Inequality, politicized discourse, and political
movement
Case study: Thailand political unrest in 2006-2010
A Research Paper presented by:
Chidchon Chansilpa
(Thailand)
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Specialization:
Poverty studies and policy analysis
(POV)
Members of the Examining Committee:
Dr.Andrew M. Fischer (Supervisor)
Dr.Thanh Dam Truong (Reader)
The Hague, the Netherlands
December 2012
ii
Acknowledgements
First and foremost I would like to show my gratitude to my Supervisor
Dr. Andrew M. Fischer and my Reader Dr.Thanh Dam Truong for all the expert comments, valuable guidance and abundant patience and understanding.
Also, I extend appreciation to my discussants for their feedbacks and to Kanokkarn Tevapitak for advising and encouraging me throughout the study process.
Undoubtedly, my appreciation needs to go to the residents of Nang Loeng
community who kindly responded to my interview requests, especially
Mrs.Suwan Welployngam for the endless hospitality.
iii
Contents
List of Acronyms
vi
Abstract
vii
Chapter 1 Introduction
1
1.1
Introduction
Error! Bookmark not defined.
1.2
Statement of the Problem
1.3
Objectives and Research Questions
Error! Bookmark not defined.
1.4
Research Methods and Limitations
3
1
1.4.1 Research Methods
Error! Bookmark not defined.
1.4.2 Limitations
4
Chapter 2 Concepts and Analytical Framework
5
2.1
Introduction
5
2.2
Discourse Analysis
5
2.3
Frame Alignment
5
2.4
Inequality-Induced Conflict
6
2.5
Collective Identity
6
2.6
Populism and Democracy
6
2.7
Analytical Framework
7
Chapter 3 Data Analysis
8
3.1
Introduction
8
3.2
The Yellow Shirts’ Discourses
8
3.2.1 Who Are the Yellow Shirts?
8
3.2.2 The Yellow Shirt Protest
9
3.3
The Red Shirts’ Discourses
11
3.3.1 Who Were the Red Shirts?
11
3.3.2 The Red Shirts Protest Mobilization
14
3.4
The Red Shirts’ “Prai-Ammart” Discourse and the Analysis
16
3.5
Conclusion
20
Chapter 4 Symbolization of the Politicized Discourse
21
4.1
Introduction
21
4.2
Symbolizing the Concept of Inequality in Political Protest
21
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4.2.1 Thaksin, Populism, and Pro-democracy Movement
21
Amplifying the Concept of Inequality
23
4.3.1 The Role of the Elite and the Use of Media in Mobilization
23
4.3.2 The Leaders’ Role
23
4.3.3 Leaders-People Relations
24
4.3.4 The Use of Media
26
Conclusion
29
Chapter 5 Conclusion
30
5.1
The Root Cause of the Inequality-Induced Political Protest
30
5.2
How the Concept of Inequality was Used to Mobilize the Protest
31
4.3
4.4
References
34
v
List of Acronyms
PAD
People’s Alliance for Democracy
UDD
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship
TDRI
Thailand Development Research Institute
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Abstract
This research paper explores how inequality can be politicized in social mobilization for structural change. The case of urban protests in Bangkok involving
two main groups, the Yellow Shirt and the Red Shirt during 2006-2010 is examined, with a focus on the discourse how the Yellow and the Red Shirt socially constructs issues of “inequality” in an attempt to mobilize a broad base
of support that connects rural people with those living and working in the metropolitan areas. The paper situates the main actors in the protest, showing how
the Red Shirt leaders, who are political elites themselves, have manage to create
unity by bringing up many issues related to inequality and their attack on the
political agenda of their opponent. In doing so how they could attract the support of many individuals and groups who took part in the protest. Using field
research data involving six people from different backgrounds, the paper
shows how those who took part in the protest perceived themselves as ‘poor’
and contrast these perceptions with the normative definitions of poverty and
exclusion. The perception of Red shirt supporters in the areas selected by this
study seems to reflect the same direction of the agitation by the protest leaders
and the Red shirt supported media. During the time of the protest the Red
Shirts widely use the feudalist term such as “Prai” or “serf”, to identify themselves and to differentiate themselves from their opponents, the Yellow shirts
whom they referred to as the ‘aristocrats’ or ‘ammart’. This construction of
opposing positions also has a clear cut distinction between the “haves” and the
“have-nots” in terms of access to power in decision-making rather than poverty and inequality per se. The emerging picture suggests that poverty became
an identity of the Red shirt protesters during their actions, despite the fact that
the leaders did not bring many agendas directly related to poverty reduction.
The role of Thaksin Shinawatra became more important at this stage as a symbol of “inequality revolution” since his populist policy had major positive impact in inequality alleviation, which linked directly to democracy. In conclusion, the vision of a society advocated by the Red shirts seems to depict one in
which feudal forms of power and distinction should not prevail. ‘Inequality’
and ‘poverty’ have been politicized to fuel movements that aspire for democratic rule with full inclusion in decision-making without the exclusionary practices of the aristocracy.
Keywords
Inequality, politics, movement mobilization, conflict, Thailand
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Thailand political situation has not been in its most stable position in the past
decade. Large scale political protests have been constantly taken place in Bangkok during 2006-2010. It is generally believed that the country was facing extreme political polarization (The Asia Foundation 2010). The segregation of
two different classes became clearer. The explicit polarization has ignited when
the Yellow shirts protesters, who later on seen as elites or the upper class,
started their protest against Thaksin Shinawatra, the Prime Minister at the time.
The protesters’ identity based on the collective belief of the royal loyalists since
the main agenda, except for Thaksin’s involvement in corruption, was the accusation of royal subversion1. As a result of the movement, the Prime Minister
was overthrown by a military coup in mid 2000s, caused frustration to his supporters. Thus, they began to demonstrate in the name of democracy against the
coup. The chronicle demonstrations developed to violence2.
The research paper aims to understand how inequality can be politicized
in social mobilization for structural change. The study elaborates the process
and the use of constructed ‘inequality discourses’ that the protest leaders
brought up to the mobilization. The paper uses Discourse analysis through
media, literature, and interviews conducted in the selected area as research
methods.
In the first chapter, the paper provides Historical context of how the situation emerged. Mainly, the actors in the situations comprised of two different
groups creating for and adopting discourse from one another. The Yellow
shirts, which referred by their opponent as ‘the aristocrats’, symbolized themselves by behaving as the gatekeeper of conservative power. Meanwhile, the
Red shirts who actively introduced themselves as ‘the serf’ or the poor were
seen as the progressive one. The following chapters of this research paper provide the gist of related historical context that seems to be the ground for the
grievance that started the movements. The academic trend widely used to explain this phenomenon of the rapid emergence of these political-oriented social
movements will be presented, together with findings and analysis from the
fieldwork to examine whether they are suggesting in the same direction.
1.2 Statement of the problem
The political situation that happened in the past decade has clearly been creating changes in Thai society. This situation shows that inequality that has been
structurally embedded throughout the history of the country was brought explicitly up to mobilize the Red shirt movement. On the contrary, the same is-
1
2
Manager Online, 14 November 2009
Aljazeera, 13 April 2009
1
sue did not seem to be very pressing in the agenda of the Yellow shirt movements.
The initial understanding of people about the Yellow shirt movement
is that they were protesting against Thaksin Shinawatra for corruption cases 3
and the accusation of disloyalty to the monarchy, while some scholars suggested otherwise4. The participants of this group were of better backgrounds comparing to their opponent in terms of education and economic status (Sathitniramai 2010). On the contrary, the Red shirt movement was formed as a
response to the action of the conservative structural gatekeepers, namely the
Yellow shirts. The Red shirt movement has made creatively use of media in
order to utilize the notion of inequality to unite, symbolize, and legitimize their
movement in order to achieve their goals of ‘democracy redemption’ by bringing the self-exiled former Prime Minister back to the country. Yet, in spite of
the clear perception the society have to the movement, within the Red shirt
supporters there were various groups of people joining in the movement rather
than a homogeneous group as the Yellow shirts.
Because of the complexity of the reason, upon which the grievance was
built, in this study, the attention will be paid on the causality of the movements
and process how the Red shirts creating the image the society have about
them. The significance of understanding these two questions should provide
the coherent understanding between the Red shirt supporters and the nonsupporters.
1.3 Objectives and research questions
This research paper seeks to find the basic understanding of the situation from
both the Yellow and the Red shirts movement. Yet, the focus of the paper lies
toward how the notion of inequality was used and perceived by the Red shirt
leaders, academics, and the protesters themselves. In doing so, it is needed to
examine what were the strong root causes of the grievance used as a catalyst
factor to draw individuals out to join the protests. Also, it is necessary to examine the standpoint of the both sides since the formulation of the Red shirt can
be seen as an encounter reaction to the Yellow shirt movement5.
The core research question of this paper will base on two anchor questions. The first is “how was the concept of inequality used to mobilize political
movements in Thailand during 2006-2010?” However, in order to answer that
question, another question must be first responded. The question is “what was
the causality of both movements?” These questions also involve with a few
sub-questions formulated to give more insight in understanding the two research questions. The sub-questions are...
-
What were the protest agendas?
Who were the actors; who joined and mobilized the agenda?
How did the Red shirt symbolize ‘inequality’ to their movement?
What was the role of media in the mobilization?
Matichon Online, 13 July 2011, The Asian Times, 3 February 2010
Nithi Eawsriwong (2010b), p.28-33
5 Aljazeera, 13 April 2009
3
4
2
These questions will formulate understanding about the causality of the
situations and clarify what triggered individuals’ will to join the movement. By
answering these sub-questions, the perception of the protesters shall be more
easily to understand what the motivation for the participants was, why they
chose to join the movement, and more importantly, why are they still holding
on to the movement’s principles.
1.4 Research methods and limitations
1.4.1 Research Methods
The research methods used in this paper can be categorized into 3 sections;
literature review, media analysis, and qualitative interview.
The literature review used is collected form books, journal, working
papers, reports, and online resources on and by the Red shirt. Also, theoretical
literature on discourse analysis, micro-mobilization, etc is used to expand border of theoretical framework. These helped formulating understanding both
theoretically and practically about the topic.
