GÖTEBORGS UNIVERSITET
What Aesthetic Attitude?
Insufficiency of Both Tradition and Critique
Robin Karlsson
5/28/2012
Advisor: John Eriksson
The aesthetic attitude is a dodgy concept. So dodgy that there are numerous theories about out
there. Here we find ourselves in an attempt at making sense of the situation, trying to clean up. To
salvage good parts. To find the way to clarity. Indeed, there seems to be quite some confused
notions in the tradition. Both on the sides of defense and opposition. It is a well-known fact that
Dickie delivered a heavy blow against the notion of an aesthetic attitude, and Disinterest specifically.
But how bad was the blow really? Not too heavy .And can Disinterest stand on its own either way?
Doubtfully. Are we in need of breaking with tradition and build a-new? Probably.
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 2
Outline .................................................................................................................................... 3
Investigation ............................................................................................................................... 4
Section I – What is an aesthetic attitude? ........................................................................... 4
Part I – Perception .................................................................................................................. 5
Section II Aesthetic Vision ................................................................................................. 5
Section III – Impressionistic Seeing ................................................................................... 8
Part II – Psychical Distance .................................................................................................. 10
Section IV – Distance Explained ...................................................................................... 11
Section V – Dickie on Distance ........................................................................................ 12
Part III – Disinterest and Dickie ........................................................................................... 15
Section VI – Disinterest Confused – Disinterested attention itself................................... 15
Section VII – Disinterest Confuses – Relevance .............................................................. 20
Section VIII – Disinterest confuses – Morality ................................................................ 21
Section IX – Disinterest Confuses – Role of the Critic .................................................... 23
Part IV – Stolnitz and Disinterest ......................................................................................... 25
Section X – Definition of Stolnitz Aesthetic Attitude ...................................................... 25
Section XI – Definition of ’Disinterested’ ........................................................................ 26
Section XII – Definition of ‘Sympathetic’ ........................................................................ 27
Definition of ’Attention’ ................................................................................................... 28
Section XVI – Facing Dickie’s Criticism – the Role of the Critic ................................... 29
Part V – Criticizing Disinterest ............................................................................................ 31
Section XVII – Disinterest (a) .......................................................................................... 31
Section XVIII – Disinterested (b) ......................................................................................... 32
Section XIX –Sympathetic................................................................................................ 33
Section XX – Attention ..................................................................................................... 33
1
Section XXI –Striking beauty and the Last Strike at Disinterest ...................................... 35
Part VI – The Final Showdown ............................................................................................ 36
Section XXII – Fenner’s Attitude ..................................................................................... 36
Section XIII – Criticizing Fenner ..................................................................................... 38
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 39
What remains .................................................................................................................... 39
An Attitude From the Ashes ............................................................................................. 41
List of literature ........................................................................................................................ 42
Introduction
It is with works of art as it is with wine – it is better if one can do without both and
keep to water, and if from the inner fire and inner sweetness of the soul the water
spontaneously changes again into wine.1
Or so Nietzsche would have us believe. Myself, I can’t help being sympathetic to the
statement above. Certainly, there seems to be quite a lot of things Nietzsche wants to say with
these lines. However, what I want to turn our attention to is the idea that one can view the
world in more than one way. Indeed, the quote here could be interpreted in the way that
Nietzsche wants to tell us that we are able to view the world in 'aesthetic light,' so to speak.
That the most mundane objects can face us aesthetically, and all we have to do is to be in a
certain state of mind.
This is not a notion originating in Nietzschean thought, or German for that matter. Indeed,
Kant may be the one most associated with the idea of an aesthetic attitude; but it is with the
British Taste-theorists we first find the concept, and more precisely: with Lord Shaftesbury.2
We should not be surprised were we to find differences in the ways these thinkers thought
about the aesthetic attitude, and what it is. They are, after all, from different times and much
has happened in between.
1
2
Human All-Too-Human part 2 aforism 109
The Aesthetic Attitude, David E. W. Fenner (1996) p 28-9 (in the continuation simply Fenner (1996))
2
However, this is not a paper on a historical overview on the subject. In fact, Nietzsche and
Lord Shaftesbury will not be much mentioned in this essay. What we are going to do is to
search for the aesthetic attitude, orienting ourselves among the different concepts out there.
Perhaps we have to develop a new account, if none plausible exists. The question we ask
ourselves, at the outset of this essay is: What is the aesthetic attitude?
Outline
But before trying to answer that question, we will see how we are going to answer it.
At the outset of the investigation we shall introduce the concept of what an aesthetic attitude
is and what it is that we are actually looking for.
In part I we begin with considering two notions of the aesthetic attitude that focuses at
perception. While we these theories have their virtues, they also carry vices. Their vice being
in large parts that they are insufficient. It is clear that we do not wish to deny that their value
to us, only that they are not the whole explanation for the attitude. As such our abilities of
perception is an important aspect of the attitude we will pick up from them.
In part II we will familiarize ourselves with the account of Bullough, a psychologist who
brings Distance to our attention. This is a rather influential account of the aesthetic attitude
and will, during the second half of this part, be criticized by Dickie, of whom we will
familiarize ourselves with as his The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude is highly influential and
has convinced many philosophers that the aesthetic attitude does not exist. There is though,
some kind of thing that both Distance and Dickie agrees on: that there must be some kind of
inhibitory feature to the perceiver.
In part III Dickie continues his criticism in Myth by attacking Disinterest. Disinterest is the
most common and most accepted account of the aesthetic attitude and as such it is natural that
we should examine it. But it seems as if Dickie’s criticism is unsatisfactory and does not
really hit the mark. As such we must more closely examine Disinterest. We will do this in part
IV.
In part V, however, we see that Disinterest can’t stand as a theory either way, regardless that
Dickie’s criticism failed at its objective. It seems to be very little cause to allow for so little
interest towards the object of aesthetic appreciation. The Disinterest account seems to forbid
that the object be considered in regards to how it is connected with other objects or concepts
3
in the world in an unmotivated manner. A larger participation of the individual will be shown
to be motivated.
Part VI will consist of a last account for consideration, as this is quite different from the
others. Since this account is not acceptable on its own terms either, we pick the useable parts
from it. This ought to give further support to a widening sphere of relevant connections to the
object to include cognitive connections.
In the conclusion we sum up our findings and try to give a sketch on how a plausible attitude
may look.
Investigation
Section I – What is an aesthetic attitude?
As was briefly implied in the introduction, the aesthetic attitude refers to a state of mind in
which you will be able to appreciate objects aesthetically. It has been a subject of much
debate what an aesthetic attitude is supposed to be and how to characterize it. Fenner gives a
definition of the traditional account of the aesthetic attitude and what the term contains:
The aesthetic attitude is, traditionally, an attitude, state of mind, or a state of
perceiving that is entered into, voluntarily and consciously, by an agent (spectator,
subject, viewer, listener, etc.) that serves to (1) make the spectator receptive to the
having of an aesthetic experience (in connection with the aesthetic object or event [...])
and (2) transform the object of the spectator's perception from an ordinary object-inthe-world into an aesthetic object.3
While we may not yet be able to answer many questions, it seems proper to pose them:
Regarding point (2) in Fenner's presentation, about the object's ontology, we will spend little
time; merely noting that the change from an 'ordinary object-in the world' into an aesthetic
object needs not be a change on ontological level. Traditionally, this is done by denying the
existence of aesthetic properties in the object.4
It might also be questioned why this attitude must be voluntarily and consciously "switched
on," so to speak. Certainly, it is difficult to see how one could possibly enter a state of
perceiving non-consciously, but not so far-fetched when considering the state of mind.
3
4
Fenner (1996) p. 3
More on this later on in the essay, see specifically page 14.
4
In my experience it is seldom the notion that the attitude must be volitionally and consciously
entered into is a feature of it that is seldom questioned. It might be difficult to question this, as
one can easily think of examples where one can choose how to view works of art, as in the
example of Duchamp’s Fountain. My first reaction to it was that is simply a broken urinal.5
Since then I have been able to appreciate it as a work of art. Today I would like to claim that I
am able to perceive it as any of the two depending on what I wish to see it as.
But it’s just
as easy to claim that I’ve just happened to be in the right state of mind when considering the
Fountain one time, and as such I had an aesthetic experience of it. Once having known how to
perceive it, I might be able to resume my aesthetic viewing of it. It is possible to claim that I
just happened to be in a state of mind which made me susceptible to having aesthetic
experiences.
Furthermore, we can ask ourselves how a spectator is made receptive to having an aesthetic
experience. However, we will have to go on to examine the specific theories to be able to say
anything of value in this regard.
Part I – Perception
We begin with perception, as it is one of the key concepts in aesthetics. It should be noted that
while these accounts are not the most widely accepted, they are of interest as they focus on
different aspects than the other accounts.
Section II Aesthetic Vision6
Vincent Tomas, in Aesthetic Vision, asks:
If looking at a picture and attending closely to how it looks is not really to be in the
aesthetic attitude then what on earth is?7
With this question we are introduced into how Tomas considers his idea of the aesthetic
attitude. One of the many aspects the aesthetic attitude focuses on is a perceptual distinction.
Tomas focuses on this particular feature of the attitude and tries to describe how it is
distinguished from ordinary perception:
[...] the recognition of physical objects – the sort that is involved i ordinary perception
but which does not occur in aesthetic perception – is secondary recognition. It
presupposes primary recognition, which occurs alone in aesthetic perception.
5
6
7
Not that I've actually stumbled upon Duchamps Fountain, but I've seen pictures of it as well as read about it,
as Duchamps works are quite common in philosophical literature.
The names of the attitudes is borrowed from Fenner (1996).
Aesthetic Vision, Philosophical Review, 1959 p. 63. (in the continuation simply Aesthetic Vision)
5
Secondary recognition is "predictive," but primary or aesthetic recognition is not.8
Certainly, there are concepts here which need explanation. Tomas is of the idea that ordinarily
when one sees, for example, a chair, one does not simply see the chair. In fact, one sees many
more characteristics of the chair than the purely perceptual, (or visual,) such as a body capable
of holding up ones weight and whose shape is unlikely to change to a significant degree
within the next five minutes.
However, the only characteristics that one can actually perceive in the chair "at the moment
are a certain set of colours and . . . a certain visible shape."9 As the quote marked with
footnote 8 suggests, Tomas seems to consider this to be a more original way of perceiving
than ordinary viewing.
