereignty that changes its political valence and downplays the difference
between liberal democracy and totalitarian dictatorship—a difference about which Adorno once said that it
"is a total difference. And I would say," he added, "that it would be abstract and in a problematic way fanatical if
one were to ignore this difference."[54]
AT: Whatever Being
Whatever being is impossible to realize—we can only empty out the concept of
rights if there is a concrete alternative.
Daly, 04 (http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm, The non-citizen and the concept of
'human rights', Frances Daly,
Australian National University 2004)//cc
What it is that we might want a human potentiality to mean is, of course, a complex, difficult and open-ended issue. But it
is
important for us to ask whether a human potentiality must start from emptiness. Agamben repeatedly
refers to the need to begin from a place of 'amorphousness' and 'inactuality', assuming that there is
something that will necessarily follow from the simple fact of human existence – but why should we
assume this? What might constitute or form this potentiality is surely concerned with what is latent but as yet unrealized. For
Agamben, there is nothing latent that is not already tainted by a sense of a task that must be done (Agamben, 1993: 43). There is
no ability to achieve any displacement with what is present within values of community and justice, there
is only an immobilizing nothingness that assumes a false essence, vocation or destiny. If the 'whatever'
being that he contends is indeed emerging, and it possesses, as he argues, "an original relation to
desire", it is worthwhile asking what this desire is for (Agamben, 1993: 10). If it is simply life itself, then it is not clear
why this should be devoid of any content. Any process of emptying out, of erasing and abolishing, such as that
which Agamben attempts, is done for a reason - it involves critique and rejection, on the basis,
necessarily, that something else is preferable. But Agamben provides us with very little of what is needed
to understand how we might engage with this option. Defenses of Representations
Apocalyptic Reps
Top level
Debate about apocalyptic impacts is crucial to activism and effective policy
education
Blain – professor of Sociology – 91
Michael Blain, RHETORICAL PRACTICE IN AN ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN, Peace & Change
Peace activism can be understood as a sociopolitical performance. It enacts a pattern of discourse that can be
rhetorically analyzed in terms of its strategy of incitement. As peace activists mobilized their forces in the
1980s, they built up a discourse -- a repertoire of possible political statements for use against nuclear
weapons policies. Such statements as nuclear annihilation, radiation pollution, and strategic madness have
been the primary incitements to peace activism. Activists use language pragmatically. As political actors
addressing a public audience, they know they must speak a language familiar to that audience. Nineteenthcentury activists were educated, middle-class women, clergymen, educators, and businessmen with a reform
Christian conscience. Twentieth-century activists have included political leftists and cultural dissidents as well
as traditional pacifists and religious liberals.(n1) Middle-class professionals have played prominent roles in the
peace movement. For example, medical activists like Helen Caldicott and Robert Lifton have elaborated a
discourse on the madness of "nuclearism"(n2) In fact, some analysts interpret the peace movement as a power
struggle of middle-class radicals and countercultural rebels against the power elite.(n3) This article presents the
results of a rhetorical analysis of activists' discursive practices in a victorious campaign to defeat a U.S.
government plan to construct the first new nuclear weapons plant in twenty years in the state of Idaho, the
Special Isotope Separator (SIS). It shows how activists in the Snake River Alliance (SRA), a Boise, Idaho, antinuclear
organization, mobilized hundreds of "Idahoans" to act as "concerned citizens" and "Life Guards," to lobby,
testify, demonstrate, and finally, to kill this plan. The article introduces a perspective on how discourse
functions in political movements. An effective movement discourse must accomplish two things: (1)
knowledge, or the constitution of the subjects and objects of struggle, and (2) ethics, or the moral incitement
of people to political action. I will show how this perspective can illuminate how anti-SIS activists developed an
effective discourse to kill this crucial nuclear weapons program. A critical evaluation of this campaign can
contribute to peace in at least three ways: it can celebrate the artful practices these activists engaged in to
achieve their political objectives; it can add a case study of a victorious campaign to the emerging literature on
the tactics of nonviolent action; and finally, it can contribute to the current debate about the future of the
peace movement in a post-cold war world. The anti-SIS campaign involved an alliance of environmental and
peace groups, which suggests one possible political strategy for future peace actions. POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
AS VICTIMAGE RITUALS Political activists must engage in discourse to fight and win power struggles with their
adversaries. In political battles, such as the anti-SIS campaign, words are weapons with tactical functions.
Michel Foucault clearly articulates this perspective: Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are
joined together. And for this reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose
tactical function is neither uniform nor stable ... as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play
in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct ... according to who is speaking, his position
of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be situated ... with the shifts and reutilizations of
identical formulas for contrary objectives.(n4) A power strategy refers to all means, including discursive
practices, put into play by an actor in a particular power relationship to influence the actions of others. The
language of political movements, including peace activism, is militaristic; activists talk strategy, tactics, and
objectives. And it is important to see that discourse is itself a part of any power strategy. Kenneth Burke's
concepts of victimage rhetoric and rituals can be used to illuminate this process.(n5) Political activists use
victimage rhetoric to mobilize people to fight and defeat their adversaries. Victimage rhetoric is
melodramatic in form. It functions to incite those who identify with it to engage in political acts of ritual
scapegoating. Activists mobilize people to engage in activism by getting them to identify with an actual or
impending violation of some communal "ideal"--a problem, concern, or danger. Activists mount "education"
campaigns to get the public to identify with the imminent danger. A critical knowledge of the nature of this
danger is constructed, taking the form of villainous powers inflicting or threatening to inflict some terrible
wrong on the world. This rhetorical practice is tactical in the sense that it is designed to generate intense anger
and moral outrage at what has, is, or could be happening to the values of those who identify with it. These
people can then be mobilized in a campaign to fight the villain. This effect is intensified by emphasizing the
negative features of the actions of the agents and agencies responsible for the violation. Once implanted, this
knowledge exerts an ethical incitement to activism. Activists, this model suggests, must develop a discourse
that does two things: vilify and activate. These two functions correspond to two moments in a melodramatic
victimage ritual. These two moments of identification are (1) acts of violation or vilification and (2) acts of
redemptive or heroic action. Movement leaders must construct images of both villains and activists fighting
villains. They must convince us that acts of violation have occurred or will happen, and then they must goad
us into doing something about it. This analysis suggests that a movement discourse is a rhetorical system
composed of two elements working in tandem. One of the main features of motive in victimage ritual is the
aim to destroy the destroyer. In the anti- SIS campaign, as we shall see, the objective was to kill a Department
of Energy (DOE) program to build a nuclear weapons plant. One means of accomplishing that objective was to
vilify its proponents. The second element in a movement discourse is redemptive or ethical. Once leaders
succeed in convincing their followers that there is a real threat, they must then incite those convinced to act.
To accomplish these objectives, peace activists have assembled a discourse charged with peril and power--a
knowledge of the scene they confront and an ethic of political activism. They have constituted a "knowledge"
of the dangers posed by the nuclear arms race and nuclear war that is infused with a redemptive ethic of
political activism. Activists use this knowledge and ethic to goad people into campaigns to achieve antinuclear
objectives. For example, activists have invoked the term power in two distinct ethical senses. There is the "bad"
power of the agents of the nuclear arms race (politicians such as Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher;
agencies such as the U.S. government, NATO, or the Department of Energy). And there is the "good" power
that activists produce by their concerted political actions, including a subjective effect called
"empowerment." Activists empower themselves by "taking personal responsibility for the fate of the earth,"
sacrificing time, energy, and money to the cause. By engaging in political activism, peace activists say they
transcend psychological despair and obtain a sense of personal power.(n6)
Warming Rhetoric Good
Eco-apocalyptic discourse solves extinction
Leeson-Schatz 12 – PhD candidate in English @ Binghamton
Joe, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,”
Journal of Ecocriticism, 4.2
It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain
life1. Nevertheless, within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological
position, or strategy for activism should be adopted. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic’s particular
orientation that ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect the tangible reality that
surrounds any discussion of the environment. This demands including human--‐induced ecocidal violence
within all our accounts. Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within inner--‐academic
or policymaking circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our
eyes.¶ This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything
else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, explains that¶ Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned
sig--‐ nificance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism
circulate in present--‐day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and
electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the
contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi) ¶ Luke reminds us that
regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and
therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the
symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the
first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of
government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can
influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science--‐fiction of weather--‐controlling weapons are
now only steps away from becoming reality2.¶ Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to
motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. In reality it takes
awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform. On the screen it
takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion . What is constant is that “as
these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations
as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the
organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). We cannot motivate people to change the ecological
conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental
destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our
use of elements of scientifically--‐established reality reconstructs the surrounding power structures in
beneficial ways. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the
picture.`¶ In recent years, many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of
urgency. They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co--‐opted by hegemonic
institutions. Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding
ecology. In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy
our metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist
thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal
rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that rather than withdrawing
from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship
people have to their ecology. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that “instead of
bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary ... it can enable a novel form of
transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight. ... [I]t is a mode of ethicopolitical practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into
practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes” (454--‐455).
Discursive cooptation is inevitable – only apocalyptic environmental
representations re-claim the progressive environmental agenda
Leeson-Schatz 12 – PhD candidate in English @ Binghamton
Joe, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,”
Journal of Ecocriticism, 4.2
Luke and Darier’s Foucauldian approach to ecocriticism is not without value. They demonstrate how “discourse
delineate[s] ... the terms of intelligibility whereby a particular ‘reality’ can be known and acted upon. When we
speak of a discourse we may be referring to a specific group of texts, but also importantly to the social
practices to which those texts are inextricably linked” (Doty, 1996: 6). Power continuously operates in both
hegemonic and resistant ways regardless if we are monkey-wrenching, speaking at a political press conference,
or using the written language of the academic. No matter the form, the way we articulate our discourse must
construct reality in a precise way in order to render it intelligible for others to understand. Judith Butler notes
that “the media’s evacuation of the human through the image has to be understood ... in terms of the broader
problem that normative schemes of intelligibility establish what will and will not be human” (146)5. Once other
animals and the environment are understood as less than human their lives become inconsequential compared
to the short--‐term benefit of human civilization. To this ends—despite Luke and Darier’s fear of being coopted—apocalyptic imagery can help in two regards. First, it helps people recognize the interconnection of the
global ecology in order to appreciate the similarity between humans and other species. Second, it provides a
self-motivating reason for people to change their behavior to avert extinction even when confronting those
who refuse to recognize the intrinsic value of non-human animals. In either case omnicidal images change both
the mindset and the actions of those we encounter, thereby fostering new directions for humanity to evolve.¶
Any hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner ignores how any
particular metaphor—apocalyptic or not—always risks getting co-opted. It does not excuse inaction . Clearly
hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the
debates surrounding off--‐shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. “As this
ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems ... will go unsolved ... only to fester more ominously into the
future. ... [E]cological crisis ... cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context ... of
internationalized markets, finance, and communications” (Boggs 774). If it weren’t for people such as Watson
connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn’t get the needed coverage to enter into public
discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it
even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, “Those who dominate the world exploit
their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is known. Unless they also face resistance,
questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, they certainly will remain the dominant forces”
(2003: 413). Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a grave injustice to the
gains activists are making on the ground. It also allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate
over the environment by framing out any attempt for significant change, whether it be radical or reformist.
Turn – apocalyptic discourse removes environmentalism from solely the hands of
the government – encourages agency invocation, demonstrates
interconnectedness and creates policy change
Leeson-Schatz 12 – PhD candidate in English @ Binghamton
Joe, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,”
Journal of Ecocriticism, 4.2
Once one understands the world as interconnected—instead of constructed by different nation--‐states and
single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn’t be conceptually severed from any other. In
short, we’d all have a stake in the global commons. Ecocritics can then utilize biopolitics to shape discourse
and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new
future for there to be any future. Influencing other people through argument and end--‐of--‐the--‐world tactics
is not the same biopower of the state so long as it doesn’t singularize itself but for temporary moments.
Therefore, “it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no
longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities ... will destroy
its [very] possibility” (Hardt & Negri 347). In the context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it
would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute
wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not-in-my-backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction
elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not one’s own . Ultimately,
images of planetary doom demonstrate how we are all interconnected and in doing so inaugurate a new world
where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.
Apocalyptic reps induce action-studies prove
Veldman 12
(“Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse¶ How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among
Environmental Activists” Ethics & the Environment¶ Volume 17, Number 1, Spring 2012)
As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly
does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism.¶
Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes
from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of
his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but
varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest,
which he labeled
“alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear
war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem
to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect
alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the
contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a
threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable
eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid).¶ Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey
conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again,
due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming.
They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already
making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely
than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support
action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern.
Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them
personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)”
(2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other
motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and
DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those
who think environmental
problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.¶
National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not
[End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater
insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior.¶ When seeking a subset of
environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the
collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological
disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living
fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve
wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet
after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate
practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching”
(lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while
there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism
and activism are bound closely together.¶ The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism
holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of
Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with
them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of
an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending
revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess
worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a
more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of
environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior:¶ images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and
apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for
stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting,
recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as
a divine entity.¶ (2008, 212)¶ What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that
people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move
beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to
some form of the apocalyptic narrative.¶ All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that
believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism
are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely
powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or
simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus
only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence
that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore
the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature
(McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and
spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument
that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear
to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section
explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8]
The 1AC is necessary discourse – combating complacency is crucial to halting
certain and inevitable extinction
Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong
Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of
Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse
We shall not speculate here as to the “how and when” of human extinction; rather, we ask why there remains
so little discussion of this important topic. We hypothesise that a lethal mix of ignorance and denial is blinding
humans from the realization that our own species could soon (a relative concept, admittedly) be as endangered
as many other large mammals (Cardillo et al. 2004). For notwithstanding the “overgrown Petri dish” model of
human decline now confronting us, the most sinister menace that we face may not be extrinsic selection
pressures but complacency. Entrenched in our culture is a knee-jerk “boy who cried wolf ” skepticism aimed at
any person who voices concerns about the future—a skepticism fed by a traditionally bullish, growth-addicted
economy that eschews caution (Table 1). But the facts of extinction are less exciting and newsworthy than the
roller-coaster booms and busts of stock markets.
Human extinction is the greatest act of suffering imaginable – using scientific
methods to forestall extinction is crucial
Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong
Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of
Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse
Human extinction is 100% certain—the only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of
Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the
evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected,
given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of
evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—
extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard extinction as
catastrophic—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—is not
only specious, but self-defeating. Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any
life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more
suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by
the getting of wisdom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, postpone extinction.
But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an
immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario
for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the
center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution.
More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our species’ mortality, rather than seeking spiritual
comfort in escapist fantasies, could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual cumulative burden of human
suffering.
Inev Framing Bad
Only tragic framing of warming as inevitable causes inaction – the aff’s comic framing allows for agency
Foust & Murphy, 9 – *Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the
University of Denver AND **doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver (Christina R. &
William O’Shannon, “Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse,” Environmental Communication: A Journal of
Nature and Culture, Vol. 3 No. 2, July 2009, pp. 151 – 167, Taylor & Francis)//BI
A comic apocalyptic frame suggests that human beings have agency at different points within the global warming
narrative. Comically framed discourse posits that humans may mitigate the worst effects of climate change, or that they may
adapt to the unchangeable telos. For instance, Kristof (2005) identifies relatively inexpensive ‘‘initial steps we can take to reduce carbon
emissions . . . like encouraging mass transit, hybrid vehicles, better insulation and energy-efficient light bulbs,’’ which ‘‘could reduce global
emissions by one-third’’ (p. A25). At the same time it leaves open the possibility that humans may influence the future ,
apocalyptic rhetoric from a comic frame casts global warming as a material reality, (more or less) ordained and thus constraining human
choices. Empowerment within the comic variation of apocalypse is not a trivial matter, however. It requires humans to make the
right decisions from a limited set of choices: ‘‘Nature commands humans to adapt or die. The natural world keeps erupting, shifting,
storming, collapsing, whirling. It refuses, despite our entreaties, to become something dependable and constrained and rational’’ (Achenbach,
2004, p. C1). In other words, a comic apocalypse does not suggest that events are controllable through any or all human actions. Using the
comic frame permits humans to miss the fully tragic telos (which would, presumably, end all time and humanity): In [climatologist Roger
Pulwaty’s] view, a crisis is a point in a story, a moment in a narrative that presents an opportunity for characters to think their way through a
problem. A catastrophe . . . is one of several possible outcomes that follows from a crisis. ‘‘We’re at the point of crisis . . . ’’ Pulwaty concluded.
(Gertner, 2007, p. 68) By distinguishing between ‘‘crisis’’ and ‘‘catastrophe,’’ the comic variation suggests that the tragic telos is only one
potential ending to the climate change narrative, contingent upon whether humans alter their behavior in an appropriate manner. Human
beings can assume responsibility within a comically constructed apocalypse, even if the narrative begins tragically .
Eilperin (2007) reports that ‘‘the warming of the climate system is unequivocal . . . even in the best-case scenario, temperatures are on track to
cross a threshold to an unsustainable level’’ which ‘‘could’’ produce effects ‘‘irreversible within a human lifetime’’ (p. A1). What begins as a
tragically ordained story takes a comedic turn, as humans have an opportunity to realize that they are mistaken. Eilperin interviews climate
scientist Gerald Meehl, who concludes ‘‘that a sharp cut in greenhouse gas emissions could still keep catastrophic consequences from
occurring: ‘The message is, it does make a difference what we do’’’ (p. A1). Comically, the telos does not overshadow the
significance of human choice, which may stave off total catastrophe. While mitigation is one potential source for
human agency, another is adaptation. As Revkin (2007) quotes Dr. Mike Hulme: ‘‘Climate change is not a problem waiting for a
solution . . . but a powerful idea that will transform the way we develop’’ (p. A16). The emphasis on transformation suggests that
humans can adapt to the apocalyptic telos of global warming, even though the telos is, implicitly, foretold. The comic telos thus
requires humans to rethink their choices, sometimes after the worst effects of global warming have taken place. Such effects may be forecast
as though they will (most likely) occur, maintaining the apocalyptic structure (even in the comic variation): If the scientists are right about an
apocalyptic future of floods, droughts, dead coral reefs, rising sea levels and advancing deserts, global warming is an existential threat that
should affect our approach to just about every issue. To take it seriously, we would have to change the way we think about transportation,
agriculture, development, water resources, natural disasters, foreign relations, and more. (Grunwald, 2006, p. B1) Though the ending of global
warming is foretold, climate change provides a comic challenge from which people may learn, grow, and adapt. While the tragic variation
would end the narrative with humans and all other species as victims of the catastrophic effects of global warming, the
comic version is more open-ended. Furthermore, comic variations often present the apocalyptic telos in a nontotalizing way, again
with the effect of amplifying human agency. Comic versions of the global warming narrative posit localized effects, as Clynes (2007) suggests:
‘‘A one-meter rise in sea levels over the next 93 years would have enormous consequences, flooding low-lying coastal areas and megadeltas,
such as the Nile and Brahmaputra in Bangladesh, where millions of people live’’ (p. 52). Though Northern industrialized nations could adapt to
flooding, developing coastal countries likely could not: ‘‘the dramatic effects of climate change could push the number of displaced people
globally to at least one billion’’ (Clynes, 2007, p. 52). Discourse such as this takes seriously global warming’s threat, while emphasizing a
non-total telos. As exemplary of the comic variation, it reinforces responsibility for making ethical choices, rather than
resigning oneself to the foretold, total catastrophe. In addition, comic discourse indicates a time frame (93 years in the previous
example) over which global warming will occur, rendering the temporality comic. While a tragic temporality might predict an exact date after
which human agency is impossible; or, leave time to be experienced as rapid through its portrayal of catastrophic events; a comic framing
allows readers to experience a more manageable time period across which effects may occur. In comic
temporality, the effects of global warming do not happen all at once: ‘‘while widespread permanent inundation . . . is possible,
it isn’t likely to occur in [New York City] in our grandchildren’s lifetimes, or even their grandchildren’s. And an extra 5 to 10 inches of water over
the next few decades,’’ Rogers (2007) concludes, is manageable for residents (p. 1). While such temporality may make the issue of climate
change appear less pressing to crass readers unconcerned with their families’ or communities’ futures, it permits human action on
climate change, rather than limiting possible expressions of human agency to total resignation .
Crisis Rhetoric Good
No link and turn - they critique crisis manipulation – our affirmative is an example of an ethical crisis – our
rhetoric is key to public legitimacy and leadership
Kiewe 98 Associate Professor of Speech Communication at Syracuse University, and editor of The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric
(Amos Kiewe, “The Crisis Tool in American Political Discourse,” Politically Speaking: A worldwide Examination of Language Used in the Public
Sphere, Praeger Publishers 1998, p.88-89)//KP
IMPLICATIONS Crises
are not alike. The inception of crises varies, their topicality is diverse, and their management attests to the rhetorical and political skills
crisis come to life discursively by the
participants in a public drama, whether they include the president, the public, and/or the press . Crises are communicative
entities because the very term implies a perception of extraordinary events. The definitions of crises are rhetorical screens or lenses
through which certain events are articulated. Crises are special events, distinct from the routine. The modern presidency, save for few
of a given president. For presidential scholars, the important consideration is the rhetorical nature of crises. A
exceptions, has transported the crisis tool into a convenient means instead of an end to be confronted. As illustrated in this chapter, some presidents take
advantage of a crisis situation and exemplify superb leadership qualities, whereas others fail to respond properly to a critical situation. Some can find an opportunity
in a crisis situation, and others manufacture a crisis. All
situations and issues that presidents confront are conceivably prone to
crisis manipulation. Because crisis rhetoric is not altogether different from routine rhetoric , a generic configuration that
divides crises into categories would do little in comprehending crisis situations. The distinction to be made, and thus the more proper test
for assessing the viability and strategic use of presidential crisis rhetoric, is the ethical one. Regardless of the varied nature of
the many crises that presidents confront, the essential question to ask is whether or not the crisis in question is ethical. In an
ethical crisis, the nation’s viability is clearly threatened , the consequences are detrimental, immediate actions
are called for, urgency is clearly needed, the situations gain quick public legitimacy, and presidential leadership is
acute. A manufactured crisis lacks these qualities because it smacks of opportunism of various sorts. Precisely for this reason— the perception of
urgency and drama and the growing reliance on rhetorical means— the modern presidency has found crisis
rhetoric an attractive formula for leadership. Like the analogy of the boy who cried wolf, too many wolf crises will blunt the nation’s ability to
recognize a real crisis when it arrives.
Nuclear Reps
Top level
Nuclearism checks atrocities – confronting aggressors is key to utilitarianism
Futterman, 94 (J.A.H., Ph.D. from UT Austin, University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
"Meditations on the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Work," http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html,
slim_)
With the above statement as background I observe that many peace activists confront
the evil impulse in the powers of war
with the evil impulse in themselves. They rightly see nuclear war as a threat to the planet, and therefore a threat
to themselves and humanity, and so confront the threat of violence with anger. Such an attitude is self-defeating, because
acting from it creates more conflict, rather than less. Rather than making peace, such action merely makes war on war. Now the peace
activists didn't invent this type of response. In the same spirit, nuclear weapons were first invented by good people who were
confronting the evil of the Nazis (who were trying to develop their own atomic bomb) with the evil impulse in themselves. And by
continuing to develop and/or maintain a stockpile of them we give our assent to this evil impulse. I give my assent. Atomic
Bombing of Nagasaki I give it because in response to the Nazis, I would have done the same thing. In response to Stalinism,
I would also have done as my predecessors did. I believe that Nazism had to be defeated at all costs, and Stalinism had to be
contained, in order to preserve and enlarge the freedoms that I hold dear for myself and for all people. Such a response satisfies the
criterion of Utilitarianism — the greatest good for the greatest number — at least in its outcome so far. Even the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which hastened the defeat of the evil of Japanese Imperialism, satisfies the criterion of Utilitarianism in
that it spared the loss of American lives and the even worse devastation of Japan and loss of Japanese lives that would have resulted from a
conventional invasion. And I suppose I would have supported it for that reason. (And if you think there we could have demonstrated the bomb
over an unpopulated area, remember that we used our entire stockpile of two bombs, and that it took two cities, to bring about the surrender.)
[29] But the image of an orphaned baby, burned and screaming, annihilates forever the argument that it was good. [30] It was an evil response
of good people to evil, and it was the best that we humans could do at the time. Aftermath of Nagasaki Bombing And so the question of
whether I am good or evil in my participation in the nuclear weapons business is already contained in the discussion of
yezer tov and yezer ra, above. Or in the Christian idea that we are simultaneously sinners and saints. I am neither one nor the other — like you,
I am both. In associating with a nuclear weapons program, I
confront the evil of potential aggressors against America with
my own evil impulse. On the other hand, it is necessary (but not sufficient) for us to defend our turf, even in this outrageous manner,
if we are to defend our freedom. (Otherwise we risk being attacked just for being vulnerable. And if the old enemy is no longer
visible on our horizon, all we need do is to become complacent for a new one to appear .) Just as an individual needs his
evil impulse to live, so does a nation. The question is not how to eliminate the evil impulse — the question is how to
harness it. How can we use it for good
Interrogation of psychological causes of nuclear war is useless – policy
approaches are key
Blight, 86 – PhD in cognitive psychology, served as director of the Avoiding Nuclear War
project at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Chair of Foreign Policy Development
at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and Professor at the Balsillie School of
International Affairs (James G., “How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of
Nuclear War?,” Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 617-660, JSTOR)//BI
I believe, with many others, that avoiding nuclear war is the most important public policy problem of our time. As a
psychologist, I do not believe my colleagues and I have contributed significantly to its solution, which must, in my
view, consist of piecemeal attempts to understand the dimensions of the risk of nuclear war and then to suggest
ways of reducing that risk. I do not believe that reducing the risk of nuclear war is primarily a psychologists'
problem although, as a psychologist, I do tend to frame the issue so as to make certain psychological aspects of the
problem appear to be basic. Failure on the part of psychologists and psychiatrists to enter more fully into the
policy makers' construction of the central aspects of nuclear risk lay, it seems to me, behind our tendency,
especially at the level of intermediate causes, toward solutions we pluck off our own shelves but which are not
easily integrated into the policy makers' modus operandi. It has also led, I think, to utopian schemes put forward as
solutions to the deep psychological causes, solutions which fail to take adequately into account either the
historical record or political reality. The great concern of nuclear policy makers is with a crisis between the
superpowers. But nuclear crises are not well understood; in fact, the sort that everyone fears is without precedent,
for it is imagined to precipitate a major nuclear war and unprecedented devastation. Because crises are poorly
understood - psychologically, as evolving belief-states - crisis management, which may at some future point
represent the last shred of hope for avoiding a nuclear war, seems to me to lack almost completely a relevantly
useful, psychological knowledge-base.
Reps Solve Nuclear War
Fear of nuclear war is necessary to prevent its occurrence
Futterman, 94 – physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (J. A. H., “Obscenity and Peace:
Meditations on the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Work,” 1994, http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html)
I could say that if I didn't do it, someone else would, but that answer was rejected at Nuremberg. (It's also a better reason to leave the weapons
program than to stay.) I continue to support the nuclear weapons business with my effort for many reasons, which I discuss throughout this
piece. But mostly, I do it because the fear of nuclear holocaust is the only authority my own
country or any other has
respected so far when it comes to nationalistic urges to make unlimited war. As William L. Shirer states in his preface to The
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Touchstone Books, New York, 1990), "Adolf Hitler is probably the last of the great adventurer-conquerors in the
tradition of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, and the Third Reich the last of the empires which set out on the path taken earlier by France,
Rome and Macedonia. The curtain was rung down on that phase of history, at least, by the sudden invention of the hydrogen bomb, of the
ballistic missile, and of rockets which can be aimed to hit the moon." Now this contrasts with the argument
of those who would
"reinvent government" by putting up bureaucratic roadblocks to maintaining the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal
through research and testing. They reason that if the reliability of everyone's nuclear arsenals declines, everyone will be less likely to try using
them. The problem is that some "adventurer-conqueror" may arise and use everyone's doubt about their arsenals
to risk massive conventional war instead. An expansionist dictatorship might even risk nuclear war with weapons that are
simpler, cruder, less powerful, much riskier (in terms of the possibility of accidental detonation) but much more reliable than our own may
eventually become without adequate "stockpile stewardship."[14] But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than
Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now
imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian
concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to
create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only
catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when
we
contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war?
Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost . As long as horror of nuclear exchange
remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror,
the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible
attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned
above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes
it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact
we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature
of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all
the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be
what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.
Deterrence K2 Solve
There’s an infinite set of root causes to war that can’t be empirically verified – err
toward testable hypotheses about war initiation – only deterrence solves
Moore, 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal
of International Law, (John Norton, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-41)
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective
deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war ? Past, and many contemporary,
theories of war
have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or
social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other
such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and
manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others,
there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent
existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions
leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus
in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion,
distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against
Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance,
injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce
a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress.
No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in
the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war
exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking
about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and
Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels
of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently
been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the
most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to
play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is
an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the
decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own .
Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing
the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I
have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant
necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for
settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to
high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused
on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders ,
and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of
necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13
presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait
without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and
other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war.
We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus
Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs
were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that
major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically
an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of
democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision
elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of
the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the
objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk .I5 VI Testing the Hypothesis Theory
without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than
previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general
construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should
insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other
constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal
interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective
deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against
settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one
element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the
synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general,
happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?
Effective deterrence controls escalation and is the best predictor for war
Sharp, 8 – Assoc. Dep. General Counsel for Int’l Affairs @ DOD & Adjunct Prof. of Law @ Georgetown (Former Dir. Of Research at the Law
Library of Congress, Democracy and Deterrence: Foundations for an Enduring World Peace, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, May,
2008, Dr. Walter Gary Sharp Sr., http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493031&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
Moore concludes in Solving the War Puzzle that war arises from the interaction
of all three Waltzian levels (individual, state or
national, and international), whereas some proponents of the democratic peace principle focus only on government structures to explain
war and some traditional realists focus only on the international system. Both realists and democratic peace proponents tend to emphasize
institutions and systems, whereas Moore reminds us that people—leaders—decide to pursue
war: Wars are not simply
accidents. Nor, contrary to our ordinary language, are they made by nations. Wars are made by people; more specifically they are
decided on by the leaders of nation states—and other nonnational groups in the case of terrorism—who make the
decision to commit aggression or otherwise use the military instrument. These leaders make that decision based on the
totality of incentives affecting them at the time of the decision. . . . . . . [Incentive theory] tells us that we simply have a better
chance of predicting war, and fashioning forms of intervention to control it, if we focus squarely on the effect of
variables from all levels of analysis in generating incentives affecting the actual decisions made by those with the power to decide on
war.42 Incentive theory focuses on the individual decisions that lead to war and explains the synergistic relationship
between the absence of effective deterrence and the absence of democracy . Together these three factors—the decisions of
leaders made without the restraining effects of deterrence and democracy— are the cause of war: War is not strictly caused by an absence of
democracy or effective deterrence or both together. Rather war is caused by the human leadership decision to employ the military instrument.
The absence of democracy, the absence of effective deterrence, and most importantly, the synergy of an absence of
both are conditions or factors that predispose to war. An absence of democracy likely predisposes by [its] effect on leadership and
leadership incentives, and an absence of effective deterrence likely predisposes by its effect on incentives from factors
other than the individual or governmental levels of analysis . To understand the cause of war is to understand the human
decision for war; that is, major war and democide . . . are the consequence of individual decisions responding to a totality of incentives.43
Psychological Approach Fails
Psychological approaches have zero chance of solving the nuclear threat
Blight, 86 – PhD in cognitive psychology, served as director of the Avoiding Nuclear War
project at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Chair of Foreign Policy Development
at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and Professor at the Balsillie School of
International Affairs (James G., “How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of
Nuclear War?,” Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 617-660, JSTOR)//BI
But nuclear depth psychology is distinguished principally by the emphasis its advocates place upon deep
psychological processes, the pathology of which is believed to explain an arms race they regard as patently
irrational - in the sense that the end toward which they believe it is taking us, nuclear war, is the very inverse of
the goal sought by advocates of a vigorous nuclear weapons competition between the superpowers. In short,
nuclear depth psychologists believe that what they take to be our present and escalating nuclear danger can be
traced to problems in our collective thinking about nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and that these problems
are deep and usually outside the awareness of those who make and execute nuclear policy. They thus
conceptualize risk of nuclear war as mainly a psychological problem: If we could alter the way we think in
fundamental ways, chiefly by shifting to a less parochial, more global perspective, the deep psychopathology
would be cured, the arms race would be terminated, and the risk of nuclear war could be greatly reduced, perhaps
ultimately even to zero. Two schools of thought dominate nuclear depth psychology. I will characterize them
within the terminology suggested by Holt (1984, pp. 211-212). On the one hand, there are the cognitivists, those
who believe that the deep psychopathology driving the arms race is a pathology of personal cognition, albeit one
involving the cognitions of a great many leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union. To put the point
somewhat colloquial- ly, but pointedly: Cognitivists believe the arms race is crazy because crazy people are running
it. As we shall see presently, this approach to the problem of nuclear risk has led many people straightaway to the
view that the cure for superpower psychopathology is not fundamentally different in kind from the
psychotherapeutic process required to cure any sort of psychological illness involving thought disorder. For most
cognitivists, not only may the problem of nuclear risk be conceptualized psychologically, but so also may the cure,
which is some process akin to psychotherapy. The other principal school of nuclear depth psychology is that of the
interactionists. Advocates of this view tend to believe that there is no evidence suggesting the presence of
widespread pathology in the cognitions of the in- dividual leaders of either superpower. Rather, they argue that
the deep psychopathology is more abstract, embodied in what they take to be a pathological relationship between
the two countries. Within what nuclear depth psychologists take to be crazy patterns of interaction between the
super-powers, especially institutionalized mistrust and assumptions of ubiquitous hostile intent, the leaders are
seen as functioning quite rationally, as a rule, and one of the forms taken by their rational adaptation to a crazy
system is participation in the nuclear arms race. Thus, according to the interactionists, if risk of nuclear war is to be
reduced significantly, the quality of the super- power relationship must be changed fundamentally, and this implies
a mainly political, rather than psychotherapeutic, cure for superpower psychopathology. The most famous
cognitivist among nuclear depth psychologists is Helen Caldicott. Categorical and self-righteous in her assertions,
shrill in her writing and speaking, Caldicott might easily be ignored by serious students of nuclear psychology if it
weren't for her astonishing popularity. She is a best-selling author, a speaker who is much in demand, a founding
member of the reestablished Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) and, more recent- ly, a driving force behind
Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND). Thus one must assume that a great many people have, in
Caldicott, found a voice commensurate in content and tone with their own deep fears and beliefs about risk of
nuclear war (but see Coles, 1984). Caldicott's writing is filled with ad hominem psychological asaults like the
following: The definition of a paranoid patient is someone who imagines a certain scenario in his or her own mind,
decides (with no objective evidence) that this is exactly what someone else is thinking, and then decides to act on
that notion. The paranoid delusions projected onto the Russian leaders come straight from the minds of American
strategsts and leaders, and these ideas probably reflect exactly what the Americans are planning to do themselves
and bear little relationship to Soviet strategy or reali- ty. (1984, pp. 174-175). Leading candidates for this diagnosis
of paranoia are, according to Caldicott, "so-called broad-minded intellectuals who sat on Reagan's MX
Commission" (The Scowcroft Commission). Moreover, she asserts, "such fantasy thinking is still practiced at the
highest levels of government, including President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger, and is overt
paranoia" (1984, p. 174). One may find similar diagnoses in Kovel ("paranoid madness"; 1983, p. 84) and
Menninger ("exhibitionistic drunken gesturing of two suicidal giants"; 1983, p. 350). Unfortunately for Caldicott
and her cognitivist colleagues, however, her diagnoses are simply, demonstrably wrong. The Soviets have a vast
nuclear arsenal; their missiles and bombers really are aimed at us; they really do have rather precise plans for
using them to destroy us in a nuclear war (see, e.g., Holloway, 1985; Meyer, 1985). However this state of affairs
may have come about, our leaders do not simply imagine the Soviet nuclear threat. It is real, as anyone who
examines the evidence may see. In moving from her analysis of the problem of nuclear risk - crazy leaders - to her
therapeutic prescriptions for a cure, Caldicott's irrelevance to the world of nuclear policy-making becomes total.
Because she believes that deeply sick people are driving the risk of nuclear war upward, she must choose between
two broad prescriptive alternatives: something akin to political revolution, by which our leaders, at any rate, would
be forcibly replaced; or therapy, by which they would be healed. Kovel (1983) leans toward the former alternative;
Caldicott, however, favors some novel forms of therapy, such as a kind of marriage counseling, in which each
superpower would be required to "pledge" its "troth" to the other (1984, p. 292), monthly wrest- ling matches
between "the men who control the superpowers...to alleviate the built-up aggressions" (p. 305), and parental
advice to "grow up and become responsible nations" (p. 337). One may at first wonder whether Caldicott puts
forward such suggestions as these seriously but, noting the unrelentingly humorless tone of her writing, one
suspects that she does. But because her cognitivist diagnoses are patently false, and because the realization of her
prescription is so wildly improbable, the likelihood that the course she advocates will actually lead to a reduction in
the risk of nuclear war ought to be rated at very nearly zero.
Nuclearism inev
Nuclearism inevitable – maintenance and deterrence are key to effective
peacekeeping
Robinson 1 (C. Paul, Sandi National Laboraties, “A White Paper:Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the
21st Century,” March 22, www.mindfully.org/Nucs/Nuclear-Weapons-Policy-21stC.htm, 9-23-06)
I served as an arms negotiator on the last two agreements before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and have spent most of my career
enmeshed in the complexity of nuclear weapons issues on the government side of the table. It is abundantly clear (to me) that formulating a
new nuclear weapons policy for the start of the 21st Century will be a most difficult undertaking. While the often over-simplified picture of
deterrence during the Cold War-two behemoths armed to the teeth, staring each other down-has thankfully retreated into history, there are
nevertheless huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, all in quite usable states, that could be brought
back quickly to their Cold War postures. Additionally, throughout the Cold War and ever since, there has been a steady proliferation
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by other nations around the globe. The vast majority of these newly armed states
are not U.S. allies, and some already are exhibiting hostile behaviors, while others have the potential to become aggressors toward the U.S., our
allies, and our international interests. Russia has already begun to emphasize
the importance of its arsenal of nuclear
weapons to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities to deal with hostilities that appear to be
increasing along its borders. It seems inescapable that the U.S. must carefully think through how we should be preparing to deal with
new threats from other corners of the world, including the role that nuclear weapons might serve in deterring these threats from ever reaching
actual aggressions. I personally see the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical
dream in any foreseeable future. I came to
this view from several directions. The first is the impossibility of ever "uninventing" or erasing from the human mind
the knowledge of how to build such weapons. While the sudden appearance of a few tens of nuclear weapons causes only a small stir in a
world where several thousands of such weapons already exist, their appearance in a world without nuclear weapons would
produce huge effects. (The impact of the first two weapons in ending World War II should be a sufficient example.) I believe that the
words of Winston Churchill, as quoted by Margaret Thatcher to a special joint session of the U.S. Congress on February 20, 1985, remain
convincing on this point: "Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more sure than sure, that other
means of preserving the peace are in your hands." Similarly, it is my sincere view that the majority of the nations who have now
acquired arsenals of nuclear weapons believe them to be such potent tools for deterring conflicts that they would
never surrender them. Against this backdrop, I recently began to worry that because there were few public statements by U.S. officials in
reaffirming the unique role which nuclear weapons play in ensuring U.S. and world security, far too many people (including many in our own
armed forces) were beginning to believe that perhaps nuclear weapons no longer had value. It seemed to me that it was time for someone to
step forward and articulate the other side of these issues for the public: first, that nuclear weapons remain of vital importance to the security of
the U.S. and to our allies and friends (today and for the near future); and second, that nuclear weapons will likely have an enduring
role in preserving the peace and preventing world wars for the foreseeable future. These are my purposes in writing this
paper.
A2: Ontology
Hegemonic deterrence solves ontological security
Lupovici 8– Post-Doctoral Fellow, Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto (Amir, “Why the Cold War Practices of
Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse,” 2008 http://cpsa-acsp.ca/papers2008/Lupovici.pdf)
Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security,
securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of
daily life—the essential predictability of interaction
through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and
that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains
the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence
norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective
understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence
practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily
achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the
appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the
internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break
away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which
lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are
restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but
“ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that
others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999:
358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of
their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as
well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security,21 the existence of it may further
strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons
mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood
as providing both physical and ontological
security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002:
331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD
should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and
doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of
security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of
avoiding violence.
A2: Chaloupka
Chaloupka’s theory lacks definition and has no practical application
Brians 92 (Paul, Prof Department of ENglish WSU, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC8.pdf, AD: 7/1/10) jl
The confusion underlying this apparent tangle has two closely related sources: Chaloupka plunges in, dismisses careful initial
conceptualization, and defines by accretion. Of course this book’s audience is scholarly, but I do not believe anyone can say what
Chaloupka means by “modernism,” without which “postmodernism” becomes a slippery term . In their anthology,
Bradbury and McFarlane define modernism as a literary movement between 1890 and 1930. In the Preface to his anthology, Peter Brook
describes postmodern as the capitalist world (television, mass production, and consumption) and its opponents. What is modernism to
Chaloupka? We are provided a key summary of features near the end: liberal and Marxist commitment to scientific certainty (134). And he is
still defining postmodern/postructural/deconstructive and liberal humanist discourse in the last chapter. I do not have space to describe
all the reasons why this book makes difficult reading. (Is “nukespeak” criticism “a simple critique of euphemism,” when Hilgartner,
et al.’s Nukespeak is a major analysis of secrecy and censorship in the United States?) But let me end mainly positively. By insisting upon the
failure of the traditional Enlightenment liberal humanistic, scientific, opposition to nuclear war preparations (Chap. 4 on Star Wars and the
Freeze), and by urging an alternative strategy of postmodern irony, he nudges all of us in the peace movement to rethink our assumptions and
methods. Liberal humanist antinuclearist politics has offered (referring to Helen Caldicott) “a sober, anti-ironic terrorism of images” (133–34),
but has it generally degenerated into finalities that resolve questions, reify value choices, and avoid realistic politics (137)? He too
sweepingly dismisses the flexibility and the achievements of the liberal humanist antinuclearists. But of great value,
postmodern politics seeks “to delegitimize the subtle, contemporary forms of authority” in both nuclearists and
antinuclearists (128), and discards programs but offers ironic possibilities in the face of the paradoxes of power. However, the
“discourse that would raise those discomforts in a critical manner has hardly begun to be identified ” (138).
Chaloupka’s critique is politically suicidal – it’s prevents anti-nuclear groups from
effectively coalescing
Krishna, 93 – professor at the University of Hawaii, PhD from in political science from the Maxwell School at
Syracuse University (Sankaran, “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International
Relations Theory,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 18 No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 385-417)//BI
In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka
in his equally dismissive critique of the
was operating
more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him,
along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities" while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory
Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all
sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based)
criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the
unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be
trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and
need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most
trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and
their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right,
this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and
contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very
differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been
other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement like many a
worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a
totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and
Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively
militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next
section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics
Interrogation of psychological causes of nuclear war is useless – policy
approaches are key
Blight, 86 – PhD in cognitive psychology, served as director of the Avoiding Nuclear War
project at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Chair of Foreign Policy Development
at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and Professor at the Balsillie School of
International Affairs (James G., “How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of
Nuclear War?,” Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 617-660, JSTOR)//BI
I believe, with many others, that avoiding nuclear war is the most important public policy problem of our time. As a
psychologist, I do not believe my colleagues and I have contributed significantly to its solution, which must, in my
view, consist of piecemeal attempts to understand the dimensions of the risk of nuclear war and then to suggest
ways of reducing that risk. I do not believe that reducing the risk of nuclear war is primarily a psychologists'
problem although, as a psychologist, I do tend to frame the issue so as to make certain psychological aspects of the
problem appear to be basic. Failure on the part of psychologists and psychiatrists to enter more fully into the
policy makers' construction of the central aspects of nuclear risk lay, it seems to me, behind our tendency,
especially at the level of intermediate causes, toward solutions we pluck off our own shelves but which are not
easily integrated into the policy makers' modus operandi. It has also led, I think, to utopian schemes put forward as
solutions to the deep psychological causes, solutions which fail to take adequately into account either the
historical record or political reality. The great concern of nuclear policy makers is with a crisis between the
superpowers. But nuclear crises are not well understood; in fact, the sort that everyone fears is without precedent,
for it is imagined to precipitate a major nuclear war and unprecedented devastation. Because crises are poorly
understood - psychologically, as evolving belief-states - crisis management, which may at some future point
represent the last shred of hope for avoiding a nuclear war, seems to me to lack almost completely a relevantly
useful, psychological knowledge-base.
A2: Chernus
Permutation solves best – both literal and symbolic language are necessary
Chernus, 86 – journalist, author, and Professor of Religious Studies at the University of
Colorado, Boulder (Ira, Dr. Strangegod: On the Symbolic Meaning of Nuclear Weapons, pg. 156, 1986)//BI
Symbolism has its dangers too. If our goal is to confront the full reality of nuclear war, every symbol and every
mythic image may tend to lead us further away by masking that reality. Surely those who attempt to “imagine the
real” must be aware of the pitfalls on both sides of their path. They must assimilate empirical information with full
awareness of the tendency to mythicize it and to dehumanize it, while they must absorb symbolic images of
nuclear war with full awareness of the temptation to avoid the truth and its horror. The fourth level demands a
sensitive use of both literal and symbolic language. Ideally, a new language may be needed, which synthesizes both
approaches and teaches us how to weave them together most effectively in the pursuit of wholeness. Only with
such a new language could we confront the phenomenon on both conscious and unconscious levels and unite the
two into a single perception. This new mode of thought and speech is probably a distant reality. But its raw
materials can be created today. While the disarmament movement is pressing ahead with increasingly precise
facts on the empirical side, there is still much to be done in creative exploration of the symbolic side.
