FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 27767/13
Mirko ŠKUBONJA
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 19 May
2015 as a Committee composed of:
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
Ksenija Turković, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 19 March 2013,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government
and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Mirko Škubonja, is a Croatian national, who was
born in 1950 and lives in Šibenik. He was represented before the Court by
Mr M. Barbir, a lawyer practising in Ploče.
2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.
1. Civil proceedings
4. On 7 January 2003 the applicant brought a civil action in the Split
Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) against the State seeking payment
of salary arrears.
5. On 21 March 2003 the first-instance court suspended the proceedings
(mirovanje postupka).
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ŠKUBONJA v. CROATIA DECISION
6. On 26 June 2003 the applicant asked the first-instance court to resume
the proceedings.
7. On 20 January 2004 the first-instance stayed the proceedings (prekid
postupka) pending the outcome of the parallel civil proceedings between the
State and another plaintiff concerning the same legal issue.
8. On 8 February 2007 the applicant withdrew his action.
9. On 10 May 2007 the State as the defendant asked the first-instance
court to resume the proceedings since the conditions for doing so had been
met.
10. On 25 May 2007 the first-instance court decided to resume the
proceedings.
11. By a decision of 1 June 2007 the first-instance court declared that the
applicant’s action had been withdrawn (see paragraph 8 above) and ordered
him to pay the State as the defendant 1,890 Croatian kunas (HRK) in costs
of proceedings.
12. On 21 June 2007 the applicant appealed against the part of that
decision concerning the award of costs.
13. On 17 July 2007 the State as the defendant asked the first-instance
court to rectify its decision of 1 June 2007 (see paragraph 11 above) as
regards the applicant’s surname.
14. On 6 February 2008, 9 June 2010 and 19 November 2010 the State
as the defendant urged the first-instance court to expedite the proceedings.
15. By a decision of 12 January 2011 the first-instance court rectified its
decision of 1 June 2011 (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above).
16. On 3 February 2011 the applicant pointed out to the first-instance
court that his appeal had never been forwarded to the second-instance court.
17. On 14 February 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of
12 January 2011 (see paragraph 15 above).
18. On 3 July 2012 the case-file was forwarded to the Split County
Court (Županijski sud u Splitu).
19. On 24 July 2012 the applicant informed the Split Municipal Court
that he had paid the State the costs of proceedings he had been ordered to
pay in the decision of 1 June 2007 (see paragraph 11 above) and enclosed a
payment slip indicating that on the same day he had paid HRK 1,890 in the
State budget.
20. By a decision of 12 December 2012 the Split County Court reduced
the amount of costs of proceedings the applicant had been ordered to pay
the State in the first-instance decision of 1 June 2011 (see paragraph 11
above) to HRK 1,150.
21. On the same day the Split County Court upheld the first-instance
decision on rectification of 12 January 2011 (see paragraph 15 above).
ŠKUBONJA v. CROATIA DECISION
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2. Proceedings following the applicant’s request for the protection of
the right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
22. Meanwhile, the applicant lodged a request for the protection of the
right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za zaštitu prava na
suđenje u razumnom roku) with the Split County Court (Županijski sud u
Splitu), complaining about the length of the above civil proceedings.
23. On 17 May 2011 the Split County Court declared the applicant’s
request inadmissible.
24. Following the applicant’s appeal, on 20 September 2012 the
Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) reversed the first-instance
decision by finding a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a
reasonable time. It awarded him HRK 300 in compensation and ordered the
Split County Court to decide upon his appeals within three months from
service of its decision.
COMPLAINT
25. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
about the length of the above civil proceedings.
THE LAW
26. The applicant complained that the length of the above civil
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ...
hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
27. The Government disputed the admissibility of the application on
four grounds. In particular, they argued that the application was
incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention, that
the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the violation complained of,
that he had not suffered a significant disadvantage and that the application
was, in any event, manifestly ill-founded.
1. The parties’ submissions
28. The Government argued, inter alia, that the amount at stake in the
civil proceedings complained of was only HRK 1,890 (see paragraphs 14
and 22 above), that is, some 260 euros (EUR). That sum had been further
reduced by the Split County Court’s decision of 12 December 2012
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ŠKUBONJA v. CROATIA DECISION
whereby the applicant had been ordered to pay the State HRK 1,150 only
(see paragraph 20 above), that is, some EUR 153. In this connection the
Government referred to cases where the amounts at stake had been similar
or substantially higher than the one in the present case and which the Court
had declared inadmissible for lack of significant disadvantage. In particular,
they cited the cases of Burov v. Moldova ((dec.), no. 38875/03, 14 June
2011) and Kiousi v. Greece ((dec.), no. 52036/09, 20 September 2011)
where the amounts at stake had been EUR 228 and EUR 504, respectively.
