Analyzing Public Support for Fracking in the U.S.
Charles Davis
Jonathan Fisk
Department of Political Science
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80523
Charles.davis@colostate.edu
This paper provides an analysis of public attitudes toward fracking use and policies with an eye
toward factors that help us account for differing levels of support. Using data from a national
survey of American adults, we found that women and people residing in urban areas are slightly
more inclined to oppose fracking and to favor more regulation in terms of drilling operations and
company chemical disclosure requirements than men or people living in rural areas. But our key
findings are that opposition to fracking and support for current or increased levels of regulation
are strongly related to Democratic party identification and to pro-environmental policy attitudes.
We conclude by suggesting that a tendency for people to view fracking as an environmental
rather than an energy issue has potentially important implications for the implementation of
locally based regulatory requirements.
Introduction
U.S. energy companies have increasingly utilized hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) as a
means of extracting natural gas and oil from shale formations located deep underground. While
the use of this technology has proven to be a game changer for increasing the domestic production of oil and gas (and jobs) over the past few years, it has become increasingly controversial
because of rising public concerns about drilling-related impacts on environmental quality, local
government infrastructure and public health. Consequently, greater media attention has been
devoted to both the economic and environmental aspects of fracking policy issues. And state
policymakers have attempted to reconcile newer oil and gas drilling practices with oil and gas
statutes that were enacted before the emergence of environmental policy concerns.
How are fracking policies perceived by members of the general public? To what extent
are they aware of fracking as a policy issue? Are they inclined to offer support because of its
contributions to energy supply and jobs? Or is it more likely to be viewed skeptically by survey
respondents as an environmental problem that adversely affects water or air quality? How people
respond to these questions may have important implications for their subsequent reactions to the
development and implementation of fracking policies, particularly within the realm of state and
local political institutions. Put simply, if the issue is perceived through the lens of environmental
protection rather than developmental opportunities, it seems plausible to assume that decisions to
issue drilling permits will be more closely scrutinized or even opposed by area residents. Our
research goal is to analyze public attitudes toward fracking use and policies with an eye toward
factors that help us account for differing levels of support; i.e., demographic attributes, partisan
orientation, and public policy values pertaining to economic growth and environmental
protection.
1
We begin by discussing how fracking has evolved as a policy issue over the past few
years in terms of both media attention and polls. Next, scholarly works dealing with U.S. energy
and environmental attitudes are summarized and a number of research expectations are put
forward. Third, a general overview of public support for fracking and policies regulating its use
is presented. Fourth, statistical relationships between demographic characteristics, partisan
orientation, public policy values and support for fracking use and policies are examined. We
conclude by evaluating our empirical findings in relation to those found by previous analysts and
by suggesting implications for both theory and policy.
Fracking as a Policy Issue
Natural gas began to capture the attention of industry and government officials in a major
way in 2009 thanks to a number of developments. First, a number of policymakers, industry
officials, and environmental groups directed attention to the importance of fracking as a new and
major source of domestic energy production. When used in combination with horizontal drilling,
industry and U.S. government scientists suggested that shale gas reserves were likely to provide
energy for the next 100 years (IHS Global Insight, 2009). Moreover, environmentalists and
policymakers viewed natural gas as a cleaner burning alternative to coal and as a “bridge fuel”
that moved the U.S. in a positive way to a less carbon intensive energy economy. Additional
benefits included the creation of well-paying jobs, royalty payments for less affluent landowners,
and the ancillary economic boost to communities offered through secondary services linked to
fracking operations and the payment of severance taxes or impact fees to local governments for
reimbursement costs (Wiseman, 2009).
Despite the benefits linked to the “shale gale,” stakeholders such as local governments,
homeowners, public health groups, and environmental groups activists were wary because of
continuing concerns about the contamination of water sources and other environmental impacts.
Public awareness about fracking was fueled by increasing media attention (Davis, 2012) as well
as the controversy stirred by the release of Gasland, a documentary revealing the negative
impacts associated with its use. Case examples involving grassroots political activity have been
reported in Colorado (Lustgarter, 2009) and within rural areas of New York and Pennsylvania
(Wilber 2012). Consequently, many people are quite ambivalent about fracking.
