Marihuana Policy Aff
1AC
State Budgets
Contention one is state budgets
State budgets are struggling now – revenues are low, costs are rising, and federal aid
is down – prefer our evidence - it’s predictive.
Leachman and Mai, ’14 [Michael (Director of State Fiscal Research with the State Fiscal Policy
division of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities) and Chris (Intern at the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities), “Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession”, 5-20-14, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4011]
States cut funding for K-12 education — and a range of other areas of spending including higher education, health care, and human services —
as a result of the 2007-09 recession, which caused state revenue to fall sharply. Emergency fiscal aid from the federal government initially
helped prevent even deeper cuts but it ran out before the economy had recovered, and states
have disproportionately chosen
to address their budget shortfalls through spending reductions rather than a more balanced mix of
service cuts and revenue increases. Cuts are particularly deep when inflation and other cost pressures are considered.
Revenues remain below pre-recession levels . The recession of 2007-09 and the slow recovery
continue to affect state budgets and schools. Persistently high unemployment and continued low
housing values have left people with both less income and purchasing power. So states continue to
receive less income and sales tax revenue, which are the main sources of revenue states use to fund
education and other services. State revenues are starting to improve across the country. State tax revenues grew 8.9 percent in the
12-month period ending in March 2013. But they remain 2.8 percent below 2008 levels after adjusting for inflation.
Costs are rising .
The costs of state-funded services have increased since the recession, due to inflation, demographic
changes, and rising needs. For example, in the current school year, the U.S. Department of Education estimates that there are about
775,000 more K-12 students and 3.2 million more public college and university students than there were in 2007-08.[7] ,[8] Some 8.7
million more people are estimated to be eligible for Medicaid in 2013 than were enrolled in 2008, as
employers have cancelled their coverage and people have lost jobs and wages.[9] States have avoided
raising new revenues . States have disproportionately relied on spending cuts to close the very large
budget shortfalls they have faced over the last several years, rather than a more balanced mix of
spending cuts and revenue increases. Between fiscal years 2008 and 2012, states closed 45 percent of their budget gaps through
spending cuts, and only 16 percent of their budget gaps through taxes and fees (they closed the remainder of their shortfalls with federal aid,
reserves, and various other measures).[10] States could have lessened the cuts to education funding and made more progress in restoring the
funding that has been lost if they had been more willing to raise additional revenue.
Federal aid to states has fallen . States used
emergency fiscal relief from the federal government (including both education aid and other forms of state fiscal relief) to cover a significant
share of their shortfalls through the 2011 fiscal year. After the 2011 fiscal year, the federal government largely allowed this aid to expire, even
though states continued to face very large shortfalls in 2012 and beyond. The
expiration of most federal aid at the end of
the 2011 fiscal year is a key reason why state education funding dropped so sharply in the 2012 fiscal
year and remains suspended at such low levels. Adding to states’ struggles, federal policymakers have
cut ongoing federal funding for states and localities, thereby worsening state fiscal conditions. For
example, since 2010, federal spending for Title I — the major federal assistance program for high-poverty schools — is down 12 percent after
adjusting for inflation, and federal spending on disabled education is down 11 percent.[11] These cuts
include the automatic,
across-the-board cuts known as “sequestration,” and the cuts required by the Budget Control Act of
2011.[12] (See Figure 5.)
Legalization and regulation massively benefit state budgets - resolves losses from the
market and saves money from arrests.
Gettman 7( Jon, Ph. D, September 5, 2007, The Bulletin of Cannabis Reform- Drug Science, “Lost Taxes
and Other Costs of Marijuana Laws” http://norml.drugsense.org/downloads/Gettman_Lost_Taxes.pdf ,
page 34, accessed 7/29/14 KR)
Based on a retail price of $7.87 a gram, a pound of marijuana is worth $3,570 and the ¶ commodity is
worth $7,871,480 per metric ton. At this price the annual supply of 14,349 ¶ mt of marijuana available
in the United States is worth $112.9 billion. The diversion of ¶ money spent on marijuana has a
considerable impact on the fiscal budgets of all levels of ¶ government in the United States, especially
through the diversion of this amount of ¶ money from the licit and taxed sectors of our economy to
the illicit, untaxed, and ¶ unregulated illegal economy that thrives on these considerable expenditures.
¶ The economist Joseph Schumpeter
described entrepreneurial activity as a force of ¶ creative destruction on the economy. Entrepreneurs
introduced new combinations of ¶ goods and services, and these attracted capital, diverting it from old combinations of ¶ goods and services. In
the process this reallocation or redirection of spending diminished ¶ the value of the economic activity that loses the revenue to the new
innovations. The ¶ creation of new economic channels effectively destroys many old channels of economic ¶ activity, a process defining the
concept of creative destruction. ¶ The
market in marijuana in the United States is illicit, illegal, and as such it
diverts ¶ capital away from the channels of the licit or legal economy, especially the channels from ¶
which local, state, and the federal government collect tax revenue. In this respect the ¶ emergence
and growth of the illegal marijuana market is an act of creative destruction on ¶ the ability of
government to collect tax revenue. Certainly some of the capital diverted ¶ into the marijuana market seeps back into the licit
economy, but this phenomenon is no ¶ different from legal spending being re-circulated. The difference is that the initial ¶
purchase of marijuana, and a large portion of the redistribution of the purchase price, ¶ travels
through economic channels which essentially avoid contributions to funding ¶ government. ¶ It is
obvious to most Americans that marijuana is not taxed, and that therefore there ¶ would be additional
revenue for government if it were legal and taxed like other ¶ commodities. What is less apparent to most
Americans is that the large, illicit market in ¶ marijuana costs government considerable revenue through its diversion of capital from ¶ the legal
economy into the illicit economy.
The primary budgetary impact of illegal ¶ marijuana sales is not the loss of
potential tax revenue on marijuana, but the loss of actual ¶ tax revenue from the diversion of capital
to the untaxed illegal market. ¶ The 14,349 metric tons of marijuana purchased in the United States annually is worth ¶ $112.9
billion. If those funds were spent on legal commodities rather than marijuana ¶ those economic
transactions would produce billions in tax revenues for local, state, and ¶ the federal government. ¶ For
example, according to the 2002 Economic Census by the US Bureau of the Census, ¶ the average business in the United States devotes 17.5% of
its revenue to payroll. The ¶ money spent on marijuana, consequently, removes $112.9 billion from the gross domestic ¶ product, and results in
a loss of payroll expenditures by businesses of $19.7 billion. 4ost Taxes and Other Costs of Marijuana Laws¶ - 35 - ¶ Allowing for 15% federal
income tax, 15% social security tax (combining individual and ¶ employer shares), and estimating a state income tax rate of 4.7%, this results in
a loss of ¶ $6.8 billion in taxes for state and the federal government. Assuming an estimated sales ¶ tax of 5.4%, the result is a loss of $6.1 billion
in tax revenue for state governments. ¶ Assuming an effective corporate tax rate of 2.6% of gross revenue, the result is a loss of ¶ $2.9 billion in
tax revenue. This
minimal model produces a total loss of tax revenue of ¶ close to $15.9 billion. ¶ A more
accurate estimation of lost tax revenue can be acquired through examination of ¶ current levels of
government revenue as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). ¶ (See Table 15.) The diversion of
funds into the illicit market in marijuana costs ¶ government $31.1 billion in tax revenue annually.
Local, state, and the federal ¶ government receive 28.7% of the GDP in tax revenue. If the money
spent on marijuana ¶ were instead spent on legal goods, it would add $112.9 billion to the GDP,
producing ¶ $11.6 billion in revenue to state and local governments, $7.2 billion to the federal ¶
government in social security and other social insurance premiums, and $12.2 billion in ¶ other federal
tax revenue. Marijuana Prohibition results in the creative destruction of ¶ $31.1 billion in tax revenue.
¶ Table 15.
Government Receipts by Source as Percentages of Gross Domestic Product ¶ Applied to the Illicit Marijuana Market. (Reference Year
2006) ¶ Illicit Marijuana Market $112,947,860,206 ¶ ¶ GDP %56¶ State/Local Government Revenue Loss 10.30% $11,633,629,601 ¶ ¶ Federal
Government Revenue Loss ¶ Individual Income Taxes 8.00% $9,035,828,817 ¶ Corporation Taxes 2.70% $3,049,592,226 ¶ Social Insurance 6.40%
$7,228,663,053 ¶ Excise Taxes 0.06% $67,768,716 ¶ Other 0.07% $79,063,502 ¶ ¶ Total Federal Revenue Loss 18.40% $19,460,916,314 ¶ ¶ Total
Federal/State Revenue Loss 28.70% $31,094,545,915 ¶ In 2004 total US expenses on the criminal justice system (police protection, the judiciary,
¶ and corrections) totaled $193.5 billion57. The cost allocation employed by the ONDCP ¶ report on the costs of drug abuse is to calculate the
cost of drug law enforcement by using ¶ ¶ 56 Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal year 2008, Historical Tables,
(Washington, ¶ D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007) Table 2.3, Year 2006, pg 34-35. ¶ 57 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Justice Expenditure and
Employment Extracts 2004, NCJ 215648. U.S. ¶ Bureau of the Census' Criminal Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts Program (CJEE);
filename: ¶ cjee0401.csv. 5ost Taxes and Other Costs of Marijuana Laws¶ - 36 - ¶ the percentage of drug arrests. In
2004 marijuana
arrests accounted for 5.5% of all ¶ arrests. Consequently marijuana arrests cost taxpayers $10.7 billion
in 2004. ¶ Taken together, the lost tax revenue from the diversion of funds to the marijuana market ¶
and the cost of marijuana arrests produce a budgetary cost to local, state and the federal ¶
government of $41.8 billion.
The direct costs of legalization are outweighed by economic benefits – legalization
cuts police spending up to 13 billion per year and revenues could rise up to 500 million
state revenue – our evidence is comparative.
David G. Evans, 2013 Esq., Executive Director, Drug Free Projects Coalition THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION –
The journal of Global Drug Policy and Practice
http://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/11204/3240/The%20Economic%20Impacts%20of%20Marijuana%20Legalization%20final%20for%20journ
al.pdf?sequence=1 retrieved 8/1/14 - Director of Regulatory and Legal Affairs, David G. Evans, Esq. has over 40 years experience in the
addictions field. His law practice has a concentration in addictions law. He represents several addiction treatment programs and does
governmental affairs work related to drug and alcohol issues. Dave is a former research scientist with the Division of Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse in the New Jersey Department of Health. He was involved with the analysis of legal and regulatory requirements regarding: drug and
alcohol abuse, research and data collection, courts, criminal justice, domestic violence, drug-free workplaces, juveniles, confidentiality,
treatment, drug testing, AIDS, drug use forecasting, and discrimination.
The marijuana legalization advocates have argued that whether the
direct costs of legalization are outweighed by
economic benefits depends on the following economic concerns: (a) estimated savings from reduced
spending on the criminal justice costs of marijuana law enforcement and revenue losses from shifts in
law enforcement policies; (b) projected revenues from additional taxes and streams of income; ( c)
immediate and projected expenditures to address the known harms of marijuana use and to implement
and enforce policy reforms.¶ Budgetary savings¶ Criminal justice budgets typically do not list the costs of enforcing particular drugs
laws, however, Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron has written a series of policy papers estimating various
government expenditures associated with marijuana criminalization (1). According to Miron,
legalization will reduce the need for prosecutorial, judicial, correctional, and police resource
spending by approximately $7.7 billion – $13.7 billion per year, (2) even though some revenue from
court fines and asset forfeitures would be lost (3). Miron claims his estimates can be verified
empirically and his calculations are adjusted for economic inflation and growth in enforcement
spending over the past decade (4). Accordingly, Miron is cited to argue for a cost-minimizing approach
to criminal justice (5).¶ Revenue gains¶ Although marijuana advocates claim that marijuana taxation, licensing, and industry could
generate more than $8.7 billion in government revenue, (6) the value of gains cannot be gauged at this time because revenues from licensing
and industry vary by state (7). Additionally, tax revenue projections are inherently uncertain because they rely on questionable assumptions
about the unknown impact of black market supply on consumer demand in regulated markets.¶ Tax
expert and attorney Pat
Oglesby conducted an analysis of existing marijuana tax proposals (8). Oglesby claims that Washington
State’s legalization proposal (Initiative 502), which includes restrictions on advertising and drugged driving and has three
distinct excise taxes,
could generate approximately $500 million in state revenue (9). Oglesby also
acknowledges the possibility that Colorado’s taxation scheme could generate between $47 million
and $100 million in revenue , (10) but he concludes the projections are completely unreliable because the state’s regulatory
framework is fundamentally flawed (11).¶ Finally, he finds Oregon’s plan (Measure 80) created a conflict of interest because “medical”
marijuana is sold privately at cost but under the legalization plan marijuana would be sold at a controlled cost, though he admits money can be
made under a state-controlled marijuana monopoly (12). Voters in Oregon rejected the plan. Finally, Oglesby notes that the economic impact of
legalization depends on various other factors that cannot be assessed at this time, including the possible emergence of new jobs, the likelihood
of tax evasion, and legalization’s probable impact on alcohol consumption (13).¶
Scenario one is economy
State budget cuts halt current progress against unemployment which devastates
federal government economic standing.
Sandler and Aversa 11 (Michael and Jeannine, 2/25/14, writers for Associated Press, Huffington
Post, “State and Local Budget Cuts are Slowing U.S. Economy”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/26/state-and-local-budget-cu_n_828601.html accessed
7/31/14 KR)
WASHINGTON — Deep
spending cuts by state and local governments pose a growing threat to an economy
that is already grappling with high unemployment, depressed home prices and the surging cost of oil. ¶
Lawmakers at state capitols and city halls are slashing jobs and programs, arguing that some pain now
is better than a lot more later. But the cuts are coming at a price – weaker growth at the national
level.¶ The clearest sign to date was a report Friday on U.S. gross domestic product for the final three months of 2010. The
government lowered its growth estimate, pointing to larger-than-expected cuts by state and local
governments. The report suggested that worsening state budget problems could hold back the
recovery by putting more people out of work and reducing consumer spending.¶ Across the country, governors
and lawmakers are proposing broad cutbacks – lowering fees paid to nursing homes in Florida, reducing health insurance subsidies for lowerincome Pennsylvanians, closing prisons in New York state and scaling back programs for elderly and disabled Californians.¶ "The massive
financial problems at the state and local levels have and will continue to restrain growth," said economist Joel Naroff of Naroff Economic
Advisors.¶ State
and local governments account for 91 percent of all government spending on primary
education, according to the Brookings Institution. And they provide 71 percent of higher-education
spending. States also account for more than 70 percent of spending on roads, bridges and other
infrastructure.¶ But those same governments cut spending at a 2.4 percent rate at the end of last year.
And economists predict they will slash their budgets by up to 2.5 percent this year – potentially the
sharpest reduction since 1943. The deepest cuts are expected to occur in the first six months of this
year.¶ The worst cuts so far_ 3.8 percent – came in the January-to-March period of 2010. That was the
sharpest quarterly drop since late 1983, when the U.S. economy was recovering from a severe
recession. Most economists think the cutbacks this year will exert an even bigger economic drag than last year.¶ Newly elected Republican
governors are leading the charge. They're acting on campaign pledges to shrink government to meet budget gaps. They favor smaller
governments with lower taxes and less regulation, which they say will boost private-sector growth and job creation.¶ Some Democrats –
including Govs. Andrew Cuomo of New York and Jerry Brown of California – have followed suit. They're pushing for cuts to social programs and
concessions from unions.¶ The governors' push for painful cuts comes just as they gather in Washington this weekend for their winter
meeting.¶ "We have to balance our budgets. We have to address costs. And we also have to move forward at the same time," Maryland Gov.
Martin O'Malley, head of the Democratic Governors Association, said after his group met with President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe
Biden at the White House.¶ No state has attracted more attention than Wisconsin. Pointing to the state's projected $3.6 billion gap, Republican
Gov. Scott Walker wants to strip state workers of collective bargaining rights. He also wants them to contribute more to their pensions and
health insurance costs.¶ The budget fight has taken center stage in Congress. Democrats are bending to Republican demands for spending cuts
to avoid a shutdown of the federal government next week.¶ The reduction in federal spending has a direct effect on states and municipalities.
They depend on money from Washington to keep schools operating, put police officers on the street and subsidize public services like job
training. The
end of federal stimulus programs is also widening state deficits.¶ Many governors, including
those in Florida, New York and Colorado, are pursuing tighter budgets. Their proposals include laying
off public workers and teachers, reducing spending for education and health care, and ending some
social services. They're also targeting public pension funds and health insurance plans and seeking larger contributions from public
employees.¶ State and local budget experts fear the cutbacks will intensify this year. States are struggling to close budget gaps of about $125
billion for the upcoming budget year, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.¶
Economic crisis triggers war – best empirical evidence supports
Royal ‘10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, (Economic Integration,
Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed.
Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of
interdependent states. Research
in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels.
and Thompson's (1996) work on
leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a
pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous
shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that
leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively,
Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski
even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a
Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with
parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers ,
declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately,
although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second,
on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory
of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of
trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states.
He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have
an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline,
particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases,
as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4
Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during
periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict,
which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to
which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic
decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill
'Diversionary
theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments
have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'
effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing
that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani
across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government.
and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the
fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has
provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are
statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with
an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic,
dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the
economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other
perspectives that link
economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in
the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend
to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global
interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by
economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.
Scenario two is infrastructure
Federal funding for transportation infrastructure fails- states need new tax revenue to
fill in the gaps
Economist 11(4/28/2011, The Economist, “Life in the slow lane”
http://www.economist.com/node/18620944 accessed 8/1/14 KR)
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that America needs to spend $20 billion more a year just to
maintain its infrastructure at the present, inadequate, levels. Up to $80 billion a year in additional
spending could be spent on projects which would show positive economic returns. Other reports go further. In
2005 Congress established the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission. In 2008 the commission reckoned that
America needed at least $255 billion per year in transport spending over the next half-century to keep the system in good repair and make the
needed upgrades. Current
spending falls 60% short of that amount.¶ If they had a little money…¶ ¶ If
Washington is spending less than it should, falling tax revenues are partly to blame. Revenue from
taxes on petrol and diesel flow into trust funds that are the primary source of federal money for roads
and mass transit. That flow has diminished to a drip. America's petrol tax is low by international standards, and has not
gone up since 1993 (see chart 3). While the real value of the tax has eroded, the cost of building and
maintaining infrastructure has gone up. As a result, the highway trust fund no longer supports even
current spending. Congress has repeatedly been forced to top up the trust fund, with $30 billion since 2008.¶ Other rich nations avoid
these problems. The cost of car ownership in Germany is 50% higher than it is in America, thanks to higher taxes on cars and petrol and higher
fees on drivers' licences. The result is a more sustainably funded transport system. In 2006 German road fees brought in 2.6 times the money
spent building and maintaining roads. American road taxes collected at the federal, state and local level covered just 72% of the money spent
on highways that year, according to the Brookings Institution, a think-tank.¶ The
federal government is responsible for only
a quarter of total transport spending, but the way it allocates funding shapes the way things are done
at the state and local levels. Unfortunately, it tends not to reward the prudent, thanks to formulas
that govern over 70% of federal investment. Petrol-tax revenues, for instance, are returned to the states according to the
miles of highway they contain, the distances their residents drive, and the fuel they burn. The system is awash with perverse incentives. A state
using road-pricing to limit travel and congestion would be punished for its efforts with reduced funding, whereas one that built highways it
could not afford to maintain would receive a larger allocation.¶ Formula-determined block grants to states are, at least, designed to leave
important decisions to local authorities. But the formulas used to allocate the money shape infrastructure planning in a remarkably blockheaded manner. Cost-benefit studies are almost entirely lacking. Federal guidelines for new construction tend to reflect politics rather than
anything else.
States tend to use federal money as a substitute for local spending, rather than to
supplement or leverage it. The Government Accountability Office estimates that substitution has risen substantially since the 1980s,
and increases particularly when states get into budget difficulties. From 1998 to 2002, a period during which economic fortunes were generally
deteriorating, state and local transport investment declined by 4% while federal investment rose by 40%. State
and local shrinkage is
almost certainly worse now.¶ States can make bad planners. Big metropolitan areas—Chicago, New York and
Washington among them—often sprawl across state lines. State governments frequently bicker over how (and how much) to invest. Facing
tight budget constraints, New Jersey's Republican governor, Chris Christie, recently scuttled a large project to expand the railway network into
New York City. New Jersey commuter trains share a 100-year-old tunnel with Amtrak, a major bottleneck. Mr Christie's decision was widely
criticised for short-sightedness; but New Jersey faced cost overruns that in a better system should have been shared with other potential
beneficiaries all along the north-eastern corridor. Regional planning could help to avoid problems like this.¶ Please, not again¶ What is to be
done?¶ The rehabilitation of America's transport network will be neither easy nor cheap. To
make the necessary repairs and
upgrades, America will need to spend a lot more. In a deficit-conscious environment, that will require
new revenue . The most straightforward first step would be a rise in fuel-tax rates, currently at 18.4 cents a gallon. But petrol-tax
increases are even more unpopular than deficits, and rises may prove riskier as oil prices increase.¶ Some in Washington
would rather take their cut further away from consumers. A tax on oil, rather than petrol, could be a little easier for consumers to stomach.
America's big oil producers signalled openness to a similar policy during negotiations over the ill-fated but bipartisan Kerry-Graham-Lieberman
climate bill. It could return as a means to fund infrastructure.¶ Economists press for direct user fees. An early Obama administration flirtation
with a tax on miles driven attracted little support, but some cities have run, or are thinking of running, pilot schemes. Congestion charges
present another possibility.
State governments have increasingly turned to tolls to fund individual projects,
but tolling inevitably meets stiff public resistance. Meanwhile, Manhattan's attempt to duplicate the congestion charges of
London and Stockholm failed to win the necessary political support, despite the offer of a generous federal subsidy in return for trying the
experiment. An earlier attempt to auction scarce landing and departure slots at New York's three large airports faced stiff resistance from
airlines and was ultimately killed.¶ Whatever
the source of new revenue, America's Byzantine funding system
will remain an obstacle to improved planning. Policymakers are looking for ways around these constraints. Supporters of a
National Infrastructure Bank—Mr Obama among them—believe it offers America just such a shortcut. A bank would use strict cost-benefit
analyses as a matter of course, and could make interstate investments easier. A European analogue, the European Investment Bank, has turned
out to work well. Co-owned by the member states of the European Union, the EIB holds some $300 billion in capital which it uses to provide
loans to deserving projects across the continent. EIB funding may provide up to half the cost for projects that satisfy EU objectives and are
judged cost-effective by a panel of experts.¶ American leaders hungrily eye the private money the EIB attracts, spying a potential solution to
their own fiscal dilemma. But there are no free lunches. To
keep project costs down, the bank must offer low rates,
which depend in turn upon low capital costs. That may be impossible without government backing , but
the spectacular failure of the two government-sponsored housing organisations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, illustrates the dangers of such
an arrangement. The EIB mitigates this problem by attempting to maximise public return rather than profit. To earn funding, projects must
meet developmental and environmental goals, along with other requirements. But giving the bank a public mission would invite congressional
oversight—and tempt legislators to meddle in funding decisions. The right balance of government support and independence may prove
elusive.¶ Budget crises could give a boost to public-private partnerships. Partnerships can be a useful way to screen out poorly conceived
projects that are unlikely to generate the promised returns. No private firm will bid to build and operate a project that will probably fail to cover
its costs through toll or fare revenue. Well-designed contracts can also improve incentives by giving the construction firm a long-run interest in
the project. Infrastructure projects built through public-private partnerships in Britain and Chile, where the arrangement is far more common
than in America, have sometimes, though not always, been completed more cheaply and quickly than public plans.¶
At the state and
local level transport budgets will remain tight while unemployment is high. With luck, this pressure
could spark a wave of innovative planning focused on improving the return on infrastructure
spending. The question in Washington, apart from how to escape the city on traffic-choked Friday afternoons, is whether political leaders
are capable of building on these ideas. The early signs are not encouraging.¶
Investments in efficient infrastructure reduce oil dependence
US Treasury 3/23/12
(US Department of the Treasury, 3/23/2012. “A New Economic Analysis of Infrastructure Investment: A
Report Prepared by the Department of the Treasury with the Council of Economic Advisors,”
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economicpolicy/Documents/20120323InfrastructureReport.pdf, p. 3, accessed 6/23/2012, BS)
A more efficient transportation infrastructure system will reduce our dependence on oil, saving
families time and money. Traffic congestion on our roads results in 1.9 billion gallons of gas wasted
per year, and costs drivers over $100 billion in wasted fuel and lost time. More efficient air traffic
control systems would save three billion gallons of jet fuel a year, translating into lower costs for
consumers. Finally, new research indicates that Americans who were able to live in “location efficient” housing were able to save $200 per
month in lower costs, including paying less at the pump, over the past decade.
There will be extinction in the status quo. Shifting away from oil dependence is key to
a sustainable human existence.
Beddor et al, Center for American Progress National Security Intern, ’09
(Christopher, Winny Chen is a Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress, Rudy deLeon is the
Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at Center for American Progress,
Shiyong Park is an intern with the National Security team at the Center for American Progress Action
Fund, Daniel J. Weiss is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Climate Strategy at American Progress,
Center for American Progress, August 2009, Center for American Progress, “Securing America’s Future:
Enhancing Our National Security by Reducing Oil Dependence and Environmental Damage,”
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_security.pdf, p. 16, accessed 6-29-12,
CNM)
For more than three decades the
United States has repeatedly erred on the side of inaction. Policymakers,
rather than pursuing long-term sustainable goals, were swayed by the prospect of immediate benefits or political
risks. And the public was too focused on falling prices at the pump after successive energy crises to
see the bigger picture of ever- escalating oil imports. We stand at a similar crossroads today, but this
time it is no longer a matter of financial inconvenience. It is a matter of national security, global
economy, and sustainable human existence.
Drug Cartels
Contention two is cartels
Cartels reliant on marijuana now- more profitable than any other alternative- gross
revenues give an incomplete picture
O’Rourke and Byrd 11 (Beto and Susannah Mississippi, El Paso form City rep and Representative,
“Dealing Death and Drugs: The Big Business of Dope in the U.S. and Mexico: an Argument for Ending the
Prohibition of Marijuana,” Cinco Puntos Press, 2011, pg 42)
The United States government is much more bullish about the revenues made by Mexican drug cartels, estimating that Mexican cartels bring
home between $15 billion to S30 billion annually from illicit drug sales.“ At one point, the
White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy estimated that more than 60 percent of the cartels’ revenue—$8.6 billion out of $13.8 billion in
2006—came from U.S. marijuana sales. They retracted those estimates in 2010, but continue to assert that
marijuana is the top revenue generator for Mexican drug cartels.“ Just looking at retail value or gross revenue
estimates, it's easy to assume cocaine is the most profitable business center in the Mexican cartel’s portfolio. But
gross revenues don’t give a fiill picture of profitability. A review of costs, market demand and risk is
important to assessing which drug brings the most value to the cartels. Marijuana has the largest
customer base with the most stable demand and steady prices. Cocaine prices, costs and demand are
more volatile. Marijuana is the cheapest drug to cultivate and produce while cocaine goes through an
expensive manufacturing process. The cartels pay about $23 to buy a pound of marijuana from a farmer in Mexico. It costs the
cartels about $4,000 to buy a pound of cocaine from the Colombians to import to the U.S. Cocaine also has a longer supply chain
through more international borders than marijuana, increasing the risks of seizures. While cocaine has
a higher retail value than marijuana, the markup for marijuana is higher. For example, a cartel can buy a pound of
marijuana for $23 in Mexico and sell it for $550 a pound in Chicago, or 23 times the initial investment. They could buy a pound of cocaine for
$4,000 from the Colombians and sell it for $32,000 a pound in Chicago, only eight times the initial investment.
The Mexican cartels
own the value of marijuana from farm to market. The cocaine market is not vertically integrated. The
Mexican cartels buy cocaine from producers in the Andes region, decreasing their share of the markup
in comparison to marijuana.
Mexico on the brink of becoming weak state- cartels poised to take control
Page 12 (James, MA Thesis in Political Science, Cal State Chico, “Mexican Drug Cartels and International
Theory: History With Solutions,” Thesis, https://csuchicodspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.4/522/12%203%202012%20James%20Page.pdf?sequence
=1 Fall 2012)
Currently, with
a failing economy and high levels of violence in different areas of the country, Mexico is
seeing a decreased interest in investments from other countries as well as a decreased ability to
compete with other nations like China and the Caribbean in terms of export production and foreign assembly plant creation.2 The
government in its current state is unable to support the Mexican people; however, a deal struck
between the government and the cartels could provide the tools needed to pick up the country’s
economy and restore some level of “faith” in government officials. Business for narcotic traffickers
will likely take a turn towards providing security benefits as the government will become ineffective in
enforcing narcotics laws and officials of the government will become “ wholly owned subsidiaries” of
the drug cartels . The situation in Mexico is quite similar to the situation in Somalia, except that the cartels have the ability to keep some
level of infrastructural control over the situation. It is a balancing act that the cartels want to have between a failed and a strong state of
Mexico. The failed state would be Somalia where really no faction has control and no means of an operation can be established. The strong
state would be the U.S. where people can call the police and expect them to show up and handle a situation, and the corruption of politicians is
still a scandal. A
weak state is where a narcotics operation can be established and if government officials
for some reason interfere, then a small bribe is enough to make the problem go away. Applying rationalchoice theory to the problem, this is how a self-motivated entity such as a drug cartel will want to act as it
maximizes its own benefits while minimizing its costs. Their power and the expansion of it is all that
matters, and the best way to expand that power is to maintain a level of calm control over the people
they are working among. The PRI had this level of agreement in place before, and if the cartels have their way, then this
is how the country will go back to operating . This is how democracy will fail in Mexico , and it is how
Mexico will slip into a lesser-state status; it will not be a failed state, but rather, a weak state. From
the outside, Mexico will look like a well-oiled and well-funded machine with state officials doing their
jobs. The country will look like a safe place for investors from around the world in which to invest and set up new
factories and franchises. Funding for different government projects will be available and civil society itself
will appear to be at an functioning. When examined more closely, however, the truth about where the
money and peace is coming from will be exposed. Behind the door deals will be where decisions
about government are being made, not at polling stations and voting booths. The charade of an
election between several candidates in several areas of government will occur, but no matter who is
elected, the outcome will be the same: the cartels will remain behind the scenes , pulling the puppet
strings of all elected officials to ensure that policy creation will continue to benefit them . Policy may vary
from state to state, as different cartels control different states, but in reality, the vote will no longer count for anything substantial.
This is what it means to fall into a weak-state status: the drug traffickers essentially take on the role of government in
many capacities and thus undermine the concept of democracy.
Minimizing profit windows key to eliminating cartels
Morris 13 (Evelyn Krache, International Security Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Think Again:
Mexican Drug Cartels,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels 12/3/13)
“We Need to Hit Them Where It Hurts: the Wallet." Exactly. Despite the ongoing arguments about drug legalization and
border security, the most effective way to combat the scourge of the DTOs would be to interdict not drugs or people but money. As in any
business, money is the fuel that keeps the cartels running. Even if Sinaloa, to give only one example, were to disappear
tomorrow, other organizations would quickly rise to take its slice of the lucrative pie. One of the most basic tenets of business is that highly
profitable markets attract lots of new entrants. This is true for legal and illegal enterprises alike. The staggering profits of illegal trade would be
much less attractive if the DTOs could not launder, deposit, and ultimately spend their money. But shutting down the cartels' financial
operations will be a formidable task, given the help they have had from multinational financial institutions, which have profited from the
cartels' large-dollar deposits. In 2010, Wachovia bank (which was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008) admitted that it had processed $378 billion
of currency exchanges in Mexico -- an amount equal to about one-third of the country's GDP -- to which it had failed to apply anti-laundering
restrictions. In 2012, British bank HSBC settled with the U.S. government for $1.9 billion to escape prosecution for, among other things,
laundering hundreds of millions of dollars for the Sinaloa cartel. U.S. law enforcement has also implicated Bank of America and Western Union
in DTO money laundering. Although illegal money transfers can happen without banks' knowledge, the volume and widespread occurrence of
these transactions indicate just how easy it is for the cartels to clean their dirty money. Paying a fine to avoid prosecution is almost no
punishment at all. The fines Wachovia paid amounted to less than 2 percent of its 2009 profit. Even the record fine assessed on HSBC
amounted to only 12 percent of the bank's profits. Furthermore, banks can simply accrue funds to offset any possible fines, either by increasing
what they charge cartels or by setting aside some of the earnings from laundering, even as they continue to do business with the DTOs.
Prosecuting bank employees involved in money laundering, up through the highest levels of an institution, would be a better tack. Pictures of a
chief compliance officer as he entered a courtroom for sentencing would have a far greater deterrent effect than any financial penalty. To that
end, investigative techniques and legal precedents for going after global criminal networks are increasingly robust, and the political payoffs
could be substantial. One
of the more successful campaigns in the war on terrorism has been the financial
one; experience gained in tracking the funds of al Qaeda could make it easier to similarly unravel Los
Zetas' financing. Malfeasance in the financial industry is nothing new, but public sensitivity to banks' wrongdoing is arguably higher than
it has been in decades. An enterprising prosecutor could make quite a reputation for herself by tracking DTO money through the financial
system. The
cartels, along with the violence and corruption they perpetrate, are threats to both Mexico
and the United States. The problem is a complicated one and taps areas of profound policy
disagreement. The way to make progress in combating the DTOs is to ignore issues like gun control
and illegal immigration and follow the money. Stanching the cartels' profits will do more to end the
bloodshed than any new fence or law.
Colorado and Washington were good first step- widespread legalization gut cartel
profits
Debusman 14 (Bernd Jr., MA international journalism, Drug War Chronicle “Marijuana Legalization
Will Hurt Mexican Cartels, But How Much?”
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2014/jan/15/marijuana_legalization_cartel_impact, 1/16/14)
On January 1, Colorado made history by becoming the first American state where marijuana can be purchased for recreational purposes, and in
which marijuana is regulated from the seed to the actual sale of product. As attitudes in America begin to shift in favor of outright legalization,
it increasingly seems possible that more states -- and eventually the entire country -- might follow. But
what does this mean south of the border, where Mexican cartels make enormous profits by trafficking this illegal commodity? Given the nature
of the illegal drug business, arriving at a precise figure is impossible. At times, the
Office of National Drug Policy has said that
as much as 60% of cartel profits come from the production and sale of marijuana. On the other hand, a 2010
RAND study estimated the percentage to be between 15 and 26 percent. More recently, research by the Mexican Institute of Competiveness
released in October 2012 suggests that if only Washington, Colorado and Oregon legalized marijuana, then cartel profits would fall as much as
30 percent. Another variable which must be taken into account when analyzing the impact of legalization on the cartels is the nature of the
organizations themselves. All of Mexico's criminal groups have a range of diverse business interests aside from marijuana, and most are
considered poly-drug organizations, which make huge profits from methamphetamine, cocaine and other drugs. Some cartels, including the
notorious Zetas, have gone beyond trafficking illicit goods and are now involved in prostitution, migrant smuggling, extortion, human
trafficking, counterfeiting and oil theft. On its own, legalization would not be able to bring an end to the activities of these groups, but -whatever the actual figure -- legalization would have a definite financial impact. By some accounts, legalization in Colorado
kept $5 million from the hands of criminals the first week, much of which, if the US government is to be believed, would have gone to Mexican
traffickers. The
most immediate effect in Mexico would likely be felt in areas heavily involved in
production, such as Michoacán or the "Golden Triangle" region that straddles Sinaloa, Durango and
Chihuahua. Parts of this region are completely dominated by the cartels, who pay farmers to grow marijuana (and
poppy, to a lesser extent). If the price of marijuana were to suddenly drop, the cartels that manage the
production in that area would experience a significant decline in profits. Mexican analyst Alejandro
Hope estimated that the Sinaloa Cartel stands to lose up to half of its profits from legalization in
Colorado, Oregon and Washington alone. Much of the power of cartels in Mexico stems from their ability
to corrupt local authorities and buy protection. Whatever the precise figure, any legislation that
disrupts the flow of money into cartel coffers benefits the Mexican government by allowing it to focus their
resources elsewhere.
Legalization puts cartel revenue in total jeopardy at every step of the supply chain
Sacco and Finklea 13 (Lisa, Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy, and Kristin, Acting Section
Research Manager and Specialist in Domestic Security, “State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives:
Implications for Federal Law Enforcement,” Congressional Research Service,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43164.pdf 9/9/13)
Marijuana proceeds are generated at many points along the supply chain, including production,
transportation, and distribution. Experts have debated which aspects of this chain—and the related proceeds—would be most
heavily impacted by marijuana legalization. In addition, the potential impact of marijuana legalization in 2 of the 50 U.S. states (complicated by
two separate legal frameworks and regulatory regimes) may be more difficult to model than the impact of federal marijuana legalization. For
instance, in evaluating the potential fiscal impact of the Washington and Colorado legalization initiatives on the profits of Mexican drug
trafficking organizations, the Organization of American States (OAS) has hypothesized that “[a]t the extreme, Mexican
drug trafficking
organizations could lose some 20 to 25 percent of their drug export income, and a smaller, though
difficult to estimate, percentage of their total revenues.”104 Other scholars have, in estimating the potential
financial impact of marijuana legalization, based their estimates on a hypothetical federal legalization of
marijuana. Under this scenario, small scale growers at the start of the marijuana production-toconsumption chain might be put out of business by professional farmers, a few dozen of which “could
produce enough marijuana to meet U.S. consumption at prices small-scale producers couldn’t possibly
match.”105 Large drug trafficking organizations generate a majority of their marijuana-related income
(which some estimates place at between $1.1 billion to $2.0 billion) from exporting the drug to the United States and
selling it to wholesalers on the U.S. side of the border.106 This revenue could be jeopardized if the
United States were to legalize the production and consumption of recreational marijuana.
Legal marijuana severely hampers cartel terrorism and violence- history proves
Beauchamp 14 (Zack, M.Sc International Relations, London School of Economics, “What Everyone
Should Know About Legal Pot and Terrorism,” ThinkProgress.org, project of the Center for American
Progress Action Fund, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2014/01/08/3122901/drugs-terrorism/ 1/8/14)
So if illict drug profits are helping terrorist groups slaughter innocent people, and counter-narcotics enforcement has eminently failed to solve
the problem, what can we do? Well, the logic linking drugs and terrorism depends crucially on drugs being illegal. If the drug trade didn’t take
place in the shadows, there would be no reason for farming to take place in failed states or for drug sellers to partner with terrorists for
distribution. “Opium poppy, marijuana, and even coca grow in a broad range of countries, not just those where production currently occurs,”
Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron writes. “If drugs were legal, production would be widely dispersed and have no particular overlap with
countries that harbor terrorists.” Miron’s simple argument is impossible to assess in the aggregate; each drug market has different connections
to terrorism, so the effect might be different depending on the substance. Instead, let’s instead pare down and focus
solely on
marijuana, the only drug whose legalization is possible in the United States in the near term . A 2010 RAND
Corporation study found that if legal American marijuana replaced Mexican imports , either through national legalization
or a national grey market birthed by state-level legalization, cartels would lose a full 20 percent of their drug income. A
recent revision of the RAND study by a Mexican think tank came to a slightly higher estimate, adding that
“losing
marijuana revenues could have a transformative impact on the Mexican drug trafficking
industry, over and beyond the direct potential reduction of marijuana export income.” Afghanistan, not often
discussed in marijuana legalization debates, might also see real gains. A 2009 U.N. Office of Drug Control (UNODC) report found that
Afghanistan produced a huge percentage of the world’s cannabis and the largest percentage of hashish (cannabis resin). The Afghan marijuana
trade, valued at $65 million in 2012, is “taxed by those who control the territory, providing an additional source of revenue for insurgents,”
according to UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa. There are some questions as to whether reducing drug revenue would actually
reduce terrorist violence. The RAND researchers, for instance, suggest Mexican cartel violence might actually increase in the short term as
gangs struggled over scarcer resources. However, the
best historical analogy RAND could uncover — the American
mafia post-prohibition — suggests the long-term reduction in violence could be enormous . Like
cartels, the mafia engaged in all sorts of profitable illegal enterprises beyond the illegal intoxicant
racket, the loss of alcohol revenue was seemingly devastating for the mafia. Homicides declined
rapidly after the repeal of prohibition; “plausibly,” RAND’s researchers write, “a large share of that
decline was accounted for by fewer killings in the bootlegging trade.” Piazza’s findings, published after RAND’s
paper, are also crucial here. His research suggests a direct correlation between drug profits and terrorist
violence; increases in the latter directly follow increases in the former (a point he solidified in a
follow-up study on opium in Afghanistan). That suggests each dollar in drug profit at least marginally
increases the ability of cartels and other terrorist organizations to do their nasty violence; soldiers and
car bombs don’t pay for themselves. Even though cartels and the Taliban don’t need marijuana profits to be violent, they’ll be
somewhat more limited in their ability to conduct violence without them.
Mexican stability is critical to U.S. power
Kaplan 12 – chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor
(Robert D., With the Focus on Syria, Mexico Burns, Stratfor, 3-282012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/focus-syria-mexico-burns)
While the foreign policy elite in Washington focuses on the 8,000 deaths in a conflict in Syria -- half a world away from the United States -- more than 47,000 people
have died in drug-related violence since 2006 in Mexico. A deeply troubled state as well as a demographic and economic giant on the United States' southern
border, Mexico
will affect America's destiny in coming decades more than any state or combination of states in the Middle East. Indeed, Mexico
may constitute the world's seventh-largest economy in the near future. Certainly, while the Mexican violence is largely criminal, Syria is a more clear-cut moral
issue, enhanced by its own strategic consequences. A calcified authoritarian regime in Damascus is stamping out dissent with guns and artillery barrages. Moreover,
regime change in Syria, which the rebels demand, could deliver a pivotal blow to Iranian influence in the Middle East, an event that would be the best news to U.S.
interests in the region in years or even decades. Nevertheless, the Syrian rebels are divided and hold no territory, and the toppling of pro-Iranian dictator Bashar al
Assad might conceivably bring to power an austere Sunni regime equally averse to U.S. interests -- if not lead to sectarian chaos. In other words, all military
intervention scenarios in Syria are fraught with extreme risk. Precisely for that reason, that the U.S. foreign policy elite has continued for months to feverishly
debate Syria, and in many cases advocate armed intervention, while utterly ignoring the vaster panorama of violence next door in Mexico, speaks volumes about
Washington's own obsessions and interests, which are not always aligned with the country's geopolitical interests. Syria matters and matters momentously to U.S.
interests, but Mexico ultimately matters more, so one would think that there would be at least some degree of parity in the amount written on these subjects. I am
not demanding a switch in news coverage from one country to the other, just a bit more balance. Of course, it is easy for pundits to have a fervently interventionist
view on Syria precisely because it is so far away, whereas miscalculation in Mexico on America's part would carry far greater consequences. For example, what
the Mexican
if
drug cartels took revenge on San Diego? Thus, one might even argue that the very noise in the media about Syria, coupled
with the relative silence about Mexico, is proof that it is the latter issue that actually is too sensitive for loose talk. It may also be that cartel-wracked Mexico -- at
some rude subconscious level -- connotes for East Coast elites a south of the border, 7-Eleven store culture, reminiscent of the crime movie "Traffic," that holds no
allure to people focused on ancient civilizations across the ocean. The concerns of Europe and the Middle East certainly seem closer to New York and Washington
than does the southwestern United States. Indeed, Latin American bureaus and studies departments simply lack the cachet of Middle East and Asian ones in
government and universities. Yet, the fate
of Mexico is the hinge on which the United States' cultural and
demographic future rests. U.S. foreign policy emanates from the domestic condition of its society, and
nothing will affect its society more than the dramatic movement of Latin history northward. By 2050, as much as a third of the American population could be
Hispanic. Mexico and Central America constitute a growing demographic and economic powerhouse with which the United States has an inextricable relationship.
