T-Domestic (SSRA)
1NC
Interp-Domestic Surveillance finds non-public information about US Citizens.
Small 8 (Matthew, US Air Force Academy, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil
Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis,” 2008,
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf)//ghs-VA
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence
gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or understood
needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence,
domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community
best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United
States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept.
The SSRA repeals the 2008 FISA Amendments Act
U.S Congress 3/19/15 (https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1466/all-info “All
Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R.1466 - Surveillance State Repeal Act”)
Repeals the USA PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (thereby restoring or reviving
provisions amended or repealed by such Acts as if such Acts had not been enacted), except with respect
to reports to Congress regarding court orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA) and the acquisition of intelligence information concerning an entity not substantially composed of
U.S. persons that is engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 is surveillance of foreign persons
WSJ 08(The Wall Street Journal is a New York-based English-language international daily newspaper
with a special emphasis on business and economic news. “FISA Amendments Act of 2008”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121391360949290049)
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 provides critically important authority for the U.S. Intelligence
Community to acquire foreign intelligence information by targeting foreign persons reasonably
believed to be outside the United States. It ensures that the Intelligence Community has the flexibility
and agility it needs to identify and respond to terrorist and other foreign threats to our security.
Voting issue—
1. Limits – Would justify an infinite number of affs that curtail contracts between the
government and International organizations for surveillance which makes neg prep
impossible kills clash.
2. Topic Education – they move the debate away from the core of the topic which is
surveillance of U.S citizens within the country and the NSA.
3. Extra-topicality – Justifies any international untopical action, which kills neg prep
and causes a rush to generics.
2NC—FISA=Foreign
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 is surveillance of foreign persons
WSJ 08(The Wall Street Journal is a New York-based English-language international daily newspaper
with a special emphasis on business and economic news. “FISA Amendments Act of 2008”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121391360949290049)
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 provides critically important authority for the U.S. Intelligence
Community to acquire foreign intelligence information by targeting foreign persons reasonably
believed to be outside the United States. It ensures that the Intelligence Community has the flexibility
and agility it needs to identify and respond to terrorist and other foreign threats to our security.
The SSRA repeals the FISA act, which conducts foreign surveillance; this is un-topical.
The wall between criminal and foreign investigations is murky.
DeRosa 05 (Mary, senior fellow in the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously,
she served on the National Security Council staff. “Section 218. Amending the FISA Standard”
https://apps.americanbar.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/section-218 7/6/05 crc)
Section 218 amends FISA by changing the certification requirement when the government seeks a FISA surveillance or search order. Previously,
the government was required to certify that "the
purpose" of the application was to obtain foreign intelligence
information. After section 218, the government must certify that obtaining foreign intelligence
information is "a significant purpose" of the application. This change was designed to promote information sharing
between intelligence and law enforcement officials and to eliminate what has become known as the "wall" that separated law enforcement
and intelligence investigations.¶ The FISA, passed in 1978, sets forth procedures for the conduct of electronic surveillance and physical searches
for foreign intelligence purposes. Over the years, the Department of Justice interpreted FISA's requirement that "the purpose" of collection be
foreign intelligence to restrict the use of FISA collection procedures when a law enforcement investigation was involved. The restriction was
designed to ensure that prosecutors and criminal investigators did not use FISA to circumvent the more rigorous warrant requirements for
criminal cases. But law
enforcement and foreign intelligence investigations often overlap, and enforcing this
separation between intelligence and law enforcement investigations—the "wall"—inhibited
coordination of these investigations and the sharing of foreign intelligence information with law
enforcement officials. The change to "significant purpose" was intended to clarify that no such separation is necessary.¶ It is not
clear whether the change in section 218 was legally necessary to eliminate the "wall." The Department of
Justice argued to the FISA Court of Review in 2002 that the original FISA standard did not require the
restrictions that the Department of Justice imposed over the years, and the court appears to have
agreed. This leaves the precise legal effect of a sunset of section 218 somewhat murky.
The 2008 FISA Amendments are a form of foreign surveillance
FISA Amendments Act of 2008( Text of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS-110hr6304enr.pdf)
there are procedures in place that have been approved, have been submitted for approval, or will be
submitted with the certification for approval by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that are
reasonably designed to— ‘‘(I) ensure that an acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
The foreign powers that are targeted by FISA are international, making SSRA untopical.