Chernus ignores empirics and his theories are non-falsifiable
Summers, 91 – PhD, Department of Psychology, Mount Allison University (Craig, Book
Review: Chernus, Ira. Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age,
Nuclear Texts and Contexts, No. 6, pg. 2-3 Spring 1991,
http://public.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf)//BI
As a central theme, Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age states that: “The question to
be asked about nuclear weapons . . . is: What fantasy images are embedded in our attitudes and behaviors?” (p.
83). But Psychology as a discipline and profession is based on empirical research, not fantasy images. Author Ira
Chernus does acknowledge that his approach is not easily interwoven with formal psychological research
(discussing theologian Paul Tillich, p. 48; also pp. 105- 106). But he nevertheless uses arguments, such as those
from Mircea Eliade, that “can be neither verified nor falsified by empirical research” (p. 193), an ominous note for
social scientists reading the book. Chernus overlooks vast areas of empirical research in political science,
economics, political psychology, and even the scientific evidence on nuclear winter, stating that “the empirical
reality of a large-scale use of nuclear weapons eludes scientific understanding” (p. 64). As one example to the
contrary, in psychology there have been innumerable experimental studies of imagery, both in terms of imaginal
thinking, and a narrower literature specifically focusing on nuclear imagery (e.g., Journal of Social Issues, v. 39[1]).
Skirting these seems to be a gross omission in a book purporting to use imagery as a basis for a psychological
understanding of the nuclear age.
Chernus’ fundamental premise of psychic numbing is poorly established and
doesn’t account for other factors
Summers, 91 – PhD, Department of Psychology, Mount Allison University (Craig, Book
Review: Chernus, Ira. Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age,
Nuclear Texts and Contexts, No. 6, pg. 2-3 Spring 1991,
http://public.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf)//BI
This book attempts to explain political psychology in the nuclear age through nuclear imagery and psychiatrist R. J.
Lifton’s (1967) construct of psychic numbing. To start with an image of my own, the nuclear threat could be
characterized by two men (gender intended), each holding a gun to the other’s head as a means of security. The
inherent danger and illogic in this is of course mad; a madness defined by Mutual Assured Destruction (M.A.D.).
The book draws heavily on metaphors of madness in attempting to explain this situation, and in attempting to
“point to new political possibilities that will lead beyond the nuclear trap and void” (p. 70). The logic followed in
the book is that psychic numbing causes us to shut off any thoughts about a fundamental threat to our existence.
We therefore develop no images of nuclear doomsday, and this is essentially why we do not act to prevent it. It is
not completely clear, however, why numbing makes us inactive regarding the nuclear threat, but not about other
threats. Certainly death is a more immediate threat to blacks in South Africa or to those in bread lines in Eastern
Europe and the U.S.S.R. Yet rather than being numbed into paralysis, these victims defy government threats of
bloodshed to hold public rallies. Numbing may not be the cause of general inactivity regarding the nuclear threat;
unlike demonstrations against foodlines and racism, we may just find it too longterm, large and improbable to deal
with in our day-to-day lives. Psychology as a discipline and profession is based on empirical research, not fantasy images. Author Ira
Chernus does acknowledge that his approach is not easily interwoven with formal psychological research (discussing theologian Paul
Tillich, p. 48; also pp. 105- 106). But he nevertheless uses arguments, such as those from Mircea Eliade, that “can be
neither verified nor falsified by empirical research” (p. 193), an ominous note for social scientists reading the book. Chernus
overlooks vast areas of empirical research in political science, economics, political psychology, and even the scientific evidence on nuclear
winter, stating that “the empirical reality of a large-scale use of nuclear weapons eludes scientific understanding” (p.
64). As one example to the contrary, in psychology there have been innumerable experimental studies of imagery, both in terms
of imaginal thinking, and a narrower literature specifically focusing on nuclear imagery (e.g., Journal of Social
Issues, v. 39[1]). Skirting these seems to be a gross omission in a book purporting to use imagery as a basis for a
psychological understanding of the nuclear age. Similarly, although the subtitle “Religion and the Psychology of the
Nuclear Age” appears to describe a study of religion, this book uses a religious approach, based on “infinitude” (p.
51) and immortality. It supports Lifton, who allegedly “recognizes that the nuclear dilemma has religious roots” (p.
187). However, religious roots are much more directly dealt with in books such as those by Mojtabai (1986) and
Del Tredici (1989), who discuss Amarillo, Texas and the Pantex nuclear-weapons plant there. This is a book that
relies heavily on lofty language and philosophical jargon (e.g., “radical finitude”, p. 53). Relating mythological terms
like “the underworld” (p. 254) to nuclear deterrence is about as useful to a real understanding of the nuclear
threat as former U.S. President Reagan’s references to “the evil empire.” These grandiose descriptions fail to
recognize simple economic realities. The scientific-military-industrial complex and the nuclear industry are often
supported simply because they provide companies and shareholders with profits, and employees with jobs.
Therefore, it may not be that numbing occurs because of the magnitude of the threat, but that rationalization
occurs because of vested interests in the threat. It would therefore be worth considering whether there is any
difference between numbing in the hibakusha that survived Hiroshima, and rationalization (or numbing) for
questionable work that pays well. This distinction may perhaps be studied empirically. As with imagery, there are
also empirical studies that could have been considered in any book dealing with these types of psychological
mechanisms (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959 and all of the subsequent studies validating cognitive dissonance).
The only evidence for numbing in the book is Lifton’s observations of victims in Hiroshima, which are then linked to
potential victims of the contemporary nuclear threat. Lifton himself recently associated the thought processes in
perpetrating Nazi mass killing, and in contemporary “perpetrators” of the nuclear threat, which would have been
very relevant to reference here (Lifton and Markusen, 1990). The tendency throughout Nuclear Madness is to increasingly leave
the initial evidence and begin describing events as schizophrenic, neurotic or mad.
Chernus misapplies Lifton’s observations and lacks a coherent alternative
Summers, 91 – PhD, Department of Psychology, Mount Allison University (Craig, Book
Review: Chernus, Ira. Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age,
Nuclear Texts and Contexts, No. 6, pg. 3-4 Spring 1991,
http://public.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf)//BI
Infantile omnipotence desires? All will attest to the existence of social fantasy? Nuclear Madness does, but it is
surely a step backwards for any reader attempting to learn something of explanations in contemporary political
psychology. In relying on clinical metaphors from over forty years ago, Chernus has tied his philosophy to a clinical
approach with little actual evidence, and which is generally no longer accepted. Psychic numbing and mental
illness could be used successfully if not treated as just a metaphorical explanation for nuclear irrationality. This is a
difference between Lifton’s (1967) actual psychiatric observations and Chernus’s numbing metaphor. But Nuclear
Madness dwells on descriptive images and similes, not actually pursuing responses to the nuclear threat using
either side of psychology: (a) the experimental and observational bases, which have been extensively documented,
or (b) clinical psychopathology, which would be worth seriously pursuing. One could propose very real psychiatric grounds
for the suicidal nature of being a passive bystander or having vested interests in the nuclear arms race (see Charny, 1986). Masking,
numbing, rationalizing, or however ignoring the potential for nuclear omnicide is a psychological process that poses a
very real threat to human life, and may thus fit the criteria for inclusion as a pathological disorder in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). People with different political
agendas could make completely different conclusions using the material in Nuclear Madness. It is also the case
that completely different premises and images could be used to arrive at the same conclusions. A discussion of
sexual and pornographic images of the nuclear threat in Rosenbaum (1978) is equally metaphorical. It is
descriptive, but not explanatory. Perhaps no real explanation is necessary in Nuclear Madness, though, or even any
conclusions on religious thinking or psychological processes. Chernus’s description of “the bomb” as “a symbol of
neurotic ambivalence” (p. 67; also 56, 61) is almost just an abstract, artistic image. This would be okay if presented
this way in the introduction. As it is, though, we are misled from the title on into thinking that this book will
provide an understanding of psychological perceptions and responses to the nuclear threat.
A2: Masco
Relegating the bomb to the “unthinkable” delegitimizes nuclear strategies – this
stigmatization is key to elimination
Ritchie 13 (Nick, Lecturer at University of York, Ph.D. from University of Bradford, former member of Oxford
Research Group specializing in nuclear disarmament, proliferation, and arms control, "Valuing and Devaluing
Nuclear Weapons," www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-34-1%20Ritchie%20article.pdf, 2013, slim_)
Most recently, the 2009 report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND)
stated: If we want to minimize and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, the critical need is to change perceptions of
their role and utility: in effect, to achieve their progressive delegitimation, from a position in which they occupied a
central strategic place to one in which their role is seen as quite marginal, and eventually wholly unnecessary as well as
undesirable.17 It argued that there exists a strong base upon which to devalue nuclear weapons, notably the ICJ’s 1996
Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, arguments that nuclear weapons have little or no utility as instruments of warfighting, that there ‘is a strong taboo
on the actual use, if not possession, of nuclear weapons’, and arguments that the currency
of nuclear weapons has diminished with the end of the Cold War such that they no longer represent a route to political prestige
and global influence (if they ever did).18 The NPT process and succession of international commissions in the 1990s and 2000s cemented two
key concepts in the disarmament narrative aimed at qualitative change in nuclear policy and practice: reducing the role of nuclear weapons and
delegitimizing nuclear weapons. The 2007 Carnegie study gave force to the concept of devaluing nuclear weapons and together these ideas
were a central strand of the 2009 ICNND report. In fact, the strength and range of the recognition that
devaluing nuclear
weapons in the security policies of the NWSs is an essential process along the road to nuclear disarmament is impressive.19
The concepts of reducing the role and delegitimizing nuclear weapons have specific connotations but are subsumed, I argue, within a broader
concept of devaluing. The concept of delegitimizing, for example, means to render illegitimate or, as Gill puts it, ‘to diminish or
destroy the legitimacy, prestige or authority of an entrenched idea or object’.20 This has been routinely associated with
two dynamics: a process of formally ‘rendering illegal’ the possession and/or use of nuclear weapons in international law; and the informal
stigmatization of nuclear use captured by the notion of a ‘nuclear taboo’.21 Devaluing and delegitimizing are not
synonymous. Nuclear weapons could be stripped of much of their value but still be considered legitimate weapons to
possess and use in extremis. Likewise, delegitimizing nuclear weapons does not mean stripping nuclear weapons of all value if
possessor states still imbue considerable value irrespective of widely accepted and codified illegitimacy. Nevertheless, a process of normative
and potentially legal delegitimation will diminish the values assigned to nuclear weapons through explicit and
widespread political and social stigmatization.22 Legitimating and delegitimating nuclear weapons will be explored in a subsequent
article.23
Conceptualizing value of nuclear deterrence is a prerequisite to their
delegitimization
Ritchie 13 (Nick, Lecturer at University of York, Ph.D. from University of Bradford, former member of Oxford
Research Group specializing in nuclear disarmament, proliferation, and arms control, "Valuing and Devaluing
Nuclear Weapons," www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-34-1%20Ritchie%20article.pdf, 2013, slim_)
Knowing Nuclear Value The concept of devaluing nuclear weapons has become a fixture of NPT politics and discourse. It encompasses
but also goes beyond related notions of marginalizing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons. Yet the concept of ‘devaluing’ has
received little analytical treatment in terms of what devaluing might actually constitute in sociopolitical terms for the nuclear weapon states
(NWS) and the political challenges involved. Conceptualizing the value of nuclear weapons as
a precursor to their
devaluation in security policies as part of a step-by-step process towards a nuclear weapons-free world is understudied and begs the question ‘how do we “know” nuclear value?’ The value of nuclear weaponry is not objective or predetermined. Instead, values are assigned in a particular socio-historical context. More specifically, it is the perceived beneficial
effects of possession and deployment that are valued. Multiple effects mean that nuclear weapons are valued in multiple ways by possessor
states. Perceptions of beneficial effects are part of a society’s nuclear weapons discourse that tells us what nuclear weapons are and what they
can do across a range of social and political domains. Nuclear discourse itself is nested in a broader strategic culture. Kartchner
defines strategic culture as a
set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common
experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other
groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.33 Discourse, here, is a socially constructed and
historically contingent system of signification, or ‘code of intelligibility’, that reflects, enacts, and reifies relations of power by reproducing
accepted ways of being and acting in the world and silencing others.34 It is discourses that shape our understandings of appropriate nuclear
policy practice and processes of valuing/devaluing nuclear weapons.35 This brings us closer to Foucault’s conception of discourse not
simply as synonymous with language but as a form of discipline whereby
formal and informal discursive practices define
the boundaries of a discourse and determine what can be done and said, and how. Discourses and discursive practices draw authority
by reference to a set of ‘truths’ that shape how external actors, events, and desired outcomes are defined and interpreted, and what
information or knowledge is considered ‘real’, legitimate, and therefore relevant.36 Power and knowledge directly imply one another, in our
case the power to define, legitimize, and institutionalize what constitute ‘normal’ understandings about nuclear weapons and nuclear practice.
As Edward Lock argues: ... strategic culture represents a political web of interpretation
in which strategic practices gain
meaning. This web shapes the military practices of states by rendering certain strategic practices as possible and
legitimate while others remain either impossible or illegitimate.37 Foucault labelled this a hegemonic ‘regime of truth’ and from a contingent
and situated regime of nuclear truth emanates what we can label a ‘regime of value’ in which nuclear weapons are discursively embedded. In
sum, we can ‘know’ the value of nuclear weapons through analysis of nuclear discourse embedded in a broader
strategic culture that assigns beneficial effects to nuclear weapons that constitute a socially and historically situated regime of nuclear
truth.38
Terrorism Reps
Top level – Generic
The rhetoric of terrorism creates less violence long term
Chowdhury and Krebs ’10 (Arjun Chowdhury, Professor of IR at The University of British Columbia, Ph.D. Minnesota. His ongoing
research focuses on autocratic survival strategies, the effects of counterinsurgency campaigns, and the transition from the imperial to the
international system. and Ronald R. Kerbs, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Ph.D., Columbia
University. January 2010 “Talking about terror: Counterterrorist campaigns and the logic of representations” European Journal of International
Relations 16.125// JG)
The success of counterterrorist efforts, therefore, does not hinge only on military tactics, operations, and strategy. Also important, if
not equally important, is the state’s rhetoric. Coercion can temporarily suppress resistance, and co-optation can temporarily sap ¶ protest.
Defeating terrorist insurgency in the long run, however, requires both undermining the legitimacy of political violence and
opening space for the pursuit of a less violent, ¶ but still legitimate, communal politics. These are fundamentally rhetorical
projects. An ¶ enduring settlement depends on either direct dialogue between the state and the aggrieved ¶ group or the emergence of a
moderate politics that mediates between the two, and both ¶ paths demand a sustained rhetorical effort to transform the game of politics. Paul
Pillar ¶ (2001: 18) nicely characterizes counterterrorism as ‘an effort to civilize the manner in
¶ which any political contest
is waged.’ Force alone can hardly civilize politics. Remolding ¶ the culture of contention requires rhetorical intervention. To
the extent that the insurgents’ violence is redirected into non-violent contestation, and to the extent that this ¶
transformation can be attributed to the state’s efforts, counterterrorism has succeeded.
Terror representations are key to counterterrorism
Chowdhury and Krebs ’10 (Arjun Chowdhury, Professor of IR at The University of British Columbia, Ph.D. Minnesota. His ongoing
research focuses on autocratic survival strategies, the effects of counterinsurgency campaigns, and the transition from the imperial to the
international system. and Ronald R. Kerbs, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Ph.D., Columbia
University. January 2010 “Talking about terror: Counterterrorist campaigns and the logic of representations” European Journal of International
Relations 16.125// JG)
These legitimation requirements are perhaps particularly pressing in the arenas of terrorism and counterterrorism,
which are fundamentally communicative and symbolic ¶ enterprises (Hoffman, 2006; Kydd and Walter, 2006). Terrorism is
open-air theater, seeking to attract large audiences through spectacular displays (Jenkins, 1975: 16). ¶ Counterterrorism
does not always need equally large audiences, and the spectacular is ¶ often ineffective (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007). But counterterrorism
is equally theater. If ¶ terrorists avidly seek publicity for their causes and adopt methods designed to signal ¶ their
resolve, so too must the terror-fighting state be centrally concerned with what messages it sends to what
audiences. Thomas Schelling (1966: 142) observed that force ¶ could be ‘an expressive bit of repartee … [which] took mainly the form of
deeds, not ¶ words.’ But deeds accompanied by words are that much more expressive, and there is a ¶ good reason that leaders devote effort
to molding that interpretive context.
Threats = Real
Threats are real – they predate 9-11
Feinstein and Slaughter 4
Lee, Acting Director of the Washington Program of the Council on Foreign Relations, Anne-Marie, Dean of the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Interational Affairs at Princeton University and President of the American
Society of International Law, A Duty to Prevent, Foreign Affairs 83.1
We live in a world of old rules and new threats. This period did not begin on September 11, 2001. Before then,
politicians and public figures were already lacing their millennium speeches with calls for a new global financial
architecture, new definitions of national self-interest and humanitarian intervention, and new ways of
organizing international institutions. They recognized that the existing rules and institutions created to address
the economic, political, and security problems of the last century were inadequate for solving a new generation
of threats to world order: failed states; regional economic crises; sovereign bankruptcies; the spread of
HIV/AIDS and other new viruses; global warming; the rise of global criminal networks; and trafficking in arms,
money, women, workers, and drugs.
The representational threat of terrorism is real and needs an equal response
Chowdhury and Krebs ’10 (Arjun Chowdhury, Professor of IR at The University of British Columbia, Ph.D.
Minnesota. His ongoing research focuses on autocratic survival strategies, the effects of counterinsurgency
campaigns, and the transition from the imperial to the international system. and Ronald R. Kerbs, Professor in the
Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Ph.D., Columbia University. January 2010 “Talking
about terror: Counterterrorist campaigns and the logic of representations” European Journal of International
Relations 16.125// JG)
Attacks on civilians are often weighted with symbolism: the World Trade Center was ¶ targeted on 11 September
2001 precisely because it symbolized America’s cultural and ¶ economic power. Terrorists are simultaneously highly
strategic and culturally sensitive. ¶ This is not accidental: terrorists most effectively further their ends when they
are attuned ¶ to the power of symbols. The literature, however, has less often recognized that, in this ¶ theater,
there is a dialogue taking place on-stage, between terrorist and counterterrorist ¶ players. The latter may have
superior material resources at their disposal, but they cannot ¶ stand outside culture. Complementing military,
economic, and political measures, state ¶ leaders wage a rhetorical campaign that not only legitimates these
approaches, but has a ¶ logic and effect of its own.¶ This article has focused on ethnonational insurgency, but its
insights travel to the ¶ dominant concern of recent years — transnational Islamist terrorism. The basic purpose ¶ of
counterterrorism is shared across national and transnational contexts: to help nurture ¶ an environment in which
moderate co-ethnics (or Muslims), often themselves voicing ¶ nationalist (or Islamist) goals, can offer a credible
alternative to extremists, leading to ¶ the latter’s eventual delegitimation (Krebs, 2008). This article’s analytical
framework ¶ regarding the representational politics of counterterrorism also remains relevant to ¶ transnational
terrorists, whatever their religious, ideological, or communal coloration. ¶ The two questions that structure Table 1
— Are the violent actors represented as having ¶ a political agenda? Are they represented as potentially legitimate
interlocutors? — can ¶ be answered in either the affirmative or the negative, even if the terrorists are not national
¶ citizens and are therefore unquestionably Other. While this is obviously true of the first ¶ question, since Others
often pursue recognizably political agendas in international politics, it may not be as self-evident of the second, as
one might assume that clearly-drawn ¶ lines between Self and Other prevent the former from offering even the
prospect of ¶ legitimacy to the latter. We do not see processes of identity construction as establishing ¶
impermeable boundaries, even in the international arena. The history of foreign relations — and we here cast our
subject intentionally as foreign relations — is marked by ¶ continual bargaining with Others. Implicit in such
negotiations, at least when they are ¶ conducted publicly and must be legitimated, is that the parties,
notwithstanding their ¶ abiding differences, share enough to make conversation possible. Identity is nested, and ¶
there is always a conceivable basis for the discovery of sufficient higher-order commonality. In other words, Self
and Other are always potentially liminal, and thus even foreign terrorists may be represented as legitimate
interlocutors.
Responding to threats is necessary – the alternative is isolationist pacifism
Schweller 4
Randall, Professor of Political Science @ The OSU, Unanswered threats: political constraints on the balance of
power, Google Book
Balancing behavior requires the existence of a strong consensus among elites that an external threat exists and
must be checked by either arms or allies or both. As the proximate causal variable in the model, elite consensus
is the most necessary of necessary causes of balancing behavior. Thus, when there is no elite consensus, the
prediction is either unbalancing or some other nonbalancing policy option. Developing such a consensus is
difficult, however, because balancing, unlike expansion, is not a behavior motivated by the search for gains and
profit. It is instead a strategy that entails significant costs in human and material resources that could be
directed toward domestic programs and investment rather than national defense. In addition, when alliances
are formed, the state must sacrifice some measure of its autonomy in foreign and military policy to its allies.
In the absence of a clear majority of elites in favor of a balancing strategy, therefore, an alternative policy,
and not necessarily a coherent one, will prevail. This is because a weak grand strategy can be supported for
many different reasons (e.g., pacifism, isolationism, pro-enemy sympathies, collective security, a belief in
conciliation, etc.). Consequently, appeasement and other forms of underbalancing will tend to triumph in the
absence of a determined and broad political consensus to balance simply because these policies represent the
path of least domestic resistance and can appeal to a broad range of interests along the political spectrum.
Thus, underreacting to threats, unlike an effective balancing strategy, does not require overwhelming, united,
and coherent support from elites and masses; it is a default strategy.
Alt -> Terrorism
The alts language to describe terror causes more terrorism
Murdock, ‘5 – [Deroy, nationally syndicated columnist for Scipps-Howard News, “Terrorism and the
English Language,Ӧ 3-9, http://www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/hl867.cfm]
Yet within a week, some incredibly detached language emerged to describe what happened
on 9/11. Consider this message that Verizon left in my voice mail box on September 19:
"During this time of crisis, we are asking all customers to review and delete all current and
saved messages that are not essential," a nameless female announcer stated. "This request is
necessary due to extensive damage that was recently sustained in the World Trade Center
district."¶ Time of crisis? Did a tidal wave cause the "recently sustained" wreckage in
Manhattan? Similarly, a company called Tullet & Tokyo Liberty referred to "the disaster that
has hit New York and Washington." The use of the passive voice in these and similar
instances suggested that the World Trade Center and Pentagon were smashed by unguided,
perhaps natural, forces. Kinko's was even more elliptical. Shortly after the massacre, the
photocopying company placed in its stores some very colorful posters with the Stars and
Stripes superimposed upon an outline of the lower 48 states. The graphic also included this
regrettable caption: "The Kinko's family extends our condolences and sympathies to all
Americans who have been affected by the circumstances in New York City, Washington, D.C.,
and Pennsylvania." Circumstances? That word describes an electrical blackout, not terrorist
bloodshed. Likewise, I kept hearing that people "died" in the Twin Towers or at the Pentagon.
No, people "die" in hospitals, often surrounded by their loved ones while doctors and nurses
offer aid and comfort. The innocent people at the World Trade Center, the Defense
Department, and that field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, were killed in a carefully
choreographed act of mass murder. A Terrorist By Any Other Name The more this passive,
weak, euphemistic language appeared as the war on terrorism began, the more I thought it
was vital to pay close attention to the words, symbols, and images that govern this new and
urgent conflict. The civilized world today faces the most anti-Semitic enemy since Adolf Hitler
and Josef Goebbels committed suicide in Berlin nearly 60 years ago. Militant Islam is the most
bloodthirsty ideology since the Khmer Rouge eliminated one-third of Cambodia's people. The
big difference, of course, is that Pol Pot had the good manners to keep his killing fields within
his own borders, as awful as that was. Islamo-fascism is a worldwide phenomenon that
already has touched this country and many of our allies. Yet Muslim extremists rarely have
armies we can see, fighter jets we can knock from the sky, or an easily identifiable
headquarters, such as the Reichs Chancellery of the 1940s or the Kremlin of the Cold War.
While basketball players and their fans battle each other on TV, actresses suffer wardrobe
malfunctions, and rap singers scream sweet nothings in our ears, it is very easy to forget that
Islamic extremists plot daily to end all of that and more by killing as many of us as possible.
Language can lull Americans to sleep in this new war, or it can keep us on the offensive and
our enemies off balance. Here are a few suggestions to keep Americans alert to the dangers
Islamic terrorism poses to this country: September 11 was an attack--not just a series of
coincidental strokes and heart failures that wiped out so many victims at once. Victims of
terrorism do not "die," nor are they "lost." They are killed, murdered, or slaughtered. We
should be specific about the number of people terrorists kill. "Three thousand" killed on 9/11
sounds like an amorphous blob. The actual number--2,977--forces us to look at these people
as individuals with faces, stories, and loved ones who miss them very much. The precise
figures are: 2,749 killed at the World Trade Center, 184 at the Pentagon, and 44 in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Likewise, the Bali disco bombings killed 202 people, mainly
Australians. The Madrid train bombings killed 191 men, women, and children. Somehow, a
total of 191 people killed by al-Qaeda's pals seems more ominous and concrete than a
smoothly rounded 200. Terrorists do not simply "threaten" us, nor is homeland security
supposed to shield Americans from "future attacks." All of this is true, but it is more
persuasive if we acknowledge what these people have done and hope to do once more--wipe
us out. Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, said this on NBC Nightly News last Sunday: "We need to tighten up our drivers'
license provisions and our immigration laws so that terrorists cannot take advantage of the
present system to kill thousands of Americans again." That is a perfect sound bite. There is no
vague talk about "the terrorist threat" or "stopping further attacks." Sensenbrenner concisely
explained exactly what is at risk, and what needs to be thwarted--no more killing of
Americans by the thousands again. Quote Islamo-fascist leaders to remind people of their
true intentions. President George W. Bush, Heritage Foundation President Ed Feulner, or
Deroy Murdock can talk about how deadly militant Islam is and how seriously we should take
this gravely dangerous ideology. Far more persuasive, however, is to let these extremists do
the talking. However, their words are nowhere as commonly known as they should be. For
instance, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri said in their 1998 declaration of war on
the United States: "The ruling to kill all Americans and their allies--civilian and military--is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."
The late Iranian dictator, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, put it this way in 1980: "Our struggle
is not about land or water.... It is about bringing, by force if necessary, the whole of mankind
onto the right path." Ever the comedian, he said this in 1986: "Allah did not create man so
that he could have fun. The aim of creation was for mankind to be put to the test through
hardship and prayer. An Islamic regime must be serious in every field. There are no jokes in
Islam. There is no humor in Islam. There is no fun in Islam. There can be no fun and joy in
whatever is serious." Asked what he would say to the loved ones of the 202 people killed in
the October 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, Abu Bakar Bashir, leader of Indonesia's radical
Jemaah Islamiyah, replied, "My message to the families is, please convert to Islam as soon as
possible." The phrase "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) has been pounded into
meaninglessness. It has been repeated ad infinitum. Fairly or unfairly, the absence of
warehouses full of anthrax and nerve gas in Iraq has made the whole idea of "WMD" sound
synonymous with "L-I-E." America's enemies do not plot the "mass destruction" of empty
office buildings or abandoned parking structures. Conversely, they want to see packed office
buildings ablaze as their inhabitants scream for mercy. That is why I use the terms "weapons
of mass death" and "weapons of mass murder." ¶ When speaking about those who are killed
by terrorists, be specific, name them, and tell us about them. Humanize these individuals.
They are more than just statistics or stick figures. I have written 18 articles and produced a
Web page, HUSSEINandTERROR.com, to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein did have ties to
terrorism. (By the way, I call him "Saddam Hussein" or "Hussein." I never call him "Saddam"
any more than I call Joseph Stalin "Joseph" or Adolf Hitler "Adolf." "Saddam" has a cute, onename ring to it, like Cher, Gallagher, Liberace, or Sting. Saddam Hussein does not deserve
such a term of endearment.) To show that Saddam Hussein's support of terrorism cost
American lives, I remind people about the aid and comfort he gave to terrorism master Abu
Nidal. Among Abu Nidal's victims in the 1985 bombing of Rome's airport was John
Buonocore, a 20-year-old exchange student from Delaware. Palestinian terrorists fatally shot
Buonocore in the back as he checked in for his flight. He was heading home after Christmas to
celebrate his father's 50th birthday. In another example, those killed by Palestinian homicide
bombers subsidized by Saddam Hussein were not all Israeli, which would have been
unacceptable enough. Among the 12 or more Americans killed by those Baathist-funded
murderers was Abigail Litle, the 14-year-old daughter of a Baptist minister. She was blown
away aboard a bus in Haifa on March 5, 2003. Her killer's family got a check for $25,000
courtesy of Saddam Hussein as a bonus for their son's "martyrdom." Is all of this designed to
press emotional buttons? You bet it is. Americans must remain committed--intellectually and
emotionally--to this struggle. There are many ways to engage the American people. No one
should hesitate to remind Americans that terrorism kills our countrymen--at home and
abroad--and that those whom militant Islam demolishes include promising young people with
bright futures, big smiles, and, now, six feet of soil between them and their dreams. ¶ Finally,
who are we fighting? Militants? Martyrs? Insurgents? Melinda Bowman of Brief Hill,
Pennsylvania, wrote this in a November 24 letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal:
"And, by the way, what is all this `insurgent' nonsense? These people kidnap, behead,
dismember and disembowel. They are terrorists." Nicely and accurately put, Ms. Bowman. Is
this a war on terror, per se? A war on terrorism? Or is it really a war on Islamo-fascism? It is
really the latter, and we should say so. Jim Guirard runs the TrueSpeak Institute in
Washington, D.C. He has thought long and hard about terrorism and the English language. He
informed me Tuesday--to my horror--that three years into the war on terrorism, the State
Department and the CIA have yet to produce a glossary of the Arabic-language words that
Middle Eastern terrorists use, as well as the antonyms for those words. Such a "Thesaurus of
Terrorism" would help us linguistically to turn the war on terrorism upside down. Why, for
instance, do we inadvertently praise our enemies by agreeing that they fight a jihad or "holy
war?" Why not correctly describe them as soldiers in a hirabah or "unholy war?" A Weapon
at the ReadyIn closing, I would say that America and the rest of civilization can and must win
this new twilight struggle against these bloodthirsty cavemen. We can and we will crush them
through espionage, high-tech force, statecraft, and public diplomacy overseas. Here at home,
we can and will vanquish them through eternal vigilance. One of our chief weapons should be
something readily available to each and every one of us--the English language.
Eco Security Reps
Top level
Environmental securitization is necessary to accurately represent the link
between climate and conflict
Mazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA
Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens
security and what to do about it,” pg. 12-13
The expected consequences of climate change include rising sea levels and population displacement, increasing
severity of typhoons and hurricanes, droughts, floods, disruption of water resources, extinctions and other
ecological disruptions, wild- fires, severe disease outbreaks, and declining crop yields and food stocks.
Combining the historical precedents with current thinking on state stability, internal conflict and state failure
suggests that adaptive capacity is the most important factor in avoiding climate-related instability. Specific
global and regional climate projections for the next three decades, in light of other drivers of instability and
state failure, help identify regions and countries which will see an increased risk from climate change. They are
not necessarily the most fragile states, nor those which face the greatest physical effects of climate change.
The global security threat posed by fragile and failing states is well known. It is in the interest of the world’s
more afflu- ent countries to take measures both to reduce the degree of global warming and climate change
and to cushion the impact in those parts of the world where climate change will increase that threat. Neither
course of action will be cheap, but inaction will be costlier. Efficient targeting of the right kind of assistance
where it is most needed is one way of reducing the cost, and understanding how and why different societies
respond to climate change is one way of making that possible.
Climate and security are linked – Darfur proves environmental concerns were
central
Mazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA
Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens
security and what to do about it,” pg. 84-85
A contrasting illustration is provided by UNEP’s analysis of conflict and the environment in the Sudan. In this
case, the authors are primarily interested in the specific environmental aspects of recovery, reconstruction and
development, and they explicitly exclude other factors to focus on the environmental dimensions of conflict. 43
Like de Waal, they note that environmental problems affecting pasture and farmland occur throughout Sudan
and are ‘clearly and strongly linked to conflict in a minority of cases and regions only’, but that nevertheless
‘there is substantial evidence of a strong link between the recent occurrence of local conflict and
environmental degradation ... in the drier parts of Sudan’. 44 Like de Waal, they discuss the breakdown of
traditional systems of mediation and dispute resolution after 1970 and the influx of small arms into the region,
‘with the unfortunate result that local conflicts today are both much more violent and more difficult to contain
and mediate’. 45 Although they also recognise that land degradation ‘does not appear to be the dominant
causative factor in local conflicts’, they conclude that: There is a very strong link between land degradation,
desertification and conflict in Darfur. Northern Darfur – where exponential population growth and related
environmental stress have created the conditions for conflicts to be triggered and sustained by political, tribal
or ethnic differences – can be considered a tragic example of the social breakdown that can result from
ecological collapse. Long-term peace in the region will not be possible unless these underlying and closely
linked environmental and livelihood issues are resolved.
Hegemony Reps
Cards
Hegemony solves and turns their impact – it halts violence while stopping oppression – data
and empirics prove
Barnett 11 – Thomas P.M. – Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis &
Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist
and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation
in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,”
March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-andglobalization-at-crossroads
We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the
global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and
absolute lack of mass violence . That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do
take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be
adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing
"megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering
activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me
be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization , the U.S. military has been the greatest force for
peace the world has ever known . Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the
It is worth first examining the larger picture:
20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no
identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not
keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed
everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace . We introduced the
international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What
resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy , the persistent spread of
human rights , the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy , a roughly 10-fold increase in
adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based
conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled"
American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world
that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the
As for the sheer "evil" that is our militaryindustrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment
reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the
20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That
status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. ¶
comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers
, these
calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due
to war . We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and
report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude
accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we
would do well to keep U.S. power, in all
of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.¶ To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century
of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism1. America
then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.
This is statistically proven
Drezner 5 – Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University, Senior Editor at the National Interest, M.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Political Science from
Stanford University, “Gregg Easterbrook, War, and the Dangers of Extrapolation”, 5-25,
http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html
explosions in Iraq,
massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human
society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from
watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline . Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a
Via Oxblog's Patrick Belton, I see that Gregg Easterbrook has a cover story in The New Republic entitled "The End of War?" It has a killer opening: Daily
significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily
fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human
history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide
peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily.
There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest
All told, there were less than half as many wars in
2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees
study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq.
that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more
speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the
extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This
the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends
the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth
of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people
suggests
the rest of
are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the
piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First,
he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a
global hegemon called the U nited S tates right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't
understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the
reason the "great powers" get along is that the U nited S tates is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify
power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it
subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who
knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar
world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax
a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one
where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world . The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the
Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But
mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a
temporary reduction in war and war-related death.
The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed
conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away . Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing
amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous
non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and
the spread of democracy are right out the window . UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more
clearly --
U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if
imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular
basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot of them . Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy
in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each
other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.
The most robust and comparative data sets support our thesis for how violence occurs and
how to halt it
Josh Busby 12, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and
Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International
Security and Law, http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html
Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers
have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see
his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's work that
suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare . I was struck
by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal piece back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep
decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro
of a unipolar world that is
not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which
suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes,
Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war . Under unipolarity, there is only one
great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing
Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power
preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor
powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for
Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is
becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars
between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed out,
Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing
to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go
to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen noted, the measure Pinker uses to
suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population.
But, if my read of other reports based on Uppsala data is right, war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though
later data suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era
may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at
war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World
War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful .
What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive
dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests
because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the
unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in
Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the
United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably
lead to instability and draw in
the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace
either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.
American hegemony is foundationally sound and egalitarian – it promotes social, economic
and political equality for all
Charles A. Kupchan ’14 [Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government
Department at Georgetown University. He is also Whitney H. Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Kupchan was Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council during the first Clinton
administration. Before joining the NSC, he worked in the U.S. Department of State on the Policy Planning Staff.
Prior to government service, he was an Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University. May 16, 2014, “The
Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax Americana”, Taylor & Francis, Security
Studies, Volume 23, Issue 2, 2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2014.874205, ml]
Since its founding era, the United States has sought to construct an egalitarian socioeconomic order—one that
would depart from Europe's social stratification and class immobility. This social norm has not only shaped the
evolution of American society, but also contributed to the transformational ambition of US hegemony. When the
United States occupied Germany and Japan at the end of World War II, it set about dismantling Germany's
industrial cartels and Japan's zaibatsu. Both were seen as contributors to militarism and as socially regressive. The
United States continues to demonstrate enmity toward regimes marked by illiberal politics and economic oligarchy
and on occasion has resorted to the use of force to topple such regimes. Through its dominating position in
international financial institutions, the United States has also sought to export the “Washington consensus,”
propagating to the developing world its neoliberal approach to economic policy. The private sector played its part
in shaping a brand of hegemony aimed at exporting economic liberalism. Although they overstate their case,
revisionist historians of the Cold War provide ample evidence that the interests of US companies did figure in the
architecture of order that emerged after World War II, particularly in Western Europe. Commercial and financial
opportunities provided US companies strong incentives to expand their overseas presence, ultimately serving as a
vehicle for the replication abroad of America's domestic socioeconomic order.74 Nonetheless, the private sector
operated within the confines of a geopolitical architecture primarily defined by strategic and ideological objectives.
Cultural Logic With a few notable exceptions—the burst of overseas expansion at the end of the nineteenth
century and the 2003 invasion and consequent occupation of Iraq among them—the United States has opted for
what Ikenberry calls “liberal hegemony” rather than formal empire.75 More often than not, Pax Americana has
been enforced through persuasion instead of coercion . This distinguishing feature of US hegemony rests in part
on social norms supportive of the autonomy of all peoples, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or religion . From
the eighteenth century onward, Americans embraced a republican identity that set them against the imperial
ambitions of Europe's great powers, particularly in the Western Hemisphere.76 As it became a major naval power,
the United States did colonize the Philippines in 1898 and used brute force against the tenacious insurgency that
followed. Congress and the public, however, readily soured on the material and moral costs of formal empire.
Soon thereafter, President Woodrow Wilson began a campaign to spread self-determination and end colonialism
worldwide, a goal US leadership ultimately brought to fruition with the dismantling of European empires after
World War II. The United States is also an immigrant and multicultural nation and is therefore, to use a phrase
coined by Henry Nau, “at home abroad.”77 Like Great Britain, the United States has embraced a brand of
hegemony with universalizing ambition and cultural inclusivity. Moreover, ethnic, racial, and religious categories
have figured less prominently in the character of US hegemony than they did during the era of Pax Britannica. The
British saw themselves as steeping inferior peoples in British law, education, religion, and administration—a
process that would ultimately produce societies recreated in Britain's image. In contrast, the United States has
seen itself as freeing foreign peoples to realize universal values. Shepherding the citizens of other countries to the
ballot box has been an act of liberation, not one of inculcation. In this respect, the United States has long based its
foreign policy on a belief, perhaps naïve, in the universality of liberal political values across all cultures. The
reproduction internationally of America's defining creed at home is regularly deployed as a justification for the
sacrifice of blood and treasure abroad. Such ambition has noble intent and has produced many positive
outcomes—for example, the defeat and democratization of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. But this
transformational instinct has also drawn the United States into some of its most frustrating episodes of nationbuilding, the inconclusive conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq among them. Americans have not always embraced
such cultural universalism. Indeed , the impact of racial attitudes on US foreign policy has evolved in step with
societal attitudes toward race on the home front. In the nineteenth century, racism acted as a major impediment
to overseas expansion: Americans did not want to incorporate into their union or rule over “inferior peoples.”78 A
surge in feelings of Anglo-Saxon solidarity accompanied rapprochement with Great Britain at the end of the
nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, the United States opposed including a racial equality clause in
the Versailles Treaty and imposed strict quotas on immigration. It was only during the second half of the
twentieth century, as the civil rights movement advanced at home, that Washington became a major supporter
of the international promotion of racial and gender equality and deployed the nation's economic and military
power in the service of building liberal societies abroad. Commercial Logic The United States inherited from the
British the task of providing the public goods needed to sustain a liberal international trading order. But
Washington also implemented two significant changes to that order. First, as mentioned above, it insisted on the
dismantling of colonial empires, viewing them not only as antithetical to its own political identity and values, but
also as a main cause of the economic nationalism that helped spawn World War II. Second, Washington put new
emphasis on the institutionalization of liberal multilateralism, overseeing at the close of World War II the flurry of
diplomacy that ultimately produced the financial architecture born at Bretton Woods in 1944. The General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs followed in 1947. The United States was in important respects replicating
internationally its domestic reliance on a liberal and institutionalized framework for managing trade and finance.79
As was the case with Britain, America's preference for open trade was conditioned by its underlying socioeconomic
order. During the nineteenth century, the United States imposed trade tariffs to protect its growing industrial base.
As industrialization proceeded and manufacturers became globally competitive, protectionism gave way to free
trade.80 This change of course was further advanced by the development of a robust financial industry strongly
supportive of open commerce. Moreover, the pro-growth and anti-monopoly policies that succeeded in
ameliorating the class cleavages of the New Deal era were exported to Europe after World War II with the aim of
speeding recovery and fostering social stability in America's expanding zone of hegemonic influence.81 American
hegemony has been distinguished by its diversity. Motivated primarily by the objective of checking and
ultimately pacifying peer competitors, the United States has applied different geopolitical logics in different
theaters. Its rejection of social hierarchy at home has been reflected in its effort to promote more egalitarian social
orders in the periphery. America's multiculturalism and democratizing creed have contributed to its universalizing
and transformational ambition abroad. And the US commitment to free-market capitalism at home has produced a
brand of hegemony aimed at establishing an open trading order globally.
Intervention inevitable—key to preserve national security and democracy
Simpson 6/16 (Emile Simpson served in the British Army from 2006-12 as an infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha Rifles. He
completed three tours in Southern Afghanistan, and also served in Brunei, Nepal, and the Falkland Islands. He previously read
history at Oxford University, and was a visiting defence fellow there in 2011 on the Changing Character of War Programm, June
16th, 2014, “The US-led international order is dead”,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/16/the_us_led_international_order_is_dead_american_exceptionalism_iraq_
nigeria_schoolgirls)//SQR
The anachronism of the commentators' outrage at the delay in intervention in Nigeria -- the knee-jerk desire to intervene
everywhere and fight every jihadist under the sun -- was nonetheless echoed in parts of the president's speech. The
speech worked where it looked forward, and set out the new and critical distinction between the potentially unilateral use of force "when our
core interests demand it," but offered a higher bar for using force in relation to broader issues of "global concern that do not pose a direct
threat to the United States." The speech failed where it blurred this new and important distinction by rehearsing the language and motifs of the
last era, motifs that now sounded tired, and out of tune with U.S. public opinion. We heard that "America's support for democracy
and human rights goes beyond idealism -- it is a matter of national security," because "democracies are our closest
friends and are far less likely to go to war," and that "respect for human rights is an antidote to instability and the
grievances that fuel violence and terror." That doesn't fit with the small print: "In countries like Egypt, we
acknowledge that our relationship is anchored in security interests." We heard that the test of any U.S. drone
strike was whether "[we] create more enemies than we take off the battlefield." But the idea of a global battlefield against
terrorist enemies is seriously out of date, at least since we worked out that the original Taliban and Saddam Hussein actually had very little to
do with al Qaeda. Indeed, the irrational durability of the idea of the world as a battlefield is as anachronistic as Guantanamo Bay.
Economy Reps
Econ predict good
Prefer economists – ideologically diverse, policy-divorced, objective scientists
whose only detractors are, themselves, implicated by ideological motivations.