Media analysis method is also used to examine how the notion of poverty was represented among the Red shirt leaders, scholars and public figures.
This method is proceeded by analyzing videos recorded during series of protest
in the past few years, shared links on social media, from Red shirt participant’s
DVDs collection, talk shows, and news channel that belong to the Red shirt.
Therefore, these mediums can give more insight about how they represented
themselves and communicate within the group and to others.
Qualitative interview techniques are used to gather the primary data. A
field research was undertaken during July-August 2012. In-depth interview was
chosen in order to understand perceptions of the informants. The selected area
was Nang Loeng, Bangkok where the residents of the community6 were highly
politically active because the community is located in walking distance to the
political protest area used by the Red and the Yellow shirt participants, located
also close to the parliament. The importance of the location brought about the
unavoidable contact to the protest. In general, residents of this community had
more reasons than people who lived far away from this area, to be exposed to
the protests even if they were apolitical. First of all they could have friends or
relatives who were protesters and because of the culture makes people like to
share their opinions on things including politics. But more importantly, some
of the residents sold food and beverages in the rally area; therefore, they had to
unavoidably listen to the protest. Furthermore, during the violent insurgence in
2010, the community had lost one of their adolescence, while many others injured because the non-resident Red shirt protesters threatened to set their
community to fire. The significance of this situation was the fact that the people had emotional impact from the situation, yet the informants continued to
support the Red shirt movement. Nonetheless, the community’s residents had
The community comprised of two different categories of residents; first was the
people who lived on the temple’s land, which mostly a slum community and often
seen as the poor, second was the people who live in the market area who usually had
better economic status than the latter.
6
3
diverse background in terms of experiences, education, economic, political, and
social status which led to different political point of views. Six of the residents
of the community were interviewed and gave insight about how they as Red
shirts supporters saw themselves, as well as the political situations which directly affected their lives. The data and quotes gathered from the field work
will be used to support the media and secondary data analysis.
1.4.2 Limitations
Time constraint is one of the major limitations of this research paper. It is not
because of the amount of time provided to spend in gathering and analyzing
the data, but the fact that the physical protest was ended over years, while the
issues related to it has been continuously developed and created an impact on
the perception of the informants. Therefore, it is necessary to note that the
collected information might not contain exactly the same perception as what
the informants used to have during the protests.
Secondly, while some information is still provided online, many others
such as community radio program used to broadcast news cannot be found
anymore. Despite the continuation of the stations, yet the content and the style
have been changed. Thus, data collection could not be comprehensively gathered.
Thirdly, the Red shirt movement comprised of various groups from the
poor to the rich who came from both the urban and the rural area, also from
overseas. Hence, interviews conducted in an urban community can only give
insight into the perception of a certain group among the diverse composition
of the movement.
4
Chapter 2
Concepts and analytical framework
2.1 Introduction
This research paper’s analysis is guided by theories regarding to discourse analysis and frame alignment theory to explain the causality of the movement. And
the concept of inequality, which links to concept of populism and democracy
that allows the movement to occur, is also used to understand the Red shirts’
main agenda that explains one of the reasons to bring the issue up to gather all
the participants with collective identity together.
2.2 Discourse Analysis
Discourse, according to Charoensin-O-Larn (2011: 19), is a system, constitution process, identity, and significance of things in the society we are living in,
in terms of knowledge, power, truth, or self. Furthermore, discourse that becomes an anchor to the society is called the ‘dominant discourse’. He also
elaborates Foucault’s ideational explanation of the concept that discourse is
upon the dissimilarity between something that can be seen ‘correct’ at one period of time. Therefore, discourse is created under certain kind of rules at certain time. These rules control the existence, alteration, and the disappearance
of everything.
Categorization is a constructed instrument, which might or might not
base on scientific rules, to label class, role, duty, etc of things (ibid: 22). For
example; woman, peasant, patient, these are all attached to different roles and
duties according to the categories they are in. Charoensin-O-Larn explains
Foucault’s description that the more specific or identical thing is, the more systematized and controlled it becomes. Hence, ‘identity’ and ‘significance’ to
Foucault means the utilization of power or violence to force something that it
has to belong to some discourse. Meanwhile, the very same discourse will eliminate, hinder and prevent other thing from emerging any diversity that is different from the constructed identity and significance of the discourse. For instance, traditions and rules of one society are good examples of this statement.
Discourse analysis is thus an attempt to examine the process and details of identity and significance construction.
2.3 Frame Alignment
Frame alignment is a concept that explains the relation between individual and
social movement organization, in a way that the influence of individuals’ interest and belief affect the movement organization’s activities and goals (Snow et
al. 1986: 464). This process can be broken down into four stages. The first one
is ‘frame bridging’, which is the first stage of social movement organization.
The process starts when individuals who share frustration or beliefs, begin to
form the social movement organization. At this stage, the role of technologies
is essential in terms of facilitating frame bridging. The second step is ‘frame
amplification’, which can be divided into two orders; value amplification and
5
belief amplification. The former is “identification, idealization, and elevation of
one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have
not inspired collective action for any number of reasons” (ibid: 469). Also, in
practice the frame amplification is often brought together with the constitutional right. As for the latter, belief amplification is related to assumed relations
and characteristic of things. In other words, while values symbolize the objectives or finished line of the movement, belief amplification is explained as influential conceptual factors that produce the need to accomplish the goals. The
third point of frame alignment is ‘frame extension’. After the problem is located and organized in the bridging process, and the values and beliefs are set, the
next step is ‘frame extension’. Frame extension is the stage where after organizing the movement, it still needs to maintain the presence of the members. Often times, this process depends on the alteration of the movement frame.
Hence, this is a linking process within the theory of frame alignment before it
starts to transform. The final stage of this process is ‘frame transformation’,
which has two other sub-concepts; 1) transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames and 2) transformation of global interpretive frames. These two
concepts were used to explain different kinds of influence that affect the adaptation of frames in order to keep the movement going on.
2.4 Inequality-induced conflict
The fundamental idea of inequality lies upon the management of wealth and
resource distribution. Cramer (2005) suggests that inequality, whether too
much wealth or poverty, induces in conflicts and violent uprising. However, a
point he made to bear in mind is even if there is high inequality, yet it takes
high degree of power and suppression to induce immense consequence.
The nexus between inequality and conflict argues by Lichbach (op. cit.
Cramer 2005: 5) is the role of the ‘deprived-actor’, which amplifies the role of
beliefs and values. As a result, people set their expectation accordingly.
2.5 Collective Identity
The concept of collective identity bases on the concept of self and identity.
Abadi-Nagy says that collective identity has four layers (2003). The first layer is
the most important which deals with the sharing of “culture traits, social traits,
values, beliefs, myths, symbols, images” (ibid:176). The second deals with the
indoctrination of a person with those ideals, the third is when the person is
“indoctrinated” and conforms to those values (ibid:177). The fourth layer is
when the three layers are finished and that person shares a “feeling of belongingness” with that group (ibid:177).
2.6 Populism and Democracy
Populism is a concept that comes along with the contemporary democracy.
The one of most significant claims it has the idea that it is “an appeal to ‘the
people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas
and values of the society” (Canovan 1999: 3). As she elaborates that different
context also influences the values that the populists have, this lies on the relationship the habit of elites and the elite political culture. Furthermore, the voice
6
of the populists can be strong when it comes to legitimacy of the movement
since they have been claiming as true democracy. From this statement the picture becomes clearer to understand when Urbinati (2006: 17-18) suggests that
the representative methods of democracy may not be the best way of democratic practice, especially comparing to participatory approach, because it involves political process and access to the administrative level. Thus, it is plausible to understand why the populists see themselves as true democracy.
However, Canovan (1999) points that the way the populists practice
democracy may seem like a direct democracy, yet she inserts that in fact it
jeopardizes the liberal democracy since its principles are more illiberal. Moreover, another view suggested is populist democracy tends to be a “majoritatianism that neglects or overrides the rights of minorities”.
2.7 Analytical Framework
To understand the causality of Thailand's inequality induced political movements, there is a need to formulate a substantial analytical framework. Such a
framework has been built for this study based on a critical analysis of the discourses on the matter. These discourses had played major part in creating the
collective identities of the movement participants and have been constructed
on the notion of the several aspects of inequality. Meanwhile, the fact that
Thailand claims itself to be democratic country, its inequality is still an active
agenda; the concept of populism was brought to the picture from the country’s
political context as a politicized catalyst of the movement.
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Chapter 3
The politicized discourse of inequality:
Thailand political unrest in 2006-2010
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the findings from the fieldwork will be represented. Identities
of the street political actors will be elaborated to construct perception about
the situations and some of the national values that affected political struggles in
certain way. Moreover, the identities of the participants will expand the understanding about the protesters’ objectives and the reasons why the discourse
directly relating to inequality such as the feudalist terms used in class categorization, namely the ‘serf’ and the ‘aristocrat’ or ‘prai’ and ‘ammart’ were politicized and symbolized as the protesters’ identities.
3.2 The Yellow shirts’ discourses
3.2.1 Who were the Yellow shirts?
First of all, to reach the clear picture about the Yellow shirt’s discourse, it is
important to understand who the Yellow shirts were. Eawsriwong (2010) explains the Yellow shirt as non-poor; in fact, he describes them as the middlemiddle class and above. His conclusion based on Sathitniramai’s and Laothammatas’ researches on the protesters to address who the Yellow and the
Red shirts were. The result of these researches pointed in the same direction
that the Yellow shirts had more income than the other party. For example,
there were more numbers of the Yellow shirts who were in the social security
system than the Red shirts. Therefore, it was more likely that the Yellow shirt
participants were in formal sector, while the Red shirts tended to work in informal sector. Moreover, other than the economic status, the research (Sathitniramai: 2010) also showed that more proportion of the Yellow shirt supporters worked as civil servants and petty traders, and tended to have higher
education than the Red Shirts.
Eawsriwong (2010) believed that the reasons behind the Yellow shirt
protest lied essentially to the social factors. He explained that since the participants were not poor, so it was necessary to look back to see what had happened with Thai economy in the past decade that was so significant that frustrated the non-poor so much that they had to come out to the demonstrate.