In recent years Mexico's economic growth has outpaced that of its northern neighbor. Mexico's population of 111 million plus Central America's of more than 40
million equates to half the population of the United States. Because of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 85 percent of Mexico's exports go to the United
States, even as half of Central America's trade is with the United States. While the median age of Americans is nearly 37, demonstrating the aging tendency of the
U.S. population, the median age in Mexico is 25, and in Central America it is much lower (20 in Guatemala and Honduras, for example). In part because of young
workers moving northward, the destiny of the United States could be north-south, rather than the east-west, sea-to-shining-sea of continental and patriotic myth.
(This will be amplified by the scheduled 2014 widening of the Panama Canal, which will open the Greater Caribbean Basin to megaships from East Asia, leading to
the further development of Gulf of Mexico port cities in the United States, from Texas to Florida.) Since 1940, Mexico's population has increased more than fivefold. Between 1970 and 1995 it nearly doubled. Between 1985 and 2000 it rose by more than a third. Mexico's population is now more than a third that of the
United States and growing at a faster rate. And it is northern Mexico that is crucial. That most of the drug-related homicides in this current wave of violence that so
much dwarfs Syria's have occurred in only six of Mexico's 32 states, mostly in the north, is a key indicator of how northern Mexico is being distinguished from the
rest of the country (though the violence in the city of Veracruz and the regions of Michoacan and Guerrero is also notable). If the military-led offensive to crush the
drug cartels launched by conservative President Felipe Calderon falters, as it seems to be doing, and Mexico City goes back to cutting deals with the cartels, then the
capital may in a functional sense lose even further control of the north, with concrete implications for the southwestern United States. One might argue that with
massive border controls, a functional and vibrantly nationalist United States can coexist with a dysfunctional and somewhat chaotic northern Mexico. But that is
mainly true in the short run. Looking deeper into the 21st century, as Arnold Toynbee notes in A Study of History (1946), a border
between a highly
developed society and a less highly developed one will not attain an equilibrium but will advance in the
more backward society's favor. Thus, helping to stabilize Mexico -- as limited as the United States' options may be, given the
complexity and sensitivity of the relationship -- is a more urgent national interest than stabilizing societies in the Greater Middle East. If Mexico ever
does reach coherent First World status, then it will become less of a threat, and the healthy melding of the two societies will quicken to the benefit of both. Today,
helping to thwart drug cartels in rugged and remote terrain in the vicinity of the Mexican frontier and reaching southward from Ciudad
Juarez (across the border from El Paso, Texas) means a limited role for the U.S. military and other agencies -- working, of course,
in full cooperation with the Mexican authorities. (Predator and Global Hawk drones fly deep over Mexico searching for drug production facilities.) But
the legal framework for cooperation with Mexico remains problematic in some cases because of strict interpretation of 19th century posse comitatus laws on the
U.S. side. While the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to affect historical outcomes in Eurasia, its leaders and foreign policy mandarins are
somewhat passive about what is happening to a country with which the United States shares a long land border, that verges on partial chaos in some of its northern
sections, and whose population is close to double that of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Mexico, in addition to the obvious challenge of China as a rising great
power, will help write the American story in the 21st century. Mexico
will partly determine what kind of society America will become,
and what exactly will be its demographic and geographic character, especially in the Southwest. The U.S. relationship with China will matter more than any other
individual bilateral relationship in terms of determining the United States' place in the world, especially in the economically crucial Pacific. If policymakers in
Washington calculate U.S. interests properly regarding those two critical countries, then the United States will have power to spare so that its elites can continue to
focus on serious moral questions in places that matter less.
Loss of hegemony causes global instability
Kagan 12, Senior Fellow at Brookings (Robert, 3/14/12 “America has made the world freer, safer and
wealthier” CNN,http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-americamade/index.html?hpt=hp_c1)
We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the
unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war
among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries
prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people
have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior
centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war.
This is the world
America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if
America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not
look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline.
But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world
order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades,
the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance
would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad.
If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more
autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising
powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the
golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party.
Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end
up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of
wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally,
what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that
American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems
have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not
constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th
century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great
powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The
era of American
predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who
holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of
human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international
institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of
government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there
was nothing inevitable about the
world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It
is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market
principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that
supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long
as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If
and when American power declines, the
institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether
as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the
United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to
American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like
right before the American order came into being.
Prohibition leads to the use of harder drugs – non-uniques their cartel shift and public
health arguments
PETER J.
BOETTKE et. al – 2013. (Professor of Economics and Philosophy, George Mason University; Ph.D., Economics, George
Mason University; CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE, Professor of Economics, George Mason University; Ph.D., Economics, George Mason University; and
ABIGAIL R. HALL, Mercatus Ph.D. Fellow and Ph.D. student at George Mason University, Oregon Law Review, “Keep off the Grass: The
Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy,” 2013, Accessed via LexisNexis on 7/29/2014) \
The first unintended consequence of prohibition is that individuals are more likely to consume
poisonous substances and overdose with the increase in drug prices. As the price of a given drug rises,
it creates additional profit opportunities for those willing to enter the drug trade. Since the drug
market is illegal, and therefore, conducted underground, quality control is reduced compared to
"above ground" markets. Drug users have few means available to determine which drugs are "pure"
and have no recourse should they purchase a substance of inferior quality. Further, the underground
market allows for less information sharing about products and vendors because transactions take
place secretly to avoid authorities. Consequently, more poor-quality drug products enter the market,
which leads to a greater potential for poisoning and overdose.¶ The greater prevalence of poor-quality drugs is not the
sole mechanism through which overdoses increase. The illegality of drug use generates unintended "potency
effects," which affect both the supply and demand sides of the drug market. On the supply side, prohibition results in
drug dealers carrying and selling more potent drugs. Because drug laws increase the risk of selling low potency drugs,
suppliers tend to substitute toward higher potency drugs. For example, under prohibition, suppliers prefer to transport
cocaine, as compared to marijuana, because cocaine is more potent and therefore more valuable per
unit.¶ On the demand side, drug prices are driven up by prohibition, which causes drug users to seek
"more bang for their buck." That is, since the overall cost of obtaining drugs is higher, more potent
drugs are relatively cheaper than "weak" drugs. Because drug users must act illegally to obtain drugs,
they seek to maximize the satisfaction or "high" from each dollar spent. This dynamic manifests itself in [*1079]
several ways. Drug users may switch from lower potency to higher potency within a given drug (for example, from marijuana with lower levels
of THC to marijuana with higher levels of THC). Alternatively, drug
users may switch from substances like marijuana to
"harder" drugs like cocaine and heroin. Finally, drug users may employ more intense methods of drug
use, such as injection.¶ Taking both sides of the market together, prohibition leads to a greater use of more potent
substances, which increases the likelihood of overdose and drug-related death. Indeed, these effects
may be seen in the rate of unintended overdose deaths in the United States. In 1971, two years before the
creation of the DEA and the year President Nixon declared drugs to be a public menace, just over one death per 100,000
deaths was due to an overdose. n53 By the year 2007, over 27,500 people died as a result of a drug overdose, which translates to almost ten
per 100,000 deaths. n54 Between 1990
and 2007 alone, overdose rates increased five-fold. n55 The most
common sources of overdose deaths are higher potency drugs – mainly cocaine, heroin, and opioid
painkillers. n56
Plan Text
Thus the plan, the United States should legalize nearly all marihuana by removing it as
a Schedule 1 Drug from the federal Controlled Substances Act and by creating a
regulatory tax regime.
Solvency
Legalizing marihuana by rescheduling, regulating and taxing solves.
CMA 11 (California Medical Association, Cannabis and the Regulatory Void: Background Paper and Recommendations, 2011,
http://www.cmanet.org/files/pdf/news/cma-cannabis-tac-white-paper-101411.pdf, da 7-31-14) PC
Policy Recommendations¶ Cannabis is currently not sufficiently regulated. In order to allow for a
robust ¶ regulatory scheme to be developed, cannabis must be moved out of its current Schedule ¶ I
status within the DEA‟s official schedule of substances. Rescheduling cannabis will ¶ allow for further clinical
research to determine the utility and risks of cannabis, which ¶ will then shape the national regulatory
structure for this substance.¶ CMA policy has acknowledged the criminalization of cannabis to be a failed public ¶ health policy (HOD 704a09) and has recognized a public movement toward the ¶ legalization of cannabis (HOD 101a-10). Cannabis illegality has
perpetuated the ¶ effective prohibition of clinical research on the properties of cannabis and has
prevented ¶ the development of state and national standards governing the cultivation, ¶ manufacture,
and labeling of cannabis products, similar to those governing food, ¶ tobacco and alcohol products, most
of which are promulgated by federal agencies. ¶ So what shifts in public policy could protect public health and benefit personal health? ¶ In
order to fully evaluate and regulate cannabis, it should be legalized and ¶ decriminalized.¶ Solutions¶
Sustain
physicians as “gatekeepers” until a proper gate is built: CMA believes that the ¶ physician role as “gatekeeper” should be sustained, under
Council on Scientific and ¶ Clinical Affairs (CSA) guidelines, until such time as the legal and regulatory ¶ environment has changed from one in
which medicinal cannabis is decriminalized at ¶ the state level but illegal at the federal level to a desired environment in which cannabis ¶ use is
legalized and regulated at both the state and federal levels. ¶
Reschedule cannabis : The federal Controlled Substances
Act classifies cannabis as a ¶ Schedule I controlled substance, therefore preventing prescriptions from
being written ¶ for the substance and subjecting it to production quotas by the Drug Enforcement¶ Agency
(DEA). These production quotas make it extremely difficult to acquire cannabis ¶ for clinical research purposes,
thus contributing to the lack of data currently available ¶ about cannabis. As of 2010, CMA supports the rescheduling of
cannabis to facilitate ¶ further clinical research (HOD 102a-10). This clinical research should be targeted at ¶ determining the safety and efficacy
of cannabis and its constituent active chemicals.¶ Three
options exist for rescheduling cannabis and supporting further
research:¶ 1. Move cannabis to an appropriate scientific schedule within the current DEA ¶ scheduling
structure;¶ 2. Place cannabis on its own schedule with parameters unique from other ¶ enumerated
schedules;¶ 3. Support the development of local cannabis regulations as an interim ¶ alternative
pending federal action.¶ The route to challenging cannabis‟s status as a Schedule I controlled substance is by ¶ filing a rule-making
petition with the DEA Administrator. The Administrator has the ¶ authority to reschedule substances by considering the “scientific evidence of
[the ¶ substance‟s] pharmacological effect, if known” and “the state of current scientific ¶ knowledge regarding the [substance].”33¶ Because
the DEA has historically denied petitions to reschedule cannabis, CMA should¶ encourage the formation of a national coalition between state
medical societies, medical ¶ specialty societies, and other relevant groups for the purpose of building support for ¶ cannabis rescheduling. The
national movement whereby 16 states and the District of ¶ Columbia have decriminalized the use of medical cannabis should serve as a model
for ¶ building this coalition. With strength in numbers and the power to place the necessary ¶ political pressure on the DEA, this coalition should
consider jointly petitioning the DEA ¶ to reschedule cannabis.¶ Regulate
medical cannabis: Rescheduling medical
cannabis to allow for further clinical ¶ research is the acceptable avenue for providing an opportunity
to formulate a workable, ¶ evidence-based federal and state regulatory structure that protects public
health and ¶ safety. By allowing adequate research to determine the utility, safety and efficacy of ¶
cannabis as well as the necessary controls for the substance‟s production, distribution, ¶ taxation, etc.,
cannabis regulation is able to mirror that of other prescribed medications. ¶ The appropriate regulatory bodies
can use funds collected through a cannabis tax to ¶ enforce violation of the implemented standards. The regulation of cannabis should ¶
address several broad areas, including:¶ Research: As with any drug or pharmaceutical product, the properties of ¶ cannabis should be
thoroughly studied through clinical research to determine ¶ utility, safety, and efficacy for potential medicinal uses. The outcome of this ¶ ¶ 33
21 U.S.C. §811(c)(2), (3), 1994.annabis and the Regulatory Void¶ 13¶ clinical research should be used to determine an appropriate regulatory ¶
framework for cannabis control.¶ Production & Distribution: Production
of cannabis should be held accountable ¶ to
quality control measures and standardization. All vendors should be licensed ¶ and distribution of
cannabis should include restrictions on purchase and use to ¶ all minors. All cannabis supply should be
subject to purity, concentration and ¶ product labeling standards. Labeling standards should include
warning labels,¶ similar to those on tobacco and alcohol products. Pending federal regulation of ¶ cannabis, local regulatory
structures should be implemented in order to control ¶ the production and supply of cannabis.¶ Public
Safety: Workplace safety should remain a priority, with the enactment of¶ prohibitions against workplace intoxication, similar to the treatment
of alcohol ¶ use. Also, regulations
surrounding driving safety and zero-tolerance for school ¶ possession
should be implemented.¶ Advertising: Public advertisement of cannabis should be subject to time and ¶
place provisions, similar to tobacco and alcohol, with sanctions including loss of ¶ licensure for those entities that violate this
provision.¶ Reporting: An outcomes reporting system is needed to track beneficial and ¶ adverse effects of cannabis in real-time.¶
Regulate
recreational cannabis : Consider permissive federal authority for states to ¶ regulate this more widely
used cannabis for purity (strength) and safety ¶ (contaminations) with current, education and research on
outcomes of such policy. ¶ These actions would mirror alcohol and tobacco control. While an unlikely political
act ¶ nationally at this time, Colorado is already attempting this without federal authority. ¶ Growing local discontent with federal non-actions
coupled with increasing violence¶ among cannabis dealers (“cartels”) in Mexico could help leverage this action. CMA ¶ should authorize
responsible collaboration with groups which support such state level ¶ action.¶
Tax cannabis : A tax should be levied on
cannabis as a means of collecting funds ¶ dedicated to regulation, enforcement and education.¶ Facilitate
dissemination of the benefits and risks of cannabis use as determined by clinical ¶ research: The outcomes of clinical cannabis research should
be publicly shared so as to ¶ educate the public.¶
Support educational efforts : Various educational campaigns
targeting different ¶ demographics are needed. These educational activities can be funded through an¶
earmarked portion of the cannabis tax. The goal of these educational campaigns should ¶ be to reduce
cannabis use among children, adolescents, and young adults. Separate ¶ campaigns should be launched targeting the public,
physicians, and medical students. 20¶ Within the general public demographic, smaller targeted campaigns will educate ¶ specific cohorts such
as youth, adults, and law enforcement officials.¶
Refer for national action : National advocacy is essential to
promoting the adoption of ¶ consistent, effective regulations at the federal level. Without a national
solution, a ¶ patchwork of state-by-state decriminalization efforts will persist, thus exposing ¶ physicians
and members of the public to liability and federal criminal sanctions.¶ White paper dissemination: This white paper
shall be distributed to interested CMA ¶ members, component medical societies, specialty societies, and other interested ¶ organizations.
State Budgets
2AC – Lack of Revenue Now XT
Lack of state revenues threatens state funding now – most recent data proves.
Johnson and Lechman 2013 [Johnson, Nicholas and Lechman, Michael, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, “Four Big Threats to State Finances Could Undermine Future U.S. Prosperity”, 2/14/13,
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-14-13sfp.pdf, accessed 7/31/14]
Without adequate revenues, states and localities cannot continue providing public services like
education, health care, and infrastructure that lay the groundwork for a prosperous future. But state
revenue systems face four serious challenges.¶ 22 The most severe recession in seven decades blasted holes in state budgets
from which they have yet to recover. The recession of 2007-09 sharply reduced state revenues, causing budget
shortfalls totaling well over half a trillion dollars. Revenues have improved lately but remain about 6 percent below where
they were five years ago, even as the number of people needing state services has grown. In addition, states need to replenish
reserve funds diminished in the recession, such as “rainy day” budget reserves, pension funds for
state workers, and unemployment trust funds. These factors make it very hard for states to reverse
past budget cuts — let alone exploit new opportunities for cost-effective investments in areas like early education, job training, and new
business incubation.¶ 22 States’ antiquated tax systems are ill-suited to raising adequate revenue in a 21st
century economy. States have not modernized their tax systems to keep pace with trends such the
growth of the service sector and of e-commerce. Nearly half of total household purchases go for services, for example, yet
only a few states apply their sales taxes to a broad array of services. States’ failure to update their tax systems will take a
growing toll on revenues and hence on their ability to finance the rising need for state-funded services
in areas like education and health care.¶ 22 The federal government, which provides about one-quarter of state and local
revenues, is on track to make deep spending cuts that could hit states hard. The 2011 Budget Control Act has already caused cuts in grant
programs to states and will push federal funding for a wide range of state and local services — schools, water treatment, law enforcement, and
other areas — to its lowest level in four decades as a share of the economy.2 Additional, automatic cuts (“sequestration”) are
scheduled to begin in March, causing over $6 billion in additional cuts in aid to states this year . Those
are just the budget cuts that are already scheduled to occur (even though specific individual cuts have not been
determined); there is substantial risk that future deficit-reduction legislation could impose still more cuts,
especially if that legislation doesn’t include substantial revenues.¶ 22 Some state policymakers are pushing for large
tax cuts that would further undermine state revenues, with potentially dramatic consequences for public services. In five states
governors and/or leading legislators have proposed complete repeal of the state income tax, which
typically provides one-third to one-half of all state revenues. (No state other than oil-rich Alaska in the 1970s has ever
repealed its income tax.) Less radical but still harmful tax cuts are on the table in a number of other states, as
are rigid limitations on state budgeting.¶ States and localities educate the nation’s children and build and repair its roads,
bridges, airports, and public transit systems. They provide public safety, help the homeless, protect waterways from sewage contamination,
provide job training, and much more. Many of these services are essential for the nation’s long-term economic growth. If states can’t
perform them adequately, the country’s long-term economic potential could diminish, and poverty
and inequality could be more severe than they otherwise would be.¶ Some states likely will rise to the above
challenges, protecting their schools, transportation networks, and other public services and modernizing their revenue systems for the long
term. Some
other states likely won’t meet the challenge, choosing instead to accept depressed
revenues and decaying public services as the “new normal.” The country’s future prosperity depends
to a significant degree on the number of states that choose the first, more fruitful path.
Essential services are being cut now due to lack of state revenue.
Pfingst 2012 [Pfingst, Lori, Washington State Budget and Policy Center, “WOMEN, WORK, and
WASHINGTON’S ECONOMY How State Budget Cuts are Hurting All Three”, 2/2/12,
http://budgetandpolicy.org/reports/women-work-and-washingtons-economy/pdf_version, accessed
7/31/14]
Few of us have escaped the pain of the Great Recession, but the downturn has had an especially severe impact on women in our state. Of
the $10 billion in state spending cuts already made, 93 percent have targeted education, health, and
human services – areas that disproportionally employ and serve women. This is taking a major toll on
the economic well-being, health, and safety of women and their families:¶ Fewer jobs for women and persistent
overall unemployment. Over half of public service jobs are in education, health, and social services, where women make up nearly threequarters (72 percent) of the workforce. Cuts in these areas have forced a large number of women out of work, contributing to stubbornly high
unemployment overall. Women’s
economic disadvantages prior to the recession made them more
vulnerable to cuts. Women are at greater risk for poverty than men due to their large numbers in
lower-paying fields and under-representation in higher-paying jobs; greater likelihood of working part-time;
earnings that are lower, on average, than men’s; and their role as primary caregivers for children, which affects whether and how much they
can work. Cuts
to work supports especially jeopardize women’s ability to work and meet their families’
basic needs. Time limits have cut 23,000 Washingtonians off from resources that support work and
keep them engaged with the economy. Over 27,000 fewer families are receiving assistance to help them afford child care so
they can work. After recent cuts, cash assistance provides just 27 percent of the resources families need to meet basic needs.¶ Cuts to
reproductive health programs threaten maternal and child health.
In 36 of 39 counties in Washington state, use of
Maternity Support Services, a program proven to promote healthier pregnancies and safer births, has
declined. Forty-nine family planning agencies have lost funding, resulting in 46,000 fewer women
receiving critical reproductive health services.¶ Less help for survivors of domestic violence and sexual assault as need is
rising. The Governor has proposed cuts to assistance for victims of violence just as two alarming trends appear to be on the rise in Washington
– more women are seeking help for domestic violence and sexual assault, and are increasingly requesting help with finding shelter, feeding
their children and other economic hardships. ¶ We
need a state economy and budget that works for all Washingtonians.
Given the important contributions women make to family economic security, child well-being, and the
education and health of our population, it is essential that policymakers consider their needs to
ensure a fair and just recovery. As the state grapples with an additional $1.5 billion shortfall this
legislative session, it is critical that we raise revenue, asking for more from those who can best afford it, to prevent
cuts that would further threaten not just the well-being of women, but all of us.
Massive state budget deficits now – lack of revenue.
Johnson et al, ’11 [Nicholas (Vice President for State Fiscal Policy at the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities); Phill Oliff (Staff at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities); and Erica Williams (Staff at the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities), “An Update on State Budget Cuts: At Least 46 States Have
Imposed Cuts That Hurt Vulnerable Residents and the Economy”, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
2-9-11, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=1214, RSR]
With tax revenue still declining as a result of the recession and budget reserves largely drained, the
vast majority of states have made spending cuts that hurt families and reduce necessary services .
These cuts, in turn, have deepened states’ economic problems because families and businesses have
less to spend. Federal recovery act dollars and funds raised from tax increases have greatly reduced the extent, severity, and economic
impact of these cuts, but only to a point. And federal
aid to states is slated to expire well before state revenues
have recovered . The cuts enacted in at least 46 states plus the District of Columbia since 2008 have occurred in all major areas of state
services, including health care (31 states), services to the elderly and disabled (29 states and the District of Columbia), K-12 education (34 states
and the District of Columbia), higher education (43 states), and other areas. States
made these cuts because revenues from
income taxes, sales taxes, and other revenue sources used to pay for these services declined due to
the recession. At the same time, the need for these services did not decline and, in fact, rose as the number
of families facing economic difficulties increased. These budget pressures have not abated . Because
unemployment rates remain high — and are projected to stay high well into next year — revenues
are likely to remain at or
near their current depressed levels. This has caused a new round of cuts. Based on gloomy revenue
projections, legislatures and governors have enacted budgets for the 2011 fiscal year (which began on
July 1, 2010 in most states). In many states these budgets contain cuts that go even further than those
enacted over the past two fiscal years. Cuts to state services not only harm vulnerable residents but
also worsen the recession — and dampen the recovery — by reducing overall economic activity .
When states cut spending, they lay off employees, cancel contracts with vendors, reduce payments to
businesses and nonprofits that provide services, and cut benefit payments to individuals . All of these
steps remove demand from the economy. For instance, at least 44 states and the District of Columbia have reduced overall
wages paid to state workers by laying off workers, requiring them to take unpaid leave (furloughs), freezing new hires, or similar actions.
State and local governments have eliminated over 400,000 jobs since August 2008, federal data show .
Such measures are reducing not only the level and quality of services available to state residents but also the purchasing power of workers’
families, which in turn affects local businesses and slows recovery. States are taking actions to mitigate the extent of these cuts. Since the
recession began, over 30 states have addressed their budget shortfalls in part by increasing taxes. Like budget cuts, tax increases remove
demand from the economy by reducing the amount of money people have to spend. But tax increases can be less detrimental to state
economies than budget cuts because some of the tax increases affect upper-income households, so are likely to result in reduced saving rather
than reduced consumption. Many
more states will need to consider tax increases or other revenue measures,
as well as such steps as tapping remaining state rainy day funds, as a way to minimize harmful budget
cuts. The cuts thus far in state-funded services — and the resulting harm to families’ well-being and to state economies — would have been
much greater without federal assistance. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided roughly $140 billion over two and a half years
in the form of enhanced Medicaid funding and funding to pay for education, public safety and other services. In addition, H.R. 1586 — the
August 2010 jobs bill — extended enhanced Medicaid funding through June 2011 and added $10 billion in additional
2AC – Legalization Provides Revenue XT
Legalization would increase federal and state revenue- multiple scenarios of taxation
all prove a profit
Patton 10 (Michelle, Ross-Blakeley Law Library- Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, 15 Berkeley J.Crim.
L.197, “Legalization of Marijuana: A Dead-End or the High Road to Fiscal Solvency”
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/bjcl15&div=7&g_sent=1&collection=journals#19
7 pages 191-197 accessed 7/29/14 KR)
B. Revenue Sources¶ 1. Taxes and Fees¶ If
any of the initiatives passes, local and state governments would be
able¶ to generate much-needed revenue through various taxes and fees. As with any¶ other legal industry, the
marijuana industry would be subject to sale, income,¶ and business taxes. It is likely that the
marijuana industry would be treated¶ similarly to the alcohol and tobacco industries and thus face
additional taxes¶ and fees, such as excise taxes, licensing and permit fees for the sale of¶ marijuana,
and penalties for violations of the proposed law and accompanying¶ regulations. This section will evaluate each
of the taxes that may be imposed under the proposals and calculate the likely and/or minimum revenue¶ from those taxes.¶ The actual revenue
derived from these taxes and fees would depend on the¶ extent to which the federal government impedes legalization, the level of¶
consumption and retail value of marijuana, and the actual tax and fee rates.¶ Since the level of enforcement of the federal prohibition is
unknown, for the¶ purposes of this Article it is assumed that the federal prohibition will have no¶ effect on the revenue produced through
legalization of marijuana. Wherever¶ else there is uncertainty over values, this Article will err on the side of¶ underestimating the likely
revenue.¶ In order to determine the likely consumption level and retail value under¶ legalization, both the current figures and likely effect of
legalization must be¶ considered. In
2006, California produced so million pounds of marijuana.¶ Most of that
marijuana was exported to other states, but Californians still¶ consumed an estimated 1 million
pounds of marijuana. Based on a 2001-¶ 2005 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), the estimated retail¶ value
for a pound of marijuana is $2,783.With a market size of one million¶ pounds, the current retail value
of the Califomia’s marijuana industry is $2.783¶ billion. There is some agreement about the effect that legalization will
have on the¶ consumption and price of marijuana. The analyses of Harvard Senior Lecturer¶ Jeffrey Miron and the BOE are the most current, indepth, and well-respected¶ And as a result will be used to guide the analysis in this Article. ¶ Miron
estimated that legalization
will cause a decrease in expenditure of¶ no more than 25%. He began his analysis by assuming that
legalization will¶ not cause a change in demand for marijuana, in order to understate potential tax¶
revenue. The rationale for this assumption was that any increase would¶ come from casual users
whose use would be modest and that modest increase¶ would likely be offset by a decrease in alcohol
and/or tobacco revenue.¶ Based on a comparison to marijuana prices in the Netherlands, he predicted that¶ legalization
will cause a decline in price that is unlikely to exceed so%. He¶ also determined that the price elasticity of demand is
between -0.5 and -1,¶ resulting in an increase in consumption of 50% to 100% and a decrease of 0%¶ to 25% in the total expenditure on
marijuana in California. In
order to¶ understate potential revenue, Miron predicted a 25% decrease in¶
expenditure. Using Miron’s expenditure estimate, alter legalization,¶ California’s marijuana industry
would have a $2.09 billion retail value.¶ The Board of Equalization (BOE) analyzed Assembly Bill 390's¶
legalization scheme and produced more nuanced estimates. They predict that¶ legalization will result
in a 50% decline in retail price, again reducing the retail¶ price index to $1,391 .5 per pound.This
decline would increase consumption¶ by 40%. This increased consumption would increase the current
estimated¶ usage to 1.4 million pounds a year and raise the annual retail value to $1.948¶ billion.
However. the BOE then found that a $50 per ounce tax would reduce¶ Consumption by 11%, to 1.246
million pounds per year and $2.793l billion¶ retail value.¶ These calculations and estimates are summarized in Table 1.
The current,¶ non-legalized price per pound of marijuana, estimated consumption in¶ California and California’s marijuana market retail value
are provided in the¶ second column. The three columns on the right represent the estimated price¶ per pound, market size, and retail value
after legalization. The figures based on¶ Miron's predictions are in the first of these three columns. The BOE estimates,¶ potential tax revenue
both with and without the $50 excise tax, are provided in the last two columns.¶ California currently imposes a statewide sales tax on the retail
sale of¶ tangible personal property. Retail
sales of marijuana, regardless of the¶ legality of those sales under
state or federal law, would be subject to sales¶ tax. The current sales tax rate is 8.25%. That rate is
composed of a 6%¶ tax funding the state General Fund, 0.25% tax funding the Fiscal Recovery¶ Fund,
and 2% tax funding local government activities.” At that rate, a sales¶ tax on marijuana would produce
between $133.039 million dollars and¶ $172.178 million dollars, depending on whether Miron or BOE
estimated retail¶ sales are used and whether there was an excise tax imposed.¶ Local governments are also
permitted to impose up to an additional 1.0%¶ sales tax on sales within their jurisdiction. There is no information available¶ as to the
breakdown of consumption by city or county, so at this time it is¶ impossible to determine the revenue this would actually derive for each
county.¶ However, if
all jurisdictions enacted a 1.0% sales tax, this would generate for¶ local governments
between $17338 million and $20.87 million.¶ Using the estimated market retail values, above, Table 2 breaks down the¶
estimated revenue derived from sales tax by its component tax. The minimum¶ sales tax based on the 8.25% that all jurisdictions impose is
totaled. as is the¶ total potential sales tax if all local jurisdictions imposed the optional 1.0% sales¶ tax. California also imposes an 8.84% tax on
corporations and a progressive¶ income tax of up to 9.55%. Without knowing the profit levels and scale of¶ each individual’s or corporation’s
operations, it is impossible to calculate a¶ reliable estimate of the revenue that these would generate. Current
profit levels¶ are not
comparable because of the differences in the market structure between a¶ legal and illegal industry.
Despite this uncertainty, it is not unreasonable to¶ predict that these taxes would generate significant
revenue, into the millions of¶ dollars.¶ There are additional taxes and fees that could be imposed on the¶ marijuana industry. The
fees could be based on penalties for violating the act¶ and accompanying regulations and/or from any required licenses and permits¶ required
to cultivate, transport, sell or use marijuana.¶ The various initiatives all include different combinations of taxes and fees. For instance, the
TRCCA authorizes taxation of cultivation, sale and¶ other marijuana business-related activities at a rate no lower than $50 an ounce,¶ although
marijuana growers could offset the tax with subsidies for¶ environmentally friendly production activities. Since these taxes calculated¶ above
would not equal $50 an ounce, the legislature would have to impose¶ additional taxes and fees, likely in the form of a $50 excise lax?“ It also¶
explicitly authorizes the state and local governments to create a system issuing¶ licenses and permits and collecting fees. 9¶ The RCTCA has a
more complicated taxation scheme. All marijuana-¶ related activities would still be subject to the same sale, income, property and¶ business
taxes, fees and fines as any other similarly situated business under¶ state and local laws?“ However, the local governments would be the ones¶
authorized to impose additional taxes and fees, such as excise taxes, targeted at¶ marijuana-related activities. As a result, taxation levels likely
will vary from¶ city to city and county to county. This could result in a $50 excise tax in some¶ areas, but it could also create competition which
would drive down the tax¶ rates.¶ The CS is the broadest sweeping initiative in its authorization. It permits¶ all levels of government, including
federal, to tax the manufacture, sale and use¶ of marijuana. It recommends following the example of the alcohol and¶ tobacco industries, both
of which impose excise taxes. ¶ All of these acts authorize regulation of the industry, which would include¶ licenses and permits and the
accompanying fees?“ This
potential revenue¶ would likely offset most of the administrative costs involved in
regulating the¶ industry, similar to how the MMP fees and alcohol licensing fees offset the cost¶ of
those programs. For instance, liquor-licensing fees cover $51 .508 million¶ Of the ABC's $53395 million budget. ¶ There would also
be revenue derived from fines and penalties for¶ violation of the proposed law and accompanying
regulations. This amount¶ would be offset, at least partially, by the elimination of fines imposed under
the¶ current marijuana laws. ¶ All of the proposed initiatives and current debate contemplate additional¶ fees in the form of excise
taxes. Since this tax rate has not been set, it is¶ impossible to estimate the exact revenue that it would produce. For the¶ purposes of this
Article, a $50 per ounce statewide excise tax is used. This is¶ the amount proposed as a minimum in TRCCA and a maximum in A.B. 390.2“¶ It
will provide a guideline for other rates.
The BOE found that an excise tax of¶ $50 would result in an 11% decrease
in consumption. This would generate¶ revenue of $996.8 million. Miron’s estimated values included additional
taxes,¶ like a $50 excise tax, and predict that this excise tax would generate $1.12¶ billion in revenue.¶ Table 3 summarizes the potential tax
revenue that legalization could¶ generate for state and local governments. It does not include the revenue from¶ income or business taxes
because at this time the profit involved in the industry¶ is unknown. It also does not include the revenue from fees because that¶ revenue in its
entirety will fund the regulatory costs of legalization. These¶
totals range from $160.71 million to $1.313 billion
depending on whether¶ additional sales and excise taxes are imposed.
education funding.
Legalization and regulation provide additional economic benefits from taxes while
undercutting cartel profits
Donlan 13 (6/3/13, Thomas G., editorial page editor at Barron’s Weekly, Barrons “Should Pot Be
Legal?”
http://online.barrons.com/news/articles/SB50001424052748704509304578511261557343002#articleT
abs_article%3D1. Accssed 7/29/14 KR)
America's 40-year crawl toward legalization of marijuana is picking up speed. Twenty-six states have taken steps toward legalization, some
quite bold. Just last week, Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper made one of the biggest moves yet, signing a package of bills addressing how
marijuana will be grown, sold, taxed, and used. The measures, which follow Colorado voters' approval of legalization last fall, form the
cornerstone of the nation's first fully legal market for pot. Come Jan. 1, Colorado residents over 21 will be allowed to buy marijuana at retail
stores and smoke it for their pleasure. The state of Washington, where voters also passed a referendum to legalize marijuana, will be next. If all
goes well with those pioneering efforts, it may be only a matter of time before more states follow.¶ Proponents say Americans should be
allowed to smoke cannabis as a matter of basic personal freedom, adding that a society that enjoys legal whiskey, beer, wine, and tobacco has
no business outlawing a recreational drug like pot that has fewer unhealthy side effects. After all, tens of millions of Americans enjoy smoking
marijuana, if illegally.¶ Enlarge Image¶ Jim Hill looks over the marijuana he grows for medical purposes at his farm in Potter Valley, Calif. Eric
Risberg/Corbis¶ It's
Prohibition all over again. That Gatsby-era law gave rise to the Mafia, rampant crime,
and in the end, increased drinking. As Rep. Steve Cohen (D., Tenn.) put it recently, "This is the time to
remedy this prohibition."¶ Plenty of people agree. The Pew Research Center recently found that 52%
of Americans support legalized possession of small quantities of marijuana. It was the first time a national poll
produced a majority against pot prohibition, although the Gallup Poll and other national polls are coming close. The Pew survey found that
nearly every group in the country is part of the gradual change in public attitudes -- men, women, whites, blacks, rich, and poor.¶ It's not just
about the right to light up.
With the nation's retail marijuana market estimated at about $30 billion,
legalization also would bring some important economic benefits. It could lead to sharply lower prices,
striking a blow to the Mexican drug cartels and American street gangs. Pot could be produced in the
U.S. for much less than Mexican pot produced illegally. By some estimates, illegality adds 50% to
marijuana's prices. If both countries legalized the drug, Mexicans might grow a lot of it and sell it to American consumers, but the
inexpensive legal product would not draw the attention of the ultraviolent Mexican drug traffickers any more than Mexican tomatoes do.¶
Legalization also could bring some relief to cash-strapped states. Marijuana taxes would join levies on
liquor, tobacco, gambling, and other pursuits that once were banned. A report prepared for the
libertarian Cato Institute suggests states could raise a total of about $3 billion from marijuana taxes,
and other estimates are even higher. California alone could pull in $1.4 billion a year, a state tax
authority has projected. That may seem minor compared with a state budget approaching $100 billion, but it would top the $1.3
billion that California now gets from alcohol and tobacco taxes combined.¶
Best stats prove that legalization is a financially beneficial
Stuart 2014 [Stuart, Hunter, Huffington Post, “If You Support Legal Marijuana, Memorize These 13
Stats”, 4/19/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/19/benefits-legalizing-weed-by-thenumbers_n_5173785.html, accessed 7/29/14]
¶ With Colorado and Washington starting
to tax and regulate recreational weed sales, and medical marijuana legal in 18 other states, we can
finally start to put some hard numbers on the industry's value. Numbers like:¶ $1.53
billion: The amount the national legal
marijuana market is worth, according to a Nov. 2013 report from ArcView Market Research, a San Francisco-based investor group
focused on the marijuana industry.¶¶ $10.2 billion: The estimated amount the national legal marijuana market
will be worth in five years, according to that same ArcView report.¶¶ $6.17 million: The amount of tax revenue
collected in Colorado on legal marijuana sales in just the first two months of 2014.¶ $98 million: The total tax
revenue that Colorado could reap in the fiscal year that begins in July, according to a recent budget proposal from
Gov. John Hickenlooper.¶ 40 million: The amount of marijuana tax revenue Colorado is devoting to public school construction¶ 7,50010,000: The estimated number of marijuana industry jobs that currently exist in Colorado, according to
Michael Elliott, the Executive Director of the Marijuana Industry Group, a trade association that advocates for responsible marijuana
regulation.¶ $190
million: The amount in taxes and fees legal marijuana is projected to raise for the state
of Washington over four years starting in mid-2015, according to the Economic and Revenue Forecast Council, an independent
agency that advises the state government on the budget and tax revenue.¶ $105 million: The estimated annual sales tax
revenue generated by medical marijuana dispensaries in California, according to the Marijuana Policy Project, a
Washington, D.C.-based group that supports legalization.¶ $142.19 million: The estimated size of the medical
marijuana market in Arizona in 2014, according to the ArcView Market Research report, up from $35.37 million last
year. Arizona has a record 80 medical pot dispensaries currently open, with more expected to open this year, according to AZMarijuana.com.¶
$36 million: The amount of estimated tax revenue Maine would earn every year if it legalized and
regulated marijuana, according to a 2013 estimate from the Marijuana Policy Project. Portland, Maine's largest city, voted to legalize
weed in November, and a grassroots campaign to get state legalization on the ballot in 2016 is underway.¶ $21.5 to $82 million: The
amount of estimated tax revenue Rhode Island would earn every year if it legalized and regulated
marijuana, according to an April 9 report from the non-profit organization Open Doors. Rhode Island legislators are considering a bill this
session that would tax and regulate marijuana like alcohol.¶ ¶ $134.6 million: The amount of estimated tax revenue
Maryland would earn every year if it legalized and regulated marijuana, according to a 2014 estimate from the
Maryland Department of Legislative Services. Maryland Gov. Martin O'Malley signed a law legalizing medical marijuana on April 14, and state
lawmakers are considering a bill this session to legalize weed for recreational purposes, too.¶ $17.4
billion: The estimated total
amount that marijuana prohibition costs state and federal governments every year, according to a 2010 study
by Harvard University economist Jeffrey Miron.
2AC – Legalization Saves Criminal Justice System Costs XT
Legalization opens up additional revenue by reducing pressure on the judicial system
Patton 10 (Michelle, Ross-Blakeley Law Library- Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law, 15 Berkeley J.Crim.
L.197, “Legalization of Marijuana: A Dead-End or the High Road to Fiscal Solvency”
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/bjcl15&div=7&g_sent=1&collection=journals#19
7 pages 198-200, accessed 7/29/14 KR)
2. Criminal Justice Costs¶ In
addition to taxation and regulatory fees, the legalization of marijuana¶ would
generate additional available revenue for state and local government by¶ reducing costs in the
criminal justice system. If marijuana is legalized, the state¶ police and judicial system would no longer
arrest and prosecute individuals for¶ marijuana cultivation, possession or sale. As a result, individuals
would no¶ longer be incarcerated for these activities. This reduction in prison population¶ is in accord with the recent
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger decision. If¶ marijuana is legalized for only those individuals twenty-one years old and older, some of these costs
would remain but they would be drastically reduced.¶ This reduction of expenditures would also likely find much support with¶ voters.
According to a 2009 Field Poll, state prisons and correction facilities¶ was one of the two areas in which voters support cuts in state spending.¶
California currently spends $8.234 billion on corrections and rehabilitation. 76¶ This Article follows the
methodology devised by Harvard economist¶ Jeffrey Miron in order to estimate the potential criminal justice savings. The¶ percentage
of marijuana-related arrests, prosecutions, and prisoners and¶ parolees in relation to total arrests,
prosecutions, and prisoners and parolees are¶ estimated and multiplied by the law enforcement,
judiciary, and correctional¶ system budgets, respectively. This will result in an estimate of savings
from¶ decriminalization.¶
2AC – Bank Revenue
Regulations allow for bank transactions to support cannabis transactions- they will
follow on when there is federal certainty
Kennedy 14(Bruce, reporter and writer at moneywatch, January 28th, 2014, CBS Money Watch, “Will
the banking industry allow marijuana transactions?” http://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-the-bankingindustry-allow-marijuana-transactions/ accessed 7/29/14 KR)
The financial and marijuana industries appear to still be digesting comments made last week by U.S.
Attorney General Eric Holder, who said that legal marijuana businesses should have access to the
banking system.¶ Speaking during an event at the University of Virginia, Holder said the Department of
Justice would soon unveil proposed regulations regarding such transactions. ¶ While using marijuana
remains a crime under federal law, 20 states and the District of Columbia have legalized the medical
use of cannabis. And earlier this month, Colorado and Washington state made the recreational use of marijuana legal for adults. ¶ ¶ Play VIDEO¶ Bringing legalized marijuana to the masses¶ Holder
said the move is “an attempt to deal with a reality that exists in these states,” and to reduce the cashonly system many marijuana businesses are forced to use.¶ “There’s a public safety component to
this,” he added. “Huge amounts of cash, substantial amounts of cash just kind of lying around with no
place for it to be appropriately deposited, is something that would worry me, just from a law
enforcement perspective.”¶ Holder's remarks are getting mixed reviews from cannabis businesses in Denver.¶ “The news is wonderful,” said Elliot
Klug, CEO and partner of Pink House, a medical marijuana company with seven retail stores and five
production facilities in Colorado. “The sooner it is on paper, the better. It will be a boon and a relief
when full banking is authorized. We are spending so much time handling cash it has become almost
ridiculous.Ӧ Klug believes the change would not only reduce the financial uncertainty his industry
faces but would further increase investment opportunities in cannabis. ¶ ¶ Play VIDEO¶ America's changing
attitudes on marijuana¶ But Kayvan Khalatbari, co-owner of the Denver Relief medical marijuana
facility, remains skeptical.¶ "Is it a sign that this industry is well on its way to becoming legitimate in
the eyes of the Feds? Yes,” he said, “but talk is cheap, and both [Holder and President Barack Obama]
have a history of saying one thing and doing another, so I won't hold my breath.Ӧ There's also the question of what the major
credit card companies would do if banks start to allow marijuana companies to open accounts and have normal transactions.¶ “We prohibit the use of the card for marijuana transactions and adhere to federal law in such
matters,” said Sanette Chao, director of corporate affairs and communications at American Express (AXP). ¶ Although Amex doesn't have a separate policy for businesses that provide ancillary goods and services to marijuana
sellers, Chao notes the company does ban unlawful transactions and reserves the right “to terminate merchant contracts that are harmful to our brand or have high levels of card member credit losses and customer service
Experts who have watched the cannabis industry evolve believe
the credit card companies will follow the banks' lead, should the federal government chose to change
the law or, at least, look the other way.¶ “If all of this is cleared on a federal basis, then it will just be
viewed as any other transaction that goes through their process,” said Mac Clouse, a professor of
finance at the University of Denver's Daniels College of Business.¶ Clouse also believes this has become
a fairness issue, with states where residents voted to legalize marijuana for medical and recreational
wanting their local laws to be upheld.¶ “If you vote to make this product legal, then [the marijuana businesses] shouldn't be at a disadvantage in dealing with general business
disputes.” ¶ ¶ Play VIDEO¶ Medical marijuana: Will Colorado's "green rush" last?¶
practices compared to all other businesses,” he added. “You're either going to legalize it and let them be a viable business, or not. Don't try to put them somewhere in between, where it just makes them have more risks than any
other small business.“
2AC – Empirics
Local tax revenue already projected to continue increasing.
