Grounding
for
the
Metaphysics of Morals
8 This shows that “all moral philosophy rests entirely on its pure part”
(389).
Immanuel Kant
10 One must not imagine that this has been accomplished by
Christian Wolff. The relation of his Universal Practical Philosophy to a
metaphysics of morals is analogous to that between general logic and
transcendental philosophy: Wolff’s treatise is not properly formal,
but mixes a priori and a posteriori elements.
Preface
1 Ancient philosophy was divided into three branches: physics, ethics,
and logic. This division remains adequate today.
2 This division is arrived at as follows: all rational knowledge is either
formal (logic) or material. Material philosophy, in turn is concerned
with laws, either of nature (physics) or freedom (ethics). Ethics, then,
is the science of the laws of freedom.
3 While physics and ethics are both informed by empirical data, logic,
as purely formal, is not.
4 Philosophy, inasmuch as it is a priori, is called pure. Logic is an
entirely formal a priori science; while an a priori science applied to
determinate objects of the understanding is called metaphysics.
5 In accordance with the two different material spheres of
application, there are two different kinds of metaphysics: a
metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. The empirical
part of ethics is practical anthropology, while its rational/formal part
is called morals.
6 It is an open question whether pure philosophy, like industry, would
benefit from some form of division of labor.
7 That there must be a pure moral philosophy is clear from the
universality of moral laws, e.g. the prohibition of lying does not
depend on the nature of humanity or of the environment we inhabit.
9 And so, a metaphysics of morals is absolutely necessary, inasmuch
as without one, morals are liable to corruption.
11 The present work is not a metaphysics of morals, but a grounding
for one. It provides such a grounding in the form of an, albeit
incomplete, critical examination of practical reason.
12 Kant has chosen to separate this groundwork from a metaphysics
of morals proper, in part in order to avoid unduly complicating the
latter, which should be accessible to a lay audience.
13 The aim of the work is to establish the supreme principle of
morality.
14 The method of establishing it is to “proceed analytically from
ordinary knowledge to a determination of the supreme principle and
then back again synthetically from an examination of this principle
and its sources to ordinary knowledge” (392).
First Section: transition from the ordinary
rational knowledge of morality to the
philosophical (393-405)
I Kant states his thesis: only the good will is good in itself
(393-394)
1 According to Kant, only the will is truly good, since every other good
depends on the good will, and becomes bad in its absence.
2 Even qualities conducive to a good will are themselves only good
inasmuch as they presuppose a good will.
3 The good will is not good on account of what it effects, but is good
in itself.
II Kant examines the thesis against contrary opinions (394396)
4 The thesis that only the will is good, however intuitive, is still
somewhat surprising, and needs to be further examined.
5 Kant refutes the opinion that happiness is the main good by
recourse to the efficacy of nature, since this good would have been
better procured by instinct than by reason.
6 It is even the case that the more reason put to the purpose of
obtaining happiness, the more miserable a person becomes.
7 But while reason cannot produce a will good for the sake of
obtaining a further end, it can serve to produce a will good in itself.
III Kant explicates the notion of the good will (397-404)
8 The notion of a good will will be explicated via an elucidation of the
concept of duty.
III.i. Delineation of the scope of inquiry (397)
9 In doing so, certain cases must be omitted: among them i) cases of
actions contrary to duty, and ii) cases where an action in accord with
duty is performed from purely selfish motives, as when, e.g. a
dishonest shopkeeper does not overcharge inexperienced
customers. The main case to be examined is iii) that wherein an
action is done in accord with duty, but also from an immediate
inclination to perform the action.
III.ii Exposition of the concept of duty (397-401)
III.ii.1 examples contrasting actions performed out of duty and actions
performed in accordance with duty (397-399)
10 For example, most people desire to preserve their lives; they also
have a duty to do so; but only the person who preserves his life from
duty, e.g. the despondent person contemplating suicide and deciding
against it, acts in a moral manner.
11 Similarly, a person with a beneficent constitution does not act
morally when she gives, whereas one who lacks this constitution
does.
12 Thirdly, to secure one’s own happiness is a duty, but most do not
aim to do so out of duty. Only when one aims to secure this happiness
out of duty does the will to be happy attain moral stature.
III.ii.2 Propositions drawn from the above examples (399-401)
13 These examples show us that the scriptural command to love one
another must be understood in a volitional, and not an affective,
sense. I) “Only [...] practical love can be commanded.” (399)
14 ii) “An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the
purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to
which the action is determined.” (399)
15 iii) “Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the
law” (400). This proposition follows from the previous two.