Evidence of public concern about fracking is also revealed in the results of polls taken
over the past few years. A 2010 national survey conducted by the Infogroup/Opinion Research
Corporation for the Civil Society Institute.indicated that 45% of Americans were at least
somewhat aware of fracking controversies and many of those responding were worried about
threats to drinking water quality. The study also concluded that most respondents would support
disclosure requirements and further research dealing with potential health and environmental
impacts. In addition, these results revealed that concerns were not based on partisan orientation;
i.e., regulatory restrictions were supported by a majority of Republicans, Independents, and
Democrats. More recent polls conducted by Bloomberg News (Efstathiou, 2012) and Quinnipiac
University (2012) conclude that people want to retain the economic benefits associated with
fracking but remain concerned about its health and environmental impacts (Mufson 2012). This
suggests that oil and gas companies can continue to expand drilling operations into states barring
reports of major spills or other accidents that can be transformed into a catalyst for policy
changes.
2
Literature Review on Energy and Environmental Attitudes
Extant literature on public opinion relative to energy and the environment can be seen as
addressing three major areas. First, some studies adopt a more longitudinal focus and trace public
opinion over a specific time period (Bolsen and Cook 2008; Farfar 1994; Nisbet and Myers
2007). A second category commonly examines public opinion in the context of a fairly broad
‘support for environmental issues versus economic priorities’ theme (Michaud et al. 2008;
Truelove 2012). Much ink has also been spent to study the public’s opinion when energy tradeoffs are presented. In a related category, but sufficiently dissimilar for the present purposes, are
those projects that examine public opinion in a very specific context such as hazardous waste,
wind development, climate change or nuclear power (Ansolabehere 2007; Bolsen and Cook
2008; Borick 2010; Bord and O’Connor 1997; Jacquet 2012; Jenkins-Smith 2001; McCright and
Dunlap 2011). While, the literature certainly has identified broad attitudinal trends and has
captured the sometimes fickle nature of attitudes the public’s holds towards energy and the
environment, we place this analysis firmly in the camp that examines opinions in a specific
energy medium. As such, this review is split into two parts. First, we offer a cursory review of
the literature that considers energy attitudes over time and when specific environmental/energy
tradeoffs are presented. The second and more substantive portion provides an overview of what
previous research has found on specific energy types, with a special emphasis natural gas.
In one of the more widely cited longitudinal studies, Bolsen and Cook (2008) followed
public opinion on ‘energy’ from the mid 1970s through 2006. The work identified that energy
price and the presence of focusing event as critical and recurring shapers of public opinion. A
latter portion of the study examined the public’s opinion relative to drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). And, much like the pattern noted above, opinion tended to follow
energy prices and focusing events. In fact, from early 1990s through the mid 2000s, the public
firmly opposed ANWR drilling except during periods of extraordinarily high prices (at the time)
– in July 2005, for example, when oil peaked to over $60/barrel. Other longitudinal studies
tracked attitudes throughout a project’s lifespan and have typically found that attitudes follow a
fairly common pattern. Negativity typically peaks during the height of development and once the
project has entered the post-development period, attitudes uptick but do not return to their predevelopment levels, which are typically more positive (Brown et al. 2005).
A long line of research also exists that explores the relationship between social,
demographic and ideological and energy opinions. In brief, there appears to be a fairly strong
consensus that individuals who identify as Democrats and liberals express stronger
environmental attitudes than do Republicans and conservatives (Smith, 2002; Duffy 2003;
Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright 2001). Moreover, younger, wealthier and more educated individuals
also tend to be more receptive to pro-environmental attitudes than do older, less educated and
poorer segments (Finucane et al. 2000; Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 2008; Kwan 2012;
Semenza et al. 2008; Xiao and Dunlap 2007). Education, it should be noted, also affects the
perceived and actual ability to understand energy issues (Southwell et al. 2012). Research
performed by Konisky, Milyo and Richardson (2008) detected that contextual and demographic
factors affected respondents’ feelings towards energy policy varied based on the type of
governmental action, ideology and party and across energy types.1 Again, the strongest
predictors, the authors argue, of environmental policy preferences are political attributes.
Specifically, Republicans and conservatives, even when the authors controlled for their trust in
1
The survey asked of a 1,000-person nationally representative sample of U.S. adults.
3
government, are substantially more skeptical of additional governmental action to address
environmental issues.
Other research centers on the roles that gender, race, and religious beliefs play in
determining environmental concern. In terms of gender, women are generally seen to have
stronger environmental sympathies as compared to men (Xiao and Dunlap 2007). In terms of
race, recent research demonstrated few, if any, systematic differences between whites and
African Americans on environmental policy issues (Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 2008;
Mohai and Bryant 1998). However, Greenberg (2009) did find differences based on race with
31% of white females increasing reliance on coal, which is ten and thirteen percentage points
lower than Hispanic and African American females, respectively. Perhaps Ansolabehere and
Konisky (2009, 571) summarized this literature best, when they described it as showing a mixed
and inconclusive relationship between demographic and even some political characteristics and
environmental opinions.