Redmond 2014 [Redmond, Jason, RT, “Crime down and revenue up in Colorado since start of
marijuana legalization”, 6/4/14, http://rt.com/usa/163644-colorado-marijuana-crime-drop/, accessed
7/29/14]
Economically speaking, rolling back the weed ban in Colorado has done wonders as well. The Associated
Press reported this week that nearly $19 million in recreational marijuana was sold throughout the state in just
the month of March, with $1.9 million of that going immediately to Denver to be divvied up by
lawmakers to various state programs.¶ By the end of the year, weed taxes are expected to net Colorado
around $30 million, which as of this week will be used on a plan that puts that money into mostly child drug use prevention and
outreach, the AP reported, which means more school nurses and public education efforts funded by marijuana excises. The New York
Times reported this week that those taxes have so far provided the state with around $12.6 million.
According to Reuters, the latest year-end projection in total revenue generated is around $98
million—exceeding the state’s original estimate by 40 percent. Meanwhile, federal lawmakers in the United States
took a huge step towards national marijuana reform on Thursday last week when the Republican-controlled House of Representatives voted to
approve an amendment from Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-California) that, if signed into law, will prevent the Drug Enforcement Agency from
using federal funds to go after medical marijuana patients and providers in jurisdictions where state law says pot can legally be prescribed.
2AC – Jobs
Legalization creates jobs and generates revenue for the states.
Caulkins and Hawken 2013 91 Or. L. Rev. 1041 (2012-2013) High Tax States: Options for Gleaning Revenue from Legal
Cannabis; Caulkins, Jonathan P.; Hawken, Angela; Kilmer, Beau; Kleiman, Mark A. R. Jon Caulkins has been on the Heinz School faculty since
1990, with leaves of absence to be co-director of RAND’s Drug Policy Research Center in Santa Monica (1994-1996), to found RAND’s Pittsburgh
Office (1999-2001), and to teach at Carnegie Mellon’s campus in Doha, Qatar (2005-2011). Angela Hawken, PhD is associate professor of
economics and policy analysis at the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine University. She is from South Africa, where she taught undergraduate
and graduate econometrics and microeconomics before moving to Los Angeles in 1998 to complete a PhD in policy analysis at the RAND
Graduate School. https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/13603/Caulkins.pdf?sequence=1 retrieved 7/29/14
Another part of the marijuana industry that becomes taxable under legalization is the salaries of
workers, who (unlike workers in illicit industries) pay income and payroll taxes. How important that is depends
on the share of wages in total costs. In many industries, labor costs predominate. If that were true also for the
new marijuana industry, payroll taxes might be roughly comparable to excise-tax revenues in
Colorado. To see why, suppose, for example, the proportion of the retail sales price that comes from paying wages is the same as the
wholesale price as a proportion of retail. Then, suppose that wholesale prices are two-thirds of retail prices, and two- thirds of the marijuana
industry’s cost structure comes from wages.
Since the FICA rate is 15.3%, counting the employer’s half,99 it would
produce essentially the same revenue as a fifteen percent excise tax on the wholesale value. Ironically,
that would be revenue to the federal government, not to the state that legalized. That said, states
could also collect income taxes on marijuana-industry wages; for example, 4.63% in Colorado.
2AC – Licensing
Profit from licenses and drug tourism.
Caulkins and Hawken 2013 91 Or. L. Rev. 1041 (2012-2013) High Tax States: Options for Gleaning Revenue from Legal
Cannabis; Caulkins, Jonathan P.; Hawken, Angela; Kilmer, Beau; Kleiman, Mark A. R. Jon Caulkins has been on the Heinz School faculty since
1990, with leaves of absence to be co-director of RAND’s Drug Policy Research Center in Santa Monica (1994-1996), to found RAND’s Pittsburgh
Office (1999-2001), and to teach at Carnegie Mellon’s campus in Doha, Qatar (2005-2011). Angela Hawken, PhD is associate professor of
economics and policy analysis at the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine University. She is from South Africa, where she taught undergraduate
and graduate econometrics and microeconomics before moving to Los Angeles in 1998 to complete a PhD in policy analysis at the RAND
Graduate School. https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/13603/Caulkins.pdf?sequence=1 retrieved 7/29/14
Most proposals to regulate the marijuana industry include some form of licensing of producers,
manufacturers, and stores, with associated licensing fees. Fees are typically modest, perhaps intended
to cover only the administrative cost of processing the applications and other costs of maintaining a
regulatory regime. For example, Washington I-502’s fee is $1,000 per year for a producer.90 If I-502’s
three-tiered excise-tax structure ended up producing tax revenue of fifty dollars per ounce, that
means the producers’ license fee would vanish into irrelevance by comparison if production volumes
were in the thousands, or even hundreds, of pounds per licensee.This does not imply that fee revenue
has to be negligible, especially in a big state . In California, the Alcohol Beverage Commission is
funded through license fees and has an annual budget of about $50 million .91 Also, as was noted above in Part
I, section D, states could limit the number of licenses enough to drive up their market value, and then auction them to the highest bidder—a
scheme that has a variety of benefits to the public, but not to the producers.
The importance of drug tourism will depend partially on the prevalence of these three different types of drug tourists. The
Colorado
Tourism Office reports that the tax revenues per tourist dollar spent vary due to differing local tax
rates and types, but the average is about 5.5% per tourist.95 Hence, if a drug tourist spent $300 on
meals, lodging, and other expenses for every $100 worth of marijuana purchased, the sales tax
revenue on those ancillary purchases could exceed the excise plus sales-tax revenue from the
marijuana sale.96 For Colorado tourists, per-visit spending varies from $1,000 for skiers down to $48
for day-trippers, with an average of $370.97
2AC – Medical Marijuana
Exponential growth of medical marijuana profits
Ferner 2014 [Ferner, Matt, Huffington Post, “Colorado Recreational Weed Sales Top $14 Million In
First Month”, 3/10/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/10/colorado-marijuana-taxrevenue_n_4936223.html, accessed 7/30/14]
The medical marijuana sales for January generated an additional $900,000 in sales tax, for a total tax
revenue of $2.9 million for both sides of the state's marijuana dispensary market. Including fees, the
figure jumps to $3.5 million.¶ "The first month of sales for recreational marijuana fell in line with expectations," Barbara Brohl,
executive director of the department, said in a statement. "We expect clear revenue patterns will emerge by April and plan to incorporate this
data into future forecasts."¶ The figures represent the tax returns from 59 businesses around Colorado, according
to the department.¶ The recreational marijuana tax numbers come from two levies that state voters approved last November -- a 10 percent
special sales tax and a 15 percent excise tax.¶
Gov. John Hickenlooper (D) recently announced that he expects that
the combined sales from both legal medical and recreational marijuana in the state will reach nearly
$1 billion in the next fiscal year -- about $600 million of that is projected to come from just recreational
sales. The state stands to collect at least $134 million in taxes and fees.¶ The first week of sales was
robust in the state. With only 37 dispensaries open at the time, they collectively brought in roughly $5
million in total sales.¶ Although the initial crush of retail pot sales has tapered off since January, sales and tax figures are expected to
remain steady with more than 150 recreational marijuana dispensaries now licensed, and more added to that
list every month.¶ Though the first $40 million in tax revenue from the industry is flagged for school
construction, Hickenlooper has proposed that the state use additional revenue to fund a statewide media campaign to address substance
abuse treatment and highlight the risks associated with drug use.
Colorado gains $42 million in first year of Marijuana legalization
Jeffrey Miron MARCH 11, 2014 10:20AM How Much Tax Revenue from Legalized Marijuana? http://www.cato.org/blog/how-much-tax-revenue-legalized-marijuana Jeffrey
Miron is Director of Economic Studies at the Cato Institute and the Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Economics at Harvard University. His area of expertise is the
economics of libertarianism, with particular emphasis on the economics of illegal drugs. Miron has served on the faculty at the University of Michigan and as a visiting professor at the Sloan
School of Management, M.I.T. and the Department of Economics, Harvard University. Retrieved 8/2/14
Some marijuana legalizers push the argument that legalization will generate additional tax revenue. Opinions differ widely, however, on exactly
how much revenue.¶ In mid-February, Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper predicted that the taxes, licenses, and fees on medical-plusrecreational marijuana would generate $134 million for the fiscal year starting in July.¶ In my 2010 Cato White Paper, I predicted that full
legalization (federal and state) would generate roughly $55-60 million per year for Colorado.¶
Now just released data from
Colorado for January, the first month of fully legal marijuana sales, show about $2 million from
recreational marijuana and about $3.5 million for medical-plus-recreational marijuana. The latter
figure implies annual revenues of about $42 million. ¶ This January figure may turn out to be misleading. On one hand,
the industry could grow over time, boosting revenues. On the other hand, initial hoopla over legalization may have inflated January sales. And,
longer term, sales in Colorado could decline if other states legalize or medicalize.¶ If the lower revenue numbers persist, does that weaken the
case for legalization?¶ No: Increased tax revenue was never the main reason for legalization. Instead, the crucial goals of legalization are
greater freedom for marijuana users and elimination of prohibition’s unintended consequences (crime, corruption, poor quality control,
diminished civil liberties, restrictions on medical uses, and expenditure on enforcement).¶ Collecting revenue on legalized marijuana is
perfectly sensible; it allows lower tax rates on everything else. But this appears to be a small effect, and it is not the main benefit of legalization
in any case.
2AC – Numbers
Marijuana legalization to save and gain 8.7 billon dollars to state and federal
government
Jeffrey Miron and Katherine Waldock September 27, 2010 The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition
http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/budgetary-impact-ending-drug-prohibition retrieved 8/2/14 Jeffrey A. Miron is a senior lecturer
in economics at Harvard University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Professor Miron earned his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and chaired the economics department at Boston University prior to joining the Harvard faculty. Katherine Waldock is a doctoral
candidate at the Stern School of Business at New York University.
State and federal governments in the United States face massive looming fiscal deficits . One policy change that can
reduce deficits is ending the drug war. Legalization means reduced expenditure on enforcement and an increase in tax revenue from legalized sales.¶ This report estimates that
legalizing drugs would save roughly $41.3 billion per year in government expenditure on enforcement
of prohibition. Of these savings, $25.7 billion would accrue to state and local governments, while
$15.6 billion would accrue to the federal government.¶ Approximately $8.7 billion of the savings
would result from legalization of marijuana and $32.6 billion from legalization of other drugs.¶ The
report also estimates that drug legalization would yield tax revenue of $46.7 billion annually,
assuming legal drugs were taxed at rates comparable to those on alcohol and tobacco.
Approximately $8.7 billion of this revenue would result from legalization of marijuana and $38.0
billion from legalization of other drugs.¶
A2: You Underestimate
Underestimations of marijuana sales and taxation still provide billions of dollars in
increased revenue for states and the federal government
Miron 5(Jeffery A., Visiting professor of Economics, Department of Economics Harvard University, “The
Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition” http://www.cannabiscommerce.com/library/Miron_Report_2005.pdf page 11-15, accessed 7/29/14 KR)
In addition to reducing government expenditure, marijuana legalization would produce¶ tax revenue
from the legal production and sale of marijuana. To estimate this revenue, this report¶ employs the following procedure.
First, it estimates current expenditure on marijuana at the¶ national level. Second, it estimates the expenditure likely to occur under
legalization. Third, it¶ estimates the tax revenue that would result from this expenditure based on assumptions about the¶ kinds of taxes that
would apply to legalized marijuana. Fourth, it provides illustrative¶ calculations of the portion of the revenue that would accrue to each state.¶
Expenditure on Marijuana under Current Prohibition¶ The first step in determining the tax revenue under legalization is to estimate current¶
expenditure on marijuana.
ONDCP (2001a, Table 1, p.3) estimates that in 2000 U.S. residents ¶ spent $10.5
billion on marijuana. This estimate relies on a range of assumptions about the¶ marijuana market, and
modification of these assumptions might produce a higher or lower¶ estimate. There is no obvious reason,
however, why alternative assumptions would imply a¶ dramatically different estimate of current expenditure on marijuana. This report
therefore uses¶ the $10.5 billion figure as the starting point for the revenue estimates presented below.¶ Expenditure on Marijuana under
Legalization¶ The second step in estimating the tax revenue that would occur under legalization is to¶ determine how expenditure on marijuana
would change as the result of legalization. A simple¶ framework in which to consider various assumptions is the standard supply and demand
model.¶ To use this model to assess legalization’s impact on marijuana expenditure, it is necessary to state¶ what effect legalization would have
on the demand and supply curves for marijuana. This
report assumes there would be no change in the demand for
marijuana.22 This¶ assumption likely errs in the direction of understating the tax revenue from legalized marijuana,¶ since the penalties for
possession potentially deter some persons from consuming. But any¶ increase in demand from legalization would plausibly come from casual
users, whose marijuana¶ use would likely be modest. Any increase in use might also come from decreased consumption¶ of alcohol, tobacco or
other goods, so increased tax revenue from legal marijuana would be¶ partially offset by decreased tax revenue from other goods. And there
might be a forbidden fruit¶ effect from prohibition that tends to offset the demand decreasing effects of penalties for¶ possession. Thus, the
assumption of no change in demand is plausible, and it likely biases the¶ estimated tax revenue downward.¶ Under the assumption that
demand does not shift due to legalization, any change in the¶ quantity and price would result from changes in supply conditions. There
are
two main effects¶ that would operate (Miron 2003a). On the one hand, marijuana suppliers in a legal
market would¶ not incur the costs imposed by prohibition, such as the threat of arrest, incarceration,
fines, asset¶ seizure, and the like. This means, other things equal, that costs and therefore prices
would be¶ lower under legalization. On the other hand, marijuana suppliers in a legal market would
bear¶ the costs of tax and regulatory policies that apply to legal goods but that black market suppliers ¶
normally avoid.23 This implies an offset to the cost reductions resulting from legalization. ¶ Further,
changes in competition and advertising under legalization can potentially yield higher¶ prices than
under prohibition.¶ It is thus an empirical question as to how prices under legalization would compare to¶ prices under current
prohibition. The best evidence available on this question comes from comparisons of marijuana prices between the U.S. and the Netherlands.
Although marijuana is¶ still technically illegal in the Netherlands, the degree of enforcement is substantially below that in¶ the U.S., and the sale
of marijuana in coffee shops is officially tolerated. The regime thus¶ approximates de facto legalization.
Existing data suggest that
retail prices in the Netherlands are¶ roughly 50-100 percent of U.S. prices.24 25¶ The effect of any
price decline that occurs due to legalization depends on the elasticity of¶ demand for marijuana.
Evidence on this elasticity is limited because appropriate data on¶ marijuana price and consumption are not readily available. Existing
If the price
decline under legalization is minimal, then expenditure will not change¶ regardless of the demand
elasticity. If the price decline is noticeable but the demand elasticity is¶ greater than or equal to 1.0 in absolute value, then expenditure will
remain constant or increase.¶ If the price decline is noticeable and the demand elasticity is less than one, then expenditure will decline. Since
the decline in price is unlikely to exceed 50% and the demand elasticity is likely at¶ least -0.5, the
estimates, however, suggest¶ an elasticity of at least -0.5 and plausibly more than -1.0 (Nisbet and Vakil 1972).¶ 26 27¶
plausible decline in expenditure is approximately 25%. Given the estimate of $10.5¶ billion in
expenditure on marijuana under current prohibition, this implies expenditure under¶ legalization of
about $7.9 billion.28¶ Tax Revenue from Legalized Marijuana¶ To estimate the tax revenue that would result from marijuana
legalization, it is necessary¶ to assume a particular tax rate. This report considers two assumptions that plausibly
bracket the¶ range of reasonable possibilities.¶ The first assumption is that tax policy treats legalized
marijuana identically to other¶ goods. In that case tax revenue as a fraction of expenditure would be
approximately 30%,¶ implying tax revenue from legalized marijuana of $2.4 billion.29 The amount of revenue
would¶ be lower if substantial home production occurred under legalization.30 The evidence suggests,¶ however, that the magnitude of such
production would be minimal. In particular, alcohol¶ production switched mostly from the black market to the licit market after repeal of
Alcohol¶ Prohibition in 1933.¶ The
second assumption is that tax policy treats legalized marijuana similarly to
alcohol or¶ tobacco, imposing a “sin tax” in excess of any tax applicable to other goods.31 Imposing a
high sin tax can force a market underground, thereby reducing rather than increasing tax revenue. ¶
Existing evidence, however, suggests that relatively high rates of sin taxation are possible without ¶
generating a black market. For example, cigarette taxes in many European countries account for¶ 75–85 percent of the price (US
Department of Health and Human Services 2000).¶ One benchmark, therefore, is to assume that an excise tax on legalized marijuana doubles¶
the price. If
general taxation accounts for 30% of the price, this additional tax would then make¶ tax
revenue account for 80% of the price. This doubling of the price, given an elasticity of -0.5,¶ would cause roughly a 50% increase
in expenditure, implying total expenditure on marijuana¶ would be $11.85 billion (=$7.9 x 1.5). Tax revenue
would equal 80% of this total, or $9.5 billion.¶ This includes any standard taxation applied to
marijuana income as well as the sin tax on¶ marijuana sales.¶ The $9.5 billion figure is not necessarily attainable given
the characteristics of marijuana¶ production, however. Small scale, efficient production is possible and occurs widely now, so the¶ imposition of
a substantial tax wedge might encourage a substantial fraction of the market to¶ remain underground. The assumption of a constant demand
elasticity in response to a price¶ change of this magnitude is also debatable; more plausibly, the elasticity would increase as the¶ price rose,
implying a larger decline in consumption and thus less revenue from excise taxation.¶ The
$9.5 figure should therefore be
considered an upper bound.¶ These calculations nevertheless indicate the potential for substantial
revenue from¶ marijuana taxation. A more modest excise tax, such as one that raises the price 50%,
would¶ produce revenue on legalized marijuana of $6.2 billion per year.
A2: Warehouses
Legalization of marijuana has increased the real estate market
Huspeni, 14’ [Dennis Huspeni, Apr 25, 2014 , “Metro Denver industrial real estate booming”,
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/print-edition/2014/04/25/metro-denver-industrial-real-estate-booming.html?page=all]
Metro Denver’s industrial market has tenants bidding for space, landlords enjoying rents approaching
pre-recession levels, and developers taking orders for new space faster than they can get it built.
“Investment demand is as high as it’s ever been for industrial properties,” Smith said. “Even the vanilla warehouse
market is on fire.” Tenant demand is being driven largely by the marijuana industry, in which business owners are
scooping up warehouse space “at double or even triple rents,” Smith said. “That’s put a crunch on supply. ”Investors are looking to
buy warehouse buildings to lease to marijuana businesses, as are the businesses themselves . Denver has
just been a wonderful market for us,” said Nagle. “Not only is it really inviting for companies coming to the Denver
area, [but also] there’s a lot of business to be had here. The number of companies headquartered
here brought us here and it’s a nice midway point in the country.
The impact of marijuana on the real estate industry was key to Colorado’s economy
Higdon, 13’ [James Higdon, December 12, 2013, “Colorado pot laws help Mile-High City’s appetite for
real estate to grow even higher”, http://fortune.com/2013/12/12/colorado-pot-laws-help-mile-highcitys-appetite-for-real-estate-to-grow-even-higher/]
Exactly how much real estate is unclear, but some informed
estimates are eye-popping: “This year, 3 million square
feet or more purchased and probably another 2 million leased,” says Jason Thomas of Avalon Realty
Advisors, a firm that is handling increasing numbers of transactions that turn nondescript warehouse
spaces into massive marijuana growing operations. Even conservative estimates acknowledge the
fundamental impact on Denver’s mainstream real estate market. Alec Rhodes, managing director at Cassidy Turley
Commercial Real Estate Services in Denver, estimates the impact of marijuana growing operations at merely 1.5
million square feet, a contribution to the local economy that “got us through the recession.” “It kept our
vacancy rate in check during the downturn,” he says, noting that the vacancy rate was 8.6% at its worst and is now “very tight” around 5%.
Meanwhile, vacancy for similar properties in Colorado Springs, a community that has opted out of the new marijuana laws, is “a whopping
12%,” according to Sean Sheridan, a real estate developer there.
2AC – State Budgets Cuts Hurt the Economy XT
State budget cuts kill economic growth- lack of federal stimulus to fall back on
Associated Press 14 ( Chicago Sun-Times “State Spending Cuts Slow U.S. economic growth”
http://www.suntimes.com/business/4006926-420/state-spending-cuts-slow-us-economic-growth-inq4.html#.U9qyH4BdW9t accessed 7/31/14 KR)
WASHINGTON — Deeper
spending cuts by state and local governments weighed down U.S. economic
growth in the final three months of last year.¶ The government’s new estimate for the October-December quarter illustrates
how growing state budget crises could hold back the economic recovery .¶ The Commerce Department reported
Friday that economic growth increased at an annual rate of 2.8 percent in the final quarter of last year. That was down from the initial estimate
of 3.2 percent.¶ The weaker figure was disappointing and prompted some economists to lower their forecasts for economic growth in the
current January-March quarter.¶ State
and local governments, wrestling with budget shortfalls, cut spending at
a 2.4 percent pace. That was much deeper than the 0.9 percent annualized cut first estimated and was
the most since the start of 2010.¶ Consumers spent a little less than first thought. Their spending rose
at a rate of 4.1 percent, slightly smaller than the initial estimate of 4.4 percent. Still, it was the best
showing since 2006. And it suggests Americans will play a larger role this year in helping the economy
grow, especially with more money from a Social Security tax cut.¶ One of the crucial questions is whether consumers
can spend enough this year to help offset negative forces in the economy — notably struggling state and local governments and a wobbly
housing market that has depressed homes values.¶ Rising energy prices also pose a danger. If oil prices were to rise to $150 or more a barrel
and then stay there for months, another recession is possible, economists said. Gasoline prices would near $5 a gallon. Consumers
and
businesses would spend much less, and some employers might slash jobs.¶ “Consumers stumbled a bit
to start the year, and while we expect them to pick up the pace some in coming months, the recent
rise in energy prices poses a notable headwind,” said economist Michael Feroli at JP Morgan Chase
Bank.¶ Overall economic growth in the October-December quarter was marginally better than the 2.6 percent pace logged in the prior
quarter. The economy has steadily grown after hitting a difficult patch last spring. But rising oil prices
and budget cuts by state and local government are creating headwinds. ¶ Feroli and other analysts now predict
the economy will grow at a pace around 3.5 percent in the January-March quarter. That’s down from earlier estimates in the 4 percent-plus
range.¶ Government stimulus
is fading and budget cuts at the federal level could further hamper
economic growth.¶ The federal government trimmed spending at the end of the year, entirely
reflecting cuts to defense spending. And a showdown over the U.S. budget is taking place on Capitol
Hill between Democrats and Republicans, threatening a government shutdown.¶
2AC – Econ Impact XT
Economic collapse leads to extinction – causes instability in rogue states.
Kemp 10
[Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House
under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director
for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East
Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West:
India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4]
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The
world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major
reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and
the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which
are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to
political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The
internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the
collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then
take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan
increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program.
That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt
joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism
increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oilproducing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a
tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire
consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.
Economic decline causes multiple scenarios of nuclear war
Burrows and Harris 8 and Harris 2009 Mathew J. Burrows counselor in the National Intelligence
Council and Jennifer Harris a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future:
Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” The Washington Quarterly 32:2
https://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrowsharris.pdf
Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number
of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a
growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While
we continue to believe that the Great
Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful
effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability
of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not
be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the
potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile
economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if
economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025,
however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in
2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups
inheriting organizational structures,
command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks
and newly
emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military
presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries
about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with
external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is
in an economic downturn.
not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East
with a nuclear Iran. Episodes
of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella
could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well
established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems
also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The
lack of strategic depth in
neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian
intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.Types of
conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly
if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will
drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if
government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even
actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward,
one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing
moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle
East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
A2: Econ Resilient
Double-dip now causes depression - overwhelms their D
Isidore 11 (Financial Correspondent-CNN Money, 8/10,
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/10/news/economy/double_dip_recession_economy/index.htm
Another recession could be even worse than the last one for a few reasons. For starters, the
economy is more vulnerable than it was in 2007 when the Great Recession began. In fact, the
economy would enter the new recession much weaker than the start of any other downturn since
the end of World War II. Unemployment currently stands at 9.1%. In November 2007, the month before the start of the Great
Recession, it was just 4.7%. And the large number of Americans who have stopped looking for work in the last few years has left the
percentage of the population with a job at a 28-year low. Various parts of the
economy also have yet to recover from the last
recession and would be at serious risk of lasting damage in a new downturn. Home values continue to lose
ground and are projected to continue their fall. While manufacturing has had a nice rebound in the last two years, industrial production is
still 18% below pre-recession levels. There are nearly 900 banks on the FDIC's list of troubled institutions, the highest number since 1993.
Only 76 banks were at risk as the Great Recession took hold. But what has economists particularly worried is that the tools generally used
to try to jumpstart an economy teetering on the edge of recession aren't available this time around. "The
reason we didn't go
into a depression three years ago is the policy response by Congress and the Fed," said Dan Seiver, a finance
professor at San Diego State University. "We won't see that this time." Three times between 2008 and 2010, Congress approved massive
spending or temporary tax cuts to try to stimulate the economy. But fresh from the bruising debt ceiling battle and credit rating
downgrade, and with elections looming, the federal government has shown little inclination to move in that direction. So this new
recession would likely have virtually no policy effort to counteract it.
A2: US Isn’t Key to Global Economy
U.S. economy key to global economy – perception of slowdown spills over
Dees, DG-Economics Principle Economist, and Saint-Guilhem, European Central Bank research, 09
(Stephan and Arthur, March 2009, European Central Bank, "THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY AND ITS EVOLUTION OVER TIME,"
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1034.pdf, accessed 7-20-12, CNM)
The U.S. economy is very often seen as “the engine” of the world economy. AS a result, any sign of slowdown
in the United States raises concerns about harmful spillovers to the other economies. The current economic
recession in the United States has questioned the ability of the global economy to “decouple” from U.S. cyclical developments. While there
were some signs of decoupling in the first quarters following the U.S. downturn, they disappeared rapidly
towards the end of 2008, when the crisis became more global and the economic cycles turned out to be
more synchronous across the world. While the increasing economic integration at the world level and the
resulting emergence of large economic players, like China, is likely to have weakened the role of the U.S.
economy as a driver of global growth, the influence of the U nited S tates on other economies remains
however larger than direct trade ties would suggest. Third-market effects together with increased financial
integration tends to foster the international transmission of cyclical developments.
2AC – State Cuts Hurts Transportation Infrastructure XT
Federal funding for transportation infrastructure fails- states need new tax revenue to
fill in the gaps
Economist 11(4/28/2011, The Economist, “Life in the slow lane”
http://www.economist.com/node/18620944 accessed 8/1/14 KR)
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that America needs to spend $20 billion more a year just to
maintain its infrastructure at the present, inadequate, levels. Up to $80 billion a year in additional
spending could be spent on projects which would show positive economic returns. Other reports go further. In
2005 Congress established the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission. In 2008 the commission reckoned that
America needed at least $255 billion per year in transport spending over the next half-century to keep the system in good repair and make the
needed upgrades. Current
spending falls 60% short of that amount.¶ If they had a little money…¶ ¶ If
Washington is spending less than it should, falling tax revenues are partly to blame. Revenue from
taxes on petrol and diesel flow into trust funds that are the primary source of federal money for roads
and mass transit. That flow has diminished to a drip. America's petrol tax is low by international standards, and has not
gone up since 1993 (see chart 3). While the real value of the tax has eroded, the cost of building and
maintaining infrastructure has gone up. As a result, the highway trust fund no longer supports even
current spending. Congress has repeatedly been forced to top up the trust fund, with $30 billion since 2008.¶ Other rich nations avoid
these problems. The cost of car ownership in Germany is 50% higher than it is in America, thanks to higher taxes on cars and petrol and higher
fees on drivers' licences. The result is a more sustainably funded transport system. In 2006 German road fees brought in 2.6 times the money
spent building and maintaining roads. American road taxes collected at the federal, state and local level covered just 72% of the money spent
on highways that year, according to the Brookings Institution, a think-tank.¶ The
federal government is responsible for only
a quarter of total transport spending, but the way it allocates funding shapes the way things are done
at the state and local levels. Unfortunately, it tends not to reward the prudent, thanks to formulas
that govern over 70% of federal investment. Petrol-tax revenues, for instance, are returned to the states according to the
miles of highway they contain, the distances their residents drive, and the fuel they burn. The system is awash with perverse incentives. A state
using road-pricing to limit travel and congestion would be punished for its efforts with reduced funding, whereas one that built highways it
could not afford to maintain would receive a larger allocation.¶ Formula-determined block grants to states are, at least, designed to leave
important decisions to local authorities. But the formulas used to allocate the money shape infrastructure planning in a remarkably blockheaded manner. Cost-benefit studies are almost entirely lacking. Federal guidelines for new construction tend to reflect politics rather than
anything else.
States tend to use federal money as a substitute for local spending, rather than to
supplement or leverage it. The Government Accountability Office estimates that substitution has risen substantially since the 1980s,
and increases particularly when states get into budget difficulties. From 1998 to 2002, a period during which economic fortunes were generally
deteriorating, state and local transport investment declined by 4% while federal investment rose by 40%. State
and local shrinkage is
almost certainly worse now.¶ States can make bad planners. Big metropolitan areas—Chicago, New York and
Washington among them—often sprawl across state lines. State governments frequently bicker over how (and how much) to invest. Facing
tight budget constraints, New Jersey's Republican governor, Chris Christie, recently scuttled a large project to expand the railway network into
New York City. New Jersey commuter trains share a 100-year-old tunnel with Amtrak, a major bottleneck. Mr Christie's decision was widely
criticised for short-sightedness; but New Jersey faced cost overruns that in a better system should have been shared with other potential
beneficiaries all along the north-eastern corridor. Regional planning could help to avoid problems like this.¶ Please, not again¶ What is to be
done?¶ The rehabilitation of America's transport network will be neither easy nor cheap. To
make the necessary repairs and
upgrades, America will need to spend a lot more. In a deficit-conscious environment, that will require
new revenue . The most straightforward first step would be a rise in fuel-tax rates, currently at 18.4 cents a gallon. But petrol-tax
increases are even more unpopular than deficits, and rises may prove riskier as oil prices increase.¶ Some in Washington
would rather take their cut further away from consumers. A tax on oil, rather than petrol, could be a little easier for consumers to stomach.
America's big oil producers signalled openness to a similar policy during negotiations over the ill-fated but bipartisan Kerry-Graham-Lieberman
climate bill. It could return as a means to fund infrastructure.¶ Economists press for direct user fees. An early Obama administration flirtation
with a tax on miles driven attracted little support, but some cities have run, or are thinking of running, pilot schemes. Congestion charges
present another possibility.
State governments have increasingly turned to tolls to fund individual projects,
but tolling inevitably meets stiff public resistance. Meanwhile, Manhattan's attempt to duplicate the congestion charges of
London and Stockholm failed to win the necessary political support, despite the offer of a generous federal subsidy in return for trying the
experiment. An earlier attempt to auction scarce landing and departure slots at New York's three large airports faced stiff resistance from
airlines and was ultimately killed.¶ Whatever
the source of new revenue, America's Byzantine funding system
will remain an obstacle to improved planning. Policymakers are looking for ways around these constraints. Supporters of a
National Infrastructure Bank—Mr Obama among them—believe it offers America just such a shortcut. A bank would use strict cost-benefit
analyses as a matter of course, and could make interstate investments easier. A European analogue, the European Investment Bank, has turned
out to work well. Co-owned by the member states of the European Union, the EIB holds some $300 billion in capital which it uses to provide
loans to deserving projects across the continent. EIB funding may provide up to half the cost for projects that satisfy EU objectives and are
judged cost-effective by a panel of experts.¶ American leaders hungrily eye the private money the EIB attracts, spying a potential solution to
their own fiscal dilemma. But there are no free lunches. To
keep project costs down, the bank must offer low rates,
which depend in turn upon low capital costs. That may be impossible without government backing , but
the spectacular failure of the two government-sponsored housing organisations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, illustrates the dangers of such
an arrangement. The EIB mitigates this problem by attempting to maximise public return rather than profit. To earn funding, projects must
meet developmental and environmental goals, along with other requirements. But giving the bank a public mission would invite congressional
oversight—and tempt legislators to meddle in funding decisions. The right balance of government support and independence may prove
elusive.¶ Budget crises could give a boost to public-private partnerships. Partnerships can be a useful way to screen out poorly conceived
projects that are unlikely to generate the promised returns. No private firm will bid to build and operate a project that will probably fail to cover
its costs through toll or fare revenue. Well-designed contracts can also improve incentives by giving the construction firm a long-run interest in
the project. Infrastructure projects built through public-private partnerships in Britain and Chile, where the arrangement is far more common
than in America, have sometimes, though not always, been completed more cheaply and quickly than public plans.¶
At the state and
local level transport budgets will remain tight while unemployment is high. With luck, this pressure
could spark a wave of innovative planning focused on improving the return on infrastructure
spending. The question in Washington, apart from how to escape the city on traffic-choked Friday afternoons, is whether political leaders
are capable of building on these ideas. The early signs are not encouraging.¶
2AC – Oil Dependence Impact XT
Oil dependence driven warming causes multiple scenarios for conflict, kills readiness,
and prevents quick disaster response capabilities
Beddor et al, Center for American Progress National Security Intern, 9
(Christopher, Winny Chen is a Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress, Rudy deLeon is the
Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at Center for American Progress,
Shiyong Park is an intern with the National Security team at the Center for American Progress Action
Fund, Daniel J. Weiss is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Climate Strategy at American Progress, Center
for American Progress, August 2009, “Securing America’s Future: Enhancing Our National Security by
Reducing Oil Dependence and Environmental Damage,” p. 8-9,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_security.pdf, accessed 6-29-12, CNM)
The significant contribution of oil combustion to global warming leads to serious national security concerns as
well. As mentioned earlier, oil consumption results in far-spanning and acute environmental damage, including global warming. In 2007, the
CNA Military Advisory Board published a study on the effect of climate change on American security interests. Their study found that “climate
change poses a serious threat to America’s national security ... [It] acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the
most vola- tile regions of the world.” It will: • Create destabilizing conditions, including reduced access to fresh water,
impaired food production, health catastrophes, and loss of land, which will place additional strains on weak
governments. • Exacerbate marginal living standards in developing countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,
creating widespread instability and increasing the likelihood of conflict, mass migrations, and failed states.
Make Defense Department operations more vulnerable because extreme environmental conditions will
considerably increase operation and maintenance costs, compromise seal-level military bases, complicate
ship and aircraft operations, and expose the national power grid upon which DoD is heavily reliant. 32 These
findings were backed up by a 2007 Center for American Progress report, “The Security Challenges of Climate Change,” which in
addition to these findings identified other effects on national security. These included “increased U.S. border stress due
to the severe effects of climate change in parts of Mexico and the Caribbean” and a “strain on the capacity
of the United States—and in particular the U.S. military—to act as a ‘first responder’ to international
disasters and humanitarian crises due to their increased fre- quency, complexity, and danger.”33
A2: Domestic Oil Solves
Domestic oil can’t keep up with demand – we’d run out in 4 years
Beddor et al, Center for American Progress National Security Intern, ’09
(Christopher, Winny Chen is a Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress, Rudy deLeon is the
Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at Center for American Progress,
Shiyong Park is an intern with the National Security team at the Center for American Progress Action
Fund, Daniel J. Weiss is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Climate Strategy at American Progress,
Center for American Progress, August 2009, Center for American Progress, “Securing America’s Future:
Enhancing Our National Security by Reducing Oil Dependence and Environmental Damage,”
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_security.pdf, pg. 3, accessed 6-29-12,
CNM)
Even with a slowdown in U.S. consumption over the last several months, domestic oil pro- duction cannot keep up
with demand. U.S. oil production has steadily declined since the mid-1980s, and today the United States has a
consumption rate of over 5 billion barrels per year, while production hovers at only 1.8 billion barrels.6 The
“drill, baby, drill” crowd believes that the United States can reduce its use of imported oil by vigorously developing domestic oil reserves.
Unfortunately, this sloganeering doesn’t hold up to the facts. The amount
of oil in proven U.S. reserves—reserves that the United
States is fairly certain it can extract oil from in the future—has steadily deceased since the late 1970s from 31.8 billion
barrels in 1977 to 21 billion barrels in 2007.7 This means even if we drilled and produced all the U.S. oil
reserves it would be exhausted in only about four years if consumption remains constant.
A2: Friendly Countries
Exports from reliable neighbors is unsustainable
Beddor et al, Center for American Progress National Security Intern, ’09
(Christopher, Winny Chen is a Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress, Rudy deLeon is the
Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at Center for American Progress,
Shiyong Park is an intern with the National Security team at the Center for American Progress Action
Fund, Daniel J. Weiss is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Climate Strategy at American Progress,
Center for American Progress, August 2009, Center for American Progress, “Securing America’s Future:
Enhancing Our National Security by Reducing Oil Dependence and Environmental Damage,”
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_security.pdf, pg. 5, accessed 6-29-12,
CNM)
Increasing oil exports from reliable neighbors is a good development, but it will not continue for much
longer. Canada appears to have sufficient reserves to last over 100 years if it continues at its current level of production, but
the majority of Canada’s oil is in oil sand reserves—an extremely dirty fuel that is expensive to refine. Strip
mining, water pollution, and toxic hydrogen sulfide production hinder the extraction of oil sands, 15 and the process is the lead- ing cause of
greenhouse gases in Canada, emitting 40 million tons of carbon dioxide per year. 16 These harmful environmental consequences
make oil sands unsustainable,17 and Canada’s oil production will likely diminish in the near future as a result. Meanwhile,
Mexico’s crude oil produc- tion has fallen 17.3 percent just since 2004,18 and its primary oil fields will be
depleted within a decade.
2AC – Nuclear Terrorism Add-On
State budget cuts kill higher education and ruins and cuts financial aid to universities –
specifically kills STEM education
OLIFF ET EL 13 (Phil,, policy analyst at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Vincent Palacios,
research associate at CBPP, Ingrid Johnson intern at CBPP, Michael Leachman, director of state fiscal
research, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Recent Deep State Higher Education Cuts May Harm
Students and the Economy for Years to Come” http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3927 accessed
7/31/14 KR)
As states prepare their budgets for the coming year, they face the challenge of reinvesting in public
higher education systems after years of damaging cuts — the product of both the economic downturn
and states’ reluctance to raise additional revenues. In the past five years, state cuts to higher education
funding have been severe and almost universal. After adjusting for inflation:¶ States are spending $2,353 or 28
percent less per student on higher education, nationwide, in the current 2013 fiscal year than they did
in 2008, when the recession hit.¶ Every state except for North Dakota and Wyoming is spending less per student on higher education than they
did prior to the recession.[1]¶ In many states the cuts over the last five years have been remarkably deep. Eleven
states have cut funding by more than one-third per student, and two states — Arizona and New
Hampshire — have cut their higher education spending per student in half.¶ Deep state funding cuts have major
implications for public colleges and universities. States (and to a lesser extent localities) provide 53 percent of the
revenue that can be used to support instruction at these schools.[2] When this funding is cut, colleges and universities
generally must either cut spending, raise tuition to cover the gap, or both. ¶ That’s what has happened since the recession hit. More specifically, colleges and
universities have:¶ Increased tuition. Public
colleges and universities across the country have increased tuition to
compensate for declining state funding. Annual published tuition at four-year public colleges has grown by $1,850, or 27 percent, since the
2007-08 school year, after adjusting for inflation.[3] There has been great variation across the states. In two states — Arizona and California — published tuition at
four-year schools is up more than 70 percent, while other states’ universities and many two-year colleges have held tuition increases closer to the rate of inflation.
Major increases in federal student aid and tax credits, on average, have fallen well short of covering
these increases.¶ These sharp increases in tuition have accelerated longer-term trends of reducing
college affordability and shifting costs from states to students. The College Board reports that the price of attending a fouryear public college or university, even after accounting for increased federal financial aid and tax subsidies, has grown significantly faster than the growth in median
income over the last 20 years.[4]¶
Cut spending, often in ways that may diminish the quality of education. Tuition
increases have made up only part of the revenue loss resulting from state funding cuts. Public colleges
and universities also have cut faculty positions, eliminated course offerings, closed campuses, shut
down computer labs, and reduced library services, among other cuts. For example, Arizona’s university system cut more
than 2,100 positions; merged, consolidated or eliminated 182 colleges, schools, programs and departments; and closed eight extension campuses (local campuses
that facilitate distance learning).[5]¶ Reversing these trends and reinvesting in higher education should be a high priority for state policymakers. A large and growing
share of future jobs will require college-educated workers.[6] Investing in higher education to keep tuition low and quality high at public colleges and universities,
and to provide financial aid to those students who need it most, would help states to develop the skilled workforce they will need to compete for these jobs. ¶ But
policymakers will need to make sound tax and budget decisions in the coming years if they are to renew state investment in higher education. Significant
investments in higher education in most states may require raising new revenue, as state revenues have yet to recover from the recession and a wide range of other
crucial public services also require reinvestment after years of deep cuts. ¶ Conversely, states that enact deep tax cuts will make it much more difficult to rebuild
their higher education systems and jeopardize their ability to compete for the jobs of the future. Florida
governor Rick Scott, for example,
is calling for $135 million in business tax cuts at a time when Florida’s higher education funding has
fallen by 41 percent over the last five years. Other states considering tax cuts also have reduced their higher education funding
substantially in response to the recession.¶¶ States Have Cut Higher Education Funding Deeply Since the Start of the Recession¶ Public colleges and universities
educate over three-quarters of the nation’s undergraduates.[7] In
2012 state and local government revenue made up 53
percent of educational revenue (revenue that can be used to support instruction) at public higher
education institutions.[8] The great majority of that 53 percent comes from state tax revenue.[ 9]¶ States
have cut higher education funding deeply. Comparing current 2013 fiscal year spending with spending in fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year just prior to the recession,
and adjusting for enrollment and inflation, we find that: ¶ State spending nationwide is down $2,353 or 28 percent. ¶ Every state except North Dakota and Wyoming
has cut funding.¶ Thirty-six states have cut funding by more than 20 percent. ¶ Eleven states have cut funding by more than one-third.¶ The two states making the
largest cuts by percentage, Arizona and New Hampshire, have cut their higher education spending in half.[10] (See Figures 1 and 2.)¶ ¶ Why Have States Cut Higher
Education?¶ The cuts have resulted from state and federal responses to the deep recession and continued weak recovery. ¶
State tax revenues fell
very deeply and remain depressed. States are required to balance their budgets annually. The
recession of 2007-09 hit state revenues hard, and the slow recovery continues to affect them.
