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Risks associated with extreme solar storms and consequential geomagnetic storms extend beyond the scope of insurance and will ultimately have to be dealt with by means of collaboration across governments, businesses and society as a whole. In the light of what we know about current technological options for mitigating the impacts of space weather, the risk to the economy and society has to be reduced. The present document has been created by a working group within the
CRO Forum’s Emerging Risk Initiative as a road map to support the achievement of this goal. The steps envisaged in the document are:
Using a variety of solar storm scenarios, the working group outlined a realistic and balanced description of the societal and economic impacts of an extreme solar storm scenario that was meant to be comprehensible to a non-technical, non-scientific audience and starts from current scientific knowledge. This implies a discussion on the quantification of the risk (including the probability of occurrence of a very strong event, technical vulnerability aspects, risk-handling and mitigation options), and the scenario of a large-scale, prolonged power outage and its impact on the worldwide economy and society, seen from a broad perspective (considering sectors and parties outside the insurance industry). Even if the probability of occurrence of such a scenario remains uncertain, whether the risk is tolerable or intolerable, in particular when technical mitigation and adaptation measures are available, is an issue that had to be addressed.
We believe the levers for effective risk mitigation will be found outside the insurance industry.
Hence, it is important to identify and understand the respective interests of the relevant stakeholders. Such stakeholders include political (national, supranational) decision-makers, the electricity generating, transmission and distribution industries, network providers, downstream electricity (industrial and private) consumers, individual enterprises, industry trade organisations and insurers. What are the various interests of the parties identified bearing in mind the specific potential solar storm impacts on them or their clients? Given the array of impacts, interests, and societal/economic leverages analysed, we had to identify the most promising stakeholders for implementing a successful risk mitigation process. We had to develop arguments designed to persuade stakeholders to invest resources (time, money) in risk mitigation. Most likely top-down regulation will prove to be an effective means of mitigating risk, given the prevalence of (myopically) short-term cost/benefit thinking at lower levels. For example, organising round tables with relevant stakeholders at EU Commission or Parliament level could be a relevant route to engage policy makers and regulatory bodies.
The working group on solar storm risk established by the CRO Forum`s Emerging Risks Initiative seems to be a sound starting point for developing the baseline study and strategy, but might not be the optimal solution with regard to execution and, in particular, the access to policy maker levels and other lobbying. Hence, when it comes to the outreach phase, we recommend to transfer the initiative to an international insurers’ platform characterised by an international outreach.
Accordingly, the working group suggests The Geneva Association to take over this initiative for the outreach phase.
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Earth-directed solar storms such as coronal mass ejections (CME) or solar flares can damage satellites and generate hemisphere-wide geomagnetic storms on earth. Geomagnetic storms trigger geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) in the ground which can transmit to large-scale conductor grids through the grounding cables of high-voltage transformers. If strong enough, GIC have the potential to damage high-voltage transformers or other equipment. This has happened twice: in 1989, in North
America, and in 2003, in the UK, Sweden and South Africa. Both the North American and central
European bulk power grids were designed some 60 years ago, and have reached the limits of their load and buffer capacities. Moreover, old and degraded equipment is more vulnerable to damaging forces. These days, few grid operators are prepared for events of magnitudes comparable to that of
1989, which has a probability of occurrence of around once in 50 years. However, catastrophic extreme events like the solar super storms of 1859 or 1921 could occur at frequencies of less than once in 100 years.
Multiple transformer damage from very strong GIC could cause a large-scale and prolonged blackout.
Swift recovery would be unlikely, since repair and/or replacement of transformers would be required, which could substantially delay recovery. We have no experience in dealing with large-scale, prolonged blackouts. The societal and economic consequences of urban areas being deprived of water, food, and energy over long periods are unforeseeable. Operators of high-risk technologies such as nuclear power plants depend, in particular, on the reliability of the power network. The risk of a widespread power outage lasting several weeks and affecting highly populated areas, such as the northeast USA, central Europe or large cities in East Asia, and the extensive impact this would have on the wider economy and on society would, we firmly believe, be catastrophic.
Electricity providers and grid operators should be prepared for large-scale GIC with strengths that appear once in 100 years and stronger. State-of-the-art mitigation technology is available but has not been fully implemented in bulk power grids. There are no back-up transformers. The current restructuring of the European power grid (to allow for better integration of renewable energies) should result in improved standards and a new, and more resilient, design. The USA, Canada, the UK and some
Scandinavian countries are analysing various risk mitigation measures (in terms of effectiveness, feasibility and costs). Cooperation on a political/regulatory and on a technical level, e.g., with the North-
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), could support timely implementation. Political and legislative regulation (such as the SHIELD Act, a US legislative initiative) could help to enforce higher standards and a more securely operating bulk power system. We believe it is necessary to invest resources (time and money) in mitigating the risk of a widespread, prolonged power outage. Since the technology is fundamentally available, this is a risk we do not have to bear.
As the geomagnetic storm impacts materialize only within technological structures of an increasingly electrified planet, there is no deep-rooted cultural awareness of this hazard within our societies, as is the case with other natural hazards. Because of this non-perceptual character, controversy and even conflicting industry interests are encouraged to evolve and might hamper the risk mitigation initiative. Against this background, the initiative will be most convincing if the need for risk mitigation is promoted by a group of leading global insurers rather than by insurers acting individually. The working group agreed to ask The Geneva Association (GA) to take over the insurance initiative on solar storm risks. The GA appears to be an adequate platform since it represents the insurance industry, enables committee work and is able to carry out lobbying activities.
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Physics
The 11-year solar cycle is caused by reversals in solar magnetic field polarisation and manifests itself in an increase in the numbers of sunspots at points where stray magnetic field lines penetrate the sun’s surface. Sunspots, magnetic instabilities subject to enormous tension, are the source of solar flares – energetic eruptions in which large amounts of energy are released in the form of X-ray radiation and fast-travelling plasma particles such as electrons and protons. Solar flares can, in turn, trigger coronal mass ejections (CME) near coronal holes in which huge clouds of plasma particles escape the sun’s atmosphere (the corona) and can – if correspondingly directed – reach the earth in less than two days. Impact by a CME distorts the earth’s magnetic field, and plasma particles penetrate the upper layer of the atmosphere (the ionosphere) near the geomagnetic North and
South Poles, creating vast, bright polar lights and geomagnetic storms. The energy densities of such storms are very low, but the areas affected can be extremely large, and the integrated energies correspondingly enormous. Moreover, the stronger the storm, the further it extends into lower latitudes.