Aesthetic perception, for Tomas, is the lines, shapes and the colors as a given whole which
can be categorized, while they are not. If it was to be categorized we would already have
taken the steps of secondary recognition, whereas in primary recognition, which Tomas takes
aesthetic viewing to be,
[...] we are made aware of familiar appearances, not familiar objects or events, and
that when we attend to these appearances we are attending to something "in the
picture" in precisely the same sense that lines, colors, shapes, and volumes are [...]10
It is clear that we are not concerned with actually perceiving objects but appearances that,
when communicated to others must be in such a manner as to refer to common every-day
objects, because these are the formations in which they are perceived in.
However, Tomas makes us aware that
[...] aesthetically to see a garden is not to see "a blooming confusion," but to see
appearances of a familiar sort – the sort represented by shrubs and flowers.11
So, even though aesthetic vision, according to Tomas, is made up of lines, shapes and colors
they are not any more obscure or confusing than if we were to view ordinarily. Certainly, one
does not lose orientation of the world even though aesthetic viewing is pre-categorical. It is,
then, not a cow-blank stare where one is bombarded with seemingly randomized stimuli. It is
Ibid. p. 65.
Cit. Ibid..
10
Ibid. p. 67.
11
Ibid. p. 63.
8
9
6
viewing attentively.12 One must agree with Tomas that in aesthetic viewing one does not even
begin to ponder the question of whether what one sees exists or not, seeing as 'aesthetic
viewing' is pre-categorical and wholly in "primary recognition."13
In extension, this means that Tomas considers every kind of aesthetic experience to be
formalistic in nature. In fact, when Tomas is describing a scene in a theater of a wistful tramp
shuffling down the road toward the sunset, he claims that one cannot aesthetically appreciate
it as such; what one appreciates is the beauty of the formalistic relations in the scene, the
appearances making up the categorized wistful tramp. I, myself, find this conclusion highly
counter-intuitive, surely it matters that the tramp is wistful or that it is the very same wistful
tramp that we have followed throughout the play? As this seems to be in accordance with
Tomas's goal, however, my intuitions might not be damaging criticism against it.
However, Tomas's account has a in how to handle other kinds of art, other than the visual arts,
or even representative visual arts. It's more difficult to understand how one is to view
a symphony in a classificatory way and in a nonclassificatory way, such as the former
would detract from the aesthetic experiencing of that object. One could, of course,
classify a certain symphony as a Romantic symphony, but this classification, it seems,
is still in the purview of potentially helping one's aesthetic experience of the work; that
is, this classification seems itself to be, broadly, an aesthetic feature of the work.14
It is possible to meet (the first part of) this criticism by referring to Heidegger, and how he
considers our ordinary perception to be, generally zuhanden, (equivalent to Tomas's ordinary
perception,) where things in the world are always value-laden and always contain gearcomplexes (where the object in question belongs, how it is characterized and how it is used)
and vorhanden, (equivalent to Tomas's aesthetic vision,) where the object faces us in its pure
formalistic appearance. This, of course, goes for any object in the world, including objects not
usually considered “objects” in the strict sense, (such as music,). As such we can explain how
we can stretch Tomas's view to things beyond representational, or even visual art generally.15
The second part of the criticism, that the classification of a symphony might be aesthetically
relevant is something that Tomas's 'Aesthetic Viewing' cannot handle. Tomas could simply
Fenner (1996) p. 83
Ibid. p. 58.
14
Ibid. p. 84.
15
Sein und Zeit, Heidegger p. 68-70 (in Heidegger’s originial work). (in the continuation simply SuZ) It is, of
course, not entirely enlightening to refer to a phenomenologist as Heidegger, seeing as it is difficult to
understand him..
12
13
7
claim that it would be aesthetically irrelevant, but is this not quite counter-intuitive as well?
Maybe not as much as what I found counter-intuitive above, when treating plays, but surely
it’s not implausible to assume that the place of the work of art in history and tradition is, or at
the very least could be, an aesthetic feature?
There is another aspect worth pointing out. Perhaps we cannot deny that the phenomenon
Tomas is describing exists, and perhaps we should not want to. But what Tomas has actually
accomplished is the explanation of a certain phenomenon and dubbing it 'aesthetic vision.'
Tomas has, through this, made the claim that this is what it means to experience something
aesthetically. Tomas provides no justification for this attribution of categorical (aesthetic)
experience to this way of perceiving. Heidegger, however, provides a motivation for the
individual to look at things in this way distinct from aesthetic experiences. 16 And it’s not
difficult to conceive how one can perceive the form of an object non-aesthetically?
Even after we stretched Tomas’s account to other mediums than visual arts, it does not seem
as if it can handle all kinds of art; conceptual art, for instance, is something that ‘Aesthetic
Vision’ cannot handle.17 But this does not mean that we must give up Tomas account
completely. We have not shown that his account in its entirety is false, only that it is
insufficient. We want to retain, from Tomas’s account, that viewing the formalistic properties
is an important aspect of the aesthetic experience while we also claim that it is not the only
aesthetically relevant aspect.
Section III – Impressionistic Seeing
As we find 'Aestehtic Vision' unsatisfactory, we could perhaps turn to one closely related but
completely different conception: That of Virgil Aldrich. The most apparent similarities are
that they both are dealing with perception and that they make a distinction between ordinary
perception and the kind of aesthetic perception (which would be the kind of perception you
use when in the aesthetic attitude). This time, however, the aesthetic way of perceiving is
called 'viewing aspectually' or prehending or 'prehension.'
The distinction between ordinary perceiving and aesthetic perceiving is different with
Aldrich. Ordinary experience is, for Aldrich, characterized by science and observation. It's the
16
17
SuZ p. 172.
If we again turn to Heidegger and the section of SuZ of which footnote 16's reference comes from (§36 but also
§35 and §§ 37- 39,), we have further basis for accepting the impossibility of this aspect of perception might
handle conceptual art. Indeed, as we have seen, Heidegger considers this kind of viewing to be devoid of
"meaning" or such things.
8
way one necessarily considers objects in the ordinary world. One is acquainted with patterns
and commonalities, while being disposed to use the object in purposeful ways. These are the
intrinsic characteristics of an object, what might be objectively there to be viewed. Fenner
summarizes:
A description of the physical object may be articulated, and in a manner complete
enough to secure recognition of the object. Moreover, the object's uses are apparent in
such a recognition. The base properties are forthcoming in a fairly superficial
consideration of the object.18
We shall, without further ado, allow Aldrich to describe what the aesthetic viewer does in
contrast:
What I am approaching is the phenomenon of categorical aspection. It is so pervasive
that it usually escapes notice. The same material thing may be perceptually realized
either as a physical or as an aesthetic object . . . The aesthetic space of things
perceived thus is determined by such characteristics as intensities or values of colors
and sounds, which as we shall see later, comprise the medium presented by the
material things in question . . . Thus prehension is, if you like, an "impressionistic"
way of looking, but still a mode of perception, with the impressions objectively
animating the material things – there to be prehended . . . Let us say, then, that under
observation, the characteristics of the material things are realized as "qualities" that
"qualify" it, while for prehension, its characteristics are realized as "aspect" (objective
impression) that "animate" it19
Aldrich's example of categorical aspection, or prehension, is when one perceives snowflakes
falling, when focused on a point on the horizon, one can see them as comets falling.
Categorical aspection, then, seems to be attributing label(s) to the formalistic properties one
sees. While the objective qualities of the object does not change, one sees them as a, (possibly
different,) something.
There's a claim of objectivity to be found in Aldrich's account, seeing as whatever aspects of
the object viewed prehensiously, they all supervene on the same objective qualitites. That is,
one certainly cannot add or remove anything from the formalistic properties that one sees, and
as such there are boundaries for what I can 'prehend.' Indeed, it is very difficult for me to
prehend a pig when what I look at is a bottle of whiskey.
However, one can question whether this is enough to build a basis of objectivity upon. Fenner
does not think so, and Morreal means that such a weak claim of objectivity can
18
19
Fenner (1996) p. 87.
Cit. Ibid. p. 88.
9
[…] end up with both P and not-P. “This cloud is and is not – depending on the ability
of and plurability of the observers – a house, locomotive, frog on pad, sandwich,
microscope”20
We can see that it limits our prehension but this claim of objectivity does not seem to give us
any guidance in determining what is good art or beautiful or anything of the sort. as Morreal
seems to point out, this criterion of objectivity seems to allow for two judgments that
contradict each other. We can conclude that this criterion of objectivity is quite inadequate.
Certainly, there is another difficulty with this theory in that it has a difficulty of handling
other aesthetic mediums than visual. How is one to aspectually appreciate music? And as
Dickie puts it: "Even looking at an impressionistic painting does not involve an
impressionistic way of looking."21 It's not even clear how this is connected with the visual arts
themselves.22
The question we ought to ask ourselves is whether there is anything useful in this account, for
our purposes. One may be able to perceive the same formalistic properties with different
prehensions. Indeed, some art may be welcoming something like it. It is not unheard of to put
“a face” in a painting.23 Perhaps just certain aspects of a work of art should be prehended, but
the phenomenon seems to exist. However, as with Tomas’s account, it does not seem to cover
all phenomena we call aesthetic experiences either. But we can pick it up as a feature of our
perception relevant to aesthetic experience.
Part II – Psychical Distance
As these two, ‘Aesthetic Vision’ and ‘Impressionistic Seeing,’ were the largest and most
developed accounts of the attitude theories whose focus is on perceptual distinctions or
abilities, proved insufficient as whole accounts we are not going to turn towards the two
largest and more well-known concepts; Disinterest and Distance. These attitudes are more
focused at motivation, intentionality and/or stances towards aesthetic experiences. We are
going to follow George Dickie in his The Myth of the Aesthetical Attitude in his criticism of
the two concepts.
Fenner (1996) p. 90.
Cit. Ibid. p. 89
22
Ibid..
23
See for example Allegory of Iconoclasm c. 1966-68, by Marcus Gheeraerts the Elder
20
21
10
Section IV – Distance Explained
The first account Dickie criticizes is Distance, whose main proponent is Edward Bullough.
Before going on to the criticism, however, we are in need of a presentation of the theory.
Distance simply consists in the assumption that if one wishes to experience an object
aesthetically, one must psychically distance oneself from the object, hence the name:
Psychical Distance or simply Distance. It has both a negative and a positive aspect. The
negative: one must remove oneself from the practical attitude one usually takes towards
objects. The positive:
[...] the elaboration of the experience on the new basis created by the inhibitory actions
of Distance . . . Distance appears to lie between our own self and its affections . . .
Distance is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self, but
putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends.24
By psychically distancing oneself one does not stop being affected by the work of art.