He concluded that Thaksin was attacked by issues threatening the middle class,
e.g. media’s freedom of speech intervention, which was the most crucial political instrument for the middle class. Furthermore, the populist policy was not as
useful to the middle class, as it was to the poor. It was true that the middle
class did benefit from the universal healthcare but not much from the SMEs
bank, village funds, etc, but not as much as the poor. On the contrary, it
caused more insecurity to the middle class. Firstly, because of the fact that
more of them work in the formal sector, thus proportionately they paid more
tax, which was the main resource for the subsidies provided for the populist
program. Secondly, they did not directly benefit from many of the programs,
8
which, to them, were created to serve politicians’ scheme. Thirdly, it reduced
some quality and standards of services that they were used to. To be more
elaborated, for example, the universal healthcare or “30 Baht cures all” program clearly created equality to all Thai citizens to access the healthcare. Siamwalla’s report7 (2003) under the Thailand Development Research Institute
(TDRI) pointed that the limited subsidies for the health scheme deteriorate the
medical standard in the hospitals that joint the program. Since the budget was
lower, thus the program were not able to cover all the expenses, led to the
lower standard comparing to the more expensive ones that the government did
not subsidize. As a consequence, if the middle class wanted a better service,
they had to go to the private hospitals, which began to privatize and the fees
became more expensive for the middle class. In other words, in order to maintain a good life they used to have, they now had to pay more. These also are
the reasons that Eawsriwong believed to be the urge for the middle class to
join the protest.
3.2.2 The Yellow shirt protest
However, as for the start of the “physical movement”, it began in September
2005 when “Muangthai Raisapdah” or “Thailand Weekly” TV show was taken
out of the channel’s program because Sondhi Limthongkul and Sarocha Pornudomsak, the co-hosts of the show stated criticized Thaksin government and
linked it up to the royal family. After the show was removed from television,
Sondhi and Sarocha took the show to the street instead of just hosting it in a
studio. At the same time they broadcasted the show through their own channel
called the “ASTV” and started to call people out to the park where the show
was hosted, then began the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or the
Yellow shirt movement.
The main agenda of the show was to take Thaksin was accused of
many cases, Atibodhi (2006) had published booklet called “Stop Thaksinomic”
listing all the cases Thaksin was accused of, including tax evasion, corruption
during the construction of Suvarnabhumi Airport, conflict of interests, and the
abuse of authorized power. But above all, the accusation of not being loyal to
the royal family, and insulting the Monarchy8, was one of the most significant
agenda that mobilized this movement.
The accusation of disaffection to the royal family is taken very seriously
in Thailand. Not only because of the social sanction since Thais can be extremely sensitive when it comes to insulting His Majesty the King, but also because it is against the “Lese Majeste” law, which appointed the violation against
the royal family, the royal development projects, and the royal institution, is
criminal case. The penalty is a minimum 3 years and a maximum 15 years9.
Thus, when Thaksin was accused of being disrespect to the King, it drew lots
of people to protest against him. In this way, this issue was politicized and used
as political instrument against their opponent. The Yellow shirts vigorously
TDRI publication, June 2003
Sanook.com 11 November 2009
9 BBC News, 9 September 2008
7
8
9
imposed this image on Thaksin by showing video clips, recordings, and quotes
through various media.
To illustrate how the loyalty to the monarch is used as a political instrument in this case, a news scoop by TNEWS10 (2010) called “Thaksin’s aristocrat” was posted on Youtube with the content capturing a part of a speech in
his video link in the Red shirts protest in 201011on March 15th as he said…
“…don’t drag Thais down with you because you will not be around for so long. The
world nowadays develops extremely fast. With information, communication, and technology,
the alteration in the culture is huge. Hence, the eighty years old aristocrat cannot
understand (the change). If the person with no understanding has the power to
lead the country, I have to say, I don’t know where we are going to go…”
The news report had critically analyzed the quote and interpreted what
was his implication of the aristocrat that the word aristocrat must have been a
person because he said eighty years old. Although normally when the Red shirt
leaders talked about the aristocrats it was clear that they meant the Privy Council or the President of the Privy Council; General Prem Tinnasulanonda, in this
case it was unlikely. Thaksin was describing the aristocrat as a human being.
The Privy Council was not a person, thus it could not be. While the President
of the Council was a person but he was not eighty years old, nor in the position
“to have the power to lead the country”. Also, Thaksin usually, even in the
very same video link session, called the name of the President directly, instead
of using jargon words like the aristocrat. The report had come to the conclusion that the only possibility of who Thaksin meant when he said “the aristocrat” must have been the King.
This statement, together with many other statements he had made during his speeches to the Red shirt participants, had created a certain attitude that
royalists would have against him. April 16th and November 10th 2009, the Time
Online had published Thaksin interview that later on became the reason for
him to be convicted of the Lese Majeste. In the very same episode of the news
report had shown the link between his interview with Time Online and the
video link he used to communicate with his supporters. In the interview he
responded to the question “was it because you were more popular than the King?”. The
answer was “it is a different kind of love”, while in the video link he said to his audiences
that “the way the people love a politician is different from the way they love the aristocrat”
The news analysis tried to point out that by his quotes from diverse situations,
one meant directly to answer the question about himself and the King, another
had the same meaning but did not say it out frankly. Thus, with all of the presented sequences, it had high possibility that the aristocrat Thaksin was mentioning should implicitly mean King Bhumibol. The report went on with a
statement that the Lese Majeste law was criminal, not political case as Thaksin
usually claimed.
The significance of this news analysis is to evidence how the Yellow
shirts brought up the issue regarding to the disloyalty to the monarchy into
their political agenda. The scoop, of course, based on real situations, showed
News agency who image themselves as a dedicate news agency works against antimonarchy and pro-Thaksin movements
11 “Thaksin’s aristocrat”, 1 April 2010
10
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Thaksin’s speeches that no one could contest that he did not say it. But the fact
that the scoop had analyzed them and amplified the undertone of the speeches
with the conducting language, was enough to strengthen the attitude that the
royalists already had concerning to Thaksin’s disloyalty.
It is clear now that the issue of disloyalty had been effectively politicized. However, there also were other issues relating Thaksin’s legitimacy that
were mentioned during the protest. For instance, the Supreme Court had convicted him for corruption charges12 such as tax evasion and violation of law
prohibiting political figures from having business deal with governmental organization. The author finds those issues legitimate by itself without being politicized, in terms of the grounds to protest against a corrupted politician.
Therefore, these issues should be seen as supplementary argument rather than
the main mobilizing discourses. Nevertheless, to conclude, the Yellow shirts
discourse actually based mainly on the middle class’ agendas. The movement
consisted of homogeneous group, characterized by their economic and social
status. However, the shared societal interest among the group was the fear of
alteration that came together as part of modern society. Thaksin Shinawatra
who had successfully symbolized himself as the messiah of these changes such
as bureaucratic administration reformation and the introduction of populist
policy, became a threat to the conservative middle class. This caused the frustration among them, along with the politicized issue of disaffection to the
monarch the feeling and emotion of the people was used to catalyze the
movement.
3.3 The Red shirt’s discourses
3.3.1 Who were the Red shirts?
The Red shirts or the “United front of Democracy against Dictatorship”
(UDD) was formed in late 2006 to be counter-protest to the Yellow shirt
movements. Studies showed that the Red shirts composed of various groups.
Wasi (op cit. Thabchumpon and Mccargo: 2012) categorized five different
groups within the movement as; 1) Thaksin himself, 2) those hired by Thaksin,
3) idealistic reds, 4) violent extremists and 5) the poor and their sympathizers
from both urban and rural areas. However, Thabchumpon and Mccargo argued the accuracy of his second and fifth categories, which also are the focal
groups of the study. Their research showed that the ordinary people who
joined the protest were not only taking part in solely because of poverty. In
fact, it suggested that what Wasi had described to be the hired ones and the
poor were practically the same group, and were actually neither hired, nor
poor. On the contrary, they were “loosely organized networks drawn from an emerging
class of urbanized villagers that straddled both urban and rural society, and who had
been mobilized by pro-Thaksin politicians and other actors”
Often times, media portrayed the Red shirt participants as poor farmers, who likely came from the North or Northeast of Thailand because they
benefitted directly from Thaksin’s populist policy. This image had become the
12
Jurist, 21 October 2008
11
dominant discourse usually explained as class and economic grievance. Also,
because of the nexus between the Red shirts and the “Assembly of the poor”
who had notably number of participants from the Northeast of the country
and successfully organized mass movements in Bangkok in the 1990s (ibid).
The discourse derived discreetly from the fact proven by studies that many of
the Red shirt supporters were market-oriented farmers. Apornsuwan (2010)
suggested that the Red shirt movement was a significant political phenomenon
dominated by the lower class or the primary producers, mostly farmers, also
secondary producers such as skill labors, commodity and service producers,
and the petty to middle level of employers. Namely, the lower and lower middle class were the main body of the rallies, while the middle and upper class
were the minority.
However, to answer who the Red shirts were, Sathitniramai (2010) interviewed the Red shirt supporters from the North, Northeast, and the Central
plain of the country. The research not only evidence that the Red shirt supporters were not necessarily the poorest of the poor, but it also explained that
the reasons why the informants joined the movement were because of frustration triggered by two dominant factors; poverty and inequality, and populist
policy. Firstly, the informants were categorized into three categories; the Red
shirts, the Yellow shirts, and the neutralists.
The research found out that in terms of economic status the
Red shirt informants received less monthly income comparing to the
Yellow shirt informants, but more than the neutralists. The Red shirts’
average income was 17,034 Baht (roughly 427 Euros). Therefore, the
researcher suggested that the Red shirt informants were the lower middle class, not the poor. Thus, the objectivity of poverty should not be
the reason for the political conflict at the time.