McCarthy 05 (Andrew, an attorney, and a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC, an organization
that conducts research and education in national security issues. “Section 218. Amending the FISA Standard”
https://apps.americanbar.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/section-218 7/6/05 crc)
¶ The suggestion that a "foreign power"
under FISA could be any "political organization" comprised predominantly of non-citizens is
overwrought. One isn't told what Prof. Cole means by a "political organization"—Hezbollah, Hamas and Sinn Fein, for example, describe
the foreign powers FISA targets, by statutory definition, are those engaged in
clandestine intelligence gathering activities, sabotage or international terrorism. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(2)(A),
themselves as such—but
(C).¶ Atop his faulty premise that FISA is suspect, Prof. Cole piles the additional myth that Section 218 is suspect because it permits FISA
searches and surveillance "undertaken primarily for criminal law purposes." To the contrary, as the FISA Court of Review reasoned in its 2002
opinion, FISA as written never limited the government to searches whose primary purpose was intelligence gathering. By mandating that
intelligence gathering be "a primary purpose," Section 218 actually constrains the government in a way that neither the Fourth Amendment nor
FISA does. Given that FISA easily passes Fourth Amendment muster, a provision such as Section 218, which narrows it, a fortiori is not
constitutionally suspect.¶ Finally, Professor Cole's mythical account skews the history of the wall and the purpose of Section 218. Nobody is
saying FISA "mandated a 'wall' between law enforcement officials and intelligence agents"—and when I argued that FISA did not require a wall,
that palpably was an assertion, not, as Professor Cole oddly spins it, a "conce[ssion]." Yes, the wall was unnecessarily erected by the courts and
the Justice Department. But that it was a mistake did not make it any less real. And that there may have been cultural impediments to
intelligence sharing does not mean the structural ones manufactured by the wall were not critical.
Aff AT: T-Domestic
2AC
We meet—repealing SSRA curtails domestic surveillance
Buttar 13 (Shahid, a constitutional lawyer, grassroots organizer and executive director of the Bill of Rights Defense
Committee. “USA vs. NSA: Legislative Efforts to Curtail Spying” http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/18122-thensa-vs-usa 8/14/13 crc)
The sustained grass-roots uproar over domestic surveillance has reached the ear of Congress, which is
considering more than a dozen legislative measures to curtail the National Security Agency's various
programs that spy on Americans en masse. While most address merely the pieces of the problem, one in particular would
address the many facets hidden even in the wake of the Snowden leaks.¶ Even relative to the Leahy and Conyers-Amash proposals, the
widest-ranging bill among those pending in Congress is the "Surveillance State Repeal Act" (HR 2818)
introduced by Rep. Rush Holt, D-New Jersey, a former Princeton physics professor and former leader of the House Intelligence
Committee. The Holt bill, unlike any of the other measures proposed, would fully repeal the Patriot Act and
the 2008 FISA amendments in their entirety, essentially restoring limits on executive power and
unwinding the surveillance abuses of the George W. Bush and Obama administrations at once.¶ The first
two enjoy bipartisan support: the "FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act" (SB 1215), introduced by Senate Judiciary
Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, as well as the Libert-E Act (HR 2399), co-sponsored by Reps. John Conyers, D-MI, and Justin Amash, R-MI.
Both bills would curtail powers extended in the FISA amendments of 2008, as well as portions of the
Patriot Act.
The FISA amendment act pertains to domestic surveillance
Cato institute 12- (“The Surveillance Iceberg: The FISA Amendments Act and Mass Spying without
Accountability”) http://www.cato.org/events/surveillance-iceberg-fisa-amendments-act-mass-spyingwithout-accountability
History teaches that government spying is naturally subject to abuse without strong oversight, yet only
the tiniest fraction of electronic surveillance of Americans—the tip of a vast and rapidly growing
iceberg—is meaningfully visible to Congress, let alone the general public. Under the controversial FISA
(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Amendments Act of 2008, set to expire at the end of the year, the
National Security Agency is empowered to vacuum up the international communications of Americans
under sweeping authorizations that dispense with the need for individual warrants. Despite reports of
large-scale overcollection of Americans’ e-mails and phone calls, including purely domestic traffic,
the NSA has brazenly refused to give Congress any estimate of how many citizens’ private conversations
are being captured in its vast databases, and legislators have shown little willingness to demand greater
transparency as they prepare to reauthorize the law. Increasingly, even ordinary criminal investigations
employ off-the-books electronic surveillance techniques that circumvent federal reporting
requirements. The public is informed about the few thousand wiretaps authorized every year but
remains largely in the dark about newer and far more prevalent techniques, such as the routine use of
cell phones as sophisticated tracking devices.