Distance is necessary so that one's emotions or person is not actually engaged directly with
the object. One is Distanced insofar as one is able to remain in control of oneself; one might
experience sadness, joy or rage but one ought not to act on these emotions.25 If one is unable
to keep one's emotions in check, then one has been unsuccessful in “fusing” the emotions with
the experience. One becomes engrossed in the emotions and the aesthetic attitude is broken;
one has become Under-Distanced and the experience is no longer aesthetic.26
As Fenner points out, this account can be extended to include any object whatever; even
punches in the face can be regarded aesthetically. There is no logical necessity to lose one's
distance even if a play or a work of art would contain a punch in the face, while it might prove
to be difficult.
As has been mentioned above, one can be Distanced in degrees. One can be greatly distanced
to an artwork, only barely forming a connection to it, barely allowing it to stir one's emotions,
even to the degree of doing something else. This would be the kind of spectra ranging from
adequately distanced to over-distanced. When one is over-distanced one does not have an
aesthetic experience. Many of us have perhaps been reading a newspaper or something of the
like while in front of the television; very seldom does one feel moved by what is going on on
Cit. Fenner (1996) p. 61.
Fenner (1996) p. 61.
26
Stolnitz (1960) p. 54-57.
24
25
11
the screen while dividing one's attention between that and something else. We have already
mentioned under-distanced, and so no further comments on that will be provided.
This raises another question: is this scale of being under-distanced, properly distanced or
over-distanced either a set of absolutes or boundaries on a continuum, so as to allowing one to
be just slightly over-distanced. In the one case, with the degrees of distance as a set of
absolutes there are specific features about the work of art to be attended, otherwise one at
once becomes put into one of the two camps at the far ends. Certainly, one can consider
calling each person that thinks about the technicalities of a play (how they accomplish a
certain effect or have created one of the dresses) to be under-distanced, and as such not
enjoying the performance purely aesthetically. This is the view of Allan Casabier, whose view
of attention being that either it's there or it's not.
If one is not tempted by this account and turn to the continuum view where there is a range of
being properly distanced in order to appreciate the performance aesthetically. This is claimed
by Sheila Dawson. It can handle a more merciful view of the spectator, where he/she needs
not be disposed to pay attention to just some specific properties of the play. One might be
disposed to appreciate and prefer some properties among several which can all be considered
to be of aesthetic nature or aesthetically relevant. This is something which Casabiers account
has a difficulty of handling,27 so, for future reference, we are discussing Dawson’s account.
Section V – Dickie on Distance
Dickie begins, saying that the most relevant question we can pose ourselves when evaluating
this theory is:
Are there actions denoted by "to distance" or states of consciousness denoted by
"being distanced"? [...] are we ever induced into a state of being distanced either by
being struck by the beauty of the object or by pulling off an act of distancing? 28
Dickie cannot recall ever performing any such action before, neither can he remember being
induced to such a state. Dickie has no reason to suspect that he is significantly different from
anyone else in this regard.
Dickie agrees that there are certain features one ought to pay attention to while ignoring
others while experiencing a work of art. However, he sees no reason to take the step to
27
28
Ibid. p. 64-6.
Myth p. 57.
12
introduce a technical term where there is no need for one. He believes that being 'underdistanced' and 'over-distanced' is just two ways of not paying attention to the work of art,
since in either case one is preoccupied with other things (either an activity that does not
belong or with one's own emotions). Since Dickie considers Distance to be only about
attention to the right things, he believes introducing the terms mentioned above may mislead
one to believe that it says something of further value.
Is Dickie’s objection sound? There certainly appears to be more things being said in
presenting the concept of Distance. Distance seems to tell us to be actively engaged in the
work of art in whatever way we can. Only when we actively engage the work of art or directly
act on what happens one breaks Distance, and falls out of the attitude.
Dickie meets this objection by noting that there are conventions and patterns of behavior that
is acceptable, depending on where the work of art is exhibited. Dickie speaks of this in the
example of a theater and quotes Samuel Johnson:
[T]he truth is that the spectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first act
to the last, that the stage is only a stage and that the players are only players.29
But there are moments when one is completely “swept away” and forgets that one is in a
theater. How can one plausibly claim that one remembers the accepted conventions and
patterns of behavior in such a case? Fenner relates one experience of his regarding this:
[…] as a student I was once in a particularly stirring performance of Faust at the Royal
Opera House in Covent Garden. Toward the end of the opera, when the heroine is
imprisoned and then finds relief in death, I was so caught up in the spectacle that I was
inclined to behave in some way that would not be appropriate […] the only thing that
stopped me was my last-moment recognition that I was in a theater and the spectacle
was not real and would not benefit from my acting out.30
It could be argued that in such a case that one is swept away one is regarding the conventions
sub-consciously. Indeed, this may be a further fact that is being included in the term of
Distance. If so, then Dickie's criticism does not hit the mark. We are inclined to say, with
Bullough, that the Distance between us and the work of art ought to be as small as possible
while still being there.
This leads us to Dickie’s next criticism. Dickie questions whether one ought to be distanced at
all when we engage a work of art. Since Bullough claims that one ought to maintain, at the
29
30
Cit. Fenner (1996) p. 68.
Ibid..
13
very least, some distance for remaining in the attitude. First, Dickie brings a statement from
Dawson, regarding this particular aspect of distancing:
One remembers the horrible loss of distance in Peter Pan – the moment when Peter
says "Do you believe in fairies? . . . If you believe, clap your hands!" the moment
when most children would like to slink out of the theatre and not a few cry – not
because Tinkerbell may die, but because the magic is gone. What, after all, should we
feel like if Lear were to leave Cordelia, come to the front of the stage and say, "All the
grown-ups who think that she loves me, shout 'yes'."31
Dickie is unconvinced by these claims. The break in Distance might be, in fact, the dramatic
high point of the play, and children generally respond enthusiastically towards it. Dickie
believes that there also seems to be something suspect in the comparison to King Lear, seeing
as it is not the same kind of play. Surely we must agree with Dickie, especially as he points to
more examples, such as: Our Town, The marriage Broker, A Taste of Honey. It could
plausibly be argued, that addressing the audience in this way is not a fault in the aesthetic
character of these plays, but may even be thought to be one of their strongest points.
Of course, these are not the only instantiations of a negative reaction to this kind of disruption
of distance in a play. Susanne Langer reports one such occasion which "shattered the illusion
and caused her acute misery."32 even though most of the other children responded quite
favorably. With the argument from Dawson and the testimony of Langer, Dickie concludes
that this is not the aesthetic attitude. But I believe that we have to say a few more things in
regards to this.
Distance could save itself by appealing to a more moderate claim than it does originally, it
could surrender the position of being the aesthetic attitude, to being one among several, but in
so doing it is left to explain what kind of works of art that it is proper to adopt this particular
attitude towards and to distinguish itself from others.
However, I believe that it has lost much of its appeal already, and it’s questionable why we
should consider this an aesthetic attitude at all if it has a negative effect on aesthetic
appreciation, exemplified by both Dawson and Langer. If one has a bad experience as a
consequence of having the attitude it does not do its job as to facilitate an aesthetic
experience, much less being necessary for one. One could argue that it has good consequences
31
32
Cit. Myth p. 57
Cit. Ibid..
14
in relation to other works of art, but it may be that one can find an attitude which could handle
all works of art just as well.
What remains from this discussion that’s valuable to us, however, is that one ought to be
distanced in the way as to inhibit interventions in the way that the object of aesthetic
appreciation ought to be experienced. It might be in the way of a play, where one ought to
simply be a passive receiver and as such respect the accepted patterns of behavior. Some sort
of inhibitory feature ought to be retained from here, in either way.
Part III – Disinterest and Dickie
Before venturing on to explain the Disinterest theory it could, perhaps, be of interest to point
to the history this account has. As was said in the introduction, this account sprung up among
the British taste-theorists, first provided by Lord Shaftesbury. Of course, Lord Shaftesbury is
not the person most associated with the idea of Disinterest.
In fact, that honor befalls Kant. Kant wanted to "explain the rationality of subjective
presumptions of universality"33 as well as explain the value of aesthetic experience. Kant's
notion of Disinterest actually only stretched as far as to include beauty, while Schopenhauer
furthered the account to include all aesthetic experience in general.34 But we are not about to
explain more than is necessary. We turn to the account of Disinterest, and Dickie's criticism is
our ticket to ride.
Section VI – Disinterest Confused – Disinterested attention itself
As Dickie turns towards Disinterest he wants to emphasize that this way of conceiving of the
aesthetic attitude is to attend, in the ordinary sense, to an object in a certain way disinterestedly. He is arguing against the conception of Stolnitz, as this is the most accepted
account of this view today (as well as 50 years ago).
Stolnitz defines "aesthetic attitude" as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and
contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone." Stolnitz
defines the main terms of his definition: "disinterested" means "no concern for any
ulterior purpose"; "sympathetic" means "accept the object on its own terms to
appreciate it"; and contemplation" means "perception directed toward the object in its
own right and the spectator is not concerned to analyze it or ask questions about it."35
Britisih Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 39, No. 4, October 1999 ; The Aesthetic Attitude, Gary Kemp p. 396 (in the
continuation simply 'AA.')
34
Ibid..
35
Myth p. 57-8.
33
15
The distinction, then, is motivational or intentional in nature rather than perceptual; we are
attending with a certain purpose.
However, Dickie points out, this does not mean that when attending to a work of art our
attending does not change simply because we are led by different purposes: There is nothing
in the comparison of two differently motivated people that would suggest that they would
attend differently, as long as they are both attending to the same object. This is important
because it could only be fruitful to talk of attending disinterestedly if one could attend
interestedly.
Dickie takes it, since Stolnitz defined "disinterested" as "no concern for any ulterior purpose,"
the notion gets confused as, Dickie believes, it’s treated as a difference in perception. Dickie,
to prove his point, puts forward an argument similar to the one against Distance:
How would one look at a painting disinterestedly or interestedly? An example of
alleged interested viewing might be the case in which a painting reminds Jones of his
grandfather and Jones proceeds to muse about or to regale a companion with tales of
his grandfather's pioneer exploits. Such incidents would be characterized by attitudetheorists as examples of using a work of art as a vehicle for associations and so on,
i.e., cases of interested attention. But Jones is not looking at (attending to) the painting
at all, although he may be facing it with his eyes open. Jones is now musing or
attending to the story he is telling, although he had to look at the painting at first to
notice that it resembled his grandfather. Jones is not now looking at the painting
interestedly since he is not now looking at (attending to) the painting. Jones's thinking
or telling a story about his grandfather is no more a part of the painting than his
speculating about the artist's intentions is and, hence, his musing, telling, speculating,
and so on cannot properly be described as attending to the painting interestedly. What
attitude-aestheticians are calling attention to is the occurrence of irrelevant
associations which distract the viewer from the painting or whatever. But distraction is
not a special kind of attention, it is a kind of inattention.36
To put it shortly: Dickie believes that interested attention, in contrast to disinterested
attention, is just a form of distraction from the object of aesthetic experience, and in so is not
really attention at all.