The impacts of strong space weather events can be split into three groups, basically from top to bottom, i.e. space to ground:
Effects on space-borne technology: Satellites can be disturbed and damaged by charged particles and energetic radiation; there are changes in atmospheric drag on low earth orbiting satellites
Atmospheric effects: Disturbances affecting various radio communication systems, in particular affecting air traffic near polar routes
Ground effects: Disruption of or damage to large conducting structures on the ground (e.g. high-voltage power transformers in large power grids) caused by geomagnetically induced currents (GIC)
A holistic description of the risks associated with solar storms goes beyond merely estimating the return periods of large solar eruptions such as solar flares or CMEs, with subsequent geomagnetic storms on earth. It must include clear descriptions of the vulnerabilities and exposures involved.
Exposure
There is, currently, a fleet of around 700 operational satellites in space. It constitutes an important telecommunications and surveillance infrastructure serving the commercial, scientific and military sectors. About 160 satellites are used for commercial telecommunications, TV and global navigation satellite systems (GNSS, for positioning and timing), and generate around US$ 170bn in revenue per year. Typically, satellite life spans, depending on mission and orbit, can exceed 15 years (particularly in the case of geostationary satellites). There are roughly 60 launches of new satellites per year.
Today`s satellites are designed to withstand an event of the strength of the 1989 storm (Quebec event).
A mandatory prerequisite of commercial aircraft take-off and flight along particular routes is the availability of operational radio communication systems. During strong space weather events, the
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ionospheric reflection and transmission behaviour of radio signals is disturbed. Disturbances to or the complete absence of telecommunications via HF radio signal or satellite and the lack of OTH (overthe-horizon) radar and GPS navigation affects a wide variety of sectors, and especially aviation. These effects are, of course, stronger and occur more frequently the closer one gets to the geomagnetic pole. During severe events, flights have to be re-routed away from the polar routes, which results in delays and increases fuel consumption. In the event of GPS signal failure, it may be necessary to change to less automated guidance and landing procedures, causing delays at airports. Another important issue is the increased radiation levels to which crew and passengers are exposed at high altitudes during solar storm events. The dose of radiation (X-ray and cascade particles from collisions of solar energetic particles with atmospheric particles) can increase to over a factor of four, depending on the flight path relative to the magnetosphere open-closed boundary.
A strong geomagnetic storm shifts electrical currents in the earth’s crust, generating a geoelectric field of a few volts per kilometre between different regions on the ground. The one in hundred year geoelectric field strength was estimated to reach 10 – 50 Volts/km in an area of low electric conductivity. If the geology between the regions concerned is electrically resistive they could still be electrically connected (“short-circuited”) via long high-voltage power lines. The induced voltage between the regions can then trigger geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) which enter the power grid through grounding cables. If a GIC is strong enough, it can cause damage to important utility components, such as high-voltage transformers. This has happened twice in recent history: in 1989
(Canada and the USA) and 2003 (the UK, Sweden and South Africa).
Analyses on the economic impact of different solar-storm-prone technical infrastructure and property show that a widespread, prolonged power outage has the greatest economic loss potential, followed by damage to or the loss of satellites (including the loss of GPS and its role in electronic signal timing). Whilst satellites are more likely to be damaged by smaller or intermediate solar storm events, the overall economic implications of a prolonged power outage induced by an extreme GIC would be far greater. Besides damage to property resulting from a lack of electricity or social unrest with consequential looting, a prolonged power outage would cause loss of revenue and business interruption, and could directly result in a fall in GDP in the region affected in proportion to the duration of the outage. We will therefore focus on the scenario of a widespread, prolonged GICinduced power outage.
Vulnerability
Because experience of ground effects from strong solar storms is limited and scientific data describing the hazard – in terms of strong geomagnetic and geoelectric disturbances – goes back a few decades only, any statement made in connection with physically extreme events goes well beyond the scale of what has been experienced and empirically measured hitherto. In other words, extrapolation and speculative, but realistic, assumptions have to be made in order to describe an extreme solar storm event. For instance, the strongest event in recent history – the Carrington Super
Storm in 1859 – is associated with a return period of about 500 years. Taking uncertainties into account, this estimate could easily be altered by factor 10 – in either direction. The 1989 event, the strongest in the last 50 years, caused a nine-hour power outage throughout Quebec, and severely damaged two transformers in the North American power grid. It would be a 50-year event in terms
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of geomagnetic strength. These estimates are based on extreme value statistics estimates of measured geomagnetic disturbance over the last 50 years (the geomagnetic storm time index D st
). In potentially damaging hazard terms, GIC rather than D st
data would have to be analysed. Of course, there is a strong correlation between geomagnetic and geoelectric disturbance and the strength of
GIC it can produce during a solar storm. However, the correlation is stronger as regards frequency rather than intensity. Further very important factors driving GIC strength are the underlying geology
(e.g. electrically resistive igneous rock that strongly enhances the current flowing through the transmission lines) and the power-grid topology (in particular, line length and orientation).
It is very important to note the major difference between a normal power outage caused, for example, by lightning, winter storm or human failure, and a GIC-induced outage. Blackouts caused by more common natural phenomena and human failure typically result in minor damage or damage that can be fixed within a short time, so that power is generally restored to the system within hours or days. (One exception to this was the five-week power outage that occurred in Auckland, New
Zealand, in 1998). Unlike the typical natural phenomena, which are very well understood and against which effective protective measures have been implemented in power grids, extremely strong geomagnetic storms can produce GIC which can overwhelm the protective measures and damage or even destroy high-voltage transformers. This constitutes a new level of power outage altogether. If sufficient transformers are knocked out and the (n-1)-criterion (that stipulates a defined amount of redundancy in the power grid) is violated in several grid sections, the power outage will exceed that experienced with regular outages, and power will only be restored once enough damaged equipment has been repaired or replaced. Replacing high-voltage transformers is a costly and time-consuming task.
Focusing on power grids, the following facts play a major role in estimating the risks associated with the failure of the power supply. The electrical resistance of the underlying geology is one factor that determines the strength of the geoelectric field at the earth’s surface. In 2003, a geoelectric field of 4
V/km was measured in Scandinavia and values of far more than 10 V/km are by no means impossible.