Meanwhile, when asked about the subjective assessment to
their own economic status, more percentage of both the Red (18.75%)
and the Yellow (23.08%) shirts considered themselves to be “poorer”
than the majority, while less number of the neutralists (14.63%) who
actually received less income that the majority considered themselves
not to be poorer. On the contrary, most neutralists (78.05%) considered themselves to be middle class, while roughly sixty percent of the
Yellow shirts and fifty percent of the Red shirts considered themselves
to be middle class.
In terms of attitude about income inequality, the results showed
that the most numbers of the informants who found the gap between
the rich and the poor unacceptable were the Yellow shirts (42.31%),
while only 25 percent of the Red shirts and 12.2 percent of the neutralist had the similar feeling. In other words, 75 percent of the Red shirts
and 87.8 percent of the neutralists did not feel the significance of income inequality between the rich and the poor.
This research also presented social grievance of the Red shirt informants. From focus group interview conducted in Ubonrachtani, the Northeast
of Thailand, the results indicated four different points that urged the Red shirt
informants to participate the protest; 1.) Grievance caused by affronts about
economic status and lack of education, 2.) Social classification, 3.) Justice ine12
quality caused by Abhisit government, thus the Red shirts needed to protest to
redeem democracy by putting pressure on the government to dissolve the
house and to organize new national election, and lastly 4.) Social inequality,
corruption: bribes. One informant described the situation as “we have no patronage. Our mob also has no patronage”.
On the other hand, the Red shirt informants who lived in Nakornpathom (Bangkok’s satellite city) did not express any frustration. In contrast, they
felt that their economic status had become better. Technology and infrastructure had made their lives easier. Their children now had better education than
what they used to have. Hence, they felt that there were more opportunity in
life and success derived from individual’s ambition, hard work and competence. This expression appeared again in the result of the informants who live
in Chiang Mai (the city in the North). They also felt the better improvements
in life and their economic status. However, they did not express as much confidence as the informants in Nakornpathom did when asked about their children’s future. Nonetheless, the disparities of the answers may occur as a result
of different locations and situations; the informants in Nakornpathom had better economic status than in Chiang Mai and Ubonrachtani respectively.
Populist policy was also one of the reasons suggested by Sathitniramai.
This supported Eawsriwong’s point about the reasons that the Red shirt participants supported Thaksin Shinawatra because the kind of “help” that the government gave was designed particularly to alleviate the informal workers’ burdens. In other words, it was not one of the alleviation in the patronage way like
what they usually received from politicians during election seasons, but the
welfare relief that happened because of their votes affected the policy-making
level. This means that the voters’ power had more value, also help improving
their well-being. Sathitniramai’s data (ibid) presented that in general the all of
the Red shirt informants had directly benefited from the populist policy. Often
times, it appeared that in literature, about the Red shirt that their supporters
tended to say that “Thaksin’s policy was edible” or “it is touchable concrete
democracy” (Sathitniramai 2010:32). The research also found that the Red shirt
informants felt that during Thaksin’s government, the country’s economy was
better, their products sold more, led to better changes in their economic status.
One of the informants said that his child could have his education because of
Thaksin making his economic status improve. The author found that within
the fact that people kept referring to Thaksin when talking about their better
quality in life shows the hidden patronage feelings in the politician-voter relationship, which, in this case, is bigger than the usual local politician patronage,
but in the national level. The importance of this relationship worth mentioning
because, for example; if a local politician helps his voters for something, only
the people in that area would know or talk about it. But in the national level,
many voters have the feeling and they know from media that other people are
in the same way relationship with this politician, thus it overwhelms the feeling
they have about the politician. Furthermore, the research indicated that many
of the informants mentioned about Thaksin that he was very sympathetic to
the people. Some even said that “he made the people became visible”.
Also because of the bureaucratic administration reformation during
Thaksin’s government had a noticeable effect on bureaucratic services. The
research informants expressed that the officers paid more respect to the people
and felt that services became more efficient. To support these statements,
13
some of the informants in Bangkok who were interviewed by the author also
revealed the same feeling about the bureaucratic services and added that because of the reformation, people in the slum learnt to work on communitybased development projects. She expressed that “now even the grocers know
how to write official project proposal”.
However, apart from the better improvement in the economy, the informants also praised Thaksin for the success in suppressing national dope
rings. This directly related to the informants’ daily lives because after the coup
in 2006 their children became or came back to drugs abuse. Together with the
achievement in reducing drugs abuse, the subjugation of influential people or
the godfather (Jao poh) also boosted Thaksin’s popularity in the eyes of the
informants because, again, it affected directly on the people’s daily lives. Some
of Sathitniramai’s informants stated they had to pay these influential people
when they brought their products to sell but after Thaksin these influential
people stopped harassing them.
In conclusion, the Sathitniramai’s research results showed that there
were three main reasons for the Red shirt informants to support the movement; 1.) to oppose the coup and the military political intervention, 2.) injustice
and double standard, 3.) Abhisit’s government did not come from election.
While these three political related reasons played important role in urging the
informants out to participate the protest, economic inequality seemed to be
less essential reason for them since the study found that none of the informants stated that economic inequality was an urgent agenda for them. In other
words, the motivation for the informants to support the movement was mainly
because of politics inequality.
3.3.2 The Red shirts protest mobilization
Whenever the mobilization of the Red shirt movement came in to the picture,
the three names of the most prominent leaders; Veera Musikapong, Jatuporn
Phromphan, and Nattawut Saikua need to be mentioned. The trio political
Southern elites who have become the image of the Red shirts, succeeded in
leading the most enormous political movement that comprised of the majority
of participants from the North and Northeast. Together with other sub-leaders
with various backgrounds and professions creating complex nexus between
groups of participants, the trios were able to induce the rallies in any direction
possible.
Thabchumpon and Mccargo’s research suggested that despite the fact
that many of the protesters were able to practice their agencies, but the importance of networking could not be overlooked. The paper indicated the significance of the community leaders’ role in recruiting the participants to join
the protest. It described the nature of this movement as a “loosely structured
network organization” (2010: 1009). To be more elaborated, the number of
participants grew through close relationships between people such as friends,
families, acquaintance, etc. In addition to this point, the author’s informant
who was a community leader in a slum in the urban area of Bangkok admitted
that both of the leading political parties came to the community and asked
each community leaders to recruit people to attend their political events.
14
The paper also presented that the networks building occurred during
the meeting at the UDD political schools, which initially scheduled on weekday
morning and eventually reduced to weekend only. The courses instructed by
many famous figures and took two to three days long. The schools were a great
start to increase the participants’ network within the Red shirt community. The
study indicated that numbers of people who joined the schools tended to create their own group after finishing the courses, instead of taking part in the
groups that were already there. The alumni, in fact, were the key contacts to
gather participants for the protest in 2010. Many of the alumni primarily joined
the demonstration in early the first quarter of the year but after the violent protest suppression by the military in April 10th, the majority of the participants
left the rally, while some of those believed to be the “hard-liners” moved on to
occupy the city center on Ratchaprasong junction. Thus, after the protest shifted to Ratchaprasong, the extremist became more influential in the movement.
Another point not only suggested by Thabchumpon and Mccargo
(2012), but also mentioned by Eawsriwong (2010) was the significance of how
the Red shirts communicate among themselves. This is a very interesting point
because the Red shirt movement was one of the most influential and had most
number of participants in Thailand’s street political history. The studies, both
by the reference and the author’s fieldwork, have found that the Red shirt supporters have been using various means of communication such as; community
radio channels, CDs and DVDs distribution, newsletter, social media, etc. The
study indicated that the communication was efficient that they could gather the
crowd within a short notice such as half an hour. In addition, Eawsriwong
(2010) had once addressed the change caused by the “real-time culture” as a
result of technological development that enabled individuals’ opportunity to
receive information in real time. In other words, the easier the information was
able to reach its audience, the faster the audience gets the chance to react. For
example, the author noticed that often times during the protest; social media
was well used as a stimulator through pictures, videos, and messages encouraging supporters to join the events, both by individuals and public pages. Moreover, some informants admitted that they had been daily following the Red
shirts’ media. One of the author’s interviewees in Bangkok said that she watch
the Red shirts’ channels at least eight hours a day because she also left the television on while she worked. The shows she watched were various from variety
talk show to political news analysis but always had to be from the Red shirt
cable company. Furthermore, according to Thabchumpon’s study, the community radio stations usually broadcasted in local language, instead of speaking
the official Thai. This should help the audience feel more connected to the
programs. Besides, the programs broadcasting in the Red shirts’ networks
could sometime be very entertaining such as music with satire lyrics related to
the action of their opponents on certain issues. Therefore, it was more likely
for the audience to follow and at the same time get the messages, whether hidden or not, from the programs.
In short, the mobilization of the Red shirt movement relied heavily on
the flow of connections, with the trio leaders; Veera, Jatuporn, and Nattawut
as main conductors. Around the three major figures were various groups of
connection. For example; the UDD school network not only had strong nexus
with the trios, but at the same time had crucial linkages with the provincial vote
canvassers who also had strong relations with the community radio network.
15
Each groups had their own strength, which helped widening and tightening
their relations within the movement. The use of media also played major role
in term of mobilizing the movement. Not only to expand the fan base, but also
one of the most efficient way to communicate with the followers.
3.4 The Red shirts’ “Prai-Ammart” discourse and the analysis
After series of rallies actively hosted by members of the Yellow shirt movement in Bangkok in the beginning of this chronicle political turmoil in 2005,
with the existing images the Yellow shirts imposed on Thaksin and his supporters, the UDD or the Red shirts took their part and carried on with the imposed image. On the contrary, they imposed an image back on the Yellow
shirts. The feudalist words “Prai” or “serf/peasant” and “Ammart” or “aristocrat” were brought back once again to the modern society and were widely
used to describe political protesters. These concepts indicated social inequality
since one usually referred to the rulers, while the other was used to describe
the ruled ones.