One of the more prolific outlets to study the public’s opinion on energy is the MIT
Energy Initiative. The survey gauges how individuals perceive the economic costs and
environmental harms associated with each type of fuel used to generate electricity within the
United States.2 The survey, conducted almost annually since 2002, reveals some interesting
patterns. First, Americans have consistently reported differences in the environmental dangers
associated with traditional and alternative fuels. In general, traditional fuel sources (Coal, Oil and
Nuclear Power) are seen as more harmful to the environment when compared to renewable
energies. Natural gas is also seen as harmful to the environment but relative to oil, it is viewed as
a safer and slightly less expensive alternative. Compared to coal, natural gas is also seen as a
desirable environmental alternative as the data showed the public believes it to be cleaner and
but more expensive. Finally, natural gas also enjoys a perceptible advantage relative nuclear
power – as it is viewed as cleaner and cheaper. Yet, when compared to wind and solar, the public
views natural gas as somewhat more harmful and more expensive (Ansolabehere and Konisky
2009; Konisky and Ansolabehere 2012).
Echoing the research done by) and reaffirming the earlier work by Ansolabehere (2007),
Truelove (2012) also found that natural gas occupied a middle ground between dirtier fossil fuels
and cleaner renewables. Both Truelove and Ansolabehere and Konisky (2012), expand up the
‘tradeoff’ category by soliciting opinions on the siting of a production facilities near the
respondent’s home . The pattern mirrors how the public perceives the costs and benefits of each
energy type. Large majorities of the public, for example, supported the building of a wind power
facility near their home. The opposite was true for the building of a coal-fired or nuclear plant.
For natural gas, respondents were less polarized as only a slight majority would oppose a natural
gas facility if one were to be built near their home.3 Konisky and Ansolabehere (2009) also
analyzed the results in an effort to ascertain whether demographic, economic, and political
characteristics had on uneven effect on responses. Respondents, who viewed themselves as
Democrats, were more likely to oppose the construction of a nearby natural gas or coal fired
plant. Women and minorities also expressed greater opposition to the construction of any new
plant except in the case of nuclear, which elicited strong opposition from nearly all population
segments. Older respondents were more inclined to support the construction of natural gas and
These surveys, conducted in 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010, were among the first to compare public
perceptions of and attitudes about the major fuel sources.
3 Konisky and Ansolabehere (2009) used data from a 2008 a web-based MIT survey, which solicited responses from a
1,430 sample of U.S. residents.
2
4
nuclear plants while those living in suburban communities tended to report higher levels of
opposition to coal and wind power facilities (See also Greenberg 2009). Feelings towards
utilities and energy companies also shaped perceptions. Those individuals who reported feeling a
greater sense of trust in the aforementioned organizations expressed less opposition to the siting
of nearby plants.4
While, the literature does provide some evidence of how the public views natural gas
development, there are relatively few reports that examine the public’s opinion on fracking
specifically. Of the few that exist, one of the more comprehensive projects surveyed the views of
a representative sample of 525 Pennsylvania residents.5 Importantly, the report solicited
opinions after the discovery and fracking of the Marcellus Shale play. The results suggest that
Pennsylvanians vary widely in how much attention they are paying to fracking. Nonetheless, a
plurality of residents believed that fracking produces greater benefits than costs for the state (41
to 33 percent). The percentage jumped to an even stronger majority (50 to 32 percent) when
respondents were asked to consider future impacts. Yet, despite being fairly positive about
fracking’s economic impact, residents did report considerable environmental concerns. For
example, by a 60 to 28 percent majority, respondents believed that fracking poses a threat to the
state’s water quality (Rabe and Borick 2011).
Pennsylvanians were also questioned about their beliefs on potential governmental action
relative to fracking. Approximately 33 percent were troubled by the prospect of regulation,
however, strong majorities did not share such a concern (58 percent in the case of regulation and
51 percent in the case of taxation) (Rabe and Borick 2011). Although, the survey did not include
a wide array of questions seeking opinions on potential regulatory actions, the instrument did ask
whether companies should be required to disclose the chemicals used in drilling. Interestingly,
over 90 percent of respondents reported that firms should be required to disclose their fracking
chemical cocktails. It is also noteworthy that the survey included a follow up question that
addressed whether companies should not be required to disclose information. Again, over 83
percent of residents answered that they somewhat or strongly disagreed with this statement,
suggesting that information disclosure enjoys strong popular support (Rabe and Borick 2011, 7).