Persistently high unemployment and still-depressed housing values have left people with less income
and less purchasing power. As a result, states are taking in less income and sales tax revenue, the
main sources of revenue states use to fund education and other services. Indeed, state tax revenues remain 6 percent
below 2008 levels after adjusting for inflation.[11¶ Limited revenues must support more students. Higher education dollars are spread over increasing numbers of
students. In part due to the “baby boom echo” causing a surge in the 18- to 24-year-old population, enrollment in public higher education increased by about 1.3
million full-time equivalent students, or 12.4 percent, between the beginning of the recession and the 2011-12 academic year (the latest year for which there is
data).[12] ¶ Other areas of state budgets are under pressure also. For example, about 535,000 more K-12 students are enrolled in the current school year than were
enrolled in 2007-08.[13] An estimated 3.9 million more people were eligible for subsidized health insurance through Medicaid in 2012 than were enrolled in 2008,
as employers have cancelled health coverage and people have lost jobs and wages.[6][14] ¶ States could have reduced the size of spending cuts by enacting
significant new revenues, but many chose not to. States have disproportionately relied on spending cuts to close the very large budget shortfalls they have faced
over the last several years, rather than a more balanced mix of spending cuts and revenue increases. Between fiscal years 2008 and 2012, states closed 45 percent
of their budget gaps through spending cuts and only 16 percent of their budget gaps through taxes and fees (they closed the remainder of their shortfalls with
federal aid, reserves, and various other measures). States could have lessened the need for deep cuts to higher education funding if they had been more willing to
raise additional revenue.¶ The federal government allowed aid to states to expire prematurely. States used emergency funds from the federal government
(including both education aid and increased Medicaid funds) to cover roughly one-third of their shortfalls through the 2011 fiscal year. After the 2011 fiscal year, the
federal government allowed this aid to expire, even though states continued to face very large shortfalls in 2012 and beyond.[15]¶ Cuts Have Driven Up Tuition¶
Public colleges and universities across the country have increased tuition to help make up for lost state revenue.[16] As a result, the average cost of attending a
public college or university — particularly a four-year institution — has surged in recent years. ¶ Average annual published tuition at four-year public colleges — the
“sticker price” — has grown by $1,850, or 27 percent, in real terms between the 2007-08 school year, the year just prior to the recession, and the current 2012-13
school year.¶ Tuition increases have been both substantial and widespread. Since the 2007-08 school year, after adjusting for inflation, the average tuition at public
four-year colleges has increased by:¶ More than 50 percent in seven states;¶ More than 25 percent in 18 states; and¶ More than 15 percent in 40 states. [17] (See
Figures 3 and 4.)¶ Two states, Arizona and California, have increased tuition by more than 70 percent. ¶ Significant boosts in federal student aid and in the value of
federal tax credits have reduced the impact of these tuition hikes on students and their families, but only partially so. Beginning in 2009, the federal government
significantly increased Pell Grant awards for low-income families. The federal government also expanded a key higher education tax credit that mostly helps middleincome families and is available to individuals with incomes up to $80,000 and married couples with incomes up to $160,000. With few exceptions, states
themselves have not increased financial aid to offset rising tuitions; per-student state grant aid has actually fallen slightly since the 2007-08 school year, after
adjusting for inflation.[18]¶ Thanks to the boost in federal assistance, the College Board calculates that the annual value of grant aid and higher education tax
benefits for students at four year public colleges has increased by an average of $1,410 in real terms since the 2007-08 school year, enough to offset over three
quarters of the $1,850 tuition increase paid by the average student nationwide.[19] But since the sticker price increases have varied so much while federal grant and
tax-credit amounts are basically the same across all states, students in states with large tuition increases (such as Arizona or New Hampshire) undoubtedly have
borne a much higher share of the increased cost, while students in states with smaller tuition increases may have realized net reductions in cost.¶ The cost of
college has spiked even as the recession and its aftermath have diminished students’ and their families’ financial resources. Between 2007 and 2011, even as
tuitions surged, real median household income fell by 8.1 percent.[20] While the recession has ended, the slow recovery has meant continued high unemployment
and still-depressed real estate values, leaving many families in a precarious financial position. ¶ It is worth noting that, in contrast to these trends, two-year colleges
generally have increased their tuition rates less than four-year colleges during the recession, both in dollar terms and in percentage terms. In fact, the College Board
estimates that the increases have been small enough that — after taking into account increased federal aid and tax credits — the net cost to an average student for
attending a community college has gone down during the recession. Here again, however, there are significant state-to-state variations, with community college
tuition rising more than $1,000 above inflation in Massachusetts, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington.[21] ¶ Public Colleges and Universities Also Have Cut Staff
and Eliminated Programs¶ Recent tuition increases, while substantial in most states, have fallen far short of fully replacing the funding that public colleges and
universities have lost due to state funding cuts. ¶ Between 2009 and 2010 (the latest year for which data is available), tuition increases offset: ¶ Just over 60 percent
of cuts to funding that state and local governments provided to public colleges that offer graduate degrees; ¶ About 30 percent of the cuts to funding that state and
local governments provided to public colleges that offer bachelor’s degrees but not graduate degrees; and ¶ Only 14 percent of the cuts to funding that state and
local governments provided to community colleges.[22] ¶ Because tuition increases have not compensated for the loss of state funding, public colleges and
universities have simultaneously cut spending to make up for declining state funding. ¶ Data on spending at public institutions of higher learning in recent years are
incomplete, but considerable evidence suggests that public colleges and universities have constrained spending to make up for lost state funding, often in ways that
reduce the quality and availability of their academic offerings. For example, since the start of the recession, in response to state budget cuts:¶ Arizona’s university
system cut more than 2,100 positions; consolidated or eliminated 182 colleges, schools, programs, and departments; and closed eight extension campuses (local
campuses that facilitate distance learning).[23]¶ The University of California laid off 4,200 staff and eliminated or left unfilled another 9,500 positions; instituted a
system-wide furlough program, reducing salaries by 4 to 10 percent; consolidated or eliminated more than 180 programs; and cut funding for campus
administrative and academic departments by as much as 35 percent.[24] ¶ California’s community colleges have cut enrollment by 485,000 students or about 17
percent, cut course offerings by 15 percent resulting in hundreds of thousands of students being denied access to classes, increased class sizes, laid off faculty and
staff, and instituted furloughs.[25] ¶ The University of Colorado system between 2009 and 2011 laid off 339 staff and faculty, even as enrollment grew by 2,100
students.[26]¶ The University System of Louisiana furloughed 727 employees, laid off another 210 staff and faculty members, and cut 217 academic programs. In
addition, campuses have reduced library services and cut funding for athletics, student scholarships, and research.[27] ¶ Since 2007, the University of Nevada-Las
Vegas eliminated more than 700 faculty and staff positions, 15 academic programs, and 31 degree programs.[28]¶ The University of New Hampshire eliminated
nearly 200 staff positions, implemented a hiring freeze, and froze staff salaries.[29] ¶ The University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill eliminated 493 positions, cut
16,000 course seats, increased class sizes, cut its centrally supported computer labs from seven to three, and eliminated two distance education centers. [30] ¶ Since
2009, Highline Community College in Washington eliminated 72 staff positions, increased the number of courses taught by part-time faculty, and reduced Adult
Basic Education and English-as-a-Second-Language programs by 10 percent.[31]¶ Nationwide, employment at public colleges and universities has grown modestly
since the start of the recession, but that growth has been well below the growth in the number of students. Between the 2007-08 and the 2011-12 school years the
number of full-time equivalent instructional staff at public colleges and universities grew by about 6 percent, while the number of students at these institutions
grew by 12 percent. As a result, the ratio of students to instructors grew from 19.7 to 1 to 20.9 to 1 during that period. ¶ In five states — California, Maine,
Minnesota, Nevada, and New Hampshire — full-time equivalent instructional staff at public colleges and universities fell between the 2007-08 and the 2011-12
school years, even as enrollment grew.[32]¶ Funding Cuts and Tuition Increases Exacerbate a Longer-Term Erosion of Higher Education Affordability¶ The decline in
state funding and the resulting rise in tuition since the start of the recession have accelerated a longer-term cost shift from states to students and families. ¶ For at
least the last quarter-century, state and local funding for higher education has been dropping, and tuition has been increasing. Per-student revenue from state and
local governments fell by $2,600, after adjusting for inflation, between 1987 and 2012. During that same period, per-student tuition increased by $2,600. In other
words, the entire increase in tuition at public colleges and universities over the last 25 years has gone to make up for declining state and local revenue, leaving no
additional funding available to improve programs and services or fund costs that are rising faster than the rate of inflation such as employee health care. ¶ This
trend has meant that students have assumed much greater responsibility for paying for public higher education without those institutions receiving more money to
fund quality improvements. In 1987, public colleges and universities received 3.3 times as much in revenue from state and local governments as they did from
students. They now receive about 1.1 times as much from states and localities as from students. ¶ The cost shift from states to students has not occurred in a steady,
straightforward way. During and immediately following recessions, state and local funding for higher education has tended to plummet, while tuition has tended to
spike. Funding has tended to largely recover, and tuitions have tended to stabilize, during periods of economic growth.[33] But the long-term trend is clear: states
have been reducing their contributions to public higher education, while students have been picking up a larger share of the costs. (See Figure 5.)¶ This trend —
along with slow growth in middle-class incomes — has caused a decline in higher education affordability. As students have shouldered greater responsibility for
paying for college, the growth in the cost of their education has far outstripped the growth in students’ and their families’ financial resources. Over the 20-year
period between 1991 and 2011 (the latest year for which there is data), median household income grew by about 3 percent, after adjusting for inflation.[34]
Between the 1990-1991 and the 2012-13 school years (the current school year), tuition at four-year public colleges grew by 159 percent in real terms. Grants and
tax benefits for higher education also grew during that time, somewhat mitigating the growth in the cost to students. But even after taking those grants and tax
benefits into account, the cost of college grew by 58 percent in real terms, well above the rate of growth in household income.[35]¶ Adequate Financing for State
Higher Education Systems Will Be Required for Student Success and National Prosperity¶ Reinvesting
in public higher education should
be an urgent priority for policymakers who are concerned about the long-term economic success of
their state and its residents. Diminished educational resources and rising tuition at the nation’s public colleges and universities have serious
consequences for students, their families, and the broader economy. ¶ Rapidly Rising Tuition Threatens College Access and Burdens Students with Increasing Levels
of Debt¶ Rapidly rising tuition makes it less likely that students will attend college. Research has consistently found that college price increases result in declining
enrollment.[36] While many universities and the federal government provide financial aid to help students bear the price, research suggests that both the
advertised tuition cost and the actual price net of aid affect whether students go to college; in other words, a high sticker price can dissuade students from enrolling
even if the net price doesn’t rise.¶ Research further suggests that college cost increases have the biggest impact on students from low income families. For example,
a 1995 study by Harvard University researcher Thomas Kane concluded that states that had the largest tuition increases during the 1980’s and early 1990’s “saw the
greatest widening of the gaps in enrollment between high- and low-income youth.”[37]¶ Gaps in college enrollment among higher- and lower-income youth are
already pronounced, even among prospective students of similar ability levels. In a 2008 piece, Georgetown University scholar Anthony Carnavale pointed out that
“among the most highly qualified students (the top testing 25 percent), the kids from the top socioeconomic group go to four-year colleges at almost twice the rate
of equally qualified kids from the bottom socioeconomic quartile.”[38] (See Figure 6.) Rapidly rising costs at public colleges and universities likely widen these gaps
further.¶ For those who do attend college, rapidly rising costs make it more likely that they will need to work a significant number of hours every week to finance
their education. Working a significant number of hours, in turn, places students at greater risk of dropping out of school. A 2003 study from the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found that students who work more than 20 hours a week are less likely to complete their degree.[39] ¶ Moreover, rising tuition
burdens students with mounting levels of debt. Indeed, student debt levels have swelled since the start of the recession. Between the 2007-08 and the 2010-11
school years, the amount of debt incurred by the average bachelor’s degree recipient at a public four-year institution grew from $11,800 to $13,600 (in 2011
dollars), an inflation adjusted increase of $1,800, or 15 percent. The average level of debt incurred had grown from $11,100 to $11,800, an increase of $700, or
about 6 percent, over the previous eight years.[40] ¶ Diminished Educational Resources May Make It Harder to Improve Graduation Rates and Academic Quality ¶
Research supports the idea that smart investments in higher education can help students — especially those from lower-income families — stay in school and
complete their degrees. Both instructional spending (spending directly related to classroom instruction) and student services spending (spending on counseling,
career guidance, tutoring, and other services intended to support students outside of the formal instructional program) positively affect student graduation rates
according to research by Ronald Ehrenberg and Douglas Webber of Cornell University.[41] Student services expenditures have a particularly large impact on the
graduation rates of students with lower levels of academic preparation and fewer financial resources. The authors’ findings make intuitive sense. Students with less
academic preparation and fewer financial resources are more likely to need intensive tutoring to ensure that they are keeping up with their coursework and
guidance navigating the complexities of college course offerings to ensure that they get the credits they need to graduate. But state funding cuts are reducing public
colleges and universities’ ability to make these kinds of investments. ¶ Additionally, funding cuts have made it harder for public colleges and universities to staff
classrooms with full time, tenure-tracked professors, which may also threaten student outcomes. Many schools have turned to part-time and non-tenure-track
faculty as a cost-saving measure, but the use of those types of instructors reduces the likelihood that students will graduate from college, according to a study by
Ehrenberg and Liang Zhang (also of Cornell).[42] Dr. Ehrenberg explained in an interview with the New York Times, “It’s not that some of these adjuncts aren’t great
teachers. Many don’t have the support that the tenure-track faculty have, in terms of offices, secretarial help, and time. Their teaching loads are higher, and they
have less time to focus on students.”[43] Another study by Paul Umbach of the University of Iowa finds that part-time and non-tenure track faculty spend less time
preparing for class, are less likely to challenge their students, and interact with students less frequently than their full-time, tenure-track peers.[44] ¶ Moreover,
increased class size and larger student loads for faculty — also consequences of reduced state aid — negatively affect student assessments of class quality,
according to research by James Monks and Robert Schmidt of the University of Richmond.[45] Funding Cuts Jeopardize Both Students’ and States’ Economic
Futures¶ The
reduced college access and reduced graduation rates that research suggests are likely to
result from budget cuts affect more than just the students, because college attainment has grown
increasingly important to long-term economic outcomes for states and the nation.¶ Getting a college degree is
increasingly a pre-requisite for professional success and for entry into the middle class or beyond. A young college graduate earns $12,000
a year more annually than someone who did not attend college, after adjusting for inflation,
according to research from the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. ¶ The benefits of academic attainment
extend beyond those who receive a degree; research suggests that the whole community benefits when more residents have college degrees. Areas
with
highly educated residents tend to attract strong employers who pay their employees competitive
wages. Those employees, in turn, buy goods and services from others in the community, broadly
benefitting the area’s economy. Economist Enrico Moretti of the University of California at Berkeley finds that as a result, the wages of workers at
all levels of education are higher in metropolitan areas with high concentrations of college-educated residents. This finding implies that — even though
not all good jobs require a college degree — having a highly educated workforce can boost an area’s
economic success.¶ And the economic importance of higher education will continue to grow into the
future. The Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce projects that by 2018, 62 percent of all jobs will require at least some college education. That
is up from 59 percent in 2007, 56 percent in 1992, and 28 percent in 1973. ¶ The Georgetown center further projects that the nation’s education system will not be
able to keep up with the rising demand for educated workers. By 2018 the county’s system of higher education will produce 3 million fewer college graduates than
the labor market will demand, Georgetown projects. ¶ The
increase in student debt in recent years also has important
implications for the broader economy. While debt is a crucial tool for financing higher education,
excessive debt can impose considerable costs on both students and society as a whole. Research finds
that higher student debt levels are associated with lower rates of homeownership among young
adults;[50] can create stresses that reduce the probability of graduation, particularly for students
from lower-income families;[51] and reduce the likelihood that graduates with majors in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics will go on to graduate school . ¶ This research suggests that states should
strive to expand college access and increase college graduation rates to help build a strong middle class and develop the skilled workforce needed to compete in
today’s global economy. It suggests further that the severe higher education funding cuts that states have made since the start of the recession will make it harder
to achieve those goals.
Domestic scientists needed now and are key to nuclear attribution —- deters state
sponsorship, the vital internal link to nuclear terrorism
May 8 (Michael, Professor – Stanford University, APS and AAAS, "Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the
Art, and Program Needs", https://seaborg.llnl.gov/docs/nuclearForensics_role-stateoftheartprogramneeds.pdf i-ii, accessed 8/2/14 KR)
A believable attribution capability may help to discourage behavior that could lead to a nu- clear
event. The chain of participants in a nuclear terrorist event most likely includes a national government
or its agents, since nearly all nuclear weapons usable material is at least notionally the responsibility
of governments. A forensics capability that can trace material to the originat- ing reactor or
enrichment facility could discourage state cooperation with terrorist elements¶ and encourage better
security for nuclear weapon usable materials. In addition, most terrorist organizations will not have
members skilled in all aspects of handling nuclear weapons or build- ing an improvised nuclear device.
That expertise is found in a small pool of people and a credible ¶ attribution capability may deter
some who are principally motivated by financial, rather than ideological, concerns.¶ There is an
important difference between nuclear foren- sics as it is practiced today and the analysis of foreign nuclear tests as it was practiced during the Cold War and for some time thereafter, even though both rest
on the same scientific base. Nuclear forensics for attribution involves comparing data and analyses from
the samples recovered to data and analyses from samples from identified sources. Forensic analysis for
attribution therefore requires that data concerning foreign-origin material be available. Some of these
data exist in the United States but many more reside abroad, in international and national databases,
in sample archives, and elsewhere. Therefore, nuclear forensic analy- sis would benefit from as much
international cooperation as possible.¶ Following a nuclear explosion, trained forensics teams would
need to promptly gather highly radioactive samples from fallout and from the atmosphere. These
samples then would have to be safely and promptly transported to United States and possibly other
laboratories. Close coordination among the FBI (if the explosion occurs in the United States) and/or local
authorities (if elsewhere), first responders, and forensics teams is necessary.¶ Nuclear forensics results
such as origin and history of materials and type of explosive device are not available im- mediately.
Some constraints come from nature; some from personnel and equipment availability; some are due to
the iterative nature of interpreting nuclear data, where initial results are fed into computer codes before
being subject to further analysis. Political leaders will face a period of uncertainty that could range from
days to months, during which forensics and other attribution information gradually becomes available.¶
Nuclear forensics relies on physical, isotopic, and chemi- cal analyses of radioactive and sometimes
microscopic quantities of materials, including impurities and such things as crystal structures and surface
finishes where available. Facilities for such analyses exist at the U.S. DOE laborato- ries and, on various
scales, at a number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), foreign government, and university
laboratories around the world. A number of these facilities participated in the analysis of intercepted
nuclear weapon usable materials in the past several years. In the event of a nuclear detonation or
other nuclear emergency, U.S. facilities would be badly stretched in several respects. The trained
specialists needed are too few and would be overcommitted; a high proportion of them are close to
retirement age and the ability to replace them and augment their number is inadequate and underfunded. Labora-¶ tory facilities are not up to the most modern and effective standards that prevail in
some other countries such as Japan and France. Specialized field-deployable equipment to make key
early measurements in the affected area needs to be improved and tested. As a result, there could be
unneces- sary delays of days or more in getting forensic results of importance to the overall process of
attribution, at a time when it can be readily foreseen that there would be very high pressure for reliable
attribution data if the origin of a nuclear explosion were undetermined.¶ Nuclear forensics remains a
technically complex chal- lenge for the scientific and law enforcement communities. The difficulty in
successful forensics work, especially as part of an attribution process, should not be underestimated.
However, the potential for nuclear forensics to play a crucial role in analysis of both pre- and postdetonation materials is enormous. The problems of a declining pool of technically competent
scientists, the need for new technology, and the utility of international cooperation, all point to the
need for a set of new initiatives in order to maximize the potential impact of nuclear forensics.
Nuclear terrorism is likely – results in extinction.
Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al.,
April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and
acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf
To an increasing extent, people
are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with
populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear
explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city.
We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities
approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in
the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three
countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these
countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover,
even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the
entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive
contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized
nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic
consequences . Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against
city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and
terrorists would be most
likely to strike there . Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists
supported by such a state,
could generate casualties comparable to those
once
predicted for a full-scale
nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict . Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke
generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant
global climate perturbations
(Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include
potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale
nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical
outcomes.
1AR – Terrorism Leads to Extinction XT
Attacks are likely and will escalate.
Vladimir Z. Dvorkin ‘12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior
fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International
Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear
Terrorism is a Real Threat,"
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what_can_destroy_strategic_stability.html
Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat
with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to
combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on
Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this
sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these
efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various
acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional
explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of
radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weaponsuseable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “ dirty bombs ” will not cause many immediate casualties, but
it will
result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-
economic destabilization .¶ Severe consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants,
research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to
such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple
of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities
located nearby. The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at
facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these
efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear
facilities .¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose
hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become
uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists
that poses the maximum risk. There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists
decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device. Information on the design of such devices, as well
as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that
presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials
can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible . Research
reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of
countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium
fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium
bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on
Hiroshima . The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of
thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and
political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at
transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries.
These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A
nuclear
terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these
measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states
could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will
delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the
attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they
do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists
have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous
population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause violent protests in the
Muslim world. Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow. The prediction that Samuel
Huntington has made in his book “ The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may
come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems.
Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially
dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of
Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability. BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list
because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend
against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global
and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top
of the list.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to
a radical transformation of the global order .
All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies
by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.
A2: Nuclear Terror Not Possible
The risk of a nuclear terror attack is high now.
Matthew, et al, 10/2/13 [ Bunn, Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov,
Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear
Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October
2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCoPrincipal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research
fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military
Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin.
Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian
Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the
General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard
University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security
expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear
Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear
Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed
Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of
Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the
Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed
Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to
1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to
1998.http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html
]
In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute
for U.S. and Canadian Studies published “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism.” The assessment
I. Introduction
analyzed the means , motives , and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the
threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real . The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits
in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders from around the
world that nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet . For any
country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster, and
the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the
detonation. Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires
international
cooperation
to secure nuclear materials, especially
among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the world’s two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in
securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of
convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted
for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States
have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership
with other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen
and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might
be addressed. This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. “The
U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism” (The 2011 report executive summary): •
Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat.
The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited
damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam ; by
the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased
availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move
people, technologies, and materials across the world. • Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is
Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk.
potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous
government
studies have confirmed . Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical
Terrorists could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon
and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own. • The nuclear material for a bomb is
small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover
nuclear material after it has been stolen. Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being
stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. • Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons
safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs).
for almost two decades . The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or
nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise . Al-Qaeda reportedly
conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan. The group’s
nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership
are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass
destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear
use . While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group’s activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the
group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions
probably has reduced the group’s ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However,
abandoned its nuclear ambitions.
On the contrary,
there is no sign the group has
leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that
the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever .
2AC – Poverty Add-On
State budget cuts cut funding to basic social services like food, investigations, abuse
against children, domestic, elders, and people with disabilities
CWDA and CSAC 9 (County Welfare Directors Association of California and California State
Associations of Counties, April 2009, “Human Services in a Time of Economic Crisis”
http://www.cwda.org/uploads/CSAC-CWDA-Joint-Repor0409.pdf page 12-15 accessed 7/31/14 KR)
The worsening economy and the state’s budget- balancing decisions have required counties to
respond with cost-cutting measures that affect their ability to provide core services. These cuts have a
direct negative impact on individuals and families seeking help.¶ Deep cuts into core safety net services.¶ Counties
have made significant cuts to program operations – including staffing, contracted¶ services, program integrity activities, and other basic
operations – to mitigate their diminishing federal, state and local funds.¶ ���� Already inadequate staffing levels have been further reduced.
Even as counties experience insufficient staffing levels, they have continued to steadily reduce positions over the last eight years to cut costs.
This has been accomplished via unfilled vacancies, eliminated positions, hiring freezes, and, most recently,¶ 12¶ layoffs and furloughs. To
quantify what the statewide funding cuts mean to safety-net services, it is possible to postulate what the impact has been on staffing alone.
Based on actual cost and workload data, the cumulative funding loss from the combined deficit and
budget cuts calculates into a statewide loss of 9,297 workers across the spectrum of county- operated
human services programs during the past eight years.25¶ Counties continue to make direct cuts to staffing
levels. Many report that while 2008-09 has been bad, 2009-10 will be even worse. In the current fiscal year, Alameda County has left 14.6
percent of its positions vacant, Placer County has eliminated positions and left others vacant for a 20.7 percent reduction, and Amador County
has done the same for a 25.6 percent reduction in positions. Santa Cruz County reported 71 eliminated positions in the current year,
representing 13 percent of its workforce, and anticipates eliminating another 40 to 50 positions in 2009-10.¶ With respect to outright staff
layoffs, San Francisco reported 112 layoffs, Contra Costa Coutny 74, Tulare County 78, and several other counties reported small layoff
numbers. Many counties held positions vacant, ranging from 7 percent to 15 percent. In the current budget year, and projected for 2009-10,
counties are also implementing furloughs to reduce costs. Twelve counties reported mandatory or voluntary furloughs for some or all of their
staff. Los Angeles County, which this year held 1,000 positions vacant, noted that “with rising caseloads and insufficient funding to hire behind
attrition, we staff these programs at dangerously low levels.”26¶ ���� Millions of dollars of contracted services have been cut. County
human services departments often partner with community- based organizations or other county
departments to address the many needs of families and extend the effectiveness or integrity of their
programs. For example,¶ CalWORKs programs often contract for job training or substance abuse
treatment for participants in welfare-to-work, and most departments contract with their county
district attorneys for welfare fraud investigation and prosecution.¶ Counties surveyed by the California Budget
Project in 2008 reported that they reduced spending on contracts with community partners by a total of more than $37 million between 200405 and 2007-08.27 Out of 40 counties surveyed by CWDA in October 2008, nearly all reported reducing contracts in 2008-09 by an additional 10
to 20 percent, with Santa Barbara reporting an 80 percent reduction. Counties that reported dollar amounts showed a total of $13 million in
contract cuts.28 This year, Contra Costa County reduced the contract with its district attorney by 50 percent, and other counties also reported
reductions in this area.29¶ ���� Program
integrity activities are being scaled back. A number of counties are
cutting back on fraud prevention, investigation, and collection activities, including both in-house and
those conducted by the District Attorney (DA). More counties are considering doing so for the
upcoming fiscal year. Merced County reports reducing their DA fraud investigation services by half. Some, such as Amador and Contra
Costa counties, report they have reduced departmental staff for early-fraud prevention, and Imperial and Kern counties report they may do the
same.¶ Furthermore, some
counties are reducing income eligibility verification staff. With high caseloads for
existing staff, eligibility investigations may be incomplete or rushed. These factors can add to errors
that may or may not benefit applicants. For example, the state’s negative error rate for Food Stamps,
which measures whether benefits were correctly denied, suspended, or terminated, increased to 27.7
percent in October 2008, the highest in the nation. These errors add to workload for fraud
investigation and fair hearings, which¶ Human Services in a Time of Economic Crisis¶ 13¶ Human Services in a
Time of Economic Crisis¶ compounds the staff reductions to fraud prevention and investigations.¶ ���� Basic operations have been cut. In
addition to reducing staff and cutting contracts, counties have sought other ways to shave costs. Many counties have cut training programs and
information technology and have limited travel to geographically dispersed clients.31¶ Cuts
translate into reduced services and
adverse impacts.¶ The significant cuts made to human services program operating budgets do not
bode well for the vulnerable families who are seeking assistance or for their communities.32¶ ����
Access to needed services has declined . Reductions to basic operating costs affect the ability of
families to access services at a time when demand is soaring. About 20 percent of the counties
statewide have closed office sites or reduced office hours, including some counties that have done
both. Sacramento County indicates that it has closed one district office and is considering closing more offices. A number of additional
counties are considering closing offices and reducing office hours in the upcoming fiscal year.¶ Office closures and reductions in operating hours
result in families having less opportunity to obtain the services they need. Furthermore,
families may need to travel farther
to apply for benefits, an added time-consuming hardship. Several counties report that community members now need
to travel across town and in one case in Solano County, to another town 15 miles away, to obtain some services. Offices located in already
disadvantaged communities within counties are also being closed, making access to services more difficult for individuals who are already
particularly vulnerable in this economic downturn.¶ Even
when offices remain open, the hiring freezes and staff
furloughs often result in only minimal staffing. A number of counties have¶ been forced to reduce
staffing levels on some days to only those critical staff needed to provide emergency services. Some
counties report consolidating particular services in specific offices due to staffing issues, such that some services are no longer available in
communities where they previously existed.¶ ���� Determinations of
eligibility for services are potentially delayed.
All of these office and staffing reductions further compound the difficulties faced by county staff in
handling the dramatically increased volume of applications for services. And with thousands fewer
human services professionals on the job, it is increasingly difficult for applicants and clients to meet
with a worker. Already, in some locations, applicants are standing in long lines. In almost one-fifth of counties, appointments for an initial
eligibility interview for some programs must be pushed more than two weeks out, and in another seven counties appointments take between
one and two weeks to schedule. Again
applying actual cost and caseload data, the number of workers lost due
to funding deficits and cuts could cause delays in CalWORKs benefits and employment services to
almost 280,000 families statewide. That same calculation indicates delays in Food Stamp issuance to
472,000 families or individuals, and delays in Medi-Cal assistance to 342,000 applicants or clients.¶ ����
Welfare-to-Work services are being curtailed. The multi-million dollar cuts to contracted services have hit welfare-to-work services to
CalWORKs recipients particularly hard. More than one-quarter of counties specifically report scaling back on these services. In
addition to
cutting employment training, job search, career education, and job placement services, numerous
counties report reducing transportation reimbursements, making it difficult even for those recipients
who have managed to find jobs in this economy, let alone those who are still seeking employment. A
few counties also report that their ability to¶ 14¶ identify barriers to employment among their
CalWORKs clients is now compromised.¶ Besides affecting the ability of CalWORKs recipients to secure
employment, reductions in welfare-to-work services also have implications for the state. For example,
Butte County reports that it is eliminating home visits for non-compliant and sanctioned cases and will be granting good cause exemptions for
participants in remote locations who lack transportation. Butte County is not alone in expanding the use of good cause exemptions when the
county cannot provide transportation, child care, or other necessary services. San Bernardino County was able at one time to provide welfareto-work services to its Safety Net population (parents who have exhausted their 60-month time limit on aid), but has had to eliminate those
services. These trends are troubling for the state’s efforts to comply with federal work participation rate requirements and represent a reversal
of years of work to improve county capacity in these areas.¶ ���� Other
critical services are being reduced. In addition to
welfare-to-work and related services, counties are reducing other services that support families,
children, elder adults, and persons with disabilities. With respect to their CalWORKs clients, some
counties report reducing domestic violence services, learning disability and psychiatric evaluations,
and alcohol and other drug treatment services. Some counties are significantly reducing or eliminating
assistance to families who are homeless or at-risk of homelessness, making it more difficult for these
families to become self- sufficient.¶ However, the reductions go well beyond the CalWORKs program,
touching services to those who are already among the most vulnerable. Cuts to both the Child Welfare
Services (CWS) and Adult Protective Services (APS) programs are occurring in many counties, in some
cases for the first time in recent years. These programs are especially hard-hit in¶ counties that have
spent their own funds to backfill the significant historic funding gaps in CWS and APS, because
precipitously declining county revenues have made it nearly impossible for counties to continue this
practice.¶ In CWS, almost one-fifth of counties report making cuts to their programs. These cuts are resulting
in the elimination of preventive services provided to increasingly stressed families, as well as counseling and other services to children already
in the system. With counties scaling back to provide only the most essential services, they are left with the ability only to respond to allegations
and incidences of child abuse rather than be in a position to prevent abuse and keep families together. Some counties report they are reducing
efforts to recruit foster families and providing fewer services to support foster families.¶ The results of these cuts are siblings being separated
and children being placed in higher levels of care than needed. In general, with fewer workers, counties are missing opportunities for
prevention and case management that help avoid crises and higher- cost interventions over time.¶ Similarly, cuts to APS programs are leaving
elderly Californians and adults with disabilities progressively more vulnerable to abuse and neglect. Cases are increasingly being triaged, with
only the most severe and life-threatening receiving immediate attention. Response
time is delayed and face-to-face
investigations are being reduced. Cases are being closed more quickly in order for workers to manage
the caseload. Meeting all of the statutory mandates of the program is impossible, especially after a
direct cut of $11.4 million in 2008-09 after years of stagnant funding during which county purchasing
power fell further and further behind the actual cost of operating the program.
Poverty is an ethical and moral obligation of the policy and public sphere
Khali 4(Victor Mofuoa Khali, senior specialist ethics Ethics and Compliance Division, Vodacom Group
Ltd. He is also a former Assistant Lecturer/Research Assistant in Department of Applied Ethics at St.
Augustine College of South Africa, 25th AAPAM Annual Rountable Conference “Understanding Poverty in
Society: An Ethical Perspective”
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/aapam/unpan025673.pdf page 1- 13
accessed 8/2/14 KR)
ABSTRACT:¶ Poverty
constitutes a very controversial subject in society today. This is so because it has
virtually become a way of life. While some explanations argue that poverty is a natural phenomenon, others have argued that
poverty is a product of human activity. Thus there is no consensus regarding why poverty exists. Notwithstanding this, the phenomenon
of poverty can be felt, measured, defined and demonstrated. In addition, poor people can be
identified and ranked in accordance with their socio-economic status even though ethical aspects
need to be taken into account. Increasingly, analysts look for ethical issues in their analysis of poverty, attempting to find out the
connection between poverty and human behaviour. Theories of distributive justice become important tools upon
which studies pertaining to poverty in this regard draw. Such values are valued because of being
effective gateways into policy areas. They are useful as windows into policy- making process and
considerations when formulating public policy. While poverty belongs to the public sphere since it
affects people, it has moral and ethical implications.
Consequently, its investigation should not exclude moral and ethical
questions. This paper adopts an ethical perspective in dealing with the broad topic above, without discounting the value of other approaches. It
argues that a full understanding of poverty in society is contingent upon looking at the phenomenon’s moral and ethical dimensions including
the principles underlying public responses.¶ 2¶ The problem of poverty¶ For some analysts, including the author, poverty is a social menace. Of
course, recognizing that poverty exists is only part of the equation (Komba, 2002). Understanding why poverty exists for all practical purposes,
the most difficult one. Admirers of present socio-economic order in the world with its technological advancement, which has undoubtedly
helped to raise living standards, must sometimes be baffled that so many of the world’s citizens live in poverty. Even
if poverty is
accepted as a relative or absolute term in some of the world’s economies, it still baffles the
imagination to learn that the largest statistics of citizens of such economies live in poverty. For instance,
Shaw and Barry (1998) noted that over one in six US workers earns poverty-level wages and nearly one-third of the unemployed fail to collect
their statutory welfare entitlements. Surprisingly, this
is the case despite the fact that poverty is accepted as a
relative term in the world’s largest economy. By the same token, India – the world’s largest democracy, faces shocking level
of poverty. Of India’s 1.2 billion people, 700 million live in abject poverty (Sunday Times, October 2003). Such is the level of poverty in India, the
world’s second most populous country. Not that Africa and South Africa are any better. More than 40% of South Africa’s labour force is without
jobs and in certain parts of the country poverty level is way beyond 60% (Sunday Times, October 2003). Admittedly, this is a shocking reality of
poverty in the modern world, which boosts renowned technological advancement and democracies.¶ 3¶ The underlying reasons for poverty
cannot be understood without first considering wealth distribution in society. This is so because repeated studies have shown that poverty
coexists alongside wealth. Unfortunately, social, economic and political explanations seem to provide unreliable forecasts of poverty. Despite
national and international initiatives to eradicate poverty, the impoverished populations of the world are no better off today than they were
ten or twenty years ago (Komba, 2002). In its report “attacking poverty”, the World Bank points a gloomy picture of the conditions of the poor
in the world (World Bank, 2001). It is being acknowledged that the efforts of the past decade have made little dent on the ambitious goal of
“eradicating poverty”.¶ Clearly, the above picture points to the effect that there is “a void” in the theoretical explanations as to why poverty
exists. In that case, ethical
arguments for explaining why poverty exists appear to be incontestable. This is
so because the previous analysis singularly fails to mention the impact of ethical values on the
redistribution of wealth in society. Thus explanations of why poverty exists will be incomplete unless
they explore the different values and beliefs people hold about distributive justice, which are likely to
influence their political and socio-economic behaviour.¶ POVERTY IN SOCIETY: ESSENCE, MEANING AND BASIC THRUSTS¶
Poverty cannot escape definitional controversy as a social phenomenon. It has been struggling since the dawn of history to define itself. The
biblical injunctions say, “The poor ye have always with you”. This injuction¶ 4¶ underscores the difficulty of defining “poverty” or “the poor”. A
definition that promises to get us quickly out of the quagmire and take us close to understanding poverty is that provided by Baumal and
Blinder, (1994:425). According to them, there are two ways to define poverty. The more optimistic definition uses an absolute concept of
poverty: if you fall short of a certain minimum standard of living, you are poor; once you pass this standard, you are no longer poor. The second
definition is based on a relative concept of poverty: the poor are those who fall too far behind the average income.¶ Each definition has its pros
and cons. The basic problem with the absolute poverty concept is that it is arbitrary. Who sets the line? Most of the Basotho would be
delighted to live a bit below the South African poverty line and would consider them quite prosperous. Similarly, the standard of living that we
now call “poor” would have not been considered so some hundred years back in Lesotho. Clearly, poverty seems to be an issue of time and
space. Thus, different times and places apparently call for different poverty lines in society.¶ The fact that the concept of poverty is culturally,
not physiologically determined suggests that it must be a relative concept. For example, one suggestion is to define the poverty line as one-half
of the national average income. In this way, the poverty line would automatically rise, as the nation grows richer.¶ 5¶ In a similar fashion, once
we start moving away from an absolute concept of poverty towards relative concept, the sharp distinction between the poor and the non-poor
starts to evaporate. Instead, we begin to think of a parade of people from the poorest soul to the richest billionaire. The “poverty problem”
then, seems to be that disparities in income are “too large” in some sense. At least in part, the poor are so poor because the rich are so rich. If
we follow this line of thought, we are led away from the narrow problem of poverty toward the broader problem of inequality of incomes and
wealth, which are not at all insurmountable or insuperable. Shaw and Barry reject the view that inequalities in wealth and income are inevitable
and cite the economies of Japan and Germany, both as capitalistic as the USA and UK, where the distributions of incomes are far less extreme.
For them,
“inequality of income is not a brute fact of nature, even in market-oriented countries and how
much inequality a society is willing to accept reflects both in moral values and the relative strength of
its contending social and political forces” (1998:97-8).¶ Explanation of why more unequal distribution of wealth and income
occurs in prosperous democratic societies like the USA and the UK are too complicated for discussion in this paper. What can be asserted,
however, is that any answer will be incomplete unless it explores the different values and beliefs people hold about distributive justice, which
are likely to influence their political and socio economic behaviour.¶ 6¶ THE CONCEPT OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE¶ In general, justice refers to
what is owed or due to individual members of society. The
content given to the concept of justice, that is. what one
determines as actually being owed or due to another will vary according to certain philosophical and
methodological presumptions from which one approaches the issue. For example, utilitarian conceptions of
justice, Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness; communication conceptions of justice, and catholic teaching of social justice are all
competing notions that depend on different views concerning the relationship between individuals
and society, how society ought to be structured and what constitutes the appropriate goals of a just
society. When considering the concept of justice, it is important to distinguish among four different types of justice:¶ (1) Commutative
justice which refers to that which is owed between individuals in conducting business transaction;¶ (2) Contributing justice, which refers to
what individuals owe to society for the common good;¶ (3) Legal justice, which refers to rights and responsibilities of citizens to obey and
respect the rights of all and the laws devised to protect peace and order; and¶ (4) Distributive justice, which refers to what society owes to its
individual members i.e. the just allocation of resources. Thus, it is this forth type of justice with which the paper will concern itself.¶ 7¶
Considered as one type of justice, distributive justice is a central concept in the catholic tradition and is closely linked to the concepts of human
dignity, the common good, and human rights. Considered as an ethical principle, distributive justice refers to what society or a larger group
owes its individual members in proportion to:¶ (1) The individual needs, contribution and responsibility;¶ (2) The resources available to the
society or organization; and¶ (3) The society or organization’s responsibility to the common good.¶ In the context of allocation of resources,
distributive justice requires that everyone receive equitable access to the basic resources necessary for living a fully human life in so far as there
is a basic human right to just allocation of resources.¶ The principle of distributive justice implies that the society has a duty to the individual in
serious need and that all individuals have duties to others in serious need. In
decisions regarding the allocation of
resources, the duty of the society is not diminished because of the person’s status or nature of need.
Everyone is entitled to equal access to basic resources necessary for living in a human way. In other
words, allocation decisions should not be based upon judgments of the quality of persons. Benefits
and burdens should also be distributed in a just manner.¶ That said, it is not surprising that the concept of distributive
justice has been with us since the dawn of human life. And indeed, it has been an¶ 8¶ important branch of ethics at least since Aristotle, who
noted that it invariably raises the interrelated notion of:¶ • Individual rights • Fairness¶ • Equity and¶ • Entitlement (McEwan, 2001).¶ These
issues are often discussed as distributive justice, which explores the appropriate distribution of social and economic benefits and related cost in
any given society according to the following five principles:¶ 1. An equal share for each individual/collectivity. This principle upholds the
principle of equal benefits for each individual as, for example, when equal welfare allowances are paid by government regardless of differences
in individual income;¶ 2. A share according to the needs of each individual/collectivity. This approach is based on the principle of targeting
specific needs of individuals usually in cases where rationing is seen as necessary. For example, special offers in a supermarket may be limited
to one item per customer to attract the largest number of shoppers and reduce complaints should stocks run out too early.¶ 3. A share
according to the efforts of each individual/collectivity. This approach supports the principle¶ 9¶ of recognizing individual achievement, as in the
case of a productivity scheme that rewards staff according to their individual outputs.¶ 4. A share according to the social contribution of each
individual/collectivity. This approach grants awards according to the social benefit of specific activities such as paid leave of absence for
employees to attend local council or trade union meetings, or tax concessions when a firm organizes specialized training for its employees not
provided by its competitors.¶ 5. A share according to the merits of each individual/collectivity. This approach supports the principle of
rewarding recipients on the basis of individual merit or collective achievement, as in competitions when the winners receive most prize money,
or when a company is awarded the Queen’s Award for Industry in recognition of outstanding export achievements (McEwan, 2001:274).¶
Theories of distributive justice¶ As noted earlier, explanations why poverty or unequal distribution of
wealth or income occurs will be incomplete unless they take on board at least three interrelated
ethical variables: libertarian, utilitarian and egalitarian influences. These are distinct and interrelated
approaches to distributive justice. They have influenced the economic, political and moral values as
well¶ 10¶ as relationships regarding distribution of social and economic benefits and related costs in
any given society. The libertarian explanations for poverty, (explained as unequal distribution of wealth and income), are varied but all
focus on “rights”. For instance, Nozick’s libertarian theory of economic distribution asserts that individuals possess what he describes as
“Lockean rights (1974). According to McEwan (2001:274-275), acknowledgement of these rights imposes “side constraints’ on how individuals
may behave towards other persons, so that each individual remains responsible for his/her own unique life without coercion from others. This
is achieved through an entitlement theory of economic justice, which allows each individual to own personal goods, property and money that
have been fairly obtained. The individual is also entitled to dispose of them as s/he chooses, unless one or more persons have a prior claim to
them due to violation of their lockean rights. This entitlement theory is derived from three interrelated principles:¶ 1) The original acquisition of
holdings. Following Locke, Nozick argues that property is a moral right since individuals are entitled to the products of their labour, as when
personal assets are used productively and sold without others suffering from those transactions. This principle also applies to money, which
may be held/saved without deterioration, other than that due to inflation.¶ 2) The legitimate transfer of holdings to/from others. Individuals
may also acquire assets from others, which they are entitled to hold if legally obtained. These include all purchases, exchanges;¶ 11¶ gifts
received or donated, but exclude anything obtained by theft,¶ fraud or violence.¶ 3) The illegal acquisition of holdings. Nozick defines injustice
as any¶ violation of a person’s rights that seeks to justify the illegal acquisition of holding contrary to the above two principles (McEwan,
2001:275).¶ Paramount in Nozick’s entitlement theory of economic distribution is how possessions are acquired (McEwan, 2001). For instance,
if individuals are legitimately entitled to their holdings then economic distribution is just, regardless of actual distribution at any one time.