Colander 04 – Christian A. Johnson Distinguished Professor of Economics at Middlebury College
(David Charles, “Economics as an Ideologically Challenged Science”, September 2004; <
http://cat2.middlebury.edu/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0422.pdf>, p. 2-8)//Beddow
I find myself largely unconvinced by these heterodox charges of bias . Since the reason
I am unconvinced probably has as much to do with the reference point I am using as it does with
the actual nature of mainstream economics, let me begin my consideration by giving what I see as
my reference point. I see myself as a general economist and historian of economic thought who
has been critical of the mainstream profession, but who nonetheless sees himself as part of that
broader mainstream. I have no strong emotional tie to mainstream economics, but I do have a
strong sense of the inevitable institutional realities and the imperfections of the world; I am a realist,
not an idealist. Heterodox economists’ charges would likely have been considered
more sympathetically from a non-economist, academic, reference point, which, in
its postmodern version, sees ideology everywhere (except possibly in itself),
whereas mainstream economics would likely be considered more sympathetically
from the lay-public reference point, where, at least in the United States, the
majority view is that academics have a left-leaning ideological bias, and the
economists are probably the best of a highly-ideologically tainted group. Net let me
discuss what I mean by ideologically challenged. By ideologically challenged I do not mean
that there is an ideological component to economists’ argument. Obviously, there
is. The question one asks, the frame that one uses in structuring an approach to
an issue, and even the language one uses, all embody ideological content and
thus every researcher is in some sense ideologically biased. As Leroux (2004) points
out, there is no escaping the Mannheim Paradox. So it goes without saying that there is an
ideological component in economics. Even at its best, any field of study can only reflect the
culture of which it is a part. What I take from this insight about the pervasiveness of ideology is the
following: When everything, even the consideration of ideology, is ideological, then
the ideological reference point must be in term s of relative degrees of ideological
bias. To condemn any field for being ideological is useless; all fields of inquiry are
guilty as charged. But so too are the chargers. Thus, I will avoid any consideration of
postmodern arguments of deep structural ideological bias and focus m y consideration on
intentional ideological bias, or, if unintentional, on bias that exceeds that ideological background
level of ideology that affects us all. This is, of necessity, a judgment call, not a proof, but I believe
that m a king a judgment on whether economics exceeds this threshold is important because that
judgment plays a role in deciding whether to take the results of mainstream economic research at
face value, or whether those results should be passed through an ideological filter b e f o re using
them in a decision process. In judging economics’ ideological bias two other issues m u s t also be
taken into account. The first is that economics is involved in policy deliberations, and those
deliberations necessarily require value judgments to arrive at any conclusion. As Michael Frieden
(20 03) write s: “Ideologies need, after all, to straddle the worlds of political thought and political
action, for one of their central functions is to link the two.” (p. 76- 77) The point is that policy
prescriptions must be based on values; one cannot violate Hume’s Dictum that a “should” can only
be derived from another “should.” Sophisticated considerations of ideology, such as Kenneth
Hoover’s Economics as Ideology (2003), see ideology as necessary to give definition and
meanings for such contentious concepts as equality, justice, and freedom. Ideologies are thus
m o re prevalent in a policy than in a pure science. One can see that when
supposedly pure science enters into policy issues, as is occurring in the global
warming debate, the charges of ideological bias increase substantially. A second
issue that needs to be considered is what might be called the status quo bias. For Marx, ideology
referred to the way in which groups holding power subtly structure the meaning an d interpretation
of reality, and what is viewed as natural, to achieve their ends. Amadae, Foley, and other
thoughtful critics of economics seem to me to be following Marx, and, in many ways, that choice
leads them to their conclusion that economics is ideologically biased. While I agree with Marx’s
observation, I do not see Marx’s observations as providing much guidance about a useful reference
point from which to judge the ideological bias of a field of study. The reason is that not only is it
impossible for society to escape an ideological bias, it is also impossible for
society to avoid the status quo bias. Groups holding power will inevitably structure things to
support their position; money will flow easier to those who support the system than it will to those
who oppose it. That is the only evolutionary stable equilibrium. The status quo bias allows some
challenges to the system ; a successful evolving complex system operating in a changing
environment needs challenges, but the status quo bias poses obstacles to any challengers, m a
king only the hardiest challenges survive. Academia is democratic capitalism’s incubator for
challenges to the system, and thus academia has m o re freedom than most parts of society, but
the status quo bias means that the chances for survival of arguments critic al of the system are
much lower than the chances of survival for arguments supportive of the system . Because of the
status quo bias, even if, on average, economists openly analyzed issues in as nonideological a
manner as possible, the groups holding power would pick and choose subsets of mainstream
research favoring the existing system to support and to publicize. To set the ideological bar at
what might be called the Marxian level, which presumes no status quo bias, is, in
m y view, essentially to condemn all sustainable mainstream research, be it in
economics or any field, if that research is not strongly critical of the status quo. But
that leaves no one to argue in favor of the status quo without their being guilty of
having an ideological bias in favor of the current system. That, to me, is not a
useful bar, because it does not distinguish between shades of ideological bias with
in mainstream work—in this view, the only difference between mainstream scientists and prostatus quo ideologues is that mainstream economists are more subtle in hiding their ideological
views; they are both tainted. 2 I believe that it is important to distinguish these different levels, and
that the ideological bias bar must be set at a level that accounts for an expected level of status quo
bias. Let me begin with a few observations about mainstream economics. My first observation is
that one seldom sees mainstream economists discussing ideology in their research. It is in
heterodox economics that that ideology is discussed. What is the reason f o r this lack of interest in
ideology? Are mainstream economists intentionally hiding their ideology by burying it? I believe not;
I believe that the reason most mainstream economists don’t discuss ideology is that
they don’t think much about it, and have little to say about it. As I argued in Colander
(1991), most academic economists are local utility maximizers; they operate within
a narrowly defined institutional structure. By that I mean that most economists go
about their daily business doing what they were taught to do— analyzing
problems, bringing the tools they learned to bear on problem s, providing empirical
analysis of policy issues, teaching, or doing whatever else goes along with the
normal process of advancing along in their career. They spend little time thinking
about the broader meaning of their research, or broader ideological issues in
general. Any discussion of ideology, or any broader philosophical issue, is usually
pushed aside as a hobby, not a part of doing economics. Modern U.S. academic
economists do not see themselves as directly involved in policy; they see
themselves as technicians. 3 Their input into policy is not front line, but in the background,
finding empirical relations hips and studying whether policies work. They see themselves as
scientists, but in term s of t heir policy work, they are better seen as engineers. The following
statement of a student whom I recently interviewed at top graduate program s in the U.S. is typical
of their views. 4 He states, “Although a direct link to policy formation is not always present,
economists serve a crucial role in providing clarification of issues both technically and in policy
debates.” Most of the students (68%) I surveyed did not consider political reasons to be important
in their decision to do graduate work in economics; only 11% saw them as very important. Fifty
percent of the students I surveyed listed desire to engage in policy formulation as very important,
but they did not see this policy interest as incompatible with their academic careers, and with being
non-political technicians. What I take from this evidence is that the role most U.S.
economists see themselves playing is not that of a person directly involved in m a
king policy within a political arena, but instead as that of a person engaged in
policy formation via providing expert empirical support rather than recommending
direct policy implementation. This disregard for ideology has, of course, ideological
overtones. But, in m y view, it falls within the level of back ground ideology, like
background radiation, that permeates everything we do. My second observation is that
most economists have political views similar to those of the population from which they come.
They are not highly reactionary or conservative, although listening to many left
wing heterodox economists might lead one to believe that they are. In m y recent
survey of graduate students at top U.S. schools, 4 7 percent of the student s classified themselves
as liberal, 24 percent as moderate, 16 percent as conservative, and 6 percent as radical. These
divisions would make the m significantly m o re liberal than the U.S. population at large, which is
almost evenly split between liberal and conservative. 5 The students perceived their views as
slightly m o re liberal than those of their parents, 40 percent of whom they classified as liberal, 36
percent as moderate, 16 per cent as conservative, and 3 percent as radical. The large majority of
these students (80 percent) felt that their politic al views did not change in graduate schools,
although there w a s a slight movement toward conservative views over time. In the survey, I also
asked those who did change their views in what direction their views changed. For most schools
the change went both ways. One student captured what likely is happening when he stated, “I
became more eclectic. Both conservatives and liberals have their favorite pipe dream s at odds
with reasonable economics.” The fact that the student thought he could distinguish a reasonable
economics from the conservative an d liberal economics is a sign, to me, of a field that is in within
the range of acceptable ideological bias. Although in the United States the economics profession is
more conservative, and less radical, than are most academics, that is not the case in relation to the
U.S. population at large, which is much more conservative than are academics. But it is an open
question whether it is most academics who are out of line, or is it economics? Let me give an
example: I consider m y self to be a committed pluralist. As part of m y educational philosophy I
believe that students should be presented with many views, so that they can choose. That
philosophy led m y school to hire some left-leaning heterodox economists. When I later wanted to
add a right-leaning heterodox economist to the faculty, these left-leaning economists strongly
opposed it, arguing that these right-leaning economists did not measure up, and had an obvious
ideological bias. My argument that that right-leaning ideological bias w a s simply a counterweight
to their left-leaning ideological bias did not sway them. A standard comment of a typical left-leaning
(right- leaning) academic is that they would be happy to hire a right-leaning (left-leaning)
economist, if they could find a bright one, but finding a bright one is next to impossible. Charges
of ideological bias of mainstream economics do not come only from the left. Within
economics, there are critics who claim that mainstream economics is a bastion of
liberal thinking and activist sentiments. (Coleman, 2002) I find these charges as
unpersuasive as I find the charges from the left. (Colander, 2003) Modern mainstream
economics is a large tent that includes individuals with a wide variety of political
views. It is not a monolithic group that has a definite ideological slant distinct from
that of the population at large. This means, for western European and U.S.
economists that they are ideologically favorable to democracy, feel that markets
are an acceptable means around which to organize society as long as government
plays a role in guiding those markets, and are concerned about equality, but do
not believe that the system should be condemned for its failure to achieve a m o re
equal distribution of income. My third observation is that heterodox critics of economics, such
as Fullbrook or Lee do not, as I read them, have that baseline ideological nature of a field of inquiry
in mind when they charge that economics is ideologically biased , because if they did, their
consideration would be less personal. It would simply be the way things are—these are the
interpretations and ideas that have won out. As I interpret most heterodox critics, they
mean that mainstream economics is intentionally ideological—that it has a
purpose and its purpose is not an objective consideration of the economy arriving
at conclusions in a relatively non-ideological fashion; that purpose is to support a
particular belief, and to prevent other sets of beliefs from being considered. That is
not m y read of the economics profession. Let me consider Fullbrook’s charges that the
rem oval of history of economics thought from the graduate school curriculum , which he claim e d
was done in order to “facilitate indoctrination ” , as an example of mainstream economics’
ideological bias. As a former president of the History of Economic s Society, and the author of an
history of economics thought textbook, I have been involve d in discussions about the rem oval of
history of thought from t h e graduate school curriculum and have opposed it, so I share with
Fullbrook an opposition to these changes. However, I do not see the reason graduate schools are
eliminating history of thought as having anything to do with indoctrination, or ideological bias. There
are two reasons why. First, in m y view, there is nothing necessarily anti-indoctrinating or
nonideological in the history of thought, since it can be taught in many different ways; for example,
one could structure the course in a Whig fashion that portray s the latest developments in
economics as the natural evolution of our search for the truth. Second, based on m y discussions
with economists in graduate program s, indoctrination is not the reason for dropping the course.
Rather, in the minds of the graduate professors, the history of thought courses are being eliminated
to open up room for m o re technical training in statistics and technical field courses. Now one can
argue that technical training is a type of indoctrination, but that argument is a much more subtle
one than Fullbrook makes. And, even if he had made it, I would not find it convincing since there is
nothing necessarily pro market about math. Marx can be presented in a highly mathematical way,
as can be seen in the work of John Rom e r or Michio Morishima. The reality is that the mainstream
economics profession sees the history of thought as an avocation, not as part of economics. W h i l
e I do not share that view, it is a view shared by a group of historians of economic thought who
would like to move the history of economic thought to a history, philosophy, or history of science
department, in order to improve its scholarship. (Weintraub, 1996). My point is that the debate
about history of thought’s role in graduate training has little relevance to the debate about the
ideological content of mainstream economics. This is the point that Roy Weintraub and I were m a
king on the HES discussion group that Fred Lee was responding to. We were not disparaging the
history of economic thought; we were simply telling graduate students: this is the way it is; if you
want to survive in economics, recognize its structure and d live with it because students are
unlikely to be able to change the system. The fact that o n e operates within a system does not
necessarily mean that one prefers that system, or that one is ideologically committed to that
system. It might simply be that one has com e to the conclusion that one can often be m o re
effective at changing a system from within than from without. The decision when to fight a
system and when to accept it and operate within it is a complicated one, and
mainstream economics includes economists of many ideological persuasions,
many quite at odds with the status quo ideological persuasions. They have simply
chosen to work for change from within rather than from outside; they are
mainstream, but they are not orthodox. 6 My fourth observation is that for me to take
heterodox charges of mainstream ideological bias seriously, I would want the
accusers to be as ideologically neutral as possible. They do not seem to be. They
are organized around ideological and policy lines. Consider the post Autistic movement.
It had left-leaning heterodox economists--radicals, feminists, institutionalists, and
post Keynesians- -but it had no Austrians or libertarians in it. Heterodox groups can
almost always be classified as belonging to the right or the left. When I have suggested to either
side that they combine, I often find m o re animosity towards each other than I find against the
mainstream. Why are there no Marxists at George Mason University, a center for Austrian
economics in the United States? And why are there no Austrians at the New School, a center for
left radical economists? My view of the majority of the heterodox critics is that they want
economics to reflect their ideology, not that they want economics to be
nonideological. I would feel much better about heterodox charges of mainstream ideological
bias if they weren’t associated with a particular political position. 7 Let me now summarize what I
take from these four observations in regard to modern economics and ideology. Modern
economics is much more eclectic than what is usually classified by heterodox
economists as neoclassical economics. That is what I mean when I have argued that
neoclassical economics is dead. (Colander, 2000) Economics today is distinguished by
modeling technique, not ideological viewpoint. T h e holy trinity of greed, rationality, and
equilibrium that is often attributed to neoclassical economics has given way to the broader trinity of
enlightened self-interest, purposeful behavior, and sustainability. Today’s mainstream
economists care far less about what you say, or what position you take on an
issue, than they do about how you say it, and whether it tells them something they
didn’t at least think that they already knew. Mainstream economists are far more
rigid in form than in content.
AT: Econ Predictions Bad/Impossible
Economics is empirically verifiable science – predictions are possible and correct
Avent 11 (Ryan, author of The Gated City, “Economic Science” 3/17//11, The Bellows)
http://www.ryanavent.com/blog/?p=2380
Is economics a science? Let me first associate myself with Adam Ozimek’s comments here. If you want to
say that economics isn’t a “hard science”, that might be all right, depending on just what you mean by it. If
you mean that economists can’t run lab experiments and can’t predict outcomes as accurately as, say,
chemists, then that’s acceptable to me. If you mean that economists have no experiments, or don’t
use the scientific method, or something of that nature, then you’re dead wrong. The currency of
the economics realm is evidence. When economists do research they form hypotheses, build
models, gather data, test the models against the data, and publish their conclusions. If other
economists try to get similar results and fail, the original result is called into question. Economics
is quite often effectively predictive. If the supply of one good is disrupted, economists can tell you
with great certainty what will happen to demand for complementary goods and substitutes. If
supply levels are known and research establishing elasticities has been done, they can tell you even
more about what will happen . Their predictions will nearly always be right. And this is true for many
aspects of economics. It’s important to note that because economists can’t always run their own
experiments, there will tend to be more confidence about theories that focus on things which occur very
often. Prices shift constantly, and economists consequently know a LOT about prices. Massive, global
economic recessions occur about once a century. There is obviously a lot more uncertainty regarding the
theories that describe these events. Economics struggles with limited data at times. Economists could
substantially increase their macroeconomic sample sizes if they had good data on economic activity for
all of human history, but unfortunately governments haven’t been collecting data all that long. (Though
economic historians have put together respectable careers carefully assembling historical data sets.) The
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, which has been the subject of intense study in this recession,
only goes back to 2000. But much of the progress of “hard” science has been about improving the
available data. These limitations don’t detract from the scientific endeavor at the heart of the
economics discipline. Economics is not empty philosophizing or groping in the dark.
Defense of Econ Leadership
The alternative to U.S. economic leadership is mercantilism—turns all their
offense and makes global war inevitable
Posen 9 - Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam,
“Economic leadership beyond the crisis,”
http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf)
In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based
largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote
economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in
increasing international economic integration. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods
oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad,
and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and
playing by American rules. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in
tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United
Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important
emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism,
global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for
the last two decades. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that
world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery
to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there
remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited
to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. In fact, financial stability will come under
strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms
and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the
ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be
meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least
temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic
arrangements. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and
other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even
more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure
has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give
their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a
transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western
Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by
the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing
strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oilexporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases
these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this
particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became
increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a
number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point
here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised
model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF,
the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and
investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model
has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and overconsumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, American global
economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market
economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially
discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism. This crisis
therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only
deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that
challenge. Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia
have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). Is there
an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest
over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial
crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to
significant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where
political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category. A few years of slower
growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings
versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the
crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in
technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of
rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open
economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an
ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This
last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because
capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist
(albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been
concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of
hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode
globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract
that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South
Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is
one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico's
continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector,
admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany's and Japan's obvious crisisprompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve
as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic
performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies
like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths.
If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not
outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is
reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more
multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that
adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately
defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from
the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been
before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up
money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has
been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid
excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy
fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing
the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic
situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage
the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other
rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to
their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and
in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of
these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient
in response to future shocks (to every country's detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of
reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or
managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on
the following priority measures.
Russia Reps
Cards
Must take russia as it is—debating about other things bad
Miller, PhD, 14—Middle East analyst, author, and negotiator. He is currently the Vice President for
New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar at the Wilson Center. On the U.S. Advisory Council of Israel
Policy Forum, the University of Michigan with a B.A. in 1971. Continuing on toward an M.A. in American
Civil War history,[5] Miller changed fields to Middle East and American diplomacy and spent 1973 to 1974
in Jerusalem studying Arabic and Hebrew. He completed his Ph.D. in 1977. (Aaron David, The Naïveté of
Distance, March 31st,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/31/united_states_russia_crimea_isolationism, chm)
there are some crucial facts about world history and geography that
Americans don't really understand . As the world digests Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggressive moves and ponders future
ones by Russia or other smaller powers, here are a few things about these two profoundly important forces -- or more specifically, the
U.S. relationship to them -- that Americans need to keep in mind. Grasping them is, in a word, critical. America is of the world.
But does it really understand it? Sandwiched between two non-predatory powers to the north and south, and fish
to the east and west, the United States has lost -- if it ever had it -- the capacity to think and feel like a power that is
vulnerable to geography and history. One would have thought that the nation's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan would have made it
wiser in this regard, and it did in one respect: America is more wisely and willfully risk averse when it comes to nation-building and
meddling in the affairs of smaller powers and tribes. But have these experiences made Americans any wiser about why
small powers and tribes -- and bigger ones too -- behave the way they do, or more artful in anticipating their
actions or reactions? I don't think so. People in the United States just don't have the head or stomach for it.
Americans have never really lived on the knife's edge, worried about physical or political survival; they
have not felt the breath or boot of the big power on their necks . Don't get me wrong: That's a good, very special thing. Most
nations have no such luxury. But this specialness has also made Americans much less adept at understanding the
behavior of others who aren't as fortunate. Indeed, people in the United S tates tend not to understand
others' fears or to trivialize them, choosing to dismiss their concerns as not terribly relevant to
our modern world . Nor do Americans seem to know or care much about seemingly 19th or even 20th-century
concepts such as national pride, honor, dignity, and the like -- at least not as much as other countries. Sure, Americans get
The Ukraine crisis has made it clear that
excited about the Olympics, but they don't appear to get angry, to feel slighted, bruised, or humiliated when other nations a quarter the size of the
United States and with a fraction of its power ignore U.S. warnings, play Washington like a finely-tuned fiddle, or say no without cost or consequence. I
don't see a whole lot of enthusiasm in America for confronting the Russians over Sevastopol, let alone Kharkiv. It takes something really big like 9/11 to
get Americans going. So when
Putin, the Egyptian generals, or the mullahs in Iran act in ways that don't seem to
add up to Americans' neatly ordered world or when they speak out against the U nited States in defense of
their national dignity and pride, or out of personal or national pique, Americans judge it to be either
inauthentic, politically contrived, somehow unhinged from reality, or unmoored from anything that could
be perceived to be a legitimate interest. Just because America doesn't seem to have many vital interests
doesn't mean others don't. Vital interests are those for which a nation is prepared to invest its time,
treasure, and prestige, and ultimately to risk its citizens' lives and those of others, in the name of
protection. Right now, U.S. vital interests are defined primarily in terms of defending the homeland. And this president, even while he's all but
declared the war on terror over, has been pretty robust in prosecuting it. But for a smaller power, Americans often seem to forget, protecting the
homeland can mean being much more proactive: Offense can be the best defense, they say. So maybe it's not all that unusual that the United States
didn't see Putin's land grab in Crimea coming: Americans couldn't imagine themselves doing something similar. Why
would the Russians
risk violating another nation's sovereignty? Just because they are worried about Ukraine drifting westward? Why would a pragmatist
like Putin risk the post-1991 geopolitical arrangements so painstakingly created? Why indeed. Americans, it seems, can't understand
because they can't place themselves in other people's shoes, to see what the rest of the world
sees as vital. Americans, it seems, can't understand because they can't place themselves in other people's shoes, to see what the rest of the
world sees as vital. Just because it's the 21st century doesn't mean everyone sees the world the same way. Part
of the reason America misjudges smaller powers is that it assumes somehow that all countries see the world in the
same way -- or at least are prepared to accommodate themselves to the way the United States sees it. This is driven by a
dangerous illusion that today's world is a more modern world, a globalized one where everything is more integrated and nations don't act in
ways that undermine their own economic interests. Doesn't everyone have a stake in everyone else's success? Referring to Putin moving forces into
Ukraine, Secretary of State John Kerry observed, "It's really 19th century behavior in the 21st century." Maybe. But thinking about it in another way,
maybe Putin -- along with Bashar al-Assad, Kim Jong Un, some of the Iranian mullahs, and others -- is a
21st-century leader using 19ththat in fact still work for him. For Putin, geography and power -- that is, how to avoid being
gobbled up by the first and how to maintain the second -- still mean something. And that sometimes requires actions
that don't quite measure up to American standards. History still matters. The notion that nothing in America lasts longer than 15 minutes is
a bit of an overstatement. But it's true that Americans don't pay attention to history much, and when they do , they're
often using it to defend some partisan foreign policy or to draw the wrong conclusions. For the great power willing
to learn, history can be a very useful exercise in humility, and prudence -- a cautionary tale, really, about avoiding the
century tactics
transgressions of omnipotence and omniscience (believing that one can do anything and knows everything). But for the smaller power, history can also
be a trap and create a current reality that forces actions based and driven by past traumas, vulnerabilities, victories, and humiliations. Americans
expect others to get over the past, but for much of the world, Faulkner's famous line in Requiem for a Nun still rules: "The
past is never dead. It's not even past."* The mullahs have been living in the shade of the 1953 CIA coup for decades. Putin exists
in the demise of the former Soviet Union and maybe even identifies with figures as far back as Peter the
Great. Assad is an Alawite whose worldview is shaped by his minority community's historical experience both in and out of power. And while not all
Israeli prime ministers' current realities have been shaped by the Holocaust, Benjamin Netanyahu's decidedly is. In short, smaller powers' histories
cast long shadows. Not all leaders are cut from the same cloth. American presidents and secretaries of state far too frequently deal with their
counterparts as if they all belonged to some kind respectable club in which certain rules apply and mere winks and nods can work things out. U.S.
leaders were fascinated with Syria's Hafez al-Assad for years, convinced that they could somehow make him into a partner; even his son, Bashar, for a
brief period cast a spell on the Bush 43 administration as a modern man who saw Syria's future in terms of reform. President Bill Clinton emerged from
his successful Israeli-Palestinian summit in 1998 persuaded he could convince Yasser Arafat to do a deal at Camp David. And both Obama
and
Kerry saw Putin as a guy they could work with on Syria and Iran. American leaders tend to rely too heavily on
their persuasive skills with these tough leaders from tougher neighborhoods or underestimate their partners' capacity to
just say "no." In truth, the Bushes, Clinton, and Barack Obama have about as much in common with the Assads, Arafat,
or Putin as they do with Mickey Mouse. Americans seem to get confused by the fact that such leaders wear suits and ties -- or in
Arafat's case, kiss a few Israelis -- and think it's possible to make long-term deals with them. To be sure, at times, short-term gains are possible,
and there are indeed exceptional leaders and moments. But these are rare and sometimes tragic too: Anwar Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin
paid with their lives for their peacemaking, while U.S. presidents have gotten to write about how they almost made peace in their memoirs. In short,
Americans think they understand the world. But their detachment from it, and the idealism , naïveté, arrogance,
and unbridled pragmatism that separation brings, tell a different story . For the United States to influence the
world differently -- and more meaningfully -- than it does now, that story will have to change.
Our reps of cooperation break down cycles of enmity
LaBanca 11 (Gregory R. LaBanca, B.A., Georgetown, 4/15/11, "Forecasting Uncertainty: U.S. and
Russian Threat Dynamics During the 'Reset'",
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553533/laBancaGregoryRobert.pdf?seq
uence=1)
The process of worst case forecasting created an increasingly threatening
relationship between the U.S. and Russia from 2002-2009. The U.S. came to regard Russia as an increasingly U.S.focused actor (intent on subverting
CONCLUSION Assessing the Hypotheses
the American democratization agenda abroad); an increasingly powerful actor (willing to exert economic, energy, military and political power toward this end), and an increasingly coherent and different actor from
Russia came to perceive the U.S. as an increasingly Russia-focused actor (seeking to contain
an expansion of Russian power in the name of American hegemony); an increasingly powerful actor (capable of launching successful bottom
itself (the model of antidemocratic authoritarianism). Likewise,
up revolutions in multiple countries simultaneously) and an increasingly coherent and different actor from itself (naively focused on making every other country look like itself). These processes hung together and
were mutually reinforcing.
The “reset” reflected the decoupling of these self-reinforcing processes. This assessment poses a substantial
challenge to existing theoretical approaches to threat dynamics, because those approaches cannot fully account for the way in which perceptions of capability and identity interact over time. Power transition
theory correctly identifies power equalization between a hegemon and a rising power as the most threatening moment in a bilateral relationship. However, it fails to 72 Medvedev, interview by Vitaly Abramov,
Izvestia, May 7, 2010, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2010/05/07/0800_type82916_225900.shtml. 40 recognize that perceptions of material capabilities are as significant to the overall power balance as
are the actual, objectively verifiable capabilities. This perceptual element skews the key inflection point in power transition theory—the point at which a rising power is approaching a dominate power. Although
Russia became a more powerful actor during the early and mid 2000s, it also perceived that the U.S. was an increasingly powerful actor due to its perception that democratic revolutions and international terrorism
were part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit. Accordingly, the inflection point described in power transition theory should not have been reached until late 2008, the moment at which, in Russia’s eyes, the U.S. was
at its weakest. The August Russia-Georgia war “revealed” that the color revolutions had not produced the enduring U.S. allies that Russia perceived the U.S. had sought. Moreover, the U.S. was maximally over-
According to power transition theory, we should have seen a deepening of the threat
spiral, marked by an aggressive Russian effort to undermine a relatively weaker U.S. and an aggressive
U.S. seeking to contain Russian power. Since U.S.-Russian threat dynamics moved in exactly the
opposite direction, power transition theory does not convincingly describe the bilateral threat dynamic.
extended in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Defensive realism’s focus on the role of intentions helps to address realism’s over-reliance on material balance of power. However, it fails to articulate how material elements and perceptual elements interact to
generate threat perceptions. Walt, for example, admits that his balance of threat theory “cannot determine a priori . . . which sources of threat will be most important in any given case.”73 Walt’s theory is limited
because it holds state identity constant and because it focuses, like most rationalist theories, on future expectations of utility in isolation from processes 73 Walt, 26. 41 of interaction. Since realist theories do not
realist theories cannot account for how
perceptions of intention influence threat dynamics. For example, as explained above, Moscow only determined that it was in its
admit the possibility of states updating their identities during interaction, and since interests are defined significantly by identities,
interests to try to work with the U.S. to dispel
the pernicious effects of
the security dilemma when it assessed that the U.S. was no longer capable of
using or willing to use democratization as a foreign policy tool to contain Russia. For both defensive realists and liberal institutionalists, security seekers can find themselves in threatening interactions because
uncertainty about future expectations generates fear—the essence of the security dilemma—prompting both sides to accumulate more power in order to hedge against the possibility that the other side may
choose to harm it. However, this assumption about the role of uncertainty is wrong. Rather, threat is a subjective realization that someone has sufficient capabilities to harm you and the intention of harming you.
The language of realism, the theoretical dialogue through which we seek to understand why we ought to fear others, is really the “voice of the cautious paranoid.”74 Liberal institutionalism, in turn, is the voice of
the cautious optimist; both views, and the identities of the states that hold them, can quickly slip toward increasingly delusional performances of either unwarranted threat or unwarranted trust as their perceptions
of self and other move in self-reinforcing lock-step. Rationalist presumptions about the role of shared interests in dampening threat perceptions likewise fail to shed light on threat dynamics. This thesis suggests
that simply providing two states with more information about where shared bargaining room might be found is insufficient, 74Anthony D. Lott, Creating Insecurity: Realism, Constructivism, and U.S. Security Policy
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), 55. 42 because information about intentions and interests is fundamentally indeterminate in intersubjective processes. In times of accelerating threat, it is unlikely that signals of
cooperative intent will be read as anything more than signals of deceit. Due to the attributional effect, as actors’ intentions and identities are perceived as increasingly exclusive to the other and as increasingly
coherent, suspicions about another’s “true” intentions will grow as well. It is through this pernicious, interactive cycle of mistrust that states in turn define and constitute their national interests. 75 The role of
Both the U.S. and Russia framed their increasing
sense of fear of each other prior to the reset in terms that drew upon mythological conceptions of their
identities. However, after the reset, both states simply drew on different elements of their national history to
justify their changing articulations of their identities. Identity formation is a continually evolving process in
which states can draw on and co-opt old memories, identities, and loyalties—there is no need to draw on all of them at the same time.76
interaction in the formation of national interests presents a problem for cultural based arguments as well.
Since identities change in reaction to processes of state interaction, if we freeze a state’s identity at a given point in time in order to try to understand its approach to threat, we will end up losing both the
At any given time there are multiple alternative accounts carried
along within a society until they are resolved into one account from which the “next phase of reality
constructing takes off.”77 “Resets” are precisely such points in time. Embracing Uncertainty Since worst case forecasting is a self-reinforcing
process, it is surprising that the U.S. and Russia would have transitioned from a relationship of increasing
threat to one of lessening threat. The discussion above suggests that since perceptions of power and identity are interactive, we should not expect that any one state caught in a
explanatory and predictive power that only dynamic explanations can provide.
threatening interaction can break out of the dynamic by simply changing its policy. Rather, the key circumstance determining whether a threatening relationship resets is not entirely under the control of either
state. Since threat is a function of states resolving their uncertainty in the favor of believing the worst about another’s intentions, it stands to reason that the reintroduction of uncertainty into the relationship can
break a cycle by forcing the participants to reconsider their conceptions of themselves, each other, and their mutual relations. The idea that uncertainty can free states from fear is surprising, if not anathema, to
the security dilemma—which posits that the measures a state takes to
ensure its security in turn cause a decrease in the security of all states, including itself 78—treats uncertainty
as a key motivating driver.79 Yet, if we regard uncertainty as rooted in the “other mind” problem—that is,
we can never entirely get inside the 77Harrison C. White, “Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences,” Social Research 62,
our common understanding of international relations. For example,
no. 4 (Winter 1995): 1049. 78 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 169-170. 79 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security
heads of other actors80—then the core delusion of the security dilemma is that we
nevertheless presume to have successfully peered into the minds of our counterparts and judged their intentions and identities
as malign. If that is the case, then having our delusions broken by the sudden recognizance of a more contingent, uncertain, and variable world than we had otherwise imagined can create the
type of cognitive dissonance that “resets” our mental frameworks.81 There were multiple sources of uncertainty preceding the reset that
facilitated its emergence by creating the cognitive space necessary for the U.S. and Russia to re-imagine their bilateral
relations. For example, both the U.S. and Russia underwent a change in leadership within one year of each other that brought in
administrations whose platforms challenged existing bilateral interpretations of the other’s identity. In the U.S., Obama entered office on a foreign policy platform
premised in part on a fundamental reframing of the U.S. relationship with the rest of the world. In Russia, a dual
Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 617-618. 44
Medvedev-Putin leadership structure emerged, unprecedented in Russian politics since Peter the Great’s regency. Independent of the bilateral relationship, Ukraine’s reversion to its pre-color revolution
leadership in the 2009 presidential elections and Georgia’s territorial fragmentation from 2007-2009 put up a barrier to NATO’s expansion, making NATO’s identity uncertain not only for the West, as had long
been the case, but for Russia as well. The dual nuclear revelations in Iran and North Korea in 2009 introduced doubt in both the U.S. and Russia about those countries’ nuclear ambitions, reordering international
priorities. In 80 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 296. 81 Charles Kupchan makes a related
argument when he states that an initiating actor can start a virtuous cycle that leads toward bilateral rapprochement by deliberately making itself vulnerable to exploitation in order to signal benign intent toward an
adversary. However, Kupchan underestimates the degree to which a less powerful adversary is likely to misread signals of benign intent through a conspiratorial lens. (Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends:
U.S. and Russian identities and interests became far more
uncertain to the other in the year leading up to the reset, and the reset could not have happened
otherwise. Although the circumstances underlying a reset are largely beyond state control, a state can help to tip a relationship toward an
assurance spiral, versus a threat spiral, in moments of uncertainty by seizing on these very moments to
provide small gestures of cooperation or trust; it is during moments of uncertainty that actors will be the
most likely to doubt their assumptions about the world around them and the threats they face. If timed correctly, these small acts can
create the room needed to re-imagine shared interests and identities, allowing them to then manifest
through more virtuous cycles. Of course, uncertainty can work in the other direction as well. If two states find themselves in a virtuous cycle, whereby they forecast the best about
The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 38). 45 short,
each other’s intentions, then sudden uncertainty can break the cycle, as both states develop suspicions about the other’s “real” intentions. This makes sustaining a reset difficult in uncertain times. Moreover,
whether states shift and accelerate toward the polarity of suspicion or the polarity of trust can be decided by relatively small acts due to the interactive mechanisms underlying worst case and best case
forecasting. Indeed, changes within any of the mechanisms which connect two polarities of any type can ripple through a system quickly, causing major systemic change.82 Resets, therefore, can be sustained,
but they are tenuous and timing is critical. The US is likely to have its work cut out for it. As the most powerful actor on the world stage, the US is the “logical” target for the world’s dispossessed seeking coherent
and simple stories to explain their discontent.
The status quo ensures war
Saakashvili 14—lecturer and senior statesman at Tufts University (Misha, War is Coming, April 4th,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/04/war_is_coming_ukraine_putin, chm)
the Russian Federation, after staging a referendum under Kalashnikovs in Crimea, proceeded to annex the region and
laid the groundwork -- according to Moscow -- for "new political-legal realities," that is to say, a new Russian paradigm for a lawless world. As
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in her speech to the Bundestag on March 13, Russia is bringing the law of the jungle to the table. For those of us who
have lived through Vladimir Putin's attempts to reverse the results of what he calls "the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century -- the dissolution of the Soviet Union -- what is
happening in Ukraine is not unexpected. Nor does it mark the last act of the drama. It should be abundantly clear now that
Putin's initial plan of taking eastern Ukraine by mobilizing the Russian population there has failed. But that doesn't mean he's giving up.
Russian strategists are talking about a "weekend of rage" that could involve some kind of armed siege of
government buildings in southern and eastern Ukraine. If these local provocateurs and "self-defense forces" manage to hold these buildings as they did in
Crimea, it might serve as a basis for further military intervention. Not that we should be surprised by this cynical playbook any more.
History can be a useful guide for politicians: first, to help prevent new disasters, and second, to help react to
disasters that inevitably happen anyway, despite the best laid plans. And yet, plenty of politicians are making
the same mistakes they should have learned from decades ago. These days, I can't help but be reminded of Yogi Berra's famous
quote, "It's déjà vu, all over again." In Chechnya, tens of thousands of people were killed just to make Putin president
and consolidate his power. Then, when the Colored Revolutions -- and their successful reforms -- became a menace to his rule, he invaded Georgia in order to
kill this contagious model and again reconfirm his power. Now, as before, faced with eroding popularity in Russia, a shale gas
revolution in North America, and the need for consistent port access to equip his allies in the Middle East,
Putin attacked Ukraine and seized Crimea. And yet, even with these myriad examples, the West continues to
misunderstand or excuse Putin's aggression . These days, many pundits are busy with soul-searching, with
one of the constant refrains being how the West overreached with NATO and EU expansion, and how it
needlessly provoked the Russian bear. The conclusion they come to is that part of the reason for Russia's
behavior, however petulant, lies in Western activism. It's a particular kind of intellectual self-flagellation
and, for Putin, a reflection of Western weakness that only emboldens him. Neville Chamberlain, when
presenting the case for the great European powers to acquiesce to Hitler's occupation of the
Sudetenland, argued that Europeans should not care about a "quarrel in a faraway country between
people of whom we know nothing." I hear a lot of pundits now talking about the "asymmetry of interests,"
implying that Russia is entitled to annex neighboring countries' lands for the simple reason that it cares for
these lands more than the West. Others opine that we should all get used to the idea that the Crimea is gone, and that Russia will never give it back. This
is exactly what I was told in the summer of 2008 -- that I should be resigned to the idea that a part of Georgian territory, then occupied by Russia, was gone for good. But this
logic has its continuation. As we know from history, the cycles of appeasement usually get shorter with geometric
progression. Soon, the same pundits may declare -- with their best poker faces on -- that now Moldova is "lost," or Latvia "lost," even some province of Poland. And
just because Russia is not in the mood to give it back. The biggest casualty for the West will not be the countries which already are, or strive to be, Western
allies, but rather the principles on which the Western world is built. The truth is that Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova are being punished by
Russia for their desire to live in a free and democratic society -- one very different from the Putin model. Certainly, Moscow didn't seem to care much
about the minority Russian populations in its near abroad -- so long as they were comfortably ruled by corrupt cronies of the Kremlin. But
In early March,
over the ensuing decade, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova have learned to look to the West, not so much because of geopolitical priorities, but because people there aspire to a
the West must shelter these countries not just out of
pragmatic calculations, but for the very principles that turned the Western democracies into the most successful societies in history. The basic facts are very
clear. Russia presents the greatest challenge to international law and order since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. And
even though the West has much greater superiority over Russia -- both economically and militarily -- than it ever had over the Soviet Union,
today's leaders are reluctant to take advantage of this asymmetry . The problem, perhaps, is due to the
ambivalence of most regional experts that guide Western leaders' thinking. Their fundamental misreading of Russia is based
on the fact that they don't understand the difference between the Soviet nomenclatura and modern Russia's
corrupt elite. They grossly underestimate the attachment of Russian elites to their mansions and bank accounts in the West. Likewise, Moscow's key decision-makers
Western way of life that respects human rights and universal values. For this reason,
are way more dependent financially and psychologically on the West than the bureaucrats of the Brezhnev era. Sanctions can successfully divide this group from Putin's inside
the West -- particularly Europe -- appears
reluctant to impose tougher sanctions. Unlike during the Cold War, Western companies draw much more benefit from Russia today, and thus they too will have to pay the
circle, but they have to go further and exact greater pain. And yet, despite President Barack Obama's rhetoric,
price of sanctions. But after the first round of sanctions, stocks rebounded as markets were relieved that the measures didn't seem far-reaching. So how does the West expect
Is the West willing
to pay this price now, or delay the decision and pay a much higher price in the future? The choice can best be
described in medical terms. The cancer of Russian aggression first showed up in Georgia, but the West decided to
to be taken seriously by Putin when even Wall Street isn't buying the seriousness of the Western alliance's intentions? The dilemma is simple:
neglect the diagnosis and preferred to treat the illness with aspirin. Crimea is the metastasis of what happened in Georgia, and yet
the West is still excluding the surgical option -- that is to say military intervention -- as carrying too high a risk. But at least it should apply chemotherapy. Yes, this means that
this painful dose is the only way
to help kill the cancer that is Putin. Winston Churchill once prophetically told Hitler's appeasers: "You were given the choice
between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war. " Surely, we cannot expect modernday politicians obsessed with polls and midterm elections to be Churchillian all the time . But at a minimum they should
not want to go down in history as the Neville Chamberlains of the 21st century. And misreading Putin for the man that he is -- and has
always been -- is at the heart of appeasement.
the West will feel the effects of its own drugs, and particularly European companies in the short term. But in the long term,
Trade Reps
Our reps of trade overcome public apathy – their authors use misleading
data and are based only on emotional appeal
Griswold, ’09 (Daniel, director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, “Mad About
Trade: Why Main Street America should Embrace Globalization”, pgs. 3-10,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/mad-about-trade-why-main-street-america-should-embraceglobalization) //GY
One reason why skepticism remains is the difference between “what is seen and what is unseen.” The
transition costs of moving to free trade are visible and lend themselves to images and anecdotes: a
factory closing in North Carolina, the anxiety on the face of a laid-off steel worker, the “sweatshop”
conditions in factories making shirts in Honduras and soccer balls in Bangladesh. Yet the benefits that
flow from free trade and globalization, while real and substantial, are diffused and often hidden from view:
a dozen jobs created at a small business serving an American exporter or foreign-owned plant, lower
interest rates on a loan, and $20 saved on a Saturday-afternoon shopping trip because of import
competition.
Another, related reason for the skepticism is the emotional appeal of arguments against trade. In a
November 2007 essay, “Why Lou Dobbs Is Winning,” the generally pro-trade Third Way Foundation tried
to explain why the skeptics have been winning the rhetorical debate. Advocates for open trade “have lost
the debate on values,” the authors concluded. “While neopopulists and ‘fair’ traders speak compellingly of
‘justice’ and ‘fairness,’ we speak of dollars per household in economic gains, job growth and economic
efficiency. … ‘Fair’ traders fight with values; free traders fight with data.”[9]
That is not quite right. “Fair” traders also fight with data, much of it wrong or misleading, as we shall see.
But it is certainly true that those of us who advocate the embrace of free trade and globalization as the
best policy for America too often confine ourselves to data. We fail to close the deal by drawing a
connection from the facts to our deepest American values of fairness, compassion, competition, freedom,
progress, peace, and the rule of law. The mission of this book is to make that connection.
As we build that connection, this book will challenge much of what we hear and read about trade in the
American media. Here are some facts and themes from Mad about Trade that you will not hear on cable
TV, talk radio or the most popular blog sites:
Free trade is the working family’s best friend. Import competition delivers lower prices and more variety,
empowering consumers to get the most from their paychecks. Greater product variety from imports
boosts our incomes by $400 billion a year. Those Americans who benefit the most from being able to buy
imports from China through big-box retailers are the poor (Chapter 2).
Trade has delivered better jobs for American workers. Most of the net new jobs created in the past
decade pay more than the average manufacturing job. The American middle class today is built on
millions of well-paying service-sector jobs. Despite the most recent recession, Americans today enjoy
significantly higher real hourly compensation, household incomes and family net worth than 15 years go
(Chapter 3).
Most American manufacturers have managed to thrive in a global economy. Trade has helped American
factories move up the value chain. We’re producing more planes, pills, appliances, chemicals,
semiconductors and sophisticated equipment than in decades past. The volume of U.S. manufacturing
output was two-thirds higher in 2008 than when Congress passed the North American Free Trade
Agreement in 1993 (Chapter 4).
America’s big trade deficit is not a scorecard for U.S. trade policy. If reflects a steady inflow of foreign
investment and continued domestic demand for goods and services, whether made at home or abroad.
Since 1982, America’s unemployment rate invariably rises when the trade deficit shrinks, and falls when
the trade deficit grows. Despite what Warren Buffett says, raising trade barriers cannot “fix” the trade
deficit (Chapter 5).
American companies that invest abroad are not “shipping jobs overseas”; they are reaching new
customers for U.S.-branded goods and services. For every $1 billion in goods that U.S. companies
export, they sell $6.2 billion through their foreign affiliates—and 90 percent of those sales go to foreign
buyers. Foreign capital flowing into the United States cuts almost a full point off long-term interest rates,
saving a typical homeowner $1,000 a year and federal taxpayers $40 billion (Chapter 6).
High U.S. trade barriers in the 19th century were a drag on growth and bred anti-competitive domestic
monopolies. The Great Depression occurred on the protectionists’ watch. America’s economic
performance has been superior during the era of lower tariffs since World War II, including the past 15
years since NAFTA was enacted. Nearly a quarter of a million small and medium-sized U.S. companies
are now exporting to global markets, including China (Chapter 7).
Membership in the World Trade Organization has not compromised U.S. sovereignty. It has served our
national interest by opening markets abroad to U.S. exports and restraining the U.S. government’s
abuses of our economic liberty. A global “rule of law” in place today has prevented a repeat of the
disastrous trade wars of the 1930s (Chapter 7).
The spread of trade and globalization has helped to cut world poverty in half since 1981. Fewer children
are dying, fewer are heading for work on the farm and in factories, and more are in school, especially
girls, than in decades past. Once the world shakes off the current recession, a growing middle class in
developing countries will be hungry to buy U.S.-provided goods and services (Chapter 8).
Thanks in part to expanding trade, our world is more democratized and peaceful. More people enjoy full
political and civil rights under democratic governments around the world than in any previous era. Trade
has promoted peace among nations, making it less likely that America’s sons and daughters will fight in
future wars (Chapter 8).