Greenberg’s (2009) study on risk perception and geography also sheds light on how
natural gas is perceived by the public.6 The author noted key differences between
locations/regions, which he attributed to how residents understand and evaluated risk. The Idaho
‘site’ provided the strongest support for nuclear power and much less enthusiasm for coal, oil,
natural gas and hydroelectric sources, according to Greenberg was likely influenced by its unique
energy mix. In 2009, when the survey was conducted, the state of Idaho had no coal plants that
supplied residential power. It also had no electrical generation from oil and only a few natural
gas fired plants. Moreover, while its electrical portfolio did not include a nuclear plant, it did
include a U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Environmental Management facility, which tests
and evaluates new plant designs. A similar dynamic was observed for the Oak Ridge and South
Texas regions. Both report an inventory consisting of coal, oil, natural gas and nuclear facilities,
which Greenberg argues is likely reflected in the region’s support for these energy types. In all
The survey prompt read: “How would you feel if a new natural gas-fired power plant were built within 25 miles of your
home and was asked in reference to coal, nuclear, natural gas and a large wind power facility.
5 The phone survey was completed by the Muhlenberg Institute of Public Opinion, in cooperation with the University of
Michigan’s Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy.
6 The 2008 survey consisted of 2701 residents of the United States, of which, 2101 lived within 50 miles of 11 major
existing nuclear power, waste management or laboratory facilities.
4
5
three regions, it is likely that respondents support familiar technology and often do not perceive
the associated risks (Greenberg 2009; Kahan et al. (2007) .
Jacquet (2012) also examined natural gas and wind survey data, however, his work
focused on the attitudes of landowners rather than the public as a whole. And much like earlier
research, the public held more favorable views of wind power as compared to natural gas.
Interestingly, prior to development, survey respondents held equally positive views towards both
energy types. However, after development began, attitudes began to diverge with opinions on
natural gas drilling becoming more negative while attitudes towards wind becoming more
positive. Natural gas was also more polarizing than wind power. In short, while large segments
of the sample were fairly indifferent towards wind farm development, natural gas development
evoked much stronger reactions. Finally, opinions on wind/natural gas development were fairly
stable. In other words, for both types of development, those respondents who began with
negative views were likely to become more pessimistic over time. Conversely, respondents who
held positive views were also more likely to become more enthusiastic over time.
Upon review of the scholarly literature and/or a brief review of a Sunday paper is many
U.S. states, it is clear that hydraulic fracturing is becoming increasingly contested. Much of this
controversy centers around questions about fracking’s environmental impacts (air and water), the
impact on municipal and county infrastructure and potential economic benefits (Davis 2012).
Often as a response to these concerns, policymakers are implementing a variety of new policies
ranging from new disclosure requirements to altering the structure of state oil and gas
commissions. Of the fracking literature, much of it examines aspects of the policy process in a
specific context or contexts rather than opinion determinants (Boersma and Johnson 2012; Davis
2012; Davis and Hoffer 2012; Rabe and Borick 2012). And, while much of this research does
examine fracking perceptions, it involves mainly elites’ perception, which limits their
generalizability to the broader public (Anderson and Theodori 2009; Brasier et al. 2011)
Findings
Our examination of public attitudes toward fracking is based on an analysis of survey
data from a nationwide energy policy poll developed by researchers at the McCombs School of
Business’ Energy Management and Innovation Center at the University of Texas at Austin
Energy Poll during March, 2012.* Nearly 2,400 adult Americans over 16 were interviewed and
the data were subsequently weighted using U.S. Census Bureau figures to better reflect the actual
U.S. population. The database for this paper consists of a subset of approximately 765 individuals or 32% of the original sample who answered affirmatively to a filter question asking
whether the respondent was aware of hydraulic fracturing or fracking. Consequently our findings
are somewhat more representative of those within the attentive public that are more likely to be
knowledgeable about issues and more inclined to express policy values and/or preferences.
We begin by providing a general overview of what people think about fracking as a
means of obtaining greater amounts of oil and gas as well as efforts to regulate how it is used. As
Table 1 indicates, people are quite divided in terms of their support for fracking operations.
Respondents are slightly more likely to favor than oppose its use. Only 15% of people surveyed
are undecided about the issue.