Thus, whether the distribution is just depends solely on how holdings were acquired. Property rights
are derived from an individual’s basic moral rights over all social and legislative arrangements
imposed by society. This explains why Nozick rejects the notion of taxes imposed by government for redistribution purposes. According
to Nozick such actions are unjust because “Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour”.¶
Cartels
UQ - US Marijuana key now
Legal marijuana has already impacted cartels – further legalization continues the trend
Donald MacPherson – 2014. (Currently the Director of the Canadian Drug Policy Coalition a national civil society organization with
the goal of advancing improvements to Canadian drug policy. He holds an Adjunct Professor position in the Faculty of Health Sciences at Simon
Fraser University in Vancouver; National Post, “A gift to the drug kingpins,” 4/28/2014, Accessed via LexisNexis on 7/30/2014, WSH).
How's this for economic integration, then? Access to
legal, regulated medical marijuana in Canada and the U.S. has
reduced black market demand across the continent. This phenomenon will become more pronounced
with the recent legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington, and more states to
come. It's worth noting too that concerns over drug gangs generally, but Canadian gangs in particular, were a key reason Washington voters
supported legalization in that state. Regardless, marijuana farmers in Mexico have responded to decreased black market demand by shifting to
poppy cultivation. This has resulted in a surge of cheap heroin availability at a time when heroin use is increasing in both the U.S. and Canada.
Cartels depend on marijuana ca$h- more than cocaine
Beaubien 10 (Jason, Knight-Wallace fellow at University of Michigan, NPR Global Health and
Development Correspondent, “Cash From Marijuana Fuels Mexico’s Drug War,” NPR.org,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126978142, 5/19/10
Despite an all-out war by President Calderon against the drug cartels, marijuana eradication efforts are
down as the Mexican government focuses more effort on dangerous methamphetamine labs.
Marijuana and cocaine are the two largest sources of revenue for the cartels, generating billions of
dollars in illicit profits each year. But some analysts say marijuana may be the cartels' greatest source
of cash in part because the Mexican gangs control the production, trafficking and distribution of the
drug. The cocaine they move has a higher street value, but they initially have to buy it from the
Colombians.
Cartels dependent on US revenue now- legalization solves
Carpenter 11 (Ted Galen, Senior Fellow at Cato Institute and author of 8 books and more than 500
articles and policy studies on international issues, “Undermining Mexico’s Dangerous Drug Cartels,”
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/undermining-mexicos-dangerous-drug-cartels Nov
15/11)
The only lasting, effective strategy is to defund the Mexican drug cartels. Reducing their billions of
dollars in revenue requires the United States, as the principal consumer market for illegal drugs, to abandon its failed
prohibition policy. That move would eliminate the lucrative black-market premium and greatly reduce
the financial resources the cartels have available to bribe officials or hire enforcers to kill competitors
and law enforcement personnel and intimidate the Mexican people. A refusal to abandon prohibition
means that Mexico’s agony will likely worsen and pose a significant security problem for the United
States.
Mexican cartels have the market on lockdown – U.S. buyers keep them in business
WILLIAM A. FIX et. al. – 2012. (Senior Research Fellow; B.S., Missouri State University 2001; KENDRA J. HARRIS, Research Fellow;
B.S., Metropolitan State College of Denver 2002; and AIDA A. MONTANARO, Research Fellow; B.S., University of Texas at Austin 2009; M.A. in
International Relations 2011; The Center for Terrorism Law, housed at St. Mary's University School of Law, is a fully operational legal research
center dedicated to the study of legal issues associated with both antiterrorism and counterterrorism; The Scholar St. Mary's Law Review on
Minority Issues, “OFFENSE, DEFENSE, OR JUST A BIG FENCE? WHY BORDER SECURITY IS A VALID NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE ST. MARY'S
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER FOR TERRORISM LAW,” 2012, Accessed 7/30/2014)
The simple allegation that the United States has a drug problem is a drastic understatement. Data from
2008 provided by the National Drug Intelligence Center estimates the illegal drug industry to be a $ 215 billion business with 14.2% of
Americans age twelve and older having used within the last year. n120 The
same report lists Mexican drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) as operating more effectively than those from other countries, distributing the
most product across the most territories in the United States. n121 They have even taken control of
territories previously run by Colombian cartels, and many Dominican cartels switched their supply
lines from Colombian to Mexican sources. n122 While it is difficult to accurately estimate the volume of drugs moving across
the border in any given year, federal law enforcement agents estimate they seize between ten and twenty percent of such drugs. n123 To
illustrate, agents successfully seized roughly 1,626 metric tons in the first eleven months of 2009; conservative figures indicate that another
6,000 to 14,000 metric [*760] tons of illegal drugs safely crossed the border into the hands of dealers and consumers around the United
The bottom line is that drugs are big business for individuals operating the cartels, and the
United States is a major customer. n125 Even though law enforcement agencies in both the United
States and Mexico are waging a "war on drugs," the potential benefits continue to outweigh the risks,
and the cartels are realizing massive profits. This illicit drug trade pumps an estimated $ 17.2 billion into Mexico's economy,
States. n124
ranking it the third largest source of foreign revenue. n126 Just as some drugs are referred to as "gateway drugs" because they open the door
to heavier drug use for many users, n127 the flow of illegal drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border now results in a host of crimes and violence
that furthers the overall operation. n128 Such atrocities include kidnapping and murder as well as documented incidents of recruiting young
American children to work as drug runners. n129
Regardless of what actions may yield the best solutions, this much is clear - a porous border is a national security threat. Especially when known
terrorists may be colluding with Mexican drug cartel personnel just across the border; and the cartels are smuggling and trafficking drugs,
weapons, and humans into the United States daily. If securing the border is restored as a high priority, the United States of America will
strengthen its national security.
Marijuana is still a major source of cartel revenue, cocaine and heroin only make half
Bunker, 2010 [Bunker, Robert J.,Counter-OPFOR Corporation, 2010, "Strategic threat: narcos and
narcotics overview." Small Wars & Insurgencies”,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592311003589229#.U9oBhvldUe0,MG]
Narcotics are and continue to be the major source of
revenue for the Mexican drug cartels and are estimated to be in the $14–17 billion dollar range, based
on a compilation of the various sources listed in Table 3, although given the illicit nature of the industry they could actually be somewhat lower or even much
Some of the specific commodities and activities addressed in Table 3 should be discussed.
higher.
Marijuana is by far the dominant source of narcotics revenue for the cartels
methamphetamine, and heroin.
followed by cocaine,
Marijuana is highly profitable because it is grown in Mexico as well as inside the US
in cartel controlled fields generally concentrated in California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona but
with cultivation expanding eastwards. High potency yields, starter plant cloning, and 90-day
shortened growth cycles are adding to the marijuana profit margins .20 Cocaine and heroin produced
in South America is less profitable than marijuana because the revenues have to be shared with third
party cartels and traffickers . It is notable that Colombian heroin production is decreasing while [in] Mexican production
and purity has recently increased. These two drugs are worth about half of the marijuana trafficking
trade, with most of the value in cocaine sales. Cocaine has seen recent shortages in some US cities because of disruptions
in distribution all along the transit chain from Colombia through Central America and Mexico and into
the United States due to the Mexican government crackdown, nonetheless, demand for cocaine is still relatively high in the US.21
Heroin use is generally declining in the US and is more prevalent in the eastern states. The Mexican
cartels themselves are attempting to better expand their markets in northeastern US cities.22 This may be challenging
because of the lack of Suren˜o gangs in those cities though MS-13 and 18th Street gang members are found in many pockets within the US and new distribution potentials with Norten˜o,
Puerto Rican, and other gangs may exist
Cartels are on the ropes – full legalization could severely damage their operations
Legal Monitor Worldwide – 2014. (Legal Monitor Worldwide is a subscription based publication covering legal news and
developments from worldwide jurisdictions. Legal Monitor Worldwide is updated daily and draws on information from worldwide legal
publications, as well as reliable press, internet and news agency sources worldwide, “Legal Pot Breaking Cartels,” 5/29/2014, Accessed via
LexisNexis on 7/29/2014)
For the past two decades, marijuana was responsible for almost half of the drug collars in the US as
stated by the FBI's own crime statistics. The Department of Justice (DOJ) says that a significant piece
of the US drug market has been under the direct control of Mexican drug cartels. In 2011, the National
Drug Intelligence Center, a branch of the DOJ reported that the cartels dominated the marijuana and
heroin drug trade in over one-thousand American cities that year. ¶ To put it in boxing terms, the cartels, and the pot
growers, are on the ropes. While the farmers and cartels are complaining that the US's move towards marijuana
legalization is crimping their business, some reports suggest that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is not interested in letting
the cartel's hold on the marijuana market slip away. ¶ Smaller cartels have traditionally functioned and operated along the border in the
southern corners of the country while major actors, like Sinaloa, have an existence throughout America. Sinaloa isn't alone. With them are six
other cartels, Los Zetas, Gulf, Juarez, Knights Templar, La Familia and Tijuana, that have been fighting for control of the illegal drug market for
quite some time. ¶ Tuesday, the Washington Post reported that the amount of fresh crops planted has dropped because of a huge fall in prices.
A crop of marijuana which used to sell for $100 per kilo now is in the bargain basement section for $25. One grower told the Washington Post
reporter, "It's not worth it anymore. I wish the Americans would stop with this legalization." ¶ The DEA reported that prior to legalizing pot in
Washington and Colorado, approximately 10 million pounds in the US annually and 40 million pounds came from south of the border. ¶
Marijuana legalization in the US is definitely bruising the cartel business. As much as 40 percent of
their income came from marijuana. With legalization, the cartels can't move as much pot within the
US currently.
UQ - Cartels High Now
Cartels growing in strength and numbers now- will gain total governmental control
without plan
Page 12 (James, MA Thesis in Political Science, Cal State Chico, “Mexican Drug Cartels and International
Theory: History With Solutions,” Thesis, https://csuchicodspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.4/522/12%203%202012%20James%20Page.pdf?sequence
=1 Fall 2012)
As stated earlier in the literature review, many authors and researchers believe that Mexico has not yet reached this status. While there
is
rampant corruption, and in a few areas of Mexico the government is losing its battle for control, the
state, as a whole, is not in a position of failure. The government is still operational and it is doing its best to fight off the cartels and reestablish
control. Even
though the government is currently operating in an inefficient manner in regards to
fighting the cartels, it is still fighting. How long it can fight is another entirely different question, as
time, resources and hope is running out . The following map of Mexico shows the current division of the country as cartels
are continuing to spread and expand their operations as rational actors and business entities (Figure 1).
Large cartels are coming up with new and more imposing ways to rally not only their own troops, but also to
inspire the civilians and intimidate officials. La Familia is a large and dominant cartel with many of its
members coming from Michoacán.3 This cartel is known to be brutal but also revolutionary. One of their first acts of violence that gave them
notice and fame was when they fired a few shots into the air at a nightclub and threw five severed human heads onto the dance floor with a
note calling their act “divine justice” as they only kill those that deserve it and the innocent will always be spared.5 This cartel has continued
different forms of public relations, including religious quotes, to try and sway the people of Mexico to support them in their divine war against
the government and other cartels. In
many areas of Mexico, the brutality of this cartel, mixed with
revolutionary rhetoric and small charity work, has influenced the average citizen to favor them over
the government. They often state they are the crime fighters of Michoacán, executing wrong doers, without trial and at their own
discretion. The La Familia cartel is powerful, well funded, and it is dedicated to increasing its power over Mexico. The Gulf Cartel is
another example of a cartel exploiting the increasing weak state status of Mexico by recruiting, as a
means to seize and maintain power, well-trained deserters of the Mexican military and Special
Forces.6 Their close relationship with Mexican military gave them access to soldiers looking for a
“career change” and found the drug trafficking field as a viable means to work. This is how the birth of “Los
Zetas” occurred; they were originally the muscle of the Gulf Cartel. As Los Zetas began to grow and establish their own reputation, they
eventually splintered off from the Gulf Cartel, and they have become their own organization and a dominant force in the drug trafficking game.
Their brutality is well known, as they are willing to kidnap, decapitate and murder any person/people that may stand in their way. One of their
crimes included kidnapping of 72 immigrants from Central and South America and marching them out into a deserted area; after giving them
the opportunity to pay a ransom or become foot soldiers, the Zetas executed them.7 There has not been an explanation for these actions since
they occurred, but they have only added to the infamy of Los Zetas. This reputation is one of the reasons why different gangs are willing to
work with Los Zetas in exchange for minor training and weapons. Los Zetas are considered top notch with a willingness to expand their
operation more so than other narcotic syndicates; they are sought out and actually have control over U.S. gangs like Mexican Mafia, MS-13 and
the Texas Syndicate.8 This cartel now has a hand in several illegal markets ranging from the black market DVD trade to prostitution and illegal
immigration. Los Zetas have a level of unwavering support discipline within their upper ranks and support from the people in the allure of the
“fast paced” drug trafficker lifestyle and, like the La Familia cartel,
they have their eyes on the government as the highest
prize of all. The Mexican government alone does not stand a chance against two powerful cartels like
La Familia and Los Zetas or other cartels like the Gulf Cartel that originally created Los Zetas, the
Juarez Cartel, a cartel that heads up one of the most violent cities in Mexico, or even the Sinaloa
Cartel, one of the largest cartels in Mexico. The Mexican cartels are strong, and they have agendas
that include using the government for their own profit motive.
Solvency - Prohibition Fails
Banning an illicit substance only guarantees ever increasing violence
Seth Harp – 2010. (New York University Law Review, “GLOBALIZATION OF THE U.S. BLACK MARKET: PROHIBITION, THE WAR ON
DRUGS, AND THE CASE OF MEXICO,” November 2010, Accessed 7/30/2014).
When the sale of a popular recreational drug is banned, wealth and power flowing from productive
capital are amplified and transferred from the arena of competition between legitimate firms to the
monopoly control of entrepreneurs whose competitive advantage is a willingness to break the law. n54
The government then invests in thwarting the criminals, who counterinvest in resistance and subterfuge. n55 Meanwhile, large numbers
of transactions take place without recourse to private property rights or the civil courts, leaving
violence as the only mechanism for adjudicating contractual disputes and enforcing industry norms. n56 Violence is
used to take over and hold supply routes and distribution territory, with each gangster knowing that
to succeed he must be more brutal than the gangster whom he has just supplanted. n57 Over time,
violence and expenditures ratchet upward, n58 making it increasingly more expensive to bring the good to market,
exacerbating the cycle. Meanwhile, consumers whose demand for drugs is inelastic n59 (in some cases due to addiction) resort to
theft to pay for artificially priced drugs they can no longer afford. n60 The only constant in this uncontrollable spiral is a steady supply. n61
The only change to consumers is increased price and reduced quality. Instead of champagne or powder cocaine,
they get moonshine or [*1671] crack, the latter substances being cheaper to produce clandestinely, more compact for transportation, and
providing greater per-unit intoxication to consumers wishing to minimize their transactions with criminal suppliers. n62 Were
bread
outlawed, the same phenomenon would likely ensure its provision (probably in disgusting little nuggets) because the
state is not willing or able to match what consumers are prepared to spend, a virtual guarantee of futility at the outset.
Anti-marijuana law enforcement fails, creates black markets, and pushes consumers
toward hard drugs
Zoë Amerigian - 2011. (Council on Hemispheric Affairs research associate; The Beckley Foundation; “Legalizing Marijuana: An Exit
Strategy from the War on Drugs,” 20/4/2011, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/2011/04/legalizing-marijuana-an-exit-strategy-from-the-waron-drugs/, Accessed 7/29/2014).
there are clear signs
that prohibition has not succeeded in diminishing drug supply or demand. Lowering demand for illegal
drugs is the most effective way to lower illegal drug production—while vendors may not respond to
the threat of legal repercussions, they certainly respond to market forces. As the largest consumer of
Mexican drugs, it is the responsibility of the U.S. to address its own demand for marijuana. But American
Despite assurances from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that the current drug policy is making headway,
demand and accessibility to marijuana are not decreasing. In fact, marijuana use is currently on the rise and, although usage has oscillated in
the past decades, the proportion of use among 12th graders is only a few percentage points below what it was in 1974. Eighty-one percent of
American 12th graders said marijuana was “fairly easy or very easy” to acquire in 2010.2 In a 2009 survey, 16.7 million Americans over 12 years
While the U.S. may be unable to
control its own demand for marijuana, it could stop its contribution to drug cartel revenues by
allowing a domestic marijuana industry to thrive, shifting profits from cartels to U.S. growers .¶ While
of age had used marijuana in the past month—that’s 6.6 percent of the total population.3
figures on marijuana smuggling into the U.S. fail to provide conclusive evidence of how much of the drug is entering the country, marijuana
seizures have been steady throughout the Americas in the past decade. However, this says nothing certain about actual production numbers.4
Domestically, the task of restricting U.S. production is becoming more difficult. Indoor crops that use
efficient hydroponic systems are becoming more popular in the U.S. but pose a challenge to law
enforcement agencies for a number of reasons. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), indoor systems:¶ “[have] the benefit of having lower chances of detection, high
yields with several harvests per year with high potency cannabis and elevated selling prices. The
equipment, knowledge and seeds for indoor growing have become very accessible… [and] The costs of
building an indoor growing site can be quickly recovered.”5¶ Cultivating high-quality marijuana is
becoming easier, less risky, and more profitable even for the casual grower. The rise of indoor crops
will pose a new obstacle to drug enforcement agencies in stopping marijuana production in the U.S.¶
The UNODC outlines other negative “unintended consequences” that have resulted from the illegality
of drugs. The first is obvious; when a good is forbidden, a black market inevitably rises. Black markets
inherently lack safety regulations and often finance other criminal activities. A second consequence is
that treatment programs are often underfunded when the bulk of any drug policy budget is spent on
law enforcement. Two other consequences have been termed “geographical” and “substance”
displacement. Both terms involve the idea of the “balloon effect”: when an activity is suppressed in
one area, it simply reappears in another area. Geographical displacement can be illustrated by events
in Colombia, the Caribbean, and Mexico: as the U.S. cracked down on Colombian drug trafficking,
smuggling routes were shifted to Mexico and the Caribbean. Drug trafficking was not eliminated, but
simply moved from one site to another. Substance displacement is an even more disturbing
repercussion: as availability of one drug is mitigated through enforcement, consumers and suppliers
flock to alternate drugs that are more accessible.6 While marijuana is not a harmless substance, most
would agree that it is the least harmful of illicit drugs. Some drug users may be pushed toward more
dangerous substances, or “hard” drugs, because marijuana is too difficult to or dangerous to obtain.
Conversely, raising the accessibility of marijuana could pull users away from hard drugs. These ramifications
of the current drug control system need to be taken into account in the debate over legalization.
Marijuana Prohibition increases violence
Steven B. Duke – 2013. (Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Oregon Law Review, “The Future of Marijuana in the United States,” 2013,
Accessed via LexisNexis on 7/29/2014)
However strongly its supporters may deny it, marijuana prohibition inevitably produces crime and
violence. The ongoing wars between drug cartels and the Mexican government furnish grisly proof.
Fueled by billions of dollars from drug markets in the United States, Mexican gangsters have
murdered more than ten thousand people in the past few years, fighting for territory both among
themselves and with the government. n35 In the United States, large criminal organizations
maintained by violence and bribery increasingly control the networks that distribute marijuana.
Ironically, although marijuana has never been shown to trigger violent propensities in its users, the
billions earned by suppliers generate a great deal of violence, both in the United States and
elsewhere. Internationally, many terrorist organizations obtain much of their financing from drug distribution. n36 By being the world's
leader in drug prohibition, the United States is indirectly helping to finance the terrorist organizations that are trying to destroy us.
Solvency - General Legalization
Legalizing marijuana stops growth of Mexican cartels- loss of profits, strengthens
government, loss of recruitment
Fúnez 14 (Ramiro S., MA Politics NYU, “An Argument for Legalizing Marijuana Even Conservatives Can
Rally Behind,” WorldMic., http://mic.com/articles/78275/an-argument-for-legalizing-marijuana-evenconservatives-can-rally-behind 1/7/14)
Legislators in Mexico City submitted a proposal to decriminalize small amounts of marijuana possession last year, but the country's federal
government has shown no sign of attempts to loosen up its tough stance on drug laws. Consequently, drug lords have capitalized on the
substance's illegality and profited from their exclusive proprietorship. Despite Mexico's inability to quash rampant cartel-related crimes
because of the federal government's refusal to ease its policies,
the growing international push to legalize marijuana
could subdue the power of drug lords, especially if the Mexican government recognizes how impactful state-regulated cannabis
is. Doing that could help ease violence across the border and is the kind of result everyone should get
behind, no matter your views on weed. Here are three ways marijuana legalization could stop the growth of
Mexican drug cartels: Marijuana legalization in Colorado, Oregon and Washington could eliminate up
to 30% of profits made by Mexican drug cartels, a study conducted by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute reveals. The
possibility of federal authorization of recreational use of marijuana in the United States and Mexico
could lead to steeper losses on the part of illegitimate crime groups. Uruguay is the first Latin
American country to legalize recreational possession and use of marijuana and will earn up to $40
million in government profits appropriated from the country's black market. Mexico, which has a
black market marijuana trade system with estimated values ranging from $2 billion to $20 billion
annually, could use those funds to reinforce and establish government institutions aimed at curtailing
the use of harder substances like cocaine and heroin. More government revenue from marijuana profits could usher in
free addiction treatment programs and hard drug enforcement agencies. Mexican drug cartels, including the notoriously ruthless Los
Zetas, have infiltrated approximately 276 cities in the United States and are known to specifically target
marijuana dealers for recruitment, according to the Department of Homeland Security. Considering
the fact that marijuana is the most commonly purchased and sold controlled substance and that many
of those illegitimate vendors sell cannabis almost exclusively, a complete nationalization of the
marijuana industry would significantly deter recruitment efforts made by cartels in the United States.
Solvency - Cartel Profits
Even conservative estimates confirm marijuana is uniquely key to weakening cartels –
legalization solves
Zoë
Amerigian - 2011. (Council on Hemispheric Affairs research associate; The Beckley Foundation; “Legalizing Marijuana: An Exit
Strategy from the War on Drugs,” 20/4/2011, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/2011/04/legalizing-marijuana-an-exit-strategy-from-the-waron-drugs/, Accessed 6/15/2014).
Eliminating the marijuana market share of Mexican cartels would hit them especially hard because it
serves as a steady, reliable source of income and carries relatively little risk for them to produce. The
percentage of total cartel drug revenues from marijuana is greatly debated—Mexican and American official figures range from 50-65 percent,
Even the most conservative of these estimates—
roughly a fifth of revenue—would strike a blow to cartel profits if eliminated. Marijuana is particularly
valuable to cartels because they control the entire production line; they both grow and distribute it
themselves, making it more reliable and less risky. Conversely, cocaine is imported to Mexico mostly
from South America, heightening the risk of smuggling it. More troubling is that cartels are now even growing marijuana
but a study by the RAND Corporation suggests closer to 15-26 percent.13
on U.S. public lands, mostly throughout national parks and forests, in order to avoid the task of smuggling drugs across the U.S.-Mexican
border.14¶ If Mexico were to reach the point of legalizing marijuana, the U.S. could continue to buy the drug legally from south of the border,
like many other consumer goods. But even if Mexico did not implement its own legalization, recent data indicates that a domestic U.S. industry
could fill the role of the supplier and eliminate the need for Mexican marijuana. The drug is increasingly grown domestically and U.S. growers
are already posing a threat to Mexican market share. Exact numbers are impossible to assess, but figures of American domestic marijuana
a report by the RAND Corporation
found that legalizing marijuana in California alone (and a subsequent rise in state-wide marijuana production) could
lower Mexican cartel marijuana revenues by 65-85 percent. This could occur if Californian marijuana were smuggled to
production range from 30-60 percent of the total consumed in the U.S.16 Additionally,
the rest of the U.S. where the drug would still be illegal. The marijuana’s projected high quality and low price would make it an extremely
It seems reasonable to assume that if the drug were legalized in all fifty states, the
domestic market could easily overwhelm the Mexican market share.¶ In terms of tangible effects on Mexican drug
competitive product.
violence, the RAND Corporation and UNODC agree that removing U.S. demand for illegal marijuana would increase violence in the short run
in the long run, once U.S. demand is
met by domestic supply, cartels would be financially debilitated and, most likely, some of the violence
quelled. The U.S. population is by far the largest drug market for Mexico, making our action necessary
for any transnational legalization to be effective. While cocaine, methamphetamines, and heroin are still funding cartels,
because Mexican cartels would be fighting for dominance in a shrinking market.18 But
drug violence will not be completely eliminated; but any move to starve their resources is a step forward in weakening them and, ultimately,
saving lives.
Legalizing weed smashes cartels business model and simultaneously solves their
heroin revenues
Froma Harrop – 2014. (Syndicated Columnist, Author, RealClearPolitics, “Fight Heroine with Marijuana,” 3/24/2014,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2014/05/24/fight_heroin_with_marijuana_122741.html, Accessed 7/29/2014).
A plague of heroin addiction is upon us. Another plague. Heroin was the crisis that prompted Richard Nixon to launch the war
on drugs in 1971.¶ Time marched on. Cocaine and then crack cocaine and then methamphetamine overtook heroin as the drugs of the
moment. Now heroin is back -- and badder than ever.¶ ¶ The war on drugs also grinds expensively on, an estimated $1 trillion down the hole so
far. Amid the triumphant announcements of massive drug seizures and arrests of the kingpins, heroin
has never been more
abundant or so easy to find, in urban and rural America alike.¶ Still, marijuana accounts for almost half of drug
arrests, and most of those are for possession, not selling. This may sound counterintuitive, but as states ease up on the sale and
use of pot, opportunity knocks for dealing with the heroin scourge."If I had to write a prescription for
the heroin problem," retired Cincinnati police Capt. Howard Rahtz told me, "the first thing I'd do is legalize
marijuana."¶ Rahtz has fought this battle on several front lines. After serving 18 years as a law officer, he ran a methadone clinic to treat
addicts. A member of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, Rahtz won't go so far as the group's official position, which is to legalize all drugs.¶
"I would not make heroin available as a recreational drug," he said. "But I would make it available on a medical basis."¶ Rahtz sees treatment as
the only promising way to truly confront the heroin epidemic. He recalls his days as a police captain going after the traffickers:¶ "We started
getting record amounts of drugs, money and guns, and I'm writing memos to the chief. But then I'd ask the guys, 'Is anyone walking around
Cincinnati unable to find drugs?'"¶ Because
drug cartels garner 60 percent of their revenue from the marijuana
trade, legalizing pot would smash up their business model. "I have zero problem with recreational marijuana," Rahtz
said.¶ He would like Colorado and other states now taxing marijuana to earmark the money for drug treatment and rehabilitation. It's crazy that
only 10 percent of heroin addicts get into treatment, according to federal statistics.¶ Why the heroin epidemic now? Much of the surge in
heroin use stems from the recent crackdown on prescribed painkillers. Those addicted to pain medication went looking for an easily available
alternative and found heroin.¶ (One might question the value of making it hard for those hooked on PRESCRIPTION DRUGS to get them. At least
then, a doctor would be on their case.)¶ Today's astounding heroin death tolls reflect the reality that heroin sold is now 10 times more pure
than it was in the '70s. Adding to the tragedy, tolerance levels for heroin drop for those in treatment. The relapse rate in drug programs is high,
and those who go back are killed by the strength of the drug on the street. ¶ What should be obvious is the futility of dumping all this money
into the war on drugs while putting those wanting treatment on waiting lists. Even if many of those treated end up going back into the dungeon
of drug use, their weeks or months off the drug ate into the dealers' profits.¶ Bringing heroin addicts in for treatment deprives the cartels of
their best high-volume customers. Legalizing pot puts them out of their most lucrative business. Using tax revenues
from the legal sale of marijuana to pay for treatment completes the virtuous circle.¶ This virtuous circle can replace the vicious circle of the
drug war. As odd as this sounds, we
can fight heroin with marijuana.
Legalization deals a body blow to cartels and the side effects of marijuana are
negligible
Steve Huntley – 2010. (Commentary columnist for the Chicago Sun-Times and a member of its editorial board, Chicago Sun-Times,
“Decriminalizing Pot Would Devastate Cartels,” 3/30/2010,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/2010/03/30/decriminalizing_pot_would_devastate_cartels_231779.html, Accessed 7/29/2014)
Legalizing marijuana wouldn't end the criminal drug trade and its violence. Addicts still would crave meth, cocaine and other hard
narcotics. But decriminalizing marijuana would be a body blow to drug cartels. Half the annual income for
Mexico's violent drug smugglers comes from marijuana, one Mexican official told the Wall Street Journal last year.
Imagine how many smugglers and street-corner reefer hustlers would be put out of business. One recent advocate of
considering legalization as part of a new approach to crime is John J. DiIulio Jr., who served as President George W. Bush's director of faithbased initiatives. Writing in the journal Democracy, DiIulio said that the impact of more than 800,000 marijuana-related arrests on crime rates
last year was "likely close to zero." He argued there
is "almost no scientific evidence showing that pot is more
harmful to its users' health, more of a 'gateway drug' or more crime-causing in its effects than alcohol
or other legal narcotic or mind-altering substances."¶ Legalization backers go further, pointing to Canadian studies
suggesting health-care costs are higher for tobacco or alcohol users and that police disruption of drug-trafficking gangs contributes to street
violence by causing gang power struggles.¶ The
prospect of reducing violence, undermining gangs, freeing law
enforcement to concentrate on serious crimes and more revenues for hard-pressed governments -- all
are reasons to end the "reefer madness" in our laws.
Widespread marijuana legalization stops cartel revenue and recruitment
Grillo 13 (Ioan, author of “El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency”, New York Times, Nov 27,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/opinion/drug-war-no-more.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0)
It is yet to be seen how the change in thinking will play out on the ground. While it will take several years, the
widespread
legalization of marijuana looks increasingly likely, creating the potential of a taxable market in the
herb from U.S. cities to Latin American farms. Former President Vicente Fox of Mexico has even announced his support for a
U.S. internet entrepreneur in a cannabis venture. Such a market would take billions of dollars out of the hands of
cartels and remove the chain link that pulls so many growers and sellers into the world of organized
crime. It will also provoke some fiery discussions at the United Nations, whose treaties oblige signatories to fight drugs.
Legalization puts cartel revenue in total jeopardy at every step of the supply chain
Sacco and Finklea 13 (Lisa, Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy, and Kristin, Acting Section
Research Manager and Specialist in Domestic Security, “State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives:
Implications for Federal Law Enforcement,” Congressional Research Service,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43164.pdf 9/9/13)
Marijuana proceeds are generated at many points along the supply chain, including production,
transportation, and distribution. Experts have debated which aspects of this chain—and the related proceeds—would be most
heavily impacted by marijuana legalization. In addition, the potential impact of marijuana legalization in 2 of the 50 U.S. states (complicated by
two separate legal frameworks and regulatory regimes) may be more difficult to model than the impact of federal marijuana legalization. For
instance, in evaluating the potential fiscal impact of the Washington and Colorado legalization initiatives on the profits of Mexican drug
trafficking organizations, the Organization of American States (OAS) has hypothesized that “[a]t the extreme, Mexican
drug trafficking
organizations could lose some 20 to 25 percent of their drug export income, and a smaller, though
difficult to estimate, percentage of their total revenues.”104 Other scholars have, in estimating the potential
financial impact of marijuana legalization, based their estimates on a hypothetical federal legalization of
marijuana. Under this scenario, small scale growers at the start of the marijuana production-toconsumption chain might be put out of business by professional farmers, a few dozen of which “could
produce enough marijuana to meet U.S. consumption at prices small-scale producers couldn’t possibly
match.”105 Large drug trafficking organizations generate a majority of their marijuana-related income
(which some estimates place at between $1.1 billion to $2.0 billion) from exporting the drug to the United States and
selling it to wholesalers on the U.S. side of the border.106 This revenue could be jeopardized if the
United States were to legalize the production and consumption of recreational marijuana.
Solvency - Black Market
Legalization of marijuana kills the black market and stifles cartels
Zoë Amerigian - 2011. (Council on Hemispheric Affairs research associate; The Beckley Foundation; “Legalizing Marijuana: An Exit
Strategy from the War on Drugs,” 20/4/2011, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/2011/04/legalizing-marijuana-an-exit-strategy-from-the-waron-drugs/, Accessed 7/29/2014).
The difference between decriminalization and legalization is in their degree of leniency towards drugs; decriminalization permits drug use while
legalization permits both drug use and production. Those that favor decriminalization maintain that it would enable law enforcement agencies
to shift resources from prosecuting drug users to prosecuting drug suppliers. Decriminalization would also free up resources for effective drug
treatment programs. Those that favor legalization go one step further than decriminalization: in Vicente Fox’s words, “[W]e
have to
take all the production chain out of the hands of criminals and into the hands of producers—so there
are farmers that produce marijuana and manufacturers that process it and distributors that distribute
it, and shops that sell it.”11 Legalization would include the benefits of decriminalization, while also
depriving gangs and cartels of a lucrative product; if both the supply and demand sides are legitimate,
a black market would become obsolete. Legalizing marijuana in the United States, the largest buyer of
Mexican drugs, could potentially weaken drug cartels by limiting their sources of revenue. The UNODC
has acknowledged that this is a plausible way of reducing gang and cartel profits.
Solvency - USFG key
Legalization cuts cartel profits and recruitment – USFG is key
Ramiro S.
Funez – 2014. (Ramiro is a Honduran-American political journalist, activist and foreign policy analyst earning his Master's
degree in Politics at New York University., “An Argument for Legalizing Marijuana Even Conservatives Can Rally Behind,” 2/7/2014,
http://mic.com/articles/78275/an-argument-for-legalizing-marijuana-even-conservatives-can-rally-behind, Accessed 7/29/2014)
Marijuana legalization in Uruguay, Colorado and Washington has sparked deliberation among many lawmakers who are curious about how
similar legislation would affect other countries, including the crime-ridden barrios of Mexico.¶ Legislators in Mexico City submitted a proposal
to decriminalize small amounts of marijuana possession last year, but the country's federal government has shown no sign of attempts to
loosen up its tough stance on drug laws. Consequently, drug
lords have capitalized on the substance's illegality and
profited from their exclusive proprietorship. Despite Mexico's inability to quash rampant cartel-related crimes because of the
federal government's refusal to ease its policies, the growing international push to legalize marijuana could subdue
the power of drug lords, especially if the Mexican government recognizes how impactful stateregulated cannabis is. Doing that could help ease violence across the border and is the kind of result everyone should get behind, no
matter your views on weed.¶ Here are three ways marijuana legalization could stop the growth of Mexican drug cartels:¶ 1. Loss of Profits¶
Marijuana legalization in Colorado, Oregon and Washington could eliminate up to 30% of profits made
by Mexican drug cartels, a study conducted by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute reveals. The
possibility of federal authorization of recreational use of marijuana in the United States and Mexico
could lead to steeper losses on the part of illegitimate crime groups. ¶ 2. Strengthening of Government Institutions
Uruguay is the first Latin American country to legalize recreational possession and use of marijuana and will earn up to $40 million in
government profits appropriated from the country's black market. Mexico, which has a black market marijuana trade system with estimated
values ranging from $2 billion to $20 billion annually, could use those funds to reinforce and establish government institutions aimed at
curtailing the use of harder substances like cocaine and heroin. More government revenue from marijuana profits could usher in free addiction
treatment programs and hard drug enforcement agencies. ¶ 3. Loss of Recruitment Mexican drug cartels, including the notoriously ruthless Los
Zetas, have infiltrated approximately 276 cities in the United States and are known to specifically target marijuana dealers for recruitment,
according to the Department of Homeland Security. Considering
the fact that marijuana is the most commonly
purchased and sold controlled substance and that many of those illegitimate vendors sell cannabis
almost exclusively, a complete nationalization of the marijuana industry would significantly deter
recruitment efforts made by cartels in the United States.
Drug cartel’s increasing power is spreading into U.S. and Central America thus growing
their army of allies
Bunker, 2010 [Bunker, Robert J.,Counter-OPFOR Corporation, 2010, "Strategic threat: narcos and
narcotics overview." Small Wars & Insurgencies”,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592311003589229#.U9oBhvldUe0, MG]
The four dominant Mexican drug cartels, their enforcers, and affiliated gang contractors are in violent
competition with one another for control over narcotics trafficking routes ( plazas) into the United
States and the markets within.
Narcotics sales within Mexico, and into Central America with the continual opening of new markets in the
countries of that region, are also now a source of strife and competition. In addition, conflict
over auxiliary forms of illegal revenue
generation including street taxation, extortion, and kidnapping along with human and arms smuggling
is also taking place between the various gangs, cartels, and mercenary groups on both sides of the US–
Mexican border. Until recently, the Mexican state generally turned a blind eye to the growing power,
influence, and military-type capabilities of the cartels and their allies . Numerous political, judicial, law enforcement, and
military officials and reporters had been corrupted and/or killed allowing the cartels freedom of action via their doctrine of ¿plata o plomo? (silver or lead?). Since
late 2006, however, open warfare has broken out between the Mexican drug cartels and the state under the Felipe Calderon administration. With the fighting
intensifying, President Calderon recently said, ‘It’s either the narcos, or the state.’9 Over
10,000 have died in what has basically
become a ‘free for all’, given the wars raging amongst the cartels themselves and between the various
cartels and the Mexican state. The violence levels, however, are, in context, still somewhat restrained given the absence of ‘car bombs’ as were
employed by the Medellı´n cartel against the Colombian state in that conflict decades ago. Highlighting additional concerns about this internal war in Mexico, it was
reported in March 2009: The
biggest and most violent combatants are the Sinaloa cartel, known by U.S. and
Mexican federal law enforcement officials as the ‘Federation’ or ‘Golden Triangle,’ and its main rival,
‘Los Zetas’ or the Gulf Cartel ... The two cartels appear to be negotiating a truce or merger to defeat
rivals and better withstand government pressure. U.S. officials say the consequences of such a pact would be
grave.10 These two cartels alone are estimated to have fielded over 100,000 foot soldiers, rivaling the
Mexican army which numbers about 130,000.11 Additionally, the forces of these cartels include former
special forces personnel and have access to equipment and weaponry which are in many cases far
superior to that fielded by the Mexican state . Table 2 focuses on US prison and street gangs affiliated with the four major Mexican
cartels. Only Suren˜o (southern) gangs with Mexican and Central American cultural origins have been listed because of their identifiable direct ties to the cartels.
Prison and street Norten˜o (northern) gangs, independent Mexican gangs (e.g. the Fresno bulldogs), black, Puerto Rican, white and other ethnicity prison and street
gangs, and all forms of motorcycle gangs have been excluded from this table. The reason for this exclusion is that, while these gangs may benefit from narcotics
trafficking inside the United States, they are typically one step removed in the distribution networks and act as retail sub-contractors or second order wholesale
suppliers of the narcotics.12
What is apparent
from this table
is that the Mexican cartels have at their disposal direct
linkages to a gang contractor network encompassing tens of thousands of members . This gang wholesale
distribution network is controlled by the prison gangs, such as the Mexican Mafia (La Eme) and Barrio
Azteca, who have enforced their will and dictates upon numerous Hispanic street gangs in the United
States to increase their power and enrich their pockets. For instance, all gangs which include the number ‘13’ ‘M’ in their names
are subordinate to La Eme. This also includes the local taxation of gang territories to extract revenues from legitimate and illicit businesses operating within the
gang’s turf. Thereby, each
of these gang members can in some way be thought of as a ‘foot soldier’ who, if
given a directive by the Mexican Mafia, have the choice of carrying it out or risk having a ‘green light’
placed on them and being killed.13 This would mean that both MS-13 and 18th Street members, increasingly under the
control of La Eme, in Central America whose cliques are led by original gangsters or OGs (i.e. originally deported Los Angeles gang members) are to
some extent still theoretically (and nominally) under the authority of the Mexican Mafia in California. If they did
not follow La Eme dictates, their families and fellow ‘homies’ in the US could suffer severe
consequences ranging from intimidation and beatings to rape, torture, and murder. While actual Mexican Mafia
influence in Central America is currently in debate, the street and prison gangs are the same in that region. Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street dominate and
do openly show respect to La Eme. The
national security importance of these close relationships between Suren˜o
prison and street gangs and the Mexican drug cartels is that dangerous internal narco-terrorism
potentials now exist for the US homeland depending on the orders gang ‘foot soldiers’ are given. While
this might sound highly implausible, if the Mexican drug cartels and the United States government did in fact
engage in open conflict with one another, the Mexican Mafia could possibly side with their cartel
allies: The Mexican Mafia works with allied gangs in the American Southwest to control large swaths
of territory along both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. These gangs are organized to interact directly with traffickers in Mexico
and oversee transborder shipments as well as distribution inside the United States.14 With its revenue streams and power threatened, La Eme could draw upon its
dominance of the Suren˜o street gangs to provide support to the Mexican cartels. Failure to provide such ‘military aid’ if requested – even if it is only symbolic and
limited in scope – would not only endanger short-term narcotics trafficking operations but also the long-term relationship between these allies. The
Mexican
drug cartels thus possess the very real ability to draw either upon their own mercenaries and
employed assassins and bring them into the United States to engage in operations against our
government or upon allied domestic prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia. The latter, in turn, can order
subordinate ‘13’ street gang ‘foot soldiers’ to engage in specific insurgent operations (such as the
killing of police officers or judges) on their behalf. This capability combined with the tried and true ¿plata o plomo? (silver or lead?)
doctrine utilized in Mexico, and in Colombia decades before, to intentionally undermine and corrupt the workings of government is a volatile mix. If any real intent
to stand up to the US government were ever added to it, Pancho Villa’s notorious raid into Columbus, New Mexico in 1916 would look like a Sunday picnic.15 It is
assumed such potentials have been considered by Homeland Security Janet Napolitano. However, her vague focus on a ‘trigger point’ concerning spillover of narcoviolence from Mexico into the United States fundamentally misses the domestic aspects of the narco-insurgency which could very well emerge.16 As has been
outlined earlier, this
‘virus’ which has taken parts of Mexico and is spreading values incompatible with those
of a healthy democracy is growing on both sides of the US–Mexican border and has extended its
network into Central America along with enclaves and territories in South America as well. 17 From a
theoretical perspective, it represents the fusion and intersection of third phase cartel and third generation
gang concerns that John Sullivan and this author have been researching and writing on now for over a
decade.
IL - Afghanistan
Legalizing weed undercuts Afghan terrorist operations
H. A. Goodman – 2014. (Author and Journalist published in Salon.com, the Jerusalem Post, Chicago Tribune, The Hill's Congress Blog,
and other publications; Huffington Post, “Legalizing Marijuana Should Be a Top National Security Objective: Terrorism and Border Instability
Would Diminish,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/h-a-goodman/legalizing-marijuana-shou_b_5583767.html, Accessed 8/2/2014)
First, Afghanistan
according to CBS News is the world's largest supplier of cannabis and the plant is
even more profitable to Afghan farmers than opium poppy. Considering that the U.S. is the largest
consumer of marijuana in the world with 7.3 percent of Americans -- around 23 million citizens -- who
regularly use marijuana, the Afghan economy and people could benefit greatly from supplying a legal
cannabis industry.¶ American citizens spend $40.6 billion a year on marijuana, so a federally
recognized marijuana industry in the U.S. could provide people in war-torn states like Afghanistan a
needed source of legal income. This alone could mitigate instability, but the fact that terror groups are
using profits from Afghanistan's cannabis crop directly undermines our national security objectives.