Kemp defends the attitude view in his article from '99 titled Aesthetic Attitude37 and discusses
this particular criticism of Dickie's:
[...]Dickie's contention that the notion of interested attention collapses into that of
distraction or partial attention is surely mistaken. [...] It seems straightforward that
there can be cases of full attention to a work of art which is not the sort of attention
36
37
Ibid. p. 58.
I’m referring to AA as referred to in footnote 23.
16
exercised in aesthetic experience. [...] For example, a music student might listen
closely to a piece in order to identify key modulations or rhytmic groupings. This is
not a case of distraction, not a case of not attending to the music. Yet it is not an
aesthetic attitude either, as the struggling music student will attest (we murder to
dissect). It would be a diversion from the potential aesthetic experience but not
diversion from the music.38
Dickie does discuss this kind of example:
[...]Jones listens to a piece of music for the purpose of being able to analyze and
describe it on an examination the next day and Smith listens to the same music with no
such ulterior purpose. There is certainly a difference between the motives and
intentions of the two men: Jones has an ulterior purpose and Smith does not, but this
does not mean Jones's listening differs from Smith's. It is possible that both men enjoy
the music or that both be bored. The attention of either or both may flag and so on. It is
important to note that a person's motive or intention is different from his action
(Jones's listening to the music, for example). There is only one way to listen to (to
attend to) music, although the listening may be more or less attentive and there may be
a variety of motives, intentions, and reasons for doing so and a variety of ways of
being distracted from the music.39
Kemp believes that Dickie’s conclusion – that there is no such thing as the aesthetic attitude –
is unsupported by these claims. Furthermore, Kemp turns against Dickie's claim that "there is
only one way to listen to music." Kemp points out that this is "a substantive psychological
claim, and substantively false"40 as far as he can see.
Listening for modulations – as opposed not only listening more generally for
enjoyment but as opposed to listening for changes of metre or rhythm – is a case in
point. Another might be searching a Jackson Pollock for faces, if we want examples
outside music. It is hard to agree that in these cases one can properly be described as
being distracted from the music or picture.41
We shall have opportunity to discuss this shortly42, but for present purposes we only need to
take a look at why this criticism does not hit the intended mark of destroying the notion of the
attitude.
As Kemp points out, this distinction in purpose or motivation that Dickie points to is all that is
needed for an attitude-theorist. It is true that Stolnitz definition as it is quoted by Dickie can
be read as to regard the perception, but it needs not be read as such.
AA p. 393.
Myth p. 58.
40
AA p. 394.
41
Ibid..
42
We are going to introduce the problem om p. 22 but find it's solution on p. 29.
38
39
17
That it is the 'attitude' that possesses the distinguishing feature of being disinterested
does not imply that the perception is itself what possesses that feature. It might not
even make sense to speak of perceptions qua perceptions as interested or disinterested.
[...] it is probably more plausible to say that they are so in virtue of the purposes which
guide the perception. [...] the main point of the theory can without evident loss be put
by saying that attention is aesthetic precisely when it is not pragmatically motivated.
That there are clear cases of close, pragmatically motivated attention does nothing to
show that there is no such thing as close attention which is not so motivated.43
It does not matter that Dickie shows that the distinction between interested – disinterested is
perceptual. Indeed, all experiential distinctions are not perceptual.
Kemp says that Dickie might refer to a different claim:
[...]the music student's attention, since it focuses so narrowly upon one aspect of the
music, necessarily excludes other aspects or properties which may be essential to an
understanding or aesthetic appreciation of the piece. As it might be put, the student
gives his whole attention to the music, but not to the whole of the music.44
According to Kemp, Dickie’s conclusion that there is no such thing as the aesthetic attitude is
unfounded. All that it amounts to is that the attitude has been misdefined. According to the
possible claim Dickie can make, Disinterested attention is nothing more than attention to the
aesthetically relevant properties. But this concerns the nature of the aesthetic attitude and is
no longer the simple objection Dickie wanted to make; it is no longer something that can be
solved by considering the term ‘attention’ and seeing that it is the same in both cases of
interested attention and disinterested attention.
This new definition of the aesthetic attitude may prove to make the attitude approach vacuous:
it is now a matter of whether we can replace the notion of an aesthetic attitude with the notion
of attention to aesthetic properties.
But it is precisely the most basic commitment of the aesthetic attitude approach –
especially understood as deriving from Kant – to avoid the notion of an aesthetic
property. Kant held that beauty is precisely not a concept, not a property, not
something in terms of which objects can be literally described. The proper task of a
philosophy of beauty rather is to attend to the special features of aesthetic experience
or judgement. The basis of that judgement is subjective which is precisely to say that
aesthetic predicates do not express genuine concepts, do not pick out objective
properties or features of reality. [...] The sense of properly aesthetic description should
be explained in terms of the mental propensities awakened by disinterested attention,
not in terms of the mental propensities awakened by disinterested attention, not in
43
44
Ibid..
Ibid. p. 395.
18
terms of features literally possessed by the objects. Aesthetic experience takes
explanatory precedence in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, not the objects of
experience. If so, then it is no objection to the aesthetic attitude theory to point out that
it would be logically adequate to define the attitude to generic attention to aesthetic
properties.45
We are led to understand that this regards the basic metaphysical commitments of the two
views of Dickie and the attitude-theorists. The attitude theorist denies that there is such a
thing as aesthetically relevant properties and is, through their attitude, trying to explain
exactly in what way we are to engage an object aesthetically. According to attitude-theorists
aesthetic properties such as beauty, or aesthetic attributes in general, are not properties of the
object itself. Unless Dickie gives us a viable alternative – to explain which the aesthetic
properties are and how the relation between them and the object looks – he is asking us to
surrender the attitude approach to a concept which does not explain all aspects. And since this
debate, according to Stanford:
[...] seems to always result either in claims about the immediate graspability of
aesthetic properties, which are arguably insufficient to the task, or in claims about the
essentially formal nature of aesthetic properties, which are arguably groundless.46
It seems as if he is asking us to accept a notion which does not make sense. Surely, in light of
this, the attitude approach is to prefer. Even were we to deny the approach towards aesthetic
properties as not making sense we can move to a softer claim that would still deny this kind of
view, the Lockean-relational account:
One focuses on the aesthetic properties of the object. But the set of aesthetic
properties is, formally, a matter of the relationship between the object and the subject;
the subject is able to bring out the aesthetic properties from the objective base
properties. [...] the aesthetic properties are supervenient on both the agent's attendance
and the base properties.47
Thus leading to that the set of aesthetic properties is relative to the agents experience, and as
such it is impossible to explain which are the aesthetically relevant properties, since there is
no complete set of relevant aesthetic properties. Indeed, Dickie himself supports this
conclusion. He says that there is no aspect or property of an object that can be excluded a
Ibid. p. 395-6.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/#AesAtt visited 2012-05-17. These lines I have quoted is
used as an argument against the attitude approach, however that is only insofar as we admit that there are
aesthetically relevant properties that it is proper to focus one's attention to. If we do not, as the reasoning up
to this point seems to imply that we should not, then the argument falls on the other side of the curtain. What
is one to focus one's attention to?
47
Fenner (1996) p. 105.
45
46
19
priori from attention. As such we seem to have no grounds to accept that Disinterested
attention boils down to attention to the aesthetic relevant properties.
Section VII – Disinterest Confuses – Relevance
Further criticism that Dickie delivers is about confusion that Disinterest is causing in aesthetic
theory in different aspects. One such confusion would be about aesthetic relevance or
acceptable interpretation of a work of art. In the words of Stolnitz the question goes as
follows:
Is it ever 'relevant' to the aesthetic experience to have thoughts or images or bits of
knowledge which are not present within the object itself?48
the subsequent answer being:
If the aesthetic experience is as we have described it, then whether an association is
aesthetic depends on whether it is compatible with the attitude of "disinterested
attention." If the association re-enforces the focusing of attention upon the object, by
"fusing" with the object and thereby giving it added "life and significance," it is
genuinely aesthetic. If, however, it arrogates attention to itself and away from the
object, it undermines the aesthetic attitude.49
Dickie discusses via an example of a poem that Stolnitz provides:
Between the erect and solemn trees
I will go down upon my knees;
I shall not find this day
So meet a place to pray.50
One student reading this poem got an image of a rugby forward running while reading the
third verse51, while an image of a catherdral arose for another. According to Stolnitz, the
cathedral image "is congruous with both the verbal meaning of the poem and the emotions
and mood which it expresses. It does not divert attention away from the poem."52
Dickie believes that using Disinterestedness as a criterion of relevance is confused. It does not
seem to offer much guidance in that regard at all. Dickie points out that Stolnitz seems to use
congruousness with the meaning of the poem as a criterion, something quite independent of
Cit. Myth p. 61
Cit. Ibid..
50
Cit. Ibid..
51
How strong each pillared trunk; the bark / That covers them, how smooth; and hark, / The sweet and gentle
voice / With which the leaves rejoice!
52
Cit. Ibid..
48
49
20
Disinterest. Dickie thinks that the problem can be described in terms "of relevance to a poem,
or more generally, to a work of art, rather than aesthetic relevance.”53
We must agree with Dickie that disinterested attention does not offer much of a criterion for
determining what interpretation or what kind of "fusion" is acceptable/unacceptable. There is
nothing wrong with accepting Dickie's alternative – acceptable interpretation ought to be
judged in relevance to work of art – and it would not significantly damage the theory.
The theory could still claim that fusion is beneficent to the aesthetic experience so long as the
"fused image" does not draw attention to itself but helps to focus attention on the artwork.
And, indeed, we cannot say that the image of a rugby forward running would necessarily draw
away attention from the poem. Surely, one can interpret the poem in numerous ways, without
that drawing one's attention away from the poem. Regardless, the theory of Disinterest can no
longer, by itself, deny the adequacy of the 'rugby forward running'-image. There seems to be
other measures we can use to claim inadequacy of that, should we like to.
Section VIII – Disinterest confuses – Morality
Dickie also believes that the Disinterest confuses the relationship between art and morality.
He puts forward the attitude-theorists view in two quotations:
We are either concerned with the beauty of the object or with some other value of the
same. Just as soon, for example, as ethical considerations occur to our mind, our
attitude shifts.
And
Any of us might reject a novel because it seems to conflict with our moral beliefs . . .
