Design and Methodology in Communication Research
Special Topics: Ethnography
Ontologies, Epistemologies and the Ethics of Commonsense
Brad King
Prepared for Prof. Jan Marontate
October 28, 2008
CMNS 801-5 Design and Methodology in Communication Research
The paradox of scientific method is that it encourages us to forget what we know. This is
because if we knew what we were looking for one would not have to look and yet, if we look without
knowing what exactly we're looking for, how can we be certain when we've found it? This paradox
presents itself as the methodological problem of verification, which is perhaps, not as pronounced
within the social sciences as it is within the natural ones. Durkheim’s (1982) well-known “rules” of
sociological method place the problem of verification at the forefront when he tells us that “the
objective reality of social facts is sociology's most fundamental principle.” Of course, Durkheim’s rules
are subject to revisionism but what should this revision look like? In this short paper I will be focussing
on (although not in this order) these Durkheimian themes: “objective reality”, “social facts” and the
methodological “principles” which organize these themes. My objective here not to create a research
programme nor to provide a procedural on social science method, but rather to problematize the
phenomena of “objective” reality, the establishment of “methodological principles”, and the
establishment of “social facts.” In other words, I wish to draw attention to ontologies, epistemologies,
and an ethics of common sense that sits between the two.
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Special Topics: Ethnography
Messing with People’s Heads: Perspectives on Social Science Method
Law's (2004) position is that existing social science methodologies are ill-suited to understanding
the "mess" of the social world: the ephemeral, the indefinite, and the irregular. But he argues that the
problems lie not so much within the methods themselves, but in the normativities attached to them.
What he urgently wants to draw attention to is the political dimensions of social science methodology.
The plea here is not to do away with methodology altogether but to encourage heterogeneity. In other
words, he is arguing for a methodological pluralism rather than methodological hegemony.
Ethnography, he argues, is particularly suited to dealing with the "messiness of practice" because
ethnography itself is methodologically messy. It relies on observations which are given in a contingent
and situated scenario. He concludes by saying that method must be considered "performative." I will
come back to this crucual point later. The ultimate objective of such "method assemblages" -the
deliverables they yield- concern truth and politics (Ibid 148). Truth and method are linked in terms of the
latter's performativity. This relationship essentially illuminates the relationship between epistemology
and ontology. How we come to know the world is directly related to how we choose to exist in that
world. Truth is related to method in the sense that they are both transitive. The lineage of this
philosophical position can be tranced back to Harold Garfinkel and his presentation of
ethnomethodology. Properly speaking, one cannot call ethnomethodology a theory or method.
Garfinkel’s socioloical reading of the Schutzian phenomenology (Schutz, 1967)provides much of the
theoretical basis of his metdhod. Methodologically speaking, it shares some affinities with the
pragmatism of Dewey (1958) and Mead (1934). What is valuable in Garfinkel’s ethnomthodology (1967;
2002; 2006) is that he urges us to study the vectors of practical reasoning as they take shape within an
actor's or a group of actor's common sense understanding of social order. To do this one must
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Special Topics: Ethnography
understand the common sense knowledge of the structures and orders not only as a topic, but also as a
resource for investigation.
In Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, the objective is to "understand the rational accountability of
practical actions as an ongoing practical accomplishment." He is also concerned with three constituent
phenomena: 1) The establishment of objective (context-free) propositions in place of indexical ones; 2)
The essential task of reflexivity that accounts for practical actions -otherwise considered banal and
generally un-remarkable; 3) Examining actions in-context as a practical accomplishment. He proceeds
with the following guidelines (he calls them "policies"): 1) The field of inquiry must be unlimited by
sociological boundaries or restraints; 2) We must acknowledge the persistence of rationality -by this we
mean to account for the continual need for members to make choices and decisions based on their
understanding of a "coherent", "planful", "knowledgeable" "character" of various activities. As
Habermas says (TOC 1?) one can only be rational in the presence of others, but unlike Habermas,
Garfinkel suggests that the subjective character of rational action is itself, subject to articulation and
negotiation within a community of actors. Rationality does not exist as a universal ethics (Habermas) but
as an objective phenomenon of indexical communication. 3) In keeping with the second policy Garfinkel
suggests that it is methodologically inadequate to assume that the properties of rationality can be
ascertained by referring to apriori standards that exist outside of the community of actors. Standards of
efficiency, appropriateness and effectiveness are the products of specific subjective positions as are
morals and ethics. In terms of the later, want to distance myself from a moral or ethically reletivist
position and it is not my intention to suggest that ethnomethodology suggests such a stance. But the
practice of ethnomethodologists, like ethnographers, can be a morally and/or ethically “messy” one
which requires special consideration. The question I want to turn to now is how does one make sense
and organize this “mess”?