16 In short, the moral worth of an action lies not in the expected
effect, but in the representation of the law in itself.
III.iii Explication of the notion of law involved in the
aforementioned concept of duty; the categorical imperative
(402-403)
III.iii.1 Statement of the Categorical Imperative (402)
17 The will must not obey particular laws, but lawfulness as such.
III.iii.2 Examples concerning the maxim of conformity to law (402403)
18 That lying in distress is not in conformity with universal law.
III.iii.3 Summary (403)
19 i) Respect is an estimation of a worth outweighing any inclination;
ii) duty is the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical
law; iii) duty is the condition of a will good in itself.
IV Closing remarks (403-405)
20 Comparison between theoretical and practical reason: whereas
theoretical reason at its height leads to contradictions, practical
reason merely elucidates common sense.
21 The source of the corruption of laws is the internal dialectic
between reason and inclination.
22 Thereby, even ordinary practical reason is led to philosophy.
Second section: transition from popular moral
philosophy to a metaphysics of morals (406445)
I Justification of the transition (406-412)
1 Even though the concept of duty sketched has been taken from
everyday cases, it is not thereby an empirical concept: we have no
indubitable experience of seeing anyone acting from pure duty.
2 Moreover, even when we examine our own actions and find no
other motive in them, we cannot be certain that we are acting from
duty alone, and not some hidden motive.
3 To hold that our concept of duty is drawn from experience is to
concede the moral sphere to skeptics. Whereas for Kant, duty makes
demands on us that have perhaps never been faithfully carried out in
the history of the world.
4 Furthermore, the claim that morality is empirical is in conflict with
the absolutely necessary character of moral laws.
5 And morality cannot be based on examples, because examples
themselves are judged for their conformity to moral principles.
6 In sum, morality itself demands we move from popular morality to
a metaphysics of morals.
7 Philosophy must prefer clear insight to the patchwork observations
of popular morality.
8 Popular morality confuses many principles of action – fear of God,
happiness, duty, human nature, etc. It does not even begin to ask
whether moral concepts must be sought in a wholly non-empirical
way.
9 A pure metaphysics of morals also aids morality itself: we are more
impressed by depicting an action done from pure duty than by one
arising from mixed motives.
10 Metaphysical principles cannot be abstracted from merely
contingent experience. And so, even for ordinary morality, a
metaphysics of morals is necessary.
II Transition from popular philosophy to a metaphysics of
morals (412-420)
II.i The nature and kinds of imperatives (412-417)
11 The transition embarked on in this part is not that from ordinary
morality to philosophy (which was accomplished in the first part), but
from popular morality (which allows for an empirical part) to a
metaphysics of morals (which is pure).
12 The rational will is nothing other than the capacity to act in
accordance with a conception of law, i.e. it is nothing other than
practical reason. The relation of law to a subject may be both
subjective and objective, and therefore sufficient, or it may be merely
objective, in which case it is objectively necessary but subjectively
contingent.
13 “The representation of an objective principle insofar as it
necessitates the will is called a command, and the formula of a
command is called an imperative” (413).
14 Every imperative is expressed by an ought. An imperative
determines the will by an objective representation of reason, rather
than by a subjective sensation.
15 Imperatives only apply to human willing on account of its
subjective imperfection: though a perfectly holy or even divine will is
subject to objective law, it would thus be out of place to think of it as
subject to an ought.
16 “All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically”
(414).
17 Every imperative represents a possible action as good, therefore
necessary for a rational subject. If it is represented as a means, it is
hypothetical; if as an end, it is categorical.
18 “An imperative thus says what action possible to me would be
good, and it presents the practical rule in relation to a will which does
not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good” (414).
19 A hypothetical imperative states that an action is good for
obtaining a given end.
20 Hypothetical imperatives are important for the constitution of the
sciences as well as the rearing of children.
21 Inasmuch as all rational beings are essentially ordered to
happiness, one particularly important hypothetical imperative is that
of prudence, i.e. the necessity of securing given means to achieve the
end of one’s happiness. This, however, remains hypothetical.
22 There is only one categorical imperative, concerned not with the
matter or result of an action, but with its form and principle.
23 In short, the will has three kinds of principles: 1) rules of skill,
which belong to art, 2) counsels of prudence, which belong to welfare
3) commands (laws) of morality, which belong to morality.
II.ii The ground of their possibility (417-420)
24 The possibility of technical imperatives is analytically contained in
the end sought.
25 Similarly, counsels of prudence would be a priori, if only the
concept of happiness were determinate (it isn’t).
Duty
To oneself
26 Commands of morality, by contrast, are neither pragmatic nor
empirical.
