Graduate School of Development Studies
The Influence of the Presidentially Appointed Councillors on
Local Governance: The Case of Accra and Kumasi Metropolitan
Assemblies in Ghana
A Research Paper presented by:
Wuripe Alhassan
[Ghana]
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Specialization:
[Public Policy and Management]
[PPM]
Members of the examining committee:
Dr. Sylvia Bergh [Supervisor]
Dr. Barbara Lehmbruch [Reader]
The Hague, The Netherlands
November, 2011
Disclaimer:
This document represents part of the author’s study programme while at the
Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and
not necessarily those of the Institute.
Inquiries:
Postal address:
Location:
Telephone:
Fax:
Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands
Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands
+31 70 426 0460
+31 70 426 0799
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Dedication
This research paper is dedicated to my humble and lovely parents Adam Mahama Wuripe and Abiba Wuripe for their untiring effort to see me to this level
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Acknowledgement
Thanks and praises be to Almighty God for making this a success. To my supervisor, Dr. Sylvia Bergh, I say thank you for the patience, guidance and directions you gave me in this endeavour. You have imprinted an indelible mark
on me and I will forever remain grateful. I would also like to thank my second
reader, Dr. Barbara Lehmbruch for the invaluable insights you offered
throughout this study. I know I cannot repay you, all I would say is ‘Naawuni
Ni Yo Sam veili’.
I also want to thank all professors and support stuff of ISS especially
those of the PPM specialization for the knowledge they have impacted to me, I
have really learnt a lot. It was wonderful studying under your tutelage. To the
entire PPM class of 2011, I say ‘dank u’ for the companionship we shared
throughout the journey. I also want to acknowledge and thank ISS Ghanaian
community for the wonderful friendship and love we shared during this insight
journey.
To my Dad and Mom, thank you for the love, support and motivation.
May the good lord shower abundant mercies and blessings on you. And to the
entire Wuripe family, thank you for your prayers and support. Special thanks
also go to Chief Alhaji Bingle and honourable Isaac B. Assah for the support
during my field work.
I would like to also acknowledge and appreciate the Dutch Government
who made it possible for me to undertake this course through the NUFFIC
Fellowship Programme.
Last but not the least, to my brothers and friends; Ali, Ridwan Rufai,
Sadiq, Wuni, Al-Jabbar Majeed (Abology) and Humaida thank you all for your
love, support and encouragement while I was away.
GOD BLESS US ALL
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Contents
Disclaimer:
Dedication
Acknowledgement
List of Tables
List of Figures
List of Maps
List of Acronyms
Abstract
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
1.3 Objectives of the Research
1.4 Research Questions
1.5 Hypothesis:
1.6 Relevance and Justification
1.7 Research Methodology
1.7.1 Study Sites
1.7.2 Selection of Case Study
1.7.3 Respondents selection
1.7.4 Techniques employed to gather data
1.7.5 Secondary Data
1.7.6 Scope and Limitation
1.8 Organisation of the paper
Chapter 2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
2.0 Introduction
2.1 Concept of Decentralization
2.2 Local Government, Local Governance and Local Democracy
2.3 Accountability
2.4 Representation
2.5 Bicameral Legislatures
2.6 Gender Quota (GQ)
2.7 Literature Review on Electoral Systems and Ghana Local Electoral
System
2.7 Conceptual and Framework
2.8 Conclusion
Chapter 3 Overview of Decentralisation and Local Government
Trajectory in Ghana
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3.0
3.1
Introduction
Emergence of Local Governance in Ghana
3.1.1 Indirect Rule by British Colonial Authorities (BCA)
3.2 Decentralisation and LG under PNDC and the Fourth Republic:
1982 to date.
3.2.1 Decentralization & LG under PNDC: 1981- 1992
3.2.2 Decentralisation and LG under the Fourth Republic
3.3 The Structure of Ghana’s LG System
3.3.1 The Regional Coordinating Council
3.3.2 The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
3.3.3 The Sub-Metropolitan DAs
3.4.4 Urban Councils (UC)
3.3.5 Zonal Councils
3.3.6 Town/Area Councils
3.3.7 The Unit Committees
3.5 Profiles of AMA &KMA
3.5.0 Profile of Accra Metropolitan Assembly
3.5.1 Brief History of AMA
3.5.2 Institutional and Administrative Structure of AMA
3.5.3 The People and Population
3.6.0 Profile of Kumasi Metropolis
3.6.1 Historical Overview of KMA
3.6.2 Geography
3.6.3 Institutional and Administrative Structure of KMA
3.6.4 The people and Population
3.7 Conclusion
Chapter 4 Research Findings of the Influence of Non Elected
Councillors in AMA & KMA of Ghana
4.0 Introduction
4.1 Process in the Picking of Non Elected DA Councillor
4.2 Accountability in Ghana’s Local Government
4.3 Appointed Councillors and Representation in Ghana’s DAs
4.3.1 Impact of NEC on the Authority and Autonomy of DAs
4.4 What are the Relations between Appointed and Elected Councillors?
4.5 Women Empowerment and Promotion of Gender Equality in
Ghana’s LG
4.8 Conclusion
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Policy Considerations
5.0 Introduction
5.1 Major Findings
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5.1.1 NEC Nomination Process
5.1.2 Representation
5.1.3 Accountability
5.1.4 Underrepresentation of Women
5.1.5 Result of Hypothesis
5.2 Some Policy Directions
5.2.1 Nature of Nominations
5.2.2 Institute Effective Downward Accountable System for
NECs
5.2.3 Gender Quota
Appendices
Appendix A
Interview Guide used to Collect Primary Data for this
Paper 44
A1
Questionnaires for District Chief Executive
A2
Questions for Appointed Assembly Councillors
A3
Questions for Elected Assembly Member
Appendix B
General Assembly and Committees
Meetings Observed
References
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List of Tables
Table 1.2: Categorisation of District based on scores to determine level of
development
Table 1.3: Number of proposed sampled respondents to be interviewed
Table 1.4: Successful number of respondents Interviewed
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List of Figures
Figure 2.1: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
Figure 3.2: Institutional and Administrative framework of AMA & KMA
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List of Maps
Map 3.1: Map of Ghana
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viii
List of Acronyms
AFRC
AMA
ANC
BCA
CDD
CG
CoG
CSO
DCE
EC
GA
IDEA
ILGS
LAA
LG
LGA
KMA
MA
MC
MCE
MMDA
MUA
NA
NC
NDC
NEC
NJO
NLC
NPP
NRC
PADC
PNDC
RC
RCC
SSA
SMC
SMDC
SMD
TAC
TC
TLG
TT
UC
UNDP
ZC
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Accra Metropolitan Assembly
African National Congress party
British Colonial Authority
Centre for Democratic Development
Central Government
Constitution of Ghana
Civil Society Organisation
District Chief Executive
Elected Councillor
Government Appointee
International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Institute of Local Government Studies
Local Administration Act
Local Government
Local Government Act
Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly
Metropolitan Assembly
Municipal Council
Metropolitan Chief Executive
Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assembly
Municipal Assembly
Native Authority
Native Court
National Democratic Congress
Non Elected Councillor
Native Jurisdictional Ordinance
National Liberation Council
New Patriotic Party
National Redemption Council
Presidentially Appointed District Councillors
Provisional National Defence Council
Regional Council
Regional Coordinating Council
Sub-Saharan Africa
Supreme Military Council
Sub-Metropolitan District Council
Sub-Metropolitan District
Town/Area Council
Town Council
Traditional Local Government
Think Tank
Unit Committee
United Nations Development Programme
Zonal Council
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Abstract
Ghana embarked on a robust decentralization and LG reforms aims at giving
power to the people in order to evolve good democratic local governance. In
this light this research sets out to find out the influence of the non elected
councillors on local governance in Accra and Kumasi Metropolitan Assemblies. This study examines the participation of NECs in relation to representation, accountability, and women underrepresentation in the District Assemblies. It highlights the influence of NECs on the authority and autonomy of
the DAs. And consequently test the argument that non-elected seats are reserved to nominate into the DAs persons with expertise and valuable experiences who can contribute to local development.
Relevance to Development Studies
Decentralization and local governance is currently popular and promoted
across developing world after the gross failure of centralization and also, the
realisation that development is impossible without active involvement and participation of the ordinary local people. It is therefore imperative to study the
actors [who are acting on behalf of the local people] crucial in ensuring that the
local people take their rightful positions in efforts to better and improve the
livelihood of the ordinary local people; who unequivocally matters most in development.
Keywords
Decentralization, Local Government/Governance, Local Democracy, Accountability, Representation, Bicameralism and Gender Quota
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Globally, decentralization and local governance has received a lot of attention
since its re-emergence in 1980s, and the interest in it shows no sign of waning
in the near future (Rees and Hossain 2010). The interest in decentralization
started unfolding after the glaring failure of centralized planning which was
vigorously pursued by countries in the post colonial period. Whilst there was
scanty evidence that decentralization would succeed, there were large documentations sufficing that centralization had foundered (Awortwi, 2010; World
Bank, 1997 & 2000, Wunch & Oluwu, 1990).
Although the first wave of decentralization introduced in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s was considered to have largely failed (S. Bergh,
2004; Crook &Manor, 1998: 1), decentralization has increasingly become widespread and popular in developing countries especially Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) since 1980s. Awortwi (2010) notes that currently over two thirds of
countries in SSA have practiced one or more forms of decentralization as a
reform strategy however, that the focus of which has changed over the years
compared with earlier decentralization reforms. Many analysts argue that the
current process is different from efforts of the 1960s and 1970s because it is
taking place alongside broad economic and political reforms and with the support of donors (Awortwi, 2010; Abrahamsen, 2000; Romeo, 1996).
Theoretically the rationale for countries embarking on decentralization
is that transfer of some Central Government (CG) powers, resources and responsibilities to the local level would provide greater transparency, accountability, responsiveness, probity, frugality, equity, and empower local people by
placing governance at their door steps and ‘bring government closer to the
people’ thereby giving them the chance to participate in development (Crook
& Manor, 1998: 2). However in practice many developing countries including
African countries adopt decentralization for various reasons such as shedding
of CG economic burden set off ethnic-based political conflicts e.g.in Nigeria
and Ethiopia (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Awortwi, 2010) which goes contrary to
the theoretical underpinnings.
Like most SSA countries, Ghana embarked on decentralization in order
to attain the benefits associated with decentralization reforms. This is seen explicitly in the policy guidelines of the Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC, 1988); which had come to power after the overthrow of a civilian
government of Dr. Hilla Liman’s People’s National Party (PNP) in December
1981. The ‘coup makers’ claiming to have come to liberate the people from
what they regarded as elite capture of the state promised to give back ‘power to
the people’. It was therefore unsurprising that in the council’s first major policy
document dubbed the “PNDC Policy guidelines” contained policy positions
on local government and decentralization. It stated: “the urgent need for participatory democracy to ensure that the bane of remote government that had
afflicted Ghanaians since independence is done away with effectively, to render
governments truly responsive and accountable to the governed”. It further
1
stated that “the assumption of power by the people cannot be complete unless
a truly decentralized government system is introduced, that is CG, in all its
manifestations, should empower LG councils to initiate, coordinate, manage
and execute policies in all matters affecting them within their localities”
(PNDC ‘policy guideline’, 1982; cited in K. Ahwoi, 2010: 1).
The PNDC in order to put into reality its rhetoric of giving ‘power to
the people’ introduced a new decentralization policy in 1988 which was subsequently adopted and incorporated into the 1992 constitution when Ghana returned to constitutional rule in 1992. This decentralization policy recognised
three types of decentralization which has long been categorized by scholars of
public administration namely; Political (Devolution), Administrative (Deconcentration) and Fiscal decentralization (Rondinelli et.al, 1984). Awortwi
(2010), notes that Ghana’s decentralization reform was to achieve political/democratic decentralization (Devolution). In a nutshell the robust decentralisation initiated by Ghana broadly aims to enhance local governance and
local democracy.