A2: Economics Gendered
Globalization decreases gender inequality – best studies
Fontana et al, ’98 (Institute of Development Studies¶ University of Sussex, Marzia Fontana, Susan
Joekes and¶ Rachel Masika “Global Trade expansion and¶ liberalisation: gender issues and¶ impacts: A
study prepared for the Department for International Development (DFID) UK” January 1998, Report No
42, pgs. 10-18, http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/sites/bridge.ids.ac.uk/files/reports/re42c.pdf) //GY
2.5.1 Trends in female employment and trade expansion¶ Increased manufactured exports from the South
are very strongly associated with the¶ feminisation of the industrial labour force, as shown in a study of
formal sector¶ employment in manufacturing in developed and developing countries over the period ¶ 19601985 (Wood, 1991). With reference to developing countries, the study shows a¶ strong relation between
increased exports and increased female employment in¶ manufacturing. The largest increases in both the
export orientation and the female¶ intensity of manufacturing appeared to be in Mauritius, Tunisia, Sri
Lanka, Malaysia¶ and the four East Asian ëtigersí.5¶ 2.5.2 Case studies and comparative research¶ The
existing research on women and trade (reviewed in Joekes and Weston, 1994) ¶ consists primarily of
several case studies of EPZs and of export-oriented¶ manufacturing firms (mainly in East Asia and Latin
America, but also Sri Lanka and¶ Bangladesh), some household-level case studies of women with jobs in
such firms and¶ two cross-country studies. The contribution of EPZs has been much studied, as the¶
majority of their employees are women.6 Studies have focused on employment¶ opportunities, which
favour women, and working conditions. Evidence is¶ inconclusive on this latter point. Some argue that
women fare better in EPZs than in¶ domestic industries, especially when total remuneration is taken into
account; others¶ show that pay is poorer. Working conditions generally appear to be poor, although¶
arguably not usually worse than in most jobs open to women. Some evidence also ¶ suggests that young
single women were the preferred workforce, at least initially, in¶ many EPZs in Asia (Baden and Joekes,
1993). Other evidence shows clearly that¶ wage discrimination tends to be more severe among married
persons than among¶ young single persons (Gannicot, 1986; Tzannatos, 1995). ¶ One important
conclusion of this research is that the growth of export-oriented¶ manufacturing has benefited women. It
has created many jobs for them (both¶ absolutely and relative to men) often drawing them into paid work
for the first time, at¶ wages which, although lower than those of men, are often higher than women would¶
have earned in the alternative forms of work open to them. In some countries, the¶ regularity of the
wages from these factory jobs, and the location of the work outside¶ the sphere of control of male
relatives has empowered women, increasing their¶ influence on household decisions, and permitting
them to escape from situations of¶ domestic violence and oppression (Kabeer, 1995). However, it is also
observed that¶ these gains may be only short term (Joekes, 1995).¶
…¶
Another area of research is the impact of trade on gender-based wage discrimination.¶ A study by
Tzannatos (1995) suggests that the terms and conditions of womenís¶ employment in developing
countries have benefited from economic change and¶ liberalisation and that improvements appear to
occur at a more accelerated pace than¶ in developed countries during their industrialisation. His findings
point to an overall¶ improvement in the position of women in the labour market mainly resulting from¶
increases in female relative pay within sectors, particularly manufacturing, more than¶ from shifts
between sectors. However Tzannatos' data also point to another disturbing¶ trend: a strong, positive
relationship between the size of the discriminatory gap in¶ male and female wages and the level of female
education in the population (Susan¶ Joekes, personal communication). The convergence of male-female
wage gaps which¶ Tzannatos identifies is not happening as fast as would be predicted, given the ¶
diminution of gender gaps in educational provision. This may reflect the fact that¶ most educated women
are absorbed into low-wage parts of the manufacturing sector¶ such as clothing. This should be a source
of concern for policy makers, particularly¶ given the importance accorded to female education as a means
to promote gender¶ equality. The relationship between trade and gender discrimination in labour markets ¶
certainly warrants further detailed investigation.
Trade solves poverty
Trade solves poverty and economic inequality
Griswold, ’02 (Daniel Griswold the director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.
“Seven Moral Arguments for Free Trade” This article appeared in the Insider on May 1, 2002.
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/seven-moral-arguments-free-trade) //GY
7. Free trade feeds and clothes the poor.¶ Free trade and free markets empower poor people by giving
them greater opportunity to create wealth and support their families. By dispersing economic power more
widely, free trade and free markets undercut the ability of elites in less developed countries to pillage a
nation’s resources at the expense of its poor. Proof can be found in the immigration patterns of poor
people throughout the world. By the millions, they seek to leave closed and centrally controlled
economies for those that are more open and less controlled. Poor people themselves understand that a
free economy serves their interests, even if many of their self-appointed intellectual advocates in the
West do not.¶ Nations open to trade tend to be more prosperous, just as cities along coastlines and
navigable rivers tend to be wealthier than those in more remote, inland locations. The most recent
Economic Freedom of the World study, by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, found that the nations
that were most open economically from 1980 through 1998 grew nearly five times faster than those that
were most closed. And that trade-related growth lifts the lot of the poor. To cite the most dramatic
example of this, the World Bank estimates that the number of Chinese citizens living in absolute
poverty—that is, on less than $1 per day—has fallen since 1978 by 200 million. Revoking China’s normal
trade status, among all its other negative consequences, would set back one of the most successful antipoverty programs in the history of mankind. In contrast, those regions of the world where poverty has
been the most intractable, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, have been the least open to trade and
foreign investment.¶ For all these reasons, trade sanctions fall heaviest on the poor of the target nation.
Political rulers have the power to protect their pampered lifestyles, while the poor are left to suffer the
consequences of U.S. policies that were enacted in the name of helping the very people they victimize.
You can be sure that the communist leaders in Cuba and the ruling junta in Burma will continue to enjoy
their fine, catered meals and chauffeur-driven cars while the millions of poor people they oppress are
made even more miserable by U.S. trade and investment sanctions.¶ When all these arguments are
weighed, it should become clear that a policy of free trade is moral as well as efficient. Free trade limits
the power of the state and enhances the freedom, autonomy, and self-responsibility of the individual. It
promotes virtuous and responsible personal behavior. It brings people together in “communities of work”
that cross borders and cultures. It opens the door for ideas and evangelism. It undermines the authority of
dictators by expanding the freedom, opportunity, and independence of the people they try to control. It
promotes peace among nations. It helps the poor to feed and care for themselves and creates a better
future for their children. For which of these virtues should we reject free trade?
A2: economics = racist
Trade increases social equality and human rights, checks state power, and prevents
conflict
Griswold, ’02 (Daniel Griswold the director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.
“Seven Moral Arguments for Free Trade” This article appeared in the Insider on May 1, 2002.
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/seven-moral-arguments-free-trade) //GY
U.S. trade policy is almost always debated in terms of economic utility. Does free trade raise or lower
incomes? Does it help or hurt U.S. industry? Does it create or destroy jobs? But behind the statistics and
anecdotes lie moral assumptions about human nature, the sovereignty of the individual, and the role of
government in a free society. Free trade may deliver the goods and boost efficiency, but is it morally
superior to protectionism?¶ The Bush Administration is sending contradictory signals on the issue of free
trade. In March, President Bush announced measures to protect the U.S. steel industry from foreign
competition. In May he signed a farm bill that inflates subsidies for U.S. “agribusinesses” and distorts
global trade. But in a speech in May of last year before the Council of the Americas, President Bush
joined the moral debate, telling his audience, “Open trade is not just an economic opportunity, it is a moral
imperative. Trade creates jobs for the unemployed. When we negotiate for open markets, we are
providing new hope for the world’s poor. And when we promote open trade, we are promoting political
freedom. Societies that open to commerce across their borders will open to democracy within their
borders, not always immediately, and not always smoothly, but in good time.Ӧ Western moral thought
provides a solid foundation for pursuing a policy of economic openness. Drawing on that tradition, here
are seven moral arguments to support free trade among nations:¶ 1. Free trade respects the dignity
and sovereignty of the individual. ¶ A man or woman [person] engaged in honest work has a basic right
to enjoy the fruits of his or her labor. It is a violation of my right to property for the government to forbid
me to exchange what I produce for something produced by a fellow human being, whether the person I’m
trading with lives across town or across the ocean. Protectionism is a form of stealing, a violation of the
Eighth Commandment and other prohibitions against theft. It takes from one group of people, usually a
broad cross-section of consumers, and gives the spoils to a small group of producers whose only claim to
the money is that they would be worse off under open competition.¶ Free trade meets the most
elementary test of justice, giving to each person sovereign control over that which is his own. As Frederic
Bastiat wrote in his 1849 essay, “Protectionism and Communism,” “Every citizen who has produced or
acquired a product should have the option of applying it immediately to his own use or of transferring it to
whoever on the face of the earth agrees to give him in exchange the object of his desires. To deprive him
of this option when he has committed no act contrary to public order and good morals, and solely to
satisfy the convenience of another citizen, is to legitimize an act of plunder and to violate the law of
justice.”¶ 2. Free trade restrains the power of the state. ¶ Free trade is morally superior to protectionism
because it places trust in what Adam Smith called “the natural system of liberty” rather than in a mancentered system of centralized industrial policy. And by doing so it allows citizens to fulfill their creative
and productive potential.¶ There is no compelling moral reason why a small group of politicians should
decide what goods and services an individual can buy with his earnings based solely on where those
products are produced. By diffusing economic decision-making as broadly as possible, free trade reduces
the power of fallible and fallen people in high places to inflict damage on society.¶ As economists have
been pointing out for two centuries now, the gains that protectionism confers on a select group of
producers and the government’s coffers are almost always outweighed by the losses imposed on the
mass of consumers. This dead-weight loss weakens the productive capacity of the country as a whole
compared to what it would be if its citizens were allowed to engage in free trade. ¶ Producers who seek
protection are not only robbing their fellow citizens of income and freedom of choice; they are sapping the
economic strength of their own society. Protectionists are prone to wrap their agenda in words of
patriotism and compassion, but their aim is self-centered and self-serving.¶ 3. Free trade encourages
individuals to cultivate moral virtues.¶ To be successful in a free and open marketplace, producers must
serve their fellow human beings by providing goods and services others want and need. And the most
economically successful will be those who provide not just for a select few but for a broad segment of
consumers.¶ In the 1991 papal encyclical Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul II observed that a market
system encourages the important virtues of “diligence, industriousness, prudence in undertaking
reasonable risks, reliability and fidelity in interpersonal relationships, as well as courage in carrying out
decisions which are difficult and painful but necessary.” On top of such character traits, trade encourages
good manners and the decent treatment of others.¶ In the long run, trade rewards those participants who
act in a trustworthy manner. A supplier who misses deadlines for shipment or a buyer whose credit is no
good will soon lose business to their competitors with better reputations. In other words, there is no
inherent conflict between good business and good morals, and in a free and open market under the rule
of law the two complement each other.¶ 4. Free trade brings people together across distance and
cultures.¶ Trade opens the door for relationships that transcend economic exchange. When nations trade
with one another, more than material goods cross borders. People and ideas inevitably follow through the
same open doors. Fax machines, cellular telephones, and the Internet are rapidly spreading as tools of
international business, but they are also tools of friendship and evangelism. At a Cato Policy forum in
1999, Ned Graham, son of Billy Graham and president of East Gates International, spoke about the
impact of expanding trade on his organization’s missionary work in China:¶ Ten years ago, there was
almost no information-exchange technology available to the average Chinese citizen. If we wanted to
contact a friend in China, we usually had to do so by mail unless that individual had a private phone,
which was extremely rare in the inland provinces. Today, despite difficulties, much of that has changed.
We routinely communicate with thousands of friends all over China via fax, cell phones, and email. The
proliferation of information technology has allowed us to be much more effective in developing and
organizing our work in the PRC.¶ Today more than 100 Western missionary groups are either working or
attempting to work openly in China to spread the faith. Since 1992, Ned Graham’s organization has
legally distributed more than 2.5 million Bibles to non-registered believers in China. This ministry would
have been impossible without China’s economic opening to the world that began 20 years ago and
America’s ongoing policy response of engagement. More than 20 million Chinese are now on the Internet
and that number has been growing exponentially. The number of telephone lines and cell phones in
China has grown more than ten-fold in the last decade. The works of Friedrich Hayek, probably this
century’s most influential defender of a free society, are now being distributed legally on the Mainland.
Free trade has brought new ideas and new relationships to China and other previously closed societies.¶
5. Free trade encourages other basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and religio n.¶ This
is probably the most contentious of the seven reasons, and it goes to the heart of the current debate
about trade with China and the use of sanctions in the name of human rights and democracy. By raising
the general standard of living, free trade helps people achieve higher levels of education and to gain
access to alternative sources of information. It helps to create a more independently minded middle class
that can form the backbone of more representative kinds of government. The wealth created from
expanded trade can help to nurture and sustain civil institutions that can offer ideas and influence outside
of government. The emergence of civil liberties and more representative government in countries such as
Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico can be credited in large part to economic development spurred by free
trade and market reforms.¶ As a general rule, nations that are more open economically tend to enjoy other
liberties as well. In the last 25 years, as the world has turned away from centralized economic controls
and toward a more open global market, political and civil freedoms have also spread. In 1975, only 42
countries in the world were classified by the non-profit group Freedom House as being politically free,
where citizens enjoy full civil and political freedoms. Today the number has more than doubled to 85. The
percentage of the world’s people enjoying full civil and political freedom has also more than doubled
during that time, from 18 percent to 40 percent.¶ In his book, Business as a Calling, Michael Novak
explains the linkage with what he calls “the wedge theory”: Capitalist practices, runs the theory, bring
contact with the ideas and practices of the free societies, generate the economic growth that gives
political confidence to a rising middle class, and raise up successful business leaders who come to
represent a political alternative to military or party leaders. In short, capitalist firms wedge a democratic
camel’s nose under the authoritarian tent.¶ Religiously motivated conservatives who want to impose
sanctions against China would undermine progress on human rights by removing one of the most positive
influences in Chinese society. Granted, the Chinese government today remains an oppressive
dictatorship, a bad regime that jails its political opponents and interferes in the private lives of its citizens.
But for all its unforgivable faults, the Chinese government today is not nearly as bad as the government
was during the totalitarian rule of Mao Tse-tung, when millions were killed and the entire social order was
convulsed by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The people of China do not yet enjoy
the range of political and civil rights we do in the West, but they are freer and materially better off than
they were three decades ago. For that they can thank economic and trade liberalization.¶ 6. Free trade
fosters peace by raising the cost of war.¶ In an 1845 speech in the British House of Commons,
Richard Cobden called free trade “that advance which is calculated to knit nations more together in the
bonds of peace by means of commercial intercourse.” Free trade does not guarantee peace, but it does
strengthen peace by raising the cost of war to governments and their citizens. As nations become more
integrated through expanding markets, they have more to lose should trade be disrupted.¶ In recent years,
the twin trends of globalization and democratization have produced their own “peace dividend”: since
1987, real spending on armaments throughout the world has dropped by more than one-third. Since the
end of the Cold War, the threat of major international wars has receded. Those nations most closely
associated with international terrorism — Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea —
are among the least globalized countries in the world in terms of non-oil trade and foreign investment. Not
one of them belongs to the World Trade Organization.¶ During the 1930s, the industrialized nations waged
trade wars against each other. They raised tariffs and imposed quotas in order to protect domestic
industry. The result, however, was that other nations only raised their barriers even further, choking off
global trade and deepening and prolonging the global economic depression. Those dark economic times
contributed to the conflict that became World War II. America’s post-war policy of encouraging free trade
through multilateral trade agreements was aimed at promoting peace as much as it was prosperity. ¶
Economy
Econ Good
Poverty
Growth solves poverty
Kraay and Dollar, 1
Aart Kraay and David Dollar *a Research Manager in the Development Research Group of the World
Bank's Development Economics Vice Presidency, **Senior Economist in the Development Research
Group of the World Bank's Development Economics Vice Presidency, “Trade, Growth, and Poverty,”
International Monetary Fund, Sept. 2001, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/dollar.htm //
IS
The world has become a much smaller place over the past two decades. International trade has grown
twice as fast as worldwide income during this period. Spurred by advances in information technology, a
growing share of this trade is in services rather than merchandise, especially among rich countries.
International direct and portfolio equity investment has also surged tremendously during the same period.
What are the implications of international integration—or globalization—for inequality and poverty? In
recent research (Dollar and Kraay, 2001b), we have explored this question by studying the experiences of
a group of developing countries that have significantly opened up to international trade during the past
two decades. We provide evidence that, contrary to popular beliefs , increased trade has strongly
encouraged growth and poverty reduction and has contributed to narrowing the gaps between rich and
poor worldwide. Growth rates have increased Per capita GDP growth in the post-1980 globalizers
accelerated from 1.4 percent a year in the 1960s and 2.9 percent a year in the 1970s to 3.5 percent in the
1980s and 5.0 percent in the 1990s (Chart 1). This acceleration in growth is even more remarkable given
that the rich countries saw steady declines in growth from a high of 4.7 percent in the 1960s to 2.2
percent in the 1990s. Also, the nonglobalizing developing countries did much worse than the globalizers,
with the former's annual growth rates falling from highs of 3.3 percent during the 1970s to only 1.4
percent during the 1990s. This rapid growth among the globalizers is not simply due to the strong
performances of China and India in the 1980s and 1990s—18 out of the 24 globalizers experienced
increases in growth, many of them quite substantial. Real per capita GDP growth Although these
experiences are suggestive of the growth effects of trade, they are hardly conclusive. In recent research,
we have studied the growth effects of trade more systematically using a large sample of developed and
developing countries. Although a large body of literature has examined the effects of trade on growth (and
many of these studies have found substantial growth effects of trade), this evidence has recently been
subjected to criticism, most influentially by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000). First, many existing studies
measure trade openness simply as the share of a country's trade in its GDP. However, differences in
countries' trade shares reflect their geographic characteristics (for example, countries that are small and
close to major markets tend to trade more than countries that are large or remote) to a much greater
extent than their trade policy decisions. As a result, it is difficult to draw conclusions from many of these
studies, which rely on cross-country evidence, about the effects of trade liberalization on growth. Worse,
the observed correlation between trade and growth may simply reflect geographical determinants of
growth. Efforts to use more direct measures of trade policy (such as average tariffs or nontariff barriers)
have shown mixed results, although this may simply reflect the difficulties in systematically measuring
these indicators of trade policy. Second, it is often difficult to disentangle the effects of trade liberalization
from other domestic policy choices—after all, many countries that liberalize trade often simultaneously
embark on other domestic reforms that can also have sizable growth benefits. Without adequately
controlling for other policies, one risks confounding the effects of trade liberalization with other growthenhancing policies. Third, it is difficult to identify the direction of causation in many existing studies—does
trade cause faster growth or do economies that grow quickly also trade more? While conclusively
identifying causal effects of trade on growth is likely to remain elusive for some time, it is possible to
improve on many existing studies that ignore the issue entirely. In our recent research, we have
attempted to address some of these concerns. In order to eliminate the geographically determined
component of trade, we have estimated the effect of trade on growth using decade-over-decade changes
in countries' trade as shares of their GDPs. This, by definition, removes the spurious effect of geography
on trade and growth (because countries' geographic characteristics do not change over time) and, in our
view, gives a cleaner (although still far from perfect) measure of the policy-induced component of trade.
To control for the effects of other contemporaneous changes in policies and institutions that may affect
growth, we included measures of the stability of monetary policy, financial development, and political
instability. Finally, we use an econometric technique for which the results are less likely to reflect reverse
causation running from growth to trade. The evidence that emerges from this analysis is consistent with
the experiences of the post-1980 globalizers. We found a statistically significant and economically
meaningful effect of trade on growth: an increase in trade as a share of GDP of 20 percentage points
increases growth by between 0.5 and 1 percentage point a year. Inequality has not increased
systematically Although the growth benefits of trade are increasingly recognized, many analysts are
legitimately concerned about the effects of trade liberalization on income distribution. In our research,
however, we document that the growth benefits of increased trade are, on average, widely shared—we
have found no evidence of a systematic tendency for inequality to increase when international trade
increases (see Dollar and Kraay, 2001a). Chart 2 illustrates this point by plotting changes in a measure of
inequality (the Gini coefficient, which ranges from 0 to 100, with a higher coefficient indicating greater
inequality) on the vertical axis, and changes in trade volumes on the horizontal axis. This figure reflects
the experiences of more than 100 developed and developing countries, with changes in trade and
changes in inequality measured over periods of at least five years in order to capture the medium-to-longrun relationship between trade and inequality. Chart 2 exhibits a striking absence of any simple
correlation between changes in trade and changes in inequality. In our other research, we have examined
the validity of this simple result in several dimensions. We considered a wide variety of measures of
openness, including direct measures of trade policy and international capital flows, as well as trade
volumes themselves. We also searched for nonlinearities in this relationship, allowing for the possibility
that the effects of trade on inequality are different in rich and poor countries and in countries with different
factor endowments. The conclusion that emerges from this—that there is little evidence of a systematic
tendency for inequality to either increase or decrease with increased trade—is consistent with the simple
evidence presented in Chart 2. Changes in trade and income inequality This evidence is also consistent
with the experiences of the post-1980 globalizers. While several of our globalizers have seen increases in
inequality (most notably China, where the Gini coefficient increased from around 32 in the early 1980s to
40 in the mid-1990s), several others have seen decreases (for example, Malaysia, where the Gini
coefficient fell from 51 to 48 during the same period). And, in many countries, large shifts in income
distribution can arguably be linked to influences far removed from international trade. In China, for
example, domestic liberalization, restrictions on internal migration, and agricultural policies have played a
much larger role than increases in international trade. Poverty has declined The combination of
increases in growth and little systematic change in inequality in the globalizers has considerably boosted
efforts to reduce poverty. In Malaysia, for example, the average income of the poorest fifth of the
population grew at a robust 5.4 percent annually. Even in China, where inequality did increase sharply
and the income growth rate of the poorest fifth lagged behind average income growth, incomes of the
poorest fifth still grew at 3.8 percent annually. The fraction of the population of these countries living
below the $1 a day poverty threshold fell sharply between the 1980s and the 1990s: from 43 percent to
36 percent in Bangladesh, from 20 percent to 15 percent in China, and from 13 percent to 10 percent in
Costa Rica, to name a few. Gap between rich and poor has narrowed We have already seen that
income inequality within countries is as likely to decrease as increase with increased trade. But is
globalization leaving poor countries behind and widening the gap between the richest and poorest
countries? Our evidence on the growth performance of the globalizers relative to the rich countries and
the nonglobalizing developing countries suggests otherwise. The rapid growth of the globalizers relative
to the rich countries means that the globalizers are narrowing the per capita income gap. Moreover,
because most of the globalizers—especially China, India, and Bangladesh—were among the poorest
countries in the world twenty years ago, their growth has been a force for narrowing worldwide inequality.
Dedev
Collapse inevitable
Economic collapse inevitable – best studies
Hopper, 14
Tristin Hopper is an award-winning reporter working for the National desk of the National Post. Originally
from Victoria, BC, the first years of Tristin's journalism career were spent in Whitehorse, where he was a
reporter for the Yukon News and later an associate editor for Up Here and Up Here Business magazine,
citing a U.S. team led by applied mathematician Safa Motesharrei and funded in part by NASA’s Goddard
Space Flight Center, “The utter collapse of human civilization will be ‘difficult to avoid,’ NASA funded
study says,” 3/18/14, http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/18/the-utter-collapse-of-human-civilizationwill-be-difficult-to-avoid-nasa-funded-study-says/ // IS
After running the numbers on a set of four equations representing human society, a team of NASAfunded mathematicians has come to the grim conclusion that the utter collapse of human civilization
will be “difficult to avoid.” The exact scenario may vary, but in the coming decades humanity is
essentially doomed to some variant of “Elites” consuming too much, “resulting in a famine among
Commoners that eventually causes the collapse of society.” That is, unless civilization is ready for one of
two “major policy changes ”: inequality must be “greatly reduced” or population growth must be “strictly
controlled.” The apocalyptic pronouncements, set to be published in an upcoming edition of Ecological
Economics, come courtesy of a U.S. team led by applied mathematician Safa Motesharrei and funded in
part by NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. The otherwise obscure report was first made public in a
recent column in Britain’s The Guardian newspaper in which environment writer Nafeez Ahmed warned
that it constituted a “highly credible wake-up call” and declared that its menu of suggested policy changes
were “required immediately.” In the days since, environmentalists, socialists, hard-line U.S. Republicans
and even survivalists have taken up the banner of the 32-page study. Derrick O’Keefe, the Vancouverbased former editor of Rabble.ca, wrote in a Tuesday Twitter post that “this NASA-funded study makes
case that future is socialism or extinction.” At about the same time, an anonymous commenter on
M4Carbine.net declared “this is why I keep buying ammo.” The study starts by reducing human civilization
into four easy-to-toggle factors: Elites, Commoners, nature and wealth. The paper explains that this was
done because “ecological strain” and “economic stratification” are the only two things that consistently
plague collapsing societies. Each factor was then assigned a complex mathematical equation and
gathered together in what researchers called the HANDY (Human And Nature Dynamical) model. The
model was then configured to calculate the fate of several types of societies, including the “unequal
society,” a system of rich and poor that researchers dubbed the one most “closely reflecting the reality of
our world today.” In the first scenario the population of elites suddenly spikes after 750 years, causing a
“scarcity of workers” that sounds the civilization’s death knell by year 1000. The second, “full collapse”
scenario has the elites and commoners irreparably eating up the Earth’s resources after 350 years,
leading to a slow bleed that destroys both humans and the planet by year 500. “It is important to note that
in both of these scenarios, the Elites — due to their wealth — do not suffer the detrimental effects of the
environmental collapse until much later than the Commoners,” reads the paper. “We could posit that this
buffer of wealth … allows Elites to continue ‘business as usual’ despite the impending catastrophe,” it
continues, suggesting that these kind of “oblivious elites” destroyed the Mayans and the Romans. The
only two scenarios that do not kill everyone, in fact, are the ones in which birth rates are either strictly
controlled or “resources are distributed in a reasonably equitable fashion.” The non-deadly scenarios “are
designed to indicate the kinds of policies needed to avoid this catastrophic outcomes,” read the study.
The study is eerily reminiscent of the 19th century writings of English scholar Thomas Malthus, who
concluded that without massive controls of the birth rate (preferably through abstinence), humanity was
doomed to eat itself to famine and disaster. Two hundred years of technological advances in agriculture,
however, have made many of Malthus’ predictions somewhat moot. But this time around, simply being
modern and technologically advanced will not be enough , claims the Safa Motesharrei study, pointing
to the likes of the Roman Empire as evidence that “advanced, sophisticated, complex and creative
civilizations can be both fragile and impermanent.” “Every civilization we know about has collapsed: the
Maya, the Romans, Chinese dynasties, the Sumerians,” Debora MacKenzie, a Belgium-based Canadian
journalist who has written about societal collapse for New Scientist, told the National Post by email.
Growth Bad – Poverty
Growth causes poverty
Trainer 2
Ted Trainer, Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work at the University of New South Wales, “If You Want
Affluence, Prepare for War,” Democracy & Nature, Taylor & Francis Online // IS
Rich countries are taking most of the world’s resource production. Their per capita resource consumption is about 20 times the
average of the poorest half of the world’s people. That they are consuming far more than their fair share is evident in many measures; for
example, to provide a North American lifestyle requires approximately 12 ha of productive land, but the per capital average amount of productive land
on the planet is only 1.2 ha. The
rich squander resources on affluent living standards and frivolous luxuries while billions live in
poverty. Many of these resources are drawn from the Third World. Much of the productive capacity of the Third World
has been allocated to the production of commodities and manufactured goods for the benefit of the corporations and banks in the rich countries, who
own the plantations and factories, and of the people who shop in rich world supermarkets. Very little of the benefit goes to the poor majority in the Third World. Shirt makers in
Bangladesh are paid 15 cents an hour.2 In other words, the development that has taken place is almost totally inappropriate to the needs of most Third World people. It has
been development in the interests of the rich. The crucial point about ‘development’ is to do with options foregone. It is easy to imagine forms of development that are far more
likely to meet the needs of people, their society and their ecosystems but these are prohibited by conventional/ capitalist development. Needs would be most effectively met if
people were able to apply their available resources of land, forest, fisheries, labour, skill and capital to the production of basic items such as food and shelter. This is precisely
what normal conventional /capitalist
development prevents, because it ensures that the available resources and the
productive capacity are drawn into the most profitable ventures , which means mostly into producing relatively luxurious items for
export to richer people. Compare the capacity of a worker to feed his family on the 15 cents an hour wage earned in a shirt factory, spent on food
imported from a rich country, with the approximately four hours per week required by a home gardener to produce all the vegetables a family requires.3
The global economy is therefore an imperial system, one in which
there is a net flow of resources and wealth from the poor to
the rich and the resources the poor majority of people once had have been taken from them and now produce mostly for the benefit of the rich few.
These unjust distributions and the inappropriate development are primarily due to the market mechanism. Economic
activity and especially development are not determined by reference to the needs of humans , societies and
ecosystems. In the present global economy they are determined mostly by market forces. The inevitable result is that the rich get almost all
of the valuable resources (because they can pay most for them) and that almost all of the development that takes place is development of
whatever rich people want (because that is most profitable, i.e. will return most on invested capital). It is in other words a capitalist economic
system and such a system ensures that the few who own most of the capital (most is now owned by about 1% of the world’s
people) will only invest it in ventures that are most likely to maximise profits, and therefore in ventures which produce for
those people with most ‘effective demand’, i.e. rich people. No other forms of development are undertaken, hence much of the
productive capacity of Tuvalu or Haiti lies idle because people with capital can make more money investing somewhere else. More importantly, no
other forms of development are conceivable. The dominant ideology has ensured that ‘development’ cannot be thought of in any other way than as
investing capital in order to increase the capacity to produce for sale in the market.4 Thus the possibility that development might be seen
predominantly as improving the quality of life, security, the environment and social cohesion, or that these things might be achievable only if the goal of
Development can only
be thought of in terms of movement along the single dimension to greater levels of business turnover,
sales, consumption, exporting, investing and GDP. Thus conventional development is only the kind of
development that results when what is developed is left to be determined by whatever will most enrich
those few with capital competing in a market situation. The inevitable result is development in the
interests of the rich, i.e. those with the capital to invest and those with most purchasing power. The global economy now works
well for perhaps less than 10% of the world’s people, i.e. the upper 40% of the people in rich counties, plus the tiny Third World
elites. Conventional development is, in other words, a form of plunder. It takes most of the world’s wealth,
especially its productive capacity and allocates it to the rich few, and it takes much of this from billions of people who are so
increasing the GDP is rejected, almost never occurs in the development literature, let alone in development practice.
seriously deprived that 1200 million people are malnourished and tens of thousands die every day. Again the core point is that there are far better
options; it is possible to imagine other forms of development in which the resources and the productive capacity of Third World people are fully devoted
to production by the people of the things they most urgently need.
*AT: Growth Good
Growth doesn’t solve poverty – best studies
Irwin, 14
Neil Irwin, senior economics correspondent for The New York Times, M.B.A. from Columbia University,
where he was a Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics and Business Journalism, “Growth Has Been Good
for Decades. So Why Hasn’t Poverty Declined?” The New York Times, 6/5/14,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/upshot/growth-has-been-good-for-decades-so-why-hasnt-povertydeclined.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 // IS
“The federal government,” Paul Ryan, the House Budget Committee chairman, wrote in The Wall Street
Journal, “needs to remember that the best anti-poverty program is economic growth,” which is not so
different from the argument put forth by John F. Kennedy (in a somewhat different context) that “a rising
tide lifts all boats.” In Kennedy’s era, that had the benefit of being true . From 1959 to 1973, the
nation’s economy per person grew 82 percent, and that was enough to drive the proportion of the poor
population from 22 percent to 11 percent. But over the last generation in the United States, that simply
hasn’t happened . Growth has been pretty good, up 147 percent per capita. But rather than decline
further, the poverty rate has bounced around in the 12 to 15 percent range — higher than it was even in
the early 1970s. The mystery of why — and how to change that — is one of the most fundamental
challenges in the nation’s fight against poverty. The disconnect between growth and poverty reduction is
a key finding of a sweeping new study of wages from the Economic Policy Institute. The liberal-leaning
group’s policy prescriptions are open to debate, but this piece of data the researchers find is hard to
dispute: From 1959 to 1973, a more robust United States economy and fewer people living below the
poverty line went hand-in-hand. That relationship broke apart in the mid-1970s. If the old relationship
between growth and poverty had held up, the E.P.I. researchers find, the poverty rate in the United States
would have fallen to zero by 1986 and stayed there ever since. “It used to be that as G.D.P. per capita
grew, poverty declined in lock step,” said Heidi Shierholz, an economist at E.P.I. and an author of the
study. “There was a very tight relationship between overall growth and fewer and fewer Americans living
in poverty. Starting in the ′70s, that link broke.” Now, one shouldn’t interpret that too literally. The 1959 to
1973 period might be an unfair benchmark. The Great Society social safety net programs were being put
in place, and they may have had a poverty-lowering effect separate from that of the overall economic
trends. In other words, it may be simply that during that time, strong growth and a falling poverty rate
happened to take place simultaneously for unrelated reasons. And there presumably is some level of
poverty below which the official poverty rate will never fall, driven by people whose problems run much
deeper than economics. But the facts still cast doubt on the notion that growth alone will solve America’s
poverty problem.
Hegemony
AT: Heg Good
Impact defense
No heg now and military power fails
Mitzayan, 13
Gevorg Mirzayan, Russian political expert cited in numerous articles, “Is Russia-U.S.A. Partnership a
Reality?” 12/7/13, Global Affairs, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/Is-Russia-USA-Partnership-a-Reality16233 // IS
Several years ago the world entered the multipolar era, with the United States no longer the
global leader. Without a doubt, the American military budget still exceeds the aggregate defense
spending of all key powers, but the U.S.A. definitely lacks the political, economic and image-related
clout to settle regional crises on its own, even relatively minor ones in Somalia or Libya. The U.S.’s
informal leadership is fading into the past, a claim made not only by Russia but also by Europe, who is
more or less successfully attempting to become independent from the foreign policy of Washington; Israel
and Saudi Arabia, who are both unhappy about Washington's desire to conduct foreign relations with Iran;
Egypt, China, Pakistan, Japan and other countries. The United States also recognizes this changing
reality. Having ousted the Bush doctrine of American omnipresence, Mr. Obama's approach implies the
de facto rejection of a globalized foreign policy, a minimizing of U.S. political commitments in most
regions of the world (first of all in the Middle East), and a concentration of assets along the important
Asia-Pacific track. This position has even obtained support from the hostile Republican Party, for example
during the Syrian crisis. According to the Washington Post, the majority of Republicans in Congress were
ready to vote against a U.S. intervention in Syria [1]. Their inherent desire for an indirect conflict with Iran
in Syria (in the bipolar world, such wars are referred to as peripheral conflicts) and even the opportunity to
entangle Mr. Obama in an unpopular war were not enough to prevent Republican neo-isolationism and
statements that "the war in Syria has no clear national security connection to the United States." [2] The
American electorate fully shares the pragmatic and essentially isolationist attitudes of the White House
and Congress. According to an ABC News/Washington Post survey, in spite of the massive campaign to
demonize Bashar Assad, only 36 percent of Americans supported intervention in the Syrian conflict,
whereas 59 per cent were against it [3]. As a result, U.S. policies under Mr. Obama are effectively
switching over from the Roman to the British-style paradigm. The appetite for global dominance and a
readiness to solve all international problems have been ousted in favor of strengthening regional
systems of checks and balances, as well as establishing local sheriffs, i.e. states charged with stabilizing
and managing their regions taking into account U.S. interests. With these steps, Washington would like to
appoint several managing states in each region so that they could contain each other’s aspirations,
determine the frontiers for mutual expansion, and maintain the regional balance of power. This has been
exactly the case with the American policy change towards Iran. If the American strategy of engagement
succeeds, Tehran, along with Ankara, will become local sheriffs for handling crises in the Middle East. A
similar role is in store for Russia, although in another part of the world.
Impossible
Hegemony is impossible and no transition wars – best studies
Nguyen, 14
Thomas Nguyen, Fellow of the Future Worlds Project at Carnegie Council for Ethics and International
Affairs and Data Lab Program Administrator at the International Peace Institute. He has previously
worked a Columbia University and at the US State Department. He holds a Master of International Affairs
from Columbia University as well as philosophy and political science degrees from the University of Texas
at Austin. Cited authors mentioned at note 50: Krauthammer, Zakaria, Bremmer, and Kupchan. “Of All
Possible Future Worlds: Toward a Logic of One World,” 2014,
http://www.possiblefutureworlds.com/chapter7 // IS
The impossible is that which does not exist in any possible world or only exists in some impossible world. If an impossible world is
excluded, particular flavors of that world will not exist either. Neither a unified global state nor a hegemonic global
empire will prevail in fifteen years, according to all of the reports . By this account, what is impossible may not seem
too surprising for conventional foreign policy thinkers. The end of the Cold War signaled to many the end of communism as a
competitive world ideology to Western values of individual and group rights.[48] The end of such a history is a decades-old story.[49]
What receives less attention but warrants more, however, is what we lose and what we gain from these impossible worlds. What is
deemed impossible has profound consequences on how we should address liberty, justice, peace, and pluralism. With the
impossibility of these two idealized worlds come both positive and negative tradeoffs. For years now scholars and experts
have argued that America’s unipolar moment is coming to an end .[50] Thus, the expectation of a new
hegemonic global empire instantiated as a Pax Americana is more a nostalgic fantasy rather than a
forthcoming, expected reality. At most, as the Russian “Strategic Global Outlook 2030” report predicted,
America may remain the most dominant player on the global scene that will preside over all other states
in a global federation. But even then the US will not be a full-fledged hegemon dictating what other countries
should do. With the impossibility of a hegemonic world, the prospects for a highly stable and peaceful world are relatively diminished
according to Walzer’s spectrum.[51] For those American patriots who see with a sense of loss America’s
declining role in the world as a stabilizer and peacemaker, there may still be some silver lining. No other
country will assume that role either: there will be no Pax China or Pax India. Further, as these countries
rise, they will increasingly—even if unevenly—share our values. I do not think that a patriot whose values will spread
to the rest of the world should be too disappointed with such a future. Thus, although peace may be uncertain, no one
country will arbitrarily determine or endanger an individual’s liberty or a people’s freedom in another
country without legitimate contest. Our values may be unevenly distributed in our possible worlds, but they will be more
shared than if we were living in such an idealized hegemonic world. This relative lack of order and peace may be the direst for
people and peoples in weak, conflict-ridden, or tyrannical states since these states will still be insulated enough from the rest of the
world to rule over their own sovereignty, even if in atrocious ways. Although these peoples’ position is disconcerting and our values
may vary within countries, at least on a different level, globalized tyranny will not be in any of our immediate futures .
Not falsifiable
It’s just not falsifiable
Rosencrance, 8
Richard Rosencrance, “The Failure of Static and the Need for Dynamic Approaches to International
Relations,” Oxford University Press, 2008,
https://www.academia.edu/2829745/1_Core_Assumptions_of_Liberal_Theory // IS
THE perennial difficulty in the study of international relations is that general theories holding statically
over time are unsatisfactory. The leading theories—emphasizing a single concept (“realism,”
“constructivism,” “liberalism,” and so on)—themselves either are
unfalsifiable , or if falsifiable, are
false . There are few if any theoretical propositions that are both falsifiable and true. As a result,
practitioners have to make do with empirical generalizations that hold only part of the time—that is, apply
only probabilistically. Both international and domestic factors have to be taken into account in order to
develop a reasonable static approach to how nations behave. A three-variable conspectus that comprises
(1) end p.716 international restraints and availabilities; (2) leadership preconceptions; and (3) domestic
restraints and pressures can explain international outcomes more fully than any of these variables taken
individually. A regression equation, in short, is necessary. The coefficients of this equation, however, may
have changed over time, with international coefficients having less strength than they once did and
domestic ones more strength (see, inter alia, Reus-Smit 1999). I shall elaborate these claims in the first
half of this chapter. In the second half I will concentrate on some dynamic features of the international
system that point to the possibility of different and more cooperative outcomes in the years ahead as the
influence and content of these factors undergo change.
Tradeoff – Soft Power
Hard power undermines soft power – that’s key to peace
Kinzer, 15
Stephen Kinzer, a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University,
“We’ll always be the foreigners,” The Boston Globe, 7/20/15,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/07/19/alwaysforeigners/fzloR9tFsD2mXIOCwYDNUK/story.html // IS
If the bad news is that most of our military adventures are doomed to failure, there is also good news. We
have another way to influence foreign countries. The triumph of American popular culture in the world is
total. With sneakers and pop stars come ideas we want to promote. These ideas transform societies.
Cultural imperialism, sometimes called “soft power,” is one of America’s most potent weapons. We should
let it do its slow work. American interventions aim to unite foreign peoples behind our vision for their
country. Often they have the opposite effect . The coalition that deposed the Shah of Iran in 1979
included groups that hated each other, but shared a burning desire to end United States control of their
country. Some Afghans support the Taliban not because they favor its program, but because the Taliban
is from Afghanistan and they see the other side as a tool of the United States. In Iraq, former officers of
Saddam Hussein’s ultra-secular army have joined with religious fundamentalists to fight the Americanbacked government. People in countries that the United States invades, occupies, or dominates may
flock to our side for a while. In the end, though, many come to see us above all as foreigners — because
that is what we are. It is folly to assume that the United States, or any outside power, can use military
power to win “hearts and minds” in a faraway land. For centuries this didn’t matter. Instead of trying to win
the friendship of local people, big powers simply crushed them. Only when that went out of fashion did we
invent the fantasy that an invading army can win hearts and minds. Generations of wise Americans have
sought to purge it from the American soul. Among the first was William Graham Sumner, the renowned
Yale professor who invented the term “ethnocentrism.” “We assume that what we like and practice, and
what we think better, must come as a welcome blessing to Spanish-Americans and Filipinos,” Sumner
warned more than a century ago as the United States prepared to take its first overseas territories. “This
is grossly and obviously untrue. They hate our ways. They are hostile to our ideas. Our religion,
language, institutions, and manners offend them. They like their own ways, and if we appear amongst
them as rulers, there will be social discord.” This is as true today as it was then. Yet the illusion that
people around the world are eagerly awaiting our guidance is deeply rooted in the American psyche. In
the wake of the Cold War, some went so far as to claim that all nations were finally concluding our way of
life is best for everyone. It isn’t. Nations and peoples want to find their own way, not follow formulas from
the other side of the world. We win friends by letting them do so.
AT: Military tech
Litany of alt causes
Thompson, 15
Loren Thompson, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer
of Source Associates, was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown, doctoral and
masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political
science from Northeastern University, ”Five Reasons America's Rivals Are Catching Up In Military
Technology,” Forbes, 7/9/15, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2015/07/09/five-reasonsamericas-rivals-are-catching-up-in-military-technology/ // IS
As the Obama years begin winding down, senior Pentagon officials have belatedly noticed that potential
enemies are closing the gap with America in military technology. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert
Work told a Washington audience earlier this year that “Russia and China are fielding very advanced
capabilities at an extremely rapid pace” — long-range antiship missiles, sophisticated jamming systems,
stealthy aircraft and other warfighting gear in which America once had a big advantage. Meanwhile,
regional players like Iran are demonstrating surprising skill at fielding warfighting technology suited to
blunting American military power locally, and even non-state actors like ISIS are presenting U.S. military
planners with unexpected challenges.
The defense department’s answer to America’s eroding edge in the tools of war is what Work and others
call an “offset strategy” — a combination of leap-ahead technology, novel operating concepts, and new
organizational constructs aimed at bolstering the joint force’s ability to best even the most capable
adversaries. The department says similar strategies aimed at offsetting the rising power of overseas
adversaries were fruitful during the 1950s and 1970s. However, the Obama Administration doesn’t
exhibit much reflection about why America’s rivals are catching up in the first place, perhaps because any
such exercise would lead inexorably to the conclusion that its own policies are part of the problem. Here
are five reasons why.
1. Chronic under-investment in military modernization. The United States hasn’t invested heavily in new
military technology for 30 years. In 1985, at the height of the Reagan defense buildup, the purchasing
power of the Pentagon’s procurement budget was twice what it is today — and four times today’s level
relative to the size of the national economy. Now that was an offset strategy. Once the Cold War ended,
though, Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 43 and Obama all found excuses for not spending heavily on new gear,
and today’s increasingly decrepit military arsenal reflects that pattern. George W. Bush began his term of
office with a “military transformation” initiative that sounded a lot like today’s offset strategy, but that
proved ill-suited to the demands of a global war on terror.
When Obama took office in 2009, he quickly wiped out what little was left of his predecessor’s
transformation initiatives. In fact, virtually all of the savings realized in military spending during the
President’s first term came from military modernization. The same pattern persisted in his second term,
as Obama chose to comply with “sequestration” legislation aimed at controlling budget deficits by cutting
defense technology accounts while sparing other types of military spending. So no kidding, today the
U.S. spends less on military technology than it does on beer and cigarettes. Coming as they did after a
prolonged drought in military modernization, the Obama priorities have accelerated America’s military
decline.
2. A risk-averse acquisition culture. Technological breakthroughs of the kind that Edison, Tesla and
Westinghouse wrought are typically accompanied by numerous mistakes and false starts. When you’re
trying to do something that has never been done before, it’s nearly impossible to stick with a pre-ordained
plan or budget (look at Boeing’s Dreamliner). Politicians used to understand this; when Senator Harry
Truman stumbled across a secret plant that was part of the Manhattan Project to develop atomic bombs,
he accepted military assurances it was a necessary expenditure and ceased investigating. That trust is
completely gone today, replaced by a political culture in which legislators score points by attacking
military projects they don’t understand.
Not surprisingly, the prospect of being hauled in front of Senator McCain has had a chilling effect on the
willingness of Pentagon acquisition officials to take risks. And since Democrats never much cared for the
“military-industrial complex” anyway, there has been little opposition to continuously layering more
regulations, reviews and reporting requirements on an already underfunded modernization effort. The
Obama Administration’s contribution to the bureaucratization of defense acquisition is called “Better
Buying Power,” and seeks to control everything from contractor profits to intellectual property. To cope
with the consequences of their risk-minimization mindset, Pentagon officials now talk of looking to Silicon
Valley for breakthroughs they can’t get from traditional military contractors.