Considering the typical lengths of high voltage power lines in such regions, voltages of more than
1,000 V are possible, i.e. the severity of the problem increases with distance. Earthed substations connected via long power transmission lines simply short-circuit regions of different electrical potential. Thus, they provide an alternative way of neutralising the voltage, since this does not occur through the bedrock due to the high resistance of the underlying geology. Strong GIC can enter highvoltage transformers through grounding cables and cause various types of disturbance. Due to, on average, shorter line lengths and higher line resistances, the medium- and low-voltage levels are less affected by GIC than the high-voltage levels. In 1991, a GIC of more than 200 A lasting for one minute was measured in a 400 kV power grid in Finland. Probably the strongest GIC (since 1977) – about 320
A for a duration of more than ten seconds – was recorded in the Swedish power grid in April 2000.
The theoretical upper limit of GIC strength is estimated to be 2,000 A for a duration of up to a minute. Uncontrolled currents of such intensity can damage essential utility components.
Large, high-voltage transformers have to cope with large amounts of electrical energy (the “load”, measured in hundreds to thousands of MVA [mega volt-amperes]), far more than any GIC could carry. But the amperages of extreme GIC are comparable to the typical amperage flowing through high-voltage transformers (up to 2,000 A). Unlike the 60 Hz (USA) or 50 Hz (Europe) alternating current voltage in power transformers, GIC are encountered in the form of quasi-direct current. If an additional, strong direct current then invades the transformer, the saturation level may be reached.
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This is associated with a number of potentially dangerous features. The electric energy needed by the transformer in order to periodically magnetise and demagnetise the iron core is vastly increased.
In normal operational mode, the magnetising voltage is not in phase with the normal voltage of the power grid, and it has to be converted from the normal voltage by specified converters. In the saturation regime, demand can easily outstrip what can be supplied by the converters, and the voltage of the power grid may collapse, as happened in Quebec in 1989.
In the saturation regime, higher frequency voltage oscillations, referred to as “harmonics”, can evolve in the transformer, triggering eddy currents in various parts of the transformer’s iron core and other conducting parts. These currents produce very localised “hot spots”, which can damage or destroy the cellulose insulation of the transformer windings. Insulation damage can lead to the total loss of the machine. Even if the insulation is not destroyed, degradation of the cellulose in the transformer during a GIC event increases its vulnerability to subsequent events. The speed of degradation varies from one transformer to another. To estimate transformer criticality, it is essential to determine key factors such as age of utility, topological location within the grid, previous behaviour during disturbances and current state (determined with the aid of diagnosis technologies like gas sensors, oil temperature, chemical analysis of the transformer oil, etc.), underlying geology and geomagnetic latitude. Both the North American and European grids experienced enormous growth in installed MVA in the 1970s, with transformers designed for lifetimes of 30 to 40 years. If the infrastructure consists of ageing and obsolete equipment, it is more vulnerable to destructive forces.
Besides ageing utility components, the continuous threat of capacity overload in recent years adds significantly to general grid instability. This has gradually increased and there is a real threat of largescale power outages. Both the North American and European power grids are being operated at the limits of their load capacity, and can therefore provide only limited buffering capacity in the event of a significant disturbance. To ensure the stability of the grid, it is essential for electricity generation
(supply) and load (demand) to be balanced. A deviation due to a sudden increase in demand or reduction in supply causes variations in the grid’s operating utility frequency (60 Hz in North America or 50 Hz in Europe). Such deviations are normally buffered by means of automatic generation control
(AGC). But if the disturbed frequency falls below a certain threshold, it can no longer be buffered.
Automated operating procedures designed to stabilise grid frequency ultimately lead to load shedding, in which supplies to some distribution segments or large industrial consumers will be cut off, resulting in localised blackouts (usually lasting only for a short time). This is a protective measure to prevent the grid’s high-voltage-transmission (the “backbone”) from collapsing. However, the lower the buffering capacity the higher the probability that load shedding will cascade into rolling blackouts that eventually affect the entire grid. Restarting the grid after a large-scale power outage (black start) is a difficult task, and can take several days. To ensure a smooth restart, large power plants (nuclear or coal) try to maintain the operating frequency in station supply mode, i.e. separated from the rest of the grid, generation and load are balanced on the basis of their own demand. However, this is only possible for a limited period. Such processes have been experienced on a variety of scales and measures, and there are procedures for dealing with problems that may arise in this type of situation. The main difference between a blackout caused by cascading load shedding and a blackout originating from damaged equipment (such as transformers exposed to extreme GIC) is that, in the latter case, a black start might not be possible for days or even weeks if essential equipment required to control the transmission “backbone” is unavailable. The term “prolonged” (i.e. of the order of
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weeks and more) is not associated with large-scale blackouts in general, since it clearly implies the loss of essential operating equipment and is not likely to result from events with high recurrence frequencies. The better protected a critical and complex system is against obvious disturbances, the greater the likelihood that it will experience a complete collapse should an unexpected event occur.
Economic and societal impact
A phenomenon such as a six-hour power outage is well understood. People get stuck in lifts, trains, and subways, but no one actually suffers from supply shortages. In places like hospitals, emergency power generators fill the gap. If the time span, and thus the magnitude, of the event are increased from hours to days, the situation changes dramatically. Cargoes in ports cannot be unloaded if electric trains and cranes are at a standstill for several days. This causes long delays and triggers knock-on effects such as business interruption if production lines at industrial plants elsewhere are halted due to a breakdown in the supply of prefabricated components. Hospitals and other critical operations may run out of the diesel needed to fuel their emergency generators. The list of cascading consequences is long. Contingency plans in place may prove less effective for dealing with the resulting combination of large-scale and prolonged consequences. A more detailed description of a power outage lasting more than several days would also feature, for example, losses resulting from food decay and livestock deaths on large industrial farms, due to lack of water, food or fresh air. If the breakdown lasted more than a few days, equipment used in major industrial plants such as aluminium smelters would sustain massive damage due to the furnaces cooling down. Disruption of public and private transport and various logistical problems (few petrol stations having pumps that can be operated without electricity) would force people to stay at home where, without electricity to power the pumps that supply water to toilets and kitchens, they would face hygiene problems.