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
Local governance and local democracy are not new in developing countries
generally and Africa in particular (World Bank 1989a; (Olowu et al. 2004). Like
any other developing country Ghana has made efforts to institute effective LG
system at the local level through decentralization. According to Ayee (2008)
this is witnessed by the number of commissions and committees of enquiry
appointed to fashion out LG system.
Although decentralized local governance started before independence, the
current LG system has its beginnings in the PNDC law 207, 1988 which provided for the establishment of a LG structure grouped into Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs)1. In order to empower the local
people to participate in decisions, a unique local government has been instituted which is based on non partisan electoral systems, with District Assemblies
(DAs) as the highest decision making bodies at the local level with some deliberative, legislative and executive powers (CoG, 1992: 138).
For the purposes of decision making the constitution of Ghana (ibid: 138)
stipulates that councillors to the DAs are to be recruited either by election or
appointment. Seventy per cent (70%) of the members of the DAs is elective
while the remaining thirty per cent (30%) is appointment by the president of
the republic of Ghana. However, in view of the fact that Ghana decentralization agenda is or (aims at) Devolution (Awortwi, 2010), the quota2 to president
to nominate local councillors generates a lot of questions. Indeed the decentralization policy, if actually meant to devolve power to the people then the
Herein referred to as the District Assembly
The quota refers to the 30% allocation granted by the constitution to the president
of Ghana to appoint local councillors.
1
2
2
questions that manifest are; why the inclusion of the nominated councillors, in
whose interest are they serving and what are they bringing to the DA?.
In this light the quota has been a subject of discourse and debates both by
researchers and development practitioners. Some scholars and analyst justifies
the nomination of one-third of the DA councillors on the grounds that it is to
help balance inequalities3, get people with certain expertise or “well-respected
community leaders who have valuable contributions to make ” to the development of their local communities but put off by electoral processes (Crook &
Manor, 1998: 226; Ofei-Aboagye 2004). Others observes a political motive,
namely to build a locally-based ‘political class’ who will later become national
politicians (Crook & Manor, 1998: 226; Gyimah Boadi, 1990; and the African
Confidential, 14 April, 1989).
However on the critical side The World Bank (2003) in a policy document
on Ghana’s decentralization queried the one-third nominated DA councillors
and stated that this has the tendency of reverting power back to the centre after professing to undertake a decentralization reform (Devolution).
Aside these debates, Ghana’s decentralization reform is often hailed by
donors and scholars for steady progress since its creation in the late 1980s
(Langseth, 1996; Ndegwa 2002; Crook and Manor, 1998). However, Awortwi
(2010) argues that there is the inclination to romanticize this progress without
critically assessing and evaluating the quality of progress. Similarly, since human institutions are not fixed and stable with time, there is the need for a
painstaking scrutiny of the structures and institutions especially the local legislative organ of Ghana’s LG because of its importance in determining whether
or not power is entrusted to the people.
The last issue is the lower numbers of women in the local decision making
bodies of Ghana. Women representation at the local level is still below appreciable levels even though Ghana is a signatory to international instruments4
that requires countries to make conscious efforts to see significant representation of women at both national and local level. Available statistics (see table
1.1) depicts that women numbers at the local level via the electoral system have
declined within the last two elections even though there have been ardent
campaigns by gender activist for the need to include and increase women in all
facet of life especially in decision making.
It is against this backdrop of issues that a critical study of the local decision makers and representatives of the people of Ghana LG- specifically presidentially appointed district councillors - is relevant to empirically ascertain the
kind of influence it has on the local governance system of Ghana.
Get women, minority/ marginalised groups into the DAs
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the African Women’s Protocol adopted in 2003 in Maputo
3
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3
Table 1.1: Statistics of women representation at the Local legislatures for the last two
elections in Ghana
Year
Total Number of seats
Local Level-District Assembly
2006
5950?
478
2010
6150
418
Source: Research’s own construction (Data gathered from the Electoral Commission Ghana)
1.3 Objectives of the Research
The major aim of this study is to examine the influence of the presidentially
appointed district councillors (PADCs) or Non Elected Councillors (NECs) on
the quality of local governance of Ghana. Specifically the study sets out to do
the following;
1. To examine the processes and criteria involved in the nomination and
appointment of the non elected assembly members; that is, who are the
actors behind the nominations and appointments and how do they do
it;
2. To find out the kind of accountability that the non elected assembly
members are subjected to;
3. To find out whom the non elected assembly members represent in the
legislative body since they do not have constituencies and also to underscore the independence and autonomy of the DAs;
4. To examined the kind of relationship and interactions between the non
elected assembly member councillors and the elected councillors and
5. To assess the readiness of the local level to allow women/gender quota
in view of the dwindling numbers of women in Ghana decision making
bodies especially at the local level.
1.4 Research Questions
Main question: what has been the influence of non elected councillors or presidentially appointed members’ (Government appointees as popularly called in
Ghana) participation on the quality of local governance of Ghana? The study
will also be guided by the following specific questions:
1. What are the processes and criteria in the nomination and appointments of the non elected assembly members? Who fills the presidential
quota and how?
2. Who are non-elected assembly members accountable to and how?
3. Whom and in whose interest do the non elected councillors represent?
4. How do the Appointed District Assembly members and the elected
District Assembly Members relate to each other within the DA?
5. Would local councillors support the creation and institutionalization of
women or gender quota at the local level?
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1.5 Hypothesis:
The following hypothesis is being tested in this study:
The quota is reserved to get technocrats and respectable persons, with rich experiences to contribute to the development and advancement of the local area.
This hypothesis is informed by the arguments justifying the inclusion of appointed members in the DAs.
1.6 Relevance and Justification
This study is significant to both theory and policy. Theoretically the study is
intended to expand the existing decentralization literature on Ghana since the
study attempts to specifically analyse a provision in the constitution on a section of councillor of the DA in Ghana. In terms of policy the study is timely
because Ghana is currently in the process of reviewing the decentralization
policy as well as the constitution. It would produce evidence that could aid in
the review of the local government system especially as there have been calls
by gender activist and CSOs to reserve the quota allocated to the president for
women or should be taken out.
1.7 Research Methodology
The study is focused on the decentralization and local governance specifically
on the Accra and Kumasi Metropolitan Assemblies (MA) of Ghana. To gain
insights into these areas, the research employed both primary and secondary
data. This section covers study sites, the various methods and techniques of
data collection and analysis used to carry out this research.
As stated earlier, this research aims at assessing the influence of NECs on
the local governance of Ghana. And as such it becomes imperative to hear the
experiences and views of the councillors who are involved in the system. To
this end, the study is to a large extent qualitative since it tries to understand and
explore what the presidentially appointed councillors are bringing to bear on
the local government of Ghana. In addition, to get relevant and insightful information, the study considered different data collection methods with the objective that the methods would complement each other. Thus, interviews, observations and documentations were employed during a fieldwork in Ghana.
1.7.1 Study Sites
In this research a case study approach was adopted and two MAs were selected, Accra and Kumasi MAs. Hence, this subsection gives a brief introduction
of the areas of study (where I conducted the field work) and why they were
selected among the 176 DAs in Ghana.
Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) is one of the 10 districts located in
the Greater Accra region - the National Capital- of Ghana of which AMA is at
the heart of the capital city. Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) on the
other hand is also one of out of the twenty seven districts of the Ashanti region of Ghana. Both districts are amongst the oldest districts in Ghana and
both serves as the central business districts of the respective regions. In terms
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of development both assemblies fall under the most developed districts according the criteria set by the Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. While AMA had a total score point of 78, that of Kumasi
was 76 (see Table 1.2 below).
1.7.2 Selection of Case Study
Selection of (a) case(s) depend on factors such as pragmatics, intrinsic interest,
purposiveness (typical-extremely good/bad) and access (Z. O’leary, 2010:1767; R. Yin 2003). Also the selection of two or more case allows for prediction of
similar result (i.e. enforcing each other) or to contradict each other (. R. Yin
2003:53). With regard to this paper the selection of the case is based firstly on
the fact that it is considered as typical (extremely good case). The two metropolises are chosen because they possesses almost the same features such as
level of development and with the rationale for controlling for the influence of
CG since they are the most developed and advanced DAs. Secondly based on
the fact that information and data could be easily accessed since they would
have better information management systems and records. A detail Description and discussion of the two MAs is found in chapter three.
Table 1.2: Categorisation of District based on scores to determine level of development
1
2
3
4
Total Score
Less than 20
20-39
40-59
60+
Level of Development
Most deprived/least developed
Deprived
Moderately developed
Developed
Source: Planning and Monitoring Division, Ministry of Local Government
1.7.3 Respondents selection
All respondents who participated in the study were drawn from the two MAs –
Accra and Kumasi; however, whilst the councillors were selected using simply
random sampling, the two think tanks were purposively selected.
In both Accra and Kumasi MAs twenty (20) out of forty two persons
serving as Government Appointee (GA) were sampled in order to find out
more about their backgrounds, and to also learn directly about their experiences and opinions about the GA5. I also discussed and interacted with two prominent think tanks –the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) and the
Institute Local Government Studies (ILGS [which is an institution for training
local government professionals and local councillors]). Both organizations were
selected because of their involvement in the local government affairs of the
country and at such it was deemed that a range of diverse and heterogeneous
point of views could be garnered from them in order to make triangulation of
the data possible. Aside the above, I also interviewed five elected councillors
5 Presidentially Appointed District Councillors; Government Appointee (GA) and
Nominated/Non Elected Councillor are used interchangeable.
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each from the two MAs. These people were chosen because they were among
the longest serving members in the assemblies. This was done with the help of
the administrators of the DAs where a list of longest serving councillors was
obtained and randomly sampled for interview. Below is table 1.3, showing
number of sampled respondents.
Table 1.3: Number of proposed sampled respondents to be interviewed
Respondents
Nominated/Appointed DA Members
Elected DA Members
Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE)
Governance Institutions:
Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD)
Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS)
Total
Accra
10
5
1
1
1
18
Kumasi
10
5
1
16
Source: Researcher’s own construction
1.7.4 Techniques employed to gather data
Three different data collection methods- interviews, observation and documentation were employed to gather Primary data from a field work in Accra
and Kumasi MAs, Ghana from July 10 to August 25, 2011. In this section I
will briefly discuss each technique and explain why it was chosen and how it
was used to collect data.
According to Laws, Harper and Marcus an interview is “a conversation
that has a structure and a purpose. It is more than the spontaneous everyday
exchange of opinions; it is a way for the interviewer to receive a carefully tested
knowledge. The respondent do not only answer formulated questions, but express in a dialogue, an understanding of his or her world”(2003:297).
In this research, the interview method was adopted firstly because I wanted to get rich, in-depth qualitative data by capturing people’s experiences or
views about the issue under study, and secondly the interview method is flexible enough to allow me to probe further and explore tangents (Z. O’leary,
2010:196). One on one interviews were held with the appointed councillor, the
elected members as well as the experts from the think tanks. All the interviews
were conducted in an informal manner and semi-structured. This was done in
order for me establish rapport, gain trust and to open up lines of communication to minimise any gulf between me (the interviewer) and the interviewee
(ibid, 2010:195). In each case, interviewees were given the room to express
their views and opinions on the research topic. See Appendix ‘A’ for the interview guide used for the data collection.
Apart from the interviews, I also had the opportunity to sit through general assembly and some committees meetings (see appendix B) as a non participant observer in the two MAs. Throughout my being at the assemblies all my
senses were put on the ground gathering pieces of information which I consider was relevant to my study, hence the use of the observation method. An observation is “a systematic method of data collection that relies on a researcher’s
ability to gather data through the use of the senses” (ibid, 2003:208). This of7
fered me the chance to see, hear and feel how works of the assemblies are carried out.
Lastly I was also able to gather relevant documents about the decentralization and local government system of Ghana. These included the Local Government Act (LGA) of 2003, Act 656, profiles of the case studies and other
policy documents.