According to Eawsriwong (2010) Thai prominent historian, trace back
in the history the original meaning of prai was “freemen”. But the meaning of
the word had slightly altered as a result of the change in time and cultural context. During Ayuthaya 13period the word prai was used to describe “bondsmen” who were bonded to the masters. These masters were in various ranges
from the lower level of local aristocrats to the King. The prai’s responsibility
was to pay either monetary tribute or labor work. However, the prai system
was ended after King Rama V ratified Thailand’s first conscription, which as a
consequence it terminated the prai system from the country. Therefore, after
the political reformation by King Rama V, theoretically there should be no
more prai left in Thailand anymore. Yet, the term prai was continuously used
with slightly different meaning, which referred to the lower class of the society,
the non-privileged ones whose lives cannot be improved because of lack of
education and refined manner (rai gan suksa). Also, sometimes the word can
be used to call a person with no social etiquette or rude.
On the other hand, what is sitting on the opposite side of prai is ammart or the aristocrat who clearly were the one on the upper class of the society. In other words, ammart basically means the ones who are in the decent
economic, political, and social status, which believed to be there only because
of their privileges created by the ammart culture that enabled their access to
wealth, education and other privilege opportunities. In addition, according to
the content of the Red shirt speeches, it seemed that the major vice of ammart
in the eyes of the Red shirts was the idea that these elites kept all the resources
only to sustain their wealth by excluding others from it.
However, the prai-ammart discourse was brought up by the Red shirts
to use in their protests. The notion of prai could be summed up as the oppres-
Between 1350-1757 A.D., Ayuthaya was the capital of the Kingdom of Thailand
before Thonburi (1757-1782) and Bagkok (1782-present)
13
16
sion and exploitation of the non-privileged people by the elites14. This notion
was also very useful in a way that it helped the Red shirts to unite the people
who lived in the rural area. Eawsriwong suggested that the concept of prai
covered all the Red shirts’ agendas; injustice, double standard and inequality
caused by the attempt of the elites who kept all the resources for their own
good. Nonetheless, in the author’s opinion, the significant purpose of the praiammart discourses was to create a clear cut between the divisions of people
that eventually led to class struggle.
It is also important to note that in fact, if we look closely to the qualities needed to be part of the privilege groups or ammart, Thaksin fitted all
those qualities. Thus, the question to be answered is “How could the Red shirt
icon be part of what they were fighting against?” The key to this question is
that despite all his wealth and everything, Thaksin portray himself as a victim
of injustice and implementation of double standards by his opponent. For example, in the interview published by the Financial Times in April 2009, he described his situations and the reasons why he was ousted and convicted.
“They pushed me into a corner every day. They bullied me. After I had
been ousted, I called the generals and I called Prime Minister Surayud and I said I am happy to be ousted so I can spend time with family. I could relax because I have been working
hard for many years already. But I said, don’t bully me politically. If you bully me politically
I have to fight back politically. I had done nothing wrong, they just arranged it
by using all my political opponents on the committee to investigate me.
“The court is based on the allegations of the investigating committee, which is my opponent. In normal times, if you think the judge
on the bench is not fair you can ask for a change. But this time they just
put some judge on even though they are my opponents and the investigative teams are all my opponents.”(Bold emphasis by the author)
From the interview, the image Thaksin imposed on his opponent was
clear. He stated frankly his belief that his judicature was a result of his opponents’ favoritism. Also, the undertone of this statement was that his political
opponents were pulling some strings on his case. Therefore, the fact that the
court found him guilty, must have solely been because of the patrons. To him,
the case was obviously not a fair fight. Thus, this injustice situation explained
commonality he had with the protesters and answers why the despite his privilege roots, still he was the Red shirt icon.
One other significant hidden meaning of patronage directly linked back
to the class inequality between prai and ammart, was the believed that the military coup who overthrew Thaksin from his chair was approved by the higher
power. Ji Ungpakorn (2007), one of the most prominent leftist scholars who
often criticize the role of the royal family in Thailand, had stated in “a coup for
the rich” that he believed that the 19th September coup was supported by the
royal family. He was filed for the Lese Majeste law violation15 because of the
claims he made about the role of the monarch in the coup. Together with the
belief imposed by the Yellow shirt that the Red shirts were anti-monarchy
movement, despite the fact that there was not many evidence that Ungpakorn
14
TNEWS (2006), Thaksin’s ammart
12 January 2009
15Thaingo
17
involved with the UDD a lot, it was really for their opponents to generalize
that as a whole the Red shirts were anti-monarchy movement.
He also claimed that the media was threatened not to report Thaksin’s
or his supporters’ views. Ungpakorn also cited a part of interview with General
Sonthi, the head of the coup, to emphasize that in the eyes of Thai conservative political elites always believed that the poor were not, or even never, ready
for true democracy. Furthermore, he pointed that the budget bureau during the
civilian government, which was appointed as a result of the coup, had cut the
subsidy for the populist universal healthcare program by 23 percent. As he
continued provocatively making his point relating to the civilian government
officers as they were making a career by getting blood out of a stone.
“…the illegitimate dictatorship government was staffed by ancient and
conservative civil servants and self-serving scientists and technocrats without any integrity or
democratic principles. This collection of autocrats ensured that they would not go
hungry by paying themselves fat cat salaries, no doubt funded out of
savings made by cutting the pro-poor policies of the previous government.” (Bold emphasis by the author)
From the author’s point of view, Ungpakorn did present significant
points that explained the reasons for the Red shirts’ agendas, which we be further elaborated. However, the words used were instigating which clearly dramatized the frustration of the Red shirt supporters. It is important to note that
his article was in English. Thus, unless translations, it could not get to the mass
of the Red shirt participants. Yet, it could easily influence his academic followers’ work and thoughts.
One of the interesting points Ungpakorn made by a quote from General Sonthi’s speech about the poor being not ready for democracy indicated
mindset that the rulers had about the ruled.
“I suspect many Thais still lack a proper understanding of democracy. The people have to understand their rights and their duties. Some have yet to learn about
discipline. I think it is important to educate the people about true democratic rule” (Bold
emphasis by the author)
This statement emphasized the prai-ammart discourse. The quote indicated that the head of the coup had seen the people (chao baan) as if they were
not able to make their own choices democratically. Such point of view from
significant political elite like General Sonthi was a good emphasis for the inequality discourse where the one of the most crucial claims had the sense of disrespect from the ruler over the ruled. As a consequence of disrespect, it constructed frustration within the poor’s hearts. For example, from Sathitniramai’s
research, there was an interviewee from the Northeast who expressed that the
governmental services were much better during Thaksin government. The civil
servants treated the people with more respect. In a way, this indicated that the
people had been facing disrespectful treatments, until Thaksin came into power and changed the way the government officials treated their customers. Consequently, it made a lot of sense that the poor felt that Thaksin was the inequality alleviator. Hence, when the coup, which constantly claimed to be
supported by the conservatives or the ammart, had taken place, it also symbolized the destruction of the Thaksin’s newly established entity that seemingly
led to better improvement in the poor’s lives. In other words, the coup repre18
sented the ammart. While Thaksin represented inequality reduction. Thus, the
coup overthrew Thaksin equated with ammart obstructed inequality reduction.
Another essential point needed to be made is the relevant of the role of
the monarchy and the aristocrats over the poor. Before the relation between
prai and ammart can be understood in this sense, the relation between the
monarchy and the aristocrats required to be first elaborated. Since in the Red
shirt discourse, the aristocrats often seemed to be sustained by the monarchy.
The aristocrats involving in the discourse can be categorized into two different
types, the military and the civilian elites. In this case, it is clear that the military
elites had intensely involved in the political arena by conducting the coup in
2006 and undermining core entity of democratic regime, as the Red shirt supporters might put it. One of the reasons that the Council Democratic Reform
gave in the statement after the coup was “the government’s constant violation
of Lese Majeste16”. This reason was clearly used to legitimize the coup; also it
was on the agenda of the Yellow shirts who kept requesting for the military’s
action to overthrow the current government. Thus, it is not an overstatement
to say that there was the link between the military coup and the monarchy. In
addition, General Prem the head of the Privy Council had the title “General”
before his name also emphasized the close connection between the monarch
and the military in the eyes of ordinary people. As well as the fact that the Red
shirt leaders and Thaksin usually referred to General Prem who had close relationship with the King as the “head of ammart”, was very convincing of the
relation between the monarch and the military.
Furthermore, as mentioned, the Yellow shirts were homogeneous
group, which comprised of conservative middle class who had better social and
economic status than the Red shirt in general. This characteristic of the Yellow
shirts, together with the shared belief that they were protesting in the name of
the royal family and some interactions between the Yellow shirts and monarchy, had made it easy for their opponent to make a conclusion about the link
between the group and the monarchy. For example, the Queen and one of the
princesses went to one of the Yellow shirt supporters’ cremation 17. Another
important situation that not only emphasized the Red shirts claim about the
nexus between the monarchy and the aristocrats or the Yellow shirts, but also
confirmed the validity of their agenda about inequality, is the case when the
Yellow shirts occupied the international airport and the government house in
2008 but none of the leaders were convicted for their case, while all of the Red
shirt leaders were found guilty for instigating the violent protests in 2009-2010
and other cases such as lese Majeste as well. This explained why the Red shirts’
concept of double standards was convincing; not only because it was something the poor had been facing regularly in their routine lives, but even such
remarkable movements aimed to changed inequality between two classes also
verified the validity of the claim. This frustration could be confirmed by one of
Sathitniramai’s informant who expressed that the Red shirt movement was the
movement with no privilege.
16
17
The Secretary to the Parliamentary Officials Commission
Matichon online, 13 Octoberber 2008
19
3.5 Conclusion
To sum up, the prai-ammart discourse was created to construct identities of
the protesters to unite the participants and build solid agendas to fight for, also
to draw a sharp line between the two different classes. On one hand, the concept of the non-privileged poor or prai was taken by the Red shirts whose crucial plan was to create equality for all under the name of democracy. On the
other hand, the concept of the privileged middle class, bureaucrats and elites or
ammart was taken by the Yellow shirts. An important issue that the Red shirt
used against the Yellow shirt was that the elites had been blocking the poor
from the accessibility to resources to sustain the former’s power. This whole
concept of implementation of double standards and inequality was used by
Thaksin to portray his commonality to the Red shirt participants, along with
the image of poverty alleviation provider; Thaksin was able to buy the heart of
the excluded ones. Furthermore, the head of the coup’s viewpoint on the people indicated disrespectful attitude that the conservative ruler had over the
people, together with the fact that Thaksin, the poor icon, was ousted created
discontinuity in people’s lives and indicated the comeback of the conservative
power which oppressed the poor before Thaksin came. Lastly, the connection
between the royal family and the Yellow shirt participants was constantly used
to emphasize the inequality between the two classes, namely prai and ammart.