Moreover, supplies of bottled water and tinned food stored at home would rapidly be used up. Food stores would remain closed. The problems described above would be further exacerbated by the complete breakdown of any form of communication that relies on electric power. People would be subjected to considerable stress from not knowing how long the power outage would last and being unaware of the overall situation. Public safety could be compromised in urban areas, and there would be potential for large-scale social unrest and looting. Energetic solar particles could also lead to a breakdown in satellite communications, which would further hamper the organisation of emergency management and civil protection efforts in a prolonged power outage. This could also impact the economies of regions not directly affected by power outages with, for instance, electronic trading suspended due to the loss of the GPS time-stamping signals required for internet communications.
One much quoted economic GIC scenario developed by John G. Kappenman from the Metatech
Corporation, a consulting services company, is based on an estimated more than 350 critical highvoltage transformers in North America. This scenario was also shared by the 2009 National Academy of Sciences study on Space Weather impacts. However, no official quantitative study has been undertaken to confirm the assumption of 350 critical high-voltage transformers, mainly because utilities in the region concerned are maintained by several different power supply or grid operating companies and thus represent proprietary data. Transformer diagnosis technology and standards are improving, but are still not sufficiently advanced to be able to pinpoint operational weak spots.
However, the regions identified by Kappenman correlate well with regions of underlying igneous
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rock, and therefore have a higher probability of sustaining a strong GIC event. Kappenman suggests a scenario in which the whole northeastern region from Boston to Washington (including the entire
New York City area) is exposed to a power outage lasting several months or, in some regions, more than a year. About 130 million people would be affected in one of the most important industrial and economic regions in the USA. Kappenman estimates the economic impact to be about US$ 30bn per day, or US$ 1–2tn overall, as recovery would take more than a year. The economic loss figures are based on the GDP share of the regions affected, and reflect both loss of revenue and business interruption in the U.S.A. The scenario does not take Europe or Asia into account, which are of comparable importance in international economic terms (besides other regions).
However, we believe it is unlikely that all or indeed most of the measures designed to protect transformers would fail simultaneously with resulting damage to more than 350 high-voltage transformers. Furthermore, an inherent feature of such networks is that if nodes collapse (in terms of the transformers tripping) some parts of the network would be isolated and thus protected.
Even if the Kappenman scenario were scaled down by a factor of ten into a smaller-scale and more probable event (e.g. damage to 30–40 transformers), the resulting large-scale and prolonged power outage would still severely affect the overall economy due to its impact on metropolitan and industrial areas. The non-linear and saturation effects of the chronological accumulation of losses
(e.g. the above example relating to smelters) from a smaller scenario could nevertheless produce substantial economic losses. A scaled-down event would not necessarily affect fewer people, but the recovery time would be shorter in some regions. Consequently, 130 million people could be affected by a power outage in North America. We also see potential for a wide-scale power outage in Europe and Asia – even larger than that produced in the 2006 Ems Canal incident where, in a planned and modelled line-breaker interruption in the north German Eon grid, the power was switched off, triggering outages in a number of European countries. Due to the relation between the strength of geomagnetic disturbance and how far within the northern hemisphere it extends, very severe events could affect geographical latitudes as far south as central Europe or equivalent areas in the USA 1 .
However, given that Europe has fewer regions with igneous geology, shorter power lines and lower grid loads on average (increasing its resilience to disturbances), we believe the impact of a GIC would be less severe there than in North America and involve less damage to utility equipment, which would mean a quicker recovery time. Nevertheless, such a scenario would still result in a large-scale power outage of unknown duration in metropolitan regions, probably involving widespread business breakdowns, supply shortages (ranging from water and food to fuel), the collapse of communication systems and civil disorder in urban areas. The scale of such impacts would, of course, largely depend on the duration of the power outage. Past experience with large-scale and prolonged power outages covers days to weeks rather than months, which makes it difficult to estimate the potential consequences.
The above scenario implies economic losses of such magnitudes that the insurance industry would not be able to play a major role in mitigating the losses. From an insurance perspective, the business interruption losses in the property lines affected would far exceed the cost of the direct damage to utility components (e.g. about US$ 10m to replace a high voltage transformer unit, whilst utility companies affected by the failure of a high voltage transformer would have to purchase power from other suppliers at a potential cost up to US$ 500,000 per day). The effect on liability and credit
1 In terms of geomagnetic latitude, central Europe is actually as far south as e.g. New York.
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insurance covers is much more difficult to estimate, but cannot be ignored. Other more likely but lower costs would also arise in space, caused not by geomagnetic storms but by the effects of incoming plasma particle clouds and radiation on satellites and other spacecraft potentially damaging vital components and thus reducing the operational lifetime of the spacecraft. This has already occurred on a number of occasions, and is likely to happen again. Major events directly resulting in the loss of a satellite have also been experienced several times in recent decades.
Mitigation measures
In general, there are two strategies for mitigating the impacts of strong geomagnetic storms on power grids:
1) The application of engineering solutions designed to increase the robustness of electrical components and their ability to withstand disturbances from GIC. These could include DC-blocking devices, counteractive magnetic fields in the transformer cores, digital filters and relays for improved control and deliberate tripping of specific components.
2) Improved operating procedures to be taken during geomagnetic disturbances.
The first strategy is likely to be very costly and could require the complete restructuring of today’s power grids and transformer standards due to the fact that blocking one transformer against GIC increases the effective power line length between two neighbouring (as yet unblocked) transformer stations, and hence altering the grid topology and the GIC risk at the stations concerned. Therefore, a viable engineering solution (i.e. one that increases the grid’s robustness towards GIC) calls for a detailed and precise assessment of the vulnerability changes associated with an alteration in grid topology.
The second strategy would require more accurate space weather forecasts (currently, warning times for geomagnetic storms are around one hour but the forecasting of regional strength and duration of impact is still in its infancy), including the dynamical modelling of GIC impacts on power grids or at least crucial grid sections. Although splitting the grid into smaller sections would reduce the probability of strong GIC, grid operators would not opt for such a measure because it could create unforeseeable and potentially unmanageable problems in terms of grid stability. The operators would prefer rapid adjustments in electricity generation and shifting grid loads to create greater buffers for critical sections and long power lines.
