Remembering Memories and Prior Imaginings of Santa Claus Alan Scoboria, Chantal Boucher This study examined beliefs, nonbelieved memories, and past imaginings for childhood encounters with the cultural figure of Santa Claus. The study contrasts event ratings and descriptions provided by 199 young adults who varied in childhood belief and the degree to which they reported actual vs. imagined childhood encounters with the actual Santa. Background Research on nonbelieved memories has shown that people sometimes possess vivid memories which they no longer believe to have truly occurred. Research has confirmed that nonbelieved memories are highly “memory-like” in their phenomenology (Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 2010; Clark et al., 2012; Otgaar, Scoboria & Smeets, 2013). One type of event reported in studies of nonbelieved memories are implausible encounters with mythical cultural figures. In particular, memories of encounters with the “real” Santa Claus arise. The current study takes advantage of the fact that a majority of university students report a degree of childhood exposure to the concept of Santa Claus, either personally, within their family, and/or within the broader cultural context. Memories for prior imaginings In discussing the manners by which memories are distinguished from other mental representations, Johnson and Raye (1981) distinguish between “memories for past acts of perception and past acts of imagination” (p. 67). The study of recollections of childhood “Santa” imagery permits the contrast of no-longer believed childhood memories with current memories for past childhood imaginings (never having a memory), and newly imagined Santa encounters (for those from a distinct cultural background). Goals of the study Examine autobiographical belief, recollection and memory characteristics for a relatively homogeneous type of nonbelieved memory. Contrast nonbelieved memories (remembrances of memories that are no longer believed) with remembrances of childhood imaginings. Contrast remembrances for no longer believed memories, memories for prior imaginings, and novel imaginings, for the same general type of event, using age matched believed memories and believed not remembered events as controls. Method Groups Nonbelieved memory (N = 39): Endorsed believing in Santa as a child, having a memory for an encounter with the real Santa, and indicated that they no longer believe that their memory is true. This group described the event and why they stopped believing in the memory, and rated the event. Prior imagining (N = 134): Endorsed believing in Santa as a child, having no memory for encountering Santa, and having imagined Santa as a child. This group described the memory of their prior imagining and rated the event. Novel imagining (N = 26): Endorsed no belief in nor imagining Santa as a child. These individuals imagined and described a Santa visit while in the lab. Participants The participants in the sample were 199 undergraduate students, 83% female, average age 20.65 (SD 3.82, range 17 to 47), who received course credit. Measures Autobiographical belief: 3 items tapping belief that the event truly occurred. Recollection: 3 items tapping strength of recollective memory for the event. Memory characteristics: Items associated with autobiographical memory in prior work: visual detail, contextual detail (3 items), emotion (4 items), sense of reexperiencing (2 items), narrative coherence, rehearsal, connectedness to other events, rehearsal, and event significance. (All items used 1-7 point scales. Procedure Participants completed a computer driven survey. They answered questions to screen for childhood belief in Santa, memories for encounters with Santa, and imagining Santa during childhood. Based on their responses, the participants were routed through the survey differently (see Groups). After describing/imagining and rating the Santa event, all participants described and rated a believed memory and a believed-not-remembered event (e.g., family story). These served as control events. Results Autobiographical Belief and Recollection Ratings Nonbelieved memory group. Individuals endorsing childhood memories statistically higher recollection ratings than belief ratings, consistent with prior work on nonbelieved memories. Prior imagining group. Individuals endorsing childhood imaginings made moderate and similar autobiographical belief and recollection ratings. Ratings were higher than would be expected for believed but not remembered events, for which the pattern was different. Novel imagining group. Novel Santa imaginings were rated low for both indices, as expected. Memory Characteristics for Santa Event vs. Other Events Nonbelieved memory group. Nonbelieved memories were rated similarly to believed memories (only feeling now and rehearsal were different), and higher than believed not remembered events. Prior imagining group. Prior imaginings were rated lower than believed memories across items (excepting pos, neg emotion). Novel imagining. Novel imaginings were rated low across items. Santa – Santa Encounter event BM – Believed Memory BNR – Believed Not Remembered event Implications Nonbelieved memories for the relatively homogeneous “Santa encounter” event resembled nonbelieved memories reported in prior research. Memories for prior imaginings showed similar and relatively high autobiographical belief and recollection ratings. Belief, recollection, and memory characteristics for prior imaginings were rated notably lower than comparator believed memories. Contrasting nonbelieved memories, prior memories, and novel imaginings suggests that the distinctions between memories and long-held imaginings are more of degree rather than of kind. Relatively small differences in recollective experience may serve to delineate memories from long held imaginings. References Clark, A., Nash, R. A., Fincham, G., & Mazzoni, G. (2012). Creating non-believed memories for recent autobiographical events. PLOS: One, 7, 1-7. Johnson, M.K., & Raye, C L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88, 67-85. Mazzoni, G.A.L., & Scoboria, A., & Harvey, L. (2010). Non-believed memories. Psychological Science, 21, 1334-1340. Otgaar, H., Scoboria, A., & Smeets, T. (2013). Experimentally evoking nonbelieved memories for childhood events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 39, 717-730. Alan Scoboria Department of Psychology University of Windsor Windsor, ON, Canada, N9B 3P4 scoboria@uwidnsor.ca