Table 1 here
6
How do people feel about the regulatory aspects of the issue? Since a sizeable minority of
our respondents express opposition to the use of fracking in natural gas drilling operations, it is
not surprising that many favor some degree of regulatory oversight. We find that people are
equally divided in terms of preferring more regulation (45%) versus maintaining existing levels
of regulatory activities (43%). Relatively few (12%) are comfortable with the option of reducing
regulatory requirements for energy companies engaged in fracking operations.
On the other hand, survey respondents are largely in agreement when queried about the
importance of rules requiring company disclosure of chemicals used in fracking operations. A
substantial majority (83%) agree that disclosure rules are important. A lesser number (15%) are
undecided about the need for such rules and only a tiny fraction of those surveyed do not agree
that chemical disclosure regulations are important.
Next, we consider whether a number of demographic factors commonly found to be
related to support for energy or environmental programs are associated with support for fracking
use and policies. In general, the data presented in Table 2 indicate that demographic characteristics are not strongly linked to fracking attitudes. We did find that gender is weakly related to
our measures of use and regulatory preference. Women are somewhat more likely than men to
oppose fracking use altogether and are only slightly more likely to report a preference for more
regulation and for the promulgation of chemical disclosure rules. This is consistent with results
from other studies that find women are more inclined to express support for environmental issues
or policies.
Table 2 here
While African Americans are only slightly more predisposed to oppose fracking use,
there are no statistically significant relationships between respondents classified as black and
nonblack and regulatory preferences. Other demographic attributes such as age, unemployment,
income, and educational attainment are unrelated to any of the fracking measures. We did expect
residential factors to play a larger role in conditioning how people think about fracking. Four
factors were isolated – residency in urban, suburban, and rural areas as well as in states with
current fracking operations.
Did these indicators offer any sort of bellweather about how people felt about fracking?
Again, the data suggest that residency is weakly related at best to any of the policy indicators.
We were surprised to find that living in a state with ongoing fracking activities is not associated
with attitudes toward use or regulation. In like fashion, suburban residency is not correlated with
any of our measures. However, we did find that survey respondents residing in urban and rural
areas react to fracking issues in the expected direction although the strength of the correlations is
fairly modest. Those residing in urban areas are slightly more likely to oppose fracking use and
to prefer more regulation of drilling operations and company disclosure of chemicals used while
rural residents tend to be more favorably predisposed toward use and less supportive of
regulatory actions, also by a slender margin. This offers some corroboration of prior research
indicating that jobs and increased economic activity associated with natural gas drilling may be
more welcome in rural areas where economic recovery is often occurring at a slower pace.
We also decided to examine whether factors such as party identification and respondent
attitudes toward environmental and economic policy values issues are useful in helping us to
account for differences in fracking-related attitudes (see Table 3). The results dovetail nicely
with our research expectations drawn from the literature on environmental values and policy
7
attitudes. As expected, party identification provides a clear means of differentiating between
respondents supporting or opposing fracking. Democrats are significantly more skeptical of its
practical uses than Republicans and equally more likely to favor regulations for energy company
drilling activities and the need to disclose the chemical composition of fracking fluids.
Table 3 here
Two policy-related questions were also examined in relation to fracking. One addresses
self placement on a scale ranging from a strong preference for environmental protection to a
strong preference for economic development. This turns out to be the most useful indicator in our
paper; i.e., those selecting a pro-environmental policy stance are significantly more like to
oppose fracking uses and to prefer more regulation and chemical disclosure rules. Similarly,
there is a moderately strong and statistically significant relationship between respondents’
willingness to pay for environmental protection and our fracking use and regulatory measures.
Once again, the explanatory importance of party identification and environmental policy
preferences in relation to fracking-related attitudes is consistent with much of the attitudinal
literature cited earlier.
Conclusions
Our initial research goal in this paper was to analyze support among national survey
respondents for energy industry use of hydraulic fracturing technology as well as their attitudes
toward the regulation of fracking practices and rules requiring company disclosure of chemicals
used in fracking processes. We found that members of the general public are divided on the
question of use – a small plurality express support. However, a majority of our respondents favor
regulatory actions to ensure that health and environmental concerns are not sacrificed. Further
analysis revealed that most demographic attributes of people surveyed are largely unrelated to
fracking-related attitudes.