To others
27 And so categorical imperatives are given unconditionally and
entirely a priori.
28 More specifically, the categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori
proposition.
III Elucidation of the categorical imperative (420-437)
III.i. Its content (420-424)
III.i.1 in itself (420-21)
29 Question: does the concept of a categorical imperative also
“supply us with the formula containing the proposition that can alone
be a categorical imperative” (420)?
30 Answer: yes. The content of the categorical imperative is
contained in the demand that it be necessary qua subordination to
law.
31. “There is only one categorical imperative and it is this: Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law” (421).
32 The categorical imperative may also be expressed thus: “Act as if
the maxim of your action were to become through your will a
universal law of nature” (421).
III.i.2 in its division and applications (421-424)
33 Kant proffers the following division of duties, providing examples
in the following paragraphs:
Perfect
e.g.
Don’t
kill
yourself
e.g. Don’t make
empty promises
Imperfect
e.g. develop your
talents
e.g. help those in
need
34 (1) Committing suicide violates one’s duty to oneself. The maxim
upon which the action rests (i.e. one may kill oneself out of self-love)
is contradictory, inasmuch as it assumes the existence of a power for
life that becomes a power for death.
35 (2) Making empty promises violates one’s duty to others. “The
universality of a law which says that anyone believing himself to be
in difficulty could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of
not keeping it would make promising itself and the end to be
attached thereby quite impossible” (422).
36 (3) Though, as a system of nature, it is possible that individuals
neglect their natural gifts and live idly; but it is not possible for a
rational being to will this, since “a rational being ... necessarily wills
that all his faculties should be developed” (423).
37 Not to help others in need violates one’s duty to others. “even
though it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in
accordance with that maxim, still [...] a will which resolved in this way
would contradict itself, inasmuch [it might often] have need of the
love and sympathy of others” (423).
38 “Some actions [i.e. those contrary to perfect duties, also called
irremissible duties] are so constituted that their maxims cannot
without contradiction even be thought as a universal law of nature,
much less be willed as what should become one. In the case of others
[i.e. those contrary to imperfect duties, also called meritorious
duties] this internal impossibility is indeed not found, but there is still
no possibility of willing that their maxim should be raised to the
universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict
itself” (424).
39 Violations of duty presuppose universal law, inasmuch as the
violator must will that others obey it in order for his violation to work.
III.ii. Its existence (425-430)
III.ii.1 The existence of a categorical imperative (425-429)
40 The above elucidates 1) that duties can only reside in categorical,
and not hypothetical, imperatives; and 2) what the content of a
categorical imperative is for any given application. We must now
show that there is such a categorical imperative.
41 The existence of the categorical imperative cannot be derived
from anything peculiar to human nature, but must be derived from
the nature of rationality as such.
42 without such a source, rational principles would not exist.
43 Hence everything empirical is unfitting and even detrimental to
moral principles
44 The question to be investigated is as follows: “is it a necessary law
for all rational beings always to judge their actions according to such
maxims as they can themselves will that such should serve as
universal laws? If there is [...], then it must already be connected [...]
with the concept of the will of a rational being in general” (426).
45 Will ≝ “a faculty of determing itself to action in accordance with
the representation of cetain laws” (427).
End – the objective ground of a will’s self-determination
Means – “that which contains merely the ground of the possibility of
[an] action” (427).
Incentive – the subjective ground of desires/subjective ends
Motive – the objective ground of volitions/objective ends
“Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective
ends; they are material, however, when they are founded upon
subjective ends, and hence upon certain incentives.” (427).
The whole worth of material ends consists in the faculty of desire in
the subject. Hence, no such subjective principles can be universal.
46 hence, only in something existing as an end in itself can the ground
of a categorical imperative exist.
47 But every rational being, and man in particular, exists as an end in
itself. Therefore, there is a categorical imperative. Everything that is
is either a being (and hence a means) or a person (and hence an end
in itself).
48 Given this, the categorical imperative (here called the practical
imperative) can also be formulated thus: “Act in such a way that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a
means.” (429).
III.ii.2. The categorical imperative applied in its concrete formulation
to the previous examples (429-430)
49 (1) The man who “destroys himself in order to escape from a
difficult situation [...] is making use of his person merely as a means
so as to maintain a tolerable condition till the end of his life” (429).
50 (2) “the man who intends to make a false promise [...] intends to
make use of another man merely as a means to an end which the
latter does not likewise hold” (429).
51 (3) regarding the advancement of one’s capacities: “it is not
enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our own
person as an end in itself; the action must also harmonize with this
end” (430).