As mentioned earlier, the primary data were collected in Ghana in Accra
and Kumasi MAs within a spate of six weeks from 10th July to 25th August,
2011. The process of the fieldwork unfolded in the following; I spent the first
three weeks in Accra and the last three in Kumasi. In Accra I used the first
four days of my first week in negotiating access at the assembly and also making appointments with the two think tanks. On my fifth day I started holding
interviews with the councillors which I continued on the second week. I used
the third week alternating between the assembly, the think tanks and the Ministry of Local Government to gather documents on decentralization and local
government of Ghana.
Within the three week period, I had become acquainted to most of the
councillors that I had the opportunity to travel with one of the GA in his private car to Kumasi, (my second destination for the data collection). On our
way we discussed a lot about my research topic. He dropped me right in front
of the gate of the Kumasi MA; called his friend6 and introduced me to him. I
was not familiar with the terrain and was nervous initially however after my
guest introduced me to the appropriate offices and protocols, I carried out my
work successfully.
It is worth mentioning that not all respondents who were chosen were interviewed even though I called on them several times. In Accra MA two of the
GA declined and these were a male and female, whilst in Kumasi MA three of
the respondents that I could not interview were all females. Find below table
(1.4) of successful interviews conducted.
Table 1.4: Successful number of respondents Interviewed
Respondents
Nominated/Appointed DA Members
Elected DA Members
Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE)
Governance Institutions:
Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD)
Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS)
Total
Source: Researcher’s own construction
6 The head of the IT department of Kumasi metropolis
8
Accra
8
5
1
1
1
16
Kumasi
8
4
1
13
1.7.5 Secondary Data
Apart from the primary data, I also used secondary data collected from secondary sources i.e. from published and unpublished government documents,
1992 constitution, acts and laws relating to decentralization and LG, reports,
research works, journals and newspapers. Some information was also collected
through internet browsing.
1.7.6 Scope and Limitation
This study is an academy study and as such works within a time frame and limited resources which could not allowed the research to cover the entire country
or the 176 DAs. The study therefore adopted Two DAs – the Accra and Kumasi metropolitan Assemblies as case study in order to do an in-depth studies
and analysis. Thus, the findings of the research should not be generalised to
the entire country, but rather should be taken as a microcosm of a bigger scenario and as something that may be useful for further research. In addition, the
study is limited to the on-going session of the DAs. Apart from the above, the
study encountered other constraints. Notable amongst them were the refusal
of some of the councillors in the two DAs to grant the researcher interview
and discussions even though a letter of introduction spelling out clearly the
mission of the research was presented to them. Some of those who declined
were sceptical and even thought I was using the studentship as coy to do some
undercover journalistic work. Said by one councillor “He will say he is a student and the next moment you hear your voice on the airwaves”. One of my
key informants expressed willingness to participate in the research however he
was indisposed on health grounds.
In spite of these constraints, considerable efforts were made, (firstly by
changing my interview questions from structured to semi-structured to enable
me to draw out more information from the interviewees and secondly, by collecting sufficient documents) not to allow these challenges to compromise the
quality of the study and also to ensure that the overall objectives and intended
purposes is achieved.
1.8 Organisation of the paper
This paper has been organised into five chapters. The first chapter which is the
introduction include the background, the statement of the research problem,
objectives of the study, research questions, hypothesis, relevance of the study,
methodology and scope and limitations. Chapter two presents the conceptual
and theoretical framework of the research. Chapter three discusses the framework of the local government system of Ghana. Chapter four contains the
presentation, analysis and interpretation of the findings and the last chapter
concludes the study. The next chapter looks at the concepts and theories upon
which this study is anchored.
9
Chapter 2
Framework
2.0
Conceptual and Theoretical
Introduction
This chapter sets to clarify the concepts and theories that have been employed
in this study, such as Decentralization, Local Government, Local Governance
and Local Democracy, Local Accountability and Representation. I also draw
on the principle of bicameralism (two- tier system) in order to better understand issues relating to the appointed members as the study seek to analyse the
contribution of the presidentially appointed councillors’ contribution to the
LG of Ghana. These concepts are discussed and operationalised in the study.
2.1 Concept of Decentralization
The term decentralization has acquired popularity in both scholarly and policy
circles especially in relation to developing countries. But this popularity has
seen the concept been given different meanings for different people by different people (Mawhood, 1983: 1; Conyers, 1985). Decentralization refers to the
transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and
allocation from the central government and its agencies to: (a) field units of
central government ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of
government (Rondinelli 1981a), creating open, response and effective LG system for decision-making (United Nations Development Program [UNDP]
1998:4).
However for this study, I adopted a definition by United Nations, (Decentralization for National and Local Development [New York, 1965: 88/9]). Decentralization is elucidated in this document as the transfer of authority on geographic basis, whether by deconcentration of authority to field units of the
department or level of government, or by devolution of authority to local government units. This definition is taken here because it resonates well with the
decentralization reform in Ghana. That is underscoring deconcentration and
devolution. Although Ghana decentralization has the fiscal aspect as well but is
it still in the formative stages; the structures are weak and most fiscal issues lies
within the ambit of the CG. For instance, local authorities would have to seek
approval from the CG in order to levy taxes to raise resources for development.
In the literature three major types of decentralization (Deconcentration,
Delegation and Devolution) have been recognised. These are succinctly explicated below.
De-concentration considered to be the weakest form of decentralization
(Rondinelli 1999:2, S. Bergh, 2004) is the process by which the central government offload responsibilities for certain services to its regional branch offices without involving any transfer of authority to lower levels of government
(Litvack et al. 1998:4). Delegation refers to a situation in which the central
government transfers responsibility for decision making and administration of
10
public functions to local governments or to semi-autonomous organisations
that are not wholly controlled by the central government but are ultimately accountable to it.
Devolution occurs when the central government transfers authority for
decision making, financial allocations, and management to quasi-autonomous
units of local government. Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to LGs that either elects their own mayors and councils or appointed by
CG, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions (Litvack et al. 1998:5-6; S. Bergh, 2004). By definitions, only
devolution can bring about local governance and for that matter this paper is
to a large extent leaned toward this last typology of decentralization because it
is the one that allows the establishment of a democratic decision making body
with local representatives being in control of the local affairs.
2.2 Local Government, Local Governance and Local Democracy
Local government level is the destination of whatever that is transferred from
the CG and as such is the lower tier of multi-tier government. LG has no universally accepted meaning because there are many different kinds of LG as
there are countries or nations, with each evolving its own LG systems (R.
Wraith, 1964: 17; K. Ahwoi, 2010: 3). Thus in this study LG is conceptualised
as a body below the CG with local authorities to carry out the functions of the
local government.
Also, conceptually local governance has been explained by many scholars
and policy analyst using different tools7. Here local governance is taken as a
“rule governed process through which residents of a defined area participate in
their own governance; are the key decision makers in determining their priority
concerns and the responses. Representatives of these local people frequently
will perform functions as agents of the people but they remain accountable
(and removable by) the people” (Olowu et al. 2004).
With respect to democracy, there is no generally agreed conceptualization
of democracy because is a value laden concept that cannot be precisely or easily define because of variations in its interpretation and usage by different people and class (Novacx, 1970). However the popular understanding of democracy in contemporary discourses is informed by liberal democracy which states
that democracy is a system of government where there is meaningful, extensive, regular and fair competition for all elected positions of government; a
highly inclusive level of political participation; and civil and political liberties8
enough to guarantee the integrity of political competition and participation
7 This tools include: the UN Habitat and Transparency International Urban Governance Index (UGI) for cities (UN-Habitat 2004; CLGF 2004); the Local Governance
Barometer (LGB)
8 Freedom of expression, and to form and join organisation of ones will i.e. freedom
of association
11
(Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum 2009). Conceived differently, democracy can be
defined in terms of institutions, procedures, formal rights and leadership responsiveness to the electorate. (ibid) Thus the defining features of democracy
are indispensable in human relations to ensure social order and harmony.
Clearly the connection between local governance and decentralization, and
LD is that the later reinforces LG by creating strong, organized and representative councils to improve efficiency and local development. And hence decentralization by devolution of decision-making to the local levels is a fundamental
for local democracy as it results in a more responsive organization and greater
community accountability (ibid).
Also in the literature, it is agreed the main attributes of good local governance consist of the following principles: rule of law, constitutionalism, electoral
and participatory democracy, representation, accountability, citizens’ participation in local decision making, respect for human rights, gender equity and
transparency in public affairs (Kauzya 2002).
2.3 Accountability
Accountability is a broad concept which embodies many terms including oversight, monitoring, auditing, control, exposure and punishment (Schedler 1999).
It denotes the obligation of public officials and agencies to provide information about their actions and decisions and to justify them to the public. Essentially accountability connotes; answerability and enforceability. Accountability has become a key principle in LG because of the view that the local people
are closer to their representatives and consequently can demand answers from
their torch bearers who are in charge of their localities.
The concept of accountability in the literature has been distinguished into
various forms such as Horizontal and vertical accountability of which the vertical is separated in to downward and upward. In this study the vertical is
adopted for it is the type that allows elected/appointed representatives to be
answerable to local citizens in the case of downward accountability while upward accountability is LG responding to CG. According to Olowu & Wunsch
(2004: 70) all these forms depends on the availability of information- something which is in serious short supply in most developing countries, Ghana inclusive. In his study, Blair (2000:32) underscores different accountability mechanisms available to local citizens. These mechanisms include among others
elections, political parties, civil society, the media, and public meetings. However he added that these mechanisms have each got its limitations. Many
scholars and practitioners notes that in the most cases it is the electoral mechanism that is pronounce and widely used (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004). In the
context of Ghana and especially in relation to this study, the electoral aspect is
not applicable as it is limited to elected representatives however the focus of
this study is on the non elected representatives. Also the political party’s method is also defeated because the LG system of Ghana prohibits partisan politics
at the local level (CoG, 1992).
12
As pointed out by Olowu et al (2004) the stakeholders in the accountability equation are the citizen, the central government and the representative,
however they emphasised that the effectiveness of accountability depends on
the first two stakeholders in order to make the third answerable.
2.4 Representation
The concept of representation has been a subject of contention and debated
within and amongst political theorist. The meaning of representation is notoriously contested and beyond the notion that representation connotes acting in
the interest of the represented, there seems to be little else on which theorist
agree. (Pitkins, 1974; Manin et al., 1999) According to Samuel and Shugart
(2003:33) representation is defined “as a relationship between citizens’ interest
and political outcomes, in which rulers act in to meet the interest of the public.” When leaders take decisions that are clearly congruent with the peoples
preferences, we consider them to be responsive and it is only when leaders are
responsive that citizens are well represented (Powell 2004a). However I adopt
a definition offered by (Ribot 2007) where representation is taken to mean a
situation when leaders (in this case councillors) are both responsive and accountable to the local people, this definition is favoured in this study because it
is in tandem with the theoretical rationale why powers and authority are transferred to the local units of governments.
2.5 Bicameral Legislatures
This section draws from the literature of bicameralism to explain the local decision making body of Ghana – LG- as in many respect it simulates the parliamentary pattern of the bicameral legislature. Bicameral legislature is system of
legislature where there are two separate houses or chambers for making decisions. The basic features of bicameral legislatures are; firstly, whilst the first
chambers are popularly elected, the second chamber is appointed (e.g. the Canadian Senate) or elected indirectly (although increasingly most are been modified to be directly elective) Examples of these include; the German Bundesrat,
the Irish Senate, and the French Senate. Secondly, members of the latter are
often fewer in number than the lower house members (Meg Russell, 2001).
With regard to Ghana’s local government, there is only one chamber however
it is composed of both elected and appointed members with the appointed
members fewer than the elected members. The interest of this study lies on not
the second chamber per say but on the members who make up the second
chambers.
Turning to the reasons for the inclusion of the members of the second
chambers, the reasons varies from country to country and this may include;
representation of specialized interest such as minorities, the less privilege in
society and territorial representation. Also in view of the reality that modern
legislative is burden, the members of the second chamber are drawn in to bring
different perspective, knowledge and experience to bear on decisions. (Jay M.,
2007; Russell, 2001).