3. A preference for welfare over warfare. During the Obama years, U.S. defense spending has fallen
from over 4% of Gross Domestic Product to barely 3%. Most experts will tell you this reflects the winding
down of overseas wars and passage of deficit-control legislation capping military expenditures. However,
the Congressional Budget Office projects that long after the last U.S. soldier has departed Afghanistan
and deficit measures have lapsed, the claim of military spending on GDP will continue slipping — to about
2.6% in 2025. So something else is going on here, and that something else is entitlements. Formuladriven social welfare programs are gradually eclipsing other forms of spending in the federal budget,
including spending on military technology.
Republicans are not blameless in this process; they often seem to be competing with Democrats to see
who can provide more benefits to members of the All Volunteer Force — whether those benefits are
needed for recruitment and retention or not. When it comes to the broader fiscal challenge of a
continuously growing welfare state, though, there is little doubt that Democrats are the main culprits. And
because the benefits already guaranteed in law for the elderly, the indigent, the infirmed and other groups
are growing at a faster clip than tax receipts, they are squeezing federal investment in technology across
the board. President Obama has been typical of recent Democratic presidents in claiming to favor
greater investment while actually expanding consumption in the form of new welfare programs.
4. Misguided economic and trade policies. The country whose technology gains most worry Pentagon
leaders is China. Beijing is developing “anti-access/area denial” capabilities that could overwhelm U.S.
forces in the Western Pacific, thereby making China the dominant power in the global economy’s
industrial heartland. This is not unlike the challenge that Russia posed during the Cold War, but with a
peculiar twist — Washington is helping Beijing to displace American military power by acquiescing to
economic behavior that bolsters Chinese technological capabilities at U.S. expense. For instance, the
U.S. is running a trade deficit in products employing advanced technology of over a billion dollars per
week, and most of that is attributable to trade with China.
The Obama Administration has been strikingly ineffectual at preventing Chinese theft of U.S. intellectual
property. According to cybersecurity firm Mandiant, just one of the many state-sponsored hacking groups
operating in China “has systematically stolen hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141
organizations.” Such exploits enable China’s military labs and state-influenced enterprises to catch up
with the U.S. in key technologies much faster than would otherwise be feasible. Beyond that, the
administration’s failure to counter blatantly mercantilist policies such as trade subsidies and currency
manipulation has helped China to eclipse the U.S. in a wide range technologies, from renewable energy
to pharmaceuticals to material sciences.
5. A failure of imagination. Thomas Friedman of the New York Times observed in the aftermath of the 911 attacks that the U.S. government’s inability to prevent the attacks wasn’t so much a failure of
intelligence or coordination as a “failure of imagination.” The subsequent success of insurgents using
improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan confirmed his point: U.S. military leaders and their
civilian counterparts just aren’t very good at thinking outside the box. So they are frequently confronted
with crises for which they are not prepared. Pearl Harbor. Sputnik. The Tet Offensive. You’d think a
government that spends over a billion dollars per day on defense would be a little better at anticipating
such challenges.
One reason it isn’t is that U.S. political leaders often don’t want to hear inconvenient information —
information that gets in the way of their agendas or calls into question their preconceptions. The Obama
Administration is no exception. Since it can’t imagine Moscow using its nuclear weapons, it has made no
effort to defend the U.S. against a large-scale nuclear attack. Since it can’t imagine China using its cyber
capabilities to collapse the U.S. electrical grid, it has done little to secure the grid or punish China for its
continuous cyber campaigns. Since it can’t imagine large numbers of terrorists crossing from Mexico to
attack the U.S. homeland, it hasn’t invested in the kind of technology needed to secure the border.
Given the lack of urgency about the greatest threats America faces, it’s amazing the U.S. still holds any
edge at all in the technologies most vital to its security. If you want to understand why America’s lead in
military technology is waning, don’t investigate Chinese military doctrine. Just review the policies and
priorities that have prevailed in Washington over the last several years.
India Relations
Good
UQ
US-Indo relations are high but inaction will kill them
Lavoy and White, 15
Peter R. Lavoy and Joshua T. White, *Partner at Monitor 360, and formerly served in senior positions in
the Defense Department and the National Intelligence Council, **Senior Associate and Co-Director for
South Asia at the Stimson Center, “Sustaining Ambition in the U.S.-India Relationship,” 2/4/15, Foreign
Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/04/sustaining-ambition-in-the-u-s-india-relationship/ // IS
There is, of course, a risk that the skeptics will be right, that U.S.-India relations will settle into the slow
rhythm of a cricket match in which moments of high drama are followed by seemingly interminable
inactivity. To sustain the energy generated by this summit, Washington must focus now on
implementation —aggressively following through on the many commitments it made in New Delhi. But it
would be a mistake to stop there. The United States should continue pressing an ambitious agenda over
the next two years by seeking out ways to bolster India’s role in meeting global challenges, building a
capable defense industrial base, and taking leadership in the Asia-Pacific. This is not about setting an
agenda for New Delhi, but rather, achieving practical cooperation in areas of shared common interests
and goals.
Laundry List
Key to every existential threat
Armitage et al., 10
Richard Armitage, R. Nicholas Burns, and Richard Fontaine, *the President of Armitage International and
former Deputy Secretary of State. **a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. ***the President of the Center for New American
Security, “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October, Center for New
American Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Burns%20-%20Natural%20Allies.pdf // IS
A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of
U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the
most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the
last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation
agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and
deepened their global political cooperation. Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear
this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been
embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided.
The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its
Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet
there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its
promise. We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India
on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should
establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic
partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we
articulate here a specific agenda of action. In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic
partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in
support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of
bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security
relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a
step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls,
including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity
List. These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of
commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear
Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade;
enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export
control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and likeminded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. The U.S. relationship with
India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to
occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a
result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further
emergence as a great power. U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include: • Ensuring a stable
Asian and global balance of power.• Strengthening an open global trading system. • Protecting and
preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms). • Countering terrorism
and violent extremism. • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.• Bolstering the international
nonproliferation regime. • Promoting democracy and human rights. • Fostering greater stability, security
and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka. A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace
and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of
power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise
increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India
strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both
Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened
relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed
to a strong and enduring presence in Asia. The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond
regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all
major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting
regional and global partnership.
Terrorism
US-Indo relations solve counterterror
Carafano, et al. 13
James J. Carafano, a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges, is The Heritage
Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director
of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies. Walter Lohman, the Director of
The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Lisa Curtis analyzes America's economic, security and
political relationships with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other nations of South Asia as a senior
research fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Derek Scissors, PhD. senior Research Fellow “Beyond the
Plateau in U.S. – India Relations,” The Heritage Foundation, April 2013,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations // IS
Since the end of the Cold War, the challenges facing the international nonproliferation regime have grown
manifold. The threat of nuclear terrorism along with other regional challenges, such as the Iranian and
North Korean nuclear programs, and Chinese engagement in proliferation to Pakistan, Iran, and North
Korea, have added to the complexities. However, the biggest problem is the continuing crisis of the
regime itself. Disagreement among major powers has resulted in the current status of the regime. India
and the U.S. have several common interests when it comes to nonproliferation. For both countries, the
spread of nuclear weapons is a direct threat. Traditionally, India has been a critic of the global
nonproliferation regime while the U.S. has been a strong advocate of it. While it has been a critic of the
nonproliferation regime, India has never supported the spread of nuclear weapons. Many of the
differences between New Delhi and Washington have, however, been removed in the past 10 years,
beginning with the Bush Administration. With the U.S.–India nuclear deal, India has become more
integrated into the global nuclear order and has been more forthcoming in supporting the nonproliferation
regime. Under the Obama Administration, there have been further advances with export-control regimes.
Nevertheless, differences persist over how to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Nuclear Terrorism. One promising area for expanded U.S.–India cooperation is the prevention of nuclear
terrorism. Given the level of terrorist activity in the region and India's vulnerability to Pakistan-based and
state-supported terrorism, as well as the question of the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets, there is
strong concern in New Delhi about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, New Delhi is
concerned about partial state support to terrorist groups that might be interested in gaining access to
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is a growing concern,
especially given the number of Pakistani Taliban attacks on Pakistan's military facilities. A few years ago,
the U.S. had put in place contingency plans for the recovery of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the event of
a crisis of governance or, worse, an extremist takeover of the country. India and the U.S. must institute
measures that would ensure that nuclear weapons are in responsible hands. Helping to strengthen
Pakistan's command-and-control structure is an important task. In the unlikely event of a Taliban
takeover, India and the U.S. would have to work with both the civilian and military institutions to gain
complete control of the weapons, failing which, India and the U.S. would have to physically take control of
the weapons and neutralize them. With the U.S. set to draw down forces in Afghanistan, India's concerns
about the potential for nuclear terrorism in the region will only grow . The U.S., and India to a lesser
extent, are also concerned about the possibility that Iran might transfer its emerging nuclear capabilities
to terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. There is strong potential for India and the U.S. to increase their
cooperation to deal with this common threat, including establishing certain contingency measures in the
event of a catastrophic development, as well as preparing means to secure vulnerable nuclear facilities.
AT: Good
High now
14 reasons why relations are high now
Madan, 14
Tanvi Madan, fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Harrington doctoral fellow
and teaching assistant at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at
Austin, Ph.D. from UT-Austin, M.A. in International Relations from Yale, B.A. (Hons.) in History from Lady
Shri Ram College, “India-U.S. Relations in 14 Charts and Graphics,” The Brookings Institute, 9/26/14,
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/09/26-us-india-relations-in-14-charts-madan // IS
As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits the United States, it's worth putting the India-U.S.
relationship in perspective and considering how far it has come in recent years. Fifteen years ago, there
were U.S. sanctions on India. More recently, the Obama administration has said the U.S. relationship with
India "will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century." These 14 charts and graphics show
that the relationship has changed in other ways as well, including the areas of high-level India-U.S.
engagement, economic and defense ties, people-to-people connections amongst Indians and Americans
and future opportunities to increase bilateral cooperation.
1. High-level India-U.S. engagement has been more frequent in the last decade and a half than in
the years before that.
2. In recent years, the India-U.S. relationship has enjoyed bipartisan support in the United States,
with both Republican and Democratic administrations and legislators indicating support for it.
3. In India too, Bharatiya Janata Party-led and Congress party-led governments have worked to
strengthen the relationship.
4. The bilateral economic relationship has grown in the last decade, but there is still a lot of room for
it to develop...
5. And defense ties between India and the United States have increased as well.
6. The defense trade relationship has been a key element of this cooperation, with hopes for much
more on this front.
7. Beyond economic and defense ties, there's been more people-to-people engagement than ever
before, with increased travel from the United States to India...
8. ...and India to the United States.
9. The number of Indian students traveling to the United States for higher education has also grown,
tripling in the span of a decade.
10. As Neil Ruiz points out in his recent report, significantly, these students are enrolled in graduate
degree programs and a majority are in the science, technology, engineering and math fields.
11. While India has economic and defense ties with other major powers as well, one of the elements
that makes its relationship with the United States different is the significant Indian diaspora in the
United States that has grown over the last two decades. This diaspora not only provides a cultural
link to the United States, but is also a source of revenue for India.
12. Indian Americans are running everything from government agencies to states to major companies
to research facilities; they're headlining news shows and primetime sit-coms. Still only about 1
percent of the total U.S. population, "Asian Indians"—as the Census labels them—on average are
highly educated and have a household income almost double that the national average.
13. There also seems to be more popular support than before in India and the United States for
strengthening the relationship.
14. And there are various areas where the two countries can increase their cooperation, but to move
from opportunities to outcomes, India and the United States will also have to deal with certain
obstacles along the way...something both Prime Minister Modi and President Obama will be well
aware of.
No solvency
Modi will collapse US-Indo relations now
Siddiqui, 7/19
Ahmed Mohiuddin Siddiqui, senior journalist, political analyst and a columnist with an international
reputation, “Modi’s Rise Could Spell Doom for Indo-US Relations,” Bilkul, 7/19/15,
http://bilkulonline.com/articles/articles/2699-modi-s-rise-could-spell-doom-for-indo-us-relations // IS
The Gujarat Day celebrations address to the Non Resident Indians (NRIs) by the Gujarat Chief Minister
Narendra Modi seems to be a clever ploy by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to divert the public
attention from the crushing defeat suffered by the saffron party in the recently concluded Karnataka
Assembly elections. The Modi bubble has burst . The BJP was routed in all the places where Modi
campaigned – Bengaluru, Mangalore and Belgaum. At the same time, it is an exercise to shore up Modi’s
chances to be acceptable as the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate. The chosen route to Delhi is via
America which does not augur well for the Indo-US relations in the long run. Narendra Modi’s desperation
for a US’ visa stems from his desire to be acceptable to the international community. United States is a
progressive nation with freedom of religion, protection and equal rights for its minorities whereas Modi is
retrogressive in thinking and action. He does not believe in giving due representation to the minorities
especially Muslims and Christians. US’s policies stands for inclusive development. Modi’s Gujarat is a
pathetic story of regression and division. He cannot solve problems like malnutrition and acute water
shortage in Gujarat. This is fatal even for the so called industrial development which he often boasts of in
his meetings. The cement factories in Gondal, Rajkot are closing down because of water shortage.
Thousands of workers have become jobless. But, here is a person who is aspiring for another job even
though he has one at present and not doing justice to it. United States is India’s largest trading and
investment partner. It will deter the US to invest in a state which does not provide even basic facilities to
industries. Narendra Modi did little to stop murder, mayhem and burning down of industrial houses in
2002. Loss of business amounted to hundreds of crores. In the worst case scenario of Modi coming to
power in Delhi, there is no guarantee that the Modi government will safeguard the US investment in India
which is more than $ 9 billion. Modi is closer to China as far as business interests are concerned. He has
visited China and Japan a number of times. Modi, in spite of his so called clout could not secure the
release of diamond traders jailed in China. China not only brazenly crosses Indian borders but also
opposes India diplomatically. A case in point is China’s opposition to India in seeking a $ 2.9 billion loan
from Asian Development Bank in June 2009. India was successful in getting the loan after the diplomatic
assistance by the US. In a major American policy shift, President Barack Obama declared support for
India’s bid for the permanent membership of the Security Council. This was because of the strong IndoUS bonds of friendship and the United States’ belief about India being a peaceful country. If the BJP
comes to power, the US may do a rethink on this issue given the strident war mongering by the BJP
leaders. When Pakistan beheaded our brave soldiers, the leader of the opposition and BJP leader
Sushma Swaraj wanted India to get ten Pakistani heads for one without caring about the fallout of such
adventurism and the nuclear capability of the enemy. Imagine, the more strident and extreme Modi at the
top calling the shots. It can destabilize the entire region. It can hurt the United States’ interests given its
resolve and commitment to crush the extremists and terrorists whether in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
Bad
US-China Relations
US-Indo relations collapse US-Sino relations and destabilize China
Chang, 15
Gordon G. Chang, Professor of American History at Stanford, graduated from Cornell University, where
he was a member of the Quill and Dagger society, in 1973, and the Cornell Law School in 1976,
“ Improving India-US Relations Unnerves Beijing ,” World Affairs, 1/28/15,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:KFQSu0vdcEkJ:www.worldaffairsjournal.org/bl
og/gordon-g-chang/improving-india-us-relations-unnerves-beijing+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us // IS
Beijing was obviously concerned, putting forward two broad themes across its media platforms. First,
Xinhua News Agency, in a commentary titled “US, India Unlikely on Same Page,”referred to “the
superficial rapprochement” of the two democracies, telling readers the visit “is more symbolic than
pragmatic, given the long-standing division between the two giants.” Issues, such as climate, agriculture,
and nuclear energy,divided the US and India, the commentary, which ran on Sunday, said. “Three days
are surely not enough for Obama and Modi to become true friends,” the commentary correctly remarked.
“After all,” Xinhua stated, “only one year ago, US diplomats were expelled from New Delhi amid
widespread public outrage over the treatment of an Indian diplomat in New York and Narendra Modi,
[now] India’s prime minister and then chief minister of Gujarat, was still banned from entering the United
States.” Given Xinhua’s take, Beijing had no need to worry about the summit, yet worry it did . In its
second theme, Chinese media pointed out that America was disrupting the peace in Asia. “The US
wants to use India to contain China,” China National Radio stated, also on Sunday. Then on Monday,
Global Times ran a piece titled “India, China Mustn’t Fall into Trap of Rivalry Set By the West.”The “craftily
set” trap, the Communist Party’s nationalist newspaper said, was the West “egging India on to be fully
prepared for ‘threats’” posed by Beijing. “A zero-sum game is not what China and India are asking for, but
under Western influence, India is sliding into it.” It’s hard to understand what Beijing thinks it can
achieve with “commentary” like this. Indeed, Chinese leaders appear to be oblivious to the consequences
of their own actions. Beijing’s policy has taken on an increasingly hard edge in recent years, and this has
been pushing China’s neighbors away. Indian leaders are not moving closer to Washington because
Obama has devised a nasty ambush for them; they are embracing America because, for instance,
Chinese soldiers are constantly advancing into Indian-controlled territory along their disputed boundaries.
Beijing policymakers have suffered setbacks elsewhere as well. In Sri Lanka, Beijing’s man, President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, lost snap elections this month. In late November, the China-friendly Kuomintang in
Taiwan suffered its worst defeat in more than six decades in the so-called “nine-in-one” local polls. The
residents of Hong Kong, once proud to be “Chinese,” are challenging China’s rule, occupying streets and
plazas late last year. North Korea, China’s only formal military ally, has even branded Beijing an “enemy.”
Burmese generals, once China’s most reliable friends, are now turning toward America and the West.
Vietnam, where anti-China sentiment is on the rise, these days welcomes vessels from the Seventh Fleet.
It’s high risk – China might launch a nuclear 9/11
Chang, 11
Gordon G. Chang, Professor of American History at Stanford, graduated from Cornell University, where
he was a member of the Quill and Dagger society, in 1973, and the Cornell Law School in 1976, “Will
China Launch a Nuclear 9/11?” Fox News, 9/9/11, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/09/09/will-chinalaunch-nuclear-11.html // IS
At the end of August, General Xu, in the words of the South China Morning Post, said that “if China could
no longer keep secret its missile launches, it would not be able to launch a surprise attack on the U.S.” As
we approach the 10th anniversary of 9/11, we of course have to remember that terrorists can still sting
the United States. Yet without nuclear weapons, they cannot land a deadly punch. The Soviets had tens
of thousands of nukes, but after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 they saw themselves as status quo
players. The Chinese have hundreds of nukes, and we have assumed we could deter them just as we
deterred the Soviets. General Xu’s comments, however, force us to reexamine our assumptions. Beijing,
unfortunately, may be approaching the world much like Moscow did in the turbulent 1950s. For one thing,
China’s generals do not look like they share the understandings that have underpinned the concept of
nuclear deterrence. Obviously, they have considered the possibility of launching a surprise attack on the
United States—otherwise General Xu would not have blurted out his comment. And his comment was not
a one-off remark. Currently servicing Chinese generals have talked in public of initiating a nuclear
exchange, thereby abandoning Beijing’s no-first-use pledge. In 1995, General Xiong Guangkai famously
mentioned the incineration of Los Angeles. In 2005, the People’s Liberation Army upped the ante when
Major General Zhu Chenghu said we should be prepared for the destruction of “hundreds of cities.” Is this
just empty talk? It would seem so, but we don’t really know. We need, therefore, to think through the
implications of this distressing series of inflammatory comments, especially at this solemn time, ten years
after the deadliest attack ever on American soil.
AT: Bad
Indo-Pak – squo solves
Squo solves – recent talks
Wall Street Journal, 7/10
The Wall Street Journal, “India, Pakistan Take Steps to Ease Tensions,” The Wall Street Journal, 7/10/15,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/india-pakistan-take-steps-to-ease-tensions-1436535050 // IS
India and Pakistan agreed Friday that their national security advisers would meet “to discuss all issues
connected to terror,” the countries’ foreign ministries said, signaling a thaw in relations between the
estranged neighbors. The announcement followed a meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, on the sidelines of a summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization in the Russian city of Ufa. The two sides also said they would discuss ways to
expedite the trial in Pakistan of men charged in connection with a devastating terror attack in Mumbai in
2008 that killed 166 people. New Delhi has blamed the assault on a militant group it says is backed by
Pakistan’s intelligence service. Islamabad denies allegations of official involvement, but acknowledged in
2009 that the attack was partly planned in Pakistan.
Indo-Pak – tensions inevitable
Tensions inevitable – Modi
Siddiqa, 6/29
Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistani civilian military scientist, geo-strategist, author, former bureaucrat and political
commentator, “Relations Between India and Pakistan Are Only Going to Get Worse,” The Wire, 6/29/15,
http://thewire.in/2015/06/29/relations-between-india-and-pakistan-are-only-going-to-get-worse-5056/ // IS
While Pakistan may be less anxious about the likelihood of a conventional conflict, it is far more edgy
about the possibility of covert operations inside its territory. And with the BBC reporting that the Karachibased Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) “received Indian funding”, it believes it has finally caught
India where it hurts. Pakistan has always suspected Delhi of encouraging subversion within as a
counter-weight to its own involvement in Kashmir or elsewhere. This may be the first time it feels it has
something concrete to pin on the Indians, even if the information the BBC based its story on is from “an
authoritative Pakistani source.” The BBC report could not have come at a worse time for the bilateral
relationship. Despite the ‘sari-and-shawl diplomacy’ that Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif attempted last
May, the temperature of the rhetoric India and Pakistan have exchanged over the past several months
has slowly been going up. Violence along the Line of Control had already begun to escalate in 2012 and
2013 but it’s the verbal showboating that has taken centre-stage now. Tensions rose so much earlier this
year that US Secretary of State John Kerry had to call and ask India and Pakistan’s leadership to keep
their volume down. Instability in South Asia at this critical juncture is not what the United States or anyone
wants. Tension, the new normal Ever since Narendra Modi came to power in May 2014, the rules of the
game between Pakistan and India seem to have been revised. The Indian army’s eagerness to forcibly
curb cross-border movement through the use of firepower at the LoC is certainly something novel for
Islamabad. Increased tension – at the LoC and in Kashmir – is the new status quo. However, foreign
policy hawks in Delhi are not satisfied, it seems.
US-China – indict
Chang is a hack and is wrong
Global Times, 15
Global Times, “ Gordon Chang speaks again, should we even care?” Global Times, 5/27/15
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/924008.shtml // IS
Chang was best known for his book The Coming Collapse of China in 2001. He used to work in Citibank
in Hong Kong and Shanghai and the Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, but lacks economic
training. Bearish about the Chinese economy, Chang often makes false projections about China's
collapse and without any apology he would then come up with another drastic projection. This makes him
a quite controversial figure. US mainstream society always pardons Chang's failed projections for its
stance and values. But in China's academia and media circles people neither like Chang nor understand
why his absurd words circulate throughout US mainstream media.
No seriously
Chang, 11
Gordon G. Chang, Professor of American History at Stanford, graduated from Cornell University, where
he was a member of the Quill and Dagger society, in 1973, and the Cornell Law School in 1976, “The
Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition,” Foreign Policy, 12/29/11,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/29/the-coming-collapse-of-china-2012-edition/ // IS
Not long ago, everything was going well for the mandarins in Beijing. Now, nothing is. So, yes, my
prediction was wrong. Instead of 2011 , the mighty Communist Party of China will fall in 2012. Bet on
it.
US-China – china collapse inev
Their author thinks Chinese collapse is inevitable
Chang, 11
Gordon G. Chang, Professor of American History at Stanford, graduated from Cornell University, where
he was a member of the Quill and Dagger society, in 1973, and the Cornell Law School in 1976, “The
Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition,” Foreign Policy, 12/29/11,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/29/the-coming-collapse-of-china-2012-edition/ // IS
Today, social change in China is accelerating . The problem for the country’s ruling party is that,
although Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions, their acts of social disruption can
have revolutionary implications because they are occurring at an extraordinarily sensitive time. In
short, China is much too dynamic and volatile for the Communist Party’s leaders to hang on. In some
location next year, whether a small village or great city, an incident will get out of control and spread fast.
Because people across the country share the same thoughts, we should not be surprised they will act in
the same way. We have already seen the Chinese people act in unison: In June 1989, well before the
advent of social media, there were protests in roughly 370 cities across China, without national
ringleaders. This phenomenon, which has swept North Africa and the Middle East this year, tells us that
the nature of political change around the world is itself changing, destabilizing even the most securelooking authoritarian governments. China is by no means immune to this wave of popular uprising, as
Beijing’s overreaction to the so-called "Jasmine" protests this spring indicates. The Communist Party,
once the beneficiary of global trends, is now the victim of them. So will China collapse? Weak
governments can remain in place a long time. Political scientists, who like to bring order to the
inexplicable, say that a host of factors are required for regime collapse and that China is missing the two
most important of them: a divided government and a strong opposition. At a time when crucial challenges
mount, the Communist Party is beginning a multi-year political transition and therefore ill-prepared for the
problems it faces. There are already visible splits among Party elites, and the leadership’s sluggish
response in recent months — in marked contrast to its lightning-fast reaction in 2008 to economic
troubles abroad — indicates that the decision-making process in Beijing is deteriorating. So check the box
on divided government.
Neoliberalism
Links/Turns Case
Environment
Economic contradiction force short-term thinking that results in environmental
catastrophe – this causes extinction
Foster, 11 (John B, “Capitalism and Degrowth-An Impossibility Theorem”, Monthly Review Vol. 62, Iss.
8; pg. 26, 8 pgs , January 2011, proquest)
In the opening paragraph to his 2009 book, Storms of My Grandchildren, James Hansen, the world's
foremost scientific authority on global warming, declared: "Planet Earth, creation, the world in which
civilization developed, the world with climate patterns that we know and stable shorelines, is in imminent
peril . . . .The startling conclusion is that continued exploitation of all fossil fuels on Earth threatens not
only the other millions of species on the planet but also the survival of humanity itself - and the
timetable is shorter than we thought."1 In making this declaration, however, Hansen was only speaking of
a part of the global environmental crisis currently threatening the planet, namely, climate change.
Recently, leading scientists (including Hansen) have proposed nine planetary boundaries, which mark the
safe operating space for the planet. Three of these boundaries (climate change, biodiversity, and the
nitrogen cycle) have already been crossed, while others, such as fresh water use and ocean
accidification, are emerging planetary rifts. In ecological terms, the economy has now grown to a scale
and intrusiveness that is both overshooting planetary boundaries and tearing apart the biogeochemical
cycles of the planet.2 Hence, almost four decades after the Club of Rome raised the issue of "the limits to
growth," the economic growth idol of modern society is once again facing a formidable challenge.3 What
is known as "degrowth economics," associated with the work of Serge Latouche in particular, emerged as
a major European intellectual movement in 2008 with the historic conference in Paris on "Economic DeGrowth for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity," and has since inspired a revival of radical Green
thought, as epitomized by the 2010 "Degrowth Declaration" in Barcelona. Ironically, the meteoric rise of
degrowth (décroissance in French) as a concept has coincided over the last three years with the
reappearance of economic crisis and stagnation on a scale not seen since the 1930s. The degrowth
concept therefore forces us to confront the questions: Is degrowth feasible in a capitalist grow-or-die
society - and if not, what does this say about the transition to a new society? According to the Web site of
the European degrowth project, "degrowth carries the idea of a voluntary reduction of the size of the
economic system which implies a reduction of the GDP."4 "Voluntary" here points to the emphasis on
voluntaristic solutions - though not as individualistic and unplanned in the European conception as the
"voluntary simplicity" movement in the United States, where individuals (usually well-to-do) simply choose
to opt out of the high-consumption market model. For Latouche, the concept of "degrowth" signifies a
major social change: a radical shift from growth as the main objective of the modern economy, toward its
opposite (contraction, downshifting). An underlying premise of this movement is that, in the face of a
planetary ecological emergency, the promise of green technology has proven false. This can be
attributed to the Jevons Paradox, according to which greater efficiency in the use of energy and
resources leads not to conservation but to greater economic growth, and hence more pressure on the
environment.5 The unavoidable conclusion - associated with a wide variety of political-economic and
environmental thinkers, not just those connected directly to the European degrowth project - is that there
needs to be a drastic alteration in the economic trends operative since the Industrial Revolution. As
Marxist economist Paul Sweezy put it more than two decades ago: "Since there is no way to increase the
capacity of the environment to bear the [economic and population] burdens placed on it, it follows that the
adjustment must come entirely from the other side of the equation. And since the disequilibrium has
already reached dangerous proportions, it also follows that what is essential for success is a reversal, not
merely a slowing down, of the underlying trends of the last few centuries."6 Given that wealthy countries
are already characterized by ecological overshoot, it is becoming more and more apparent that there is
indeed no alternative, as Sweezy emphasized, but a reversal in the demands placed on the environment
by the economy. This is consistent with the argument of ecological economist Herman Daly, who has long
insisted on the need for a steady-state economy. Daly traces this perspective to John Stuart Mill's famous
discussion of the "stationary state" in his Principles of Political Economy, which argued that if economic
expansion was to level off (as the classical economists expected), the economic goal of society could
then shift to the qualitative aspects of existence, rather than mere quantitative expansion. A century after
Mill, Lewis Mumford insisted in his Condition of Man, first published in 1944, that not only was a stationary
state in Mill's sense ecologically necessary, but that it should also be linked to a concept of "basic
communism . . . [that] applies to the whole community the standards of the household," distributing
"benefits according to need" (a view that drew upon Marx). Today this recognition of the need to bring
economic growth in overdeveloped economies to a halt, and even to shrink these economies, is seen as
rooted theoretically in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, which
established the basis of modern ecological economics.7 Degrowth as such is not viewed, even by its
proponents, as a stable solution, but one aimed at reducing the size of the economy to a level of output
that can be maintained perpetually at a steady-state. This might mean shrinking the rich economies by as
much as a third from today's levels by a process that would amount to negative investment (since not only
would new net investment cease but also only some, not all, worn-out capital stock would be replaced). A
steady-state economy, in contrast, would carry out replacement investment but would stop short of new
net investment. As Daly defines it, "a steady-state economy" is "an economy with constant stocks of
people and artifacts, maintained at some desired, sufficient levels by low rates of maintenance
'throughput,' that is, by the lowest feasible flows of matter and energy."8 Needless to say, none of this
would come easily, given today's capitalist economy. In particular, Latouche's work, which can be viewed
as exemplary of the European degrowth project, is beset with contradictions, resulting not from the
concept of degrowth perse, but from his attempt to skirt the question of capitalism. This can be seen in his
2006 article, "The Globe Downshifted," where he argues in convoluted form: For some on the far left, the
stock answer is that capitalism is the problem, leaving us stuck in a rut and powerless to move towards a
better society. Is economic contraction compatible with capitalism? This is a key question, but one that it
is important to answer without resort to dogma, if the real obstacles are to be understood .... Ecocompatible capitalism is conceivable in theory, but unrealistic in practice. Capitalism would require a high
level of regulation to bring about the reduction of our ecological footprint. The market system, dominated
by huge multinational corporations, will never set off down the virtuous path of eco-capitalism of its own
accord .... Mechanisms for countering power with power, as existed under the Keynes-Fordist regulations
of the Social-Democratic era, are conceivable and desirable. But the class struggle seems to have broken
down. The problem is: capital won .... A society based on economic contraction cannot exist under
capitalism. But capitalism is a deceptively simple word for a long, complex history. Getting rid of the
capitalists and banning wage labour, currency and private ownership of the means of production would
plunge society into chaos. It would bring large-scale terrorism. . ..We need to find another way out of
development, economism (a belief in the primacy of economic causes and factors) and growth: one that
does not mean forsaking the social institutions that have been annexed by the economy (currency,
markets, even wages) but reframes them according to different principles.9
IPR
Their advocacy of neoliberal intellectual property strategies locks in a global
neoliberal police state
Caffentiz 4
http://sduk.us/silvia_george_david/caffentzis_a_tale_of_two_conferences.pdf
George Caffentzis is a political philosopher and an autonomist Marxist.[1] He founded the Midnight Notes
Collective,[2] is a founder member of the co-ordinator of the Committee for Academic Freedom in
Africa[3] and a professor of philosophy at the University of Southern Maine.[4]
The realm of "intellectual property rights" also called for an alternative theory appealing to the
commons . Neoliberalism's grandest theoretical and practical efforts were called on to defend the notion
that private property institutions should be strictly extended to the realms of scientific, artistic and
technological production. Indeed, most of the "free trade" treaties and SAPs of the 1990s insisted on the
imposition of privatized 'intellectual property rights" on formerly colonized or socialist countries where
patents, copyrights and licenses did not have much legitimacy. But a planetary revolt against privatized
intellectual property rights began in those years. In the so-called underdeveloped world, there was a
large scale evasion of the drug, bioengineering, music and film distributing, and computer software
corporations' demand that they receive their royalties before "their" medicines, seeds, musical recordings,
film videos, and software programs are used. The so-called developed world also saw a parallel largescale evasion of privatized intellectual property claims through reproduction of videos, musical recordings,
and software programs. This world-wide evasion provoked an attempt to create a planetary police state
that would enforce the claims of the corporations demanding their "rights." But there was also an assault
on the ideological pretentions of the neoliberal intellectual property order from both sides of
"development." First, the 'computer revolution" and the internet had generated a huge group of
enthusiasts who systematically rejected the notion that the product of individual intellectual effort ending
on the net should be considered private property. This maxim has generated a revival of the notion of an
intellectual commons, or in Larry Lessig's term, a “creative commons” (and the complementary notion,
due to Boyle, of “a second enclosure movement”) [(Boyle 2003) (Lessig 2001)]. As Lessig writes: It is a
commonplace to think about the Internet as a kind of commons. It is less commonplace to actually have
an idea what a commons is. By a commons I mean a resource that is free. Not necessarily zero cost, but
if there is a cost, it is neutrally imposed, or equally imposed cost....Open source, or free software is a
commons: the source code of Linux, for example, lies available for anyone to take, to use, to improve, to
advance. No permission is necessary; no authorization is required (Lessig 2002: 1783, 1788). From this
perspective then, the huge income Microsoft and other software companies have been accruing over the
last two decades is as illegitimate as the gold the conquistadors looted from the palaces of the Aztecs
and Incas. Could a theory be developed that would both give a legitimacy to the common and still create
a flow of profits? Second, indigenous peoples and others in the Third World claimed that their knowledge
of plants, medicines, and agricultural techniques was being stolen from them by "gene hunters,"
"ethnobotonists," and "global musicians" who then had the temerity to demand that the victims of theft
should pay them to use the products they stole! (Caffentzis 2000). Where was the place for indigenous
and local knowledge which was collectively produced in a world that recognized only private property
claims? As Vandana Shiva writes: Patents in the context of agriculture and food productio involve
ownership over life forms and life processes. Monopoly ownership of life creates an unprecedented crisis
for agricultural and food security, by transforming biological resources from commons into commodities. It
also generates a crisis of values and ends which guide social organistion, techological change and
development priorities (Shiva 1993: 121) This crisis of values is now engulfing the whole neoliberal
intellectual property project. For throughout the last decade it become clear that a purely neoliberal
approach to “intellectual property rights” (which largely comes down to private property rights) will lead to
a planetary police state where surveillance and exclusion costs will be untenable economically,
politically and ideologically.
Opposing intellectual property enclosures key to avert extinction
Caffentzis 11
http://www.stwr.org/economic-sharing-alternatives/a-tale-of-two-conferences-globalization-the-crisis-ofneoliberalism-and-question-of-the-commons.html
George Caffentzis is a political philosopher and an autonomist Marxist.[1] He founded the Midnight Notes
Collective,[2] is a founder member of the co-ordinator of the Committee for Academic Freedom in
Africa[3] and a professor of philosophy at the University of Southern Maine.[4] Though the revolt of
indigenous people and peasants around the world gave urgency to the development an alternative theory
that would incorporate the commons, there were also other forces that were also pushing to the save
result. The problematics posed by the global commons are high on capital's agenda, since we are now at
a moment when billions of people either suspect or know that the capitalist system is on the verge (if
not already over the edge) of precipitating multiple apocalypses -from human species-annihilating
climate change, to the cutting down of the remaining tropical forests, to the total exhaustion of ocean
fisheries, to the generation of human nature-destroying genetic pollution. This tampering with the global
commons is, perhaps, the mortal danger for capital in the 21st century, since these fears profoundly
undermine capitalism's claim to be the "steward" of the world's resources. The neoliberal's response to
these problematics-let the markets allocate access to the global commons of the atmosphere, the forests,
the fisheries, and the genome-is now a "wisdom" so tarnished and dubious that even many of the most
'hard-nosed" capitalists know an alternative approach, offering more serious options, is or will be
necessary. Such an alternative theory that could conceptualize multiple property regimes that offers "a
way out" since it can conceive of a capitalism that would be self-regulating, but that still would be in
charge of the fate of the planet and the human race (Sachs 1993). The realm of "intellectual property
rights" also called for an alternative theory appealing to the commons. Neoliberalism's grandest
theoretical and practical efforts were deployed to defend the notion that private property institutions
should be strictly extended to the realms of scientific, artistic and technological production. Indeed, most
of the "free trade" treaties and SAPs of the 1990s insisted on the imposition of privatized 'intellectual
property rights" on formerly colonized or socialist countries where patents, copyrights and licenses did not
have much legitimacy. But a planetary revolt against privatized intellectual property rights began in those
years. In the so-called underdeveloped world, there was a large scale evasion of the drug,
bioengineering, music and film distributing, and computer software corporations' demand that they
receive their royalties before "their" medicines, seeds, musical recordings, film videos, and software
programs are used. The so-called developed world also saw a parallel large-scale evasion of privatized
intellectual property claims through reproduction of videos, musical recordings, and software programs.
This world-wide evasion provoked an attempt to create a planetary police state that would enforce the
claims of the corporations demanding their "rights." But there was also an assault on the ideological
pretensions of the neoliberal intellectual property order from both sides of "development." First, the
'computer revolution" and the internet had generated a huge group of enthusiasts who systematically
rejected the notion that the product of individual intellectual effort ending on the net should be considered
private property. This maxim has generated a revival of the notion of an intellectual commons, or in
Larry Lessig's term, a "creative commons" (and the complementary notion, due to Boyle, of "a second
enclosure movement") [(Boyle 2003) (Lessig 2001)].
Middle East
Representations are the root cause of policy failures and Middle East conflictthis card will smoke them
Bilgin 5
Pinar Bilgin, PhD
International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Department of International Relations Bilkent
Univ., Regional Security in the Middle East 2005 p. 12-5
Reflecting upon the history of US engagement with the Middle East, Douglas Little identifies representations of
the region as the problem behind policy failures. According to Little, it is 'American Orientalism' defined as 'a
tendency to underestimate the peoples of the region and to overestimate America's ability to make a bad
situation better' that has often misled US policy-makers in their dealings with the region. Regarding the future,
Little (2002:314) writes: Although there is greater appreciation for the complexities of the Muslim world than a generation ago, most
Americans still view radical Islam as a cause for instant alarm. Having been fed a steady diet of books,
films and news reports depicting Arabs as demonic anti-Western others and Israelis as heroic proWestern partners and having watched in horror the events of 11 September, the American public
understandably fears Osama bin Laden and cheers Aladdin. Little's argument builds upon that of Edward Said in
his 1978 book Orientalism, where the author pointed to the relationship between representations and practice.
Said's point was that the academic discourse of Orientalism (defined as 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and
epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and [most of the time] “the Occident”' [Said 1995a: 2]) had not only
helped to make the Middle East what it has become but also made it difficult to become something else : a
book on how to handle a fierce lion might … cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of lions, the
origins of fierceness, and so forth. Similarly, as the focus of the text centers more narrowly on the subject - no longer
lions but their fierceness -
we might expect that the ways by which it is recommended that a lion's fierceness
be handled will actually increase its fierceness, force it to be fierce since that is what it is, and that is what in
essence what we know or can only know about it. (Said 1995a: 94) This is because the O rientalist discourse does not
merely represent the 'Orient' but also lays down the rules that enable one to 'write, speak and act
meaningfully' (Agnew and Corbridge 1995:45). In his later works (see Said 1994b, 1995b, 1997, 2001) Said went on to show
how contemporary representations of the Middle East (and Islam) in the media (as well as academia) have reduced
it to terrorism and very little else. Said's argument is in line with E.P. Thompson's observation on the impact British historical
representations of India have had on Indian politics (Said 2001:44-5). According to Thompson, writings on India in English 'simply
left out the Indian side of things' thereby deepening the irreconcilability between Indians and the British. Thompson wrote: Our
misrepresentation of Indian history and character is one of the things that have so alienated the educated classes of India that even
their moderate elements have refused to help the Reforms [of colonial policy]. Those measures, because of this sullenness, have
failed, when they deserved a better fate. (quoted in Said 2001:45) Reading Thompson, one is reminded of the numerous
attempts made by US policy-makers during the Cold War to generate reform and modernisation
movements in the Middle East; some of which attempts have backfired (as with Iraq, Libya and Iran) (Little 2002:193-227).
What Little, Thompson and Said are pointing to are the different impact representations have on those
who produce the representations and those who are represented. What all share is the damaging effect
representations have had on both groups of actors. According to Said, the Middle East as a spatial
representation has been repressive in that it has had 'the kind of authority … [that] doesn't permit or make
room for interventions on the part of those represented' (Said 2001:42). The Middle Eastern security discourse,
which is informed by this representation, has reflected the Cold War security concerns of the great powers
while neglecting that of regional states and peoples. Hence the argument that the current state of regional
insecurity in the Middle East has its roots in practices that have been informed by its dominant
representation: the 'Middle East'. By way of adopting this spatial representation, the Middle East has been categorised
in terms of its politics (as the region that 'best fits the realist theory of international politics' [Nye 2000:163])
and the type of foreign policy its 'nature' demands. In the immediate aftermath of the US-led war on Iraq, one
newspaper columnist warned: 'Middle East is not Europe' (Zaharna 2003). Indeed. Yet, this should not be taken to suggest
that the Middle East is destined to relive its insecure past. Such representations that emphasised Middle
Eastern insecurities without reflecting upon their roots have had the effect of privileging certain security
practices (such as the 1998-99 bombing campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting the
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme) whilst marginalising others (such as the adoption of a more comprehensive
long-term policy of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East). Becoming
aware of the 'politics of the geographical
specification of politics' (Dalby 1991:274) and exploring the mutually constitutive relationship between
(inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of) security is not mere intellectual exercise; it helps
reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. Such awareness , in turn,
would enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security to help constitute an alternative
future whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security, what
they view as referent object(s), and how they think security should be sought in this part of the world.
Poverty
Poverty is rising now and neolib is to blame – only transition can solve
Wolff 11 (11/10, Richard D., Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst and a
Visiting Professor at the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New
York, “Capitalism and Poverty,” http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/wolff111011.html)
The US Census Bureau recently reported what most Americans already knew. Poverty is deepening. The
gap between rich and poor is growing. Slippage soon into the ranks of the poor now confronts tens of
millions of Americans who long thought of themselves as securely "middle class." The reality is worse
than the Census Bureau reports. Consider that the Bureau's poverty line in 2010 for a family of four was
$22,314. Families of four making more than that were not counted as poor. That poverty line works out to
$15 per day per person for everything: food, clothing, housing, medical care, transportation, education,
and so on. If you have more than $15 per day per person in your household to pay for everything each
person needs, the Bureau does not count you as part of this country's poverty problem. So the real
number of US citizens living in poverty -- more reasonably defined -- is much larger today than the 46.2
million reported by the Census Bureau. It is thus much higher than the 15.1 per cent of our people the
Bureau sees as poor. Conservatively estimated, about one in four Americans already lives in real poverty.
Another one in four is or should be worried about joining them soon. Long-lasting and high unemployment
now drains away income from families and friends of the unemployed who have used up savings as well
as unemployment insurance. As city, state, and local governments cut services and supports, people will
have to divert money to offset part of those cuts. When Medicare and if Social Security benefits are cut,
millions will be spending more to help elderly parents. Finally, poverty looms for those with jobs as (1)
wages are cut or fail to keep up with rising prices, and (2) benefits -- especially pensions and medical
insurance -- are reduced. Deepening poverty has multiple causes, but the capitalist economic system is
major among them. First, capitalism's periodic crises always increase poverty, and the current crisis is no
exception. More precisely, how capitalist corporations operate, in or out of crisis, regularly reproduces
poverty. At the top of every corporation, its major shareholders (15-20 or fewer) own controlling blocs of
shares. They select a board of directors -- usually 15-20 individuals -- who run the corporation. These two
tiny groups make all the key decisions: what, how, and where to produce and what to do with the profits.
Poverty is one result of this capitalist type of enterprise organization. For example, corporate decisions
generally aim to lower the number of workers or their wages or both. They automate, export (outsource)
jobs, and replace higher-paid workers by recruiting domestic and foreign substitutes willing to work for
less. These normal corporate actions generate rising poverty as the other side of rising profits. When
poverty and its miseries "remain always with us," workers tend to accept what employers dish out to avoid
losing jobs and falling into poverty. Another major corporate goal is to control politics. Wherever all
citizens can vote, workers' interests might prevail over those of directors and shareholders in elections.