Counter-interpretation—domestic means related to
Merriam Webster Online Dictionary NO DATE(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/domestic)
: of, relating to, or made in your own country : relating to or involving someone's home or family :
relating to the work (such as cooking and cleaning) that is done in a person's home
Prefer our interpretation
A. Limits- The AFF only being only restricted to the word domestic opens the doors up to plenty of
clash. The negative has more the enough time to prep for any plan that is only affecting the U.S.
Now we are only allowed to being up any AFFS within the resolution.
B. Topic education- Under our interpretation we are only surveiling the U.S citizens. We are not
surveiling anyone else. We are debating about the core topic here so the negative doesn’t lose
education.
Reasonability- All the AFF has to do is prove that we meet enough. Reasonability is
better because
A. There will be no need to debate interpretations. Debating the interpretations just
promotes lazy negative debating.
We Meet
We meet-FISA surveils Americans’ International calls but the calls themselves are still
domestic
ACLU No Date( The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a nonpartisan, non-profit
organizationwhose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties
guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States."[7] It
works through litigation, lobbying, and community empowerment. “FIX FISA - END WARRANTLESS
WIRETAPPING” https://www.aclu.org/fix-fisa-end-warrantless-wiretapping)
The FISA Amendments Act, passed in 2008 and reauthorized in 2012, gives the National Security Agency
almost unchecked power to monitor Americans’ international phone calls and emails. On October 29,
2012, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the ACLU’s challenge to the law. In February 2013, the
Supreme Court dismissed the ACLU's lawsuit. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), enacted by
Congress after the abuses of the 1960s and 70s, regulates the government’s conduct of intelligence
surveillance inside the United States. It generally requires the government to seek warrants before
monitoring Americans’ communications. In 2001, however, President Bush authorized the NSA to launch
a warrantless wiretapping program, and in 2008 Congress ratified and expanded that program.
We meet-FISA is domestic surveillance
Granick 12( Jennifer Granick is the Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and
Society. Jennifer returns to Stanford after working with the internet boutique firm of Zwillgen PLLC.
Before that, she was the Civil Liberties Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Jennifer practices,
speaks and writes about computer crime and security, electronic surveillance, consumer privacy, data
protection, copyright, trademark and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. From 2001 to 2007, Jennifer
was Executive Director of CIS and taught Cyberlaw, Computer Crime Law, Internet intermediary liability,
and Internet law and policy. Before teaching at Stanford, Jennifer spent almost a decade practicing
criminal defense law in California. “THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT AUTHORIZES WARRANTLESS SPYING
ON AMERICANS” http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/11/fisa-amendments-act-authorizeswarrantless-spying-americans)
By contrast, the FAA allows surveillance of a foreign entity without specifying the people to be
monitored or the facilities, places, premises, or property at which surveillance will be directed. Because
the target can be any foreign entity, the government can direct surveillance at any facility, even those
on American soil, and monitor unspecified Americans’ international communications to or from
suspected agents of the foreign entity, or even about that entity. However, the government may not
target Americans or intentionally acquire purely domestic communications.
SSRA=Domestic Surveillance
the SSRA specifically solves for domestic surveillance.
Greenwald & Hussain 14 (Glenn, a journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law.
Murtaza Hussain is a journalist and political commentator. His work focuses on human rights, foreign policy, and cultural affairs.
“Meet the Muslim American leaders the NSA has been spying on” https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/ 7/9/14
crc)
The individuals appear on an NSA spreadsheet in the Snowden archives called “FISA recap”—short for the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Under that law, the Justice Department must convince a judge with the topsecret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause to believe that American
targets are not only agents of an international terrorist organization or other foreign power, but also
“are or may be” engaged in or abetting espionage, sabotage, or terrorism. The authorizations must be renewed by
the court, usually every 90 days for U.S. citizens.
Neolib K
Neolib Link—SSRA
Neoliberalism has created an expository society—to ensure profit, public and private
actors work to move populations online into “digital amusement parks” to maximize
consumption—curtailing surveillance isn’t the solution, because surveillance isn’t the
problem—the problem is we willingly disclose personal information online in order to
exist in our digitized neoliberal age—the underlying goal of the aff is to distract
citizens with false promises of cyber-security in order to continue the flow of
consumers into their digital theme parks
Harcourt, Professor of Law at Columbia University, 14
Bernard, His scholarship intersects social and political theory, the sociology of punishment, and penal
law and procedure, served most recently as the Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Political Science at
The University of Chicago, “Digital Security in the Expository Society: Spectacle, Surveillance, and
Exhibition in the Neoliberal Age of Big Data”, SSRN,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2455223
How then do we conceptualize and visualize relations of power in our digitized neoliberal age?