13
In spite of these supposed benefits, the second chamber has come under
critical scrutiny and challenged. In his article ‘What are Second Chambers for?’
(Russell 2001) observes that whilst several countries such as UK, Canada,
France and Spain are locked in a vigorous and sometimes protracted debate,
about the reform of their second chamber with some countries considering its
abolition, others such as New Zealand, Denmark and Sweden have scrapped it
off already. But surprisingly, whilst some countries are taking away their second chambers, countries including; Poland, Czech Republic and South Africa
have adopted bicameralism as part of their recent constitutional reforms.
(Tsebelis and Money 1997)
In another vein it is worth mentioning that in jurisdictions where the upper chamber is purely by appointment, political interest has infiltrated the system diluting and defeating the intended purposes for the inclusion of these
crops of members. E.g. it is observed in Canada that the prime minister who
has the mandate to nominate senators sometimes uses the senate appointments
as a form of political patronage, selecting friends and allies of the governing
political party. (Jay M., 2007)
2.6
Gender Quota (GQ)
Gender quota, the latest tool crafted to ensure gender balance in decision making/political institution has been touted for aiding in increasing the number of
women representatives in decision making bodies across the world (D.
Dahlerup, 2006:3). The core idea for the adoption of quota systems is to recruit women into political/decision making positions and to ensure that women are not a few tokens in political life. (IDEA, quota project, 2010) Apart
from addressing the under-representation of women, the quota system also
aims at ensuring ‘Critical Mass’9 representation of women in decision making
bodies (ibid).
According to Dahlerup, the quota mechanism is very flexible and can be
applied at both national and local level. Three main typologies of gender quotas have been put forth in the literature on gender quota. These include; Legal
Quota (Constitutional/legislative) where the quotas are mandated either by the
constitution (e.g. Uganda, Mali and Phillipines) or by electoral law (like Belgium). The second type is the political party quota (also known as voluntary
party quota). This is when parties decide to adopts quota for women based on
the party agreement such as the ANC party in South Africa (IDEA, quota project: 2010). The voluntary quota is not effective as it is not legally enforceable.
For instance in Ghana, the NDC party stated in its manifesto that it was going
to appoint 40% of women in its government, but this promise has not been
fulfilled as the number of women is less than 15%. However all the two types
of GQs are based on elections (because of this some basically called it electoral
quota) and which sometime generates another kinds of problems. For instance
9 The theory of critical mass states that women should constitute at least a number
that can make an impact such as 30% and more.
14
elite women may capture the quota limiting the impact from trickling down to
the ordinary woman. Nonetheless GQ is widely trumpeted because of its far
reaching impact in uplifting women numbers (Dahlerup 2003). Quotas as noted work differently under different electoral systems and most are easily introduced in proportional representation electoral systems. However, quotas have
also been implemented in some majority electoral systems.
However in this study the GQ is operationalised to mean a special system
of appointment for women, where the 30% prerogative granted to the president to appoint councillors into the DAs of Ghana would be legislated for
women. Rather than based on elections (though between women) as done in
other jurisdictions, here it would be purely based on appointment.
2.7 Literature Review on Electoral Systems and Ghana Local
Electoral System
As mentioned in the premier chapter, the major objective of this paper is to
examine the influence of presidentially appointed district councillors on the
local governance of Ghana. In this light this section reviews literature on electoral systems at the local level, as it has far reaching impact on the outcomes of
developments at the local level (Packel 2008). Until recently local electoral systems had received less attention as far as democratisation at the local level is
concerned. More studies on electoral systems are almost entirely concerned
with electoral rules at the national level with particular focus on the relationship between electoral systems and national party systems (IDEA 2002; Packel
2008).
As regards meaning of electoral system IDEA posits that“...... electoral
systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties
and candidates” (IDEA 2002, 7). The choice of electoral system is one of the
most crucial institutional decisions for any democracy. In almost all cases the
choice of a particular electoral system has a profound effect on the future political life of the country concerned, and electoral systems, once chosen, often
remain fairly constant as political interests solidify around and respond to the
incentives presented by them. (ibid, 2002:1) The choices that are made may
have consequences that are unforeseen as well as predicted effects. However in
his democracy and elections Katz is among the most cautious who argues that
the best electoral system for a country depends on “who you are, where you
are and you want to go (Katz, 2007:208).
Electoral system choice is a fundamentally political process, rather than a
question to which independent technical experts can produce a single ‘correct
answer’ (IDEA, 2002) The consideration of political advantage is almost always a factor in the choice of electoral systems. Calculations of short-term political interest can often obscure the longer-term consequences of a particular
electoral system. For instance Awortwi (2010, 626/627) argues that the electoral system at the local level in Ghana was put in place to strengthen the
PNDC regime at the time.
15
In the literature of LGs across the third world, one key institutions differences is the issues of partisan/non partisan in local elections. Proponents of
non partisanship in local elections argue that issues of LG are matters of
“bread and butter” and as such should not be based on partisanship which
could create divisions (Olowu 2003, Packel 2008). Consequently, inclusion of
parties at the local level risks allowing policy-making to become smeared with
patronage and clientelism. (Packel, 2008) Political pressures thus prevent policy-makers from retaining a focus purely on long-term benefits. LG in Ghana is
purely on non partisanship (CoG, 1992). Also Uganda and India’s LG (panchayats) functions on non partisanship by legislation. On the other hand scholars
advocating partisanship acknowledges the link between LG and national. Examples of systems allowing partisanship in local elections are the recently decentralizing Latin American countries, including Bolivia, and Mexico. In Africa,
prominent examples of party-based systems of LG are Nigeria, Kenya, South
Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Olowu 2003;
Packel 2008).
In the electoral systems literature, large number of variant electoral systems is currently in use and many more permutations on each form, but scholars have broadly categorised electoral systems into “three broad families”: Proportional Representation (PR) systems, plurality/majority systems and mixed
systems. (IDEA, 2002:3; (Norris 1997) PR is where voters generally vote for a
party rather than a specific candidate. This system ensures that a political party’s degree of representation equally reflects the electoral support for the party.
Majority or plurality system of voting within single member districts which is a
major alternative to system of PR is where voters in a specific electoral district
vote for a specific candidate. With only one representative per electoral district,
voters have greater clarity of representation; they have no doubt who is directly
charged with accounting for their interests (Packel, 2008:4). The mixed electoral system which is the third major type of electoral systems combines the
majoritarian and proportional elements.
Indeed in Ghana, the Constitution established a system of democratic local elections premised on non-partisan basis in which candidates stands as individuals and not permitted to receive any form of help from political parties
(COG, 1992). In terms of selection of councillors, the DAs have mixed representation with 7o% elected members and 30% presidential appointees with the
candidates elected on ‘first-past-the-post’ basis to represent single-member
constituencies (LGA, 1993).
16
2.7
Conceptual and Framework
Based on the literature, figure 2.1 below shows the graphical presentation of
the concepts and theories.
Figure 2.1: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
Central Government
Transfer of Authority
and Power from CG to LG
Representation
Accountability
Free, Frequent and fair elections
Equity- Gender Quota
L
evel
Local Legislature-Bicameralism
Local Government Level
The figure above shows the transfer of authority, resources and power to
LG and how the principles of democracy combine to bring out democratic local government.
17
Good
Democratic Local
Governance
2.8
Conclusion
The chapter covered the theories and their conceptualisations in relation to this
paper. The Concepts reviewed under this chapter included decentralization,
(including some of its typologies), LG, local Governance and local democracy
highlighting linkages among these three concepts; Accountability; Representation; Bicameralism and lastly gender quotas. The chapter also reviewed some
literature on electoral system elaborating on the electoral system at the local
level in Ghana. The next chapter looks at the local governance trajectory in
Ghana from antiquity to the present.
18
Chapter 3
Overview of Decentralisation and
Local Government Trajectory in Ghana
3.0 Introduction
The preceding chapter discussed the concepts and theories; the lenses through
which this study is analysed. In this chapter I would explore and discuss the
decentralization and LG trajectories of Ghana giving a historical overview
from the pre-independent/colonial era, leading to the present framework and
structure. Also this section describes in details the current LG structure of
Ghana. Aside the above, the chapter also chronicle the profiles of the case
study- AMA and KMA- which has been slightly described in chapter one.
3.1 Emergence of Local Governance in Ghana
Local governance is not a new invention in developing countries and to a significant extent Africa in particular (World Bank 1989; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004:
2). The history of local governance in Africa and in particular Ghana date as
far back to the pre-independence era and even before the country Ghana was
discovered. Ghanaians governed and ruled themselves via chiefs and traditional
rulers since society was chiefly based on kingdoms and chiefdoms. The chiefs
together with their council of elders represented the people and communities
in various spheres such as militarily, social and economic. These chiefs or traditional leaders wielded Power and authority which could only be exercised by
them or persons to whom it was delegated. In fact this empowered the rulers
to undertake military, political, economic and social functions within their jurisdictional areas (K. Ahwoi, 2010:5). For instance, it was incumbent on the
chief and the elders to protect and defend its subjects and territories against
foreign invasion, ensure the survival of its people and modelling of the social
life of its communities. This system was part of the way of life; culture and heritage of the people and remnants of this hitherto exist to date though without
any significant powers since all powers and authority is now wielded by the
central state.
As mentioned earlier, the chiefs and their council of elders although were
not elected by the people, they was a mutual understanding and acceptance of
them as legitimate representatives of the people. The mode of leadership succession was by heir which is incongruent with modern democracy. Like modern local government, the chiefs and their councils constituted and provided
legislative, executive and judicial responsibilities for their community. They
(chiefs and his council) enacted laws and regulations for the community. Whilst
it was also the duty of the council to implement these laws, it was in addition
responsible for the adjudication and dispensing of justice. Needless to say, this
traditional system of governance was local in a sense that the people and the
rulers were closer to the people and this provide avenue for the effective application of the ‘subsidiarity’ principle even though the people could not hold
them accountable. It is also to be noted that so important was this traditional
local governance system that the British coloniser upon their arrival recognised
19
and adopted the system to rule the people. The coming of the British lead to
the modification of the existing traditional local governance system into what
later came to be known as the indirect rule which culminated in the establishment of the native authority.
3.1.1 Indirect Rule by British Colonial Authorities (BCA)
The native authority marks the premier form of organised and official institution of local government in Africa, which was a crucial feature of the indirect
rule, a system through which the British imperial powers exercised their authority (Ayee, 2008). This native authority just like its predecessor shared the
same features such as power being centred on chiefs and some units of local
royalty, and the fact that it was undemocratic. The point of departure of the
earlier (the traditional LG) and the Native authority was firstly, that while the
TLG was purported to be representing the local people, the NAs were representatives of the British colonial authorities. Secondly, in the TLG chiefs or
rulers were the ‘Alfa & Omega’ in their area of jurisdiction with absolute powers, however under NAs, the rulers were controlled and accountable to BCA
rather than the local people. The major task of the chiefs under the NA was to
help the British colonial government to administer law and order with limited
involvement in local administration. (K. Ahwoi, 2010:9).
The BCAs after taken control of the country developed a LG system
along two parallel lines (ibid). A series of Municipal Council Ordinances
(MCO) regulated local government in the major municipalities including; Cape
Coast, Accra, Secondi-Takoradi and Kumasi. Equally a series of Native Jurisdiction Ordinances (NJO) were enacted to control the remaining LGs
throughout the country. The state of LG though went through some reforms
(during first, second and third republics), never received much attention until
the PNDC introduced and prioritised decentralization & LG bringing significant changes.
3.2 Decentralisation and LG under PNDC and the Fourth
Republic: 1982 to date.
This subsection discusses the state and framework of LG in Ghana beginning
from 1982 to present. I lump the PNDC and the FR together because the former served as the foundation and preparation phase upon which the latter was
built. Also, I added decentralization to the heading because it was during this
period that the concept decentralisation was widely articulated and popularised
in Ghana.