To prevent that, corporations devote portions of their revenues to finance politicians, parties, mass media,
and "think tanks." Their goal is to "shape public opinion" and control what government does. They do not
want Washington's crisis-driven budget deficits and national debts to be overcome by big tax increases
on corporations and the rich. Instead public discussion and politicians' actions are kept focused chiefly on
cutting social programs for the majority. Corporate goals include providing high and rising salaries, stock
options, and bonuses to top executives and rising dividends and share prices to shareholders. The less
paid to the workers who actually produce what corporations sell, the more corporate revenue goes to
satisfy directors, top managers, and major shareholders. Corporations also raise profits regularly by
increasing prices and/or cutting production costs (often by compromising output quality). Higher priced
and poorer-quality goods are sold mostly to working people. This too pushes them toward poverty just like
lower wages and benefits and government service cuts. Over the years, government interventions like
Social Security, Medicare, minimum wage laws, regulations, etc. never sufficed to eradicate poverty. They
often helped the poor, but they never ended poverty. The same applies to charities aiding the poor.
Poverty always remained. Now capitalism's crisis worsens it again. Something more than government
interventions or charity is required to end poverty. One solution: production would have to be organized
differently, in a non-capitalist way. Instead of enterprise decisions being made by directors and major
shareholders, the workers themselves could collectively and democratically make them. Let's call this
Democracy at Work (DAW), since it entails the majority making the key enterprise decisions about what,
how, and where to produce and what to do with the profits. If the workers made those decisions, here are
some likely results. Primary goals would no longer be to reduce their own numbers or their wages. If
technological changes or reduced demand for their outputs required fewer workers, they would likely
maintain the wages of workers and retrain them for other jobs meeting growing demands. Workers would
not be fired and thereby pushed into poverty. Second, workers making democratic decisions would not
likely allow today's huge differences between average wages and top managers' salaries, bonuses, etc.
By eliminating concentrated income and accumulated wealth at the top, resources would be freed finally
to end poverty at the bottom. A DAW system could produce and secure the vast "middle class" that this
country pretended but never yet really had. Workers disposing of their enterprises' profits would no longer
distribute a portion to politicians and parties to protect a rich minority against the envy and resentments of
the majority. By establishing a far more egalitarian income distribution, a DAW system could also
transform a political system now corrupted by the money of corporations and the rich. Third, a DAW
system would be less likely to raise prices or reduce output quality. When workers are both decisionmakers at work as well as consumers of their enterprises' outputs, they would more likely pass and
sustain laws to outlaw the price gouging and quality deterioration common in capitalism. A serious
commitment to end poverty and its costly social effects requires us to face that capitalism has always
reproduced widespread poverty as the other side of profits for a relative few. No wonder such a system
has provoked Occupy Wall Street and so many of its signature slogans and demands.
Terror
Neolib makes terrorism inevitable
Zizek 02
2002
(Slavoj Zizek – Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University,
, Revolution at the Gates, p. 234-36)
Along the same lines, Rightist commentators like George Will also immediately proclaimed the end of the American “holiday from
history” —the impact of reality shattering the isolated tower of the liberal tolerant attitude and the Cultural Studies focus on textuality.
Now, we are forced to strike back, to deal with real enemies in the real world. . . . Whom, however, do we strike at? Whatever
the response, it will never hit the right target, bringing us full satisfaction. The ridicule of America attacking Afghanistan
cannot fail to strike us: if the greatest power in the world destroys one of the world’s poorest countries, in which peasants barely
survive on barren hills, will this not be the ultimate case of impotent acting out? In many ways Afghanistan is an ideal target:
a country that is already reduced to rubble, with no infrastructure, repeatedly destroyed by war for the last two decades ...
we cannot avoid the surmise that the choice of Afghanistan will also be determined by economic
considerations: is it not best procedure to act out one’s anger at a country for which no one cares, and where there is nothing
to destroy? Unfortunately, the choice of Afghanistan recalls the anecdote about the madman who searches for a lost key beneath a
streetlamp; asked why there, when he lost the key in a dark corner somewhere, he answers: “But it’s easier to search under strong
light!” Is it not the ultimate irony that the whole of Kabul already looks like downtown Manhattan? To succumb to the urge to
act and retaliate
means precisely to avoid confronting the true dimensions of what occurred on 11
September — it means an act whose true aim is to lull us into the secure conviction that nothing has really
changed. The true long-term threats are further acts of mass terror in comparison with which the memory of the
WTC collapse will pale — acts that are less spectacular, but much more horrifying. What about bacteriological warfare, what about
the use of lethal gas, what about the prospect of DNA terrorism (developing poisons which will affect only people who share a
determinate genome)? In this new warfare, the agents claim their acts less and less publicly: not only are “terrorists” themselves no
longer eager to claim responsibility for their acts (even the notorious Al Qaida did not explicitly appropriate the 11 September
attacks, not to mention the mystery about the origins of the anthrax letters); “antiterrorist” state measures themselves are
draped in a shroud of secrecy; all this constitutes an ideal breeding ground for conspiracy theories and generalized social
paranoia. And is not the obverse of this paranoiac omnipresence of the invisible war its desubstantialization? So, again, just as we
drink beer without alcohol or coffee without caffeine, we are now getting war deprived of its substance — a virtual war fought behind
computer screens, a war experienced by its participants as a video game, a war with no casualties (on our side, at least). With the
spread of the anthrax panic in October 2001, the West got the first taste of this new “invisible” warfare in which — an aspect we
should always bear in mind — we, ordinary citizens, are, with regard to information about what is going on, totally at the mercy of
the authorities: we see and hear nothing; all we know comes from the official media. A superpower bombing a desolate desert
country and, at the same time, hostage to invisible bacteria — this, not the WTC explosions, is the first image of twenty-first-century
warfare. Instead of a quick acting-out, we should confront these difficult questions: what will “war” mean in the twenty-first century?
Who will “they” be, if they are, clearly, neither states nor criminal gangs? Here I cannot resist the temptation to recall the Freudian
opposition of the public Law and its obscene superego double: along the same lines, are not “international terrorist organizations”
the obscene double of the big multinational corporations — the ultimate rhizomatic machine, omnipresent, yet with no clear territorial
base? Are they not the form in which nationalist and/or religious “fundamentalism” accommodated itself to global capitalism? Do
they not embody the ultimate contradiction, with their particular! exclusive content and their global dynamic functioning? For this
reason, the fashionable notion of the “clash of civilizations” must be thoroughly rejected: what we are witnessing today, rather, are
clashes within each civilization. A brief look at the comparative history of Islam and Christianity tells us that the “human rights
record” of Islam (to use an anachronistic term) is much better than that of Christianity: in past centuries, Islam was significantly more
tolerant towards other religions than Christianity. It is also time to remember that it was through the Arabs that, in the Middle Ages,
we in Western Europe regained access to our Ancient Greek legacy. While I do not in any way excuse today’s horrific acts, these
facts none the less clearly demonstrate that we are dealing not with a feature inscribed into Islam “as such”, but with the outcome of
modern sociopolitical conditions. If we look more closely, what is this “clash of civilizations” really about? Are not
all real-life “clashes” clearly related to global capitalism? The Muslim “fundamentalist” target is not only
global capitalism’s corrosive impact on social life, but also the corrupt “traditionalist” regimes in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and so on. The most horrifying slaughters (those in Rwanda, Congo, and Sierra Leone)
not only took place — and are taking place — within the same “civilization”, but are also clearly related to
the interplay of global economic interests. Even in the few cases which would vaguely fit the definition of the “clash of
civilisations” (Bosnia and Kosovo, southern Sudan, etc.), the shadow of other interests is easily discernible. A suitable dose of
“economic reductionism” would therefore be appropriate here: instead of the endless analyses of how Islamic
“fundamentalism” is intolerant towards our liberal societies, and other “clash-of-civilization” topics, we
should refocus our
attention on the economic background of the conflict — the clash of economic interests, and of the
geopolitical interests of the United States itself (how to retain privileged links both with Israel and with conservative Arab
regimes like those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait).
Neolib breeds the extreme poverty and inequality that is the root cause of
terrorism.
Slater, 06 (Philip, A.B. and Ph. D. from Harvard and taught sociology at Harvard, Brandeis, and UCSC,
“The Root Causes of Terrorism and Why No One Wants to End Them”, October 25th,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-slater/the-root-causes-of-terror_b_32466.html)
The people who do most to foment terrorism are not the fundamentalist imams and ayatollahs, who only
exploit the hopelessness around them. The people who do the most are those who create that
hopelessness in the first place--the oil monarchies, for example. For of all capitalist enterprises, the
extractive industries are probably the most deserving of the abuse heaped on them over the years . The
possessors of the earth's treasures believe, apparently, that the luck, wealth, or political corruption that allowed them to own land
containing such riches is a sign of divine favor, while the poverty of those around them indicates celestial disgust. Terrorists are
people who have lost hope--hope for the possibility of peacefully creating a better world. They may be middle-class
and educated, as many terrorist leaders are, but their despair is one of empathy for the plight of their
people as a whole. The root causes of terrorism are pathological inequalities in wealth --not just in Saudi Arabia
but all over the Third World. Even in our own country Republican policies have in recent decades created
inequalities so extreme that while a few have literally more money than they can possibly use, the vast
majority are struggling to get by. A society that impoverishes most of its population in order to enrich a few neurotically
greedy individuals is a sick society. As Jared Diamond has shown, societies in which a few plunder the environment at the expense
of the many are headed for collapse. Fundamentalist religions and radical ideologies are the common refuge of people
without hope. Christianity has played this role for centuries. The rich encourage the poor to accept the misery of this world as a
passport to heaven, despite the fact that according to Jesus they don't have a prayer of getting in themselves. This isn't really
surprising. The rich wouldn't be caught dead in a place where they let poor people in. Islamic fundamentalism is the latest
drug being offered the poor and desperate. It has the added appeal that you can not only get into heaven but also take
vengeance at the same time. Terrorism will never end until caps are placed on inequality.
War
Neoliberal capitalism creates a center-periphery distinction which structurally
creates scenarios for military conflict—it’s try or die for a new political economy.
Goodman 9 (James, Senior Lecturer at the University of Technology, Sydney, Rethinking Insecurity
War and Violence, edited by Grenfell and James, http://www.scribd.com/doc/68230825/4/Globalcapitalism-and-the-production-of-insecurity)
The shrouding of Guernica is symbolic of a deep contradiction in the US mission to secure the globe,
making it safe for markets and democracy. On the one hand, there is the abstract appeal to universal
security and the material abstraction of military technology; on the other is the concrete effect in terms of
human suffering and the absolute insecurity of warfare. In this respect we may say that the pursuit of
security necessarily produces insecurity; but insecurity for whom? Action to address insecurity is doublesided as it defines whose freedom is to be protected, and whose freedom is to be limited. Security is
“both a freeing from (danger) and a constraint or limitation imposed upon it ” (Dillon 1996: 122). In
broader terms, this realm of security — of bounded freedom — constitutes society. Within this realm, the
“sin of security, ” as Dillon puts it, is the failure to feel insecure. That insecurity is required to protect
security is neatly exemplified in the US detention center for terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay, which
declares itself “ Honor-bound to Defend Freedom. ” In capitalist societies insecurity is systemic.
Capitalism literally produces insecurity. The opportunity to profit and the risk of loss is capitalism ’ s
life-blood. Capitalist security hinges on private property, on “ having ” rather than “ not having ” and on the
security that possessions provide. As wealth is stratified, so is security and with the concentration of
property ownership comes the concentration of security. Here the question of pursuing security is
profoundly political. When security is defined by the powerful, “making safe ” tends to serve the status
quo. When security is defined by the sub-ordinated, it tends to challenge the social order. Removing
sources of insecurity for the subordinated means removing the means to dominate, and under capitalism
this means removing the “ inalienable right ” to private property. With deepening capitalist relations,
systemic insecurities are intensified. The process of commodification and financialization has gained
global reach, deepening the integration of livelihoods and living environments into a universal cash nexus
(Rupert 2003). Societies as a result become ever-more vulnerable to volatile flows of liquid assets,
rendering them radically insecure. This globalization of insecurity is deeply stratified, with sharpening
divides between those suffering under it and those profiting from it. Indeed, globalizing capitalism is best
understood as a system displacing insecurity from rich to poor across the globe. Such systemic insecurity
is socially concentrated at the collision between living environments and marketization, and profoundly
exacerbates social divides, including contributing to the feminization of poverty. It is spatially concentrated
in a growing range of poorer and vulnerable states, but, as argued here, the side-effects of systemic
insecurity rebound on the center. There is increasing anxiety amongst dominant states about
vulnerability to refugee flows, to the “ contagion ” of financial instability, to cross-border environmental
crises, to subversive information flows, to transnational political violence, to flows of laundered money, to
illicit drugs and arms flows. Reflecting this, there are increasingly intensive efforts to secure external
borders and escalating interventions against “ failed ” or “ rogue ” states on the periphery. Against this
backdrop, the US-led “ War on Terror ” and Powell ’ s efforts at the UN become symptomatic of a broader
geopolitics of insecurity where the center strikes out to secure itself against an increasingly insecure
periphery. Overall, we may perceive three elements in this production of global insecurity. First, intensive
commodification and financialization generate systemic insecurity. Secondly, systemic insecurity is
displaced to the social andspatial margins. Thirdly, the resulting side-effects generate militarist
interventions from the center, to impose order by command. The chapter explores each of these three
elements after first charting insecurity dilemmas in theWar on Terror.
NEG Security K
alt
Reject the affirmative’s fear-drive politics---critical analysis of the politics of
security and resultant militarism gives us a new political vocabulary with which to
articulate a truly democratic politics---activating your role as an ethical educator
is the only way to avert permanent warfare
Henry Giroux 13, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Violence, USA,
monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa
In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the “most crucial decisions
regarding national policy are not made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites.”53
Such massive inequality and the suffering and political corruption it produces point to the need for
critical analysis in which the separation of power and politics can be understood. This means
developing terms that clarify how power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at
the national level, with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing
functions—at least for those populations considered disposable.
The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations,
funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultrarich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has
produced. Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a
difference in fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if
the political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center stage in the struggle for
desires, subjectivities, and social relations that refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of
gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor.
War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the production of
widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures
that make a democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and
punishment to circulate as part of a culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion.
In opposing the emergence of the United States as both a warfare and a punishing state, I am not
appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not
unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance.
What is needed are modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging
of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a militaryindustrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex of ideological and
institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be addressed by making visible
its vast national and global interests and militarized networks , as indicated by the fact that the United
States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how this
military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape
national policy and everyday life.
Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component . C. Wright Mills was
right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the
cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide
experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This
narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyperindividualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified,
and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from
responsibility.
Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged
mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare
state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and
dismantle its vast networks of power. One central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the
warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would
enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and
engaged citizens.
Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically
responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and militarized
knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role, educational institutions deprive students of the
capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively
participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture
equipped to challenge the educational, military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that
dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter
of domestic and foreign polic y.
Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it
means pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity,
and agency and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what
Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and
substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what
constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful. Critical understanding
motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought
about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give war and state-supported
violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation, nor the primary
organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy.
The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own selfinterest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a
dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order
produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen
all ties to any viable notion of the public good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized
around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity,
and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate,
critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange. Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing
that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of death functions as political and
economic recovery.”57
The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a
social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while
imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural
foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current
warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of
democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its
children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this
machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than death—
the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of
consumerism and celebrity culture. It is time for educators , unions, young people, liberals, religious
organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social
movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while
establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in
arguing that:
the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination , the absence of a viable political
opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large
extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in
2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and
silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through
the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.58
The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making
clear that this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a
political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the
progressive use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of
education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective
hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and
uniting the call on the part of young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change
will more than likely be cosmetic.
Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its theater of cruelty and violence must include
developing a variety of cultural discourses and sites where new modes of agency can be imagined and
enacted, particularly as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of sociality, and
“alternative conceptualizations of the self and its relationship to others.” 59 Clearly, if the United
States is to make a claim to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral
monstrosity and war as virulent pathology. How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to be seen. In the
meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of
struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of
democratic life.
russia
Discourse of Russian threats Otherize Russia and actualizes itself
JÆGER 2000 (Øyvind, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, “Securitizing Russia:
Discursive Practices of the Baltic States,” Peace and Conflict Studies, November, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf)
Security is a code for going about a particular
business in very particular ways. By labelling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the
employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a selfreferential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification . Security issues are allotted priority above everything else
Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted.
because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a
The
typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threatdefence sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold
back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive
measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls
for defence, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty.
Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of
security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by
desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the
logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process
by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What
is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of
otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct , (i.e.
not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it
will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem . As Wæver (1994: 8)16 puts it: "Transcending a security
problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from
it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much
state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.15
the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the
the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely
to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of
wake of the Westphalian peace. But
church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about
death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 – so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden
ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the
But state identity cannot easily be produced
by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken
(Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in
faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and
reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient
ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of
the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world . In other words, discourses of
sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution.
"danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal
the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who
and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which
extenciveness of Christendom,
the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of
discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting,
(i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external
alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure
To speak security is
then to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that which is different from Self as an
existential threat – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive
identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside".
practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a binary opposition constituting Self (Neumann 1996b:
167). Turning to the Baltic Sea Region, one cannot help noting the rather loose fitting between the undeniable – indeed underscored – state focus in the works of both David
Campbell and the Copenhagen School on the one hand, and the somewhat wishful speculations of regionality beyond the state – transcending sovereignty – on the other.
Coupling the two is not necessarily an analytical problem. It only makes a rather weak case for regionality. But exactly that becomes a theoretical problem in undermining the
very theoretical substance, and by implication – empirical viability – of regionality. There are of course indications that the role of states are relativised in late modern (or
postmodern) politics. And there is reason to expect current developments in the security problematique of the Baltic states – firmly connected to the dynamic of NATO’s
enlargement – to exert an impact on regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, possibly even on regionality. NATO moving east, engaging Russia and carrying elements of
the post-modernist security agenda with it in the process, is likely to narrow the gap between the two agendas. Moreover, since the Baltic states are not included in a first round
of expansion, they might in this very fact (failure, some would say) find an incentive for shifting focus from international to regional levels. Involving Poland and engaging Russia,
the enlargement of NATO will in fact bring the Alliance as such (not only individual NATO countries as the case has been) to bear increasingly on the regional setting as well as
on regional activity. That might add significance to the regional level. It does not, however, necessarily imply that the state as actor and state centric approaches will succumb to
regionality. Neither does it do away with the state as the prime referent for, and producer of, collective identity, so central to the approaches of both Wæver and Campbell. But it
might spur a parallel to sovereignty. A way out of this theoretical impasse would then be not to stress the either or of regionality/sovereignty, but to see the two as organising
The Russian war
on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in
store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association
principles at work side by side, complementing each other in parallelity rather than excluding one another in contrariety. The Discourse of Danger
with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as
In this the value of one side in a binary
opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a
Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities",
"unpredictability", "imperialism ", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers
("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an
identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the
oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is
(re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is,
a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence".
made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain
of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher
command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he
power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by
all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the
identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a
free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and
one
approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in
all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means.
other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2)
And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National
Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of
equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and
resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows.
chi
China threat discourse is a self-fulfilling prophecy – the otherization of China is the result of
US imagination, not objective fact – the elimination of China is part of an attempt to
construct a world order around US security
Pan 4 (Chengxin, Professor of Political Science at Australia National University, “China Threat In
American Self-Imagination” Alternatives Volume 29, number 3, p. 305-331, MT)
China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S.
international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether
China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or
engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over “what China precisely is,” their
debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they
believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by
scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton,
former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that “it is time to step back and look at where China is today,
where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world.” (2) Like
many other China scholars,
Lampton views his object of study as essentially “something we can stand back from and observe with clinical
detachment.” (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as
“disinterested observers” and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in
pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of “what
the United States is.” That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not
dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own “observation” of “where
China is today,” nor to join the “containment” versus “engagement” debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the
China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the
United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the “China
threat” literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S.
conceptions of China as a threatening other are always
intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the
indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an
independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning giving
practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the “China
threat” into social reality . In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the “China threat”
problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of
self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the “China threat” literature–themes that have been
overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new
nor peculiar to the “China threat” literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as
ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general
and the U.S. “China threat” literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative
status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to
make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the
“China threat” argument in contemporary U.S. international relations
a discursive construction of other , which is
predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal,
indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security . Finally, this article will illustrate
some of the dangerous practical consequences of the “China threat” discourse for contemporary U.S.-China
relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident.
literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is
chzman
Epist/reps matter
Cheeseman & Bruce 1996 (Graeme, Senior Lecturer at the University of New South Wales, and Robert, Associate Professor in social sciences at Curtin
university, “Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers”, p. 5-8, MT)
This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence
worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The
inability to
give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic
experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the
discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be
furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on
Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book;
nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar
language and format, to problems they pose. This
however, a book about
expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is,
policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that
irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is
articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must
accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official
line, or at least its image of the world, that needs
to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy
alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate
the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference . This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and
Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as
the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and
purportedly
integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions
which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that
knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during
the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In
short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical
testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and
limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since
positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the
state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that
critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke
closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform
conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory
is integral to the
practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically
about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise,
no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that
terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world
is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical
presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years.
There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands
imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is
why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its
own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as
new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert
policy-makers, academics and students to alternative
theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing
security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of
the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past
characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words
and the
thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and
questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First
comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the
following chapter,
we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the
discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s]
policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian
War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the
Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent
chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also
question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security
agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under
challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and
security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowlybased intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making
processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or
choose not to understand them, and why?
envt
Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those
deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case
Buell 3 (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and
the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)
crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a
political liability almost as much as an asset. It calls up a fierce and effective opposition with its predictions;
worse, its more specific predictions are all too vulnerable to refutation by events. It also exposes
environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis
has all too often tempted people to try to find a “ total solution ” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as
an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third
Reich’s infamous “ final solution .”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to
Looked at critically, then,
translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism ; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in
place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same
time it depoliticizes people, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people
today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her
own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least
discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a
startlingly simple proposition: the worse one
feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s
back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature
feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological
science), and traditions of nature-based activism.
If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need to
delink from nature and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of
the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human
actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to further indifference to nature-based environmental issues, not greater
concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of
these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and
1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has
significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one
The apocalyptic mode had a
number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent
rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often,
though not always) the need for immediate “ total solution .” Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; ecodoes not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place.
authoritarianism was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of
nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”
Playing with the Law
Playing with the law is key to education
Lewis ’14 (Tyson Lewis, PhD in Educational Philosophy from UCLA, “Education as Free Use: Giorgio
Agamben on Studious Play, Toys, and the Inoperative Schoolhouse”, May 7th, wcp)
Agamben and Education: A Missed Opportunity At first, it may appear that Giorgio Agamben would endorse free play as a solution
to the ritualization of high stakes testing. As opposed to cultural petrification through schooling as a ritual performance or social
baptism, Agamben, in several important passages through his many philosophical essays and books, turns to play as a possible
alternative. ‘‘The passage from the sacred to the profane can, in fact, also come about by means of an
entirely inappropriate use (or rather, reuse) of the sacred: namely play’’ (2007b, p. 75). To play is to neglect to
follow the rules of the ritual and to liberate things from their ‘‘proper use’’ according to a certain,
predetermined Logos. The result of such play is ‘‘a new dimension of use, which children and
philosophers give to humanity’’ (Ibid). In this sense, play is the exact opposite of ritual: ‘‘Ritual fixes and
structures the calendar; play, on the other hand, though we do not yet know how and why, changes and
destroys it’’ (2007a, p. 77). In the profane time of play, ‘‘man frees himself from sacred time and ‘forgets’ it in human time’’ (Ibid,
p. 79). Thus play seems to embody a solution to petrification found in the ritual performance of schools and
attending testing regimes. Much of the secondary literature on Agamben has played-up the role of play in his philosophy,
finding in play a kind of utopianism (both in a positive and negative sense). For instance, Catherine Mills argues that for Agamben,
play offers a messianic time of redemption which ‘‘can also be used to free humanity in relation to economics, law, and so on’’
(2009, p. 125). Play, in Mills’ reading, offers Agamben ‘‘a means of resistance to the conditions of the current
‘extreme phase’ of capitalism, and most particularly to the spectacular cultural regime of consumption that
is integral to it’’ (Ibid, p. 126). Masschelein and Simons (2010) agree with this reading, emphasizing that play liberates
objects for free use and as such is essential for a coming education, or an education without
specific destination. Joanne Faulkner has likewise focused on Agamben’s theory of play, only this time less as a utopian
alternative to capitalism and more as an overly romantic fantasy of childhood innocence. It is worthwhile citing Faulkner at length
here: …the child signifies potentiality for Agamben as a purely creative, experimental, and speculative way
of being, without which nothing could come to pass into actuality…. Yet [this description] still conforms to a
disturbing tendency to signify in the child a separation from the remainder of the community. Agamben evokes the figure of
the child at play, in Infancy and History, in order to represent the possibility of a break from the
metaphysics of everyday life. Through play, the child plucks objects from their historico-material context,
transfiguring everyday things into toys…. Yet, in so doing, we might understand Agamben to recapitulate the very same
gesture that places the child within a conceptual zone of exclusion. (2010, p. 210) In this passage, Faulkner argues that the very
gesture of play granted to the child merely replicates the very schism between bare life and the life of the citizen subject which
Agamben attempts to breach. Stated differently, the ‘‘innocence’’ of childish play becomes a convenient fantasy for projecting adult
anxieties concerning the fragility of their powers and their worlds onto the other. Although these two readings of play—positive and
negative—are interesting, they both miss the central point of Agamben’s argument. The human being is not a homo ludens but a
‘‘homo profanes’’ (de la Durantaye 2008, p. 27). In Profanations it is not play as such that is endorsed. Following his analysis of
play, Agamben immediately states the following: ‘‘It [profanation] is the sort of use that Benjamin must have had in
mind when he wrote of Kafka’s The New Attorney that the law that is no longer applied but only studied is
the gate to justice’’ (2007b, p. 76). Commenting further on Benjamin’s reflections on Kafka, Agamben continues, In the Kafka
essay, the enigmatic image of a law that is studied but no longer practiced corresponds, as a sort of remnant, to the unmasking of
mythico-juridical violence effected by pure violence. There is, therefore, still a possible figure of law after its nexus with violence and
power has been deposed, but it is a law that no longer has force or application, like the one in which the ‘new attorney,’ leafing
through ‘our old books,’ buries himself in study, or like the one that Foucault may have had in mind when he spoke of a ‘new law’
that has been freed from all discipline and all relation to sovereignty. (2005, p. 63) Suspended, the law that is studied is
deactivated, no longer in force, and thus open to play. In this sense, it is not play but rather the relation
between play and study that is most important. Summarizing, Agamben writes, ‘‘And this studious play is the
passage that allows us to arrive at that justice that one of Benjamin’s posthumous fragments defines as
state of the world in which the world appears as a good that absolutely cannot be appropriated or
made juridical’’ (Ibid, p. 63). Studious play is therefore neither simply free play nor ritual but rather the zone of indistinction that
lies between the two. In this sense, we can use Agamben’s theory of play, ritual, and studious play to return to a central question
that concerns many of Agamben’s early texts: how is transmission of culture possible in an age that is ‘‘post-historical’’? Here I
would like to suggest that the
discourses and practices of ritualized testing concern themselves with the
transmission of specific content and skills. Indeed, ritual testing concerns the reproduction of the
community through socialization of students into the Logos that defines a particular identity: the
identity of the worker/consumer within a global market. This model of learning concerns the maintenance
of values and norms in the name of perpetual progress, perpetual profits, and perpetual growth.
Transmission of a particular Logos, in this sense, submits potentiality to the tyranny of the old,
leaving no space for strangers and newcomers to introduce the possibility of the new. Ironically, in a
capitalist society that privileges the continual disruptions of the market, the turn back to high-stakes testing as an apparatus of
transmission speaks to an unstated anxiety concerning the ungrounded grounds of a community estranged from itself. The more
playful capitalism destroys the past in the name of infinite progress toward absolute productivity and profitability and the power of
the entrepreneurial will produces the world for its own consumption, the more the educational system reverts back to lost rituals of
high-stakes testing. Thus the entrepreneurial will of the capitalist subject suffers a peculiar educational negation of the will, or
submission of the will to the authority of a tradition that no longer exists and a ritual that has lost its essential meaning as a focal
practice. Testing is a continual search for the authority of certain signs, laws, and customs to
guarantee the unity of meaning, the certainty of plans, and the rightness of virtues that have lost their
authority under capitalism’s ludic propulsion. Testing, in this light, is oddly anachronistic, a repetition that is not a solution
to the problem of capitalism so much as one more symptom. Free play on the other hand seems to offer a model of
education which is based on nothing more than the accumulation of events or instances without
any connection to the past. In this sense, free play suggests the impossibility of transmission. Students live
in the perpetual present of their own concerns cut off from the past or the future, exposed to moments
that are free-floating. The child constructs knowledge through the projection of his or her creative
will (or as Neill would say, the play-drive) onto the material content of the world. In this sense, the player is akin to
Agamben’s analysis of the man without content, or artist whose only real muse is his or her own willfulness. Agamben observes,
‘‘According to current opinion, all of man’s doing—that of the artist and the craftsman as well as that of
the workman and the politician—is praxis, that is, manifestation of a will that produces a concrete effect’’
(1999, p. 68). We can see the prodigious emphasis on praxis in the aesthetic theory of Nietzsche, where the artist is a Will to Power,
or even in Marx, where the essence of the human is productive labor. Summarizing a long trajectory in Western culture that has
eclipsed poiesis with a biological notion of willful action, Agamben writes, ‘‘The point of arrival of Western aesthetics is a
metaphysics of the will, that is, of life understood as energy and creative impulse’’ (Ibid, p. 72). The outcome of
willful action is nothing more than the will reaching its own limit and reflecting itself in that limit. In terms of the art world, the
artist as pure will becomes the ‘‘man without content’’ (Ibid, p. 55) who has lost his/her sense of dwelling in a
shared world precisely because his/her creations can only reflect his/her aesthetic subjectivity as absolute
essence. In both cases (free play and artistic creation), transmission is downplayed for creative, improvisational
creation. If the past exists, it only exists to be overcome, negated, or (at the most avant garde) destroyed in
the name of willful invention. If ritual negates the will or places the will in service to a tradition that futilely attempts to
transmit its content, then free play valorizes the will as the wellspring out of which tradition can be smashed,
ritual destroyed, and liberty proclaimed. As a third option, studious play is neither the transmission of specific
content (specific norms, values, and ways of being in the world), nor is it the impossibility of transmission (toppling over
into endless events and willful invention/construction). Rather studious play transforms the impossibility of
transmission into the transmission of impossibility. In such a model, transmissibility is liberated from
transmitting any definitive message or law that would ground the identity and unity of a community in an
essence. Although the transmission of tradition as a ground for community identity is an impossibility, this impossibility is also the
possibility for new uses that open up when the law is suspended, rituals are left idle, and objects are profaned. Studious play is
the transmission of whatever remains effective within the crumbs of tradition—the crumbness of tradition.
This is a strange operation whereby the impossible is given back to itself as a positive ground for
experiencing potentiality without submitting this potentiality to any pre-determinate force. Rather
than negate the will or revel in willful self-expression, the studier is willingly open to the potentiality of
whatever.
We render the law a toy with no inherent meaning
Lewis ’14 (Tyson Lewis, PhD in Educational Philosophy from UCLA, “Education as Free Use: Giorgio
Agamben on Studious Play, Toys, and the Inoperative Schoolhouse”, May 7th, wcp)
The Educational Value of Toys When
the impossibility of transmission becomes a positive ground for
experiencing the potentiality of transmissibility then the laws, things, and signs of the world are
transformed into toys. For Agamben, the toy is a peculiar kind of thing that ‘‘can be said to be withdrawn
from all rules of use’’ (1993b, p. 57). Thus a child can pick up a hammer and suddenly transform it into a microphone, a
spaceship, a guitar, an animal, and so on. Normative pressures to use the hammer in this way rather than that
way are suspended or rendered inoperative by the toy, which resists strict classification as this or that
kind of thing. Instead the toy is whatever it is. Commenting on the ontological status of whatever, Agamben argues ‘‘The being
that is properly whatever is able to not-be; it is capable of its own impotence’’ (1993a, p. 35). This whatever being becomes special
and delightful when ‘‘without resembling any other, it resembles all others’’ (2007b, p. 59). When we appreciate whatever,
we undo ‘‘the original sin of our culture’’ that consists precisely in ‘‘the transformation of the species into a
principle of identity and classification’’ (Ibid). Whatever being is special in that it can never be attributed to
an identity (of this or that kind person or thing) and as such is a desubjectification that renders impossible the
demarcation of all hierarchies, divisions, and ordinals that separate, demarcate, and classify potentiality. A
whatever-being is special, or a pure singularity, because it does not belong to any set or class. It does not have one particular
property or set of exclusive predicates but rather contains within itself properties to be and not to be this and that kind of thing. In
other words to be special is to remain indistinct and unrepresentable, and free of any
determination to be or not to be set in advance. Stated differently, whatever being is being rather. Commenting on
section nine of Heidegger’s Being and Time as well as proposition 6.44 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Agamben writes, ‘‘In the
principle of reason (‘‘There is a reason why there is something rather than nothing’’), what is essential is neither that something is
(being) nor that something is not (nothingness, but that something is rather than nothingness)’’ (1993a, p. 104). Whatever exists
prior to an either/or logic that sets being and not being against one another in a kind of dialectical contestation. As Agamben argues,
whatever is an ‘‘ambiguity’’ or an ‘‘undifferentiated chaos’’ (1999, p. 254) that resists any clear distinction
between wanting and not wanting, affirmation and negation, occurrence and non-occurrence, subject and
object, use and exchange values that keeps open the ‘‘luminous spiral of the possible’’ (Ibid, p. 257): our
freedom to be rather than that which we have become or are destined to become. Stated differently, whatever is an ontological
tautology, or what I would call an ontotautology, wherein each side of the equation [Agamben gives the example ‘‘it-will-occur-or-itwill-not-occur’’ (Ibid, p. 264)] remains an open possibility. Whatever as a tautological structure holds within itself both being and not
being without choosing either, and therefore remains within a luminous spiral of contingency as a necessary ontological ungrounding. The toy is the quintessential embodiment of whatever. Neither this nor that, it is both
simultaneously, thus holding within itself a primordial surplus or potentiality that is never exhausted by
any one particular playful activity. When things, laws, and signs are suspended from their use or
exchange values through the work of studious play, then whatever remains becomes a toy. This is
not a transformation of an essence (some kind of mutation in the ‘‘genetic structure’’ of the thing) so much as a return of the thing to
its primordial potentiality, its whatever ontology. In this sense, the toy is a free thing. Agamben writes, ‘‘A look at the world of
toys shows that children, humanity’s little scrap-dealers, will play with whatever junk comes their way, and that play thereby
preserves profane objects and behavior that have ceased to exist’’ (2007a, b, p. 79). The ‘‘little scrap-dealer’’ is attentive to
precisely whatever remains when things and signs are stripped of their sacred origins in ritual: the
potentiality to be otherwise than. Rather than the transmission of this or that message, meaning, or use, the toy plays
with the potentiality of transmissibility unleashed from specific roles, functions, or predestinations.
Summarizing, Agamben speculates: Not in the monument, an object of archaeological and scholarly research, which preserves in
time its practical, documentary character (its ‘material content’, Benjamin would have said); not in an antique, whose value is a
function of its quantitative ageing; not in an archive document, which draws its value from its place in a chronology and a
relationship of proximity and legality with the past event. The toy represents something more and something different from all these
things. It has often been asked what is left of the model after its transformation into a toy, for it is certainly not a matter of its cultural
significance, nor of its function, nor even of its form (which can be perfectly reproduced or altered almost beyond recognition, as
anyone who is familiar with the elastic iconism of toys knows very well). (2007a, b, p. 80) But what is left when such
significance, functionality, and form are left idle? Nothing less than the potentiality for new uses, for
new historical modes of being to arise, for new profane meanings to emerge. In order to further clarify its
ontological status, it is helpful to juxtapose Agamben’s theory of the toy next to Heidegger’s theory of equipment. Heidegger writes,
‘‘In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-orderto’ which is constitutive for
the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it,
the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment’’
(2008, p. 98). Only through immersed use does the being of equipment reveal itself as ready-to-hand
being of hammers— Heidegger’s famous example—is not a self-sufficient substance
that exists independent of its readiness to be picked up and used for hammering by Dasein. The readiness of
(zuhanden). In this sense, the
equipment’s being consists of an ‘‘in-order-to,’’ ‘‘towards-which,’’ and ‘‘for-the-sake-ofwhich.’’ In relation to hammers, we could say
that they are used in-order-to hammer nails, towards-the-purpose-of building houses, for-the-sake-of sheltering Dasein. Thus
the
being of equipment is determined by the equipment’s worldly qualities, or by the relational totality of
involvements which link hammers to other pieces of equipment (like nails), to contexts (like the workshop), and
to purposes (like supplying shelter). Indeed, Heidegger argues that the use of the hammer consists in ‘‘freeing it for [auf] its
readiness-to-hand within the environment’’ (Ibid, p. 117). Only when Dasein picks up the hammer as a potentiality for hammering
within the context of an in-order-to, towards-which, and forthe- sake-of is the being of the hammer freed. Freeing is an activity that
allows hammers as equipment to ‘‘be involved’’ (Ibid) in the world as the kinds of equipment that they are. In turn, an authentic use
of hammers is not a separation or radical deviation from the normative pressures of ‘‘in-order-to,’’ ‘‘towards-which,’’ and ‘‘for-thesake-of-which.’’ Rather, authentic use of equipment comes about through ‘‘an existentiell modification of the ‘they’ [as the average
everyday use of equipment]’’ (Ibid, p. 168). The modification which Heidegger speaks of here could be thought of
as innovative uses of hammers to better achieve the ultimate ‘‘for-the-sake-of-which’’ hammers are used
as hammers. The key to such innovation is that it does not modify the existentiale structure of the hammer (its fundamental ‘‘inorder-to,’’ ‘‘towards-which,’’ and ‘‘for-the-sake-of-which’’). Stated differently, these modifications remain recognizable and intelligible
precisely because the innovations retain and work within the parameters, rules, and traditions that form the essential being of the
hammer (its ontological meaning). Authentic—rather than merely generic or typical—uses of hammers within a given context of use
further free up the hammer for better, more efficient or more skillful usage. Readiness-at-hand becomes increasingly
handy via authentic use. The kind of understanding which frees up equipment to be the kind of being that
it is (ready-to-hand for various uses) is never made explicit but is rather found in the preconceptual familiarity of
Dasein with the world. But when Dasein steps out of this mode of intuitive familiarity and thematizes its involvements, then
specific things appear as ‘‘present-at-hand’’ (vorhanden) or abstracted from the totality of interrelationships
which define the being of equipment. Heidegger writes, ‘‘…looking-at enters the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside
entities within-the-world. In this kind of ‘dwelling’ as a holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the
presentat- hand is consummated’’ (2008, p. 89). Through perception of the thing as a thing with certain properties,
Dasein can then interpret it, make propositions about it, and so on. In intuitive coping and dealing, the equipment as
equipment is totally transparent, concealed, and invisible. When one uses a hammer for hammering, there is in
essence no hammer at all, only the potentiality for hammering as an activity in which one is fully
submersed. Yet when Dasein steps to the side, perceives the hammer as a thing, and thus extracts it from use, the hammer
becomes ‘‘unready-to-hand.’’ Unready-to-hand is akin to the hammer devoid of ‘‘in-order-to,’’ ‘‘towards-which,’’ and ‘‘for-the-sake-ofwhich.’’ The present-athand qualities of the hammer as a meaningless material object of a certain size, shape, color, and texture are
thrust into the foreground while the ‘‘ready-to-hand’’ qualities recede into the background. The hammer loses its
‘‘hammerness’’ when it becomes conspicuously present for Dasein to contemplate. Now we can return to the
question of the toy. It would seem that toys do not fall into either the category of ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Unlike
equipment, toys lack an ‘‘in-order-to,’’ ‘‘towards-which,’’ ‘‘and for-the-sake-of-which.’’ They are
indeterminate without destination. Thus the hammer can quickly change into a microphone, an airplane, an animal, and
back again. The normative pressures that define a hammer as a particular kind of equipment in relation to other pieces of equipment
are suspended, rendered inoperable. And when suspended, the whatever being of the hammer opens up to new
articulations, new usages that are not prefigured by the traditions, norms, values, and precedence
that form the being of the hammer as a hammer. Unlike Heidegger who argues that Dasein frees up equipment
through the actualization of its being via usage, the freedom of the toy derives from this state of indeterminacy
where all actualizations are delayed indefinitely. But unlike present-at-hand objects, the suspension of the being of the
hammer as the kind of equipment that it is meant to be does not result in any kind of conspicuous presence. As described above,
when a piece of equipment becomes present-at-hand, it is thrown into relief, thrust into the foreground, and extracted from the
taken-for-granted, totally transparent background of use. In this state, the hammer can be contemplated as a kind of
mute object that has lost its being-in-the-world. It is no longer an affordance that calls for use. Instead of an existential
potentiality, the hammer becomes a material actuality. But a toy never appears in this way. It remains open to free
use without an ‘‘in-orderto.’’ As such, the toy remains transparent and inconspicuous in ways which
present-at-hand objects cannot. Stated differently, the toy prefers not to be either ready-to-hand or presentathand. Abhanden is a peculiar ontological status that is a kind of limbo both inside yet radically outside of Heidegger’s fundamental
ontology. Neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand, I suggest that toys are abhanden or awayfrom- hand
in the sense of being-in-suspension. Abhanden conveys a sense of potentiality or whateverness brought forth through
studious play without knowing what this potentiality is destined for. To engage in studious play with the law means that
one does not simply modify its existentiell uses. This would be akin to an amendment to the current law in order to make
the law more efficient, clear, or reasonable in its applications. In such cases, the law would retain its recognizability as
a law with a particular ‘‘in-order-to,’’ ‘‘towards-which,’’ and ‘‘for-the-sake-of-which.’’ And yet with studious play,
the law is not simply reduced to a ‘‘present-at-hand’’ object of analysis either. In this case, the law would be a mute
object that lacks any utility (present or future), a kind of archeological relic that fascinates precisely
because of its alien qualities (not unlike a hieroglyphic monument whose code must be deciphered for the message to be
transmitted). To play studiously with the law is to suspend the law, transforming it into a toy. As a toy, the
law is deactivated not for the purpose of detached analysis but for the purpose of reinvention, radical
experimentation, and radical abandonment. This is the law as not the law, or the law as whatever it is without
destination or determination in advance. When one studiously plays with toys, one is not transmitting this or that
message from the past (as in ritual reenactments). If this were the case, then all toys would be monuments, antiques, or
archives to be studied for their ‘‘life’’ or ‘‘historical lessons.’’ While toys cannot be monuments, antiques, or archives,
monuments, antiques, or archives can become toys when they are playfully studied. But this would mean
letting go of their particular lessons and opening them up to whatever remains for free use.
Consequently, their function as transmitters of cultural legacy is left idle, and the monument as a ‘‘ready at hand’’ teaching tool
becomes abandoned or away-from-hand. And instead of making transmission impossible (as when we merely play with
toys), one
transmits whatever remains—a kind of open potentiality for new uses. To merely play with a
toy is to play with particular uses, but to studiously play with a toy is to be attentive to whatever
enables these free uses to emerge in the first place. Stated differently, to play is always to play with
possibilities (to be this or that) while to studiously play is to play with potentiality (to be this and that). What separates
(and binds) the two activities is precisely the status of impossibility. The player plays with what is possible for a
particular will to actualize according to its devises and plans. The emphasis here is on the new use values created
through the play which reflect back to the player his or her play-drive. The studier, on the other hand, is willingly (rather than
willfully) attentive to impossibility as a possibility of whatever to be transmitted, ignited, lit up beyond any
use value or willful intentionality. In other words, the attention of the player is on what the thing becomes (exploring a
possibility, followed by another, and another as the will dictates) whereas the attention of the studier is on whatever
makes such becomings possible in the first place (the potentiality of the toy as such). Potentially is what is transmitted
when one studiously plays with monuments, antiques, or archives as toys.
We need to break the rules in classrooms to challenge the state of exception
Barsky ‘8 (Robert Barsky, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Vanderbilt University,
“Safe Spaces in an Era of Gated Communities and Disproportionate Punishments,” 2008, wcp)
I was going to propose a moratorium on the consequences of taking intellectual risks within and beyond the academy but deem it
insufficient for the present task. In its place, I advocate a wanton disregard for arbitrary authority and an active
promotion of lust and poetry; the purposeful secretion of fantasy; and the creation more than the critique
of art, even in our classrooms. I have spent most of my career bringing the tools from the humanities to bear on crucial
social problems relating to Geneva Convention refugees (Constructing and Arguing), homeless people (“Stories”), and incarcerated
migrants (“Activist Translation” and “From Discretion”). Nevertheless, I now firmly believe that we don’t need to involve our
students more directly in political debates as delineated in, say, the New York Times, because most of
these so-called differences of opinion force us to take a stand on issues too obvious or superficial to
really matter. We all have a view about an idea as bizarre as building a wall between the United States
and Mexico in an era of much-vaunted free trade, but all the approaches to free trade take for granted our
need to control the borders. This need leads otherwise perfectly reasonable human beings to promote
freer movement of commodities as set forth by NAFTA, though they are incapable of imagining the
fundamental first move of free trade, the elimination of the border between Mexico and the United States
and between the United States and Canada, and though the European Union has done so between
worlds that were once as divergent as the United Kingdom and Germany. We have also been forced to
consider the value of torturing human beings in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, or down the street from us and
have ended up reading Alan Dershowitz debating the fine points of the law as it applies to our citizens
versus everybody else, instead of noting the insanity not only of torture but also of warehousing a prison
population that exceeds two million people. We all want to live healthy lives whether or not we’re employed but then with
a straight face wonder whether universal health care, which works everywhere else in the world, is right for us. These are not
debates, because frankly there is no serious intellectual content on either side of these so-called issues.