We believe that effective and efficient mitigation would probably require both strategies, and therefore require support from different engineering and scientific disciplines. In 2011, NERC in the
USA established a Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force (GMDTF) composed of electricity providers and their engineers, scientists, and government representatives, who investigate the implications for bulk power system reliability faced with geomagnetic disturbances and develop solutions to help mitigate this risk.
Another potentially simple, but expensive, solution would be the instalment of replacement or substitute transformers at locations of high risk and high exposure. The typical construction period for a customised high-voltage transformer is one year and prices are around US$ 10m. This is why, currently, no back-up or spare transformers are stored at utility compounds or production sites.
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Nevertheless, the cost of replacing, e.g., the 100 most critical transformer units with more modern and hence more resilient units would be marginal compared to the potential total economic loss at stake in the event of a Carrington-type super storm.
Conclusion
Grid operators from different companies and countries, when referring to the difficulties involved in managing a high voltage power grid in the context of rare events, frequently assert that risks with a probability of occurrence of less than once in 50 years are considered a “bearable residual risk”. We disagree. We strongly believe that the risk of a widespread and prolonged power outage, e.g. lasting for several weeks and affecting highly populated areas (such as in the northeastern USA, central
Europe or major cities in East Asia), with all the far-reaching consequences for the economy and society that would imply, would be unbearable, particularly if the associated return period were of the order of once a century. A comparison could be drawn with the tsunami which followed Japan’s magnitude 9.0 earthquake in 2011. Mitigation measures taken to protect coastal infrastructure from tsunamis were simply not sufficient, particularly in the case of the Fukushima nuclear power plant.
The experts had been too optimistic, although history had already shown that significant and exceedingly high tsunamis could occur in Japan’s east coast region. Extreme tsunami events happened in Japan in 1498, 1605, 1611, 1707, 1854, 1896, and 1933 – basically more frequently than once in 100 years. Mankind’s vulnerability to tsunamis has not increased in recent decades to the extent that dependency on electricity has developed. The fact that we have not experienced a 100year (or a 1,000-year) event in the last 50 years does not mean that such an event will not happen in the next few years.
Finally, even if the probability of occurrence of a scenario as described above remains uncertain, the question to be addressed is whether the risk is tolerable or intolerable, especially if corresponding
technical mitigation and adaptation means are available. The possibility that a Carrington-like event could have a return period of less than a few hundred years cannot be ruled out. The basic issue is not whether another Carrington super storm will occur, but rather when. Protective measures and technical mitigation of damaging GIC are costly. But there is a need to invest in a more robust and resilient electrical infrastructure and this will pay off in the long term. It should be possible to identify which sectors or industries would suffer more than others from a prolonged power outage. However, economic loss might not be the main concern, bearing in mind that the potential societal consequences of a large-scale and prolonged power outage in a metropolitan area cannot be
considered a tolerable risk.
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Aim of stakeholder analysis
From the above scenario (Section I) relating to a widespread and prolonged power outage in an industrial and/or highly populated urban area, it is clear that all facets of modern life would be severely affected. The aim of stakeholder identification and analysis is not to provide an even more detailed description of the effects of such a power outage on particular sectors, but rather to identify economic sectors (industrial and financial) and societal levels that either consider such a scenario to constitute a considerable threat or play a key role in providing and implementing technological solutions to effectively reduce the risk involved.
By focusing on representatives from these sectors, it should be possible to achieve three goals which will help reduce the risk to society and the economy. The following steps will be involved:
I.
II.
III.
Approach relevant representatives of societal levels or industries (directly or indirectly) affected, to achieve risk awareness.
Develop a common understanding of the overall risk, including the potential costs of feasible risk reduction measures.
Using this common understanding as a basis, jointly request action to reduce the risk.
Again, our aim is to reach a consensus on the nature of the threat, form a common opinion on the necessity of risk mitigation, and foster the shared ambition of implementing existing mitigation measures designed to reduce the risk. To achieve the second goal, we will have to come up with arguments to persuade stakeholders to invest resources (time and money) in a successful riskmitigation process. The relevant stakeholder-specific risk analysis needs to consider a number of factors:
1.
Focus on risk: What are the risks, what is at stake and what are the limits of a tolerable business risk for each stakeholder?
2.
Focus on cost-benefit aspects: How would risk mitigation measures affect the risk profile for the stakeholder, i.e. what benefits would they entail for the stakeholder and what would each stakeholder be willing to invest (time, money, resources) to achieve a specific degree of risk reduction?
3.
Are there other framing factors? E.g. arguments relating to legal obligations (for instance, to minimise adverse impacts resulting from a breakdown in an industry’s supply function), insurance cover (e.g. D&O), image and reputation.
To answer these questions, it will be important to approach stakeholders from each industrial sector.
But knowledge gathered from other projects and research will also be very helpful. Answers to the first question will have to be treated confidentially or even anonymously given possible media attention that tends to exaggerate and to focus on the worst edge of the risk spectrum which might have negative repercussions. The cost-benefit analysis addressed in the second question will form part of the main argument for persuading and motivating stakeholders to support the initiative and take action. In addition, reputational benefits could accrue to companies from being among the first in their sector to campaign for and contribute to improvements in power supply resilience.
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In the course of discussions with stakeholders on both the risk of solar storms in general, the specific risk to shareholders, and risk mitigation prospects, the societal perspective of effective risk mitigation will inevitably be raised and could involve many or even most of the stakeholders. This strategy equally entails approaching policy-makers and requiring them to develop an appropriate
(regulatory) framework to ensure that the different industrial sectors, in particular the energy sector, contribute to the realisation of more GIC-resilient bulk power systems, particularly in critical or highrisk areas. As an enclosure to this document, there is an Excel file that provides the reader with a socalled Potential Stakeholder Profile Matrix. This Excel sheet assigns characteristics to various sectors of the industry that are deemed as relevant to the question of stakeholder participation in the initiative for GIC risk reduction. In the following, a more general discussion is provided.
Industrial sectors affected
The industrial sectors which would be substantially affected in the event of a prolonged power outage can be split into two categories:
A.
The power generating and transmission/distribution sectors would be directly hit: by damage to equipment (e.g. high-voltage transformers) and loss of revenue due to failure of the electricity supply.
B.
All other sectors in the energy downstream chain would suffer from the power outage collaterally.
While the need to implement risk mitigation measures applies primarily to the first category, the corresponding mitigation technology could be produced by industries from the second category.