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Methodological “Closeness” and the Ethics of Common Sense
One possible way to do this is professionalizing ethics in practice. But the problems associated
with professionalizing ethics become particularily pronounced. Gary Allan Fine (1993) has commented
that ethnographers (like ethnomethodologists) are placed in a tenuous research position in that
practical ethics often find themselves in conflict with normative conceptions of ethical practice. The
objective is not to suggest that ethics and ethnography are incompatible but that this tension suggests
an increasingly self-reflexive attitude is required for such a research method. The structure of his
argument takes the form of three divisions which correlate with Fine's taxonomy of ethnographic "lies"
and "moral dilemmas": 1) Lies which conflict with "classical virtues" of ethnographers 2) technical
challenges which take the form of practical problems concerning method 3) Challenges concerning the
"ethnographic self." Fine goes on to provide numerous constructs and practical examples which animate
his categories. All of these examples seem to be directly (and sometimes obliquely) referring at some
level to a concept of what I will call methodological "closeness". It we continue with the idea of
methodological closeness, we can economically reorganize Fine's examples in terms of: Strategic
Closeness; Technical Closeness; and Reflexive Closeness. I hope these organizing concepts will become
clear as I relate them to Fine’s categories.
“Strategic closeness” refers to the often duplicitous attitude with which ethnographers pursue
their agendas. These attitudes often conflict with what Fine calls the "classic virtues" of good
ethnography. His examples include "the kindly", "the friendly" and "the honest" ethnographer. Preconceived notions concerning the research subject -notions such as malice or admiration- must be
suppressed or otherwise hidden as ethnographers engage in practice. Essentially strategic closeness
concerns of communicative postures (rules of engagement) which are effective in containing and
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directing research relations between two people who conduct themselves by different ethical standards.
Practical ethics in this sense may include notions such as "limited-informed consent." The concept of
"limited-informed consent" involves obtaining the informed consent of research subjects while at the
same time offering some assurances about the manner in which such research will "reflect" back on
back on the subject. In other words, subjects should be entitled to know the researchers agenda even
though this knowledge could affect the "results" of ethnographic research. But the problem concerns
the research design. As Fine (274) notes, the nature of ethnographic work is such that the agenda or
research "goal"/"objective" is often unclear at the beginning. This is a methodological consequence of
the confusion between natural and social science, and this conflict is often enshrined within academic
bureaucracy.
The second of my categories "technical closeness" concerns conflicts with respect to the ways in
which ethnographers record and collect their data. Fine’s examples include "the precise", "the
observant", and "the unobtrusive" ethnographer. For example, often the ethnographer's most valuable
tool is the field notebook. Field notes may indicate some semblance of "what actually happened" but
they are not explicit records of what transpired. To treat a noted observation with the same integrity as
one would treat a transcribed or visually recorded event, is totally wrong. Techniques that are employed
to ensure more accurate accounts may actually impede research imperatives, such as the choice to
remain embedded within communities of practice or not. Fine suggests that ethnographers are more
like "playwrights" (217) who are engaged in animating their research rather than mechanically
reproducing it. This speaks to Geertz's concept of the ethnographer as "author." But the general
features of what I have called technical closeness centre on the "illusion" and inflated importance of
verisimilitude in research. Such verisimilitude is frequently impossible, yet ethnographers retain the
concept. The reason for this is very practical: they must believe the "lie" if they are to vouch for the
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legitimacy of their own research. Perhaps the more important questions to be considered have to do
with the mechanisms of legitimacy rather than the mechanisms and tools of data collection.
The last grouping I have called "reflexive closeness" refers to Fine's discussions of "the
ethnographic self" (Ibid 282). Of particular note here is the concept of "fairness.” The concept of fairness
generally implies "balance" and impartiality. This "lie" is, like the others, directly related to the problems
of securing scientific legitimacy and although I do not feel the need to rehearse the obvious problems
with the ideas of balance, "objectivity" and the like, I do wish to draw attention to scientific standards of
"legitimacy" that are embedded within the broader discourses of scientific method. Rather than
continually expounding on the concept of "objectivity" one might do better to focus on the negative
implications of the concept and it's relation to the discursive legitimations of scientific practice. For
instance, is it ethical to remain "objectively" silent when a researcher may feel a moral imperative to
"speak out"? Can one, practically speaking, remain moral if the standards of ethical conduct they are
held to, instruct them otherwise? Of course, there is no consistent answer to these questions because
they are always formulated within specific and varied contexts.
Epistemological Methods and Ontological Claims
Returning to the relationship between methodology and politics, Law and Urry (2004) argue that
social science methodology is not only descriptive but performative; i.e., productive in the sense that it
does not just mirror reality but it -to use their term- "enacts" it. Because of this performativity the
epistemological and ontological assumptions on which such practice sits are fundamentally challenged.