When we do so . . . We have not read the book aesthetically, for we have interposed
moral . . . responses to our own which are alien to it. This disrupts the aesthetic
attitude. We cannot then say that the novel is aesthetically bad, for we have not
permitted ourselves to consider it aesthetically. To maintain the aesthetic attitude, we
must follow the lead of the object and respond in concert with it.54
Dickie believes that, according to the attitude-theorists, the moral aspects of a work of art
cannot be aesthetic since moral aspects of a work of art are somehow practically interested,
and aesthetic attention is by definition disinterested.
53
54
Ibid..
Cit. Myth p. 63.
21
Dickie, referring to Pole, is of the idea that the moral vision of a work of art can be
aesthetically relevant. Pole assumes that "philosophical theory should take notice of
practice"55 while referring to the fact that critics tend to refer to works of art in moralistic
terms and that it is a "philosophical commonplace . . . that the ethical and the aesthetic modes
. . . form different categories."56 Dickie agrees with Pole, although stressing that it may be that
all moralistic criticism is wrong one should not rule it out by means of definition.
Dickie presents Pole's view that the moral vision of a work of art can be either true or false, or
perhaps a mixture. If a work of art were to have a false moral vision there would be something
within the work itself that is lacking. The moral vision of the work of art would be an aspect
that would make the work internally incoherent, something that stood in strong contrast to the
other aspects of the work of art, and as such becoming an aesthetic fault. (Dickie himself puts
up a weaker alternative, such as the moral vision of a work of art may be either acceptable or
unacceptable, since he's uncertain as to whether it's proper to speak of a moral vision as true
or false. Also mentioning that a false or unacceptable moral vision does not make a work
incoherent, the coherence of the work is dependent on its internal relations, not anything
external.)
Dickie agrees with Pole in that the moral vision of a work is a part of the work. As such, as
soon as one comments on the moral vision of the work, one comments on the work.
Commenting on a work makes it a critical comment, and so, according to Dickie, it falls under
the aesthetic domain.
To judge a moral vision to be morally unacceptable is to judge it defective and this
amounts to saying that the work of art has a defective part. [...] Thus a work's moral
vision may be an aesthetic merit or defect just as a work's degree of unity is a merit or
defect.57
However, this does not adequately describe Stolnitz view on this relationship of art and
morality. Stolnitz agrees with Pole and Dickie here, in that the moral point of view is a part of
the work of art. Stolnitz considers the moral point of view as one of the formalistic criteria of
a novel that one needs to take into consideration when reading. Since Stolnitz considers this
relationship in this way, this is not an argument against Disinterest.
Cit. Myth p. 63.
Cit. Ibid..
57
Myth p. 64.
55
56
22
Fenner points out that Stolnitz does not proclaim the moral point of view of a novel irrelevant
to aesthetic experience, in yet another way: It could serve as knowledge-about, giving a
perspective to read the novel from. Indeed, try reading Huckleberry Finn without having its
moral point of view in mind. Indeed, to have knowledge-about the work of art which helps in
aesthetic experiencing of the object is relevant, only when knowledge-about draws away
attention from the art-work to itself is it irrelevant and ought not to be part of the aesthetic
experience.58
What Stolnitz seems to say here is not that morality is always irrelevant to aesthetics. Stolnitz
believes that you ought to read the novel as if one accepted its moral point of view without
bringing anything external into consideration.
Section IX – Disinterest Confuses – Role of the Critic
Dickie further believes that the attitude approach confuses aesthetic theory regarding the role
of the critic. According to Dickie, there is no reason to assume that the critic has a different
relationship with the work of art than an ordinary spectator. Stolnitz claims that appreciation
and criticism are distinct and psychologically opposed to each other. The critical attitude is
"questioning, analytical, probing for strengths and weakness, and so on"59 while the aesthetic
"[...] commits our allegiance to the object freely and unquestionally" ; "the spectator
'surrenders' himself to the work of art" "Just because the two attitudes are inimical,
whenever criticism obstrudes, it reduces aesthetic interest."60
Before Dickie continues with his argument he admits that Stolnitz does not deny the value of
criticism to a work of art, as it can help in preparing the spectator to further aspects of the
work of art than the spectator hitherto had access to; in the form of knowledge-about Stolnitz
allows that criticism can give further perspectives from which to view the work of art.
However, he remains skeptical to the claim Stolnitz makes that criticism has to have been
available before the experience is had, or it will interfere with appreciation. Dickie believes
that this is a logical consequence of Stolnitz definition of the aesthetic attitude and that it
confuses motivation with attending. Dickie refers back to his earlier argument.61 And while
Fenner (1996) p. 76-7.
Myth p. 64.
60
Cit. Ibid p. 61-2. This is a quote of three quotes Dickie gathers to present Stolnitz view.
61
Section VI
58
59
23
we could not accept the argument, it makes little difference in continuation of Dickie's
argumentation on this point.62
Dickie admits that it might be possible that searching for reasons is incompatible with
appreciation of art, but stays skeptical towards it. He relates one of his own experiences:
Several years ago I participated in a series of panel discussions of films. During the
showing of each film we were to discuss, I had to take note of various aspects of the
film /actor's performance, dramatic development, organization of the screen-plane and
screen-space at given moments, and so on) in order later to discuss the films. I believe
that this practice not only helped educate me to appreciate subsequent films but it
enhanced the appreciation of the films I was analyzing. I noticed and was able to
appreciate things about the films I was watching which ordinarily out of laziness I
would not have noticed.63
Dickie sees no reason to assume that he is different from any other critic and so he denies that
there is any significant difference between attending to a work of art "perceptively and
acutely" and simply searching for reasons, as the experience is concerned.
A practiced viewer, he says, "does not even have to be looking for a reason, he may just
notice a line or an area in a painting, for example, and the line or area becomes a reason why
he thinks the painting better or worse."64 Pointing out that if this is what it means to be a
critic, then people can be critics without realizing it. Dickie believes that there is no
competition between aesthetic appreciation and criticism in aesthetic appreciation. Dickie
thinks that searching for reasons helps focus attention to the work of art. He believes that
finding a reason is more like an achievement than65 an activity. It does not take time to find
one, "it is done in a flash."66
Indeed, this seems to put us in a difficult position, in regards to whether it is possible to
criticize while still experiencing aesthetically. Indeed, Stolnitz believe that they are competing
concepts, while Dickie believes they are not. Since both sides of the coin refer to empirical
examples (Dickie to himself, Kemp with an unspecified, although plausible, example of a
music student) we don't seem to get anywhere. Indeed, Stolnitz says that one can have more
than one attitude towards an object at the same time, and as such this could provide part of an
p. 14 and onwards.
Myth p. 62.
64
Ibid..
65
Ibid..
66
Ibid..
62
63
24
answer to this dispute. But as Dickie believes that criticism does not compete for attention we
have two incommensurable positions.
Perhaps the difficulties can be resolved if we give an account of Stolnitz disinterest, as he
conceives of it, since the way Dickie thinks about it doesn't seem to give a fair picture. So let
us return to this question shortly!67
Part IV – Stolnitz and Disinterest
Before we begin, however, there is one thing we ought to note. Stolnitz is interested in
explaining necessary and sufficient conditions for having an aesthetic experience. Stolnitz
further considers aesthetic experiencing a goal worthy of achieving on its own. Regardless of
what makes aesthetic experiences worth having, most people seems to agree that you don't
need further motivations for having an aesthetic experience.68 As such we know that he at
very least ascribes aesthetic experience final value and taking the heritage from Kant and (in
particular) Schopenhauer into consideration we can assume that he also considered it to have
intrinsic value.69
Section X – Definition of Stolnitz Aesthetic Attitude
Stolnitz notes that attention is selective, i.e., when we look at an object we look at it
"purposefully." That is, an object appears to me with certain features in its focus depending on
what I'm about to use the object for. Stolnitz considers this as practical perception, or our
ordinary attitude towards the world. This is the attitude we take ordinarily towards the world
and the objects in it. Stolnitz says that if we could put the attitude into the form of a question
it would be: "What can I do with it, and what can it do to me?"70
Aesthetic perception is not as common as it's not concerned with practical matters. Again, in
the words of Stolnitz:
I will define "the aesthetic attitude" as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and
contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone."71
We wil return to this question on p. 29.
Fenner (1996) p. 72
69
The distinction between these two – final and intrinsic – were not as clear when Stolnitz wrote his work, as
these different concepts were often confused. Stolnitz does not explicitly say that he considers aesthetic
experience to be of intrinsic value, but neither does he say that they gain their value from an external source. I
have, as such assumed that he ascribes it intrinsic value.
70
Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism, Stolnitz (1960) p. 33 (in the continuation simply Stolnitz (1960)),
furthermore Stolnitz does not seem to believe that perception is habitually practical out of necessity, though it
certainly appears to always be in our society, leaving out other cultures. (p. 34 in his book)
71
Stolnitz (1960) p. 34-5.
67
68
25
We have already faced these lines before, when they were presented by Dickie, but we must
now spend more time examining them to see what, if anything, Dickie missed.
As we can see, the definition of the attitude has three parts, as Stolnitz conceives of it, but also
adds 'any object of awareness whatever' as a fourth component. We shall, however, omit
saying anything about the fourth component of Stolnitz definition as it falls outside of the
scope of this investigation.
Section XI – Definition of ’Disinterested’
According to Stolnitz, perception can be considered 'disinterested' when we are not looking to
any ulterior purpose of which we could use the object, nor in manipulating the object itself.
Interest, insofar as it is relevant to aesthetic experience, is on the object alone.
Not every kind of interest matters, however. Stolnitz gives an example of a book-collector
who is only interested in the rarity of a book or its purchase price while completely ignoring
its value as a piece of literature, whereupon he remarks, almost upset, that there are collectors
who have not even read the books they possess.
Another such interest in the object, which Stolnitz considers non-aesthetic is “cognitive;”
Stolnitz does not consider the interest of gaining knowledge about an object aesthetically
relevant. Again, he gives an example: a metereologist is not interested in the appearance of a
striking cloud formation, but interested in understanding the causes and mechanisms behind
it.
Finally, Stolnitz presents us with a third way in which interest in the object can be nonaesthetic viz. the interest of passing judgement, such as the critic does. Stolnitz thinks that the
attitude of an art critic is very different from the aesthetic attitude.72
Certainly, one can understand what Stolnitz wants to say with this. Even if one can be
interested in an object for its own sake, that does not mean that it is necessarily an aesthetic
interest one has. In fact it might, as in the case of the book-collector, be one sprung from selfinterest, pride and/or vanity.