Different arguments in support of cooperation and supportive action will be required, depending on whether the sector concerned is directly or indirectly affected. Key industrial sectors identified can be grouped into the following categories:
A.1. Electricity-generating sectors:
Power plant operators (generator step-up transformer operators)
Wind/solar farm operators
High-risk sectors (such as nuclear power plants)
A.2. Electricity transmission and distribution sectors:
B.
Transmission system operators (TSO)
Regional transmission organisations (RTO)
Independent system operators (ISO)
Municipal utilities and energy suppliers
Electricity consuming sectors of major significance to the economy:
Manufacturing trades (e.g., car producers, electronics and engineering companies)
Heavy industry (steel, aluminium producers, chemical plants)
Financial sector (banking, trading, insurance)
Telecommunications (terrestrial com, sat com and TV)
Public infrastructures such as transport (trains, planes), water, sewage, waste
Cargo, supply and logistics
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Health (hospitals and pharmaceutical industry)
Food and farming (cold storage, livestock)
(A sample list of potential representatives of categories A.1 and A.2 can be found in the next section.)
Focus I: Electricity providers
Electric power supply systems can be split into three main sections: electricity generation, transmission and distribution (see diagram below). The electricity generating companies feed their power into the high-voltage transmission lines via large step-up transformers. The high-voltage power lines form the backbone of the power grid and cover long distances over large regions. The high voltage (typically > 110 kV) is modulated to sub-transmission voltage (typically 13–69 kV) via step-down transformers at substations and fed into local distribution grids, where it is modulated to low voltage (< 1 kV).
Transmission system operators (TSO), such as regional transmission organisations (RTO) and independent system operators (ISO), coordinate and control high voltage transmission and distribution over large areas. However, step-up and step-down transformers, which are vulnerable to strong GIC, might not be the property of the TSO. Often, power plant operators on the generation side also act as TSO. This could lead to a conflict of interest for electricity generation companies. On the one hand, it is in their interests to ensure the stable and secure provision of electricity including a perspective on past and current supply to continuously be secure; on the other, they would have to acknowledge that improvements were needed. When approaching electricity generation companies and TSOs, it is important to clarify the fact that any need for improvement (in terms of installing GICresilient equipment) is complementary, and not contradictory to what is already a sound performance on the part of the grid operators. The fact that there are weak spots (in relation to low frequency and high impact events) within their operations does not translate into a general calling into question of the secure provision of electricity. They are the experts in matters of grid security and will, therefore, play a key part in achieving a more resilient electricity supply. However, it is the scientists who have the necessary expertise in respect of rare and extreme GIC. The grid operators
(step-up, transmission and step-down) and power generating companies are key in terms of mitigating the blackout risk. It will have to be made clear to them that the scientific experts are describing an event with a low probability of occurrence. Nevertheless, a once-in-100-year event is not a myth and lack of experience of this type of event is not an argument that can be used to cast
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doubt on the plausibility of the assumption that such an event could occur. When talking to power grid operators in North America, one has the clear impression that the GIC threat is taken seriously.
However, when discussing the upper magnitudes of possible impact strengths, one is often faced with strong scepticism, particularly with regard to the scale of destruction of which enormous GIC are capable (the strongest measured GIC, recorded in Finland in 1991, reached over 200A and lasted for about one minute; theoretically the strongest GIC, based on solid assumptions, could rise to 2,000A and last over a interval range from ten seconds up to a minute). Of course, dealing with the risk of a
100-year (or rarer) event is not the day-to-day business of grid operators, which regularly face such complex problems as grid instability caused by volatile feed-in from renewable energy sources (for instance, wind farms) or disturbances caused by hazards like lightning. However, there is an overarching societal interest in avoiding strong GIC impact events and thus, day-to-day challenges should not hamper operators making improvements to ensure the electricity supply is more resilient to GIC.
Sample stakeholders (TSOs)
Europe:
Austria: Austrian Power Grid, VKW
Belgium: Elia System Operator
Denmark: Energinet
Finland: Fingrid
France: RTE
Germany: EnBW, Amprion, Tennet TSO, 50Hertz Transmission (Elia System Operator)
Hungary: MAVIR
Italy: TERNA
Netherlands: TenneT
Norway: Statnett
Poland: PSE-Operator
Sweden: Svenska Kraftnät
Switzerland: Swissgrid
Spain: Red Electrica
UK: National Grid, Scottish and Southern Energy, Scottish Power Transmission
North America:
PJM Interconnection
Hydro-Quebec Distribution
Hydro One Inc.
National Grid USA
Northeast Utilities
NSTAR
FirstEnergy Corp.
Consolidated Edison Inc.
LIPA
Progress Energy
Duke Energy
Dominion Virginia and North Carolina Power
American Electric Power
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Exelon
Allegheny Power
Focus II: Mitigation technology providers
When approaching transformer manufacturers and companies providing the mitigating technology one should consider the following facts. The global market in high-voltage transformers amounts to approximately US$ 10bn (with around US$ 10m per sold unit). These days, European companies like
ABB, Siemens, SGB-SMIT Group, Alstom or Areva dominate the market, but Asian manufacturers such as Bharat Heavy Electricals, Crompton Greaves Ltd. or Shihlin Electric are catching up. China, in particular, is now the world’s leading transformer manufacturing nation by number of transformer units. US manufacturers like Cooper Industries or General Electric do not play a major role in the international high-voltage transformer market. In terms of business transacted, China is followed by the USA, Japan and Germany. While, in Asian markets, the primary driver of transformer sales is price per unit, in North America and Europe power efficiency is a prominent factor in market demand.
The technological options available to mitigate the effects of strong GIC can be split into two strategies: i) ii)
Retrofitting the implemented technology
Replacing old with new (GIC-resilient) technology
High-voltage transformer manufacturers and mitigation technology providers are usually one and the same, and so both the above strategies would encourage business in this industrial sector. However, there could also be a problem regarding the conflicting motives involved with electricity generation and transmission companies. Transformer producers may praise their new GIC-resilient developments on the one hand, while not admitting that retrofitting or even replacing “last year’s” state-of-the-art developments and well-established designs would be necessary to ensure better GIC resilience, on the other. Such companies have GIC-mitigation specialists who, without doubt, are experts in the field of GIC-resilient design and mitigation. It might be too much to expect them to voice such implicit self-criticism. Indeed, it is better from their perspective if the transformer experts cast doubt on the scientific extrapolations relating to the magnitudes and extents of extreme GIC events. However, this is a risky position, and one we do not agree with.