According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "Drug trafficking, the critical link between supply and demand, is fueling a global criminal
enterprise valued in the hundreds of billions of dollars that poses a growing challenge to stability and security." The
report goes on to
state that there are "more and more acts of violence, conflicts and terrorist activities fuelled by drug
trafficking and organized crime." Echoing this alarming fact, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated the
Afghan illegal drug trade"is funding insurgency, international terrorism and wider destabilization." ¶
Therefore, Afghanistan's cannabis crop is funding terror groups; a reality that directly undermines the
White House's stated counterterrorism objectives. According to a 2010 Time article titled, Afghanistan's New Bumper Drug
Crop: Cannabis, federally legalizing marijuana would drain cash from insurgents in the ongoing Afghanistan War:¶ "'Afghanistan is using some of
its best land to grow cannabis,' says Antonia Maria Costa, director of the UN drug office in Vienna. 'If they grew wheat instead, insurgents
would not have money to buy weapons and the international community would not have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on food aid.'¶
... 'Eradicating marijuana and opium fields can breed resentment by people and be destabilizing,' says John Dempsey, a rule-of-law adviser to
U.S. and Afghan officials for the U.S. Institute of Peace.¶ ... Groups of armed drug traffickers, meanwhile, travel through the countryside, buying
opium and cannabis at the farm gates for cash. For many farmers in the area, making a living and staying alive -- sadly -- go hand in hand."¶
Furthering the link between the illegal cannabis trade and terror, a Guardian article in 2012 explained that, "Officials in southern Uruzgan
province, which borders Kandahar and Helmand, largely stamped out farming of the drug because of worries it was financing the Taliban."
Legalizing a drug that 40 percent of high school students in the U.S. have tried in order to slash funding to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other
terrorist organizations is far more feasible than introducing a democratic system to tribes and Afghan
farmers. As it stands, the U.S. is the world's largest consumer of cannabis and Afghanistan is the
largest producer, but neither Bush nor Obama has taken action to address this glaring economic
reality.
IL - Immigration
Legalization solves Mexican cartels and border security – its also not a health risk
H. A. Goodman – 2014. (Author and Journalist published in Salon.com, the Jerusalem Post, Chicago Tribune, The Hill's Congress Blog,
and other publications; Huffington Post, “Legalizing Marijuana Should Be a Top National Security Objective: Terrorism and Border Instability
Would Diminish,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/h-a-goodman/legalizing-marijuana-shou_b_5583767.html, Accessed 8/2/2014)
In addition, the White House 2011 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy highlights the border as a major security issue. As
stated in the report:¶ "Illicit trafficking across the Southwest border continues to be a chronic threat to our Nation and one of the top homeland
security priorities for the United States.¶ Mexico
is the primary foreign source of marijuana...¶ Strategic Goal: Substantially
the
simple recreational use in states like Colorado, Oregon, and Washington is estimated to cut the profits
of drug traffickers by 30 percent. Those states alone have done more than all our efforts in the drug
war. We've sold Mexico $1.3 billion worth of weaponry to fight cartels, but the violence (kidnapping, torture, assassinations, as well as
Reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the Southwest border."¶ First, just
Mexican police working with the cartels) and drugs have increased over the years. In 2012, data shows that there was one marijuana arrest
every 48 seconds in the U.S. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent over $1 trillion on the drug war, in addition to imprisoning half of the 2.3 million
inmates in prisons for drug related charges. This war on drugs that come primarily from the border (which includes marijuana) has helped give
us the largest prison population in the world. Most alarming is that in the past six years, over 50,000 Mexicans have died because of drug
violence.¶ Any
serious attempt at fixing our border with Mexico must start with federal legalization of
marijuana. As stated by renowned author and expert on the drug trade with Mexico, Charles Bowden in The War Next Door highlights
exactly why prohibition of marijuana (he also includes other drugs) is futile:¶ "The drug industry is the second-largest source of foreign currency
in Mexico, just behind oil. It earns somewhere between $30 billion and $50 billion a year -- no one really knows, including the people in the
industry. It also creates enormous numbers of jobs in the U.S.¶ ...The sole source of the enormous amount of money in the drug business and
the accompanying violence is the U.S. prohibition of drug use by its citizens."¶ Border
security should start by the federal
legalization of marijuana, especially since half of all drug seizures in the world are cannabis seizures.
Money and lives could be saved from legalizing a drug that a great many Americans already use
responsibly and live productive lives (Willie Nelson, Bill Maher, the person reading this article, etc.). The havoc wreaked
by drug gangs in Central America could be mitigated to a great degree by legalizing marijuana as well,
which would alleviate the current border crisis of desperate children seeking refuge in the U.S. ¶ Both the
Tea Party and the Democratic Party view terrorism and border security as serious national security issues. As for the national debt,
some estimates of tax revenue (and enforcement savings) from a federally legal marijuana industry
range above $20 billion per year. The sad reality is that the prohibition of marijuana is killing
Mexicans, imprisoning Americans, wasting tax dollars, ruining the border, and funneling billions to
terrorists and drug cartels. If another country did all that to us we'd attack them. When this country finally has a
national marijuana industry (a regulated market where risks from the drug are communicated to
consumers) several of our current national security needs will be met by a plant that might have killed
three people in 2013. According to the CDC, "There are approximately 88,000 deaths attributable to excessive alcohol use each year in
the United States." It's time to finally think rationally and address national security from an efficient and sustainable vantage point, rather than
continuing failed strategies. If a foreign nation or terrorist group had done as much damage to the United States as its own longstanding policy
of federally criminalizing marijuana, we would have already waged another war.
Ramped up cartel violence spurs mass migration – floods US borders and destabilizes
Latin America
LA Times, The Los Angeles Times Editorial Board, 7-6-14 “Addressing The Border Crisis”
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-immigration-20140706-story.html
Tens of thousands of Central American children, some accompanied by adults but most traveling alone, have surged
across the U.S.-Mexican border in recent months. The flood has swamped the border security
infrastructure as well as the youth housing facilities maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services. Under
federal law, HHS must take charge of unaccompanied and undocumented minors 72 hours after they are detained by immigration agents. Now
the Obama administration is asking Congress — which can't agree on what day it is, let alone enact a law — to spend an additional $2 billion to
improve the government's ability to handle the growing problem. The president also wants Congress to change the 2008 federal law that
automatically routes minors to immigration court; instead, he wants to let border agents quickly deport those children who can't make a prima
facie case for why they should be let in, a move designed to both lessen the burden on the system and serve as a deterrent to those still hoping
to enter. This humanitarian crisis, which is how President Obama has described it, is both divisive and frustrating, and finding long-term
solutions will require a broad and nuanced understanding of the problem. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has argued,
this is a regional crisis that demands regional solutions — not just more guards at the border or more lawyers in the immigration courts.
The
United States should be involved in those solutions because it is more than just a wealthy country that attracts illegal
immigrants; it bears some responsibility of its own for the violence and instability in Central America.
According to a recent report by the independent, nonprofit International Crisis Group, rivalries between drug traffickers and an
absence of governmental control along the Guatemala-Honduras border have made the area among
the most violent in the world. Where are the drugs heading? Primarily to the U.S., where most of the demand for marijuana and
cocaine comes from. Similarly, the most powerful street gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are transnational and have their roots in
U.S. cities, including Los Angeles. And while drugs are being smuggled north, guns are being smuggled south. More
than a quartermillion guns are slipped across the U.S.-Mexico border each year, according to a 2013 study by the University of San
Diego's Trans-Border Institute. Why does this matter? Because those who have spent time interviewing the
unaccompanied minors showing up at the U.S. border report that the vast majority of them say they
are fleeing violence and instability in their home countries — primarily Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. The
children have described the conscriptions of boys by gangs, and retaliation against the families of
those who refuse, including, in some cases, rape. Ironically, U.S. deportations of foreign-born criminals help feed the gangs that are
prompting the flow of minors north. It's important to distinguish between why someone flees a city and his or her decision on where to go.
Once fear of gangs and violence seals the decision to run, the vast majority are choosing the U.S. as a destination, often hoping to reunite with
family members who are already there. Many also are lured by misinformation spread by coyotes and traffickers suggesting that children, and
mothers with children, can get permisos — permits — to stay. Some misinterpret the June 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program, which offers temporary status to some children who arrived before 2007, thinking that they too will be allowed to stay. But in fact,
new arrivals are not eligible for the program. And insufficient space in detention centers and youth housing facilities has led immigration
authorities to release some young detainees into the custody of relatives or other sponsors, with an appearance ticket for a later court hearing.
Thus the rumors of permisos spread. Significantly, it's not
just children fleeing the instability. The U.S. Citizenship and
has been a sevenfold increase since 2009 in undocumented
migrants of all ages seeking entry because they face a "credible fear" of being the victim of violence if
returned to their home countries, most of them from Mexico and Central America. So violence as a catalyst for migration has
Immigration Services reported last week that there
been a long-unfolding problem. The Obama administration is right to seek humane ways of dealing with the influx, including adding
immigration judges, lawyers and others crucial to a speedier deportation process. Sending people back more quickly would also help blunt the
rumors of permisos for children. But in addition, the
government needs to consider the connections between the
American drug users who create the demand that feeds the violent drug cartels, the multinational street gangs and
the free flow of illicit weapons across the border. What can be done? Reducing drug demand and the southward flow of
guns would help, as would an increase in U.S. assistance designed to stimulate economic development in Central America, and thus job
prospects. The U.S. could expand its work with gang-intervention programs in the Central American barrios. Homeland Security recently moved
60 additional investigators to its anti-smuggling efforts along the Texas border, efforts that should continue and, if needed, increase to break up
the human trafficking networks. Everard Meade, director of the Trans-Border Institute, suggests
treating the violence
surrounding the drug traffickers and street gangs "like the regional armed conflict that it actually is"
rather than as a U.S. immigration problem. Washington can, and should, try to stop illegal immigration at the border, but it
would be wiser, and more humane, to find ways to stabilize the communities from which immigrants
are running. Any solutions must come with the full involvement and engagement of the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras
and Mexico, a challenge given the endemic corruption in those governments. But the U.S. is in the best position to bring the players together
and forge the strategic, regional approach to ending this humanitarian crisis.
Flooded borders overwhelm immigration officials and foster terrorism
Steven A. Camarota, Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in public policy analysis with a master’s
degree in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, May 2002, “The Open Door: How
Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained,” Center for Immigration Studies,
http://cis.org/node/52
If we are to reduce the chance of another terrorist attack, we must carefully examine how these
terrorists entered and remained in the United States in the past, including attacks prior to 9/11. The
findings indicate that terrorists have used almost every conceivable means of entering the country.
Thus, any set of solutions must address our entire immigration system and not focus on just one part of
the system. The Immigration System is Overwhelmed. One of the main problems with the current
immigration system is that the INS and State Department are simply overwhelmed by the number of
applicants they must process. This fact is not in dispute. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported
in May 2001 that the receipt of new INS applications (for green cards, citizenship, temporary work
permits, etc.) has increased 50 percent over the past six years and that the backlog of unresolved
applications has quadrupled to nearly four million. The crush of work has created an organizational
culture wherein “staff are rewarded for the timely handling of petitions rather than for careful scrutiny
of their merits,” in the words of a January 2002 GAO report. The pressure to move things through the
system has led to “rampant” and “pervasive” fraud, with one official estimating that 20 to 30 percent
of all applications involve fraud. The GAO concludes that “the goal of providing immigration benefits in
a timely manner to those who are legally entitled to them may conflict with the goal of preserving the
integrity of the legal immigration system.” Things are not much better at the State Department.
Assistant Secretary of State Mary Ryan, who is in charge of visa processing, said in an November 2001
interview in the St. Petersburg Times that, “I think consular officers around the world are stretched just
about as thin as they can possibly be. We do not have the personnel resources that we need to do the
job the way it should be done.” Putting caps on or reducing the caps that exist for foreign students and
guestworkers, and cutting permanent immigration back to the spouses and minor children of American
citizens, eliminating the visa lottery, and limiting employed-based immigration to only a few highly
skilled individuals would be a good start. The only way to give the State Department and the INS the
breathing space they need to implement much-needed reforms is to reduce their workload. It is
simply not reasonable to expect the INS in particular to deal with a constantly increasing workload,
make significant process in the huge backlogs that exist, and at the same time fundamentally restructure
and reform itself.
Marijuana prohibition directly fosters cartel violence
Steven B. Duke – 2013. (Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Oregon Law Review, “The Future of Marijuana in the United States,” 2013,
Accessed via LexisNexis on 7/29/2014)
However strongly its supporters may deny it, marijuana prohibition inevitably produces crime and
violence. The ongoing wars between drug cartels and the Mexican government furnish grisly proof.
Fueled by billions of dollars from drug markets in the United States, Mexican gangsters have
murdered more than ten thousand people in the past few years, fighting for territory both among
themselves and with the government. n35 In the United States, large criminal organizations
maintained by violence and bribery increasingly control the networks that distribute marijuana.
Ironically, although marijuana has never been shown to trigger violent propensities in its users, the
billions earned by suppliers generate a great deal of violence, both in the United States and
elsewhere. Internationally, many terrorist organizations obtain much of their financing from drug distribution. n36 By being the world's
leader in drug prohibition, the United States is indirectly helping to finance the terrorist organizations that are trying to destroy us.
Cartel violence is the biggest internal link to immigration and border security
WILLIAM A. FIX et. al. – 2012. (Senior Research Fellow; B.S., Missouri State University 2001; KENDRA J. HARRIS, Research Fellow;
B.S., Metropolitan State College of Denver 2002; and AIDA A. MONTANARO, Research Fellow; B.S., University of Texas at Austin 2009; M.A. in
International Relations 2011; The Center for Terrorism Law, housed at St. Mary's University School of Law, is a fully operational legal research
center dedicated to the study of legal issues associated with both antiterrorism and counterterrorism; The Scholar St. Mary's Law Review on
Minority Issues, “OFFENSE, DEFENSE, OR JUST A BIG FENCE? WHY BORDER SECURITY IS A VALID NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE ST. MARY'S
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER FOR TERRORISM LAW,” 2012, Accessed 7/30/2014)
Not only is it a concern that cartel activities spill across the border, but there are also heavy
implications for the United States if the drug cartel violence continues to escalate within Mexico.
Protecting refugees who flee the violence imposes primary responsibility on the United States. n47 The United States is seeing a huge rise in
cases of American citizens who have family living in Mexico, asking for help to bring these individuals legally into the United States. n48 The
reality is that many Mexicans already [*751] crossed into the United States illegally and will continue
to do so as long as the brutal violence is threatening their existence. n49 Mexican citizens with temporary border
crossing cards may enter the United States and permanently move in with family members and friends. For those who do not have legal
documentation, visas, or other paperwork, their hopes lie in filing for asylum. n50¶ Although
the approval rate for Mexicans
seeking asylum currently lies at two percent despite rampant violence at the borders, immigration
courts are worried that an increase in the number of applications might completely overwhelm a
system that is already overloaded. n51 There are only two asylum offices that serve the border states, one in Houston and the
second in Los Angeles. n52 The United States currently admits roughly 75,000-80,000 refugees per year from countries all over the world, n53
but given that Mexico is our neighbor with potentially sensitive diplomatic relationships at stake, the
future is uncertain if the status quo takes a turn for the worse. n54 Without a workable solution to curb
drug cartel activity and the violence it breeds, the United States cannot execute an effective solution
for immigration and border security.
IL - Mexican Instability
Mexico on the brink of becoming weak state now- cartels poised to take control
Page 12 (James, MA Thesis in Political Science, Cal State Chico, “Mexican Drug Cartels and International
Theory: History With Solutions,” Thesis, https://csuchicodspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.4/522/12%203%202012%20James%20Page.pdf?sequence
=1 Fall 2012)
Currently, with
a failing economy and high levels of violence in different areas of the country, Mexico is
seeing a decreased interest in investments from other countries as well as a decreased ability to
compete with other nations like China and the Caribbean in terms of export production and foreign assembly plant creation.2 The
government in its current state is unable to support the Mexican people; however, a deal struck
between the government and the cartels could provide the tools needed to pick up the country’s
economy and restore some level of “faith” in government officials. Business for narcotic traffickers
will likely take a turn towards providing security benefits as the government will become ineffective in
enforcing narcotics laws and officials of the government will become “ wholly owned subsidiaries” of
the drug cartels . The situation in Mexico is quite similar to the situation in Somalia, except that the cartels have the ability to keep some
level of infrastructural control over the situation. It is a balancing act that the cartels want to have between a failed and a strong state of
Mexico. The failed state would be Somalia where really no faction has control and no means of an operation can be established. The strong
state would be the U.S. where people can call the police and expect them to show up and handle a situation, and the corruption of politicians is
still a scandal. A
weak state is where a narcotics operation can be established and if government officials
for some reason interfere, then a small bribe is enough to make the problem go away. Applying rationalchoice theory to the problem, this is how a self-motivated entity such as a drug cartel will want to act as it
maximizes its own benefits while minimizing its costs. Their power and the expansion of it is all that
matters, and the best way to expand that power is to maintain a level of calm control over the people
they are working among. The PRI had this level of agreement in place before, and if the cartels have their way, then this
is how the country will go back to operating . This is how democracy will fail in Mexico , and it is how
Mexico will slip into a lesser-state status; it will not be a failed state, but rather, a weak state. From
the outside, Mexico will look like a well-oiled and well-funded machine with state officials doing their
jobs. The country will look like a safe place for investors from around the world in which to invest and set up new
factories and franchises. Funding for different government projects will be available and civil society itself
will appear to be at an functioning. When examined more closely, however, the truth about where the
money and peace is coming from will be exposed. Behind the door deals will be where decisions
about government are being made, not at polling stations and voting booths. The charade of an
election between several candidates in several areas of government will occur, but no matter who is
elected, the outcome will be the same: the cartels will remain behind the scenes , pulling the puppet
strings of all elected officials to ensure that policy creation will continue to benefit them . Policy may vary
from state to state, as different cartels control different states, but in reality, the vote will no longer count for anything substantial.
This is what it means to fall into a weak-state status: the drug traffickers essentially take on the role of government in
many capacities and thus undermine the concept of democracy.
Cartels growing in strength and numbers now- will gain total governmental control
without plan
Page 12 (James, MA Thesis in Political Science, Cal State Chico, “Mexican Drug Cartels and International
Theory: History With Solutions,” Thesis, https://csuchicodspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.4/522/12%203%202012%20James%20Page.pdf?sequence
=1 Fall 2012)
As stated earlier in the literature review, many authors and researchers believe that Mexico has not yet reached this status. While there
is
rampant corruption, and in a few areas of Mexico the government is losing its battle for control, the
state, as a whole, is not in a position of failure. The government is still operational and it is doing its best to fight off the cartels and reestablish
control. Even
though the government is currently operating in an inefficient manner in regards to
fighting the cartels, it is still fighting. How long it can fight is another entirely different question, as
time, resources and hope is running out . The following map of Mexico shows the current division of the country as cartels
are continuing to spread and expand their operations as rational actors and business entities (Figure 1).
Large cartels are coming up with new and more imposing ways to rally not only their own troops, but also to
inspire the civilians and intimidate officials. La Familia is a large and dominant cartel with many of its
members coming from Michoacán.3 This cartel is known to be brutal but also revolutionary. One of their first acts of violence that gave them
notice and fame was when they fired a few shots into the air at a nightclub and threw five severed human heads onto the dance floor with a
note calling their act “divine justice” as they only kill those that deserve it and the innocent will always be spared.5 This cartel has continued
different forms of public relations, including religious quotes, to try and sway the people of Mexico to support them in their divine war against
the government and other cartels. In
many areas of Mexico, the brutality of this cartel, mixed with
revolutionary rhetoric and small charity work, has influenced the average citizen to favor them over
the government. They often state they are the crime fighters of Michoacán, executing wrong doers, without trial and at their own
discretion. The La Familia cartel is powerful, well funded, and it is dedicated to increasing its power over Mexico. The Gulf Cartel is
another example of a cartel exploiting the increasing weak state status of Mexico by recruiting, as a
means to seize and maintain power, well-trained deserters of the Mexican military and Special
Forces.6 Their close relationship with Mexican military gave them access to soldiers looking for a
“career change” and found the drug trafficking field as a viable means to work. This is how the birth of “Los
Zetas” occurred; they were originally the muscle of the Gulf Cartel. As Los Zetas began to grow and establish their own reputation, they
eventually splintered off from the Gulf Cartel, and they have become their own organization and a dominant force in the drug trafficking game.
Their brutality is well known, as they are willing to kidnap, decapitate and murder any person/people that may stand in their way. One of their
crimes included kidnapping of 72 immigrants from Central and South America and marching them out into a deserted area; after giving them
the opportunity to pay a ransom or become foot soldiers, the Zetas executed them.7 There has not been an explanation for these actions since
they occurred, but they have only added to the infamy of Los Zetas. This reputation is one of the reasons why different gangs are willing to
work with Los Zetas in exchange for minor training and weapons. Los Zetas are considered top notch with a willingness to expand their
operation more so than other narcotic syndicates; they are sought out and actually have control over U.S. gangs like Mexican Mafia, MS-13 and
the Texas Syndicate.8 This cartel now has a hand in several illegal markets ranging from the black market DVD trade to prostitution and illegal
immigration. Los Zetas have a level of unwavering support discipline within their upper ranks and support from the people in the allure of the
“fast paced” drug trafficker lifestyle and, like the La Familia cartel,
they have their eyes on the government as the highest
prize of all. The Mexican government alone does not stand a chance against two powerful cartels like
La Familia and Los Zetas or other cartels like the Gulf Cartel that originally created Los Zetas, the
Juarez Cartel, a cartel that heads up one of the most violent cities in Mexico, or even the Sinaloa
Cartel, one of the largest cartels in Mexico. The Mexican cartels are strong, and they have agendas
that include using the government for their own profit motive.
Drug money sustains cartels allowing them to threaten the existence of the Mexican
state
Seth Harp – 2010. (New York University Law Review, “GLOBALIZATION OF THE U.S. BLACK MARKET: PROHIBITION, THE WAR ON
DRUGS, AND THE CASE OF MEXICO,” November 2010, Accessed 7/30/2014).
Mexico is currently embroiled in a major national conflict with a 2009 body count that surpassed the
body count in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. n104 Steadily enriched by the constant flow of money
from American drug sales, the cartels have infiltrated every layer of society in Mexico. ¶ [*1677] Al Capone's
thugs were farmboys and immigrants with sawed-off shotguns and tommyguns. n105 Retail gangs in American cities wield pistols, knives, and
fists. The
armed wings of Mexico's cartels, by contrast, are manned by disciplined soldiers well
equipped with increasingly sophisticated arsenals now reported to go beyond mere assault rifles,
machine guns, and grenades, to include such military materiel as anti-aircraft guns and
semisubmersible submarines. n106 Cartel operatives coordinate their operations from sophisticated command centers using cell
phones, two-way radios, scanner devices, Voice Over Internet Protocol, broadband satellite instant messaging, and encrypted text messages.
n107 Street
battles between them and the federal army are sustained infantry engagements that can
last hours and leave dozens dead. n108¶ Los Zetas, n109 a private army that rose to prominence as the
enforcement branch of the Gulf Cartel, n110 originated out of the Grupo Aeromovil de Fuerzas
Especiales, n111 the special forces branch of the Mexican army. Its defection to entrepreneurial
endeavors was a stark testament to the ability of the drug trade to compete with the Mexican state.
n112¶ [*1678] In addition to adopting western discipline and training, cartel soldiers have adopted the
most effective tactics of Islamist terrorists and other irregular paramilitaries at war with governments
and have committed rampant atrocities of virtually unparalleled savagery. n113 Those speaking out publicly
against cartel bosses, including speakers who are public officials, reporters, lawyers, and even clergymen, are murdered in short order. n114
Only the rich and hard-to-reach are lucky [*1679] enough to be killed by a sniper or a team of vehicle-borne gunmen: Cartel enemies taken
alive are slowly tortured to death in safehouses built for that very purpose. n115¶ As of 2010, large swaths of the country are under cartel
control. n116 As
much as thirty percent of Mexico's arable land is under drug crop cultivation. n117 Every
political party takes drug money, n118 the Federal Investigative Agency has been corrupted, n119 and one-fifth of the Attorney
General's office is under investigation. n120 Vigilantism is rampant. n121 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
Department of Defense are preparing for the possibility of the failure of the Mexican state. n122 The
cartels are believed to be actively trying to kill the head of state, n123 and some business leaders have even called for the U.N. to occupy the
country. n124¶ In short, Mexico
is a country pushed to the brink of a particularly awful kind of failure, the
cause of which is its status as the leading producer and transporter of drugs bound for the U.S. black
market. n125¶ Imagine instead, however implausibly, that the United States produced all of the drugs it consumes. To be sure, eradication
efforts [*1680] would be more efficient, because the United States is wealthier and more developed. But the resulting scarcity would drive the
price of drugs higher, making them an even more lucrative product. The higher price commanded by drugs would induce more determined,
better-financed criminals to enter the illegal market. This would increase production, again spurring an increase in corresponding antinarcotics
efforts, making drugs even more costly. Those increased costs would in turn be passed on to drug consumers, again raising the price of drugs,
again exacerbating the cycle, until an equilibrium were reached at which the price of drugs would be much higher than at the outset but the
total quantity supplied would have changed little or not at all. n126 All the while counternarcotics efforts would be increasing, and domestic
criminal syndicates would be gaining money, power, and reputational capital. Eventually,
with the two upward trajectories
pitted against one another, the conflict would approach an outright war. n127
IL - Mexican Trade
Drug violence threatens U.S. Mexico trade relationship
Beau Kilmer et. al – 2010. (Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany M. Bond, and Peter H. Reuter also contributed; Drug Policy Research
Center of the Rand Corporation, “Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico,” 2010, RAND_OP325.pdf, Accessed 6/3/2014)
The recent surge in violence in Mexico has been dramatic. While the per capita murder rate fell by roughly 25 percent
between 2000 and 2007, it jumped 50 percent between 2007 and 2009 (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública and Consejo Nacional de
Población, 2010). The violence associated with the illicit drug trade is largely responsible for this reversal .
The estimated annual total for drug-related homicides in Mexico increased from 1,776 in 2005 to 6,587 in 2009, and, in 2010, the total was
already 5,775 by July (Duran-Martinez, Hazard, and Rios, 2010; Shirk, 2010). In 2009, the murder rate for drug-related homicides alone in
Mexico exceeded the rate for all murders and nonnegligent manslaughters in the United States (6.1 versus 5.1 per 100,000; Shirk, 2010; FBI,
2010).¶ This violence in Mexico has security implications for the United States. The primary problem to date has not been violence spilling over
the border. While there have been such inci- dents, and some are quite horrific, homicide rates in the U.S. cities along the Mexican border
remain very low. El Paso is the second-safest city in the United States, with just 2.8 homicides per 100,000 (Borunda, 2009)—a rate that is lower
than that of Paris or Geneva. This is in sharp contrast to El Paso’s twin city in Mexico, Ciudad Juárez, which experienced 2,754 homi- cides in
2009 (a rate of 196.7 per 100,000). While spillover violence does have important security implications for those living and working north of the
border, this threat might have been exaggerated and pales in comparison to the lawlessness that pervades parts of Mexico. The
bigger
security implication for the United States is having a close ally and a large trading partner engulfed in
such turmoil.1¶ Demand for illicit drugs in the United States creates lucrative markets for the Mexican
drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, echoing President George W. Bush in 2001, noted that
America’s demand for drugs was a root cause of the violence. While this has led some to argue that priority should be given to reducing U.S.
drug demand, Reuter’s (2010, p. 3) assessment of the literature leads him to soberly conclude that “there is little that the U.S. can do to reduce
consumption over the next five years that will help Mexico.” This does not mean that a serious investment in reducing consumption among
heavy users (especially those in criminal justice settings) is not good policy (see Kleiman, 2009). It just means that one should not expect rapid
results. The great bulk of drug demand comes from the minority of individuals who are the heavy users (Everingham, Rydell, and Caulkins,
1995; Rhodes et al., 1997; Kilmer and Pacula, 2009); reducing their consumption is difficult.
Increasing border violence threatens the economy even accounting for non-linearity
Gustavo Robles et. al. - 2012. (Associate Professor of Political Science & Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies; Gustavo Robles, Senior Associate Researcher at the Program on Poverty and Governance and Ph.D Student in Political Science; Gabriela
Calderón, Postdoctoral Fellow, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Senior Associate Researcher, Program on Poverty
and Government; Stanford University, “The Economic Consequences of Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico,” 2012, Accessed 7/30/2014)
Following the above argument, and due to the nature of drug-related violence, we can assume that
this type of violence has no linear effect on economic performance, but instead that there is a
threshold after which violence causes economic activity to significantly shrink. Below this turf-war threshold,
many individuals and companies can internalize any increased costs resulting from the need for enhanced security and protection depending on
their economic size and capacity. However, said adjustments have effects on the labor market, both in the supply and demand, and we can
expect to find a marginal effect of violence on this area. Once
the violence levels have passed into the war threshold,
companies and individuals begin to change their actions in both the medium and long term, including
their location, investments, and production, in the case of commercial enterprises, and their
participation in the labor market and choice of profession, in the case of individuals. We can expect a
significant contraction in economic activity in this range of violence that might not be adequately
captured with a linear relationship model between economic activity and violence.
IL - Terrorism
Drug violence by cartels has established terrorist methods to protect their marijuana
production and other illicit drugs
Wasler 2010 [Walser, R. (2010), Heritage Foundation,US Strategy Against Mexican Drug Cartels:
Flawed and Uncertain. Backgrounder, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg_2407.pdf,
MG]
The U.S.–Mexico drug challenge remains stark and disturbing. Mexican-based traffickers smuggle an estimated 500 to 700 metric tons of cocaine into the U.S. every
year. Mexican DTOs or cartels have dominated cocaine-smuggling into the U.S. increasingly since the 1990s .
Mexico is the top foreign source
of marijuana, cultivating and harvesting an estimated 15,800 metric tons in 2007.2 Cannabis is a highly
profitable mainstay for the Mexican cartels, reportedly accounting for 50 to 60 percent of their
profits. Mexican drug-smuggling organizations are also expanding marijuana production inside the
U.S. to increase profits and minimize detection. Mexico is a major provider of heroin and methamphetamines to the U.S.
Estimates of the revenue generated from illicit sales of drugs range from $13 billion to $38 billion . Only
Mexico’s oil and auto industries generate greater revenue streams. Since 2007, the Mexican government has struck hard at the Mexican cartels. Just in recent
months, government officials have killed or arrested three major drug chieftains: Teodor Garcia Semental, a key crime figure in hundreds of Tijuana murders
(arrested January 12, 2010); Carlos Beltran Leyva (arrested January 2, 2010); and Arturo Beltran Leyva, the Boss of Bosses (killed in a gunfight with Mexican special
forces on December 16, 2009).3 In the past two years, the Mexican government claims to have seized 70 metric tons of cocaine, recovered $260 million in cash,
captured 31,000 weapons, and made more than 58,000 arrests. Mex- ico has extradited 284 indicted traffickers for prosecution and trial in the U.S.4 But
the
number of dead from drug violence has continued to climb steadily over the past five years: 1,537
killed in 2005; 2,221 killed in 2006; 2,673 killed in 2007; 5,630 killed in 2008; and 9,635 killed in 2009 .5
Because they control entry into the U.S., the
Mexican states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Michoacan, and
Sinaloa account for nearly 75 percent of Mexico’s drug murders. Ciudad Juarez, across the Rio Grande
from El Paso, has developed a reputation as the deadliest city on the planet . In the past five years, more than
1,000 police and military officers have lost their lives in the fight . Targets of cartel gunmen have
included former generals, active-duty military officers, and heads of federal and local police agencies,
as well as individuals in witness protection programs, print and media journalists, and even
recovering addicts seeking help in drug treatment and rehabilitation centers . Moreover, Mexico’s drug
violence has spawned a variety of hybrid, hyper-violent criminal organizations such as the cartel-like
Zetas that are able to employ military-like professionalism coupled with terrorist-like methods of
indiscriminate murders— tactics ominously new to North America. Mexico’s Zetas are studied closely and with considerable intensity by U.S. law
enforcement and security strategists.6 Security analysts describe Mexico’s transition from gangsterism to dangerous
hybrid forms of “paramilitary terrorism” with “guerrilla tactics.” 7 The capabilities of the Zetas , for
example,
include sophisticated intelligence-gathering, often with insider information, coordinated
military actions, and deployment of concentrated levels of lethal firepower, as well as an ability to
exploit new vulnerabilities such as extortion and the wholesale theft of oil from pipelines.
In essence,
Mexico’s narco-cartels have constructed what one expert labeled “a parallel government” in which power is
shared between elected officials and drug barons .8 A fierce debate rages over whether Mexico is in fact winning or losing its war on
the cartels. Optimists say
violence is still rising because increasingly leaderless cartels are fighting for a
diminishing slice of the criminal-earnings pie . Former Salvadoran guerrilla Joaquin Villalobos, for example, believes the state is gaining
the upper hand. “It takes time to reduce violence, but drug trafficking is going through a process of self-destruction that deepens when the state confronts it,” he
states.9 Skeptics believe a Darwinian process of survival is underway and that key Mexican cartels such as the Sinaloa have not been seriously weakened.
The
present assessments of Mexico’s progress in the war on the drug cartels need to be tempered with
uncertainty about the inadequacy of police and judicial reform, the persistent problem of corruption,
and the danger of a loss of political will to continue the drug fight .
International drug trade helps fund terrorist groups
Cilluffo, 2000 [Frank. "The threat posed from the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking,
and terrorism." House, Committee on the Judiciary. Congressional Testimony. 106th Cong., 2d sess 13
(2000), http://epsilennyt.com/NYTContent/Test/Template33/Images/threadconvergorgancrime.pdf]
As we begin the 21st Century, America is faced with a new national security challenge that is both vexing and complex. The
once clear
lines between the international drug trade, terrorism and organized crime are blurring, crossing and
mutating as never before. Unfortunately, Washington is only beginning to come to grips with this deepening phenomenon. The
continued use of an inflexible 20th Century bureaucratic entanglement of government agencies will not answer this call. We must see this
threat clearly. We must understand its roots. We must understand what it means to our future. The challenge of terrorism is not a new
phenomenon. It has, and always will remain a weapon of the weak. It is a low-cost, high-leverage method and tactic that enables small nations,
sub-national groups and even individuals to circumvent the conventional projections of national strength- i.e., political, economic or
conventional military might. This is especially the case since our swift and decisive victory in Desert Storm. Few, if any nations would attempt to
confront the US in a conventional war today - recognizing that terrorism and unconventional warfare is a more effective - and perhaps even
unaccountable - means of off-setting our strengths and exploiting our weaknesses. The overlapping of terrorism and the narcotics trade is not
new either. Many
terrorist organizations have always been involved in the drug industry . But many
ideologically bankrupt terrorist groups shed their moral righteousness and turned towards the drug
trade to further their tainted causes. Whether the terrorists actively cultivated and trafficked the drugs or "taxed" those who did,
the financial windfall that the narcotics industry guarantees has filled the void left by state sponsors. Organized crime and terrorism have two
differing goals. Organized crime's business is business. The less attention brought to their lucrative enterprises, the better. The goal of terrorism
is quite the opposite. A wide-ranging public profile is often the desired effect. Despite this, the links between organized crime and terrorism are
becoming stronger in regards to the drug trade. Organized crime groups
often run the trafficking organizations
while the terrorists and insurgent groups often control the territory where the drugs are cultivated
and transported. The relationship is mutually beneficial. Both groups use funds garnered from the
drug trade to finance their organizations and operations. Involvement in the drug business is almost a guarantee of
financial independence from a state sponsor. Groups are no longer beholden to outsiders. That brings the realization that whatever restraint
those state sponsors could impose, has now vanished. Likewise, traditional diplomatic or military measures that the United States could subject
state sponsors to curb terrorist actions is diminished. The blurring of these lines pose new challenges to the United States. The
traditional
organization of the US national security apparatus used to combat the troika of the terrorist,
organized crime, and narcotics trafficking threat is no longer applicable. In order to work towards a solution to the
problem of narco-terrorism, it is important to identify its implications to US policymaking and its implementation.
Groups like Hamas, Hizballah, and other radical groups have positioned their influence
in Latin America
Curtis, 2002 [Curtis, G. E., Hudson, R. A., & Kollars, N. A. A Report Prepared by the Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Department of Defense (2002).
“A global overview of narcotics-funded terrorist and other extremist groups”,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf, MG ]
International law enforcement agencies have reported that radical Islamic activity in Latin America is
closely connected to drug trafficking and arms dealing in the area, particularly in Colombia and in the
Triborder Region. Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamaya al
Gama'at actively use the Triborder Region as a support base. For example, they use the region to raise revenues
through illicit activities that include drug- and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forging travel documents, and even pirating
software and music. In addition, these
organizations provide safe havens and assistance to other terrorists
transiting the region. As early as 1995, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, former State Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism,
testified before the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives that Hizballah activities in the
Triborder Region involved narcotics, smuggling, and terrorism. He further asserted that Hizballah also had
cells in Colombia and Venezuela, was engaging in fund-raising and recruitment, and was receiving
guidance and logistical support from Iranian intelligence officers assigned to Iranian embassies in the
region.36
IL - Sinaloa
Eliminating the Sinaloa cartel’s revenue key to peace in Mexico- majority of revenue
comes from marijuana
Murray et al. 11 (Chad Murray, Ashlee Jackson, Amanda C. Miralrio, Nicolas Eiden, “Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization” The George
Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission: Capstone Report;
https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf;
4/26/11)
While Los Zetas and La Familia have recently dominated the media coverage of the drug war in Mexico, they might not be objectively termed
the strongest cartels in the country. They are the most active in attacking government forces and setting up narco bloqueos in major cities.59
However, they do not have the financial strength, military prowess, territorial reach, or tactical discipline of Mexico‟s largest DTO, the
Sinaloa cartel. 60 This DTO and the Tijuana cartel are major traffickers of marijuana, and their territories
are the major marijuana production areas in Mexico. They have near exclusive control of the so called
“Golden Triangle” region of Mexico where the mountainous areas of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua states meet.61 This makes sense,
because according to sources in the Drug Enforcement Agency these two DTOs likely make a majority [of] their revenue
from marijuana62 . The amount of marijuana trafficked by the Sinaloa cartel is evident by the scale of recent drug busts. In October of
2010 Mexican police and military forces seized more than 134 metric tons of marijuana in one Sinaloa facility. This was equal to almost $200
million according to Mexican authorities.63 The very next month 30 tons of marijuana was retrieved by law enforcement on both sides of the
border after a Tijuana drug smuggling tunnel was discovered.64 The DTO behind this operation has not been determined, but based on the
location it is likely to be either the Sinaloa cartel or Arello Felix Organization. These seizures represent only a proportion of the amount
marijuana trafficked into the United States from Mexico through the San Diego-Tijuana corridor in 2 months. There are other drug transport
corridors that likely receive more marijuana traffic. Although the
Sinaloa cartel does not often target civilians, it is the most
violent DTO in terms of overall casualties.65It has targeted hundreds of police officers and its leader, “El Chapo” Guzmán, is
widely thought to have caused a recent upsurge in violence after breaking a truce with the other major criminal groups in the country.66 The
feud between the Sinaloa and Juarez organizations is the reason that Juarez is the most violent city in
Mexico, and according to some accounts, the entire world. 67 The Sinaloa cartel‟s huge financial resources make it
a major threat to the government, because they are able to corrupt large numbers of local, state, and
federal government officials. This was revealed in several high profile cases in recent years.68The Sinaloa cartel is
constantly trying to expand its territory into that traditionally held by other cartels, particularly in
Juarez, and this is a major cause of much of the violence. The Sinaloa cartel has the greatest capacity
to wage „ all-out war ‟ because they have far more money than the other DTOs. Guzmán is also more focused
on winning the favor and tacit protection of the populace, and thus is more involved in the drugs trade than kidnapping, and prefers to bribe
rather than confront authorities.69 However, in many ways this makes the Sinaloa cartel more dangerous to the Government in Mexico. Its
use of bribes can make local state and even federal law enforcement unreliable. Furthermore, the Sinaloa
organization‟s outreach to the civilian population makes it even harder for the government to gain information about Guzmán. In addition,
the massive strength of the Sinaloa cartel makes an eventual peace all the more allusive. In the event
that the government would try to reduce the violence through talks with cartels, the Sinaloa
organization would be unlikely to take them seriously. The government has little to offer big organizations
like Sinaloa, which already enjoy near uncontested control over the areas in which they operate.70
Taking out Sinaloa cartel would upset the operations of all Mexican cartels
Malcolm Beith – 2013. (Freelance journalist and author of The Last Narco: Inside the Hunt for El Chapo, the World's Most Wanted Drug
Lord; InSightCrime, “The Current State of Mexico's Many Drug Cartels,” 9/25/2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-
analysis/the-current-state-of-mexicos-many-drug-cartels, Accessed 8/1/2014)
It is tempting to separate Mexico's drug cartels into six hierarchical groups, each competing for
trafficking turf. The reality, however, is that the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, the Tijuana Cartel,
the Juarez Cartel, the Zetas and La Familia, not to mention several new offshoot organizations, are
fluid, dynamic, for-profit syndicates that sometimes operate under the umbrella of what are
effectively conglomerates but more often than not operate as independent, smaller-scale franchises.
This article examines the current state of the Sinaloa Federation, the Zetas, and other Mexican cartels. It finds that due to law enforcement
pressure in recent years, Mexico's
drug trafficking organizations have increasingly splintered, and may well
end up consolidated under the influence of the last cartel standing. That cartel would likely be the
Sinaloa Federation, which remains the most powerful cartel in Mexico today. The Sinaloa Federation
is the most powerful Mexican drug trafficking organization with the largest presence nationwide and
globally. Based in the state of Sinaloa in northwestern Mexico, it has operatives in at least 17 Mexican
states. In recent years, its members are known to have operated in cities throughout the United States. At the helm of the cartel is Joaquin
"El Chapo" Guzman Loera, and he is accompanied by several other key figures, among them Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada and Juan Jose
Esparragoza "El Azul" Moreno. These three figures, in their 50s and 60s, have run the Sinaloa Federation through a hands-off, top-down
management style since the 1990s. While the cartel itself may employ as many as 100,000 operatives, the leadership is believed to rarely
communicate directly with them, preferring instead to issue wide-ranging orders and allow the plaza chiefs -- those in charge of specific
trafficking zones -- to run their operations like franchises. For this reason, the Sinaloa cartel has long been known as the Federation.
Sinaloa is the most powerful cartel – they trafficking Marijuana and Heroin
Angelica Leicht – 2014. (LatinoPost, Sinaloa Cartel, Mexico's Biggest and Baddest Drug-Trafficking Threat,” 7/14/2014,
http://www.latinopost.com/articles/6972/20140721/sinaloa-cartel-mexicos-biggest-baddest-drug-trafficking-threat.htm, Accessed 8/1/2014)
The United States Intelligence Community considers the Sinaloa Cartel "the most powerful drug
trafficking organization in the world" and in 2011, the Los Angeles Times called it "Mexico's most
powerful organized crime group."¶ The cartel is primarily involved in the smuggling and distribution of
Colombian cocaine, Mexican marijuana, methamphetamine and Mexican and Southeast Asian heroin into the United States.