The Government thus invited the Court to declare the applicant’s case
inadmissible on the same ground. In response to the applicant’s arguments
to the contrary (see the following paragraph), the Government averred in
particular that he had not submitted any evidence for his claim that the
amount he had been ordered to pay constituted half of his monthly pension.
29. The applicant replied that it could not be argued that he had not
suffered significant disadvantage because the amount of HRK 1,890
represented half of his monthly pension. Furthermore, he had to pay
statutory default interest accrued on that amount from 1 June 2007 until
12 December 2012, that is, in the period of more than six and a half years,
which had increased the sum in question by 84%.
2. The Court’s assessment
30. The Court first notes that by a decision of 1 June 2007 the applicant
was ordered to pay the State HRK 1,890 in costs of proceedings (see
paragraph 11 above), that is, some EUR 260. It also notes that the applicant
paid those costs on 24 July 2012 (see paragraph 19 above) and that the
amount it had to pay was eventually reduced to HRK 1,150, that is, some
EUR 153 by the Split County Court’s decision of 12 December 2012 (see
paragraph 20 above).
31. As regards the applicant’s argument that he also had to pay the
statutory default interest accrued on those costs from the delivery of the
first-instance decision of 1 June 2007 (see paragraph 29 above), the Court
notes that the decision in question did not stipulate payment of statutory
default interest on the costs of proceedings, and that on 24 July 2012 he had
paid only the principal amount without any accrued interest (see paragraph
19 above). While it is true that under the relevant domestic legislation
payment of statutory default interest on costs of proceedings could have
been requested in the enforcement of a judgment or decision ordering
payment of costs, the applicant could have prevented that interest from
accruing had he paid the costs immediately, after the delivery of the firstinstance decision.
32. The Court therefore finds that the amount at stake in the present case
was indeed HRK 1,890 (EUR 260). That is so regardless of the fact that the
applicant eventually had to pay HRK 1,150 (EUR 153). That being so, the
Court further refers to its findings in the cases of Kiousi v. Greece (cited
ŠKUBONJA v. CROATIA DECISION
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above) and Šumbera v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 48228/08,
21 February 2012) where it held that, having regard primarily to the low
amounts at stake corresponding to EUR 504 and EUR 227 respectively, the
applicants had not suffered a significant disadvantage. It sees no reason to
hold otherwise in the present case.
33. In particular, the Court notes that in the instant case, just like in the
Šumbera case (cited above), the proceedings complained of were incidental
proceedings for determination of litigation costs following the applicant’s
withdrawal of his civil action. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the
applicant’s financial situation was such that payment of sum in question had
a significant impact on his personal life (see Kiousi, cited above). In this
respect the Court notes that the applicant did not substantiate his allegations
that this amount represented a half of his monthly pension (see paragraph 29
above) by any evidence.
34. As to whether respect for the human rights safeguarded by the
Convention and its Protocols requires the examination of the merits of the
application, the Court has established in a number of cases (see, for
example, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII;
Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69-98, ECHR 2006-V;
Majewski v. Poland, no. 52690/99, 11 October 2005; and Wende and
Kukówka v. Poland, no. 56026/00, 10 May 2007), including those brought
against Croatia (see, for example, Horvat v. Croatia, no. 51585/99, ECHR
2001-VIII; Kozlica v. Croatia, no. 29182/03, 2 November 2006; and Pavić
v. Croatia, no. 21846/08, 28 January 2010), its practice concerning
complaints about the violation of one’s right to a hearing within a
reasonable time. Thus, given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic,
the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the
Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require an examination of the
application on the merits.
35. Lastly, as to whether the case was “duly considered by a domestic
tribunal”, the Court notes that the issue whether the applicant had to pay the
costs of proceedings to the State following the withdrawal of his civil action
on 8 February 2007 (see paragraph 8 above), and if so, in what amount, was
examined on the merits by the first- and the second-instance courts (see
paragraphs 11 and 20 above). Furthermore, his complaint about the length
of those proceedings was also examined on the merits by the Supreme Court
(see paragraph 24 above). The Court is therefore satisfied that the
applicant’s case was “duly considered by a domestic tribunal”.
36. It follows that the present application is inadmissible under
Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention because the applicant has not suffered a
significant disadvantage, and thus must be rejected pursuant to
Article 35 § 4 thereof.
ŠKUBONJA v. CROATIA DECISION
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37. In view of this conclusion it is not necessary to examine the
remaining inadmissibility objections (see paragraph 27 above) raised by the
Government.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 11 June 2015.
André Wampach
Deputy Registrar
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska
President