3.2.1 Decentralization & LG under PNDC: 1981- 1992
The PNDC came to power with a political slogan of giving ‘Power to the People’. This marked the transformation of the slogan into the administrative concept of Decentralization. Indeed in March 1982, the DCs which exited in the
third republic were dissolved “on the basis of their inability to deliver on the
revolutionary aspirations of the time” (K. Awhoi, 2010:35). Instead an Interim
20
Management Committees were set up to replace the DCs. This was carried out
through the LG (Interim Administration) Law 1982.
In 1983, the PNDC government formally embarked on the translation of
its rhetoric of giving back ‘Power to the People’ into a concrete policy through
its first ‘Policy Guidelines’. Contained in this document was the policy of decentralisation with a well elaborated system of LG. On the structure, a four-tier
system of LG was favoured made up of Regional, District, Area and
Town/village Councils. The DC was to be the basic unit of LG with the powers to make byelaws, levy taxes and rates and be responsible for development
policy planning and implementation. The DCs were to be an all elected bodies
premised on universal adult suffrage with staff of the Councils serving as exofficio members on the Councils. This operated until 1988 when the regime
enacted the Local Government Law, 207, 1988, setting the legal framework for
decentralisation under the PNDC, where a three-tier LG system was created
with DA as the nerve centre of the system. This anchored the LG until the
Fourth Republic came to force in 1992.
3.2.2 Decentralisation and LG under the Fourth Republic
The FR began in 1992 when the country in a referendum voted to return the
nation onto a Constitutional path after 11 years of military rule. Like the other
republics before, this also came with a Constitution. The decentralization and
LG, started under the PNDC regime was adopted into the Constitution. The
legal framework for decentralisation and LG is set out in chapter 20 of the
1992 Constitution; specifically from Article 240-256. The Constitution prescribes that “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which, shall as far as practicable, be decentralised” (Article 204). The
composition, power and duties of the MMDAs are enshrined in the LGA of
1993. The major aim of Ghana’s decentralisation policy is to devolve power to
the governance structures closer to the people (CoG 1992). The coming section discussed the structure of the LG system.
3.3 The Structure of Ghana’s LG System
Ghana is a unitary state headed by a president with a cabinet and an executive.
(CoG, 1992) It is divided into 10 administrative regions.10 The structure of the
LG system under ACT 462 is made up of a Regional Coordinating Council
(RCC) and a Four-tier Metropolitan and three-tier Municipal/District Assembly. (LGA, ACT 462) For a detailed Administrative structure see table 3.1 below.
Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, Volta and Western
10
21
Table 3.1: Administrative Structure of Local Government in Ghana
Level of Government
National
Political Authority
Role and Linkages
Presidency, Cabinet,
Ministerial institutions and National
Development Planning
Commission
(NDPC)
Regional
Regional Coordinating Council
District
Metropolitan, Municipal and District
Assembly
National
sector
policy formulation,
programming and
budgeting, setting
standards and monitoring ; sectoral
evaluation of national projects
Harmonization and
coordination and
monitoring of national level policies
and local level policies.
Local level policy
formulation
Town
Unit
Management
Institution
Civil Service Operations including the Ministry
of Local Government and Rural Development
(MLRD)
Local Government
Service
operating in Departments of the
RCCs
Local Government
Service
operating in Departments of the
Urban,
Zon- Day to day admin- Local Governal,Town/Area
istrative and man- ment Service
Council
agement services
Unit Committee
Mobilisation
for Secretary
(LI
participation in im- 1589.29i)
plementation and
enforcement
Source: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. Decentralization in Ghana
Implementation Status and Proposed Future Directions, Accra: 2002.(OffeiAboagye)
3.3.1 The Regional Coordinating Council
The RCC is the at the apex of the LG structure of Ghana and composed of the
Regional Minister (as chairperson) and his/her Deputy, the Presiding member
and the DCE of each DA in a region, two Chiefs from the Regional House of
Chiefs and the regional heads of departments of the RCC with voting rights. In
sum there are 10 RCCs, i.e. one for each region (LGA, ACT 462)
3.3.2 The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
The Districts are the pivot and kingpin of the LG system in Ghana, which are
located below the RCC and variously called MMDAs. It is designated as the
highest political authority at the local level, with deliberative, legislative and
executive powers (Article 214 (3) of the 1992 Constitution). For purposes of
decision making the MMDAs composed of 70% elective councillors drawn
from each electoral area within the district, the members of parliament for
constituencies that fall within the district, the DCE appointment by the President and 30% nominated persons with in the district. In fact currently Ghana
22
has 202 MMDAs made up of 6 MAs, 48 MUAs and 148 DAs. (ILGS) The categorisations into Metropolitan, Municipal and District depends on the population size of an area. See table 3.2 below for the categorisation and list of MAs
MUAs and DAs in Ghana (LGA [ACT 462])
Table 3.2: Categorization of Assemblies of Ghana
Type
Population Size
Metropolitan Assembly, the highest unit 250,000 and above
Municipal Assembly, Next lower unit
95,000 and above
District Assembly, Local Council, lower
75,000 and above
units
Source: Researcher’s own construction
3.3.3 The Sub-Metropolitan DAs
The Sub-Metropolitan District Council (SMDC) is directly under the MA. The
SMDC is created for settlement above 100,000 people. Membership comprised
of not less than twenty-five and not more than thirty members. This is made
up of all elected AMs of the Assembly in the SMD and as well as persons resident in the sub-metro. This emanated as a result of complex and peculiar socio-economic, urbanisation and management problems that confronts the Metropolises. The total number of SDMCs are over 30 but started with only 13
(LGA [ACT 462]).
3.4.4 Urban Councils (UC)
Like the SMDC, the UC is created for settlement with population over 15000,
and consists of not less than twenty-five and not more than thirty members.
The membership of UC is composed of not more than 8 persons elected from
among members of the relevant district assemblies, not more than 12 representatives from the unit committees in the area of authority of the UC and not
more than 10 persons ordinarily resident in the urban area.
3.3.5 Zonal Councils
The ZC is below the MUAs and consist of not less than fifteen persons and
not more than twenty members made up of not more than 5 persons elected
from among the members of the relevant MUA, not more than 10 representatives from the unit committee and not more than 5 persons ordinarily resident
in the zone. (LGA [ACT 462], section 10[1])
3.3.6 Town/Area Councils
The TACs are rightly below MAs or DAs only and the composition is, not less
than fifteen persons and not more than twenty members made up of not more
than 5 persons elected from among the members of the relevant MUA, not
more than 10 representatives from the unit committee and not more than 5
persons ordinarily resident in the zone. (ibid, section 17[1])
23
3.3.7 The Unit Committees
The UCOs are at the bottom of the system and are found under the various
MMDAs. It consist of not more than fifteen members made up of ten elected
members ordinarily resident in the unit and not more than 5 other persons resident in the unit and nominated by the DCE acting on behalf of the president
(ibid, section 24[1]).
Figure 3.1: Local Government Structure of Ghana
Regional Coordinating Council (10)
Metropolitan
Assembly (6)
Municipal
Assembly (48)
District
Assembly (148)
Sub-Metropolitan District
Assembly (Over 30)
Town/Area
Councils (58)
Zonal
Councils (108)
Urban/Town/Area
Councils (34/250/826)
Unit Committees
(16000)
Source: Adopted from Training Manuel prepared by the Institute of Local Government Studies.
3.5 Profiles of AMA &KMA
In an attempt to understand the local governance pretty well using this study, I
present the profiles of the two metropolises which this paper uses as case
study. This section discusses the following; historical background of the two
metros, demographic features, and other salient characteristics of the two MAs.
Also to be highlighted is the level of development in the metros. See below a
map of Ghana showing the case study.
24
Map 3.1: Map of Ghana
A map of Ghana depicting Accra and Kumasi Metropolitan Assemblies
25
3.5.0 Profile of Accra Metropolitan Assembly
3.5.1 Brief History of AMA
The Accra Metropolitan is located at the heart of Ghana’s national capital
where the seat of government is located As a coastal town, its outlets and inlets
cover sea, air and land and hence links to the outside world and the other parts
of the country are been created. AMA has a total land side of 200 square kilometres. (A.M.A. Medium Term Development Plan, 2006-2009)
Historically, the first attempt to set up a town council dates back to 1859
under an Ordinance, which was repealed in January 1861. In 1898, however,
the Accra Town Council was formally established under the Town Council
Ordinance of 1894. The first meeting of the Council was held on 14th February of the same year. In 1943, the Accra Council was established under the Accra Town Council Ordinance of the same year.
In 1944, a new Constitution came into being after the Accra Town Council had existed for 46 years with an elected membership of seven – five appointed by the Government and two by the Ga Native Authority. The Constitution was again revised in September, 1953, thus increasing the membership
from 14 – 31, and establishing the Accra Municipal Council; 27 representatives
for the Wards and four representing the Traditional Authority. After Ghana
had attained Independence, an amendment to the 1953 constitution removed
traditional representation completely. The Council thus became a wholly representative institution based on free and free election (ibid).
The Accra City Council was the first of the 58 District Councils to be integrated under the New Local Government System to promote efficiency in
the administrative machinery of the Council and to meet the ever-pressing demand for amenities and essential services by the rate payers. On 29th June
1961, Accra was declared a City and the Council thus became the Accra City
Council. The Accra City Council was dissolved in August 1964 and the Greater
Accra Assembly was created. It is the first to be integrated into the new local
government
system.
(http://www.ghanadistricts.com/districts/?r=1&_=3&sa=2995. Viewed on
10/10/2010)
3.5.2 Institutional and Administrative Structure of AMA
The AMA constitutes a body corporate and the highest political authority in
the metropolis. It guides, directs and oversees all other administrative authority in the city. It is divided into 11 administrative Sub-Metro Council Areas11.
The Assembly itself is made up of 129 members with 87 of them elected and
42 appointed by the president. A Metro Chief Executive who is the Mayor of
Accra heads AMA. The functions of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly are out11
11 sub-metros were created but 6 Six are operational. They are Ablekuma, Ashiedu Keteke, Kpeshie, Okaikwei, Osu-Klottey
26
lined in the Legislative Instrument (L.I. 1500) which established the AMA.
These functions are summarized as follows: Provision of a sound sanitary and
healthy environment; Provision of educational infrastructure for first and second cycle schools; Provision of markets and lorry parks within the Metropolis;
The planning and development control of all infrastructure within Accra; Activities bordering on the maintenance of peace and security within the Metropolis and provision of public safety and comfort.(website, AMA)
It also composed of the Executive Committee and fourteen SubCommittees through which the councillors function. In terms of administrative
work, the assembly has a Metropolitan Coordinating Director who heads the
administrative unit in the metropolis. The secretariat’s function is to implement
the resolutions and policies of the Assembly, coordinating sector development
programmes and management of assembly resource. The institutional structure
of AMA secretariat is depicted in the figure 3 below.
3.5.3 The People and Population
The indigenous people of Accra are the Ga people, however because Accra is
the capital it has received all sorts people that the Natives are confined to few
areas with the rest been occupied by migrants. In terms of population trends,
Accra which is Ghana’s capital since 1877 is today one of the most populated
with a population of about 1,695,136 million people (2000 National Population
Census) and fast growing Metropolis in Africa with an annual growth rate of
3.36%. The rapid industrialisation and expansion in the manufacturing and
commercial sectors in some major areas within the metropolis has contributed
to high immigration to Accra. Also the infrastructure already built in AMA will
for a long time make it a more attractive place for unemployed rural people as
well as public servants, national and international investors (website, AMA). As
regards political leanings, the AMA favours the current government party
(NDC).
3.6.0 Profile of Kumasi Metropolis
3.6.1 Historical Overview of KMA
The city of Kumasi was founded in the 1680’s by King Osei Tutu I to serve as
the capital of the Asante State (Fynn, 1971). Given its strategic location and
political dominance, Kumasi as a matter of course, developed into a major
commercial centre with all major trade routes converging on it (Dickson 1969).