52 (4) On the failure to contribute to the happiness of others:
“humanity might indeed subsist if nobody contributed anything to
the happiness of others [...]. But this [...] would harmonize only
negatively [...] with humanity as an end in itself. [...] For the ends of
any subject who is an end in himself must [...] be my ends also, if that
conception of an end in itself is to have its full effect on me” (430).
III.iii its unified formulation: the formulas of autonomy and of
the kingdom of ends (430-436)
III.iii.1 the formula of autonomy (430-433)
53 The objective ground of practical legislation lies in the form of
universality; the subjective, in the end [i.e. in humanity]; combined,
this gives us “the third practical principle of the will as the supreme
condition of the will’s conformity with universal practical reason, viz.,
the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates
universal law.” (431).
54 “According to this principle all maxims are rejected which are not
consistent with the will’s own legislation of universal law” (431).
55 What this final formulation adds is the indication that the
renunciation of self-interest is what distinguishes a categorical from
a hypothetical imperative.
56 Though a will subject to law may be bound by some interest, a
supreme lawgiver as such cannot be.
57 The present formulation is thus suited to show that there is a
categorical imperative only if that imperative commands that the will
have only itself qua universal legislator as object.
58 All previous attempts at grasping the principle of morality failed
because they failed to see that “man is subject only to his own, yet
universal legislation” (432).
III.iii.2 The formula of the kingdom of ends (433-436)
59 The concept of every rational being as a legislator legislating for
itself leads to the (Leibnizian) idea of the kingdom of ends.
60 A kingdom of ends is thought of as “a whole of all ends in
systematic connection (a whole of both rational beings as ends in
themselves and also of the particular ends which each may set for
himself)” (433).
61 Formula of the kingdom of ends: “Each [rational being] should
treat himself and all others never merely as a means but always at
the same time as an end in himself.”
62 “A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member
when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject
to these laws. He belongs to it as a sovereign, when as legislator he is
himself subject to the will of no other”(433)
63 “A rational being must always regard himself as legislator in a
kingdom of ends rendered possible by freedom of the will, whether
as member or as sovereign.” (434)
64 “Hence morality consists in the relation of all action to that
legislation whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible” (434).
65 “Reason [...] relates every maxim of the will as legislating universal
laws to every other will and also to every action toward oneself”
(434).
66 “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity.
Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its
equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and
therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity” (434).
67 “Whatever has reference to general human inclinations and needs
has a market price; whatever, without presupposing any need,
accords with a certain taste [...] has an affective price; but that whihc
constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an
end in itself [...] has intrinsic worth, i.e. a dignity” (434-35).
68 Morality and humanity alone have dignity.
69 What makes virtue entitled to its claims is the share that a virtuous
disposition affords to a kingdom of ends.
IV Summary of this part (436-437)
70 There are three formulations of the categorical imperative, the
third of which contains the other two.
1. (71) The form of the maxim is universality, giving rise to the
formulation of universal law
2. (72) The matter/end of the maxim is that of the rational being
as an end in himself. This gives rise to the formula of
humanity.
3. (73) The complete determination of the maxim is that all
maxims proceeding from one’s own legislation ought to
harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends. This gives rise to
the formula of the kingdom of ends. The progression from
the first to the third formulation is one from unity to plurality
to totality.
V Summary of the book up to now (437-445)
V.i The different formulations of the categorical imperatives
and their relations to each other (437-440)
74 The formula of universal law arises from the concept of an
absolutely good will. The formula of the law of nature arises from the
analogy of the will as a law for possible actions to “the universal
connection of the existence of things in accordance with universal
laws, which is the formal aspect of nature in general” (437).
75 The formula of humanity arises from the subjective incentive to
will such a being as one’s own end/destiny.
76 “Morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will [...].
That action which is compatible with the autonomy of the will is
permitted; that which is not compatible is forbidden. That will whose
maxims are necessarily in accord with the laws of autonomy is a holy,
or absolutely good, will. The dependence of a will which is not
absolutely good upon the principle of autonomy (i.e. moral
necessitation) is obligation [...]. The objective necessity of an action
from obligation is called duty.
77 The person who fulfills all his duties is not sublime because he is
subject to the law, but because he is at the same time legislates that
law.
V.ii Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality
(440)
78 “Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a
law to itself” (440).
V.iii Heteronomy of the will as the source of all spurious
principles of morality (441)
79 Every spurious principle of morality holds something other than
the will itself as its source
V.iv Classification of all possible principles of morality founded
upon the assumed fundamental concept of heteronomy (441445)