Focus III: Industrial sectors of key importance to the economy
The clients of power-consuming industries of major importance to the economy that rely on a secure and stable electricity supply are most likely to be the stakeholders who will share our common view on the need to reduce the risk of large-scale and prolonged power outages from solar storms, given they become informed about the risk. This approach appears, at first sight, to constitute a clear winwin situation for them. However, an all-embracing stakeholder analysis needs to determine how or
what the sectors in question can contribute in order to achieve a viable a reduced-risk bulk-power system. One possible means of accessing those sectors might be to make an approach via the branch specific industrial associations concerned, or higher-level umbrella organisations such as the BDI
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[Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie/Federation of German Industry], representing all of the industry sectors in Germany.
Focus IV: Scientific institutions and experts in space weather ground effects and GIC
Expertise on GIC needs to be split into two groups. On the one hand, the scientific community, which knows about GIC occurrence and understands the hazardous characteristics associated with rare and strong events. On the other hand, the experts in the field of high-voltage power systems, knowing how the systems react to rare and strong GIC events, the effectiveness of various mitigationtechnology options and how they operate.
Space-weather science, ground effects and GIC
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan, Ottawa, Canada)
International Space Environment Services (ISES, Ottawa, Canada)
NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC, Boulder, USA)
NASA Community Coordinated Modeling Center (CCMC, Greenbelt, USA)
Finish Meteorological Institute (FMI, Helsinki, Finland)
British Geological Survey (BGS Geomagnetism, Edinburgh, UK)
Linking GIC and high voltage power systems
NERC Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force (GMDTF, Princeton, USA)
EC EP7 Project: EURISGIC (EU, under lead of FMI, Helsinki, Finland)
ESA Ground Effects Topical Group (GETG, Lund, Sweden)
Electric Power Research Institute SUNBURST Network (EPRI, Palo Alto, USA)
Focus V: Authorities and regulatory parties
Preventing a catastrophe from happening in the first place or – if an accident is inevitable – mitigating its foreseeable impacts are items on the agenda of departments of public safety, national security agencies and similar institutions. In case of an unavoidable catastrophic event, it is of the utmost importance with regard to facilities like civil protection, disaster control and emergency management to keep essential infrastructures intact. Hence, such institutions and facilities constitute suitable targets for potential lobbying aimed at improving the reliability and stability of power supplies. Below is a list of sample agencies and organisations that are in charge of regulating and/or operating critical infrastructure such as the electrical power supply, and therefore need to be aligned and coordinated by the above institutions and facilities:
ENTSO-E (EU) (association of European TSOs, authority for rules and standards in
European transmission systems)
European Commissioner for Energy (EU)
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Federal network agency Bundesnetzagentur (Germany)
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Germany)
Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (Germany)
Schweizerisches Eidgenössisches Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und
Kommunikation (Switzerland)
National Grid Electricity Transmission plc (UK)
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (UK)
FERC (USA) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (regulatory authority for the U.S. energy sector)
NERC (CA, USA, parts of Mexico) North-American Electric Reliability Corporation
(regulatory agency responsible for reliability standards in the North American bulk power supply systems of USA, Canada and small parts of Mexico)
Secretary of Energy (USA)
Focus VI: Politics and initiatives
It will be necessary to approach senior politicians and high level decision-makers and gain their support for the actions necessary to effectively reduce the risk of potential GIC-induced blackouts in bulk power systems. Progress in this field differs according to continent. While in North America the issue has been on the political agenda for some time, and early initiatives (such as NERC’s
Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force) have started to analyse what is necessary and what feasible, on the European side (with the exception of some Scandinavian countries and the UK) the issue is still at an awareness-raising level. One example of this was the Space Weather Awareness Dialogue held by the European Commission on 25–26 October 2011 in Brussels, Belgium. The event, which was hosted by the Director General of the Joint Research Centre, was attended by around 70 high-level representatives from national organisations and authorities, international organisations with assets potentially affected by space weather, critical infrastructure operators, academics, and representatives of European Union institutions. The group of attendees included three representatives from the insurance sector and two from European power grid operators, but most came from the scientific community. One key finding in the final event report states:
“The analysis of the space-weather threat to ground-based critical infrastructure (power grid, aviation, telecommunications, etc.) is of equal importance as the study of space-based infrastructures.”
This appears to be a mismatch: the analysis of the threat to ground-based critical infrastructure (and power grids in particular) is considered by the insurance industry to be of greater importance than the study of space-based infrastructure, simply because of the potentially higher impact risk. Events like the Space Weather Awareness Dialogue are important, but they need to address and focus more on the issue of GIC and its potential impact on high-voltage power networks.
In March 2011, under the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme, the EURISGIC Project 2 was set up to produce the first European-wide real-time prototype forecast service relating to GIC in power systems: “EURISGIC will exploit the knowledge and advanced modelling methods developed in
Europe and North America. Close communication throughout the project with stakeholders will help in directing the research and outreach appropriately. The results of the study will help in the future
2 http://www.eurisgic.eu
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design of more robust and secure protection against GIC (Geomagnetically Induced Currents) in power transmission grids in Europe, which are anticipated to become increasingly interconnected and geographically wider.”
Awareness of space weather in political circles in Europe is relatively recent and, as such, the
European Commission has not yet considered steps to address it further. The issue is considered to cut across various DGs (Directorates-General). Departments within the Commission that generally deal with space issues include:
DG JRC - Joint Research Centre, Unit F3 on Energy Security,
DG Research and Innovation, Unit K2 on Energy Conversion and Distribution Systems,
DG ENTR - Enterprise and Industry, Unit H on Space, Security and GMES (H3 Research
Activities on Security).
Feedback from several European Commission officials in those units indicates that no initiatives are currently planned in this matter. The issue has yet not been addressed at European Parliament level either, although – due to previous experience – some MEPs (Ministers of Environmental Protection) could get involved in GIC-related discussions.