However, it came under the influence of the British rule in 1890 (Boahen
1965). With time the city began to expand and grow thereby making it second
only to Accra in terms of land area, population size, social life and economic
activity. Its strategic location has also endowed it with the status of the principal transport terminal and has assured its pivotal role in the vast and profitable
distribution of goods in the country and beyond (ghanadistricts.com).
27
3.6.2 Geography
Kumasi is located in the transitional forest zone and is about 270km north of
the national capital, Accra. It has a land size of about 254 square kilometres.
The unique centrality of the city as a traversing point from all parts of the
country makes it a special place for many to migrate to. The metropolitan area
shares boundaries with Kwabre East District to the north, Atwima District to
the west, Ejisu-Juaben Municipal to the east and Bosomtwe to the south. It’s
beautiful layout and greenery has accorded it the accolade of being the “Garden City of West Africa” (website KMA).
3.6.3 Institutional and Administrative Structure of KMA
Like AMA, the KMA constitutes the highest political authority in the metropolis. It plans, directs and supervises all other administrative authority in the
city. It is made up of ten administrative Sub-Metro Council Areas12. The Assembly itself is made up of 144 members with 102 of them elected and 42 appointed by the president. A Metro Chief Executive who is the Mayor of Kumasi heads KMA. See figure 3 below for the administrative structure (ibid).
3.6.4 The people and Population
KMA is at the hub of the Ashanti kingdom with the seat of their paramount
chief located in the metropolis. The Native language is Twi, which is widely
spoken in the metropolis. The Kumasi metropolis is the most populous district
in the Ashanti Region next only to Accra. During the 2000 Population Census
it recorded a figure of 1,170,270. Kumasi has attracted such a large population
partly because it is the regional capital, and also the most commercialised centre in the region. Ashanti Region is currently the second most urbanised in the
country, after Greater Accra (87.7%). In terms of political leanings, the KMA
is the stronghold of the current leading opposition party (NPP) in the country.
12
10 sub-metros were created but 4 are operational, namely: Subin, Manhyia, Bantama and Asokwa.
28
Figure 3.2: Institutional and Administrative framework of AMA & KMA
General Assembly (Councillors)
Metro Chief Executive
Executive Committee
Sub-Committees (14)
Metro Co-ordinating Director
Internal Audit
Central
Administration
Sub
Metros
Finance
Waste
Management
Health
Food
&
Agric
Town &
Country
Planning
Source: adopted from AMA documents. The institutional structure is a generic structure in all the District
Assemblies in Ghana that is, they are similar in all, but numbers of dept varies and. this depends on the
size of the district).
3.7 Conclusion
The chapter discussed the beginnings local governance in Ghana from the precolonial, through colonial/post colonial to its present stage. Also it presented
the framework and structures of the Ghana’s LG system from the 1992 to
date. The profiles of the AMA and KMA have been discussed. The next chapter presents the empirical findings and addresses the research questions of this
paper.
29
Education
Youth &
Sport
Chapter 4
Research Findings of the Influence of Non Elected Councillors in AMA &
KMA of Ghana
4.0 Introduction
Using empirical findings from the field this chapter analyse examine and interpret the findings in the light of the research questions this study aims to address.
The chapter begins by analysing the processes and procedures involved in
the filling of the presidential quota bringing out the actors who recommend
and those recommended for the appointments. Secondly the issue of representation- who and in whose interest- are the NECs serving, is explored taking
into consideration their impact on the autonomy and independence of the LG.
Furthermore the issue of politics and LG of Ghana is examined. Included also
in this section is laying out the kind of relationship and interactions between
the appointed and elected councillors within the LG of Ghana and revealing
whether the GAs are accountable. Lastly, the chapter slates the views of councillors about the possible introduction of genders quotas in Ghana in view of
the reality that elections do not favour women and hence the decline in the
number of women at the local level.
4.1 Process in the Picking of Non Elected DA Councillor
This section answers the research question one of the study which is what are
the processes in the nomination of the non elected assembly members and
who fills the presidential quota and how?. It attempts to ascertain empirically
whether or not the processes as laid down in the constitution is put into practice or that a convention has been evolved in the nomination and picking of
the NECs to the DAs of Ghana. It is also to find out the actors behind these
appointments and the process involved in the nomination process. According
to article 242, paragraph (d) of the 1992 Constitution thirty percent (30%) of
the member of the DAs shall be appointed by the president in consultation
with the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district.
Evidence gathered from the field (i.e. 25/29 interviewees including the
one staff each of two think tanks [CDD & ILGS]) indicates that the laid down
procedure is not adhered to in the process of appointing NECs. The process
has been circumvented. It is argued that the appointed system was meant to
get persons with expertise and useful experience to contribute to the development of the localities. This is not the case as far as the current system is concerned. The quota is used by the government to appoint sympathiser and people associated with or share the ideology of their political party.
“The quota to the president is a preserve for party members and ‘foot soldiers’ majority
of whom cannot make any meaningful contribution as far as the development of the locality is
concern. They don’t even know the system let alone to understand it. In our monitoring of the
approval process of the MMDCs we were shocked to see that majority of the government ap30
pointee could not write their names and others had to do it for them” (Interview with a
staff of TT ‘A’ July 15, 2011).
The question that is not farfetched is whether or not there are no competent people (i.e. people with know-how) in the localities? Or is it a purposive
act by the government to put party people who can easily be manipulated. Also
as regards the forces behind the appointments, this research found that the
president has delegated the task of appointing NECs to the Regional ministers
who also passed it on to their party structures. The consultation as espoused by
the constitution is not adhered to in the nomination process. No interest
groups are consulted. Tellingly, a (NEC 001, AMA) who was asked to give an
account of the procedures involved in the nomination process had this to say:
“In fact my brother let me tell you the constitutional arrangement is in theory; in reality
what happen is that the GA traditional authority is requested to submit five people. Apart
from that the rest are nominated by ward/branch party executives”.
This was concurred by an elected AM at the KMA (006) “to the best of my
knowledge, normally in the nomination of the NECs, Otumfour (paramount chief of Ashantes) is give a number of people to submit, the DCE also bring some people, and the rest are
handpicked by constituency party people”.
Following from the above, the actors in the nomination process includes;
Chiefs, MMDCEs and political party executives and stalwarts. On the process
of nomination, no standardised laid down procedure is adopted as evident
from the two MAs.
“ I was there and I received a call from my party chairman asking me whether I can fit
do that assembly work and I say yes, and that was how I got my appointment ”13 recounted by an NEC (002, KMA).
Following the above it shows that NECs are not subjected to any rigorous
scrutiny, and this could explain to a large extent why the purpose for which the
quota was instituted is defeated. Although majority of NECs are just people to
add up to the numbers, it is worth mentioning that some of them are people of
high repute with expertise and valuable experience that when brought to bear
on the work of the DAs would yield significant impacts. Virtually the process
of nominating appointees was the same in both AMA and KMA. Interestingly,
it came out that amongst the crop of appointees at the AMA are lots of technocrats and experienced persons than the KMA. Apparently this is not something to wander about because AMA is at the hub of the National capitalAccra- and could probably be the reason why it had more experienced people.
In addition my own document review showed that majority (29/42) of the appointees at the AMA are persons who had been at the DAs before either as
elected councillors or NECs. This was sharply the antithetic of KMA where
15/42 had been district AMs before their current appointment.
What also manifested strongly through my observation at the two assemblies which is worth highlighting is that, whilst majority of the GAs at AMA
This person had low educational background so he was speaking ‘pidgin English’.
13
31
are indigenes of the place, the situation was different at the KMA. Large chunk
of the NECs at KMA are not natives. They are settler people. A basic exposition to this could be that it is so because it is the world bank14 of NPP, currently the lead opposition party in Ghana.
Ghana’s LG government is premised on non partisan system (CoG, 1992)
where individuals has to seek membership to the DAs on individual basis,
however the process adopted by the government to nominate the NECs as
shown by this research (where the political party nominates the NECs) to a
large extent brings in partisanship which defeats the non partisanship logic.
Advocates of non-partisanship in local elections posit that LG pertains to
‘bread and butter’ issues, on which there should be no division along party
lines (Olowu, 2003). The inclusion of parties at the local level risks allowing
policy-making to become contaminated by patronage and clientelism instead of
focusing on long term benefits (Packel, 2008). The evidence of the nomination
process reveal here fits well with Heller (2001) findings in South Africa where
he cites the ANC party control over local nomination as a cause and a symptom of a weak LG. Also Packel (2008) noted that both de jure and de facto national party control over nominations for local councils appear to have negative impacts for local democracy.
In sum the nomination process has been relegated to the political party
and this skews the nominations in favour of loyal political party members within the metropolis.
4.2 Accountability in Ghana’s Local Government
This part addresses the second research question; who are nominated or appointed members accountable to? It is noted that, amongst the cardinal pillars
of democratic decentralization is accountability (Ribot 2007). Theoretically,
accountability is underscored in LG because proponents believed that the ordinary people would be able to demand feedback and explanations from decision makers who are in charge of their localities in view of the proximity of
local councillors instead of the CG which is sitting miles away from the local
people and more so occupied with national issues at the expense of local matters (ibid).
Olowu & Wunsch (2004:) discerned that though African governments
have made frantic efforts to put in place accountability mechanisms, the arrangements have not always work because the supporting tools (such as information) that would aid in strengthening accountability are lacking.
In Ghana accountability (be it downward or upward) is weak. At the local
level only elected councillors are subjected to some sort of accountability via
elections. The NECs who are nominated by the CG to participate in the policy
formulation and decision making at the local level are not accountable to the
local people. Empirical evidence garnered by the research reveals that NECs
do not account even though mechanisms to promote accountability is laid
14
A party strong hold in Ghana is called the World Bank of a political party
32
down in the constitution of Ghana. This is the potential to revoke the mandate
or appointment of a DA member/councillor. To remove an appointed or
nominated councillor section 9 (6) of Act 462 stipulates that the president may
revoke the appointment of NEC either in the exercise of his discretion, or upon the recommendations of third-fourths of the members of the DA, or upon
a complaint made by a registered voter in the district on stated and proven
grounds. But in reality, no local citizen has been able to initiate any action to
remove an erring councillor (Ayee cited in Olowu & Wunsch, 2004:145) due to
the cumbersome procedure involve, even though there were substantial evidence that some nominated DA members were not living up to expectation
(ibid).
This was ascertained when a question of accountability was asked by
researcher to the NECs, appointing authorities as well as some governance institutions.
“What do we have to account for and to whom, we all fought for the party to come
to power. We behave according to the dictates of our government, they tell us what do”.
(NEC 007, AMA)
Reiterating this, a TT ‘B’ alluded that “the NECs do not account because the appointments are use to reward party people i.e. ‘Jobs for the Boys”.
He added that accountability measures are not instituted for the NECs
and that even if they are, they do not function.
The issue of accountability has been widely acknowledged as crucial to
successful democratic local Governance (Crawford 2009). Agrawal and Ribot
(1999, 478) clearly state that ‘if powers are decentralized to actors who are not
accountable to their constituents, or who are accountable only to themselves or
to superior authorities within the structure of government, then decentralization is not likely to accomplish its stated aims. This means Ghana’s decentralization and LG is failing to achieve its objectives (of making democracy a reality
[COG 19992]) in view of the fact that some power and authority has been devolved to actors (NECs) who are not downwardly accountable to the local
people.
This also confirms Olowu et al. (2004, 71) observation that African countries have not made much progress in terms of accountability. Accountability
most of the time is limited to the voice mechanism (elections) and this is in the
case of elected representatives. They added that in spite of the fact that the
voice mechanism (election) is at its infancy, it is fraught with elite capture and
electoral patronage weakening its potential as a mechanism of Accountability.