We did find a few indicators that warrant mention in our efforts to account for attitudinal
differences. Women and people residing in urban areas are slightly more inclined to oppose
fracking and to favor more regulation in terms of drilling operations and company chemical
disclosure requirements than men or people living in rural areas. But our key findings are that
opposition to fracking and support for current or increased levels of regulation are strongly
related to Democratic party identification and to pro-environmental policy attitudes. These
results are consistent with prior studies dealing with public reaction to environmental and energy
issues and policies. Our findings also reinforce a trend identified by Lowry (2008) concerning
the decreasing distance between the politics of energy development and environmental
protection. While older policies dealing with traditional energy sources like natural gas and oil
were historically depicted as uncontroversial, low conflict, and distributive in nature, public
perception of newer energy policies such as fracking suggests that policy issues are just as likely
to be viewed through the lens of environmental protection (i.e., regulatory policy) as economic
development policymaking.
A perceptual shift of this sort also may have important policy implications. How might
increasingly contentious attitudes toward fracking affect the implementation of policy decisions
such as setback requirements for natural gas drilling operations or company disclosure requirements for fracking fluids? First, as Ajzen (1991) has suggested, an individual’s beliefs partially
8
shape his or her future behavior, which, in the case of fracking, would likely include the
willingness to support new and existing forms of regulation and enforcement. Second, research
by a number of environmental policy scholars points to important relationships between public
attitudes, policy change and implementation (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Borick 2010;
McCright 2009; Sheberle 2004). It may be useful to consider additional research along these
lines that more directly considers the link between someone’s policy values, partisan orientation
and specific types of behavior ranging from expressing policy preferences through
communication with social or other media sources, testimony at public meetings, voting, or
direct action. It is also important to think about how attitudes might interact with different types
of focusing events such as a major gas leak or a hotly contested ballot initiative in ways that can
trigger or activate political actions.
9
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Table 1
Public Support for Fracking Use and Policies
%
N
Support Use of Fracking for Oil
And Gas Production?
Oppose
Undecided
Support
Total
40
15
45
100
(300)
(110)
(339)
(749)
Feelings about the Regulation of
Fracking Operations?
More regulation
Keep existing level of regulation
Less regulation
Total
45
43
12
100
(311)
(293)
( 84)
(688)
Importance of Rules Requiring Company
Disclosure of Chemicals used in Fracking?
Not important
Undecided
Important
Total
5
12
83
100
( 40)
( 91)
(633)
(764)
Source: University of Texas at Austin Energy Poll, March, 2012
14
Table 2
Relationships between Demographic Characteristics and Fracking Use/Policies
Support Fracking Use?
ra
N
Regulate
Fracking?
r
N
Age
.06
-.05
Gender
-.21** (749)
-.10** (688)
.12** (764)
African American
-.10** (749)
-.09
(688)
.05
(764)
Income
.06
(749)
.02
(688)
-.04
(764)
-.03
(749)
.01
(688)
-.01
(764)
Education
.00
(749)
-.02
(688)
-.01
(764)
Urban resident b
-.12** (749)
.00
(688)
.08*
(764)
.02
(764)
Unemployed
(749)
Regulate Disclosure of
Fracking Chemicals?
r
N
(688)
Suburban resident b
.02
(749)
-.06
(688)
Rural resident b
.10** (749)
.07
(688)
Fracking state resident b
.00
.00
(688)
(749)
Source: University of Texas at Austin Energy Poll, March, 2012
**
Statistically significant at the .01 level (2 tail test)
*
Statistically significant at the .05 level (2 tail test)
a
Pearson’s correlation coefficient
b
Coded as “2,” all others coded as “1” or missing
15
.02
(764)
-.10** (764)
.00
(764)
Table 3
Relationships between Partisan Orientation, Policy Attitudes and
Fracking Use/Policies
Support Fracking Use?
ra
N
Regulate
Fracking?
r
N
Regulate Disclosure of
Fracking Chemicals?
r
N
Partisan orientationb
.45** (669)
.46** (618)
-.35** (684)
Priority given to environmental protection
vs economic growthc
.58** (749)
.48** (688)
-.47** (764)
Willingness to pay for -.37** (749)
environmental protection
-.34** (688)
.38** (764)
Source: University of Texas at Austin Energy Poll, March, 2012
**
Statistically significant at the .01 level (2 tail test)
a
Pearson’s correlation coefficient
b
Ranges from “1” (strong Democrat) to “4” (independent) and to “7” (strong Republican).
Respondents choosing another party were excluded from the analysis.
c
Ranges from “1” (environmental protection priority) to “5” (economic growth priority).
16