As with the case of knowledge it is less obvious, perhaps. But, certainly, one can understand
how one who observes for knowledge of the object (or the underlying phenomena) can miss
out on the aesthetic aspects of a phenomenon, even though one offers ones full attention to it.
72
Stolnitz (1960) p. 35
26
However, it is “disinterested” in the sense that it does not stretch outside of the phenomenon
itself, it is not Disinterested in the sense that it does not serve an ulterior purpose. And one
must admit to (at least the possibility of) the truth of the last of Stolnitz statements, regarding
the passing of judgments.
Stolnitz contrasts perceiving something in the aesthetic attitude with perceiving something in
the practical attitude: Practical perception which, once it has its object apprehended, it sees
the origins of the object as well as its “causes and interrelations with other things.”73
By contrast, the aesthetic attitude “isolates” the object and focuses upon it – the look
of the rocks, the sound of the ocean, the colors in the painting. Hence the object is not
seen in a fragmentary or passing manner […] Its whole nature and character are dwelt
upon. One who buys a painting merely to cover a stain on the wall paper does not see
the painting as a delightful pattern of colors and forms.74
By these last quotes I believe we have sufficient information to see where Stolnitz believes
that the boundaries are of what can be considered aesthetic experience and what cannot..
There seems to be heavy emphasis on the formalistic criteria of a work of art or an object of
aesthetic appreciation. As we saw above, this is a statement that appears unfounded.75
However, we need not spend time on this feature of the theory here, as this is merely a
presentation.
Section XII – Definition of ‘Sympathetic’
Moving on, we also need to examine the “sympathetic” part of the definition of the attitude.
As we have had opportunity to observe already: Even though the account is in large part
identified by its 'disinterestedness' we are not to take this to mean that we are not at all
interested in the object up for aesthetic experience. In fact, it is much to the contrary. We can
very well be so absorbed by the aesthetic experience, while reading books or such, that we
almost forget the rest of the world and are almost more interested in the activity of aesthetic
experiencing than we usually are in practical matters.
Insofar, Stolnitz claims, as we are “sympathetic” to an object of aesthetic experience we
prepare ourselves to respond to the object. We must, if we want to appreciate the object,
accept it on its own terms. That means that we have to accept everything which it might offer
us in terms of perception. For instance, if we do not agree with the moral nature of the object
Stolnitz (1960) p. 35
Ibid..
75
See p. 5.
73
74
27
of aesthetic experience, we are to inhibit our responses, as far as we want to experience it
aesthetically. If we do not we are, according to Stolnitz, not giving it a chance. 76
We have been discussing this above to a sufficient degree to omit saying much more about it.
I will just remind the reader that knowledge about the work of art is relevant if it helps focus
the perceiver's attention and irrelevant if it draws attention to itself (and as such away from
the work of art).77
Section XVIII – Definition of ’Attention’
Furthermore, we have “attention” to deal with. Stolnitz turns against the notion that aesthetic
perception is some kind of “blank, cow-like stare,”78 a notion which, he believes, is derived
from aesthetic perception as characterized as just looking, without any activity or practical
interest. From here a step is taken to that aesthetic perception is had when you expose yourself
to a work of art and allow it to bombard you with “waves of sound and color.” 79 He turns
against this and says that this is contrary to experience. In fact, he says, we are absorbed into
music or novels.
In taking the aesthetic attitude, we want to make the value of the object come fully alive in
our experience. Therefore we focus our attention upon the object and “key up” our capacities
of imagination and emotion to respond to it.
Further
Attention is always a matter of degree, and in different instances of aesthetic perception,
attention is more or less intense. A color, briefly seen, or a little melody, may be apprehended
on the “fringe” of consciousness, whereas a drama will absorb us wholly. But to whatever the
extent it does so, experience is aesthetic only when an object “holds” our attention.80
Attention, then, is an important aspect of the aesthetic experience and can also take expression
in physical enactments, such as tapping your foot to the music. Stolnitz believes that there is
nothing inherently un-aesthetical to that activity, at least. Stolnitz perspective is that, while it
may not be an integral part of the aesthetic experience, one might have to engage physically in
order to be able to fully perceive all the relevant aspects of an artwork. Such as walking
Ibid. p. 36.
Ibid. p. 53 also Fenner (1996) p. 76
78
Stolnitz (1960) p. 37
79
Ibid..
80
Ibid.. holds for both the quotes
76
77
28
around a sculpture in order to get a fuller view of it than one would've got if satisfied with just
one perspective.81
Another relevant notion to attention is discrimination. Stolnitz calls it discrimination
because it teaches the perceiver to pay attention to specific features of the artwork.
He means that it is this which gives much of the satisfaction in aesthetic experience,
and gives an example of such: One might not be able to appreciate a symphony if one
does not know what to look for in it.
Indeed, Fenner says, one might at times be required to have a good deal of
knowledge beforehand, and in some cases it's possible that even technical training is
required. However, with this possibility to pay attention discriminating, one may be
enriched in one's experience. Stolnitz believes that sometimes, without any
possibility to discriminate, one's aesthetic experience becomes flat.82
These three aspects (disinterestedness, sympathy and discriminating attention) is
what Stolnitz considers aesthetic contemplation to consist in. He is very specific to
point out that the term contemplation is designating these three phenomena, and is
not a notion on its own.83
Section XVI – Facing Dickie’s Criticism – the Role of the Critic
So how will we respond to Dickie's criticism? Stolnitz could claim that Dickie is mistaken
about what is considered criticism and recognition. Indeed, Stolnitz seems to be of the idea
that finding of a 'reason' is like an achievement, as Dickie thought. At least the discussion of
discriminating attention above seems to indicate so, in that it helps us and teaches us to pay
attention to some certain reasons in regards to that particular work of art.
Paying attention to certain elements such as a certain relation or harmony or whatever might
increase the aesthetic enjoyment and it seems that Stolnitz does not oppose that these things
are recognized immediately for “a practiced viewer.” A practiced viewer might be able to
quickly distinguish elements which the casual viewer could not.
Ibid..
Ibid. 38
83
Ibid..
81
82
29
However, this does not mean that Stolnitz accepts Dickie's idea that the critic has the same
kind of relationship to the work of art as an ordinary perceiver. As we have seen, it is not
impossible, according to Stolnitz theory, that we are both critical and experiencing
aesthetically at the same time, although these will compete for the attention, and will not be
really be any of them. That is: It might prove to be insufficient for having an aesthetic
experience to partly be in the aesthetic attitude and a criticizing attitude at the same time.
Furthermore, Stolnitz claims that any critique must take place before the experience itself, at
least insofar as the experience will be aesthetic in nature. Indeed, Dickie seems to agree to
some degree. In the demand that the viewer be practiced he would already have experience
with art similar to the one to be experienced. This means he has had his criticizing done
already and know what kind of features to look for in the new work of art he is to experience,
or he recognizes the kind of art and in so doing learns what aspects to look for. This idea,
also, seems to be in accordance with Stolnitz theory, rather than an argument against it.
The really incommensurable part, however, is Dickie's claim that criticism and aesthetic
experience is compatible with each other. It seems to find very little support for this, other
than his empirical example of himself. And even then, it seems, at very least to me, plausible
to claim that more often than not, we must “murder to dissect.”84 Studying music, trying to
identify modulations, etc. is a chore and does require quite a deal of attention which, in my
own experience, is not aesthetic in nature, regardless whether I'm able to enjoy the music
besides or not.
Perhaps, one could note, Dickie is, presumably, a competent critic and is accustomed to
distinguishing certain features while experiencing the work of art aesthetically. It could be
that, regardless of whether Dickie has very much experience with the particular style or artform, he is accustomed to dividing his attention in that sense. Perhaps this division of
attention comes so naturally to Dickie that he does not even notice it.
On a final note, it can be noted that I believe criticism, according to Stolnitz, is very much like
the interested attention in regards to knowledge. It is theorizing about what makes up the
object of attention, and Stolnitz seems to be of the idea that cognitive attention is always bad
for aesthetic appreciation.
84
Referring back to the quote of Kemp in Section VI.
30
As such, I believe, it has been sufficiently shown that Dickie's criticism in Myth has been
ineffective in regards of defeating the theory of disinterest. The only part Disinterest had to
give up was its place as a criterion of relevance.
Part V – Criticizing Disinterest
While Dickie could not prove the attitude a myth, there are still other reasons to criticize
Disinterest.
Section XVII – Disinterest (a)
In the same article that Kemp defended Disinterest against Dickie, he criticizes Disinterest
independently:
A man attends his daughter's first concert performance as a solo pianist. He listens
intently and is pleased as she negotiates the intricate counterpoint of Mozart's K. 533.
His close attention is motivated partly by his natural aesthetic receptivity but also,
more efficaciously, by his concern for his daughter's career. Nothing could help it more
than that she should perform well tonight. His listening is interest-driven: there is a
clear sense in which he listens closely because of a practical concern. But his attention
is not thereby distracted or partial, or need not be. The thought of his daughter's career
may come to mind during the performance, but it does not seem as if it has to, in order
that his attention be motivated by that concern. There is no reason to say that that kind
of attention cannot be very intently focused, no reason to say that it must be distracted.
Where attention is motivated or even guided by a purpose, there is no reason to say
that the purpose must be held consciously before the mind, in such a way that there is,
as it were, not enough room in consciousness for both the purpose and the object.
Purpose and motive surely guide our perception and behaviour in more subtle and
complex ways than that.
One cannot plausibly deny the familiar features between the music-student and the father in
the example above. Indeed, in both examples they use their full attention and they both are
pragmatically motivated. While we earlier concluded that the music-student did not have a
(purely) aesthetic experience, we want to claim that the father has, or could have.
The relevant difference between the two, however, lies in that while the music-student listens
for particular features, the father does not. He could very well, or so Kemp believes, listen to
the music as if it was someone else than his daughter performing. Indeed, this objection does
not aim to destroy the notion of the aesthetic attitude, but rather that the notion of disinterest
is sufficient for all cases of aesthetic appreciation.
31
For, indeed, the father does not look for any specific feature in the performance, such as the
music-student does. The father is not trying to understand it, he hopes that the performance is
beautiful.