In addition scholars have noted that local accountability systems are build
around three actors-citizens, political leaders and councillors- of which the effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the influence exerted by first two
actors. (Yilmaz et al. 2008). Thus in relation to Ghana, accountability in the
case of non-elected councillors would succeed on the assertiveness of both citizens and political leaders. However citizens are ruled out in terms of demanding accountability from NECs for the reason that they lack the necessary information that would empower them to hold the appointed councillors to task.
This means that the onus lies on the CG who appointed these people to hold
them to account, however they do not because they use the nominations for
political patronage (Packel, 2008).
33
Accountability which is answerability and enforceability is at the core of
the relationship between councillors and the local people.(Schedler, 1999)
While Answerability is the obligation of a councillor to inform the people
about his/her conduct, enforceability is where the people have the power to
interrogate, reward or punish the councillor (ibid). These principles (answerability and enforceability) do not apply in the case of NECs and local people
because there is no system of accountability to connect the two actors.
4.3 Appointed Councillors and Representation in Ghana’s
DAs
Local councillors are persons who are responsible for taking decisions and policy planning at the local level. In Ghana these people are either elected directly
by the local people or appointed by the president (CoG, 1992). For the elected
councillors it is palpable that they are representing the interest and views of
their constituencies at the assembly. But in the case of the non elected councillors, it is a puzzle as to whom and in whose interest they are participating in
the DAs even though some scholars have advanced some reasons; Firstly that
although the appointed persons are supposed to bring expertise, (professional
and technical), to bear on the DAs, they are predictably loyal to the CG and to
ensure the presence of the central government is felt in the DA forum and
secondly that they are representing minority groups in the DAs (Ofei-Aboagye,
2000; Awortwi, 2010).
This research found out that the NCEs to a large extent are representing
the CG. In all their workings they pulled in favour of the CG. Most of the GAs
I interviewed admitted that they were there to pursue the interest of the government to ensure that the policies of the government are push through.
A nominated councillor (010, AMA) told the researcher that “the purpose for
which I am at the DA is to help the government get its policies through at the local level, in
other words to protect my government because many a time people we believe to be our people
(some elected DA) get to the assembly and fail to fight for the government policies. So I as a
government appointee, my sole aim is to protect the government and ensure the agenda of the
government is achieved”.
“I am here to protect the government interest; any policy, project or programme brought
by the MCE to be implemented at the assembly whether due diligence has been done on it or
not I will support it.” (NEC 010, AMA).
These evidence defeats the views that the appointments are to get minorities or representation of special interest (Mawhood, 1983:12) or as it were introduce some balancing mechanism into the operations of the DAs (OfeiAboagye, 2000). Also clearly the nominated DA members are not acting in the
best interest of the local people as scholars of democratic decentralization postulates (Olowu et al, 2004). Ayee (2004) noted that although some NECs have
lived up to their stature as providing expertise and technical knowledge to the
DAs, some also “have successfully confounded the public’s views of them as
government stooges”.(Ayee in Olowu et al, 2004:143).
In addition using the definition of representation adopted in this research
i.e. where leaders (in this case councillors) are both responsive and accountable
to the local people (Ribot, 2007), the non elected councillors do not leave up to
34
expectation. The findings revealed that the NECs are not responsive to the
needs of the local people who it is presume would be made better off by the
devolution of power and authority from the CG to the local level (ibid)
Also in the literature of local electoral systems non partisan posture of LG
is defended by the argument that LG matters are issues of “bread-and-butter”
on which partisan lines (which can entrench divisions) should be avoided.
Moreover, it is thought that having a partisan LG could lead to situations
where central governments could use its wide powers to settle political scores
or victimise councils controlled by opposing parties (Olowu & Wunsch 2004,
68-70). In Ghana two reasons for has been advanced by the PNDC government and the Committee of Experts that drafted the 1992 constitution for excluding partisan politics at the local level. First it argued that in the past, elected
governments in Ghana cynically exerted influence on LG bodies to win political advantage and secondly that non partisanship at the local level would facilitates the mobilization of the people which is more conducive to consensus
formation, which is for development at the grassroots (Republic of Ghana,
1991; also see Ayee in Olowu et al, 2004).
However the inclusion of NECs in the DAs has crept in partisan politics
into Ghana’s DAs unofficially. Not unsurprisingly I found that serious partisanship is going on in the two MAs. Almost all I interacted with alluded to partisanship being played at the DAs. As mentioned by a (NEC 008, AMA):
“We can’t separate politics from our work here, in any development project decision, we
could have a non partisan discussion but the initiation and outcome of the decision is partisan
because governments bring and site projects that would boost its ‘political capital’ to better its
chances of retaining power.
“They say its non partisan, but my brother I will tell you that is a lie; it is just on paper, it is purely partisan. If you are right, you know your people and if you are left too, you
also know your members”. Opined by NEC (001, KMA)
Added by another elected councillor (EC 009, KMA); “secret party meetings
are going on in this assembly. What even annoys me is that most of the appointees who are
chairpersons of committees intentionally do not calls for meetings because they do not want to
put financial burden on their government for the reason that the less meetings we have the less
money they would expensed on sitting allowances but this allowance cannot fuel my car to run
for two days. Moreover we are not paid salaries. When the assembly system began it was not
like this, I wish the DA should be declared partisan because people are concern with their
parties instead of us trying to better the lives of the local people on whose mandate we are
here”.
Partisanship pervades Ghana’s DAs to the extent that elected councillors
align and identify themselves to the two leading political parties15 in Ghana in
order to win favours from the government. For instance, a councillor told me
that she together with some councillors, are minority in the assembly because
their party is not in power. Another elected councillor (007, AMA) affirmed
the earlier councillor assertion saying:
15
The National Democratic party (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP)
35
“We are always sidelined and excluded from getting vital information and issues because we are seen as belonging to an opposition party even though we are elected by the people
on non partisan basis”.
In the words of Ayee (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004:143) the inclusion of the
nominated councillors in the DAs is Political: “it is meant to give the DAs
some ‘political direction’ which serves as central government watchdogs”. This
resonates with an exposition give by a nominated DA member who claimed
that they are in the assembly to be ‘watchdogs’ for the government. The appointee says:
“We appointees, our duty is to ensure that government projects and policies in our constituencies are implemented smoothly. When a project is coming to the area where I reside, my
task would be to monitor the project and the elected member to ensure the project is executed
in order to boost the chances of my government.”
This lent credence to the politics of decentralization (Conyers 1983; Ayee,
2004: 143) which sees decentralization policies being use to further the broader
political interest and or strategies of those in power. Conyers discerns that politics of decentralisation until recently was seldom discussed in the decentralisation literature.
In another stretch, in pointing out the dangers of decentralization Bergh
(2004:780) notes that even though devolution of power, authority and responsibility to LGs are often framed as purely technical issues, that democratic decentralization is “inherently a political process.” This manifest strongly in the
decentralization reform of Ghana as CGs often used the LG to their advantage
(Ayee 2008, Awortwi, 2010). For instance in a recent NDC party delegates
congress to elect their presidential candidate for the 2012 general elections, the
general secretary of the party categorically mentioned that 70% of the DA
councillors across the nation are their members and for that matter they have a
strong grounding at the local level (Daily Guide, 13 July, 2011).
4.3.1 Impact of NEC on the Authority and Autonomy of DAs
Aside the above, the transfer of powers, responsibilities and resources from the
CG to the LG is meant to make local government independent in the tasks and
responsibilities shifted to it by the CG. In this direction Ghana the DAs have
been designated as the highest decision making bodies at the local level responsible for the planning, and development of the district. As a result of this
the DAs have been given eighty –six functions that empower them to provide
deconcentrated, delegated and devolved local public services (Olowu & wunsch, 2004:129) Ayee cited in Olowu et al (2004) underscores that some progress has been made towards devolution of authority to the DAs in Ghana
nonetheless, he added that the DAs are constraint in exercising this authority.
One key factor hampering this autonomy is the presence of the NECs in the
DAs. These crops of DA members advocate and push issues in favour of the
central government. When it comes to making decisions almost all nominated
members submissions and choices are leaned towards the government’s option.
“None of the nominated DA members have voted against an issue or policy initiated by
the MCE (of course who is the known representative of the CG) for my stay at the assembly
here” said by a councillor (EC 004, KMA).
36
The power and authority transferred to the DAs is meant to empower DA
members to initiate project, policies and programmes since they are closer to
the localities and to enforce the ‘bottom-up’ precept of decision making advocated by LG experts (Olowu et al, 2004). Many scholars on decentralization
argue that the initiation and generation of policies from below would yield effective and efficient solutions to address local problems (K. Ahwoi, 2010:115;
Olowu et al, 2004).
However, in reality majority of the DA members (especially the elected)
agreed that all policies, programmes and projects are initiated from the CG.
The local legislature has been reduce to ‘rubber stamp’ and treated like appendage of the CG. The characteristic of local control and the principle of
‘subsidiarity’ 16 is trample upon by the stronger presence and control by the
centre, which according to Mawhood is unacceptable to classical LG (1983:23).
Recounted by an elected councillor (005, AMA):
“It is a pity that every project or policy is from the above, instead of we (the DA members) proposing policies and projects based on our knowledge of our communities, the CG is
rather doing it. Our duty is merely to beg or criticize what the CG presents”.
Many of the councillors tacitly agreed that the power that has been ceded
to them to a large extent is usurped by the central government.
Indeed Ayee notes that one cannot but to acknowledge and admit the
threat by the appointed members to the autonomy of the DA. To tell the power wielded by the appointees, he states that in some DAs, decisions taken in
the absence of some appointed members were revisited and sometimes reversed when they later showed up at meetings (Ayee 1994, 1996, and 2004).
Summarily the autonomy of decision making by local representatives is seriously undermined and virtually powers granted to local authorities has been
recycled back to the CG which if steps are not taken would see the manifestation of centralisation which failed the developing world in the post colonial
period.
4.4 What are the Relations between Appointed and Elected
Councillors?
The objective of this section is to address the above question. Ghana’s DAs
for the purposes of planning and making decision have councillors. These
councillors composed of elected members who have their mandate from the
people and for that matter represent them at the assembly and NECs who on
the other hand ascertain their mandate to the DA by the appointment from the
president. Unlike the ECs, the NECs do not have constituents to represent
and as such might not be at the same wave length in terms of making certain
decisions.
The principle that public decisions should be made at a level of government closest
to citizens as possible
16
37
However it is to be noted that effective functioning of the assembly would
depend on the ability of these two groups to coalesce when it comes to policy
formulations and decision making, consequently, the interest to find out how
these groups interacts in the operations of the District Assemblies. Have the
two group pitched entrench camps against each other or there is some sort of
lobbying and cajoling each other in an attempt to win majority on policy decision.
Evidence gathered from the two assemblies upon which this study was
conducted points to some mixture of smooth relations sometimes and strain
relations at other times. All councillors interviewed (25) both the elected and
nominated alluded that the relation between the elected members and appointed members is easy going and that they see themselves as councillors. They do
not have as it were tagged ‘names’. As one of the councillors (NEC 009, AMA)
succinctly put it:
“In this house we do not have appointed or elected, we see one another as councillors, we
address one another as honourable member”.
Relations between councillors are regulated and guided by rules base on
the realisation of how weak and defective institutional and operational rules
can make it difficult to reach decisions, leading to policy failure and weakened
local governance (Olowu et al. 2004):9), institutions has been design such that
there are no distinctions between councillors. Moreover, coordination issues
among councillors can also impede activities of local councils, committees and
sub-committees have been instituted through which councillors’ carry out their
activities. Both appointed and elected councillors work in standing committees
in the making of policies and taking decisions which is typical of bicameral legislatures where the two houses (lower and upper chamber join in the formation
of certain standing committees for purpose of smooth decision making.
“We the elected and the appointed work together in different committees and no groupings based on elected or appointed comes to fore.” Say a councillor (EC 01, AMA).
In addition, in terms of relations in making taking decisions, councillors
form coalitions in relation to the merits of the issue at stake. Voting on decisions operates on the principle of majority rule and for a bill to be approved by
the council it must receive majority support, with each councillor having only
one vote.