20
Chapter 4
Symbolization of the politicized discourse
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is built upon the previous chapter about the politicized discourses
that were constructed in favor of the street political actors. It presents the analysis of how the concept of inequality was used as a discourse in political protest. In this chapter, evidence from Red shirt supporter interviews, together
with media analysis are used to gain insight into the perception of the Red shirt
participants in the society.
4.2 Symbolizing the concept of inequality in political protest
4.2.1 Thaksin, populism, and Pro-democracy movement
In the previous chapter, the author has elaborated the how the discourse relating to inequality, the prai and ammart, was constructed to provide the understanding of the emergence of the conflict and its mobilization. The importance
of the constructed discourse was to emphasize the hierarchical structure of the
society. Hence, it is clear that inequality is no new issue in Thai society. From
both the Yellow and the Red shirts seemed to be very comfortable to adopt
the image based on the concept of classes.
One of the most significant identities of the Red shirt protesters was
the poor. This image is falsified by several studies18; at least they have proven
the Red shirts usually were not the poorest of the country. Still many people,
both the supporters themselves and the none-supporters (not only their opponents but the neutralists as well), had the perception that the majority of the
Red shirt supporters were the poor, despite the fact that there were many other
different groups within the Red shirt supporters. In addition, Stephen Young
(2010) made an interesting point in his article, which based mainly on comparison of the Gini coefficient index of countries in the world, especially in the
same region as Thailand. The point made was that Thailand’s index was at 42,
which was slightly less than some other countries in Asean. Therefore, Young’s
argument was the question why Thai politicians and foreign commentators
gave so much weight to the inequality problems while comparing to other
countries, China, for instant, even when it had already went through the Maoist
social and economic equalization, had more inequality than Thailand. Since
evidence had shown that Thailand’s distribution of family income was not as
high as other countries where this issue did not come along in the political arena as much, then what was it in Thailand that had made this problem important? He suggested that the true issue lied on the country’s values and traditions that held people down. This claim conforms to the interview with the
18Sathitniramai
(2010), Thabchumpon and Mccargo (2012)
21
author’s Red shirt informant who described that “for the Red shirt participants
(chao baan), it was about inequality. People were not so patient anymore, these days. When
they went to a hospital, they had waited in line, and then all the good (wealthy) looking people were able to get the treatment first. You know, people experienced these things and it accumulated” Her statement indicated that there the poor had to face discrimination regularly. Hence, it is plausible to conclude that frustration began to
accumulate inside individuals who had to experience discrimination frequently,
as a result of the hierarchy that had always been attached to Thai social structure. This can also answer Young’s question why inequality was so important
that it could have such great impact in Thai politics.
It is clear that the Red shirt movement was started as a reaction to the
coup in 2006 with the official agenda of democracy redemption, however; at
the time, the hidden agenda widely accepted by their opponents was to bring
back the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The reason behind this
belief was supported by many agendas the Red shirts had to set always related
directly or indirectly to Thaksin. For example, during the Red shirt occupation
in Bangkok, Thaksin regularly had his communication with the protesters
through live video call on the protest stage19. Protest recordings showed that
the participants’ morale seemed to be boosted after Thaksin had phoned in to
talk to the people. The reason why Thaksin’s actions cannot be taken for
granted is because from the elaborated point made in the previous chapter
about the populist policy introduced by Thaksin in the first time he ran for
Premiership election. The populist policy had played crucial role in alleviating
inequality, which frustrated the discriminated ones. Thus, the Prime Minister
who came in during the economic crisis promising he would make people’s
lives better and was able to fulfill his promises, definitely won the favor of the
benefited people. These people who undoubtedly became his supporters tended to be informal workers with no registration to any kind of social security
system20. Therefore, the populist policy had impacted so much positive on
their lives. One of the informants expressed that she loved Thaksin because
the healthcare policy had help her disabled child to get good medical service
she could not possibly pay for it without the populist policy.
One most interesting comment about the “Thaksin’s policy” argument
was the fact that after his exile the populist policy continued by Abhisit’s government21, yet the Red shirt supporters did not give any credit to Prime Minister Abhisit for the continuation of the policy. This possibly led by two reasons.
Firstly, Abhisit’s government was the first government after Thaksin was ousted; the Red shirts believed that the government did not obtain the power righteously. Also because at that time the Yellow shirts used to support the Democrat party, which was Abhisit party, hence, he must have been representing
their enemy. Secondly, Thaksin had labeled himself to the populist policy by
creating an image of the first who thought of policy designed for the excluded
ones. For instant, from an interview with the Financial Times (2010), he stated
that “If you trace back what is happening in Thailand you would see that my admin-
istration the first that came from the result of the very liberal constituBangkok Post, 20 May 2012
Sathitniramai (2010)
21 Kapook.com/highlighnews
19
20
22
tion. I have been successful because of the policy platform I laid out. It was the first
time in elections that we had a policy platform, the people liked it and we won
more than 50 per cent of the vote. That is the first time in Thai history. I am trying to
act in a very democratic way to help the poor.” This statement can be more
elaborated as Canovan has put it. “Populists see themselves as true democrats, voicing
popular grievances and opinions systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties
and the media. Many of them favor ‘direct democracy’ – political decision making by referendum and popular initiative. Their professed aim is to cash in democracy’s promise of power to
the people”. To Canovan, it seems that populism is a way to appeal to the existing authority, not the challenge the power structures. Their most prominent
claim is that they speaks for the true voice of the people, which, in other
words, means they are practicing democracy, not just representing sectional
interest such as economic class. In the case of Thailand, the point Canovan
made can simply explain why in spite of the fact that the Red shirt participants
were not poorest of the poor, but the lower middle class or even people with
better economic status joined the movement. Also, it indicates a strong linkage
between populist policy and pro-democracy movement.
4.3 Amplifying the concept of inequality
4.3.1 The role of elite and the use of media in mobilization
There might be a solid ground for the nexus between populism and democracy
but without a strong catalyst, it might not be enough reasons for individuals to
actually come out to the street and take part in the movement. To answer the
question how the concept of inequality was constructed during the protest, the
author believes that the full understanding of this phenomenon can be reached
by exploring how the Red shirts communicated among themselves during the
protest. The role of the media; mass and social media is examined to give insight into the Red shirts’ point of view.
Incontestably, despite of the dominant image of the lower class, the
political elites had played significant role in mobilizing the movement. This
point conforms to Fischer’s argument (2011) that literatures tend to blame the
poor for conflicts started by inequality issue, while studies have proven that
elite participation also have significant role in leadership and core support.
Adding to the point, Pintobtang also pointed the Red shirt movements as a
‘top roots’ movement, instead of seeing it as the grassroots as others usually
claim (op. cit. Thabchumpon and Mccargo, 2011). The question is how did
these leaders mobilize the people? How did they manage to draw people out to
the join the protest? The following paragraph shall provide more understanding to answer this question.
4.3.2 The leaders’ roles
The protest leaders or the elites in the Red shirt movement were more like directors of a street theater. Most of their public activities were on the protest
ground, where they communicated with their supporters. There were various
23
groups of the Red shirt elites who came to the protest platform but there were
only the three southerner leaders who always there on the official stage22. In
fact, they became the icon of the movement. From the author’s observation, it
seemed that each of the leaders had their own characteristic that attracted the
audiences’ interest. For example, Nattawut Saikua, a good looking political
comedian23 who had the ability to keep participants to stay on the ground, was
always kept to be the last to speak on stage. Furthermore, the style of speeches
the leaders gave was very critical. They were straight forward in terms of criticizing the existing social structure via the tool of ‘prai-ammart’ discourse,
which clearly relating to the legal power of the royal family that had always
been closed issue in Thai society. This, together with many others issues represented on the stage had triggered curiosity of the participants and also the motivation for the participants to support the protests. In addition, in order to
understand the Red shirts’ point of view, it is necessary to listen to the content
of what the leaders had said on stage. For example, a speech by Nattawut Saikua on 25th February 2010, he suggested that “…all my respect to my brothers and
sisters, you need to understand Thai social situations. After the morning of 24 June 1932,
the constitutional monarchy has been in practice. The King and the royal institution were
raised up above the political institution and should not be concerned with ordinary people’s
political activity. Therefore, we shall analyze the ordinary people’s political activities… Thai
society claims that it is democratic. But that is only words, the content is actually not. That’s
why Thailand has this group of people who claim that they are the upper class. These upper
class people did not come from heaven or anything, they are just ordinary people. They are just
ordinary prai. But they were able to gather all the resources and move up to the top of Thailand’s societal structure. These people are the one who ripen the power resource of the ammart.
And who are these people? They’re the nobles, war heroes, the capitalist and scholars who set
up their own place on the top of the social structure…24 ” From Nattawut’s speech, the
author finds a well structured pattern of speech which can easily follow the
causality of the problems the leaders would want to present to the participants.
Hence, it is not surprising to hear that the Red shirt supporters found the leaders’ speech interesting and help expanding their understanding of the situations. In fact, interviewees who had taken part in the Red shirt rallies expressed
that they decided to support the Red shirt because after joining the protest they
felt that their mind had been opened up. A seventy years old informant said
that “I listened to the Red shirts, and then I analyzed what they were saying. And I realized
that the Democrat party was fooling us all along.” While another informant expressed
“I liked the Red shirts because they have taught me how to analyze. I didn’t believe in things
as easy as I used to”. Note that the word “analyze” came up during the interviews
many times. It seemed that the power of eye-opening information the informants received from the protest, had played major role in the supporters’ decision to continue joining the Red shirt movement.