Kemp believes that this is a problem that can be solved by allowing the notion of attending to
the object 'for its own sake, alone' to substitute the larger definition of disinterest. He refers to
Roger Scruton in Art and Imagination:
a desire to go on hearing, looking at, or in some other way having an experience of X,
where there is no reason for this desire in terms of any other desire or appetite that the
experience of X may fulfill, and where the desire arises out of, and is accompanied by,
the thought of X.85
This, Kemp points out, runs into problems. To begin with, it might lead us to the formalist
claim that art is non-conceptual, or that the aesthetic value of literature is devoid of any
knowledge. Secondly, it might lead to including lovemaking as an aesthetic experience 86 as
this seems to be able to satisfy the conditions of Scruton’s definition. (Perhaps it is not
entirely a mistake that it should, Kemp adds)
But that it can satisfy the conditions can be seen as a major fault in the conditions. It ought to
be seen as problematic if one has a definition supposed to distinguish aesthetic experiences
from others while unable to distinguish this from a sexual experience. Indeed, as Kemp says,
we might not want to count every act of sex as unaesthetic, but it seems as if sex can satisfy
the conditions above without being remotely near an aesthetic experience.
Section XVIII – Disinterested (b)
This criticism regards the idea the object has to be considered on its own. It might, in fact, be
damaging to aesthetic appreciation of the work of art if it is considered on its own. Fenner
points to the work of Duchamp:
In Advance of a Broken Arm, an object that was, before it became an art object, a snow
shovel. Here, as in many instances of dadaist, modern or post-modern art, the meaning
of the phenomenal object seems rather important, both to the establishment of the
object as an art object and to its appreciation as such. [...] were one to consider the
object with no regard for its purpose, one would find little of interest about it: it is
starkly symmetrical, the red of the paddle and the green shaft complement one another,
but that is about it.87
Cit. AA p. 398.
"at least in the happier cases"AA p. 398.
87
Fenner (1996) p. 80-1.
85
86
32
Can we really be content with this isolation of the object from its relations to other objects and
the world? Surely, we can consider the object in its own right while taking relevant
relationships it has with the world into consideration. It seems to me to be much more
plausible to call this to regard the object in its own right than the notion of isolation; I believe
an isolative stance omits too much of importance in regards of what the object is. This seems
to be exactly what Fenner aims for in the quote above.
I believe that the reason for maintaining such a strict isolating stance on the object is because
Stolnitz doctrine of Disinterest is heavily committed to formalism. Indeed, many writers 88 are
reluctant to accept this. I see no plausible reason to keep the notion of the aesthetic attitude so
thin that it can’t handle other aesthetic aspects than the formalistic ones.
Section XIX –Sympathetic
If we can accept the criticism above, then we no longer have any plausible reason to regard
the relationship between morality and the work of art in the same way as before.89 Indeed, we
can maintain that if we disregard a novel because we do not agree with the moral point of
view, then we have not read it aesthetically.
However, isn't it too much of a demand that we read literature in a way that we accept its
moral point of view? It ought to be straightforward to conceive how one can read a novel
without accepting its moral point of view while still understanding it and how it relates to the
further aspects of the novel. It does not seem implausible to suggest that the contrast between
my moral beliefs and those conveyed by the novel could be utilized as an aesthetic merit.
I do not mean to say that we ought to disregard the moral point of view in the novel and judge
it using our own moral point of view as a measure. But I want to suggest that the relationship
between my moral point of view and that of the novel might be more complex than simply
accepting surrendering to the novel and running with it. Just because one contrasts one’s
moral point of view with that of the novel, does not mean that one is disregarding the novel.
Section XX – Attention
Stolnitz does already allow for certain involvement with the work of art. But it seems that he's
a little reserved to allow the perceiver too much participation. This hesitation seems to stem
88
89
Such as Fenner, Dickie or Kemp
See Section VIII
33
from the idea that one might be engrossed in the activity and as such loose one's attention to
the object. But this is not, in all cases, plausible. Indeed, Fenner gives an example of this:
suppose that one is a devout Christian […] in attendance at St. Paul's in London one
Sunday. She aesthetically appreciates the formal qualities of the cathedral, the
historical relations, the relations it bears to others of its kind, […] and the significance,
in Christendom, of the cathedral.90
Since this is an objection regarding participation we can ignore the thoughts Fenner expresses
about meaning. Especially since we have dealt with this above.
Now suppose that the music begins to play, she sees the colorful procession, she
smells the incense, she feels the cold stone and the hard chairs; soon she feels the
movement of standing, kneeling, and sitting in unison with the rest of the
congregation, and then she tastes the elements.91
Everything described tells of our devout Christian experiencing everything aesthetically,
while she is still using all her senses and is experiencing in as full a range as possible.
Our devout Christian is fully participating. Can we plausibly claim that she is not
experiencing aesthetically? I doubt it. I think we ought to say that it might even add to the
aesthetic experience to participate in this way. As Fenner points out, this would mean that
“disinterestedness is not the appropriate attitude for having the best experience.”92
Fenner brings up an objection: our devout Christian might be having two attitudes at once.
Indeed, Stolnitz could take this route, claiming that she has one aesthetic attitude and one
religious. But it does not seem as if she has to be in separate attitudes. Indeed, one can
plausibly claim that our devout Christian can be fully in one, single, attitude of worship. This
attitude of worship, then, would include aesthetic experience. The church tells us it would.
Another way of meeting this criticism is by claiming that the aesthetic experience reaches its
peak when one gets completely absorbed into the act of worship. Fenner believes there is a
reason to suspect that there is a casual relationship to be found between the interested
experience and the aesthetic experience.93
Indeed, some art is even inviting the perceiver to play around with it. To take an active part
and almost lose oneself to the activity, as this is how the aesthetic experience happens in
Fenner (1996) p. 80
Ibid..
92
Ibid..
93
Ibid..
90
91
34
connection with this work of art. Perhaps the most interesting point to make here is to point to
the ones who make art. Are we to plausibly deny that they are having aesthetic experiences
simply because they are creating the art?
Surely we cannot deny that the musician is experiencing the tune he plays aesthetically? Sure,
it does not seem as if he has to, but there seems to be no reason why he cannot. Indeed, have
not everyone participated in some form of art experienced aesthetically while performing their
art-form? Playing guitar, painting or dancing, for instance, are activities where one strives for
having an aesthetic experience as possible. While it may be correct to assume that a beginner
or one learning the practice of the art-form may struggle to achieve a completely aesthetic
experience, that says nothing about the one practicing within his/her own ability.
I do not wish to say that an artist always has aesthetic experiences when they create, I claim
that there’s no reason to assume that they cannot. Perhaps it becomes more clear through the
example of a master blues guitarist decides to play a 12 bar blues with his/her friends. It does
not seem as if this person needs to compose anything while playing. What this player plays
simply comes naturally. Similarily in other art-forms: a painter may have an aesthetic
experience when they “feel the flow” of their painting or the dancer when the dance
seemingly “dances itself.”
We could further remark that, while this criticism is aimed at Disinterest, it could be used
against Distance, and might be more effective there .
Section XXI –Striking beauty and the Last Strike at Disinterest
While the upcoming criticism may be a difficulty that all concepts of the aesthetic attitude
must be able to handle, it is aimed towards Disinterest, as all the other account have already
been abandoned. The last objection is provided by Fenner:
[…] one difficulty for the aesthetic attitude is in attempting to explain the beauty
“breaking in upon us” or “striking us.” Perhaps each of us has had the experience
where we […] suddenly [have] been struck with the beauty of some part of nature.
These experiences are not planned, nor are they such into one freely, consciously,
volitionally enters. These experiences are had immediately […] [and] occur without
preparation, much less the adoption of a special attitude that gives rise to such
experiences.94
94
Ibid. p. 109.
35
Indeed, one can see the difficulty for a view explaining necessary and sufficient conditions for
having an aesthetic experience to account for this, insofar as it claims that it is always
voluntarily entered into. Fenner believes that while the major part of aesthetic experiences
happen volitionally entering an aesthetic attitude, the cases of “striking beauty” is common
enough to begin to question the tradition.95
Given the occurrence of striking beauty, the aesthetic attitude must give up on being
necessary for having an aesthetic experience, at least if we want to continue to hold that this is
something that we can volitionally enter into.
Part VI – The Final Showdown
The investigation is approaching its end and we are at a loss. We have no plausible attitude,
while many unsatisfactory suggestions behind us. We are going to examine one more
suggestion before summing up and heading to the aftermath.
Section XXII – Fenner’s Attitude
At the end of his book, The Aesthetic Attitude, Fenner points to what he believes is the most
important conclusion in his book, before he goes on to explain his understanding of the
aesthetic attitude.
Indeed, he stresses that we must deny that the attitude ought to handle any necessary
conditions for having an aesthetic experience. Indeed, striking beauty may well be a good
argument against that necessity. However, this leads Fenner to draw a distinction between
what kind of aesthetic experiences his attitude can handle.96
He dubs his account 'The Investment Account,' and, indeed, it is a very business-minded
concept. Fenner begins by noting that while we want to experience aesthetically for its own
sake, there is always some pleasure in the aesthetic experience. He calls on authorities such as
Kant, Hume, Stolnitz and St. Aquinas to give support to this claim.97
For one to adopt that attitude sufficient for production of an aesthetic experience is for
that individual to adopt the attitude of expectation of a return on the investment of
attention paid into the object, or event under consideration. This return takes the form
of pleasure, with 'pleasure' herein properly defined.98
Ibid..
Ibid. p. 129.
97
Ibid. p 112. Also Stolnitz (1960) p. 43
98
Fenner (1996) p. 112.
95
96
36
Fenner seems to believe that explaining our motivation to have an aesthetic experience –
pleasure – we are in no further need to explain what the attitude is. While we need to examine
what the properly defined pleasure is, the attitude itself seems rather simple.
Fenner does not want to say that all pleasure is of an aesthetic kind. His aim “is not to show
that simple felt, emotional pleasure is plainly and straightforwardly a constituent of aesthetic
experience”99 and adds: “or is what one expects in taking on the attitude to achieve that.”100
And with the last addition we are here led to understand that it is not this kind of pleasure that
Fenner considers to be constituent of aesthetic experience. So, then, what is?
Fenner takes the example of Apocalypse Now: One might, in fact, not experience Apocalypse
Now very pleasurable at all, yet appreciate it nonetheless. Fenner claims that this is because
the subject matter of Apocalypse Now is not what gives the proper kind of pleasure. What one
finds pleasurable in Apocalypse Now could be the strength of feelings awoken by it or some
insight into moral issues or whatever of the kind. This is the proper kind of pleasure.