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that relations between elected and nominated is not always cosy, they sometimes go in opposite directions especially when
it is clear to the elected members that the CG is introducing a policy to gain or
boost its political capital. Also in terms of power relations, both elected councillors and NCEs have the same power and therefore have equal power in
making of policies. This is quite different from other jurisdictions where elected legislators have the final say in certain matter.
38
4.5 Women Empowerment and Promotion of Gender
Equality in Ghana’s LG
It order to assess and analyse the extent to which decision makers at the local
level are prepare to help advance and bring on board women, in view of the
low numbers of women at the local level, a question was posed as to whether
local councillors would support the reservation of some seats for women at the
local level since scholars argues that the local level is the closest and most accessible level of government to women, and for that matter steps could be taken to increase their numbers at that level (Ofei-Aboagye, 2000; Allah-Mensah
2004). To the dismay of the researcher majority (23/29) of the councillors were
not in favour of the creation of a quota system as it is in other jurisdiction such
as Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania ((IDEA, quota project, 2010). The following
responses were worth noting:
“Creating women quota at the DAs to me is a funny idea, we always talk as if women
are so fragile, so vulnerable, incapable and so weak. The earlier we discarded that notion the
better for we men” opined an elected councillor (EC 005, AMA)
For me I would never support such a thing (referring to women quota) if we empower
women we would be doomed17”. (EC 03, AMA).
He justified his assertion by saying that when you take a look at households where women are richer than their husbands’ peace vanish in those
households. Probing further the researcher draws his attention to the countries
which have instituted women/gender quota schemes yet those places are moving on well. “My brother I am speaking from experience” was all that he could add.
Upon further probing I found out he is the husband of one of the outspoken
woman in the Ghanaian political scene.
Aside these, what was even surprising was an elected woman councillor
who was not in support of the instituting a women quota system. She (EC 05,
KMA) said:
“Women would also have to struggle like the way we did to be here. When they (women) see you contesting and challenging men on political platforms they add in calling you
names. So I would not support reserving a quota for women”.
Although the opponents of the idea of reserving seats for women were
many, mostly men, others including some men stated it is a laudable idea and
would help the nation if implemented. All the women I interviewed both the
appointed and elected with the exception of one, supported the idea. An elderly male councillor (NEC 01, KMA) had this to say:
“My son it is a good idea if the presidential quota is given to women, for women to take
their rightful positions in society. Women are more than men in Ghana but when it comes to
making decisions for the society they are nowhere to be found. I tell you, women are responsible for the livelihood and survival of most homes in our localities. They are the breadwinners
of many homes.”
17
This word may appeared harsh but that was how the respondent said
39
Another councillor stated: “when a women is leading she does it with an open
heart.” She then made a comparison of committees in the assembly that are
headed by men and those by women and said that those which women are
chairpersons are doing better than those chaired by men”. (NEC 01, AMA).
In addition a staff each from the two research think tanks I interviewed also strongly agreed to the institution of the women quota at the LG level. From
their perspective the democracy of Ghana cannot be achieve with the relegation of those who constitute the majority18 in the country. For them space
should be created women for women starting from the Local level to the national level. This is particularly important given the arguments by some scholars that local level representation could serve as a training ground for the participation of women at DA level (Offie-Aboagye, 2000:3-4; Thomi et al,
2000:334).
Gender quota is advocated for the reason that it has helped in soaring the
numbers of women in legislative bodies of countries (Dahlerup, 2006). Also it
is stated that gender quota is flexible and thus can be instituted at any level
(National or local), however it effectiveness depend on the type of quota chosen (ibid). For instance in Ghana voluntary party quota is not yielding results
because it is not enforceable. Hence what is needed is the legal quota which
will be backed by a law.
In this regard it is presume that reserving the 30% presidential quota to
nominate women would go a long way to increase the women in the DAs of
Ghana. However the result above shows that the local councillors are not
ready to welcome the creation of reserve seats for women.
The observation of Ayee in the year 2000 which showed that men were
“overwhelmed” at the DAs is confirmed by this research. My own perusal of
documents of the two assemblies reveals that men by far outweigh women in
the two DAs. For example at AMA out of a total of 129 councillors women
are only 20. Like AMA, the situation was not different at KMA where women
are 20 out of 144. This calls for an affirmative action such as a purely appointment as discussed in this paper.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter discussed and answered the research questions presented in chapter one of this study. The next chapter which is the last chapter of this paper
recaps the major findings of this research.
51.3% according to the 2010 population and housing census. (accessed 15/10/11
on www.ghanaweb.com)
18
40
Chapter 5
tions
Conclusion and Policy Considera-
5.0 Introduction
The decentralization reforms as envisaged by Ghana’s constitution aims at empowering local people at the grassroot (as it is stated “give power to the people”) in order to evolve a robust local democracy and local governance. Insights from concepts employed in this study revealed that in order to evolve
good democratic local governance, a proper blend of downwardly accountable
councillors combine with gender equity, and effective representation is indispensable. This paper sets out to find out how the inclusion of NECs impact on
the local democracy and local governance in Ghana and consequently to test
the hypothesis that NECs are experts and technocrats with valuable experiences to contribute to the development at the local communities (Ofei-Aboagye
2000), 2000; Ayee 2008).
In this direction this chapter aims to synthesise the main findings of this
study and to underscore the main findings as examined in the preceding chapters.
5.1 Major Findings
5.1.1 NEC Nomination Process
This study shows that Ghana’s decentralization and LG though implemented
for over two decades now could not have a standardised and transparent process and criteria for the nomination of NECs. The nominations are left at the
mercy of party executive who determine who should be nominated (which
mostly is reserve for party members) and this has subsequently chipped in partisan politics at the LG level which the constitution of Ghana frowns upon.
5.1.2 Representation
As regards representation, this research points to the effect that NECs weights
are tilted in favour of the CG and for that matter act in the interest of the CG
government and this dilutes the autonomy of the DAs as their presence brings
into the assemblies the heavy presence of the CG. This has led scholars to state
that the transfer of power and authority to the DAs is but a little with an ulterior motive of unwillingness to relinquish power to the LGs (Ayee in Oluwu &
Wunsch, 2004:152, (Antwi-Boasiako ).
5.1.3 Accountability
Strongly connected to the above is the issue of accountability which is also a
crucial tenet of good democratic LG. This paper revealed that NECs are not
downwardly accountable which implies it impacts adversely on democratic local governance. Although the NECs plans and take decisions on the behalf of
the local people, the latter are disconnected from the former in that they do
not participate in the choosing of NECs and consequently cannot hold them
41
to account. Thus downward accountability which forms a major thrust of Local democracy and governance is sacrificed in favour of upward accountability.
5.1.4 Underrepresentation of Women
Not only the above, the paper also shows the state of women representation at
the LG level where scholars presumed women can be effectively represented
(Ofei Aboagye, 2000; Allah Mensah, 2004). The findings reveal that even
though women are underrepresented, local councillors are not in support of
the institutionalization of a special quota to get women into the DAs. (i.e. supporting that the 30% president nominations should be reserve purposively to
appoint only women).
5.1.5 Result of Hypothesis
Following the evidence ascertained from the study, that the NECs advocates
strongly for the CG, this paper rejects the hypothesis that non elected seats are
reserved to introduce experts and experience people into local decision-making
bodies. This is evident by NECs not accountable in any proper way and fact
that NECs advocates strongly for the CG at the local level.
5.2 Some Policy Directions
Decentralization and LG has become a major part of the general governance
system of Ghana which has come to stay. For that matter it is only prudent
that steps are taken to make it formidable. However, the above discussions
points to the effect that some adjustments need to be made in order to attain
good democratic local government which would make the local people the
kingpins of local development as envisaged by experts and advocates of decentralization and local governance.
Following from the above findings, which points to the effect that the
NEC seats are used by ruling governments to reward their party members;
secondly, that no effective system of accountability is instituted to make
PADCs downwardly accountable to the local people and the fact women representation at the DAs is below appreciable levels, the study offers the following policy recommendations:
5.2.1 Nature of Nominations
In view of the fact that nominations of NECs are used by CGs to advance
their political agendas, this paper advocates that the nominations should be
made permanent in order to guard against governments using the nominations
for political patronage. The tenure of office of the non-elected councillors
should be longer such that changes in government would not affect their appointments. For instance NECs, once appointed must be mandated to serve
until 70years. This would prevent governments from arbitrary dismissal NECs
and more importantly it would allow NECs to gain relevant experience.
42
5.2.2 Institute Effective Downward Accountable System for NECs
Secondly, Institute a uniform mechanism to make NECs to be downwardly
accountable to local people. For it is only when the local people can monitor,
audit, and hold local councillors accountable that democratic decentralization
would yield positive result.
5.2.3 Gender Quota
Apart from the above this research recommends the Institutionalization of Legal gender quotas at the local level in order to swell women numbers at the local legislatures, which must be based solely on nominations, since the voluntary
party quotas adopted by the leading political parties has not been applied to the
latter. This research advocates for legal gender quota based on nominations in
order that governments would be oblige to pursue it.
43
Appendices
Appendix A
Interview Guide used to Collect Primary
Data for this Paper
A1
Questionnaires for District Chief Executive
1. What is the nomination process for the non-elected assembly members?
2. Who nominates the appointee?
3. What are the criteria for appointment?
4. What qualities are considered in the appointment?
5. Are groups consulted in when appointment are being made as stated
in the constitution Yes/no?
6. If yes, who are these groups?
7. If not, why?
8. Are appointments done to get experts and/ or minority groups into
the assembly?
9. What kind of influence do they bring to the assembly?
10. Who do they represent as they do not have constituencies?
11. Are the appointees from your party?
12. Are the appointees accountable yes/no?
13. If yes, to whom and why?
14. If not why?
15. How is the relationship between the appointed and elected members
like?
16. Certain people are advocating that the quota should be reserved for
women, what is your take on that?
17. Would you support that the quota should be eliminated completely?
44
A2
Questions for Appointed Assembly Councillors
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
How long have you been in the assembly?
What is your occupation?
Who recommended you for this appointment?
What is your motivation for accepting this post?
Are you active in politics Yes/No?
If yes which Party?
Are you part of any of working committees of the assembly
Yes/NO?
8. Why the above answer?
9. Whose views do you represent in the assembly since you do not
have constituencies?
10. What influence do you bring to bear on the assembly?
11. Are you accountable? Yes/No
12. If yes to whom and how?
13. How is the relationship between you and the elected representatives?
14. How is your voting behaviour/pattern? Are you part of the majority/opposition and do you vote the same way as the rest of your group
or do you vote based on the issue?
A3
Questions for Elected Assembly Member
1. How long have you been in the Assembly?
2. What motivates you to be an assembly member?
3. What development have you sent to your constituency?
4. How do work you in the assembly?
5. How is the /your voting behaviour in the assembly?
6. What is the relationship between you and the appointed members?
7. Do you know who appoints the non elected assembly members Yes/No
8. If yes who?
9. On what basis are appointed assembly members selected?
10. What contribution do they bring to the Assembly?
11. What kind of policies do they normally support?
12. Are they always in support of government policies?
13. Are some of them experts in certain fields e.g. engineering?
14. Are they incumbent party members Yes/No?
15. If yes do they display their support for government policies explicitly/implicitly at the Assembly?
16. What is the relationship between you and the appointed members?
17. Some people are advocating that the quota should be legislated for
women, do u support that? If yes why?
18. Should the quota be taken out completely?
45
Appendix B
General Assembly and Committees
Meetings Observed
MA
AMA
Type of Meeting
General Assembly
Date
20-07-2011 and
25-07-2011
Venue
Old Parliament House, Accra
AMA
KMA
Finance Committee
Executive Committee
18-07-2011
28-0-07-2011
KMA
General Assembly
04-08-2011
AMA Assembly Hall
A Hall adjacent the
Mayor’s Office KMA
Prempeh Hall, Kumasi
Source: Researcher’s own construction
46
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