4.3.3 Leaders-people relations
Thabchumpon and Mccargo
Nattawut Saikua used to have a role in political sarcastic show called “Spa Joke” or
paliarment jokes
24 Link from Youtube - Pattaya, Nattawut: class struggle under the feet of the aristocrat, or 2010 02 25@2312 พัทยา ณัฐวุฒิ สงครามชนชัน้ นายกไทยใต้ อ้ งุ ตีนอามาตย์
22
23
24
Furthermore, the emphasis made by Pintobtang(2010) that the Red shirt
movement involved with high degree of the top roots participation. He concluded the result from 400 questionnaires from the Red shirt participants during the Bangkok occupation in 2010. One of the issues he pointed out was “the
impact of public policy, government’s development projects and standards had become crucial
resource in terms of productions and welfare. Whether it was called populism or not, it had
become such necessity in individuals’ lives. Hence, individuals had no other choices but joining
the political movement from the community level such as forming groups or organizations,
tighten up their relationship with the political brokers (huakanan), village leaders, sub district headmen, etc. Then national politics had become unavoidable.” In short, Pintobtang’s point was the result of the new policy led to better standards in life.
This was the motivation for the people to join the movement by making use of
connections they have with their local politicians, resulted in national level of
political participation. On the contrary, the author’s informants had expressed
different stories, yet highly relating to the point he made about the relationships between the local politicians and their people. Instead of individuals
seeking for the middleman, the case was the middleman seeking for participants. After an in-depth interview with one of the Red shirt supporters who
was a community leader in Bangkok, she admitted that sometimes the local
politicians would come to hers and neighboring communities and asked the
leaders to gather ten people to join their events. And the politician would pay
for the transportation, lunch, and some extra daily allowance. Also, another
informant expressed that she participated both the Red and the Democrat
(used to be supported by the Yellow shirts at that time) events since they both
paid her, yet her genuine supports only went to the Red shirts. Thus, from the
interviews it seemed that despite the fact that the participants were paid to join
the events; still they had solid opinions of whom to be supported25. However,
the relations between the people and the middleman, whether it was the middleman searching for the people or vice versa, still had significant influence in
the process of movement mobilization.
In addition, one specific point the author found during the fieldwork,
also based heavily on the relations between the people and the politicians, was
the main reason why the people in the particular urban community who could
easily access both the Red and the Yellow shirts movement, chose to support
the Red shirt movement instead of the Yellow. All of the informants stated in
the same direction that despite it was a Yellow shirts dominant district, most of
the poor still supported the Red shirt because they had been let down by the
Democrat’s politicians, who had been dominating district representative elections for so long. All of the informants expressed that the Democrat representative team had not been transparent. An informant stated that “I used to be
in the inner circle of a candidate from the Democrat party. I noticed that during the election
season. They tended to say something that was not true. (The candidate said) “I have never
bought vote or anything” but I (the informant) was the one who went to take the money from
their officer. I used to be their broker… I had listened to what they had to say and it was
Note that Pintobtang’s point was made to explain the situations in the rural area,
while the author’s informants were from urban community who had more opportunity to join the rallies anytime they wanted since the costs of commuting were not as
high as the people from other provinces.
25
25
always lies. For example, these days they received budget from the Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration, they never revealed the number how much they had received or how much
they had spent. But they had enough money to take their followers to travel to other provinces
or even to Laos. They also categorized people from the trips, they could tell who their followers
were, and who were not. And they would never invite people outside of their own group”.
These points about the Democrat being corrupted and especially excluding the
people who were not supporting them from certain activities came up from
every single interviewee, despite the fact that they did not know what other
interviewees had expressed about. However, in this case, it seems that the real
issue lies on the fact that the Democrat non-followers have seen the discrimination and exclusion applied on themselves by the local politicians. This has
matured the frustration among the people. For this reason, along with the benefits they have received from Thaksin’s populist policy, the people in the
community, therefore, turned to support the Red shirt movement.
4.3.4 The use of media
It is clear that the political elites had played major part in mobilizing the
movement but only through mass media that their messages were amplified.
Media is the most effective form of communication that enables expansion of
information. One of the most crucial features of the Red shirt movement was
the fact that Thaksin’s family owned one of Thailand’s biggest telecommunication service companies, namely Thaicom Public Company Limited before
Thaksin sold it to a Singaporean company26. The family was very keen on the
business; later on in 2009 they started the first online television station called
“VoiceTV” with Panthongtae Shinawatra, Thaksin’s eldest son, as the president of the company. Hence, VoiceTV had become one of the most recognized Red shirt broadcast company. Other than VoiceTV, there were several
other stations that advertised themselves as the “Red shirt channels” such as
Asia Update (cable TV), Spring news (all-in-one media), and DTV (satellite
TV). The point to be made is that there variety of alternative media for the Red
shirt followers. Thus, the chance of amplifying the Red shirts messages was
widened.
Another means to use information communication technology still lies
basically on the internet. Study27 indicates the increase in the use of internet
services in Thailand. Therefore, more information can be easily accessed. This
explains why social media has been playing crucial role in setting the dynamic
of the movement. However, other types of information sources are also available online. For example, online newspaper, live television application, etc.
These are one major reason why the use of internet had so much significance
in the protest.
Wikipedia is one of the most common websites appear in the search
engine’ result. The website is free online encyclopedia that allows anyone with
access to the site to collaboratively edit any of the articles posted. As much as it
is its advantage, it cannot deny that this is also its weak point. Since anyone
The Asian Times, 3 February 2010
Nectec: Internet Information Research Network Technology Lab, 8 November
2012
26
27
26
with access can edit the content of the articles, it is undeniable the chance of
the information being manipulated is high as well. What relates to the point is
that the articles relating to the Red shirt insurgence, which is part of the series
of articles called “Thai political crisis in 2005-2010”28. The series presented articles giving all the details about the political situations that happened, together
with analysis of the causalities. But from the author’s observation, it seemed
that the articles were not representing the message from both parties in interest. It indicated details of what the military under supervised by the government had done to the Red shirt protesters, but not what had happened to the
government and the soldiers who were at the frontline. For example, what is
representing on the Wikipedia about a situation is “Arisman Pongruangrong led the
dissidents from Bangkok to protest in Pattaya. He negotiated with the Governor of Cholburi
to submit a letter of request to the representatives of the Secretary of ASEAN. Then he
would return to Bangkok without thwarting the summit on April 11th.”29 On the contrary, according to recording evidence and other news sources30, what had happened was that the protesters under his lead caused the cancellation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in April 2009 at the Royal Cliff
Grand Hotel. Moreover, as a result the government had to immediately evacuate the delegates via helicopter to avoid the violent protest led by Arisman. The
point the author would like to make from presenting this issue is the development of information communication technology has facilitated information
accessibility to individuals. And one of the most famous free and easiest to access information sources online that should be neutral is manipulated. It would
not be overstated to conclude that there is a high possibility for information
distortion of the audiences, especially those who follow only one-sided perspective sources. Furthermore, interviews with the Red shirt supporters indicated that five out of six interviewers agreed that after joining the Red shirt
movement they became more active in terms of learning more information.
However, it is important to note that despite the fact that the informants said
they wanted to learn more about what was actually going on because of the
curiosity induced by the information given by the Red shirt media, the major
information source they followed was the one that supported the Red shirts.
On the contrary, Rivke Jaffe (2012: 646-647) has explained the role of
information communication technology from such contrast angle that “as new
developments in information communication technology allow these representations themselves
to become increasingly mobile, the scope of for mobilization broadens. The successful referencing of different scales that such mobile representations allow can function as a political tool for
marginalized urban groups. In many cases, possibility of transnational virtual mobility —
communication and exchange facilitated through cheap access to mass media, telephones and
the internet — informs and stimulates local mobilizations of the urban poor”. The point
she has made indicates how the urban poor, in this case the protesters; make
28
วิกฤตการณ์การเมืองไทย พ .ศ.2548-2553
The real quote in Thai from the Wikipedia “นายอริ สมันต์ พงษ์ เรื องรอง
นาผู้ชมุ นุมจากกรุ งเทพมหานคร ไปชุมนุมที่พทั ยา
นายอริ สมันต์เจรจากับผู้ว่าราชการจังหวัดชลบุรีเพื่อขอยื่นหนังสือกับตัวแทนสานักงานเลขาธิการอาเซียน แล้ วจะเดินทางกลับ
โดยยืนยันจะไม่ขดั ขวางการประชุมในวันที่ 11 เมษายน”
30 Pattaya mail, 21 September 2012
29
27
use of the information communication technology. As for Thailand case, social
media such as facebook and twitter had played great role in communication
both between the leaders and the participants, and among the participants
themselves. Many political fan pages were set up both by the Red and the Yellow shirts, as well as the frustrated neutralists who in the end seemed to be taking side anyway. For example, “Red Intelligence” was created as a fan page on
facebook with over 12,000 followers after the Red shirt protest to use as a
means of communication among the Red shirts. News and event updates are
actively posted on the page, together with comments from the page administrators that can sometimes be more instigating rather than just neutral comments about situations. On the other hand, their opponents also have their
own fan pages as well. “Watch Red Shirt” is a group with more than 88,000
followers on facebook, twitter and youtube. Their fan page was formed during
the violent protest in 2010 to keep the followers posted on the protest situations. Even though the violent situations stopped, yet the group has been actively mobilized. News and updates about the Red shirts and disloyal actions
have been daily sharing. Nonetheless, not only the street political activists who
make use of the cheap, interactive, and accessible by ordinary people, but politicians also have their own pages, which allow them to communicate with their
supporters. In addition, the author finds the most fascinating part of the use of
these social media was the fact that it gives ordinary people more space to express their feeling and political opinion. This point is highly related to Jaffe’s
comment about the development of information communication technology
that the cheap access to media allows opinion exchange to happen that informs
and stimulates the dynamic of the movements. However, the author doubts
whether their opinions would actually be heard by any influential political figures. Despite the fact that people can easily post what they have in mind directly on the fan page, but from the author’s observation, what most likely seemed
to be the case is the followers either give support to the politicians, or condemn their opponents, instead of giving neutral useful comments.