We are being lured into this constructed pseudo-reality of trial balloons, nonchoices, and sensationalism
designed to keep us—and our students—from debates worth having and from projects worth spending
money on, using a resource like the trillion or so military dollars approved with nary a hesitation not only
in Congress but also in our discussions at home, approved in the name of a smoke screen created
through government-enforced fear mongering (on this point, see Melman). We need to change the terms of the
discussion by bringing the glorious tools of creativity to bear on the fertile gardens of the mind, for it is
time for the uncontrolled and unexpected. Theodore Ziolkowski has written in a book on literature and law, “Justice
gazes most often into her literary mirror when she has been disheveled by the winds of social and political
upheaval, . . . when law finds itself out of phase with the prevailing community passions” (63), and, “It is at
those moments when the tension between law and morality is increased to the breaking point that law is
changed and its evolution lurches forward again” (16). This probably is a good time for justice to gaze into
the literary mirror. Even more important, we must name the upheaval, note the disheveled, mark the tension,
and observe the breaking point; we must provide the grounds for upheaval’s creation . So this is not a time
for the complacency or self-satisfaction implied when the highbrow is invoked as a first gesture or when
we take as our task the imposition of preordained, overriding, and all-knowing models of thought on our
students and their work. Even Tzvetan Todorov is now bemoaning the efforts he and others put into structuralism, realizing
that it has had the effect of destroying through a weak pseudo-science any pleasure people have in reading literature. So we need
to go back to the pleasures of reading and the risks of creating, inside and beyond the classroom. These
efforts will have to be conceived differently, because in the past, even relative to the Vietnam era or the cold war, we allowed
policies that have raised the stakes of engagement and creative action to a level that is for most people unaffordable if not
unfathomable. As teachers, then, we can look back to those who made a difference to find some inspiration and evidence for the
power of daring: Marquis de Sade, Emile Zola, Antonin Artaud, Henry Miller, Allen Ginsberg, Antonio Gramsci—examples of those
whose public vilification was, to use the words of the prosecutor in the Gramsci trial, a conscious effort to stop the brain from
functioning for twenty years (88). And we have the great contemporary model of Noam Chomsky, who was once asked, “You’ve
been called a neo-Nazi, your books have been burned, you’ve been called anti-Israeli—don’t you get a bit upset by the ways your
views are always distorted by the media and by intellectuals?” His characteristically humorous but somewhat sardonic reply? No,
why should I? I get called anything, I’m accused of everything you can dream of: being a Communist propagandist, a Nazi
propagandist, a pawn of freedom of speech, an anti-Semite, a liar, whatever you want. Actually, I think that’s all a good sign. I mean,
if you’re a dissident, you’re typically ignored. If you can’t be ignored, and you can’t be answered, you’re vilified—that’s obvious: no
institution is going to help people undermine it. So I would only regard the kinds of things you’re talking about as signs of progress.
(qtd. in Barsky, Chomsky Effect 52) But maybe Chomsky’s answer is from another era, another sign that we are in a different
kind of crisis today, just as his pride in having been arrested for civil disobedience is a badge of honor
that can no longer be worn in the way he did. I was going to propose a moratorium on consequences, but
the fact is, they are already here, and they’re more nefarious than those Chomsky endured, because
they’re more insidious. Being labeled a négationniste, a Nazi, or an anti-Semite could be the kiss of death for our work, as
“spook” was to Coleman Silk in Philip Roth’s The Human Stain (6). And the jail time that many of us fondly invoke to prove our
engagement can’t be reasonably advocated to our students at a time when a criminal record can, in one fell swoop, obliterate their
chances for travel outside the country, for certain kinds of employment, or for credit when they are starting their professional lives in
massive student loan debt. The examples of how this works are astonishing: if one of our students chooses to participate
in an illegal demonstration and gets arrested, charged, and sentenced, she may never have a chance to
question any kind of authority again, ever. If while in prison doing time for the great crime of speaking out for what she
believes in, she mistakenly makes a call to a cell phone, against the rules in prisons, the penalty can be two years of lockdown, two
years at twentythree hours a day in an 8'x10' cell where she both shits and sleeps. So yes, it has been possible in recent years for
Stanley Aronowitz, Norman Mailer, Seymour Melman, Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, and many others to use an affiliation to
an institution like a university or to use a career like writing to protect them from the consequences of
overt social criticism, and it has been okay for people like them to celebrate and recall prison time for their
dissidence. But it’s much easier to advocate this course when the penalty is not lasting. So how do we change the world,
alter attitudes, fight for decency, get the humanities to work in the world? After a talk I recently gave about public
intellectuals, one audience member suggested that convincing right-wing hawks that a course of violent action is wrong is
impossible, for biological and chemical reasons. The only way we can challenge notions, he suggested, is through
dramatic action, like an experiment with hallucinogenic drugs or a creative amorous exchange, both types
having been practiced by our much loved and canonized poets and writers. But a productively turned-on Voltarine de Cleyre or Mary
Shelley or Lord Byron or Allen Ginsberg could not function in the current security-minded setting: if they were alive today, these
canonical authors could not travel, could not publish, and would likely have zero access to a public beyond the prison cell. They
probably wouldn’t even be brought to a much-publicized trial that could promote their actions or spread their ideas, as happened in
previous generations, to people like Timothy Leary and Jerry Rubin. And using our critical powers to deconstruct the documents that
those in authority have commissioned is ineffectual in an era when anything short of unrestrained action is deemed sissy, the
hopeless “I told you so” of a lost cause. Let us at least do what we in the humanities can do: delimit some safe
havens for the planting of new ideas and the provoking of real ideals, within and therefore beyond the
humanities. We can start by instilling in our students and ourselves the belief that the “future could
fundamentally surpass the present,” to cite Russell Jacoby in The End of Utopia, that “the future texture of life, work and
even love might little resemble that now familiar to us,” “that history contains possibilities of freedom and pleasure
hardly tapped” (xi–xii). We as teachers and students need to know how to be free and in that freedom
stimulate the unexpected, which means that we need to rethink rigid requirement we all need to hear
something unexpectedts and the idea of business as usual in the discipline—the word discipline is
particularly apt in this context— and instead look to more promising experiments, like studying questions
and catalyzing approaches to them in whatever genre or style one might think up. Such experiments can
be practiced in our classrooms if we offer our students the possibility of addressing, say, literary questions
creatively rather than programmatically. Practice will be needed, though, because students are afraid of doing creative
work in classrooms, in part because high schools are usually factories that teach them how to take tests and
universities are often considered places that award certificates that facilitate social climbing, which
suggests that students need only provide what the professors want to hear, just as the professors need only
produce what the tenure committee wants to read. To teach freedom to students, to get them to drop their wellhoned guard, to develop in the academy a saner relation to arbitrary, brutally enforced power, we must
get over the problem of the outcome from the very beginning: without the concomitant risk of low grades,
students might be willing to take the risk of real thought. A moratorium on consequences means teachers
and students prancing in joyful embrace in fields of As, the mind-set of punishment for creative resistance
no longer reinforcing the fear of real resistance to spending a trillion dollars a year in this fake and
endlessly trumped-up obsession with the paper tiger’s den called security. Creating safe spaces for
intellectual risk taking in the humanities is a start. If you are living in the United States illegally and are deported, your
return will cost you three years. With a record of any kind, you could easily be looking at ten. It doesn’t take much. We aren’t
protected from administrative regulations because we happen to be employed in the hallowed halls, particularly if we are
immigrants. As a permanent resident, I have ten days to report a change of address; failure to report can lead to deportation
proceedings—a tiny example of our newfound lust for government sanctioned arbitrariness, brutality, violence, and disproportionate
consequences for minor actions. The moratorium I describe here only sets the ground; the earth to nourish the
seeds of productive resistance and unexpected creation probably needs the sodomizing, psychedelic, farfetched, orgasmic, fictional, exploded gesture whose nature I cannot even imagine. I think that to survive
this era, we need to look to explosive examples from the past, hence the importance of recalling, rereading, and
teaching Sexus, Philosophie dans le boudoir, Lady Chatterly’s Lover, Una vita violente. Even more important, we all need to
hear something unexpected, and it’s our task as teachers, as catalysts in an era that promotes gated
communities inside and outside our minds, to set out the spaces that will make this work possible , in the
hope that the disease of freedom leaks from our classrooms and oozes its corrupting influence into our
terrified worlds. I hope it’s as contagious as can be.
Right Wing DA
UQ
Risk High
The risk is high now
Lee et al, 15
Jaeah Lee, Brandon Ellington Patterson, and Gabrielle Canon, *2013-14 Middlebury Fellow, **editorial
fellow at Mother Jones, ***B.A. in Specialized Journalism from USC, “The Rise of Violent Right-Wing
Extremism, Explained,” Mother Jones, 6/30/15, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/06/right-wingextremism-explainer-charleston-mass-shooting-terrorism // IS
The US law enforcement community regards homegrown violent extremists, not radicalized Islamists, as
the most severe threat from political violence in the country, according to a new study from the Triangle
Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Released late last week, the report comes amid renewed
focus on the problem ever since a 21-year-old avowed white supremacist carried out a mass shooting at
a historic black church in Charleston, South Carolina. There is a growing body of research highlighting the
threat from right-wing extremists, but who or what exactly does that term encompass, and how big really
is the problem? Mother Jones examined various reports and contacted experts to find out more. While
there is no uniform definition, these terms loosely encompass individuals or groups associated with white
supremacist, anti-government, sovereign citizen, patriot, militia, or other ideologies that target specific
religious, ethnic, or other minority groups. (Meanwhile, how to determine which violent attacks constitute
an act of terrorism has been a subject of renewed debate.) The available data on violent attacks
perpetrated by right-wing extremists ranges widely, explains Michael German, a former FBI agent who is
now a national security expert at the Brennan Center for Justice. Researchers at the US Department of
Homeland Security, the New America Foundation, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the University of
Maryland, and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point have all compiled data on right-wing
extremist violence using varying criteria over different periods of time, most of them going back to the mid
1990s, when the Oklahoma City bombing riveted attention on the problem. (The exception is the
University of Maryland's data, which dates to 1970, during a surge in violent far-left extremism.) The
various studies have all led to the same general conclusion: The threat from homegrown right-wing
extremists has grown in recent years. "Since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of
attacks and violent plots originating in the far-right of American politics," Arie Perliger, the director of
terrorism studies at the Combating Terrorism Center, wrote in a 2012 report.
AT: Limited to the South
SKINHEADS ARE EVERYWHERE AND ATTACK WHERE MINORITIES ARE
Lee et al, 15
Jaeah Lee, Brandon Ellington Patterson, and Gabrielle Canon, *2013-14 Middlebury Fellow, **editorial
fellow at Mother Jones, ***B.A. in Specialized Journalism from USC, “The Rise of Violent Right-Wing
Extremism, Explained,” Mother Jones, 6/30/15, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/06/right-wingextremism-explainer-charleston-mass-shooting-terrorism // IS
Perliger also notes that attacks have moved beyond states in the South—the birthplace of groups such as
the KKK and the site of major attacks during the 1960s—to places including California , New York,
Illinois, and Pennsylvania . "The existence of significant minority groups in the different states appears
linked with the level of far-right violence they experience," Perliger says. In a recent editorial, the
Southern Poverty Law Center's Morris Dees and J. Richard Cohen argued that far-right extremism is
gaining ground beyond state boundaries: "Unlike those of the civil rights era, whose main goal was to
maintain Jim Crow in the American South, today's white supremacists don't see borders; they see a white
tribe under attack by people of color across the globe.…The days of thinking of domestic terrorism as the
work of a few Klansmen or belligerent skinheads are over."
Link
Link UQ
Surveillance of right-wingers is increasing now
Lee et al, 15
Jaeah Lee, Brandon Ellington Patterson, and Gabrielle Canon, *2013-14 Middlebury Fellow, **editorial
fellow at Mother Jones, ***B.A. in Specialized Journalism from USC, “The Rise of Violent Right-Wing
Extremism, Explained,” Mother Jones, 6/30/15, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/06/right-wingextremism-explainer-charleston-mass-shooting-terrorism // IS
The federal and local governments ramped up efforts to combat domestic terrorism of all kinds in the
wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168 people. A few months following the 9/11 attacks,
FBI official Dale Watson testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that "right-wing groups
continue to represent a serious terrorist threat." But Johnson, German, and others assert that federal
counterterrorism programs since 9/11 have focused overwhelmingly on the perceived threat from Islamic
extremism. That includes the Obama administration's "countering violent extremism" strategy, which
"revolves around impeding the radicalization of violent jihadists," according to a 2014 Congressional
Research Service report. The attack in Charleston underscored "the failure of the federal government to
keep closer tabs" on right-wing extremists, argues Gerald Horne, a historian and civil rights activist at the
University of Houston. But the focus may soon increase. In February, CNN reported that DHS
circulated an intelligence assessment that focused on the domestic terror threat posed by right-wing
extremists. Kurzman and Schanzer also point to a handout from a training program sponsored by the
Department of Justice, cautioning that the threat from antigovernment extremism "is real."
Generic
They backlash to egalitarian legislation – we don’t need to win surveillance is key
Lee et al, 15
Jaeah Lee, Brandon Ellington Patterson, and Gabrielle Canon, *2013-14 Middlebury Fellow, **editorial
fellow at Mother Jones, ***B.A. in Specialized Journalism from USC, “The Rise of Violent Right-Wing
Extremism, Explained,” Mother Jones, 6/30/15, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/06/right-wingextremism-explainer-charleston-mass-shooting-terrorism // IS
Experts suggest several factors may have played into it. Researchers commonly attribute the spike in
right-wing attacks, around 2008, to the election of an African American president. Around the time of
Obama's election, Johnson notes how the white supremacist web forum Stormfront had less than
100,000 registered users. "Today, it is over 300,000," he says. Scholars have also debated the role the
2008 financial crisis, a heightening debate over immigration, and other socioeconomic changes may have
had. The Combating Terrorism Center's Perliger points out that past spikes in far-right attacks also
corresponded with the passing of landmark legislation such as the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and firearm
restrictions during the 1990s.
AT: Right Wing DA
Reps DA
2AC
Expanding the term “terrorism” to right-wing groups facilitates policing and hurts
left-wing activism
McQuade, 15
Brendan McQuade, “The Right Wing Resurgence and the Problem of Terrorism,” 7/3/15, CounterPunch,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/07/03/the-right-wing-resurgence-and-the-problem-of-terrorism/ // IS
This renewed attention on right wing movements, however, should not be a cause for celebration. The
further expansion of the category of terrorism is threatening for left movements as well. The concern for
civil liberties and fear of bad press can also prevent police from targeting other left wing “extremists.” At
New Jersey’s fusion center, an analyst told me that their assessment of anarchists confronted the same
concerns as their work on sovereign citizens: “Over last year, there was a lot of panic about Occupy.
Are anarchists violent? I did an analysis that said basically, ‘calm down, there is no indication that
anarchists in New Jersey are violent or are planning any violent actions. They are few in number and
basically irrelevant.’ That sort of negative reporting is valuable. Every time you hear about a protest at a
local university don’t activate the SWAT team and be concerned.” The immediate supervisor for these
analysts saw value in the product but also found reasons to be concerned: “The tricky part of the project
was, unless they were doing something criminal and it was documented, you couldn’t really report of
them and make it seem like they were being monitored or investigated… If you’re reporting that they are
assembling it presumes that the assembling is illegal…We’ve seen what’s happens when you report on
militias, anti-war, whatever it may be. I’m not trying to get us in the front page of Star Ledger. This is
America. These people have the right to believe whatever they want.” This anecdote should caution us
against intervening in the politics of terrorism. Expanding and adding further legitimacy to the idea of
“terrorism” will only make political policing more likely. There already enough examples of recent state
repression of left movements—the decade long “Green Scare,” the pre-emptive arrest of eight anarchists
before the 2008 Republic National Convention, the entrapment of “five stoner misfits” connected to
Occupy Cleveland in an FBI-engineered “terror” plot, among many others. We need not add more
legitimacy to this war on social movements.
AT: UQ
No threat
No threat – their studies are flawed
Walker, 15
Jesse Walker, B.A. in history from the University of Michigan <3 “Three Strange Claims in Mother Jones's
Report on the 'Rise of Right-Wing Extremism,’” Reason, 7/2/15, http://reason.com/blog/2015/07/02/threestrange-claims-in-mother-joness-re // IS
Finally, here's something you should bear in mind when reading any count of right-wing terror attacks:
These tallies tend to be a catch-all jumble of people with different ideologies. If you compare the
manifesto of the man who murdered those churchgoers in Charleston last month to the manifesto of the
man who flew a plane into a Texas IRS office a few years ago, you won't find much common ground. (In
the latter case, I'm not sure the author even hails from the far right so much as the far end of the political
long tail.) It's misleading to reify these incidents into a unified "threat," especially since the numbers
involved are ultimately so low. Writing recently in The New York Times, Charles Kurzman and David
Schanzer declared that the "main terrorist threat in the United States is not from violent Muslim
extremists, but from right-wing extremists." Here is an alternative view: Much as it might pain the
counterterrorism industry to admit it, the U.S. doesn't have a "main terrorist threat" right now. As my
colleague Ron Bailey noted this morning, "Americans are 69 times more likely to die taking a bath than
from terrorism." And no, he's not talking about Charlotte Corday.
AT: Link
Generic
Right-wingers are surveilled by companies, not the government
Lee et al, 15
Jaeah Lee, Brandon Ellington Patterson, and Gabrielle Canon, *2013-14 Middlebury Fellow, **editorial
fellow at Mother Jones, ***B.A. in Specialized Journalism from USC, “The Rise of Violent Right-Wing
Extremism, Explained,” Mother Jones, 6/30/15, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/06/right-wingextremism-explainer-charleston-mass-shooting-terrorism // IS
And because the data on right-wing violence varies so much, "it's hard to get a true understanding of the
threat," German says, adding that the FBI—whose No. 1 priority is to protect the United States from a
terrorist attack—does not publish data on domestic terrorism. "Instead, we rely on these private groups
that are doing a public service by compiling and publishing information," he says. The FBI does collect
and publish limited data on hate crimes, which it defines as criminal offenses "against a person or
property motivated in whole or in part by an offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, ethnic origin
or sexual orientation." But German as well as researchers at the Southern Poverty Law Center point out
that data relies on voluntary reporting and thus undercounts those numbers.
Security K Answers
FW
Need to master the language of the political elites to ever successfully challenge
securitization
Emily Crick 12, research associate at Transform Drug Policy Foundation, Drugs as an existential threat:
An analysis of the international securitization of drugs, International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 23,
Issue 5, September 2012, Pages 407–414
The difficulty of desecuritizing¶ Buzan et al. argue that desecuritization, which for Waever means the “shifting of issues out of
emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere”, should be the preferred way of dealing with
problems (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 4). However, because of the power of the security narrative, especially when used in conjunction
with the ‘Self/Other’ dichotomy and reliant on a set of morals that are portrayed as being universally accepted, desecuritization
becomes very difficult.¶ Waever recognizes that “A characteristic feature of the CS [Copenhagen School] is its scepticism towards
‘security’. It [security] has often anti-democratic and anti-creative implications… [and it can be seen as] a failure to deal with issues
as normal politics” (Waever, 2004, p. 10). Carston Bagge Laustsen and Ole Waever, in their article ‘In Defence of Religion: Sacred
Referent Objects for Securitization’ (2000), note that when something is securitized there are implications, “‘internally’ (for instance
by inhibiting debate and democracy) and ‘externally’ by often stimulating conflict, security dilemmas and escalation” ( Laustsen &
Waever, 2000, pp. 708–709).¶ This critique seems particularly pertinent to drugs policy. Herschinger (2011) argues
that using the language of war justifies violence as the rational response to the ‘antagonistic drug Other’, but it also frames
alternative discourses as immoral and irrational. She notes that the securitization of drugs allows actors to carry out extraordinary
measures but also to restrict the contestation of the current regime (Herschinger, 2011, p. 88) Medical and scientific experts, she
notes, are endowed with special powers to articulate the drugs threat as long as they support the global drug prohibition regime, if
however they attempt to discuss alternative viewpoints, including harm reduction methods, their reports often remain unpublished
and are labelled non-scientific (Herschinger, 2011, pp. 77–78) or ‘pro-drug’ (UNODC, 2009, p. 1). The external implications are even
plainer to see: the rhetorical ‘War on Drugs’ at times becomes a very real war as in, for example, Colombia,
Mexico or Afghanistan. ¶ As has been explored earlier, the relationship between the audience and the actor
not only influences whether the securitization is successful, it may go some way towards explaining why it
is so difficult to desecuritize an issue. Taureck suggests that the audiences are unlikely to be the general
public; rather those groups needing to be “convinced” are more often political and military elites who
are already part of, or closely connected to, the securitizing actor (Taureck, 2006, p. 20). Influential bureaucracies
associated with the maintenance and enforcement of the global drug prohibition regime, such as the
UNODC and the INCB at international level or the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Russian drugs
tsar, Viktor Ivanov, as a close ally of Prime Minister Putin, on the national level, are closely allied to the political elites
that carried out the securitizing moves and they have a vested interest in maintaining their funding
alongside their role in enforcing prohibition and thus continuing the securitization of drugs.
AT: Der Derian V2L
Seeking to change the world is a celebration of life not a negation
Todd May 5, prof @ Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism
2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531
And that
is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the
world is to offer a new form of life-celebration . It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way
of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that
might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a
complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty
about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our
art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon
both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one
aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration
– is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both.
AT: Pan
Assessing Chinese motivation is possible and prevents security dilemmas
Joseph K. Clifton 11, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE
OF CHINA”,” 2011,
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc_theses) //cc
motives can be known . Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives can be difficult, but this does not
mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of finding out information about the goals of states and the
means with which they plan to achieve them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for example, is to determine state interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The
possibility that information may be flawed should not lead to a rejection of all information . People
make decisions based on less than perfect knowledge all of the time . This ability to know motives extends to future motives, because an
analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe consistencies or constant evolutions of motives.
Prediction of the future is necessarily less certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made .104¶
First,
Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the security dilemma, which
could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic, but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security situation were the United States to
withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear
European powers to wage a preemptive war against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent. 105 This scenario is not rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that
other states will attack if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of nuclear weapons is only as a
the security dilemma exists because of a lack of
motivational knowledge, so the proper response is to try to enhance understanding of motives, not
discard motivational knowledge altogether . Misperception is certainly a problem in international politics, but
reducing misperception would allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in
preferable outcomes relative to offensive realism. 106¶ Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China ,
because mutually preferable outcomes can be achieved if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have to assume, but is actually a
status quo power with aims that have limited effect on the security of the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim with certainty that China
is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more intentional
information than what is publicly known. At the very least, valuing motivational assessments empowers
policymakers to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the possibility of reducing
competition and conflict .
deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that
China’s locked-in to a realist framework
Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell 12, Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political
Science at Columbia University, Andrew Scobell is Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation,
“How China Sees America”, Foreign Affairs, September / October) //cc
Third, American
theories of international relations have become popular among younger Chinese policy
analysts, many of whom have earned advanced degrees in the U nited States. The most influential body of
international relations theory in China is so-called offensive realism, which holds that a country will try to control its security
environment to the full extent that its capabilities permit. According to this theory, the United States cannot be satisfied
with the existence of a powerful China and therefore seeks to make the ruling regime there weaker and
more pro-American. Chinese analysts see evidence of this intent in Washington's calls for democracy and
its support for what China sees as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Whether they see the United
States primarily through a culturalist, Marxist, or realist lens, most Chinese strategists assume that a country as
powerful as the United States will use its power to preserve and enhance its privileges and will treat efforts
by other countries to protect their interests as threats to its own security. This assumption leads to a
pessimistic conclusion: as China rises, the United States will resist. The United States uses soothing words;
casts its actions as a search for peace, human rights, and a level playing field; and sometimes offers China genuine assistance.
But the United States is two-faced. It intends to remain the global hegemon and prevent China from growing
strong enough to challenge it. In a 2011 interview with Liaowang, a state-run Chinese newsmagazine, Ni Feng, the deputy
director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of American Studies, summed up this view. "On the one hand, the
United States realizes that it needs China's help on many regional and global issues," he said. "On the other hand, the United
States is worried about a more powerful China and uses multiple means to delay its development and to remake
China with U.S. values." A small group of mostly younger Chinese analysts who have closely studied the United
States argues that Chinese and American interests are not totally at odds. In their view, the two countries are
sufficiently remote from each other that their core security interests need not clash. They can gain mutual benefit from trade and
other common interests. But those holding such views are outnumbered by strategists on the other side of the
spectrum, mostly personnel from the military and security agencies , who take a dim view of U.S. policy
and have more confrontational ideas about how China should respond to it. They believe that China must
stand up to the United States militarily and that it can win a conflict, should one occur, by outpacing U.S.
military technology and taking advantage of what they believe to be superior morale within China's armed
forces. Their views are usually kept out of sight to avoid frightening both China's rivals and its friends.
Assessing Chinese motivation is possible and prevents security dilemmas
Joseph K. Clifton 11, “DISPUTED THEORY AND SECURITY POLICY: RESPONDING TO “THE RISE
OF CHINA”,” 2011,
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc_theses) //cc
motives can be known . Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives can be difficult, but this does not
mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of finding out information about the goals of states and the
means with which they plan to achieve them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for example, is to determine state interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The
possibility that information may be flawed should not lead to a rejection of all information . People
make decisions based on less than perfect knowledge all of the time . This ability to know motives extends to future motives, because an
analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe consistencies or constant evolutions of motives.
Prediction of the future is necessarily less certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made .104¶
First,
Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the security dilemma, which
could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic, but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security situation were the United States to
withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear
European powers to wage a preemptive war against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent. 105 This scenario is not rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that
other states will attack if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of nuclear weapons is only as a
the security dilemma exists because of a lack of
motivational knowledge, so the proper response is to try to enhance understanding of motives, not
discard motivational knowledge altogether . Misperception is certainly a problem in international politics, but
reducing misperception would allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in
preferable outcomes relative to offensive realism. 106¶ Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China ,
because mutually preferable outcomes can be achieved if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have to assume, but is actually a
status quo power with aims that have limited effect on the security of the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim with certainty that China
is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more intentional
information than what is publicly known. At the very least, valuing motivational assessments empowers
policymakers to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the possibility of reducing
competition and conflict .
deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that
AT: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards
Joanna Macy 95, general systems scholar and deep ecologist, Ecopsychology
There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion,
popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of
catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth.
Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes
our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation
is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning
of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.
AT: Threat Con -> War
Threat con isn’t sufficient to cause war
Stuart J Kaufman 9, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent
Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, p. 433
Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these
factors are harnessed . Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among
mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile
narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization . Such mobilization is often
spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals
seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side’s felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result
is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence.¶ A virtue of this symbolist theory is that
symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile
narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully
define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is
consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and
a security dilemma.
AT: Turns Co-op
Security can spur cooperation – their authors oversimplify
Jonas Hagmann 8, senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies, lecturer at the Department of
Humanities, Social and Political Sciences at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, PhD in IR
from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, “Re-examining security
dynamics: proliferating 'new threats' as catalysts for interstate cooperation in Europe,” Journal of Human
Security. 4.1 (July 2008): p18.
Rationalist IR theory does not look deep enough into the construction of security concerns, yet it predetermines security affairs into self-help
neither isolationist nor
cooperative foreign policy discourses are possible without the construction of specifically identified
security concerns on which these can be based. This article has developed an analytical framework that captures the differential
responses. This predetermination caricatures international security relations. From a social constructivist perspective,
characterisation of states' security environments. From this perspective, security problems are embodied with different features of effects and agency.
Conceived as such, security challenges represent ideal-typical structural and ideational world views that may enable and constrain agency by providing
the material with which their foreign policy discourses are to be assembled, but nonetheless as structures incapable of forcing their hand in one
particular direction. Seen from this perspective, the article argues that contemporary Europe and probably the wider North American environment is
best characterised as an insecurity community envisioning modern public bads. With convergent views on the security environment, this cognitive
community advocates for international cooperative order based on strategies that the perceived nature of identified security problems give rise to, and
it is not so much the mere presence
or absence of security problems that matters for international politics, but the differential features with
which threats are being framed. European grand strategic policy doctrines feature securitisation and de-securitisation moves, for instance
less so in direct reaction to common values.¶ Central to this argument is the understanding that
in the case of HIV/AIDS, but this issue's mere thematic introduction and removal from the security agenda had no further effect on European foreign
policy orientations. More important to these reorientations was complex threat framing. Complex securitisation
has increasingly
focused on collective and increasingly non-state actor-driven, modern public bad challenges . Initially this has become so by the
complementary addition of new threats sketched as modern public bads. Since the late 1990s, this logic has also been promoted by the co-option of
traditional private bads. This process represents a dislocation of security problems, which gravely challenges the state-centric 'security dilemma'. Since
then especially, European security
doctrines consistently call for international cooperation based on the
security environments' requirements. The ascendancy to dominance of modern public bads in the evolution of European security
doctrines points to the emergence of a new and rather stable ordering paradigm for interstate relations. It rejects the proposed qualification of the postcold war security environment as a Gramscian type of interregnum as much as it challenges the pessimistic culturalist disqualification of new threats as
a 'coming anarchy'.¶ In summary, this article questioned three conceptual pillars of the contemporary wider security studies field. First, it challenged the
dominant concept of security as too 'thematic' or 'two-dimensional' a construct. Focusing on threat types and referent objects, i.e. by broadening and
deepening security, important aspects of different threat discourses are neglected. The additional conceptual avenues identified in this article do not
claim to capture all possible dynamics associated with securitisation, but simply those components that seem particularly important in influencing
foreign policy argumentations. Second, the article questioned the proposed understanding of securitisation as something negative. Whether
securitisation is preferable or indeed unwanted depends on the effects that it creates, and these depend on the perspective adopted. From the
perspective of domestic politics, it may well be that securitisation is 'unwanted' (Waever 1999, p. 335) if it allows the breaking of established norms via
an allusion to existential danger. But from
an IR perspective, the linkages between securitisation and international
policymaking are neither necessarily nor automatically unwanted if modern public bads are
invoked as a structuring paradigm for cooperative interstate order . Third, the article suggested a need to carefully
reconsider the causal powers underlying security community theory. Cooperative order--though the argument is difficult to ground exclusively in shared
values conceptually--is a potent facilitating factor for international exchange. It is also difficult to reconcile empirically with those international security
requirements that contemporary western security doctrines invoke as driving policy rationales. Cooperative
security relations are
seemingly more powerfully explained by a convergence of threat perception than by a convergence of underlying
values or self-understandings. As post-structuralist discourse analysis suggests (also see Waever 1995), values and threats are relationally linked but
not equal concepts. Values are important expressions of identity and self-understanding, but it is the threats posed to them that activate policy needs.
Collective threats can serve as a rationale for cooperation
Jonas Hagmann 8, senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies, lecturer at the Department of
Humanities, Social and Political Sciences at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, PhD in IR
from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, “Re-examining security
dynamics: proliferating 'new threats' as catalysts for interstate cooperation in Europe,” Journal of Human
Security. 4.1 (July 2008): p18.
Are security concerns opponents of international cooperation? If so, why is the proliferation of security
concepts not making such cooperation more difficult? A negative vision of security is hard to reconcile
with the increasingly observed invocation of security problems as rationales for international cooperation, especially
The notion of
securitisation should be expanded into a more complex process that endows threat discourses with
particular characteristics of reach, effects and agency. In different combinations, these characteristics codify ideational outlooks on the
security environment, each with specific logical effects on foreign politics: By structuring what can be
meaningfully said about a nation's security environment, they empower different threat-based foreign
policy discourses. In this analytical framework, 'public bad' perceptions represent one such ideal-typical
outlook that paraphrases collective and increasingly non-state actor-driven security challenges. The
convergence on this particular view by European security policy experts is understood to drive security cooperation
in reaction to the subjectively assessed nature of contemporary security concerns, rather than being based on shared
by European states. Security concerns may be invoked either as catalysts or as impediments to international cooperation.
values. If ideationally converging, cognitive and transnational 'insecurity communities' of like-minded security policymakers are important driving forces
in contemporary European security cooperation, the 'value-based' explanation of state interaction proposed by the 'security communities' literature
must be critically re-evaluated.
AT: US Intervenes/Lashes Out
Impossible to mobilize support for lashout
Mandelbaum 11 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director,
Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on
Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)
http://www.cfr.org/publication/23828/cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on_renewing_america.html?cid=rssfullfeed-cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on011811&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+cfr_main+(CFR.org++Main+Site+Feed
HAASS: Michael, I think I know the answer to this question, but let me ask you anyhow, which is, the last 10 years of American foreign policy has been
dominated by two extremely expensive interventions, one in Iraq, one now in Afghanistan. Will this sort of pressure both accelerate the end, particularly
of Afghanistan? But, more important, will this now -- is
this the end of that phase of what we might call "discretionary American
interventions?" Is this basically over?¶ MANDELBAUM: Let's call them wars of choice. (Laughter.)¶ HAASS: I was trying to be uncharacteristically
self-effacing here. But clearly it didn't hold. Okay.¶ MANDELBAUM: I think it is , Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two
decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and
Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the
protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. ¶ Nation building has never been
popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again.
We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands
on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we
won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign
policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.
Perm – Redefine Security
Perm is key to redefine security – including the aff breaks the link between
security and unrestrained sovereign power
Joao Reis Nunes 7, Marie Curie Fellow and PhD Candidate in International Politics at the University of
Wales, Aberystwyth, September 2007, “Politics, Security, Critical Theory: A Contribution to Current
Debates on Security,” http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Nunes-joaonunes-politicssecuritycriticaltheory.pdf
This section wishes to draw from Huysmans’ work on security as a signifier, particularly from his conception of the signifier as eminently historical. It
argues that we
must radicalize this historicity and come to see the meaning of security as the result of a contingent
crystallization, and not an ineluctable condition. In other words, there is no fixed ‘politics of the signifier’ of
security (1998:232); as Rothschild (1995) and Wæver (2004) have shown, the meaning of security – and the set of understandings and practices
that this wide order of meaning entails – have changed through time. ¶ This section argues that the critique of the current meaning of
security must be complemented with the definition of alternative meanings . In other words, the aim is to
go beyond current understandings of security as the suspension of politics, not by arguing for the
substitution of security with other supposedly autonomous signifier (i.e. politics), but rather by
working within the signifier and attempting to release its transformative potential. ¶ The theoretical reflection
undertaken in the previous section can be seen as the first step of this departure from reified assumptions about the ‘politics of the signifier’ of security.
showing that Schmitt’s transcendental conception of sovereign power is problematic and can be
criticized at both the philosophical (Benjamin) and the social-economic-legal level (Neumann), it opened the way
for the definition of alternative normative principles of politics. In other words, it demonstrated the possibility of conceiving different modalities for
dealing with the problem of the exception, thereby allowing for a denaturalization of the connection between security
and an extreme conception of politics based on the ‘fear of the enemy’ and on unrestrained sovereign
power . It is interesting to note that Huysmans’ himself engaged with the work of Neumann and argued that it is possible to conceive
exceptionalism in different ways, according to ‘the energetic principles of politics upon which support for exceptionalism is based’
(2004:338). This section argues that it is possible to follow from this insight whilst retaining the signifier of security.
By
The K essentializes security – the aff is key to reform security practices
Maria Julia Trombetta 6, PhD from the University of Aberystwyth, “The Securitization of the
Environment and the Transformation of Security,” Delft University of Technology,
http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Trombettathe_securitization_of_the_environment_and_the_transformation_of_security.pdf
the theory of securitization as elaborated by the CopS is not well equipped to
account for the emergence of security practices based on prevention and risk management even if
This essay has outlined how
they can be brought about by the very appeal to security. Securitization theory has the great merit of conceptualising the power of discourses, and, m ore specifically, of the
the CopS identifies what characterises security, or the “securityness” of
security, with the constitution of an enemy and the confrontational logic of war. In this way the School has
imposed a problematic fixity that tends to essentialize an historical and sector specific
understanding of security and the practices legitimised by it. Moreover, in its questioning the opportunity of inscribing enemies in a
context, the CopS suggests the desecuritization of as many issues as possible, leaving unchallenged
problematic sets of practices associated with national security and opening up the space for governing through them, all the
times the word security is successfully evoked . In this way, any attempt to link the environment and security with the aims of
transforming security practices drops out of the picture. There is no difference between uttering
environmental security to justify a new role for the army or evoking it to introduce precautionary measures.
For Wæver the intentions of the speakers are irrelevant and the consequences of a successful securitization are always dangerous. ¶ The framework provided by the
word security, in transforming a situation, but
CopS legitimises environmental issues within the paradigm of Security Studies but at the same time it limits the potential that these kinds of issues have to question and
transform the paradigm itself. The Copenhagen School has created a dangerous solution that allows the inclusion of new threats and security claims within powerful,
Securitization becomes a way not only to de-politicise an
issue, bringing it above politics and ordinary procedures, but also a way to depoliticise or to maintain the depoliticization of security . A static,
reductive understanding of security is imposed. ¶ Considering securitization as a reflexive practice - through which not only
sedimented structures, making these structures appear as unchangeable.
issues are transformed into security issues but also the practices to deal with them are challenged and
transformed - can provide an account of the recent interest in precautionary approaches . This perspective
suggests that there is no such a thing as the “securityness of security” but there are different security logics, which characterise different contexts and influence each other.
Moreover, it provides a way to question, contextualize and set limits to the logic of security that has dominated International Relations. Yet it leaves open the possibility of
dealing with what could be defined as “enemicization” but avoids subsuming all the appeals to security to its logic.
Perm – Human Security
Only combining the alt with human security reps influences the securitization
process
Rita Floyd 7, PhD from the University of Warwick, “Human Security and the Copenhagen School’s
Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move,” Human Security
Journal Volume 5, Winter 2007, p 38-49, ftp://akmc.biz/ShareSpace/NienkeThesis/Thesis/Human%20Security%20and%20the%20Copenhagen%20School%27s%20Securitization%
20Approach.pdf
the
securitization approach is limited in terms of its normative utility. Normative utility hereby is understood in terms of the security analyst’s
ability to influence the securitization process in a deliberate and thought-out fashion and–though this ultimately
depends on capabilities–to a desired effect. It does not refer to the involuntary co-constitution of social and political reality performed by all constructivist security analysts. ¶ Moving now to the
human security literature, and given all that has been said so far, it should be clear that the human security approach does not have these kinds of
limitations. Thus, unlike the securitization approach, from a human security perspective, proponents can
highlight insecurities on behalf of other individuals, especially those individuals who are in no position
to speak for themselves. This, as Gunhild Hoogensen et al. call it, is the "enabling" capacity of human security, 37 which
clearly can have positive connotations, including positive securitizations . Examples of such positive securitizations are the
high profile ban on land mines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Both anti- personnel landmines
and those actors subject to the ICC pose existential threats to human security. To quote the official Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Given all that has been said here, it appears that although the securitization approach is extremely useful and, within critical security studies, practically unrivalled in terms of its analytical utility,
Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction: "Anti- personnel mines [...] kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and
especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement."
38¶ While the ICC "may exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes," 39 including, among others, genocide by killing, genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about physical destruction, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, crimes against humanity of murder, crimes against humanity of extermination, crimes against humanity of
enslavement, war crimes of willful killing, war crimes of inhuman treatment, and war crimes of willfully causing great suffering. 40 It is important to notice that although the referent object of security in both these
instances is clearly the individual, the provision of (human) security to a very large extent depends on states. This is because both of the above are treaty- based agreements that depend on the signatures,
ratification, and subsequent implementation by their member states. 41 Moreover, the ICC is only "complimentary" to national criminal courts, with considerable restrictions pertaining to its powers of jurisdiction.¶
"The International Criminal Court will complement national courts so that they retain jurisdiction to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. If a case is being considered by a country with jurisdiction
over it, then the ICC cannot act unless the country is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute. A country may be determined to be ‘unwilling’ if it is clearly shielding someone from responsibility for
ICC crimes. A country may be ‘unable’ when its legal system has collapsed." 42¶ Given that even these exemplars of human security to a large extent rely on the cooperation of states, it appears that states – just
the
establishment of the ICC and the ban on landmines are proof that successful securitizations of human
security are possible and–importantly for the argument of this article–both of these were fuelled by an ongoing discourse in all
spheres of life, including academia. Given these positive examples, human security as an approach to security from which
individuals can perform securitizing moves therefore has much worth in and of itself. It enables individuals
to (at least to some small extent) initiate securitizations, including those who are otherwise not in a position of
extraordinary decision making power in terms of security policy making, such as academics. It therefore seems that the
human security approach, though inadequate with regard to analytical utility, has much to offer in terms of normative utility. With the
"security analyst" (though it is doubtful whether we can satisfactorily use this word concerning the human security approach) and the securitizing actor being
one and the same person, the human security proponent can–occasionally– influence select
securitization processes in a deliberate and thought-out fashion, to a desired effect . Clearly, for those more
interested in achieving securitizations as opposed to simply performing security analysis, this is a valuable alternative to the securitization approach and,
as the Copenhagen School asserts – continue to matter empirically. Or, put differently, capabilities and means matter for securitization. ¶ Regardless of the role of the state, however,
indeed, to all security analysis.¶ conclusion¶ It was the aim of this article to analyse the relationship between the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach and the human security approach. A second key
objective was to ascertain whether the latter poses a viable alternative to the former. When ‘alternative’ is defined in terms of analytical utility then the human security approach cannot possibly offer an alternative
to the three step processes tracing tool that is securitization theory. Indeed, bereft of an analytical framework, the human security approach has no analytical utility. Moreover, from the perspective of the
Copenhagen School, it can be argued that writers within the human security literature perform securitizing moves themselves, leaving the entire human security literature as ultimately something that can be
if "alternative" is understood more broadly in terms of normative utility, the
human security approach does offer an alternative to the securitization approach, and indeed to all
security analysis. With its focus on identifying existential threats to individuals (securitizing moves), human security
offers an outlet to all those dissatisfied with security analysis, who are more interested in achieving securitization than simply
analysing it. The Copenhagen School’s securitization approach, in turn, is fundamentally limited in
terms of its normative utility. Here the security analyst and the securitizing actor are two functionally distinct
entities, with the securitization analyst in no position to enter the security equation at any point.¶ While the human security
approach offers an alternative to the securitization approach, this is not the same as saying that human security can possibly, or indeed should, replace the securitization approach, or for that matter
security analysis as a whole. Nor is this to say that security analysis can, or should, replace the human security
analysed by the securitization approach. However,
approach. Rather, each is important in its own unique way: one contributing to our understanding
of how security is practiced, the other – on occasion and if successful – to its practice.
XT – Human Security Good
Justifying human rights in security terms is an effective strategy – top-down and
bottom-up pressures are both key
Tim Dunne 4, DPhil in IR from Oxford, professor of International Relations and Head of Humanities and
Social Sciences at the University of Exeter; Nicholas J. Wheeler, PhD from the University of
Southampton, Professor of IR at Aberystwyth University; “’We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of
Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice,” International Relations March 2004, vol. 18 no. 1 9-23,
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1972/We+the+Peoples.pdf.txt?sequence=3
This article has put the victims of global politics at the centre of our academic inquiry. The
act of bringing together human rights and
security provides an opening into a holistic and indivisible approach. At the level of theory, it is possible to make a
convincing case for a Kantian synthesis; a violation of security in one part of the world ought to be a violation of security everywhere. And a violation at
we have mobilized a case for changing the
referent for thinking about security from that of states to ?we the peoples?. The reason for making this
move is that all too often states have failed to act as moral trustees for their citizens, creating a situation
globally where millions of people have more to fear from the violence or neglect of their own governments
than they do from that of neighbouring states. Yet even in those parts of the world where citizens can place greater hope in the rule of law
and the provision of basic rights, there has been a failure on the part of governments to live up to the humanitarian
obligations imposed by the Charter. The pursuit of these values has been crushed by the power of realism?s moral indifference, and numbed by a
set of legal rules which have narrowed our moral imaginations. ¶ Expanding humanity?s moral horizons requires recognizing
both the indivisibility of human rights and security, and the concomitant responsibility to rescue those
trapped in situations of violence, poverty and ill-health. This might require the use of force in exceptional cases like genocide and mass
one level is a violation at all levels. In keeping with the spirit of Critical Security Studies,
murder, but the best way of avoiding such a drastic remedy is to utilize the instrument of preventive diplomacy as soon as there is evidence of abuses.
Such measures applied on a concerted and international basis might prevent a deterioration of the human rights situation, avoiding recourse to more
costly actions. ¶ Since governments have manifestly failed as guardians of human rights, the question is whether they are ? like Nietzsche thought ?