Sinaloa Cartel is by far the strongest – they’re also dependent on the drug trade
Theunis Bates – 2014. (Senior editor at The Week's print edition; The Week, “A Mexican drug cartel's rise to dominance,” 2/25/2014,
http://theweek.com/article/index/255503/a-mexican-drug-cartels-rise-to-dominance, Accessed 7/31/2014)
What is the
Sinaloa cartel? The Mexican crime syndicate is the world's most powerful drug trafficking
organization, and the biggest supplier of illegal narcotics in the U.S. About half of the estimated $65
billion worth of cocaine, heroin, and other illegal drugs that American users buy each year enters the
U.S. via Mexico. Sinaloa — which is named after its home state in western Mexico — controls more than half of that cross-border trade,
from which it earns at least $3 billion a year. U.S. law--enforcement officials say the group has a presence in all major American cities, and a
near monopoly on the wholesale distribution of heroin and cocaine in Chicago. The city's Crime Commission has branded Sinaloa's elusive
leader, Joaquín Guzmán, also known as El Chapo (or Shorty), Public Enemy No. 1 — a title last held by Al Capone. "What Al Capone was to beer
and whiskey," said commission member Arthur Bilek, "Guzmán is to narcotics."
Sinaloa is the strongest and they fight the Zetas
Clare Richardson – 2012. (Freeland journalist and former World Editor for Reuters and the Huffington Post; The Huffington Post,
“Mexico's Drug Cartels: Which Groups Are Running The Show?”, 09/05/2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/mexico-drug-cartels_n_1831821.html, Accessed 7/31/2014,
WSH).
Much of the violence is attributable to violent clashes between the two main cartels, Los Zetas and
the Sinaloa cartel, and their allies. The Los Angeles Times explains:¶ In Mexico's eight most violent states, the battle has
essentially boiled down to a no-holds-barred fight between two cartels: the Sinaloa network, Mexico's oldest and
traditionally most powerful gang, and the newer and exceedingly vicious Zetas.¶ Mexico's network of drug cartels is vast and
complex, with recent power struggles driving wedges between former allies and disbanding other groups entirely. Below, check out a few of the
most notorious groups operating in the country.
Sinaloa and Zetas are the most dangerous cartels
Clare
Richardson – 2012. (Freeland journalist and former World Editor for Reuters and the Huffington Post; The Huffington Post,
“Mexico's Drug Cartels: Which Groups Are Running The Show?”, 09/05/2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/mexico-drug-cartels_n_1831821.html, Accessed 7/31/2014,
WSH).
Much of the violence is attributable to violent clashes between the two main cartels, Los Zetas and
the Sinaloa cartel, and their allies. The Los Angeles Times explains:¶ In Mexico's eight most violent
states, the battle has essentially boiled down to a no-holds-barred fight between two cartels: the
Sinaloa network, Mexico's oldest and traditionally most powerful gang, and the newer and
exceedingly vicious Zetas.¶ Mexico's network of drug cartels is vast and complex, with recent power
struggles driving wedges between former allies and disbanding other groups entirely . Below, check out a few
of the most notorious groups operating in the country.
IL - Stopping revenue key
Minimizing profit windows key to eliminating cartels
Morris 13 (Evelyn Krache, International Security Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Think Again:
Mexican Drug Cartels,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels 12/3/13)
“We Need to Hit Them Where It Hurts: the Wallet." Exactly. Despite the ongoing arguments about drug legalization and
border security, the most effective way to combat the scourge of the DTOs would be to interdict not drugs or people but money. As in any
business, money is the fuel that keeps the cartels running. Even if Sinaloa, to give only one example, were to disappear
tomorrow, other organizations would quickly rise to take its slice of the lucrative pie. One of the most basic tenets of business is that highly
profitable markets attract lots of new entrants. This is true for legal and illegal enterprises alike. The staggering profits of illegal trade would be
much less attractive if the DTOs could not launder, deposit, and ultimately spend their money. But shutting down the cartels' financial
operations will be a formidable task, given the help they have had from multinational financial institutions, which have profited from the
cartels' large-dollar deposits. In 2010, Wachovia bank (which was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008) admitted that it had processed $378 billion
of currency exchanges in Mexico -- an amount equal to about one-third of the country's GDP -- to which it had failed to apply anti-laundering
restrictions. In 2012, British bank HSBC settled with the U.S. government for $1.9 billion to escape prosecution for, among other things,
laundering hundreds of millions of dollars for the Sinaloa cartel. U.S. law enforcement has also implicated Bank of America and Western Union
in DTO money laundering. Although illegal money transfers can happen without banks' knowledge, the volume and widespread occurrence of
these transactions indicate just how easy it is for the cartels to clean their dirty money. Paying a fine to avoid prosecution is almost no
punishment at all. The fines Wachovia paid amounted to less than 2 percent of its 2009 profit. Even the record fine assessed on HSBC
amounted to only 12 percent of the bank's profits. Furthermore, banks can simply accrue funds to offset any possible fines, either by increasing
what they charge cartels or by setting aside some of the earnings from laundering, even as they continue to do business with the DTOs.
Prosecuting bank employees involved in money laundering, up through the highest levels of an institution, would be a better tack. Pictures of a
chief compliance officer as he entered a courtroom for sentencing would have a far greater deterrent effect than any financial penalty. To that
end, investigative techniques and legal precedents for going after global criminal networks are increasingly robust, and the political payoffs
could be substantial. One
of the more successful campaigns in the war on terrorism has been the financial
one; experience gained in tracking the funds of al Qaeda could make it easier to similarly unravel Los
Zetas' financing. Malfeasance in the financial industry is nothing new, but public sensitivity to banks' wrongdoing is arguably higher than
it has been in decades. An enterprising prosecutor could make quite a reputation for herself by tracking DTO money through the financial
system. The
cartels, along with the violence and corruption they perpetrate, are threats to both Mexico
and the United States. The problem is a complicated one and taps areas of profound policy
disagreement. The way to make progress in combating the DTOs is to ignore issues like gun control
and illegal immigration and follow the money. Stanching the cartels' profits will do more to end the
bloodshed than any new fence or law.
Impact - Mexican Econ
Mexican economic crisis tanks the global economy
Enrique Rangel, fellow at the Monterrey Bureau, “Pressure on the Peso,” November 28th, 1995, from
The Dallas Morning News, lexis
All year long, thousands of foreign
investors have nervously watched Mexico’s volatile financial markets as the Clinton
administration and congressional leaders debated the pros and cons of bailing out a battered currency. With the exception of 1982 - when Mexico defaulted on its
foreign debt and a handful of giant New York banks worried they would lose billions of dollars in loans - few
people abroad ever cared about a
weak peso. But now it’s different, experts say. This time, the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico’s unfolding
financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to
collapse, it would drag down a few other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is
prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. “It took a peso devaluation so that other
countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today’s global economy,” said economist Victor Lopez Villafane
of the Monterrey Institute of Technology. “I hate to say it, but if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an
international financial collapse” not seen since the Great Depression, said Dr. Lopez, who has conducted comparative studies of the Mexican
economy and the economies of some Asian and Latin American countries. “ That’s why it’s in the best interests of the United States
and the industrialized world to help Mexico weather its economic crisis,” he said. The crisis began last December when the
Mexican government devalued the currency. Last March, after weeks of debate, President Clinton, the International Monetary Fund and a handful of other
countries and international agencies put together a $ 53 billion rescue package for Mexico. But despite the help - $ 20 billion in guarantee loans from the United
States - Mexico’s financial markets have been volatile for most of the year. The peso is now trading at about 7.70 to the dollar, after falling to an all-time low of 8.30
to the dollar Nov. 9. The road has been bumpy, and that has made many - particularly U.S. investors - nervous. No
country understands better
the importance of Mexico to the global economy than the United States, said Jorge Gonzalez Davila, an economist at
Trinity University in San Antonio. “Despite the rhetoric that you hear in Washington, I think that most people agree even those who oppose any aid to Mexico - that when Mexico sneezes, everybody catches a cold,” Mr.
Gonzalez said. “That’s why nowadays any talk of aid to Mexico or trade with Mexico gets a lot of attention, ” he
said. Most economists, analysts and business leaders on both sides of the border agree that the biggest impact abroad of a prolonged Mexican fiscal crisis may be
on the U.S. economy, especially in Texas and in cities bordering Mexico.
Broad statistical models proves collapse leads to conflict
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, (Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,
Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and
Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods
of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political
science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of
interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶
First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms
in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the
often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such
as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to
uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining
power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic
conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests
that 'future
expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions
and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific
benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,
if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as
energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those
resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves
by interdependent states.4¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic
downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic
conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the
presence of a recession tends to
amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other.
(Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. &
Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the
popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary
theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising
from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external
military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and
Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller
(1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than
autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic
support. DeRouen (2000)
has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in
the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the
frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external
conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict
has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to other
perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first
paragraph of this chapter.¶ Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically
consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those
views.
Impact - Mex Stability
Collapse causes global war
Robert Haddick, MBA from U. Illinois, Editor of Small Wars Journal, December 2008,
http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html
There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little
attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most part, weak and failing states
represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse
of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of
Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests how suddenly and
catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter
Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of
worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear
consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan
would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even
bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons.
That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into
a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the
weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexican possibility
may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under
sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out
over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent
by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for
homeland security alone. Yes, the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to
the global security environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional,
economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government,
indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the
world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the
worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia.
However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.
Impact - Mex Oil Shocks
Mexican collapse causes oil shocks that crash the global economy
Michael Moran, Policy Analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-31-2009, “Six Crises, 2009: A
Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery”
http://afghanistanwar.edublogs.org/2009/07/31/rge-six-crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopoliticscould-upset-global-recovery/
Risk 2: Mexico Drug Violence: At Stake: Oil prices, refugee flows, NAFTA, U.S. economic stability A story
receiving more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence
across the northern states of Mexico, where Felipe Calderon has deployed the national army to combat
two thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption. The tales of
carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez
alone, a city located directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United
States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign that the army is winning, either, and
that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses? The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold
War (outside of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or
collapse of Mexico. The template then was communism, but narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better.
The prospect of a wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across
the northern border so far seems remote. But Mexico’s army has its own problems with corruption, and
a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin 2006 electoral victory over a leftist rival as
illegitimate. With Mexico’s economy reeling and the traditional safety valve of illegal immigration to
America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists. Meanwhile, Mexico ranks with Saudi
Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not do without. Should things
come unglued there and Pemex production shut down even temporarily, the shock on oil markets
could be profound, again, sending its waves throughout the global economy. Long-term, PEMEX
production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on
foreign investment. Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a
bipartisan demand for more security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and
possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a pledge he deftly
sidestepped once in office.
Impact - Terrorism
Uncontrolled terrorism triggers nuclear war
Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging
Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to
Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily
represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded
as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a
massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst
terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would
have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even
thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated
entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear
terrorism,
could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the
states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War
years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers
started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the socalled n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear
terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it
might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be
fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in
supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest
themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear
terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution
of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable
and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most
important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete
surprise, and American
officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at
all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and
France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps
Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in
this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in
Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would
officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would
only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were
confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well
apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the
United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible
perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s
early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil
might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For
example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president
might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In
such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible
that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly
nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be
admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear
terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington
might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or
disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity
and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their
comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One farfetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the
terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … longstanding interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that
might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the
question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could
reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy
and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one,
where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States
wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington
found the
responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that
they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major
exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in
areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or
Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then
draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of
Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the
act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear
threshold. It
would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an
entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and
China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to
them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central
dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some
readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which
possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is
subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares
that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a
possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if
not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If
China had been the
victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and
Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear
terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear
powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to
mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for
the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
Impact - Warming
Growth in CO2 emissions is driven entirely by immigration
By Steven A. Camarota, Leon Kolankiewicz August 2008, “Immigration to the United States and
World-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Center for Immigration Studies,
http://cis.org/GreenhouseGasEmissions
The findings of this study indicate that future levels of immigration will have a significant impact on
efforts to reduce global CO2 emissions. Immigration to the United States significantly increases worldwide CO2 emissions because it transfers population from lower-polluting parts of the world to the
United States, which is a higher-polluting country. On average immigrants increase their emissions
four-fold by coming to America. Among the findings: •The estimated CO2 emissions of the average
immigrant (legal or illegal) in the United States are 18 percent less than those of the average native-born
American. •However, immigrants in the United States produce an estimated four times more CO2 in the
United States as they would have in their countries of origin. •U.S. immigrants produce an estimated
637 million metric tons of CO2 emissions annually — equal to Great Britain and Sweden combined.
•The estimated 637 tons of CO2 U.S. immigrants produce annually is 482 million tons more than they
would have produced had they remained in their home countries. •If the 482 million ton increase in
global CO2 emissions caused by immigration to the United States were a separate country, it would rank
10th in the world in emissions. •The impact of immigration to the United States on global emissions is
equal to approximately 5 percent of the increase in annual world-wide CO2 emissions since 1980. •Of
the CO2 emissions caused by immigrants, 83 percent is estimated to come from legal immigrants and
17 percent from illegal immigrants. •Legal immigrants have a much larger impact because they have
higher incomes and resulting emissions, and they are more numerous than illegal immigrants. •The
above figures do not include the impact of children born to immigrants in the United States. If they
were included, the impact would be much higher. •Assuming no change in U.S. immigration policy, 30
million new legal and illegal immigrants are expected to settle in the United States in the next 20 years.
•In recent years, increases in U.S. CO2 emissions have been driven entirely by population increases as
per capita emissions have stabilized.
That’s the biggest factor driving global warming
Dave Chandler, Co-chair of the Colorado Green Party and editor of www.Earthside.com, May 29,
2009, Accessed 7/25/2009, http://www.earthside.com/earthside/our_envirnoment_earthside/
As 'ecological footprint' statistics presented below indicate, it is people living here that are most
responsible for the global climate change that is threatening the eco-system of the Earth. It would,
therefore, be the height of irresponsible to add to the numbers of Americans. Indeed, as the first few
reports here demonstrate, we should be very concerned that growing human population is
encroaching such on the rest of the environment that the sustainability capacity of the planet may
have already passed the tipping point. When species necessary for human survival, like bats and bees,
are under new survival threats themselves, then key indicators about the health of the environment
may have been presented.
Global warming leads to extinction
David Stein, Science editor for The Guardian, 7-14-2008, “Global Warming Xtra: Scientists warn about
Antarctic melting,” http://www.agoracosmopolitan.com/home/Frontpage/2008/07/14/02463.html
Global Warming continues to be approaches by governments as a "luxury" item, rather than a matter of
basic human survival. Humanity is being taken to its destruction by a greed-driven elite. These elites,
which include 'Big Oil' and other related interests, are intoxicated by "the high" of pursuing ego-driven
power, in a comparable manner to drug addicts who pursue an elusive "high", irrespective of the threat
of pursuing that "high" poses to their own basic survival, and the security of others. Global Warming and
the pre-emptive war against Iraq are part of the same self-destructive prism of a political-militaryindustrial complex, which is on a path of mass planetary destruction, backed by techniques of massdeception."The scientific debate about human induced global warming is over but policy makers - let
alone the happily shopping general public - still seem to not understand the scope of the impending
tragedy. Global warming isn't just warmer temperatures, heat waves, melting ice and threatened polar
bears. Scientific understanding increasingly points to runaway global warming leading to human
extinction", reported Bill Henderson in CrossCurrents. If strict global environmental security measures
are not immediately put in place to keep further emissions of greenhouse gases out of the
atmosphere we are looking at the death of billions, the end of civilization as we know it and in all
probability the end of humankind's several million year old existence, along with the extinction of
most flora and fauna beloved to man in the world we share.
Impact - Heg
Mexican stability is critical to U.S. power
Kaplan 12 – chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor
(Robert D., With the Focus on Syria, Mexico Burns, Stratfor, 3-282012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/focus-syria-mexico-burns)
While the foreign policy elite in Washington focuses on the 8,000 deaths in a conflict in Syria -- half a world away from the United States -- more than 47,000 people
have died in drug-related violence since 2006 in Mexico. A deeply troubled state as well as a demographic and economic giant on the United States' southern
border, Mexico
will affect America's destiny in coming decades more than any state or combination of states in the Middle East. Indeed, Mexico
may constitute the world's seventh-largest economy in the near future. Certainly, while the Mexican violence is largely criminal, Syria is a more clear-cut moral
issue, enhanced by its own strategic consequences. A calcified authoritarian regime in Damascus is stamping out dissent with guns and artillery barrages. Moreover,
regime change in Syria, which the rebels demand, could deliver a pivotal blow to Iranian influence in the Middle East, an event that would be the best news to U.S.
interests in the region in years or even decades. Nevertheless, the Syrian rebels are divided and hold no territory, and the toppling of pro-Iranian dictator Bashar al
Assad might conceivably bring to power an austere Sunni regime equally averse to U.S. interests -- if not lead to sectarian chaos. In other words, all military
intervention scenarios in Syria are fraught with extreme risk. Precisely for that reason, that the U.S. foreign policy elite has continued for months to feverishly
debate Syria, and in many cases advocate armed intervention, while utterly ignoring the vaster panorama of violence next door in Mexico, speaks volumes about
Washington's own obsessions and interests, which are not always aligned with the country's geopolitical interests. Syria matters and matters momentously to U.S.
interests, but Mexico ultimately matters more, so one would think that there would be at least some degree of parity in the amount written on these subjects. I am
not demanding a switch in news coverage from one country to the other, just a bit more balance. Of course, it is easy for pundits to have a fervently interventionist
view on Syria precisely because it is so far away, whereas miscalculation in Mexico on America's part would carry far greater consequences. For example, what
the Mexican
if
drug cartels took revenge on San Diego? Thus, one might even argue that the very noise in the media about Syria, coupled
with the relative silence about Mexico, is proof that it is the latter issue that actually is too sensitive for loose talk. It may also be that cartel-wracked Mexico -- at
some rude subconscious level -- connotes for East Coast elites a south of the border, 7-Eleven store culture, reminiscent of the crime movie "Traffic," that holds no
allure to people focused on ancient civilizations across the ocean. The concerns of Europe and the Middle East certainly seem closer to New York and Washington
than does the southwestern United States. Indeed, Latin American bureaus and studies departments simply lack the cachet of Middle East and Asian ones in
government and universities. Yet, the fate
of Mexico is the hinge on which the United States' cultural and
demographic future rests. U.S. foreign policy emanates from the domestic condition of its society, and
nothing will affect its society more than the dramatic movement of Latin history northward. By 2050, as much as a third of the American population could be
Hispanic. Mexico and Central America constitute a growing demographic and economic powerhouse with which the United States has an inextricable relationship.
In recent years Mexico's economic growth has outpaced that of its northern neighbor. Mexico's population of 111 million plus Central America's of more than 40
million equates to half the population of the United States. Because of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 85 percent of Mexico's exports go to the United
States, even as half of Central America's trade is with the United States. While the median age of Americans is nearly 37, demonstrating the aging tendency of the
U.S. population, the median age in Mexico is 25, and in Central America it is much lower (20 in Guatemala and Honduras, for example). In part because of young
workers moving northward, the destiny of the United States could be north-south, rather than the east-west, sea-to-shining-sea of continental and patriotic myth.
(This will be amplified by the scheduled 2014 widening of the Panama Canal, which will open the Greater Caribbean Basin to megaships from East Asia, leading to
the further development of Gulf of Mexico port cities in the United States, from Texas to Florida.) Since 1940, Mexico's population has increased more than fivefold. Between 1970 and 1995 it nearly doubled. Between 1985 and 2000 it rose by more than a third. Mexico's population is now more than a third that of the
United States and growing at a faster rate. And it is northern Mexico that is crucial. That most of the drug-related homicides in this current wave of violence that so
much dwarfs Syria's have occurred in only six of Mexico's 32 states, mostly in the north, is a key indicator of how northern Mexico is being distinguished from the
rest of the country (though the violence in the city of Veracruz and the regions of Michoacan and Guerrero is also notable). If the military-led offensive to crush the
drug cartels launched by conservative President Felipe Calderon falters, as it seems to be doing, and Mexico City goes back to cutting deals with the cartels, then the
capital may in a functional sense lose even further control of the north, with concrete implications for the southwestern United States. One might argue that with
massive border controls, a functional and vibrantly nationalist United States can coexist with a dysfunctional and somewhat chaotic northern Mexico. But that is
mainly true in the short run. Looking deeper into the 21st century, as Arnold Toynbee notes in A Study of History (1946), a border
between a highly
developed society and a less highly developed one will not attain an equilibrium but will advance in the
more backward society's favor. Thus, helping to stabilize Mexico -- as limited as the United States' options may be, given the
complexity and sensitivity of the relationship -- is a more urgent national interest than stabilizing societies in the Greater Middle East. If Mexico ever
does reach coherent First World status, then it will become less of a threat, and the healthy melding of the two societies will quicken to the benefit of both. Today,
helping to thwart drug cartels in rugged and remote terrain in the vicinity of the Mexican frontier and reaching southward from Ciudad
Juarez (across the border from El Paso, Texas) means a limited role for the U.S. military and other agencies -- working, of course,
in full cooperation with the Mexican authorities. (Predator and Global Hawk drones fly deep over Mexico searching for drug production facilities.) But
the legal framework for cooperation with Mexico remains problematic in some cases because of strict interpretation of 19th century posse comitatus laws on the
U.S. side. While the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to affect historical outcomes in Eurasia, its leaders and foreign policy mandarins are
somewhat passive about what is happening to a country with which the United States shares a long land border, that verges on partial chaos in some of its northern
sections, and whose population is close to double that of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Mexico, in addition to the obvious challenge of China as a rising great
power, will help write the American story in the 21st century. Mexico
will partly determine what kind of society America will become,
and what exactly will be its demographic and geographic character, especially in the Southwest. The U.S. relationship with China will matter more than any other
individual bilateral relationship in terms of determining the United States' place in the world, especially in the economically crucial Pacific. If policymakers in
Washington calculate U.S. interests properly regarding those two critical countries, then the United States will have power to spare so that its elites can continue to
focus on serious moral questions in places that matter less.
Loss of hegemony causes global instability
Kagan 12, Senior Fellow at Brookings (Robert, 3/14/12 “America has made the world freer, safer and
wealthier” CNN,http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-americamade/index.html?hpt=hp_c1)
We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the
unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war
among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries
prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people
have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior
centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war.
This is the world
America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if
America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not
look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline.
But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world
order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades,
the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance
would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad.
If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more
autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising
powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the
golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party.
Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end
up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of
wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally,
what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that
American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems
have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not
constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th
century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great
powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The
era of American
predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who
holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of
human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international
institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of
government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there
was nothing inevitable about the
world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It
is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market
principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that
supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long
as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the
institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether
as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the
United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to
American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like
right before the American order came into being.
A2 Cartels Sell Cheaper
Local marijuana will be cheaper than black market-2 reasons
Murray et al. 11 (Chad Murray, Ashlee Jackson, Amanda C. Miralrio, Nicolas Eiden, “Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization” The George
Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission: Capstone Report;
https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf
4/26/11)
Mexican marijuana would be replaced by local production. Marijuana legalization on the state level,
even limited to one or a handful of states, would have notable implications for the U.S. marijuana
market. As it has already been mentioned (see Chapter 2), a significant and growing portion of this
market is supplied by domestic sources. This is especially notable in the „M-7‟ states, which produce the
largest quantities of cannabis. In any state where marijuana legalization takes place there are compelling
reasons to believe that Mexican marijuana would be replaced by local production. First, there is the
economic advantage of a product grown within a legal market that is closer in proximity to its
consumer. It is estimated that the wholesale price of marijuana increases by $450 per pound for each
1,000 miles that it is trafficked in the U.S., which is significant considering the wholesale price of
Mexican marijuana just after crossing the border is estimated to be only$400.88 Marijuana produced
in a state where it is legal to grow, purchase, and consume would not be subject to the same inherent
security costs that Mexican DTOs face. Namely, these U.S. producers would not have to for pay bribes,
enhanced security costs, losses due to seizures, and elevated transportation costs. Secondly, there is
already a high rate of diversion, with the Sherriff of Mendocino County estimating that “a single digit
percentage of marijuana grown under the medical program is actually going to medical patients.”89 One
analysis of the market under California potential legalization found that after taxes and transportation
costs are included “diverted California sinsemilla would be cheaper, per unit of THC, than the current
Mexican marijuana price in every state except New Mexico and Texas,” and therefore affect 95% of
the Mexican marijuana market.90 There is reason to believe that diverted sinsemilla would almost
completely eliminate Mexican marijuana under these circumstances. This would occur for reasons in
addition to the THC-to-dollar ratio.
A2 Cocaine More Important
Cartels use marijuana to fund their cocaine smuggling operations
Patrick Radden Keefe – 2014. (Contributing to The New Yorker and New York times since 2006; NYT, “Cocaine Incorporated,”
6/15/2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-
billions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, Accessed 7/29/2014).
Moving cocaine is a capital-intensive business, but the cartel subsidizes these investments with a
ready source of easy income: marijuana. Cannabis is often described as the “cash crop” of Mexican
cartels because it grows abundantly in the Sierras and requires no processing. But it’s bulkier than cocaine, and
smellier, which makes it difficult to conceal. So marijuana tends to cross the border far from official ports of entry. The cartel makes sandbag
bridges to ford the Colorado River and sends buggies loaded with weed bouncing over the Imperial Sand Dunes into California. Michael Braun,
the former chief of operations for THE D.E.A., told me a story about the construction of a high-tech fence along a stretch of border in Arizona.
“They erect this fence,” he said, “only to go out there a few days later and discover that these guys have a catapult, and they’re flinging
hundred-pound bales of marijuana over to the other side.” He paused and looked at me for a second. “A catapult,” he repeated. “We’ve got the
best fence money can buy, and they counter us with a 2,500-year-old technology.”
A2 Petty Crime Shift
No crime increase – their authors are wrong
Robert G. Morris et. al. – 2014. (Michael TenEyck, J. C. Barnes, and Tomislav V. Kovandzic are all affiliated with the Program in
Criminology at UTD; PLOS one, “The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 1990-2006,” 3/26/2014,
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0092816#pone.0092816-American1, Accessed 8/2/2014)
The key results gleaned from the fixed effects analyses are presented in row 1 of Table 2, which reveals the impact of the MML trend variable
on crime rates, while controlling for the other time-varying explanatory variables. Two findings worth noting emerged from the different fixed
effects regression analyses. First, the
impact of MML on crime was negative or not statistically significant in all but
one of the models, suggesting the passage of MML may have a dampening effect on certain crimes. The second key
finding was that the coefficients capturing the impact of MML on homicide and assault were the only two that emerged as statistically
significant. Specifically, the
results indicate approximately a 2.4 percent reduction in homicide and assault,
respectively, for each additional year the law is in effect. Because log-linear models were estimated, the coefficient must
be transformed according to the following formula to generate percentage changes in crime for a one-unit increase in MML: e(b-1)*100 [27].
However, it is important to note that the finding for homicide was less variable (i.e., a lower standard error) as compared to assault. One might
argue a Bonferroni correction is necessary given the exploratory nature of the study and the multiple models that were analyzed. Once a
Bonferroni correction was carried out (i.e., α/7), only the effect of MML on homicide remained statistically significant (.05/7 = .007). Perhaps
the most important finding in Table 2 is the lack of evidence of any increase in robbery or burglary,
which are the type of crimes one might expect to gradually increase over time if the MML-crime thesis
was correct. Thus, in the end, MML was not found to have a crime enhancing effect for any of the
crime types analyzed.
Legalization cuts crime and raises revenue – Colorado proves
Matt Ferner – 2014. (Matt Ferner is the Denver editor for the Huffington Post; Huffington Post, “If Legalizing Marijuana Was Supposed
To Cause More Crime, It's Not Doing A Very Good Job,” 7/29/2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/17/marijuana-crimedenver_n_5595742.html, Accessed 8/2/2014)
When Colorado legalized weed more than a year ago, opponents of the move warned that crime
would rise. But half a year after the first sales of recreational marijuana began, the state's biggest city
has yet to see an increase in criminal activity.¶ During the first six months of 2014, violent crime in the
city and county of Denver was down 3 percent from the same period in 2013, according to the most
recent available data. Three of the four main categories of violent crime that are tracked in the data -homicide, sexual assault and robbery -- are all down from the same six-month stretch last year.
Aggravated assault, the fourth category, is up 2.2 percent.¶ Burglaries and robberies at the city's dispensaries of
medical and/or recreational marijuana are on track to hit a three-year low, according to a separate
report from Denver's Department of Safety, first reported by The Denver Post.¶ Overall, property
crime in the city is down by more than 11 percent from the same six-month period of 2013.¶ Of course,
Denver is just one city with legal weed. But as the first, albeit no longer only, large municipality in the U.S. with legal retail marijuana shops,
Denver seems a worthy example. The state's second-largest city, Colorado Springs, banned the retail shops in 2013 as did more
than two dozen other cities. While Washington state has also legalized recreational weed, sales began just this month and only a handful of
shops have opened there.¶ Correlation does not imply causation, regardless of which way the crime data move, and after just six months, it
may be too early to identify any strong social trends. But evidence
of a crime wave simply has not materialized -despite numerous dire warnings prior to legalization.¶ In 2012, before Amendment 64 legalized marijuana in Colorado for
recreational sale and use, multiple members of the state's law enforcement community warned that the measure would bring "harmful"
consequences.¶ "Expect more crime, more kids using marijuana and pot for sale everywhere," Douglas County Sheriff David Weaver said in
2012. "I think our entire state will pay the price."¶ Crime rates may
not have gone up, but revenue is soaring. Since
January, Colorado's dispensaries have sold about $90 million worth of retail cannabis. The state has collected about $35 million in taxes,
licenses and fees from both the recreational and medical marijuana markets, according to the Colorado Department of Revenue's latest tax
data. Colorado legalized medical marijuana in 2000.¶
Denver's crime statistics during the first six months of retail
marijuana align with a report recently published in the peer-reviewed journal PLOS ONE showing that
legalizing medical marijuana causes no increase in crime and may in fact be accompanied by a
decrease in some violent crime, including homicide.
A2 U.S. Mexico Drug Coop
Mexican legalization is good – three reasons
Ramiro S. Funez – 2014. (Ramiro is a Honduran-American political journalist, activist and foreign policy analyst earning his Master's
degree in Politics at New York University., “An Argument for Legalizing Marijuana Even Conservatives Can Rally Behind,” 2/7/2014,
http://mic.com/articles/78275/an-argument-for-legalizing-marijuana-even-conservatives-can-rally-behind, Accessed 7/29/2014)
Marijuana legalization in Uruguay, Colorado and Washington has sparked deliberation among many
lawmakers who are curious about how similar legislation would affect other countries, including the
crime-ridden barrios of Mexico.¶ Legislators in Mexico City submitted a proposal to decriminalize
small amounts of marijuana possession last year, but the country's federal government has shown no
sign of attempts to loosen up its tough stance on drug laws. Consequently, drug lords have capitalized on the
substance's illegality and profited from their exclusive proprietorship. Despite Mexico's inability to quash rampant cartel-related crimes
because of the federal government's refusal to ease its policies, the
growing international push to legalize marijuana
could subdue the power of drug lords, especially if the Mexican government recognizes how impactful
state-regulated cannabis is. Doing that could help ease violence across the border and is the kind of
result everyone should get behind, no matter your views on weed.¶ Here are three ways marijuana legalization
could stop the growth of Mexican drug cartels:¶ 1. Loss of Profits¶ Marijuana legalization in Colorado, Oregon and
Washington could eliminate up to 30% of profits made by Mexican drug cartels, a study conducted by
the Mexican Competitiveness Institute reveals. The possibility of federal authorization of recreational
use of marijuana in the United States and Mexico could lead to steeper losses on the part of
illegitimate crime groups. ¶ 2. Strengthening of Government Institutions Uruguay is the first Latin American country to legalize
recreational possession and use of marijuana and will earn up to $40 million in government profits appropriated from the country's black
market. Mexico,
which has a black market marijuana trade system with estimated values ranging from
$2 billion to $20 billion annually, could use those funds to reinforce and establish government
institutions aimed at curtailing the use of harder substances like cocaine and heroin. More government
revenue from marijuana profits could usher in free addiction treatment programs and hard drug enforcement agencies. ¶ 3. Loss of
Recruitment¶ Mexican
drug cartels, including the notoriously ruthless Los Zetas, have infiltrated
approximately 276 cities in the United States and are known to specifically target marijuana dealers
for recruitment, according to the Department of Homeland Security. Considering the fact that
marijuana is the most commonly purchased and sold controlled substance and that many of those
illegitimate vendors sell cannabis almost exclusively, a complete nationalization of the marijuana
industry would significantly deter recruitment efforts made by cartels in the United States.
Solvency
Access to marijuana is inevitable
Marijuana Prohibition is no longer relevant
Woodruff 2013 [WOODRUFF B. Rocky Mountain High. (Cover story). National Review [serial online].
September 16, 2013;65(17):25-27. Available from: Academic Search Premier, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July
30, 2014, http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=38&sid=1c587792-11f6-4eab-9b573d3d53f0abc4%40sessionmgr4003&hid=4212&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&A
N=54378590]
It’s a situation of nigh-unprecedented touchiness. And it’s a¶ case study in the fallout of federal overextension. Under¶ federal law,
consumption of marijuana for any reason is prohibited.¶ But D.C. has better things to do with its finite resources than go after adults who grow
pot in their basements,¶ so the bonus for keeping average Joes from smoking has been¶ on the states. And when the states of Washington and
Colorado¶ decided to let nonviolent adults do as they please, using marijuana¶ became de facto (though not de jure) legal there.¶ Good for
them. Marijuana-legalization
advocates have long¶ argued that prohibition is ridiculous because—
among other¶ reasons—anyone who wants to get marijuana can. If nothing¶ else, Colorado and
Washington have given legislators in the¶ other 48 states a chance to see what happens when libertarians¶
have their way. And thus far, the case their examples make¶ for marijuana legalization is pretty compelling .
In fact, some¶ of the weirdest hiccups in the whole process are the result of¶ federal policymaking failures. (Marijuana advocates are opti-¶
Denver, Colo. T here’s a stretch of Broadway that’s called Broadsterdam because of its medical-marijuana dispensaries.¶ Just a block over,
flanking Acoma and Bannock¶ streets, is a warehouse district. It’s not hard to guess¶ which of the squat drab buildings are grow-ops (marijuana
growing¶ operations)—they’re the ones wound in razor or¶ barbed wire, with protruding cameras, barred windows, and¶ extra air-conditioner
units (the lights needed to grow plants¶ make it hot in the warehouses, but the plants need cooler¶ temperatures). Sometimes when you drive
by, you can smell¶ weed wafting in the breeze. And deep inside at least a few of¶ those warehouses are vaults brimming with cash. Welcome
to¶ Colorado’s marijuana industry.¶ It’s been about nine months since Coloradans voted to¶ legalize the recreational consumption of marijuana
by adults¶ over 21, and state lawmakers have until October 1 to figure out¶ how to regulate the nascent industry. retail stores are ex pected¶ to
be selling marijuana to anyone over 21 (including the¶ inevitable marijuana tourists from out of state) by January¶ 2014. And until then, the
people whose livelihoods are inextricably¶ linked to the marijuana industry—a burgeoning group¶ Colorado experiments with marijuana¶ mistic
about the long game; Illinois just legalized medical¶ marijuana, which means that state’s sizable congressional delegation¶ may feel pressure to
reform federal policies toward the¶ drug.)¶ A
big part of the problem is that the federal government¶ has a law
that it can’t enforce. It’s simply not possible for¶ Washington, D.C., by itself, to keep millions and millions of¶ Americans from smoking
marijuana. Even when all 50 states¶ were on board with prohibition, it was impossible to keep weed¶ from being about as accessible as organic
arugula. Opponents¶ of legalization say—quite reasonably—that what Colorado¶ and Washington have done is detrimental to the rule of law.
But¶ having laws on the books that are unenforceable is equally¶ detrimental. Voters in Colorado and Wash ing
ton are just being¶ pragmatic.¶ That pragmatism is easier voted for than implemented; it’s¶ hard out there for a marijuana entrepreneur. But
there’s “light¶ at the end of the tunnel,” as attorney Brian Vicente puts it. He¶ shares an old mansion in downtown Denver with a few other¶
marijuana-legalization advocates. The building itself looks¶ kind of like a really nice frat house run by analternatives; it’s¶ clean and tidy, with a
kitchen full of wine bottles and a front¶ porch that houses plastic chairs and a bucket of cigarette butts.¶ And it’s a nexus of sorts for Colorado’s
anti-prohibition advocates.¶ Mason Tvert of the Marijuana Policy Project has a first-floor¶ office that sports a framed copy of an essay he wrote
in elementary¶ school explaining that drugs are bad. And in a gabled¶ room in the top of the building, Betty Aldworth, deputy director¶ of the
National Cannabis Industry Association, pushes the¶ IRS to make the tax code at least remotely coherent for the¶ owners of medical-marijuana
shops. She’s got a cartoon on her¶ desk from web comic Hyperbole and a Half that shows a stick¶ figure under a rainbow with the caption
“Maybe everything¶ isn’t hopeless bulls***.”¶ Vicente, one of the primary authors of the measure legalizing¶ recreational use in Colorado,
works with numerous clients in the¶ marijuana industry. The new regulations give current medical¶ centers a few options, he explains: They can
stay as is, they can¶ switch over to selling only recreational marijuana, or they can¶ get a dual license that would allow them to sell both.¶ Light
at the end of the tunnel, indeed, but there’s one big problem¶ that Colorado legislators won’t be able to fix: the issue of¶ growers’ keeping cash
in vaults. Most
banks won’t let medical marijuana¶ dispensaries open accounts with them, fearing that¶
federal officials might charge them with money laundering or a¶ host of other violations.¶ The
problem doesn’t affect only dispensaries. Roxanne Burns¶ owns Ultimate Hydroponics & Organics, a small gardening supply¶
store tucked into a little cranny of a storefront on¶ Broadway. It’s next door to the Colorado Alternative Medicine¶ Dispensary (and,
conveniently, about a block from a Taco Bell;¶ farther down, you can find a head shop next door to a Starbucks).¶ Burns’s business, which she
runs with her son, caters to people¶ who grow cannabis, but it doesn’t sell anything illegal. Among¶ close observers of Colorado’s so-called
green rush, the consensus¶ seems to be that it’s smarter to invest in stores that supply¶ dispensaries and growers—stores like Burns’s—than in
dispensaries¶ themselves.
Legalization supported nationally
National Support for Legalization
Voorhees 2014 [Slate, June, 10, 2014, “Yes, We Cannabis,”
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/06/marijuana_legalization_will_weed_
soon_be_legal_everywhere_in_the_united.html]
It’s not just at the ballot box where the pro-pot crowd is putting points on the board. Lawmakers
in at least 40 states have
eased at least some drug laws since 2009, according to a recent Pew Research Center analysis. According
to the Marijuana Policy Project, proposals to treat pot like alcohol have been introduced in 18 states and the
District of Columbia this year alone. Meanwhile, 16 states have already decriminalized marijuana,
according to the pro-pot group NORML—Maryland will become the 17th in October. In large swaths of the
country getting caught with a small amount of weed at a concert is now roughly the same as getting a speeding ticket on the way to the show.
While not leading the charge, the Obama administration is allowing states the chance to experiment. The feds have given a qualified greenlight
to Colorado and Washington to dabble in recreational weed, and have even taken small steps to encourage banks to do business with those
companies involved in the quasi-legal pot trade.¶ Given this momentum, it’s not difficult to see why 75 percent of Americans—including a
majority of both those who support and those who oppose legalization—told Pew pollsters in February that they now believe it’s a matter of
when, not if, the nation’s eight-decade-long prohibition of pot ends. The question is: Are they right?¶ It wasn’t until 2013 that a majority of
Americans said that they supported making it legal to use weed.¶ This moment isn’t the first time that the United States appeared on the cusp
of legalization. After steep gains in popular support during the early and mid-’70s, support for legalization climbed to 30 percent in 1978, only
to plummet back into the teens the following decade as Baby Boomers became parents and Jimmy Carter’s pro-decriminalization
administration gave way to Ronald Reagan’s war on drugs. “This was supposed to be inevitable then,” says Kevin Sabet, a legalization opponent
and former Obama drug policy adviser who helped found Smart Approaches to Marijuana after leaving the administration. “No one could have
predicted that [support] would have been wiped away so quickly.”¶ The pro-pot crowd isn’t ready to declare victory either. Ethan Nadelmann,
who heads the Drug Policy Alliance and has spent decades in the reform trenches, says he’s of two minds when he thinks about the future. “On
the one hand we have this extraordinary momentum,” he says. “On the other, public opinion can be fickle and marijuana is not going to legalize
itself.”¶ While such caution is reasonable, it’s obvious that things are different now than they were 40 years ago, when then-record levels of
support for legalization were good for little more than a vocal minority. It wasn’t until 2013 that a majority of Americans said for the first time
that they supported making it legal to use weed. Support now stands at 54 percent in the most recent Pew poll, 23 points above where the
legalization effort stood as recently as 2000 and 13 points higher than in 2010. Even those fickle Baby Boomers are back on board, with 52
percent now in favor—5 points more than that generation’s 1970s-era high. Meanwhile, each passing year brings us an electorate more familiar
and less fearful of marijuana.¶ It’s
not just a matter of shifting demographics. There’s also the fact that voters
have increasingly gotten an up-close look at state-legal weed in the form of medical marijuana. Twentyone states and the District of Columbia have legalized pot for medicinal purposes to varying degrees since California became the first to do so
almost two decades ago. Voters in Florida are set to decide later this year whether they want to join that group, something that would give
advocates their first voter-referendum victory in the South. (Florida law requires at least 60 percent support, however, making it a heavier lift
than it has been in other states.)
Drug Education
Legalization promotes drug education programs and accelerated scientific research
Blumenson and Nilsen 2009 (Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen. 2009. Eric Blumenson, Professor of Law,
Suffolk University and J.D. Harvard Law School; Eva Nilsen, Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Boston
University and J.D., University of Virginia. NO RATIONAL BASIS: THE PRAGMATIC CASE FOR MARIJUANA
LAW REFORM. Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law. Vol. 17:1.)
Legalization also paves the way for drug education programs that, by recognizing distinctions between
drugs and between use and abuse, have the credibility and content to actually educate and safeguard
their listeners. The juxtaposition of marijuana use and cigarette use - legal but age-restricted and
subject to a massive public education campaign - is informative. In 1991, the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention commenced measuring the use of both. From then until 2005, cigarette smoking
among high school students has declined, while marijuana smoking has increased by 25%. Treating
cigarettes as a public health problem seems to have worked in ways that the drug war's law
enforcement focus has not.
Finally, legalization at the federal level promotes accelerated scientific research and technological
development (for example, smokeless delivery systems) that could result in major improvements in
safety.
Regulation Solves
Legalized Marijuana Should be Regulated – Regulation results in less misuse
Pacula et al. 2014 [Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, PhD, Beau Kilmer, PhD, Alexander C.