Both of the classic forms—spectacle and surveillance—seem no longer adequate
Where can we find
the architectural schematic to understand digital security?
,
and to be honest, the contrast between the two may well have been drawn too sharply. As W.J.T. Mitchell presciently observes in The Spectacle Today, neither term can possibly be understood as mutually exclusive in our contemporary condition; rather, spectacle and surveillance should
both forms—spectacle and surveillance—are
overshadowed or surpassed today
by a third: exposure, or exposition, or, perhaps better,
the exhibition. Today, we are not coerced into revealing our most intimate desires.
No, we are not
being surveilled today, so much as we are exposing or exhibiting ourselves knowingly and willingly
The relation is now inversed: we, digital subjects, we homo digitalis, we “digital persons,”
we give ourselves up happily, voluntarily, in a mad frenzy of disclosure.
to become ourselves
be seen, as Mitchell explains, as “dialectical forces in the exertion of power and resistance to power.”54 I would go further, though, and suggest that
, or ought to be complemented,
There is no telescreen forcibly anchored into the wall
of our apartments that we cannot turn off,55 nor are we forcibly detained in a see-through cell within the omnipresent view of a central watchtower. We are neither forced into the arena, nor compelled to reveal our most intimate desires.56
, with all
our love, lust, and passion.
57
We expose our most intimate details in play, in love, in desire, in consumption, in a
stream of texts, Tweets, emoticons and Instagrams, e-mails and Snapchats, Facebook posts, links, shares and likes—throughout our digital lives, in our work, for our political convictions, to satisfy our appetites,
. Even those of us
who do not partake in the rich world of social media have no alternative but to share our intimate lives and political views in texts, e-mails, and Skype conversations—knowing that we are exposing ourselves. We write love notes and political comments, we share intimate photos and
our digital
existence is our life—it is practically the pulse, the bloodstream, the very current of our daily routines.
We need to be plugged not just to feel fully alive, but to be human
we live in the expository society
inside jokes, we throw ourselves onto the screen in our virtual spectacular forms—often wishing more than anything to be seen, to be “liked,” to feel connected, or simply because it is the only way to communicate today. For most of us,
, all too human. Guy Debord spoke of “the society of the spectacle.” Foucault drew our attention
instead to “the punitive society.” But it seems as if, today,
. How then can we visualize the architecture of this society of the exhibition? And recall that there are two key stages to visualize: first, the
neoliberal moment, with its mix of private and public, of consumption and consumerism, of responsibilization and reregulation , of maximizing and minimizing; and second, the digitization of every aspect of the neoliberal paradigm—digital security. Let’s turn first to the neoliberal aspect.
How can we schematize relations of power in our neoliberal condition? What I would propose, as the
architectural schema that best captures the neoliberal moment, is the amusement park
A private commercial space, for profit, that has been underwritten and made possible by state
and municipal governments. A mixed private-public space—or perhaps, more accurately, a space of
private profit and public expenditures—that practices a form of management or control of flows of
populations, to maximize the number of visitors, to attract more advertising, to stimulate
consumption, to facilitate spending. These are quintessential spaces that seek to optimize the
movement of large populations in order to maximize their consumption, while at the same time
minimizing labor and other expenditures. This is not just a spectacle, because everything is scattered.
The goal is to
avoid amassing consumers on any one spectacle. The goal is to
manage the patience of consumers who want to see, but who are never
sitting in the arena
surveillance goes on
The watchful eye is
everywhere That is what renders Disneyland so popular—the feeling that everything is monitored,
that everything is secure, that the children, or rather the parents have nothing to fear. There is
or the theme park—or more generally,
the themed space.
distribute, not concentrate, the population. To
optimize and redirect
queues, to make them feel shorter than they are, to learn how to
never,
. To be sure,
.
, in fact,
, in fact,
; but that is only one dimension of the endeavor. There are, naturally, a large number of CCTV cameras.
, or almost
continuous surveillance, but not in a panoptic form. We do not internalize the gaze, we are reassured
by it.