[…] the pleasure cannot be a first-order sort, where it is a feature of the direct
experience of the object itself, like the experience that the object one views is red. The
pleasure in question must be a second-order sort, attendant to the motivation one takes
toward gaining this direct experience of the object, like, to put it oversimply, the
delight one may experience in merely attending to a redness.101
This second order pleasure one might derive, then, is cognitive pleasure. Fenner claims that
aesthetic experience is not mere sentiment (which is not a necessary part of aesthetic
experience at all) but the cognitive engagement that all aesthetic experience has. Fenner
describes the aesthetic experience as: when one “considers the object, seeing connections to
other experiences, associating, appreciating in the object its elegancy, balance, beauty, or even
its usefulness.”102
I believe we ought to interpret Fenner simply as if he is trying to distinguish the pleasant parts
of an artwork from the relevant aesthetic pleasure, which he calls cognitive pleasure. Imagine
a work of art made of beautiful patterns of some sort. Further imagine that it is pleasant to rest
your eyes on it. Fenner believes that this kind of pleasantness is not the relevant pleasure and
ought not to be considered aesthetic.
Ibid. p. 113
Ibid..
101
Ibid. p. 116.
102
Ibid. p. 117.
99
100
37
Fenner seems to consider cognitive pleasure, in contrast, to be where one has formed a
cognitive connection with the object. A cognitive connection in the above example would be
to see what the beautiful patterns meant to one as a person. To see connections outside the
object and take pleasure therein.103 Perhaps one can think of it as a stronger version of
“fusion” which we have described above.
If one cannot take pleasure in the cognitive connection or is unable to form a connection, then
it is not so that one is not having an aesthetic experience, according to Fenner. Forming a
cognitive connection takes time and considerate contemplation. One spends energy on
attending and is expecting this to be returned in the form of pleasure. If one does not get a
sufficient amount of pleasure to how much one attended, then one could be said to have made
a “bad deal” or simply had a bad aesthetic experience.104
Section XIII – Criticizing Fenner
Indeed, we can claim that there seems to be something strange in this idea. The first thing to
note is that the aesthetic experience is no longer regarded as a good in itself, but what is
sought after is the pleasure. It is perhaps strange to take on this hedonistic utilitarian view,
seeing as the attitude has such
traditional associations with deontological value and self-effacing disinterest before
the object[.] [T]his formulation reads more like a caricature of the calculating art
collector than a serious modification of the tradition.105
It might be suspect to include one's motivation to have an aesthetic experience into the
attitude. Can we not see this account to be vacuous? It certainly appears to say nothing of
further value than that our attitude is characterized by our expectancy of having an aesthetic
experience. Since we expect to have an aesthetic experience we attend, and that ought to be
sufficient for having an aesthetic experience? It does not seem to be in accordance with
ordinary experience, at least not in my case.
We could further ask why we ought to consider a failed act of having the return of the
invested attention paid as an aesthetic experience at all. Indeed, if what Fenner considers to be
the relevant sort of pleasure to aesthetic experiences is cognitive pleasure, and this is signified
by the cognitive connection one forms with the object, why would we call what we have
experienced a bad aesthetic experience if one cannot form a connection?
Ibid. p. 118.
Ibid..
105
The Aesthetic Attitude, British journal of aesthetics, McAdoo, Nick,1997 vol. 37. p. 417
103
104
38
Indeed, this seems to run in the lines of what McAdoo points to when he says that we can
concentrate our attention on a work until we are “blue in the face and nothing happens.”106
How much nearer the mark is Schopenhauer when he says that: 'Everyone . . . who
contemplates the work of art . . . has to stand before the picture as before a prince,
awaiting to see whether it will speak and what it will say to them'.107
It seems as if we take this view, then Fenner's account loses its sufficiency-criteria as well. If
the account – the aesthetic attitude is simply the expectancy of the return of the attention
invested, and that this ought to be sufficient for having an aesthetic experience – loses its
sufficiency-criterion then it is completely vacuous. It does not tell us anything of value. The
only thing that remains is that we in the aesthetic attitude we expect to have an aesthetic
experience. But is this really enlightening? I don’t think so.
What we ought to retain from this account, however, is that cognitive connections ought to be
allowed to a further extent than we have seen hitherto. Forming a cognitive connection to an
object may be an essential feature of the aesthetic experience, and as such ought to be
included into the aesthetic attitude.
Conclusion
We are now arriving at our destination. The battle between the attitudes and criticism is now
over and we should now take a look on what has been left to us.
Section XVI – What remains
This last critique against Fenner regards the aspects of volition in attitude-theories. It seems
almost like we’re back at the start. The criteria in section I didn’t prove to be plausible. This
essay has proved them inadequate and it might not even have been a fair picture from the
start, it certainly seems strange to assume that the attitude traditionally has been about
handling sufficient and necessary criteria for having an aesthetic experience when one of the
main traditional proponents of it (Schopenhauer) has a view of aesthetic experience as
referred to in the quote in section XIII . What does remain is that the aesthetic attitude may
make one receptive to having aesthetic experiences.
But let us summarize our findings:
106
107
Ibid..
Ibid..
39
1. While perceptive abilities did not quite make it as accounts of the aesthetic attitude,
it’s dubitable to deny their relevance for aesthetic experiences. The ‘formalistic
seeing’ of Tomas and the ‘seeing things not in the picture’ of Aldrich is definitively
something important and our attitude might incorporate these aspects in that it contains
a will to try these things out.
2. Distance may not have made it as a theory, but some kind of limitation on our actions
ought to be put into a plausible theory of aesthetic attitude. Engagement seems to add
to the aesthetic experience and as such it should be allowed in as high degree as
possible insofar as it does not go against the limitations of the work of art. Perhaps the
limitations are more abstract than abiding by conventions and the acceptable patterns
of behavior. It could be that the work of art “dictates” a way it’s to be experienced.
Some works of art invite the spectator to go against the accepted patterns of behavior.
3. Furthermore a widened relevance of interpretation might be motivated. It does not
seem impossible to form many different cognitive connections to things which might
add to the aesthetic experience. And without one gets caught up in thoughts about
these interpretations. As such we would want to claim that the attitude promotes this.
Moral considerations should also be considered relevant to aesthetic experiences.
4. Being sympathetic towards the work of art is something that we should like to keep in
the attitude. Taking the work on its own terms might be one of the most important
features of the attitude.
5. Further we ought to accept something like physical enactment and perhaps full-blown
participation to be promoted by the attitude. We want the attitude to invite towards
active experimenting with the work of art.
6. The notion about discrimination ought also to be retained. As searching for
familiarities and such knowledge-based aspects of aesthetic appreciation does not go
away.
7. Perhaps we should take a step back from the idea that the motivation behind having an
aesthetic experience is relevant for entering the aesthetic attitude. Indeed, the objection
by Kemp could be avoided in this way.
8. We could retain the traditional view that aesthetic properties do not exist in the objects
themselves, but any aesthetic attribute is available solely because we are taking the
aesthetic attitude towards the object.
40
Section XV – An Attitude From the Ashes
“Sympathetic and engaged playful contemplation towards any object whatever.” Or
something like it might be what we have to call our account, if we look to all the criteria we
have found as basis for the attitude. I doubt we have time and space to develop our account of
the aesthetic attitude in greater detail, but we will point to the first challenge of the account:
Striking beauty and McAdoo’s claim together speaks – in that aesthetic experiences can
happen spontaneously and that aesthetic experiences are not something one can always have
when approaching an object in a certain manner – against the attitude in either (i) that it is
sufficient for having an aesthetic experience or (ii) that it can be volitionally entered into. The
attitude’s third option is to deny both of these, that one cannot choose when to be in the
aesthetic attitude or that it is sufficient for having an aesthetic experience. This account would
be so severely watered down that it could hardly be called an aesthetic attitude at all. All we
could say about it would be that some days we are more susceptible to aesthetic experiences
than others and we cannot choose when. There seems to be no use to posit an aesthetic
attitude, then.
In alternative (i) we can choose when to be in the aesthetic attitude while this is not sufficient
for having an aesthetic experience. This can handle the phenomenon of striking beauty in that
it is what is missing in the aesthetic attitude is what causes the aesthetic experience and that is
what strikes us. Indeed, this might call for the claim that we are able to perceive aesthetically
relevant aspects of an object without having an aesthetic experience or being “moved” by it.
But, indeed, it sounds like the metaphysically suspect notion of mindfulness: One ought to be
aware of oneself, of the surroundings and the relevant aspects of the world, when putting full
focus on attending to one’s activity (attending to a work of art, for example). But even so, if
this is what we believe to be sufficient for being susceptible to aesthetic experiences there
seems to be no way for us to prove it. That which causes aesthetic experiences is something
“missing” fron the attitude and in so we could just as well posit that aesthetic experiences are
always random and “strikes” in.
Alternative (ii) seems to be the alternative I can sympathize with the most. Perhaps due to its
familiarity to my interpretation of the opening quote by Nietzsche, in that it describes a state
of mind where one can have aesthetic experiences towards any object whatever. But also,
while this would mean that when we are in the aesthetic attitude we can experience any object
aesthetically only as long as the attitude lasts. We could also claim that, since we do not
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believe that being in the aesthetic attitude one necessarily has an aesthetic experience we
could claim that one does not have to view aesthetically. One could perceive as in practical
perception and still remain in the aesthetic attitude. This could tie this account closer to the
tradition.
Striking beauty could be accommodated for in that it strikes one into the aesthetic attitude, for
example. The idea is that the aesthetic attitude is a mood and as such more or less stable. An
object may cause the perceiver to enter into an aesthetic attitude, (or mood,) if ever so
slightly. It could then be explained why we are so dependent on the object of beauty in order
to continue to experience aesthetically. As with any mood it can be more or less stable, and if
one is not originally in one mood, then the cause for the mood may help one to remain in the
mood. Even so, it focusing one’s attention on the cause may not be enough to remain in the
attitude and the aesthetic experience may diminish or even end. A stable aesthetic attitude
(when the mood is not completely dependent on the objects of “striking beauty”) would , then
be able to view any object aesthetically, even the most mundane things. Neither does it
exclude the possibility of criticism when in the aesthetic attitude. I believe that alternative (ii)
is the best choice.
List of literature
Books:

The Aesthetic Attitude, Humanities Press International, inc., E. W. Fenner, David,
1996

Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism, The Riverside Press, Stolnitz Jerome,
1960

Human All-Too-Human Parts One and Two[translated to English], Dover Publication,
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 2006 [original published 1878-1888]

Sein und Zeit[translated to Swedish], Daidalos AB, Heidegger, Martin, 1992 [original
published 1927]
Book Reviews

The Aesthetic Attitude, British Journal of Aesthetics, McAdoo, Nick, 1997 vol. 37
Articles
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
The Aesthetic Attitude, British Journal of Aesthetics, Kemp, Gary, 1999 vol. 39

Aesthetic Vision, Philosophical Review, Tomas, Vincent 1959

The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude, American Philosophical Quarterly, Dickie,
George 1964, vol. 1
Web: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/#AesAtt visited 2012-05-17.
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