?cold monsters?? Or, is it simply that it is too soon to tell whether states can live up to the moral vision that inspired the framing of the Charter? The
argument advanced here is that statehood
is not an undifferentiated political category; states can be good or bad
international citizens just as individuals can be in domestic society. This leads to a rejection of the
dualism of agency that pits the state against transnational civil society; we would argue that moral boundaries
have frequently been widened when state actors and global civil society have pulled in the same
direction. It is not our claim that state leaders are always in the vanguard of this, but as some humanitarian NGOs
readily attest, big battalions ? measured in military, political and economic terms ? are sometimes required to
promote their ends. By recognizing the interconnectedness of states and global civil society, the article argues for a
multidimensional approach to agency in the same manner that critical thinking on security has
pioneered a multidimensional conception of ?threats?. The best recent examples of this process of ?topdown? and ?bottom-up? pressures are the emergence of a new norm banning landmines30 and the
development of the I nternational Criminal C ourt.31 Enlightened state leaders were crucial in realizing
the normative potential of these ideas. But without the pressure exerted by what Geoffrey Robertson calls the
global ?human rights movement?,32 it is unlikely that these political projects would have secured the
widespread support that they achieved in the society of states. ¶ The pressures exerted on governments by agencies such as
Oxfam, Amnesty International and CARE are strengthened the more that these groups can mobilize public opinion to hold governments accountable
there has not been enough pressure from below to transform the foreign policy
agendas of liberal governments so that human rights become as powerful a constituency as
commercial and political interests. As Michael Ignatieff argues, citizens exposed to media images of ethnic cleansing and starvation,
for their actions. But
living in what he calls ?the zones of safety?,33 are quite good at reaching for their chequebooks and dropping money into collection boxes. However,
this is often selective, both in terms of the proximity of the crisis and the definition of what counts as a supreme humanitarian emergency. ¶ Liberal
societies express outrage at the treatment of Kurds, Rwandans or Kosovo Albanians at the hands of state power, but accept as natural the death
elsewhere of millions through poverty and malnutrition. They are good at being charitable, but they have been very bad at making even those modest
The West punishes
those states and terrorist networks which break the rules ? Iraq and al-Qaeda being obvious examples ?
but it has been bad at healing the deep rifts that exist between the West and the rest. Yet as the attacks on 11
September showed, it is not possible to hermetically seal liberal societies from the violent consequences of
insecurity in other parts of the world. Had human rights concerns guided the West?s relations with postchanges to lifestyles that could lead to the eradication of global poverty and give real substance to ?we the peoples?.
Soviet Afghanistan and the Taliban, that country would not have become a safe haven for al-Qaeda.
Moral exhortations are important in persuading publics and governments in the West to change the who and the how of
security thinking. But the next stage for a critical approach to human security is to advance and win the
argument that an unjust world will be a disorderly one for all of us.
Securitization Key to Change Policy
Framing in terms of state security interests is key to change policy
Sudha Setty 12, Professor of Law at Western New England University School of Law, “National
Security Interest Convergence,” Harvard National Security Journal Vol 4, http://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/Vol.4-Setty-FINAL.pdf
The same may be said for politicians in the post - 9/11 context. Rights
- protective arguments that were once
championed by Democrats in Congress — for example, curtailing warrantless surveillance by the government,
complying with international law obligations regarding the detention and trial of terrorism suspects, and reforming the
laws governing removal of immigrants — have fallen prey to the phenomenon that Bell observed: There is simply
not enough political will to support these objectives to meaningfully alter national security laws or
policies. However, framing those initiatives in a way that speaks to mainstream constituencies is the next best option.¶ The following Subsections lay out areas in which rights - protective legislation can gain political traction
by reframing initiatives in terms that will appeal to more legislators and their major constituencies.¶ 1.
Foreign policy ¶ Effective foreign policy depends on the ability of the United States to maintain its soft power,
which in turn depends on maintaining the respect of other nations and preserving the willingness of our allies to
cooperate with us on policy and security matters. That respect and willingness is most forthcoming when the United States acts
as a vanguard in protecting the rights of the politically powerless. The perception that U.S. soft power in foreign relations or
U.S. c ounter t errorism and intelligence efforts might be jeopardized could — as it did in Bell’s original thesis — serve
as a persuasive means of garnering support for rights protective measures .¶ Thus, there are two important
facets to the relationship between foreign policy and rights - protective interest convergence. First, the U.S. government has
made it an imperative to win over the support and loyalty of allied nations who are skeptical of U.S.
antiterrorism efforts that previously have been dismissive of the countries’ own priorities and cultural norms. 93 This, in many
respects, reflects the most natural application of Bell’s interest convergence theory, which addressed the
interests of the U.S. political elites in the context of the Cold War. The Brown v. Board of Education decision
helped market the United States as a post-World War II moral authority, responsive to the concerns of emerging
democracies and to the growing international focus on human rights treaties and protocols.94 In the post-September 11
context, government responses to concerns that the United States has flouted its own human rights
standards,95 disregarded the rule of law,96 and lacked sensitivity to Muslims around the world,97 have
served not only moral interests, but realpolitik interests as well. In this respect, the framing of rights protection
as a foreign policy matter has occurred on occasion, but has not been consistent.
Reps Key to Change Policy
Justifying the plan in terms of US security interests is key to change policy
Robert Naiman 10, Policy Director at Just Foreign Policy, President of the Board of Truthout, former
policy analyst and researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and Public Citizen's Global
Trade Watch, “Why Peaceniks Should Care About the Afghanistan Study Group Report,” The Seminal—a
FireDogLake blog, September 10th, http://seminal.firedoglake.com/diary/70379
From the point of view of official Washington, this speaks to the core of the argument against the war. Continuing the war is not
promoting the national security interests of the United States, and in fact is counterproductive to those interests.¶ This is also the part of
the argument that is most likely to stick in the craw of many peace activists, in part because they have a well-grounded allergy to efforts to
promote the purported "national security interests of the United States," and in part because the report, if implemented, still envisions a
potential role for U.S. military force in the region.¶ However, a bit of realism about prospects in the near-term future
is in order . If you look around the world, the U.S. is currently deploying military force in a lot of places. In the places
where the U.S. is deploying military force without the presence of a significant number of U.S. ground troops,
this activity goes on without occasioning significant public debate in the U.S. There is essentially
zero public debate over what the U.S. is doing in the Philippines, almost zero about what the U.S. is doing in Somalia, very little about what the U.S. is doing in
Yemen, not very much about what the U.S. is doing in Pakistan. Following the blip occasioned by President Obama’s announcement of the so-called "end of combat mission" in
Iraq, it is likely that public debate about what the U.S. is doing in Iraq will fall back towards Pakistan levels.¶ That these things are true, of course, does not make them just.
it is not enough to be right; one has the moral obligation to also try to be effective.
And part of being effective is understanding where the adversary is vulnerable, and where the adversary is not, at present, very vulnerable.
The permanent war apparatus is currently politically vulnerable over the war in Afghanistan primarily because U.S. troops are
However, as I wrote at the outset,
currently dying there in significant numbers for no apparent reason, so it makes sense for this to be a central point of attack.
Threats Real
Threats real – threat inflation would get our authors fired
Earl C. Ravenal 9, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of
the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and
the defense budget. He is the author of Designing Defense for a New World Order. What's Empire Got to
Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of
Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75
The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare
concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”),
to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen
Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What
is
missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why , say, the
American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously,
act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security
bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial
complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial
complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely
take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the
government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus,
theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham
Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of
dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be
“bureaucratic-politics”
considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among
libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests
from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them.
Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies
that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats
are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. ¶ This journal has pioneered the
argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a,
2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what
could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and
elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases
nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the
contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working
toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In
short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from selfpromoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a
species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it
repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein
they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such subrational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some
people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as
constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely
personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign
policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a
partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and
Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job
does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of
role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually
every governmental role, and
especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of
devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of
parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other
nations.¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the
“national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more
paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and
moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be
formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with
expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured
against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived
from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement
are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame”
the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence . They
make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially
constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much
security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and
People are
fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something
important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does
not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decisionmaking. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would
present a severe risk of career termination . And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly
reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out.
talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these
reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for
personal profit.
Wilderson K Answers
Cards
Action based pragmatism is the best orientation for anti-racist politics.
Glaude 07 (Eddie is a William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African American Studies, Department of
Religion, and Chair, Center for African American Studies at Princeton, “In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism
and the Politics of Black America,” p. x-xii)//cc
Another young man stood up and offered a slight correction to his colleague's impassioned remarks. He said, "I agree with what has just been said, but we should know that
knowledge without action is useless. We must do something with that knowledge." The conversation that followed was instructive. Students weighed
in on the matter. West and Smiley of- fered their views. I asked, "What if we understand knowledge not as sepa- rate from doing, but rather as a consequence of it? What if knowledge is
s simply the fruit of our undertaking? To use one of Tavis Smiley's favorite words, we proceeded to "marinate" for a while on the implications of the relation between how we think and
how we act. At one level, my questions had been aimed simply at countering an implicit anti-intellectualism. But what I had also done was to invoke, verbatim, John Dewey's definition
In a room full of young people with varied backgrounds and
challenges in their lives, we found ourselves thinking with distinctly pragmatic tools about
epistemology and how our thoughts about the subject could affect how we seek to change the
world. Why John Dewey in this context? Because I believe that the tradition of American pragmatism exemplified by Dewey offers powerful resources for redefining African
American leadership and politics. This book seeks to make that case. I argue that pragmatism, when attentive to the darker dimensions
of human living (what we often speak of as the blues), can address many of the conceptual problems that plague
contemporary African American political life. How we think about black identity, how we imagine black
history, and how we conceive of black agency can be rendered in ways that escape bad racial
reasoning - reasoning that assumes a tendentious unity among African Americans simply
because they are black, or that short- circuits imaginative responses to problems confronting
actual black people. The relationship I propose between pragmatism and African American politics is mutually beneficial. Pragmatism must reckon with the blues or
of knowledge as the "fruit of our undertakings."
remain a stale academic exercise. The blues, of course, are much more than a musical idiom. They constitute, as Albert Murray notes in his classic book on the subject, "a statement about
confronting the complexities inherent in the human situation and about improvising or experiment- ing or riffing or otherwise playing with (or even gambling with) such posibiliteis as are
inherent in the obstacles, the disjunctures, and the jeopardy." Murray goes on to say, in words that I hope will resonate through the pages that follow, that the blues are "a statement about
perseverance and .about resilience and thus also about the maintenance"of equilibrium despite precarious circumstances and about achieving elegance in the very process of coping with
the rudiments of subsistence." In one sense, to take up the subject of African American politics is inevitably to take up the blues. That is to say, the subject cannot but account for the
To embrace pragmatism
is to hold close a fundamental faith in the capacities of ordinary people to transform their
circumstances while rejecting hidden and not- so-hidden assumptions that would deny them that capacity.
To bind pragmatism and African American politics together, I hope to show, is to open up new avenues
for thinking about both. My book does not offer a political blueprint nor is it concerned with putting forwad concrete solution to specific political problems, it
seeks instead to open up deliberative space within African American communities and
throughout the country for reflection on how we think about the pressing matters confronting
black communities and our nation. Reflection is not opposed to action. I hope to make clear how the theoretical and the practical are intimately connected.
incredible efforts of ordinary black folk to persevere with elegance and a smile as they confront a world fraught with danger and tragedy.
To be sure, the bleak realities of our country constitute the backdrop of my efforts. Our democratic way of life is in jeopardy. Fear and our clamoring need for security have revealed the
more unsavory features of American culture. The foundational elements of a free and open society are being eroded, and our political leaders lie to justify their destruction. The corrosive
effects of corporate greed on the form and content of our democ- racy are also apparent: the top 1 percent of the population is getting richer while the vast majority of Americans, of
whatever color, struggle to make ends meet. In many African American communities in particular, we see the signs of crisis: deteriorating health, alarming rates of incarceration, the
devastating effects of drug economies, and the hypercon- centration of poverty because work has simply disappeared. Political fac- tions stay the course, exploiting faith communities,
stoking the fires of homophobia (while denying the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in black commu- nities), and appealing to uncritical views of black solidarity that often blind our fellow citizens
to the destructive policies that, ultimately, undermine the values of democratic life. All the while, established African American leaders seem caught in a time warp in which the black
revolu- tion of the 1960s is the only frame of reference, obscuring their ability to see clearly the distinctive challenges of our current moment. In dark and trying times, particularly in
democracies, it is incumbent upon citizens to engage one another in order to imagine possibilities and to see beyond the recalcitrance of their condition. Participatory democracies are
always fragile, and moments of crisis serve as easy excuses to discard the values that sustain them. When we stop talking with and provoking our fellows we in effect cede our democratic
forms of life to those forces that would destroy it. In a Shade of Blue seeks, among other things, to make explicit the values and commitments that inform my own think- ing about African
The book continuously asserts the primacy of participatory democracy the
necessity for responsibility and accountability, and the pressing need for more imaginative
thinking about African American conditions of living. For me, these are not abstract concerns. I have been blessed over the last
American politics and democratic life.
couple of years to be able to speak all around the country and talk with fel- low citizens about the challenges confronting African American commu- nities specifically and our democratic
On college campuses from New Haven to Denver to Urbana, and in town-hall meet- ings from Oakland to Houston,
I have invoked my pragmatic commitments as a basis for reimagining African American
politics-to reject specious conceptions of black identity, facile formulations of black history, and easy appeals to black agency. I
form of life generally.
have insisted that we hold one another accountable and responsible in light of an
understanding that democracy is a way of life and not merely a set of procedures—that it involves a certain moral
and ethical stance and requires a particular kind of disposition committed to the cognitive
virtues of free and open debate. I have urged young African Americans to take up the challenge
to forge a politics that speaks to the particular problems of this moment and not simply to
mimic the strategies and approaches of the black freedom struggle of the 1960s. I have done so because of
my philosophical commitment to the idea that publics come into and out of existence all the time and that our
challenge is to find the requisite tools to respond to the shifts and transformations that call
new publics into being. This book emerged out of these encounters. It carries the burden of making the case that pragmatism, rightly understood,
offers resources for thinking about African American politics in the twenty-first century. As such,
In a Shade of Blue isn't for the philosophically faint of heart. Chapter 1 is perhaps the most challenging, as it seeks to make clear the significance of John Dewey's moral and political
philosophy. I hope that the gen- eral reader will find it worthwhile to persevere through the book's more difficult passages. My argument ends with the call for a "post-soul politics"—a
form of political engagement that steps out of the shadows of the black freedom struggles of the sixties and rises to the challenges of our current moment with new voices, innovative
thinking, and an unshakable commitment to the values of participatory democracy.
Social death should be understood as ontic not ontological.
Hudson (Political Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg) 13
(Peter, Social Dynamics (2013): The state and the colonial unconscious, Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies, DOI:
10.1080/02533952.2013.802867) //cc
[BEGIN FOOTNOTE] My foil here is the ontological fatalism of Frank Wilderson’s argument . See
Wilderson (2008), according to which “the only way Humanity can maintain both its corporeal and libidinal integrity is through the various
strategies through which Blackness is the abyss into which humanness can never fall” (105). And “were there to be a place and time for
blacks cartography and temporality would be impossible” (111). Here then, the
closure of colonialism is absolute. [END
FOOTNOTE] “Whiteness” as whiteness – the meaning of whiteness and that of “blackness” – is carried via
“a constellation of postulates, a series of propositions that slowly and subtly work their way into one’s mind and shape one’s
view of the world of the group to which one belongs” – “a thousand details, anecdote stories” which are “woven”
into “prejudices, myths, the collective attitudes of a given group” (Fanon 1968, 78, 133). This is how
the “subject positions” of both whites and blacks are constituted. We can call this constellation the Colonial
Big Other (symbolic) in and through which the colonial relation is constituted and reproduced. This Big Other is white, in that whiteness is
its master signifier and therefore all identities are “white” under colonialism. Everyone is white in the colonial symbolic – including blacks;
it is just that they are “less white” than “whites” to the point of not being at all – Fanon says again and again that “the black man desires to
be white” – but, when he looks at himself through the eyes he has adopted, the “eyes” that are “his” – what he (qua white eyes) sees is
something that doesn’t exist – “inequality, no non-existence” (Fanon 1968, 98, original emphasis). He “subsists at the level of non-being”
(131) – just as the white, when it sees the black, sees an other that is, as Fanon says “absolutely not self,” so does the black see himself – “as
absolutely not self” (114). This is the depth of the fissure in the black colonial subject position, caught between two impossibles: “whiteness,”
which he desires but which is barred to him, and “black- ness,” which is “non-existence.” Colonialism, anxiety and emancipation3 Thus the
self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which
the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may
be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and
its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined
once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding
the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political
and never terminally settled. Put differ- ently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific
modes of the “othering” of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain
ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and
isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for
To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological
division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side
of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the
social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then,
the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers.
the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring
relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the
It may be so deeply sedimented
that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness
from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black
being” functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible
forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of
its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential.
“ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic.
Wilderson is normatively counterproductive: ontological fatalism dehumanizes
those who have worked throughout history to REGAIN their subjectivity from
anti-black institutions – affirming the conditions of possibility for anti-racism is a
better starting point for political praxis
Brar 12 – (2012, Dhanveer Singh, PhD candidate, commnications,“Blackness, radicalism, sound: Black
Consciousness and Black Popular Music in the U.S.A (1955-1971),” A thesis submitted for the degree of
PhD in Media and Communications 2012, Goldsmiths College, University of London,
http://eprints.gold.ac.uk/7806/1/MED_thesis_Brar_2012.pdf) //cc
Paying attention to phonic materiality allowed the enquiry into the blackness of the Black Consciousness
movement and Black popular music between 1955 and 1971 to remain open. It allowed for an attentiveness to the
ways in which blackness and radicalism were always under contestation, and always being produced, even if
that meant radically breaking up black production. There seemed to be an internalised resistance at work within the
phonic materiality of the movement and the music which never let them settle . The refusal to settle acted as a
persistent questioning of the phonic materiality produced as the blackness and radicalism of the movement and the music. It is
for this reason that; James Brown and Amiri Baraka's respective black communal programs were defined but also taken apart by a
rhythmic psycho-sexuality; Sam Cooke and Martin Luther King's attempts to generalise the intense spirituality of black freedom
began to sound like atemporality and death; and neither Motown or the League could engender the discipline they felt a
revolutionary project or mass black music required because that discipline was about gendered labour. This thesis has not been
about identifying the apparent “failures” of the Black Consciousness movement or Black popular music. Instead it has been an
attempt to amplify the sound of the blackness that instigated those events, sustained them, but which could not be called to a halt. It
is by privileging the phonic materiality of the archive that I have been able to attend to both the formation of and the strain against
the blackness of black radicalism and black music. Phonic substance was necessary to the modalities of the music
and the radicalism but it was never simply the basis for opposition to racial oppression . The phonic
substance which was blackness was constantly used to work out radically different ways blackness could
be. The phonic substance structures the relationship between black music and black radicalism as blackness, but it is also a
blackness which strains against them. This is the paraontological relation; blackness in constant escape,
pressurising its own ontological ground, its own phenomenological features, its own basis as an
epistemology. Each time the music and the radicalism do this, they do it as a black sonic operation.
Returning to the wider field of Black studies, in this thesis I assembled an archive of sound recordings, television footage,
documentaries, interviews, personal testimonies, criticism, cultural analysis and a range of other materials to constitute the historical
juncture of Black Consciousness and Black popular music in the U.S. The phonic materiality marked across all of these
materials is
a realisation of the ways in which blackness is testament to the fact objects can and do resist .
The black object resists by rendering itself audible and black radicalism is a tradition in which objects
have made themselves heard. It is a tradition of objects which have recorded their strain against their
designation as objects. In this instance blackness does not operate as a total outside, it is not nonontological, it is not without analog and is not social death . No matter how much intellectual,
psychic and material energy is invested in rendering these claims true . Instead blackness is the
immanent critique which lives in the life of the object, which may not be recognised as life, even when it
strains to do so, but cannot be denied as life . Neither can it be denied the strain against its own
affirmation of life. It is a life, and a strain against it, which lives in the phonic substance the black object produces. The life of
the black object lives in the sound it makes and that sound stands as a common project of blackness,
which may be dismissed as inchoate noise, as excessive feeling, as lacking in revolutionary discipline,
but this dismissal occurs because when the object resists, it rubs up against the divide between noise and
music, excessive and proper feeling, discipline and unruliness . The blackness of black radicalism, like the blackness
of black music, lives in that break, and constantly breaks, away.
The debate within Black studies over what blackness is and what blackness does is still being contested .
With new work on the way from Fred Moten, Nahum Chandler and Jared Sexton, this only offers possibilities
for continued speculation. To repeat, the discussion over what blackness means within Black studies is not a minor dispute
234within a relative sub-discipline of Cultural studies and Critical theory. It is, as Chandler has pointed out, necessary to thought,
because blackness is a necessary problem for what is deemed to be thought. But Chandler is very careful to remind us
that this means blackness is also, paraontologically, a possibility for thought . In light of this coming work, I
believe it is necessary to continue thinking about how this debate is informed by the phonic substance
which is blackness, and which blackness escapes from, even whilst that phonic substance escapes from
it. In short, it remains vital for me to continue to be a student of Black studies. s
Any uncertainty means you should err aff: the consequences of voting neg if
Wilderson is even 1% wrong are comparatively worse than voting aff if he’s right
– the concept of structural antagonism reifies racism in our ontological
consciousness which means it is quite literally try or die.
Ehlers 12 – (2012, Nadine, Professor, School of Social Sciences, Media, and Communication Faculty of Law, Humanities, and
Arts University of Wollongong, “Racial Imperatives: Discipline, Performativity, and Struggles against Subjection,” p. 9-12, footnote
from p. 145) //cc
the study pivots on the desire to make dear tbe false
homogeneity of subjects that are denoted by these terms and the arbitrariness of race per se. In the same moment that
I employ these terms as critical tools of analysis, then, I hope to expose the mechanisms of their production and
mark possibilities for their rearticulation. The final portion of this study is concerned with examining what
forms of agency and resistance are possible within the context of this binary construction of black and white
identities. Guiding this analysis is the question of how individuals struggle against subjection and how racial norms might be
While I deploy these terms for analytic convenience,
recited in new directions, given that the coercive demands of discipline and performative constraints make it seem like race is an
insurmountable limit or closed system. That race operates as a limit appears particularly so for black
subjects. For despite the fact that all subjects are produced and positioned within and by the discursive
formations of race, the impact of that positioning and what it means for experience is markedly different .
Black subjects are situated within an antiblack context where the black body/self continues to be torn asunder within
the relations of civil society. This means that, as Yancy (2008, 134 n. n) insists, " the capacity to imagine otherwise
is seriously truncated by ideological and material forces that are systematically linked to the history of white racism!' A
number of scholars have examined these realities and advanced critical accounts of what they identify as the resulting condition of
black existence. David Marriot, for instance, argues that "the occult presence of racial slavery" continues to haunt
our political and social imagination: "nowhere, but nevertheless everywhere, a dead time which never arrives and
does not stop arriving" (2007, xxi). Saidiya Hartman, in her provocative Lose Your Mother: A journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route
(2007) refers to this haunting as slavery's afterlife. She insists that we do not live with the residue or legacy of slavery but, rather,
that slavery lives on. It 'survives' (Sexton 2010, 15), through what Loic Wacquant (2002, 41) has identified as slavery's fu nctional
surrogates: Jim Crow, the ghetto, and the prison. For Hartman, as echoed by other scholars, slavery has yet to be undone: Black
lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the
afterlife of slavery- skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and
Wilderson III, in his Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the
Structures of U.S. Antagonisms (2009), powerfully frames slavery's afterlife as resulting in a form of social death
for black subjects and, more than this, he argues that black subjectivity is constituted as ontological death.
impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery. (2007, 6) Frank B.
For Wilderson, " the Black [is) a subject who is always already positioned as Slave" (2009, 7) in the United States, while everyone
else exists as "Masters" (2009, 10 ).8 Studies of slavery's afterlife and the concept of social death have
inarguably made essential contributions to understandings of race.9 The strengths of such analyses lie in the salient ways
they have theorized broad social systems of racism and how they have demanded the foregrounding of suffering, pain, violence,
and death. Much of this scholarship can be put or is productively in conversation with Foucault's account ofbiopolitics that, as I
noted earlier, regulates at the level of the population. Where sovereignty 'took life and let live,' in the contemporary sphere biopolitics
works to 'make live.' However, certain bodies are not in the zone of protected life, are indeed expendable and subjected to strategic
deployments of sovereign power that 'make die.' It is here that Foucault positions the function of racism. It is, he argues, "primarily a
way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die"
(2003b, 254). Thus, certain bodies/subjects are killed - or subjected to sovereign power and social death- so that others might
prosper. 10 In Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America (1997), Hartman
examines the 'must die' imperative of social death understood broadly as a lack of social being-but she
also illuminates how, within such a context, slave "performance and other modes of practice . ..
exploit[ed), and exceed[ed] the constraints of domination" (1997, 54, my emphasis). Hartman analyzes
quotidian enactments of slave agency to highlight practices of "(counter)investment" (1997, 73) that
produced "a reconstructed self that negates the dominant terms of identity and existence" (1997, 72). 11 She
thus argues that a form of agency is possible and that, while "the conditions of domination and subjugation
determine what kinds of actions are possible or effective" (1997, 54), agency is not reducible to these
conditions (1997, 55).'2 The questions that I ask in this analysis travel in this direction, and aim to build on this aspect of
Hartman's work. In doing so I make two key claims: first, that despite undeniable historical continuities and structural
d)'namics, race is also marked by discontinuity; and second, race is constantly reworked and transformed within
relations of power by subjects . 13 For Vincent Brown, a historian of slavery, ''violence, dislocation,
and death actually generate politics, and consequential action by the enslaved" (2009, 1239) . He warns that
focusing on an overarching condition or state potentially obscures seeing these politics . More than this,
however, it risks positioning relations of power as totalizing and transhistorical , and it risks
essentializing experience or the lived realities of individuals . 14 I scale down to the level of the subject to analyze
both (a) how subjects are formed, and (b) how subjects – black and white alike – have struggled against conditions
in ways that refuse totalizing, immutable understandings of race. This book does not seek to mark a condition or
situa tion then, but instead takes up Brown's challenge (made within the context of studies of slavery) to pay attention to
efforts to remake condition. Looking to those efforts to remake condition and identity grapples with the microphysics of power
and the practices of daily life, enacted by individuals and i11 collective politics, to consider what people do with situations: those
dynamic, innovative contestations of (a never totalizing) power. Echoing the call raised by Brown (2009, 1239), my work focuses
then on "examining ... social and political lives rather than assuming . . . lack of social being" in order
to think about how subjects can and have "made a social world out of death itself" (Brown 2009, 1233) or
how, more generally, race can be reconfigured within the broader workings of what I am calling racial
discipline and performative imperatives. But in addressing the quotidian and those efforts to remake condition and identity,
this study insists on a shift in perspective in terms of how power is thought about . As I have remarked, I am not
focused on biopolitics or what can be seen as solely sovereign forms of power that are deployed to condition who will live and who
will die. Instead, I am concerned with disciplinary power, which is articulated simultaneously but at a different level to biopolitics (and
despi te the exercise of sovereign forms of power} (Foucault 2003a, 250). For Foucault, this form of power is not absolute,
nor does it exist in opposition to resistance. Rather, power is seen as always fragmentary and incoherent,
and power and resistance are seen as mutually constitutive. Disciplinary power is productive, in that it generates
particular capacities and forms of subjectivity (and, necessarily, agency). And finally, though subjects are formed in
power, they are not reducible to it, not determined by power. [BEGIN ENDNOTE] 14. Historian Vincent
Brown, in his "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery" (2009), has examined a number of scholars who
seemingly take up such a viewpoint, in that they broadly position blackness as a totalizing state that, historically and
in the present, renders slavery synonymous with social death and blackness as always already
synonymous with slavery. Brown focuses specifically on the academic uptake and what he sees as the
problematic distillation and extension of Orlando Patterson's (1981) concept of"slavery as social death;' where
social death indicates a lack of social being. As a scholar of slavery, Brown is most concerned with examining the limitations of
this idea in relation to the enslaved, but he is also interested in how the idea is used in relation to the present . For
Brown, Patterson's "slavery as social death," and contemporary usages of this concept to account
for the present, advance a troubling transhistorical characterization of slavery He argues in line with IIerman Bennett (quoted in Brown 1009, 1133), who has observed: As the narrative of the slave experience, soclardeath assumes a
uniform African, slave, and ultimately black subject rooted in a static New World history whose logic originated in being property and
remains confined to slavery. It absorbs and renders exceptional evidence that underscores the contingent nature of experience and
consciousness. Thus, normative assumptions about the experiences of peoples of African descent assert a
timeless, ahistorical, epiphenomenal "black" cultural experience.
[END ENDNOTE]
Framing around institutional action creates the space for effective localism-but
not the other way around – in the context of resolving oppressive trade
distortions like the aff
Monbiot, M.A. in zoology and guardian columnist, 2004 (George, Manifesto for a New World Order, pg. 1113) //cc
Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all
institutional power at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single
set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes
are oppressive: our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘antipower’. But most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that if we propose solutions which can be effected
only at the local or the national level, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those
problems which most concern us. Issues such as climate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the
balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationall y. Without global
measures and global institutions , it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich
nations to poor ones , tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on
landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing
weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these,
the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place whether we
participate in it or not . Indeed, it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by
the brute force of the powerful. That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is
The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive.
not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and replacing them with our own. It is an
In the absence of an effective global politics , moreover, local
solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for
example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless
everyone, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open
new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our neighbourhood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously working, at the international level, for the
abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do nothing to prevent ourselves and everyone else from
being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are. We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of
restraint. By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the political space in which our local alternatives
can flourish. If, by contrast, we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others,
argument for a global political system which holds power to account.
then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in
devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, as Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, now president of Brazil,
once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown.
There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent
climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival. Expalanation: these two cards combined together make an argument
that we should focus on exportability of our political theories, and not the productivity they have for us in a debate round. While talking about things in a
certain way and negaging in particular strats may be good for us, the world is larger than us. We need to think about ways the world affects us.
Experience in individual experiences in racism are not communicable or exportable. Prefer the aff b/c it can be articulated to someone outside this
room, like a policy-maker to change the way the world is. The mobiot card is an impact to this. Institutions are global and cannot be addressed at a
local level. They also affect us at a local level. The price of goods affects us as individuals in this debate. When you buy or consume something, that is
intrincsically related to things outside of the room. They’re using things that they bought, which inherently shows talking about things inform the
decisions that we make as individuals. The attempt to draw a line is entirely based on what you can produce in this room ignores the way that trade
influences the everyday lives of everyone – this is the aff. We participate in a market that props up global inequality. We should use our consumer
choices to challenge that.
Starting from action is good
Ortmann and Salzman 02 – (2002, Gunther, organizational theorist and Professor of Business
Administration at the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg, and Harold, Professor and Senior Faculty
Fellow, John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development, “Stumbling Giants The Emptiness, Fullness,
and Recursiveness of Strategic Management,” Soziale Systeme 8 (2002), Heft 2, S. 205-230, google
scholar) //cc
Our concept of stumbling as part of strategy formation is not to suggest that decision makers are inept
but, rather, the best strategists in our study were self-conscious of the limitations of calculation or a
priori decision making as establishing a plan to be »implemented«. We hold with Anthony Giddens (1984)
that knowledgeable agents have at their disposal a good deal of knowledge and competencies (capacities often
underestimated in structuralist social theory). On the other hand, it is clear that strategists and firms were not in full
control of the (unacknowledged) conditions and (unintended) consequences of their action. What the best strategists
did was to implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, engage in change as a reflexive process applying considerable portions of social
knowledge in the formation, implementation, and execution of strategies and in the restructuring processes. An apt description is
Anthony Giddens’image of the juggernaut: … a runaway engine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can
drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of our control and which could rend itself asunder (Giddens 1990, 139).
According to Giddens, The ride is by no means wholly unpleasant or unrewarding; it can often be exhilarating
and charged with hopeful anticipation. But, so long as the institutions of modernity endure, we shall never be able
to control completely, either the path or the pace of the journey (139). Gareth Morgan’s (1988) book, titled, Riding
the Waves of Change, makes this point but confers it with a somewhat heroic characterization that we want to avoid. The
process of strategy development, in our schema, occurs through knowledge development by reflexivity,
circularity, and recursiveness. That is, each step proceeds with the knowledge generated by the previous
step, and thus only by a process of acting, reflecting, and then acting, making each step contingent
on the outcome of the previous step. In conditions of modernity, the social world can never form a stable
environment because the output of processes of knowledge and strategy formation and execution will
become the input of the following recursive loops of social practice, altering its nature and spinning it off in novel
directions (Giddens 1990). All this takes place under conditions of what Talcott Parsons called »double
contingency«: the mutual dependence of actions. One firm will make its action dependent upon its competitors’ action,
and vice versa, and none of them knows or can have full knowledge about what the other will do – each conditions its actions on the
actions and outcome of the other and factors in the environment. (As Oskar Morgenstern (1928) wrote in the late twenties of the last
century, in situations like these full, and even perfect information, the heroic »As If« of neoclassical theory would immediately lead to
an inability to decide and to act.)
The thesis that the USFG/law is inherently racist is both historically flawed and
politically debilitating. It creates a witch hunt mentality, fragmenting movements’
members and goals, preventing any progress from being made on concrete racial
inequalities. Their attempt to pinpoint every instance of racist motive is both
conspiracy theory like in its performance and mirrors the politics of the far-right
Daniel A. FARBER, Associate Dean and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota,
98 [January 1, 1998, “Is American Law Inherently Racist,” Debate between Richard Delgado and Daniel
A. Farber, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository,
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=facpubs&seiredir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D10%26q%3Drelated%3A
RVxu2BBQFe0vOM%3Ascholar.google.com%2F%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C11#search=%22rela
ted%3ARVxu2BBQFe0vOM%3Ascholar.google.com%2F%22] //cc
PROFESSOR FARBER: As I was getting ready to leave for the airport, my wife gave me a final piece of advice about this debate.
She said, "Don't be too reasonable." Nevertheless, I would like to begin by stressing some common ground that I think may get lost
because the debate format naturally encourages us to take adversarial positions. In reality, Professor Delgado and I share a great
deal in our views of law and American society. Both of us see the issue of racial inequality as being central and
requiring the most serious possible attention. Both of us reject the conservative dogma of color blindness, and both of us,
as I think will be shown tonight, believe that one imperative need is for dialogue and discussion of this topic if
we are to make any progress. So we do have something in common. But we also have a fundamental disagreement, I think,
a disagreement that is illustrated by the fact that we are on the opposite sides of this debate about the inherent racism of American
law. As Professor Delgado said in his introductory remarks, critical race theory's view is essentially that racism is
embedded in the DNA of American law. And that in effect, racism is not merely a widespread blemish on
American law, but is instead, a radical infection that goes right to the heart of the legal system . I disagree
with that for reasons that I will hopefully make clear. I think that this thesis rests on a one-sided view of the legal
system. I think that it is based on a misunderstanding of some of the fundamental principles of the system . I
think in the end, despite what I know are Professor Delgado's good intentions, that the inherent racism position (and
critical race theory, in general) risks being more destructive than constructive in terms of advancing
our national conversation on race. I noticed that Professor Delgado postponed the issue of inherent racism, or the
inherency of racism, until his next ten minutes. I may also put off, to some extent, my discussion of that point as well, though I will
refer to it briefly. Let me begin with the vision of the American legal system that Professor Delgado presented in his first twenty
minutes. I do not intend to deny the reality of the dark side of American law in American legal history, and
that dark side has indeed been very bad at times. Nevertheless, I think one might equally point to some
more positive aspects of American legal society, and that we get only a skewed and incomplete picture if
we focus only on one side of the picture: if we ignore the Thirteenth, 5 Fourteenth, 6 and Fifteenth 7
Amendments; if we ignore Brown v. Board of Education"8 and the work of the Warren Court; if we ignore the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964,' 9 1965,20 and 1990;2" and if we ignore or minimize the commitment to affirmative action
that many American institutions, especially educational institutions, have had for the past two decades. I do not
think you have to be a triumphalist to think that these are important developments-you only have to be a
realist. Similarly, as serious as the problem of racial inequality remains in our society, it is also unrealistic to
ignore the considerable amount of progress that has been made. Consider the emergence of the black
middle class in the last generation or generation and a half, and the integration of important American institutions
such as big-city police forces, which are important in the day-to-day lives of many minority people. The military has sometimes been
described as the most successfully integrated institution in American society. We all know, as well, that the number of minority
lawyers has risen substantially. In state and federal legislatures, there was no such thing as a black caucus in Congress thirty or
forty years ago, because there would not have been enough black people present to call a caucus. And do not forget the
considerable evidence of sharp changes in white attitudes over that period in a more favorable and
tolerant direction. It is true that there is much in our history that we can only look back on with a feeling of
shame, but there is also much to be proud of that we should not forget. I also think that the accusation that
the American legal system is inherently racist lacks perspective in the sense that it seems to imply that
there is something specifically American about this problem . If you look around the world, societies virtually
everywhere are struggling with the problems of ethnic and cultural pluralism, and are trying to find ways to
incorporate diverse groups into their governing structures . I think if you look around the world, including even
countries like France which Professor Delgado referred to, it is far from clear that we are doing worse than the others .
In some ways, I think we are doing considerably better than most. You can always paint a picture of despair by only
focusing on the things that go wrong, and much of the critical race theory literature that I have read along those
lines reminds me a great deal of the work that is being done by people at the opposite end of the political
spectrum. If you read Robert Bork's latest book "Slouching Toward Gomorrah,"22 it reads exactly like Derrick
Bell, 3 only in reverse. While Bell sees an inherent flaw of racism that we can never overcome and that will
haunt us forever, Bork sees an inherent flaw of egalitarianism that we can never overcome and that has
corrupted all aspects of our society. Both of them can point to some evidence. If you only look at the
evidence on one side of the thesis it begins to look persuasive; but when you look at the evidence
as a whole, I think you see a much more complex picture. I think the inherency part of the thesis is perhaps
the most significant, so I want to say a few words about that now, although I will probably need to come back to that after
Professor Delgado's next segment. It seems to me the most powerful criticisms of our society or our legal system
are that it does not live up to its own ideals. For example, how could Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of
Independence, also have been an owner of slaves? That puts the question in stark terms. How can a legal system that
prides itself on equality still allow some of the outcomes that Professor Delgado has detailed? I think
those are powerful criticisms. But what I find most disturbing about much of critical race theory is the
argument that it is not the performance that is the problem-it is the ideals. That it is not that Jefferson did
not live up to the Declaration of Independence, it is that the ideals of the Enlightenment, the ideals of the
Declaration of Independence themselves are inherently and "genetically" flawed, that are themselves
inherently racist. That, as Professor Delgado has said before, "normal legal discourse" is itself racist-or, as Alex
Johnson has said, that ordinary, supposedly neutral standards of merit are secretly color coded for
Whites only, or are presented in a white voice.24 One of the primary tasks that we took on ourselves in the book was to
try to both document the academic support for that position and then to try to explain why we considered it to be so fatally flawed. It
obviously resonates with a lot of postmodernist and postcritical legal studies scholarship. There is a sort of trendiness to
talking about the social construction of reality. But when you put aside all the philosophical jargon, it
seems to be there just really is not much to support the thesis, and I will return to that later. Finally, and I think
perhaps this is the most significant practical problem, the inherent racism approach is not a step toward
bringing us to seriously confront the problems that our society has. In fact, I think it is taking us down a
false path . The dynamics of the concept of inherent racism has several unfortunate effects. First of all,
among even its adherents, it leads to a kind of "witch hunt" mentality, in which people are constantly
searching for more and more subtle forms of racism among themselves, among their opponents in the
legal system generally, and so forth. As a result, people invest their time combing the Internal Revenue
Code for deductions that might seem more favorable to one group than another group, rather than looking
at what is the stark and overwhelming problem-not how people's income is taxed but who is earning how
much and why. So we become more and more obsessed with looking for more and more subtle flaws .
Furthermore, at least in the hands of some of the practitioners or adherents to this position, it leads to a breakdown in
debate, even both among people who are essentially on the liberal side of the spectrum and in disputes
with their opponents. For example, consider the attacks on liberals like Randy Kennedy, a black professor on
the Harvard Law School faculty. We see how people, who are in some sense fundamentally allies, who all
support affirmative action and think racial problems are very important, find it impossible to hold a
discussion because of this search for motives, hidden agendas, and biases. We see the same
thing within critical legal studies in which two figures in the movement , Mark Tushnet and Gary Peller,
bludgeoned each other in the pages of the Georgetown Law Journal25 about their motivations and
potential racism, etc. I do not think that is the way we can move forward . This thesis also has been
destructive of dialogue with outsiders, with the rest of American society, with people who are not
already believers in critical race theory or the inherent racism of American society and law . For example, at
my own law school, a young member of our faculty, Jim Chen, wrote an article about racial intermarriage 6 that
was considered to be inappropriate by some other minority group members. An entire issue27 of the Iowa
Law Review was published, dedicated not only to criticizing his views , which I think was entirely appropriate, but to
speculations about the kinds of twisted motives that could lead a member of a minority group to take a
position other than the approved critical race theory position . That is not the way for us to move
forward. We also see this in the attacks, of which we heard a distant echo from Professor Delgado earlier,
on Daniel Moynihan, who has been a staunch liberal, strongly concerned about minorities during his entire
career, and yet has been anathemized for making what were considered to be politically incorrect
statements. I do not think this is going to lead us forward. And finally, what I fear the most is the response that
seemed to be implied by one of the audience questions earlier. If it is true that American society is inherently racist,
doesn't that mean that it is essentially hopeless? Now this conclusion does not logically follow from
that premise, any more than it logically follows that if certain character traits have a genetic basis then it is
hopeless to do anything about them . But nevertheless, we all recognize that when we are talking about
individuals and biology, these genetic theories tend to discourage the idea of reform , and tend to
reinforce, as a matter of social reality, the view that any bad behavior that we see is just inherent . I think we
can expect to see the same kind of thing when we are dealing with the sociological equivalent involving
the claim that there is this inherent genetic flaw in American society . You can see this most clearly in
Derrick Bell's writings, which are redolent of despair and which, in that respect, curiously resemble Robert Bork's writings, who is
similarly convinced that the genetic flaws of American society will prevent it from ever achieving his vision of justice. It is true that
we cannot afford to forget our history. It is true that much of that history is unfortunate, if not worse.
But it is also true that if we remain totally obsessed with the flaws of the past, fixated on their inevitability,
we are unlikely to be able to move past them and move forward. And in particular, it seems to me that if we
approach today's problems primarily as an issue in finger-pointing , in blaming somebody or another, or
in finding the culprit, then we are not likely to be able to unite our society in a quest toward attacking
those serious problems.
***at: malthus
Rights are key to environmental activism – this a precondition for the possibility
of environmental progress
Stein 98 – professor with a focus on political theory at the University of Kiel (Tine, “DOES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM WORK? THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS AS A
CHALLENGE TO THE POLITICAL ORDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY,” Constellations,
Volume 4, Issue 3, pages 420–449, January 1998, Wiley Online)BC
The pluralistic dimension of constitutional democracy is ambivalent in regard to environmental issues. In
an open society, where political rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom
of assembly are established, it is obvious that the citizens and environmental groups are able to
accuse the govern- ment of neglectful behavior, denounce outrageous policies, and provide alternatives to governmental problem-solving. This is a precondition for the possibility of any
environmental progress . Taking into account the past socialist regimes and comparing that situation
with Western democracies, it is easy to say which system has had the better environmental policy. An
important question is whether or not there is the possibility for critique and, therefore, influence on the
political agenda.
***at: surveillance metaphors k
2ac – visual metaphors good
Focus on negative state action with regard to surveillance is necessary to subvert
the values of ocularcentrism – the alt only reentrenches violent and repressive
power
Martin 93 – Sydney Hellman Ehrman Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley (Jay
Martin, 1993, “Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-century French Thought,”
University of California Press, 1993, pp. 381-384)//twontwon
Our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance . . . . We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the
panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism. MICHEL
FOUCAULT1 The
entire life of societies in which modern conditions of production reign announces itself as an
immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation. GUY
DEBORD2 In February, 1973, the psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan's son-in-law and the editor of Ornicar?, wrote an essay
entitled "Jeremy Bentham's Panoptic Device" which was published two years later.3 Analyzing Bentham's 1791 treatise on a model
prison, Miller noted that its intention was to provide a general guide for a "polyvalent apparatus of surveillance, the universal optical
machine of human groupings."4 Bentham had envisioned a circular arrangement of cells visible to a jailor in a tower in its center,
who was himself hidden by a system of shutters from their returning gaze. The result, Miller implied, was the sinister embodiment in
stone and metal of the unreciprocal visual dialectic posited in Lacan's theory of the eye and the gaze, the antithesis of MerleauPonty's more benign interaction of the visible and the invisible in the flesh of the world. This configuration sets up a brutal
dissymmetry of visibility The enclosed space lacks depth, it is spread out and open to a single, solitary central eye It is bathed in
light. Nothing and no one can be hidden inside itexcept the gaze itself, the invisible omnivoyeur Surveillance confiscates the
gaze for its own profit, appropriates it, and submits the inmate to it5 Miller's evocation of the Panopticon
not only implicitly challenged the phenomenologists' attempt to rescue a healthy dialectic of the visual, but also struck at the
older Enlightenment project of linking reason and illumination. "The Panopticon," he wrote, "is the temple of
reason , a temple luminous and transparent in every sense: first because there are no shadows and
nowhere to hide: it is open to constant surveillance by the invisible eye; but also, because totalitarian mastery of the
environment excludes everything irrational : no opacity can withstand logic "6 Even the jailor is subjected to the
controlling gaze of the public, which provides the ultimate moral sanction against deviance from the norm. In addition to the
manipulative force of surveillance, Bentham, so Miller noted, retained as a reserve instrument of control the older practice of
analogous punishments, imprinting on the body of the criminal an appropriate sign of his crime. "One of the merits of analogous
punishments," according to Miller, "was that the spectacle of its application immediately evoked its causethereby giving