Neolib Alt—SSRA
The alternative solves best—both teams agree that the state depends on private
corporate services for surveillance—we need critical frameworks that consider NOT
ONLY the domestic security apparatus, but the international capitalist formations that
motivate neoliberal abuses of state intelligence for private gains
Price, Professor of Anthropology, 14
David, Professor of Anthropology in the Department of Society and Social Justice at Saint Martin’s
University, “The New Surveillance Normal”, Monthly Review, July-August 2014,
https://monthlyreview.org/2014/07/01/the-new-surveillance-normal/
Convergence of State and Corporate Metadata Dreams¶ The past two decades brought an accelerated independent growth of corporate and
governmental electronic surveillance programs tracking metadata and compiling electronic dossiers. The NSA, FBI, Department of Defense, and
CIA’s metadata programs developed independently from, and with differing goals from, the consumer surveillance systems that used cookies
and consumer discount cards, sniffing Gmail content, compiling consumer profiles, and other means of tracking individual Internet behaviors
for marketing purposes. Public acceptance of electronic monitoring and metadata collection transpired incrementally, with increasing
acceptance of corporate-based consumer monitoring programs, and reduced resistance to governmental surveillance.¶ These two
surveillance tracks developed with separate motivations, one for security and the other for commerce,
but both desire to make individuals and groups legible for reasons of anticipation and control. The
collection and use of this metadata finds a synchronic convergence of intrusions, as consumer capitalism
and a U.S. national security state leaves Americans vulnerable, and a world open to the probing and
control by agents of commerce and security. As Bruce Schneier recently observed, “surveillance is still the business model of
the Internet, and every one of those companies wants to access your communications and your metadata.”7¶ But this convergence carries its
own contradictions. Public trust in (and the economic value of) cloud servers, telecommunications providers, email, and search engine services
suffered following revelations that the public statements of Verizon, Google, and others had been less than forthright in declaring their claims
of not knowing about the NSA monitoring their customers. A March 2014 USA Today survey found 38 percent of respondents believed the NSA
violates their privacy, with distrust of Facebook (26 percent) surpassing even the IRS (18 percent) or Google (12 percent)—the significance of
these results is that the Snowden NSA revelations damaged the reputations and financial standing of a broad range of technology-based
industries.8 With
the assistance of private ISPs, various corporations, and the NSA, our metadata is
accessed under a shell game of four distinct sets of legal authorizations. These allow spokespersons
from corporate ISPs and the NSA to make misleading statements to the press about not conducting
surveillance operations under a particular program such as FISA, when one of the other authorizations is
being used.9¶ Snowden’s revelations reveal a world where the NSA is dependent on private corporate
services for the outsourced collection of data, and where the NSA is increasingly reliant on corporate
owned data farms where the storage and analysis of the data occurs. In the neoliberal United States, Amazon
and other private firms lease massive cloud server space to the CIA, under an arrangement where it
becomes a share cropper on these scattered data farms. These arrangements present nebulous security relationships
raising questions of role confusion in shifting patron–client relationships; and whatever resistance corporations like Amazon
might have had to assisting NSA, CIA, or intelligence agencies is further compromised by relations of
commerce. This creates relationships of culpability, as Norman Solomon suggests, with Amazon’s $600 million CIA data farm contract: “if
Obama orders the CIA to kill a U.S. Citizen, Amazon will be a partner in assassination.”10 Such arrangements
diffuse complicity in ways seldom considered by consumers focused on Amazon Prime’s ability to speedily deliver a My Little Pony play set for a
brony nephew’s birthday party, not on the company’s links to drone attacks on Pakistani wedding parties.¶ The Internet developed first as a
military-communication system; only later did it evolve the commercial and recreational uses distant from the initial intent of its Pentagon
landlords. Snowden’s revelations reveal how the
Internet’s architecture, a compromised judiciary, and duplexed
desires of capitalism and the national security state are today converging to track our purchases,
queries, movements, associations, allegiances, and desires. The rise of e-commerce, and the soft addictive allure of social
media, rapidly transforms U.S. economic and social formations. Shifts in the base are followed by shifts in the superstructure, and new
generations of e-consumers are socialized to accept phones that track movements, and game systems that bring cameras into the formerly
private refuges of our homes, as part of a “new surveillance normal.”11¶ We
need to develop critical frameworks
considering how NSA and CIA surveillance programs articulate not only with the United States’
domestic and international security apparatus, but with current international capitalist formations.
While secrecy shrouds our understanding of these relationships, CIA history provides examples of some ways that
intelligence operations have supported and informed past U.S. economic ventures. When these historical
patterns are combined with details from Snowden’s disclosures we find continuities of means, motive,
and opportunity for neoliberal abuses of state intelligence for private gains.