3
On a more regional scale, the issue of widespread prolonged power outages featured on the agenda of the German Parliament in April 2011. The report Gefährdung und Verletzbarkeit moderner
Gesellschaften 4 states that the complex and cascading damaging effects of a prolonged power outage in a large urban area will ultimately lead to a societal catastrophe. The report singles out technical and human failure, criminal and terrorist action, epidemics, pandemics and extreme weather phenomena as potential causes of lengthy blackouts. Space weather and GIC, however, were not listed among the potential causes.
In North America, the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the ultimate regulatory authority for ensuring the integrity of the interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil, has commissioned the North-American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), as the legal authority for reliability standards in the US bulk power system, to analyse the vulnerability of the bulk power system to EMP and GIC. In the NERC HILF Report (High Impact Low Frequency events, June 2010), geomagnetic disturbances were classified as a real risk for the North American bulk power system.
NERC has created a Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force (GMD TF), a group of scientists and power system operators, to outline and review current industry experience and the ability of industry approaches to prevent GMD events.
However, the concept of ”extreme solar storms” impacting the nation’s capacity to maintain the integrity of the electric power grid is viewed as a somewhat abstract concept in the US Congress.
Congressional committees would certainly claim jurisdictional authority over such an issue. Further research on congressional committees and regulatory authorities that have a political interest in the impact of “extreme solar storms” needs to be undertaken. In the first instance, it should be noted
3 For instance: MEP Norbert Glante, (S&D, DE) Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, who is the Rapp. for the proposal of a regulation on the
European Earth observation program (GMES) and its initial operations (2011–2013). Further information can be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2009/0070(COD)&l=en#documentGateway
4 Gefährdung und Verletzbarkeit moderner Gesellschaften – am Beispiel eines großräumigen und langandauernden Ausfalls der Stromversorgung The report (in German) can be found at http://www.tab-beim-bundestag.de/de/publikationen/berichte/ab141.html
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that a bill named the SHIELD Act (H.R. 668), or “Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from
Lethal Damage Act” was introduced in the House of Representatives in February 2011. It states:
“To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense and well-being of the United States against natural and manmade electromagnetic pulse (“EMP”) threats and vulnerabilities.”
“…the Electric Reliability Organization [=NERC] [shall] submit to the Commission for approval
… reliability standards adequate to protect the bulk-power system from any reasonably foreseeable geomagnetic storm or electromagnetic pulse event. The Commission’s order shall specify the nature and magnitude of the reasonably foreseeable events against which such standards must protect.”
The bill was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on the Budget, but no part of the bill had been passed at the time of writing (March 2012).
One of the important institutions to bridge the gap between North America and Europe is the socalled Electric Infrastructure Security Summit (EISS), that takes place once a year, thereby alternating in location between Washington DC and London. In May 2012 it took place for the third time, at that time in the British Parliament in London. Invitees comprised members of parliament and other senior policy level, representatives of energy regulatory bodies, scientists and industry representatives from twenty countries, thirteen of which were European countries. Main focus is still on the USA and the
United Kingdom, that participated in May 2012 with Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Hammond
(UK), and Assistant Secretary of Defence, Mr. Stockton (USA), among many others. Issue at stake at the Summit was the threat from Solar Storms/Geomagnetic Storms and from Electromagnetic Pulse.
For the first time, insurance industry participated in the Summit, as the CRO Forum’s Working Group on Solar Storm Risk was invited for a panel. All insurers involved delivered short talks on behalf of our joint ERI/CRO Forum mandate, stressing (among other issues) that within a sound risk management framework governments have the responsibility to reduce the overall societal vulnerability by stipulating appropriate protective technology. For instance, in case of flood risk management governments have the obligation to build flood defence structures. The residual risk that cannot be reduced further by protective measures, can be borne by private insurance industry. The same holds with regard to geomagnetic storms and the bulk power systems – regulation has to stipulate standards for enhanced resilience in order to reduce the overall societal risk.
Criteria and next steps for execution of the strategy
The current insurance initiative on solar storm risks dates back to September 2011, when the
Working Group on Solar Storms within the Chief Risk Officers Forum’s Emerging Risk Initiative (ERI) was launched. The initiative was given the goal of developing a strategy road map that comprises (i) a clear and focused description of the risks and risk mitigation options and (ii) a first conceptual framework on how to reach and engage relevant stakeholders in this specific field of risk, and in particular how these issues can be addressed at higher policy-makers’ levels.
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The solar storm initiative could be accompanied by controversial issues and various industry interests that might evolve and be encouraged by the non-perceptual character of the hazard and vulnerability to it. It should be kept in mind that there is no deeply rooted cultural awareness of hazardous solar storm effects within our societies, as is the case with windstorms, hail, earthquakes or other natural hazards of which we have an immediate perception. Against this background, the initiative will be most convincing if the need for risk mitigation is promoted by a group of globally leading insurers rather than by insurers acting individually.
In seeking a platform for this outreach phase, the working group assumed that the following requirements had to be met. The platform should be representative of the insurance industry. It should allow for committee work unencumbered by antitrust issues and it should serve as a “mother ship” from which outreach activities can be arranged and coordinated, being capable of undertaking lobbying activities by itself (see the enclosed Excel sheet “Potential Lobbying Organization Profile” that lists some organizations). The Working Group concordantly agreed to ask the Geneva
Association (GA) to take over for the second phase of the insurance initiative on solar storm risks, because it meets the criteria outlined above. This was also corroborated by a decision taken at the
Face-To-Face Meeting of the Emerging Risks Initiative in Hanover in March 2012, and the CRO Forum itself has already agreed to this plan. The GA will be asked to continue to promote the topic and increase political awareness of the issue at international (and, in particular, European) level, as well as to approach other lobbying organisations with risk management relevance (more information can be found in the Excel sheet showing potential lobbying organisation profiles).
A recommendation made by the Working Group on Solar Storms for GA is to further engage solar storm experts from the various companies already involved in the ERI initiative for the committee work at GA level in the coming phase. These experts could ensure that this complex technical and, to an extent, conflict-laden topic does not lose its focus in the second phase.
Conceptual proposal
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Members of the Insurers’ Working Group on Solar Storm Risk and authors of this document
Jan Eichner took over the role as a lead author and editor. Grateful acknowledgement to all CRO
Forum Emerging Risk Initiative member companies for their contributions and revisions.
The following files belong to the current document as enclosures:
- Excel file “Potential Stakeholder Profile Matrix”
- Excel file “Potential Lobbying Organization Profile”
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