How we come to know and understand the world is directly related to how we live in, shape, and are
shaped by the world. But a few important questions remain unanswered. For example is such
"performativity" truly political if the actors themselves do not recognize their actions as being political in
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nature? For example, scientists often use the discourse of "objectivity" to legitimate their own practice
as impartial and apolitical. The same holds true for journalists, managers, and so on. Is this discourse
legitimate in itself? Or does it reveal the need for more reflexive practice? Another problematic question
concerns defining what exactly are the contours of inquiry and how do they relate to truth claims? Law
and Urry caution against answering this question too romantically (we can never really know "truth") or
too scientistically ("truth" can only be the outcome of scientific method.) Their move is to argue that
reality is a relational effect which is constructed through interaction. Such interaction always involves
the blending of material and social dimensions. If social science is performative and if it is concerned
with making truth claims about reality, then the epistemological implications of practice become
ontological and political as well. Thus it is nearly impossible for a social science to be apolitical or
"neutral." But does that mean that mean a reduction of methodology to mere relativism and
perspectivalism? If so, this would have severe consequences for any “critical” sociological practice.
I would also add that it is important to maintain some restraint in claiming that methods are
performative and subsequent realities “contingent.” Can not the methodological "enactment" of the
social be explained in terms of the rational justifications of specific objectives, goals, means and actions?
There must surely be an important distinction made between saying that there are multiple "worlds"
(realities) and multiple perspectives toward such a world.
Latour’s ANT Farm
One of the more prolific proponents of a relativistic approach to sociological inquiry has been
Bruno Latour (1993; 2005). Latour's project is to "reassemble the social" meaning: to illuminate the
social construction and social activity of the sociological object. He argues that these objects are not
merely "objective" but that they are social actors within society that have been confined by traditional
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sociology to the domain of objects. Latour's programme calls for a "critical sociology" which can replace
the object with "another matter" which is made up of social relations. He describes his "critical
sociology" as the "sociology of relations" (2005, pp. 8-9). His programme is meant to address five major
uncertainties:
1. the nature of groups and identity -the nature of goal oriented action and its
complications
2. the nature of objects, their interactions, and the broader notion of agency.
3. The nature of facts and their construction within communities of scientific practice
4. the broader programme of sociology and it's articulation as an empirical science.
Latour's method is somewhat unconventional and “un-scientific.” His logic is adductive rather than
deductive. Instead of building a conceptual system and then defending it against other disciplinary or
methodological attacks, he would rather let his sociology "build itself" so-to-speak. In his version of ANT
the systematic ordering of social phenomenon does not take place before the analysis but after the
actors have been deployed. To retain some semblance of order, ANT goes about retroactively tracing
the connections among the various actors and so, he argues, methodological rigor is not dissolved but
rather pushed down the line and carried forward in the conclusion. This is how Latour would suggest
being a "good relativist" or more specifically "pre-relativist." Although the relativist takes no coherent or
sustained position at least she has taken a position regarding her own refusal to take a position. Latour's
pre-relativist sociologist simply has not got to the point where she can even properly call herself "a
relativist" (2005, pp. 23-25). I leave you with Latour:
"Travelling with ANT, I'm afraid to say, will turn out to be agonizingly slow... Sociologists of the
social seem to glide like angels, transporting power and connections almost immaterially, while
the ANT-Scholar has to trudge like an ant, carrying the heavy gear in order to generate even the
tiniest connection... what differentiates a good ANT account from a bad one -a crucial quality
test -by asking three questions: have all the difficulties of traveling been recognized? Has the
complete cost of travel from one connection to the next been fully paid? Has the traveler not
cheated by surreptitiously getting a ride from an already existing "social order"? In the
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meantime, my advice is to pack as little as possible, don't forget to pay your ticket, and be
prepared for delays (2005, p. 25).
Concluding Remarks
The goals of this paper were modest. I have attempted to sketch out some of the philosophical
problematics behind social science methodology. In particular I have chosen to focus on Actor-Network
theory, using Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology as a means to contextualize and historicize ANT’s
sociological lineage. The linkages between ontology and epistemology that I have tried to show here
bear particular significance for those engaging in social science research. To respond to these problems
by attempting to contain them within a formalized ethics of practice often ends up compounding such
problems rather than solving them. While it is true that no solution can be “perfect” perhaps it is the
pursuit of perfection which should be interrogated here. If we are confronted today with a
professionalized sociology which insists on truth as an end-in-itself and not a means, then the central
problem of reflexivity will continue to fester. In terms of method, social science research finds itself in a
precarious situation. While it was the establishment of methodological rules that made sociology and
social science “respectable” along side its “natural” cousin, adherence to the rules of sociological
method may actually violate the spirit of Durkheim’s original suggestion.
Bibliography
Dewey, J. (1958). Experience and Nature. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
Durkheim, E. (1982). The Rules of Sociological Method. (S. Lukes, Ed., & W. Halls, Trans.) London:
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Fine, G. A. (1993). Ten Lies of Ethnography. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography (22), 267-294.
Garfinkel, H. (2002). Ethnomethodology's Programme. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Garfinkel, H. (2006). Seeing Sociologically. (A. W. Rawls, Ed.) Boulder: Paradigm.
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Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Giddens, A. (1993). New Rules of Sociological Method (2nd Edition ed.). Stanford: Standford University
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Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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