Last but not least, the use of recordings. To this point, it is clear that
internet played crucial part in political movement mobilization in Thailand. It is
undeniable that the most famous and easiest to access recording media online
is “youtube.com” has been used to share information and sometimes even to
instigate the situations. Both the Red shirts and their opponents have been actively made use of the internet sharing media. This point can simply be seen by
all the evidence the author has been providing in this and the earlier chapter.
However, from the fieldwork, some of the informants suggested that at the
Red shirt protest and events, another type of media was provided. Rather than
selling books or giving out flyers, CDs and DVDs were also available for individuals to purchase. From the author’s observation, it seems that these DVDs
contain various kinds of information; speeches from the Red shirt monk who
claimed to teach individuals how to deal with political issue problems peacefully31, five and a half hours long of a hundred different video clips relating to the
Red shirt protest with no narration32. This includes documentary on the Red
shirt movement, academic discussion relating to the Red shirts’ agenda such as
31
32
No justice, No peace
Dissolve the Red shirt, situation May 2010
28
seminar about the status of the monarchy, series of the Red shirt leaders’
speeches, etc. The significance of these DVDs is that it is an easy way to
spread their messages to the interested individuals. Especially those with academic contents, the author finds that by watching the DVDs, it is more interesting and much easier for non-academic individuals to follow than reading
academic jargon that might take a lot more time to read than to listen to the
discussion on the DVDs. The content showing in the media sometimes also
have much influence in terms of emphasizing the prai-ammart discourse by
either talking directly about it; explaining what the concept is, or indirectly
mentioning about it by calling themselves ‘prai’ and their opponents ‘ammart’
4.4 Conclusion
The evidence analysis indicated that the emergence of the Red shirt’s inequality
agenda lies upon the hierarchy structure of the country. Interviews indicated
life experience of the Red shirt supporters gave insight into the reasons why
those who considered themselves to be poor chose to join the Red shirt
movement, instead of the other. Thaksin’s populist policy has played significant part in terms of fashioning the agenda. It seems that he has successfully
symbolized himself as an inequality alleviator. Along with the basic concept of
democracy where every citizen is equal, hence, Thaksin who has introduced
populist policy and reduced inequality also is the true democratic leader. This
starter idea was amplified by the participation of the protest leaders, together
with the use of media.
29
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The Research paper explores what is the root cause of the political protest relating to inequality in Thailand and how the concept of inequality was used
during the political protest mobilization in Thailand during 2006-2010. The
analysis based on theories relating to inequality, populism, frame alignment,
and collective identity, which supported by findings from fieldwork; a politically active urban community in Bangkok, together with findings from media
analysis gain more insight in order to understand how the Red shirt supporters
conceptualized their protest and what was the core reasons for the people to
join the protest.
5.1 The root cause of the inequality-induced political protest
The result of the analysis shows that the roots of the conflict can be broken
down into 2 main points; the embedded social and cultural inequality, and the
rapid change in economic inequality. These two different points were the essential elements where two diverse groups, namely the Red and the Yellow
shirt movement used against each other. Fundamentally, the problems are far
complicated than what were these two fighting for because directly or indirectly they were fighting against each other’s principles, while each of them were
represented the end of the road. To be more elaborated, the Yellow shirt,
started first between the two movements, represented conservative movement
that struggling to maintain their position. Together with the politicized issue of
the Lese Majeste law violation by many of the Red shirt supporters, or the ‘alleged’ Red shirt supporters, that was used as political instrument to call out the
monarch loyalists to join the protest against the other party, at the same time,
to destroy their opponents’ legitimacy. Note that in Thailand, firstly, the monarch is widely fond by the people. Secondly, the violation of Lese Majeste law
is considered as criminal case, which sentence of minimum three years to maximum fifteen years. Thus, politicizing this issue not only means the Yellow
shirt leaders would be able to call out all the loyalists, but also means they
would have an extremely effective tool to put their political opponents away
legally. On the other hand, Eawsriwong (2010b) suggests that the core factor
that drove the Yellow shirt is the widened economic inequality resulted in the
rising cost of living. In other words, the fact that the living expense rose up
and the middle class was not able to obtain the same living standard they used
to have led to the economic grievance among the middle class (this point shall
be more elaborated in the following paragraph).
Meanwhile the impact of the change expanded throughout the society,
Thaksin Shinawatra the Prime Minister at the time had introduced the populism to the country for the first time. With the concept of populism, Thaksin’s
policy was during the protest interpreted as the edible democracy or what some
of the Red shirt supporters described that “it is touchable concrete democracy”
(Sathitniramai 2010:32) because the populism is considered to be the means for
the people to appeal against the existing structure and values of the society
30
(Canovan 1999: 3). In other words, populism paves the way for the excluded
ones to access resources leads to inequality reduction, thus, more equality
means democracy. This causality of populism, inequality, and democracy, was
emphasized to represent the fight of the Red shirt movement.
The crucial impacts of populism are required to be elaborated on both
the Yellow and the Red sides. Firstly, for the Yellow shirt movement, as mentioned above that the alteration of economy has had significant effect on the
middle class as Eawsriwong (2010b) explains that those elements that segregate
the middle class from the lower middle class or the poor by maintaining or improving their status such as education, has become standardized. That is to say
that the affordable privilege they used to have is being taken away. Hence, the
change caused the grievance. In contrast, the Red shirts have been directly
benefitted from the populism. Studies33show that the Red shirt supporters tend
to be those who work in informal sector where social security system does not
apply to. Thus, many of the populist policies have played major part in improving their life standard. For example, the universal healthcare scheme helps the
patient or family who were not able to afford medical expense to access health
service without becoming in debt. As an outcome, many of the beneficiaries
joined the protest to support Thaksin who is symbolized as the inequality alleviator.
In addition to the point that the beneficiaries tend to be informal
workers, the finding analysis of this paper found that the Red shirt movement
was generally perceived by the supporters and the non-supporters as the struggle of the poor sympathizers or the hired ones34 since during the movement
the supporters had been actively called themselves the serf or the peasant implying the poor status regardless to their actual economic status35. For this reason, the economic inequality is often seen as the gist of the Red shirt movement. Therefore the perception was formed. On one hand, empirical
evidence36indicates that for the Red shirt supporters economic grievance,
namely the gap between the rich and the poor, are not as crucial as it is for the
Yellow shirts, for them to join the movement. On the contrary, studies show
that the true motivation of the protesters lied upon political and social inequality, instead of economic inequality as usually understood. As Eawsriwong
(2010b) points that by choosing the word ‘Prai’ or serf that can be summed up
as the oppression of the elites over the ordinary people, to create collective
identity for the supporters, the Red shirts were able to frame all the issues relating to inequality within one concept. Furthermore, it was not only striding
forward to the points they wanted to make, but also striding back to the issues
that Yellow had thrown to them at the same time.
5.2 How the concept of inequality was used to mobilize the protest
Sathitniramai (2010)
Prawase Wasi, op. cit.: Thabchumpon and Mccargo (2012), Urbanized villagers in the
2010 Thai Redshirt protests, p. 998-999
35 Ibid., p. 1000
36 Sathitniramai (2010), p. 33
33
34
31
Undeniable, both the Yellow and the Red shirt movements were fuelled by
problems caused by inequality. Yet, surprisingly in this case, economic inequality and political, cultural, and social inequality are segregated. However, the focus of this paper is on the Red shirts’ inequality discourses that link strongly
with political, cultural and social inequality.
The analysis finds that in order to mobilize the Red shirt movement,
the protest leaders had played the major role in conducting the street politics.
Yet, in terms of participant recruitment, the movement depended heavily on
networking between local leaders and individuals. This is not only emphasized
by the literature or secondary data, but the information gathered during the
fieldwork also indicates the same insight. Interviews were conducted with Red
shirt supporters who resided in a lower middle class to poor community located near the ‘regular’ protest area in Bangkok. Five out of six informants were
Red shirt supporters, while the other one refused to be part of the Red shirts,
yet refused to the Yellow shirt followers as well. Nonetheless, the findings
from the fieldwork indicate unhealthy relationships between the informants
and the Yellow shirt local politicians reflect on the informants’ decision to turn
against the Yellow shirt movement. Along with the fact that the informants are
direct beneficiaries from Thaksin’s populist policy and the social similarity they
found in other Red shirt protesters, these reasons pushed them toward the Red
shirts’ side of the road. As a consequence, by taking part in the protests, the
participants began to tend toward the Red shirts. The most significant reason
the informants expressed is the discussion among the Red shirt had been eyeopening information that helped them gaining their analysis skills. Thus, with
this new lens they had put on, they could never look at Thai politics in the
same way they used to before.
The last point needed to be made is the role of media in the mobilization. Jaffe (2012: 646-647) describes the result of technology development in
expansion of communication that is used as a political instrument for stimulation of mobilization. This point conforms perfectly with the case study. During
the protest different types of media was widely used by many actors, from television channel’s owner to ordinary internet users. Especially, in cyber world,
costless information was rapidly shared among the users from personal social
media as ‘facebook’ to free access encyclopedia as ‘Wikipedia’. The importance
of the media issue is not only because information can easily be shared to large
number of people within a short period of time, but also because the information can simply be manipulated both to present and to represent the movements. Aside from the use of mainstream media and the widespread social media online, the Red shirts also had other types of media such as CDs, DVDs,
books, etc. This has helped them a lot in terms of expanding their messages.
Yet the number of the media used is various and can be done by any interested
individuals. This can sometimes lead to generalization and confusion of the
group identities.
However, overall, the findings have presented the causality of the
movements that lies on the different grounds from the general perception the
society usually has. Namely, the position of inequality in diverse contexts causes grievance in the society. Once the grievance has become politicized, it can
be widely use as conflict mobilization. The lessons learnt from Thailand political struggles are firstly the deep root of inequality-induced conflicts should not
be examined only on the economic aspect, yet the social and cultural perspec32
tive of inequality must also be taken seriously. Especially for Thailand case, the
constructed discourses relating to inequality that were used during the movement mobilization were built on top of others. Therefore, in order to manage
the problem successfully, it is necessary to examine the issue holistically. Secondly, another lesson from the case is the significant role of creating collective
identity in order to mobilize the movements through mass media that effectively formulize the perception of the society toward the identity of the movement.
33
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