Wagenaar, PhD, Frank J. Chaloupka, PhD, and Jonathan P. Caulkins, PhD, “Developing
Public Health Regulations for Marijuana:Lessons From Alcohol and Tobacco,” American
Journal of Public Health, June 2014, Vol 104, No. 6,
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301766]
Keep Prices Artificially High¶ Hundreds of studies on tobacco and alcohol¶ show that raising prices
reduces consumption¶ and a long list of related health and social harms.¶ Many studies show that raising
excise taxes on¶ cigarettes is one of the most effective strategies¶ for reducing early initiation and use,
discouraging¶ the transition to being a pack-a-day smoker,¶ and increasing quit attempts even among¶ youths.34---37 Similarly, higher
alcohol taxes and¶ prices have been shown to reduce initiation,¶ binge drinking, drunk driving, and
traffic crash¶ rates even among youths.38---40 Higher alcohol¶ prices are also associated with lower violence¶ and deaths from chronic
diseases such as cirrhosis¶ and certain cancers.39,41,42¶ Legalization of marijuana would reduce¶ production costs, perhaps substantially, and¶
that would be expected to lead to lower prices¶ to consumers.43,44 Although one could try to¶ raise the price of regulated marijuana all the¶
way back to its illegal underground market price through taxation or fees, such a strategy¶ encourages current illegal producers and¶ sellers to
remain in the market or for gray¶ market arbitrage between low- and high-tax¶ jurisdictions. Underground markets have¶ emerged across
states, and even across nations,¶ in response to much smaller economic gains¶ per unit weight or volume when smuggling¶ tobacco,35,45,46
and “home growing” marijuana¶ is easier than home growing tobacco.¶ Any
strategy that involves keeping the price¶ of
regulated marijuana high will need to include¶ mechanisms that reduce the incentive for¶ tax-evading
underground markets. That can be¶ done in at least 2 ways: (1) designing the¶ regulatory structure
around tax collection (e.g.,¶ by banning home production and issuing few¶ production licenses), and (2) having strong¶
enforcement and sanctions for those operating¶ outside the regulatory structure. The potential¶ and
limitations of such strategies might be¶ inferred from the cases of tobacco and alcohol,¶ in which the underground markets account for¶
variable sizes of the total market in different¶ countries despite designated agencies explicitly¶ charged with providing oversight over,
monitoring¶ of, and enforcement in the industry.¶ Thus, there is no guarantee that an underground¶ market in marijuana will not continue¶ to
exist, particularly if the legal market imposes¶ significant taxes or restricts the types of marijuana¶ goods that can be sold.¶ Adopt a State
Monopoly¶ One
way to keep price artificially high and¶ reduce underground market competition is¶ a
state-run monopoly on production, distribution,¶ and sale. (Note that this model could still¶ allow privatized production
and, in the case of¶ marijuana, cultivation and processing if the¶ state monopoly focused entirely on distribution¶ and retail sales.) Research
on state alcohol¶ monopolies, and monopolies more generally,¶ have shown that monopolies help keep the¶
price of a good higher through reduced competition,¶ reduce access to alcohol by youths,¶ and reduce
overall levels of use.19,28---30,47,48¶ State monopolies would be impossible to implement¶ currently in the United States because¶ of
continuing federal prohibition. However, it is¶ worth discussing the public health advantages¶ of a tightly controlled state monopoly in case¶
the federal legal landscape changes, either¶ through repeal or amendment of the Controlled¶ Substances Act or with some sort of¶ waivers
system.49¶ State stores often sell only the commodity in¶ question—marijuana in this case. That is not¶ unique to a state store model; private
stores¶ could also be similarly restricted. And it is not¶ without drawbacks, notably a smaller number¶ of outlets reducing customer
convenience. Inconvenience¶ is a cost that helps constrain¶ consumption, and single-purpose stores discourage¶ using the intoxicating
substance as¶ a loss leader, effectively cross-subsidizing its¶ consumption with profits from the sale of other¶ substances. The problem of using
intoxicants as¶ loss leaders is evident in the case of alcohol,¶ generating considerable policy debate in the¶ United Kingdom and elsewhere,
with some¶ movement toward imposing minimum per¶ dose pricing in addition to conventional product¶ taxes to maintain higher prices.50,51¶
As the sole distributor and retailer of marijuana,¶ the state government could more aggressively¶
pursue violators who pretend to be¶ legitimate distributors or retailers because they¶ could be more
easily identified as nongovernment¶ employees. With aggressive deterrence¶ against underground market suppliers, the¶
government can set prices at levels higher than¶ otherwise possible. Competition would not¶ push prices lower, as there would be a single¶
supplier. Moreover, having
monopoly control¶ of marijuana distribution would facilitate messaging¶
concerning the quality and content of¶ the marijuana product sold, warnings about¶ risks of use, and
adherence to point-of-sale¶ advertising restrictions. If the government store¶ sold only unbranded “generic” forms, it
would¶ eliminate altogether the incentive for producers¶ to promote their product. Finally, considerable¶ evidence from both the alcohol and¶
tobacco literature suggests that monitoring and¶ frequent enforcement checks of sellers can¶ reduce sales to minors.52---54 This is easier to¶
accomplish with state-owned stores.¶ Restrict and Carefully Monitor¶ Licenses and Licensees¶ If
a government monopoly is not
possible,¶ the next most preferred option is a strong¶ licensing system in which licenses are required¶
to participate in any part of the supply chain:¶ grower, producer or processor, wholesaler or¶ distributor, and retailer. (One
could also require¶ that individual users receive a license to¶ consume.55---57) Setting up licensing systems is¶ justified
mainly because it allows the government¶ to trace all products and ensure that they¶ meet some
minimum quality standards required¶ by law and because the sale of the¶ products can be monitored
in terms of excess¶ or insufficient supply. (It is important to note¶ that licensing is necessary but not sufficient for¶ supply to be
effectively monitored.) In the case¶ of intoxicating or addictive substances like¶ alcohol and tobacco, however, it can also limit¶ competition
(which can keep prices high), enable¶ effective tax collection, limit the density of¶ retail outlets, and reduce the potential for¶ diversion,
particularly if licenses are restricted.¶ Currently, there is no strong evidence about¶ the impact of licensing tobacco retailers on¶ tobacco use,
partly because tobacco outlets are¶ so pervasive and policies in this area are just¶ beginning to take shape. The density of tobacco¶ outlets is
positively associated with smoking¶ rates, particularly among youths,58---60 but¶ causality has yet to be definitively ascertained.¶
There is
clearer evidence in the tobacco literature¶ that strong licensing provisions that are¶ actively enforced
(through regular random¶ compliance checks and imposition of penalties)¶
are effective at limiting sales to minors
because¶ of the potential for license revocations or¶ suspensions for violators .61---63 Moreover,¶ fees
collected through the licensing systems¶ provide steady revenues to support active¶ oversight and
enforcement by regulatory¶ agencies.62¶ The alcohol literature demonstrates the¶ benefits of outlet licensing more clearly;
studies¶ from various disciplines converge in showing¶ a strong positive relationship between alcohol¶ outlet density and alcohol misuse as well
as¶ unintentional injuries and crime.28,64---66 The¶ evidence is so strong that several national and¶ regional health organizations, including
the¶ European Commission,67 the World Health¶ Organization,68 and the US Department of¶ Health and Human Services,69 have included¶
recommendations related to licensing restrictions¶ in prevention plans.¶ Keeping the number of licenses small also¶ helps control the cost of
regulating these new¶ businesses and enforcing compliance (because¶ there are fewer entities to oversee). Fewer licenses make it easier for
the government to¶ keep close records on each licensee, making it¶ easier to discover anomalies in their books that¶ could indicate diversion to
underground markets.¶ Rules—even arbitrary, meddlesome, and¶ pointless rules—can also create inefficiency in¶ the industry, keeping costs
and hence prices¶ higher. Although normally this is viewed as¶ a cost, not a benefit, of regulation, the welfare¶ effects of higher prices are
ambiguous when¶ consumption of that good creates externalities.¶ One could view the 3-tier alcohol supply¶ system, which restricts those with
a specific¶ form of license (production, distribution, retail¶ sale) from engaging in the business activities of¶ the other licensees, in this light.
This allows¶ states to impose fees (or taxes) at different¶ points in the supply chain and keep the industry¶ from realizing efficiencies that
would¶ otherwise emerge from vertical integration.¶ Licensing retailers who engage in direct to¶ consumer sales can be restricted in a variety
of¶ ways, as evidenced by existing alcohol and¶ tobacco restrictions. For example, in the case of¶ tobacco, licensing restricts the type of
businesses¶ that can sell tobacco, location of retailers¶ (e.g., distance from schools, parks, and other¶ youth venues), density of retailers (on the
basis¶ of, e.g., population and geography), and modes¶ of sales (e.g., bans on vending machines and¶ self-service). Similarly there are many
restrictions¶ on retailers of alcohol, including restrictions¶ on locations, modes and hours of sale, and¶ goods that can be sold.¶ Limit the Types
of Products Sold¶ Although limiting the types of products sold¶ are tied to licensing, regulators can easily¶ overlook its value. An important
lesson comes¶ from tobacco policy, however. Although public¶ health warnings have been posted on cigarette¶ cartons since the 1960s, the
government was¶ unable to pass legislation allowing the US¶ Federal Drug Administration to regulate the¶ constituents of tobacco products
until 2009. It¶ has literally taken decades of scientific evidence¶ for there to be enough political will for¶ the government to step in, and just
how the US¶ Federal Drug Administration will use that¶ power remains unclear.70¶ The lesson for marijuana may be to establish¶ authorities’
rights to impose regulations from¶ the outset because of how difficult it can be to¶ expand regulatory scope ex post. Subjects
for¶
regulation might include what is allowed to be in¶ the product (e.g., additives, flavorings), methods¶ of
production (e.g., to reduce pesticides, mold, or¶ other contaminants), “bundling” of marijuana¶ with other inputs (e.g.,
edibles, nicotine), and¶ limits on THC content. It might also be useful to¶ consider whether high levels of THC can and¶ should be
allowed if accompanied by high levels¶ of cannabinoids that are believed to offset¶ some of the effects of THC, like cannabidiol. If¶
governments wait to try to impose such product¶ restrictions or leave the industry to regulate¶ this itself, the outcome could be problematic,¶
as profit motive will likely dominate decisions¶ rather than consumer safety.¶ Both the alcohol and tobacco industry have¶ developed products
that are particularly appealing¶ to youths. Examples include candy and¶ gum cigarettes, alcohol pops, and wine coolers. It¶ seems valuable to
impose restrictions on marijuana¶ products targeting youths similar to those¶ imposed on the alcohol and tobacco industry.¶ Although it may
be impossible to think in¶ advance of every possible product that could¶ appeal to youths, examining current products¶ would be a useful place
to start. The medical¶ marijuana industry already sells THC-infused¶ chocolate bars, peanut butter cups, Rice Krispies¶ treats, hard candies, and
lollipops.¶ Attempt to Limit Marketing¶ The US doctrine of commercial free speech¶ makes it difficult to limit advertising. However,¶ bans on
advertising, promotion, and sponsorship¶ have been achieved in some areas (and in¶ other countries) at times when significant harms¶ were
identified (e.g., tobacco and, to a lesser¶ extent, hard liquor and sugary drinks). If the goal¶ is to maintain antismoking norms and keep risk¶
perceptions high to reduce youths’ initiation and¶ use of marijuana, comprehensive marketing restrictions¶ can be justified. Moreover, if the¶
federal ban on marijuana legalization remains,¶ market restrictions may in fact be possible¶ because of threat of sanctions from the federal¶
government. (An August 29, 2013, memorandum¶ from the US Department of Justice listed¶ 8 enforcement priorities for federal prosecutors¶
making decisions about marijuana cases in¶ states that have legalized marijuana. One of¶ the priorities is to target firms that not only¶ sell
marijuana to children but also market in¶ a manner that is appealing to youths.) The¶ alcohol and tobacco literature have demonstrated¶
positive relationships between tobacco¶ and alcohol advertising, promotion and sponsorship,¶ and youths’ use, including product¶ placements
in movies and on television and¶ radio.48,71---74 There is no reason to believe that¶ marijuana marketing would not be equally¶ appealing.¶ In
light of evidence showing that partial¶ restrictions on marketing are largely ineffective¶ at reducing
tobacco use because they just lead¶ to a shift of expenditures to other forms of¶ nonbanned
marketing,73 a comprehensive ban¶ on all forms of marijuana marketing might be¶ the ideal. Such an
approach would encompass¶ all forms of advertising (e.g., print, television, ¶ radio, transit, billboards, point-of-sale, Internet,¶ and social media
outlets), promotion (e.g., price¶ discounting, coupons, free sample distribution),¶ sponsorships, and other indirect forms of marketing¶ (e.g.,
brand stretching, branded merchandise).¶ Approaches for doing this are described¶ in the World Health Organization¶ Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control¶ Article 13 guidelines.75 Additional restrictions¶ recently placed on tobacco in other countries¶ that might be considered
for marijuana include¶ complete bans on the retail display (as done in¶ all Canadian provinces and territories, all Australian¶ states and
territories, Norway, the¶ United Kingdom, and Iceland) and plain packaging¶ policies (as done in Australia, effectively¶ eliminating the use of
the pack as a marketing¶ tool). Such steps, which would arguably appear¶ very restrictive for a relatively harmless product¶ that had already
been freely traded in the¶ marketplace, would be minimal for a new¶ product because of its first chance to be legally¶ traded. Opinions differ
on whether such marketing¶ restrictions would withstand legal challenges¶ in the United States, but it is clear that¶ efforts to restrict marijuana
marketing should¶ be initiated before or at the time marijuana is¶ legalized. Options may exist at that point that¶ will no longer be possible
after marijuana sales¶ have become well established.¶ Restrict Public Consumption¶ Limiting
consumption in public serves 2¶
purposes: it reduces secondhand exposure to¶ smoked marijuana, and it reduces the extent¶ to which
marijuana use is seen by youths as socially acceptable or normative. The value of¶ reducing secondhand exposure
to marijuana¶ smoking is not something that science has¶ clearly established in the way that reducing¶ exposure to secondhand smoke from
tobacco¶ has been shown.76 Nonetheless, nonusers are¶ exposed through secondhand smoke and¶ heavy passive exposure to marijuana can
result¶ in measurable THC concentrations in the¶ nonusers’ blood serum and urine.77,78 However,¶ the passive exposure is unlikely to lead to¶
a failed urine test.79 But for some, exposure to¶ marijuana smoke is as offensive as exposure¶ to tobacco smoke—regardless of the health¶
implications of that exposure.¶ The second justification for limiting marijuana¶ consumption in public places is the¶ beneficial effect on youths’
initiation. The¶ tobacco literature shows that clean indoor air¶ laws targeting public places that youths tend to¶ congregate (e.g., concerts,
sporting events,¶ malls, and public transportation) are associated¶ with reduced initiation and self-reported use of¶ cigarettes among children
and adolescents.72,80¶ Even
broad workplace clean indoor air laws¶ (affecting restaurants and the like) have
been¶ shown to influence the smoking behavior of¶ youths by influencing antismoking norms.36 By¶
limiting where marijuana can be consumed,¶ regulators can reduce the exposure youths¶ have to marijuana, perhaps making it less¶ normative
and more likely that youths delay¶ initiation or never start at all.¶ Restrictions on where marijuana can be¶ consumed could also reduce the
probability that¶ marijuana and alcohol be used concurrently.¶ Because of the evidence on how concurrent use¶ increases the risk of a traffic
crash, restricting¶ place of consumption could have important¶ implications for impaired driving. For example,¶ use could be restricted to
establishments that do¶ not allow alcohol to be consumed or to private¶ residences. However, if concurrent use leads to¶ a decrease in alcohol
consumption for some¶ individuals, this could also produce some benefits¶ (e.g., reduction in aggression). We cannot¶ predict how concurrent
use will influence social¶ welfare under legalization; researchers should¶ pay close attention to this relationship.¶ Measure and Prevent
Impaired Driving¶ Driving
under the influence of marijuana¶ can be dangerous. Even the National¶ Organization for the
et al.
argue that the¶ better controlled epidemiological studies have¶ recently provided credible evidence
that cannabis¶ users who drive while intoxicated are at¶ increased risk of motor-vehicle crashes.82(p18)¶
Reform of Marijuana¶ Laws includes “no driving” in its Principles¶ of Responsible Cannabis Use.81 In their review¶ of research, Room
More recent literature reviews and meta analyses¶ reached the same conclusion.10,83¶ Although driving under the influence of¶ marijuana can
adversely affect psychomotor¶ performance, the effect is much greater for¶ those driving under the influence of alcohol.¶ 16,84 Research has
found that those under¶ the influence of both marijuana and alcohol are¶ at a much greater risk of a crash than are those¶ under the influence
of either by itself.85 Some¶ have argued that THC-impaired drivers compensate¶ by driving more cautiously, but it is¶ also true that it is very
difficult to ascertain true¶ impairment because impairment can be affected¶ by a number of individual specific¶ factors, including tolerance,
amount of THC¶ consumed, and mode of consumption.11,86¶ Part of the problem of measuring impairment¶ relates to the substance itself and
how it is¶ metabolized in the body. The main psychoactive¶ constituent in marijuana is THC, and although its¶ acute psychoactive effects often
last only a few¶ hours, it remains detectable in blood for several¶ hours and, for some chronic users, up to 7 days¶ after use.87 Furthermore,
metabolites typically¶ included in specific tests of urine are detectable¶ for even longer.85,87 Therefore, detection of use¶ can occur well
outside the window of impairment.¶ Although measurement of THC in blood¶ concentration is broadly viewed as the gold¶ standard because it
correlates more closely¶ with impairment,87---89 obtaining blood is invasive¶ and requires transporting the individual¶ to a place where blood
can be safely drawn.¶ Urine samples are easier to collect but also a bit¶ invasive, and they correlate less well with true¶ impairment, particularly
for cannabis. Oral¶ fluid testing is the least invasive, but until¶ recently these tests have not generated estimates¶ that are as reliable when
done in the field¶ as when done in the lab.90 Tool development¶ continues, but it is a developing field.88---89¶ There is also the problem of
determining¶ what level of THC concentration in the blood is¶ a reasonable level at which to say that someone¶ is likely to be impaired. In the
only study of its¶ kind, an international team of scientists conducted¶ a meta-analysis of the experimental and¶ epidemiological research to
develop a per se¶ limit for THC in blood that would indicate¶ comparable impairment to a blood alcohol¶ concentration of 0.05%.11 They
concluded that¶ a THC concentration in blood serum of 7 to 10¶ nanograms per milliliter (equivalent to a range¶ of 3.5---5.0 ng/ml in whole
blood) is comparable.¶ Both Washington and Colorado set legal limits¶ of THC for driving impairment to 5 nanograms¶ per milliliter as
measured in whole blood. Some¶ toxicologists argue attempting to set legal limits¶ for THC that approximate alcohol limits is¶ a mistake.11 The
policy question is whether the¶ allowable level should permit significant impairment¶ for drivers (as the current case for¶ alcohol, allowing
driving at modest impairment¶ levels below 0.08) or whether the legally allowable¶ level for THC should be set at a very¶ low level
approximating zero impairment (currently¶ in place for alcohol in the United States¶ for drivers younger than 21 years).¶ If
a serious
campaign to reduce marijuana impaired¶ driving is to be undertaken, lessons¶ can be learned from the
alcohol literature, in¶ which a variety of strategies have been tried,¶ evaluated, and modified on the
basis of prior¶ experience, including alcohol-specific controls¶ (e.g., per se laws, higher prices, higher minimum¶ legal
drinking age), enforcement (mandatory¶ fines and jail times for offenders, sobriety check¶ points), transportation (graduated
licensing and¶ safety belt laws), and media campaigns. Reviews¶ have been conducted identifying successful and¶ cost-effective
strategies, such as raising beer¶ prices and driving under the influence per se¶ laws.91---92 Reviews have also identified core¶ elements of
specific approaches that increase the¶ likelihood of success, such as the meta-analysis¶ by Elder et al.93 that identified the following:¶ careful
planning, solid execution, significant¶ audience exposure, concurrent ongoing prevention¶ activities, and active and visible enforcement¶ of
drunk driving laws.¶
Taxation Solves
Legalization of Marijuana Brings in Revenue – Once legal marijuana can be taxed to
control usage and while eliminating illegal markets
Gieringer 2009 (Dale H. Gieringer, Ph.D.,Director, California NORML, Testimony on the Legalization of Marijuana
To the California Assembly Committee on Public Safety, October 28, 2009, p. 7-8, accessed 8-1,
http://norml.org/pdf_files/AssPubSafety_Legalization.pdf)
The only effective solution to these problems is to legalize production and sale of¶ marijuana to
adults through licensed outlets in the same way as alcohol or¶ tobacco, thereby undercutting the
criminal market. In a legal market, consumers¶ would have no incentive to patronize criminal
traffickers, since marijuana would¶ be available in licensed shops at prices well below current blackmarket price.¶ Profit margins for growers would be drastically cut by elimination of¶ prohibition. In a
totally unregulated market, the price of marijuana would¶ presumably drop as low as that of other legal herbs such as tea or tobacco – on¶ the
order of a few dollars per ounce - 100 times lower than the current prevailing¶ price of $300 per ounce - or a few cents per joint. Because this is
extraordinarily¶ cheap relative to comparable intoxicants such as beer and wine, a
strong case can¶ be made for using
taxation and licensing to raise the price so as to discourage¶ abuse, though not so high as to encourage illicit
marijuana moonshiners. As with alcohol and tobacco, taxation of marijuana could yield substantial revenues to¶ the state.¶ California
NORML recommends an excise tax on the order of $25 - $50 per¶ ounce ($.50- $1 per joint) as one
that (1) realistically reflects marijuana's potential¶ health harms; (2) is consistent with the price of
other social intoxicants; (3) is¶ low enough to undercut today's illegal market price, but high enough
to¶ discourage careless abuse.27¶ Overall, we estimate that a $50/ounce tax would generate about $770 -900¶ million in revenues
in an overall retail market of some $3 - $4.5 billion. Another¶ $240 - $360 million would be generated from sales taxes.28 Finally, the state¶
would save $200 million in enforcement costs for arresting, prosecuting, and¶ imprisoning marijuana offenders, bringing the total economic
benefits to the¶ state treasury up to $1.2 billion per year. Legal marijuana could be expected to¶ generate further revenue from spin-off
business such as tourism, coffee shops,¶ cannabis edibles, paraphernalia and industrial hemp.
Taxation of Marijuana is a Practical Regulatory Scheme – Models from other countries
have proven effective in the past
Gieringer 2009 (Dale H. Gieringer, Ph.D.,Director, California NORML, Testimony on the Legalization of Marijuana
To the California Assembly Committee on Public Safety, October 28, 2009, p. 8-9, accessed 8-1,
http://norml.org/pdf_files/AssPubSafety_Legalization.pdf)
There is nothing new or unprecedented about legal marijuana. Historically,¶ cannabis was sold overthe-counter in pharmacies prior to being prohibited in¶ the last century. More recently, non-medical sales of
cannabis have been¶ prohibited throughout the world pursuant to the U.N. Single Convention Treaty¶ of 1961.¶ Today, the closest
model to legalization may be found in the Netherlands, where¶ cannabis is available for sale to
anyone over 18 through a system of licensed¶ coffee shops (technically, sales and possession remain illegal, but under
Dutch¶ law these offenses are officially disregarded). Despite this open availability, the¶ rate of cannabis consumption in the
Netherlands is markedly less than in the U.S.¶ and many other countries with stricter laws..29 The Dutch experience¶
poignantly demonstrates the practicality of legalized marijuana in a modern¶ post-industrial society.¶ The Dutch model is not strictly speaking
one of complete legalization, because¶ production is still prohibited. The price of cannabis in the coffee shops is thus¶ supported by raids on
illicit growers (prices in the Netherlands are on the order¶ of 5 - 6 Euros per gram, around 30% lower than prices in California's medical¶
marijuana market). The
coffee shops in turn pay a tax to the government. There¶ are some 730 coffee shops in
the Netherlands, generating an estimated $600 million in tax revenues and $3 billion in business. 30
Although the Dutch have¶ not stopped illegal cultivation, they have eliminated illegal sales, which currently¶ account for the great
majority of marijuana felonies in California.¶ A model for total legalization may be found in India, where cannabis
was legal in¶ several states until the government reluctantly prohibited it in 1986 under¶ international pressure. Under the
Indian system, producers and vendors were¶ licensed and taxed by the state. Regulations differed from state to
state, in some¶ cases including limits on the number of licensees, shops, the quantity that could¶ be possessed or grown, etc. The price
and availability of cannabis were¶ regulated by a combination of licensing and excise taxes. Unlicensed¶
cultivation was prohibited, though a considerable amount of low-grade cannabis¶ escaped regulation, being harvested from fields of feral
hemp. Overall use was¶ on the order of 1% of the Indian population.31¶ The
Indian system was exhaustively studied by the
British Indian Hemp Drugs¶ Commission of 1893-4. The Commission rejected prohibition as unnecessary and¶
impracticable, arguing that it might offend local sensibilities and encourage use¶ of more deleterious drugs. Instead, it recommended a policy
of control and¶ restriction, aimed at suppressing excessive use.32 In particular, the
Commission¶ concluded, "The
combination of a fixed duty with license fees for the privilege of¶ vend constitutes the best system of
taxation for the hemp drugs."33
Solves Incarceration
Legalization will result in fewer incarcerations
Gwynne 2013 [GWYNNE K. Turning the Tide on Drug Reform. Nation [serial online]. February 18,
2013;296(7):22-24. Available from: Academic Search Premier, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 30, 2014,
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=1c587792-11f6-4eab-9b573d3d53f0abc4%40sessionmgr4003&vid=35&hid=4212]
According to the FBI, in 2011 more than 750,000¶ Americans were arrested for marijuana-related
offenses,¶ accounting for roughly half of all drug crimes in the¶ United States. Fighty-seven percent of
marijuana-related¶ arrests were for possession alone—a minor prime that¶ can still cause major
problems in one's life.
Legalization solves for the cycle of violence and death in poor communities
Block 2012 (Walter E. Block & Violet Obioha. War on Black Men: Arguments for the Legalization of
Drugs. Criminal Justice Ethics. 24 Aug 2012)
But will not legalization lead to greater criminality? No, the very opposite is the case. Matthew Robinson
believes that ‘‘America’s drug war actually produces violence and murder.’’ He asserts that violence
can be attributed to systemic and economic causes that result from the illegality of drugs. The
systemic ramifications of the drug war parallel the results of Prohibition in that illegal drugs create a
black market that encourages criminality. As the Office of National Drug Control Policy reports, drug
trafficking creates violence because of ‘‘competition for drug market and customers,’’ ‘‘disputes and ripoffs among individuals involved in the illegal drug market,’’ and ‘‘the tendency toward violence of
individuals who participate in drug trafficking.’’ Because disputes over drugs cannot be handled in a
court of law, drug traffickers settle their differences on the streets, resorting to murder to settle
scores. This has occurred so often, and horrendously, to the detriment of innocent bystanders, that
there has even evolved a name for those persons who get injured or killed in street battles: they are
referred to as ‘‘mushrooms.’’ And then there is the economic incentive that induces violence. Because
drug trafficking is a high-risk venture, like any precarious occupation, the profits are very high. This
means that traffickers have an even greater incentive to protect their ‘‘turf’’ to ensure they make these
gigantic profits. The cycle of violence and death of the innocents in poor neighborhoods is both caused
and perpetuated by the criminalization of drugs.
Legalization solves for high arrests in the current criminal justice system
McVay 2010 (DOUGLAS McVAY. Marijuana Legalization: The Time Is Now. Chapter 7 of The Drug
Legalization Debate. Studies in Crime, Law and Justice Vol 7. January 2010)
The most obvious area to feel the impact of the legalization of marijuana is the criminal justice
system. There are two groups of offenses that must be looked at in this context: (1) actual drug
offenses, e.g., possession, cultivation/production, sale; and (2) drug-related offenses, e.g., theft and
other property crimes for gain, and trafficking-related violence.
In terms of the first group of offenses, the role of marijuana is unusual. The number of persons actually
incarcerated for simple possession of marijuana is small compared to the total number of prison and
jail inmates in the United States. Yet, arrests for simple marijuana possession make up a large part of
total annual drug arrests (see above). A great deal of police and court time is squandered pursuing
throwaway arrests.
A2: Black Market
Legalization will eliminate underground markets – legal route for sale and distribution
is preferable
Miron 2010 [Miron, Jeffrey, “Marijuana Legalization in California,” The Cato Institute, 5-27-2010,
http://object.cato.org/publications/commentary/marijuana-legalization-california]
Legalization will move the marijuana industry above ground, just as the repeal of alcohol prohibition
restored the legal alcohol industry. A small component of the marijuana market might remain illicit — moonshine marijuana rather than
moonshine whiskey — but if regulation and taxation are moderate, most producers and consumers will choose
the legal sector, as they did with alcohol.¶ Legalization would therefore eliminate most of the violence
and corruption that currently characterize marijuana markets. These occur because, in underground markets, participants
cannot resolve disputes via non-violent mechanisms such as lawsuits, advertising, lobbying, or campaign contributions. Instead, producers and consumers in these
markets use violence to resolve disputes with each other and bribery or violence to resolve disputes with law enforcement. These
features of “vice”
markets disappear when vice is legal, as abundant experience with alcohol, prostitution, and gambling
all demonstrate.
A2: Crime
Legalization solves for the violence and crime associated with marijuana
Tilzey 2010 (Danny F. Tilzey. 2010. THE WAR ON DRUGS: A NEW STRATEGY)
Although it would be expected that the Public Health and Law Enforcement Options would decrease crime, variants of both currently in use
have shown no such effects. The
Legalization Option would eliminate a significant portion of the crime and
violence associated with drugs. It would help to decongest the court system with charges against nonviolent drug offenders, leading to less of these offenders in our prisons. The Legalization Option would
also allow the government to set the supply so prices are too low to make organized crime profitable
for drug suppliers in the U.S. and abroad. International terrorism, a threat to our security, would also
be affected by the Legalization Option. By legalizing drugs, terrorist organizations would be deprived
of a source of their revenue, since it is well known that they receive a large portion of their income
and support from drug trafficking. Therefore, as far as reducing crime in our society the Legalization Option is debatably the best
choice.
Legalization allows for drugs to be controlled and regulated
Sterling 1995 (Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and Reform, 40 Vill.
L. Rev. 383. 1995)
If it establishes a new drug policy, the United States could ameliorate some of the problems which have
arisen out of prohibition. By continuing to think about drug use as a moral crusade and by maintaining
prohibition, the United States has exempted the drug trade from any regulation and control. This, in
turn, has maximized the violence and disease associated with drugs. In addition, by keeping drugs
inordinately profitable, the government has continuously tempted people to sell them for easy
money. In the end, our country should not "legalize" drugs for legalization's sake; rather, we should
do so because legalized drug markets are more easily and effectively controlled, regulated and
policed.
A2: Grey Market
Legalization solves the grey market – Colorado proves
Wallis 7-10 (Daniel Wallis, Colorado Conducted A Market Study On Marijuana -- And Annual Demand Is 130 Metric Tons, Business
Insider Australia, 10 July 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/colorado-annual-demand-for-marijuana-is-130-metric-tons-2014-7, da 8-214) PC
Total marijuana demand in Colorado, where the nation’s first recreational pot shops opened in January, is estimated at
130 tonnes this year, a study for the state’s revenue authority said on Wednesday. ¶ A day after Washington
became only the second state to allow recreational sales of the drug to adults, the report said the projected demand in Colorado was much
higher than anticipated.¶ More than 90 per cent of it came from residents, while out-of-state visitors accounted for only
about 9 tonnes.¶ “The primary difference is caused by much heavier dosage amounts consumed by the state’s ‘heavy user’ population — those
who consume marijuana on a daily basis,” said the report, prepared for the Colorado Department of Revenue.¶ It
said tax figures
showed that the retail supply of marijuana was growing in the state, while supply via medical marijuana
dispensaries had remained relatively constant.¶ “The retail demand is derived primarily from out-of-state visitors and from
consumers who previously purchased from the Colorado black and grey markets ,” the report said.¶
And it estimated that out-of-state visitors currently accounted for about 44 per cent of retail sales in the Denver metro area, compared with
about 90 per cent in mountain resorts.
Regulated medical markets solve the grey market – Colorado’s model is better than
Washington’s
Bauman 6-25 (Valerie Bauman, Bad brownies: Why Washington has fallen behind Colorado on marijuana, Puget Sound Business
Journal, 25 June 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/2014/06/edible-pot-it-s-easier-to-stay-in-the-gray-area.html?page=all, da 8-214) PC
Yesterday the Governor announced that the future of edible marijuana products is up in the air in Washington state. Today, Magical Butter
announced it will be opening its marijuana-infused food truck at an Everett farmers market this weekend and selling pot brownies.¶ Confused?¶
Here’s the catch: the pot brownies will be available only to card-carrying medical marijuana patients.¶ It’s the latest wrinkle in the ongoing
tension between Washington state’s up-and-coming, yet highly regulated recreational marijuana market and the vaguely defined medical
marijuana industry. Even if edibles are verboten at the new retail stores, medical marijuana dispensaries have been selling them for years, and
show no sign of slowing.¶ Turns out, it’s
easier (for now) to stay in the gray area of medical marijuana than it is to
comply with the complex (and incomplete) new rules and regulations attached to the state’s newly
legal recreational industry.¶ The issue is one of the main things distinguishing Colorado (which already
has successful retail sales around the state) from Washington. This state didn’t put together an
effective, regulated medical marijuana market. So we don’t have that foundation in place upon which
to build a recreational industry, which is what Colorado has done.¶ Under the threat of federal intervention,
former Gov. Chris Gregoire line-item vetoed the majority of the law in 2011 that would have created a
regulated medical marijuana market in Washington. What we have instead is a system of community gardens and “access
points.”¶ Not sure what that means? Doesn’t matter. The vague law created de facto medical marijuana dispensaries
(even though they don’t want you to call them that).¶ Now that the Washington State Liquor Control Board is getting clearer about how tightly
regulated the recreational market will be, many
marijuana entrepreneurs are looking back at the grey market of
medical pot and feeling pretty enthusiastic.¶ For example, Pete O’Neil, a marijuana entrepreneur who sought to open several
recreational stores, has decided to focus his energy on turning his Seattle location into a medical dispensary. It’s an easier proposition until
Washington sorts out the twists and turns of recreational regulations.¶ "I’ve spent tens of thousands of dollars for a crazy system. It's insane,”
O’Neil said. “We're just really focusing on the dispensary.”¶ But the
state does have plans to eventually create more
regulation for medical marijuana; it’s just not clear what that will look like. Medical could get folded into the
recreational rules.¶ For now, those who want to partake in a marijuana food truck this weekend will have to bring their medical
marijuana authorizations to Jet City Farmer’s Market, where the Magical Butter food truck will be selling its wares.
A2: Marihuana should be Schedule I
Marijuana Schedule 1 Classification is Arbitrary
Winterbourne 2012 [Matt Winterbourne, “United States Drug Policy: the scientific, economic, and
social issues surrounding marijuana,” Stanford Social Sciences Journal,
http://web.stanford.edu/group/journal/cgi-bin/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Winterbourne_SocSci_2012.pdf, September 2012, p. 96-98, accessed 7-30]
Scientific research on the dangers¶ of each substance should inform its scheduling¶ placement. However, these decisions¶ were not made by
scientific researchers or¶ medical experts. Rather, these choices were¶ left to the discretion of the United States¶ Justice Department, Attorney
General John¶ Mitchell, and the Bureau of Narcotics and¶ Dangerous Drugs during the development¶ of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970.¶
Research on marijuana’s chemical¶ properties, as well as its medicinal and recreational¶ uses has,
throughout history, challenged¶ the categorization of this substance¶ by the federal government as a
Schedule¶ 1 drug. In fact, between 1840 and 1900¶ “more than 100 articles about the therapeutic¶
value of cannabis were published¶ in Europe and North America”5 alone.¶ With instances dating as far back as the
first century A.D., marijuana has been used¶ medicinally in China, India, the Middle-¶ East, Central Asia, Greece, Rome, Africa,¶ Europe, and
America. Cannabis is also currently¶ being used in various states across¶ the U.S. to treat ailments such as nausea¶ from chemotherapy,
wasting-syndrome in¶ AIDS victims, optical pressure from glaucoma,¶ depression, anxiety, and insomnia,¶ among many other afflictions5,8,11.
Historic¶ and current medical practices and reports¶ support the argument that marijuana has
legitimate¶ medical purposes. These practices¶ and reports directly rebut the assertion implied¶ by the DEA’s Drug Scheduling that¶
marijuana lacks medical value.¶ The second criterion for categorization¶ as a Schedule 1 drug is that risks of¶
addiction and abuse are too high to merit¶ legal distribution or prescription by doctors.¶ Addiction refers to drug use that adversely¶ affects
the user’s social standing,¶ ability to perform civil duties, and capability¶ to reduce or eliminate use despite a¶ desire to do so5. An addicted
individual is¶ compelled to continue their high-usage of¶ a substance despite negative consequences¶ he or she faces from using the drug.¶
Addiction often occurs through¶ tolerance or dependence, in which the¶ chemical composition of bodily functions¶ becomes so familiarized to
the presence¶ of a drug that stopping use results in adverse¶ physical and psychological reactions.¶ These reactions, called withdrawals,¶ range
in severity from mood swings¶ to organ malfunctions. A
current scientific¶ study investigated the severity of
addiction¶ and withdrawal across six psychoactive¶ drugs (caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, heroin,¶ cocaine,
and marijuana). This study concluded¶ that marijuana and caffeine were the¶ least addictive of these
substances, asserting¶ that marijuana is “slightly less addictive¶ than caffeine.”8¶ Other arguments for the
placement¶ of marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug¶ highlight the negative consequences associated¶ with marijuana use, such brain damage,¶
biological defects, deviant behavior,¶ and crime. Harry Anslinger, the first Commissioner¶ of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,¶ issued a
statement that marijuana “addicts”¶ accounted for “fifty percent of the¶ violent crimes committed…by Mexicans,¶ Turks, Filipinos, Greeks,
Spaniards, Latin-¶ Americans and Negroes.”8 Noticeably absent¶ from Anslinger’s list of “violent criminals”¶ are whites. Claims
that
marijuana¶ causes violent behavior have been refuted¶ in numerous studies conducted by
independent¶ researchers, national scientific organizations,¶ and presidential commissions¶ throughout the
20th and 21st centuries5,8. In¶ fact, marijuana has been proven, in numerous¶ controlled scientific experiments,
to¶ reduce aggressive behaviors, even among¶ those addicted to harder drugs8. In addition,¶ there is a wealth of
reports on valid¶ empirical studies refuting the claims of¶ brain damage, biological defects, and criminal¶ activity5,8,11,12,13.¶ A further
example of a fictitious¶ detrimental effect of marijuana use is the¶ “gateway theory,” which suggests that the¶ use of marijuana leads to
experimentation¶ with more dangerous illegal drugs. This argument¶ is based upon government reports,¶ such as the 1994 Center on Addiction
and¶ Substance Abuse report which stated that¶ marijuana users were 85 times more likely¶ than non-marijuana users to try cocaine14.¶ These
assertions were based on statistics of¶ marijuana use by cocaine users and non-users,¶ which indicated that 17% of marijuana¶ users also tried
cocaine, compared to the¶ 0.2% of cocaine users who had never used¶ marijuana8. This comparison does not accurately¶ depict drug use
motivations. Not¶ only is marijuana the most widely used illegal¶ drug, but it is also the least dangerous¶ and most readily accessible,
according¶ to self-report data from U.S. youths10.¶ The fact that 0.2% of cocaine users have¶ never used marijuana simply reflects a logical¶
usage progression, not a predisposition¶ resulting from marijuana use. In fact, less¶ than 1% of people who have used marijuana¶ currently use
cocaine8.¶ Another
important consideration¶ for the enforcement policies regarding¶ marijuana is the
number of deaths caused¶ by its use or abuse. This is one of the most¶ unfounded pieces of evidence used to support¶
current law enforcement policies, as¶ deaths directly associated with the abuse¶ and overdose of marijuana have not been¶ documented in any
historical record5,6,8.¶ Estimates of death directly related to the¶ abuse or overdose of tobacco, alcohol,¶ and marijuana are displayed in Figure
3.¶ The estimated annual death rates associated¶ with the use of tobacco and alcohol in¶ the United States are 430,000 and 80,000¶
respectively. While these substances are¶ excluded from the Federal Drug Schedule,¶ marijuana—among
the highest
scheduled¶ substances—has zero instances of death¶ annually due to abuse or overdose. In fact,¶ laboratory
research findings indicate that¶ an individual would have to consume over¶ 10,000 marijuana cigarettes within a couple¶ of hours in order to
reach lethal levels¶ of THC5,8—a feat that can reasonably be¶ deemed impossible.¶ It appears that marijuana, contrary¶ to assertions by
government officials and¶ the DEA, does not fit either requirement¶ for Schedule 1 categorization and does not¶ cause detrimental health
problems, induce¶ criminal behavior, or cause death. Despite¶ these glaring contradictions between the federal policy guidelines and scientific¶
data, a panel of three law judges in the U.S.¶ District Court of Appeals in Washington,¶ D.C. decided in 1994, when presented with¶ evidence for
the rescheduling of marijuana,¶ that “in their opinion [marijuana] has no¶ medicinal value—none.”5 Since 1994, 16¶ states have legalized
medicinal marijuana,¶ yet marijuana continues to be inappropriately¶ categorized as a Schedule 1 drug.
A2: Public Health
Revenue from legalization is good – revenue can fund education and treatment
Winterbourne 2012 [Matt Winterbourne, “United States Drug Policy: the scientific, economic, and
social issues surrounding marijuana,” Stanford Social Sciences Journal,
http://web.stanford.edu/group/journal/cgi-bin/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Winterbourne_SocSci_2012.pdf, September 2012, p. 98, accessed 7-30]
Current costs for funding the War¶ on Drugs are estimated between $26 and¶ $58 billion annually, including enforcement¶ efforts and
incarcerations4,6. The¶ funding requirements for continued enforcement¶ use resources with little potential¶ for revenue returns to the
government¶ or its citizens. Add to these costs the money¶ required for drug education programs—estimated¶ at around $1.3 billion in
200118—¶ and treatment facilities, and it becomes¶ clear that America is
dumping money into¶ a system which has
failed to display any¶ significant deterrence or reduction in illegal¶ drug use by either the country’s youth¶ or
adult populations9,10,19.¶ By contrast, government-sanctioned¶ taxation and distribution of marijuana¶ in the
Netherlands has effectively¶ provided the country with tax revenue to¶ support drug education and
treatment facilities,¶ while also eliminating the costly processes¶ of police training, enforcement,
arrests,¶ legal trials, and incarcerations8. Drug¶ education programs in the Netherlands¶ teach tolerance-based, responsible use
of¶ drugs, unlike the zero-tolerance, “Just-Say-¶ No” approaches coined in the 1980s and¶ still used today in the U.S. These foreign¶ strategies
to education, accompanied by¶ the societal acceptance of responsible drug¶ use, have undoubtedly contributed to the¶ lower rates of use and
abuse found in self report¶ data collected from Dutch youths16.¶ Another issue presented by the¶ War on Drugs is the increase of
incarceration¶ rates in relation to court-ordered drug¶ treatment programs. Data
from the Substance¶ Abuse and Mental
Health Services¶ Administration, as well as work conducted¶ by Delaney and colleagues, indicate that¶
court-issues treatment facilities save tax¶ payers 3-1 for in-patient rehabilitation, and¶ upwards of 131 in out-patient rehabilitation¶ compared to the expenses required¶ for incarceration18,20. Further benefits
of¶ rehabilitation programs suggested by these¶ studies include a reduction in the instance¶ of positive urine-analysis drug screens and¶ a
nearly 20% reduced rate of re-arrest within¶ six months after release from rehabilitation¶ programs (compared to those released¶ from prison
facilities).
Legalization would require that regulatory measures are taken– Allocating marijuana
revenue toward public services to protect public health
Itai Danovitch 1/7/2013 Director of Addiction Psychiatry Clinical Services at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. Assistant
Professor of Psychiatry at Cedars-Sinai and the UCLA David Geffen School of Medicine. “Sorting Through the Science on
Marijuana: Facts, Fallacies, and Implications for Legalization”JV
The adverse effects of marijuana impact a minority of marijuana users. However, any increase in marijuana use is
likely to be accompanied by an increase in the absolute number of individuals with marijuana-related problems. Enlightened
regulation should seek to attenuate the unintended consequences of increased marijuana use, and
should take extra measures to protect at-risk populations. The populations at highest risk of marijuana related
consequences are (1) youth, (2) pregnant or breastfeeding women, and (3) individuals at high risk for mental illness. In 2010, the California
Society of Addiction Medicine wrote a statement in response to Proposition 19, the California ballot initiative that, if passed, would have
legalized marijuana.68 That statement summarized seven
core regulatory measures that might help defray the
adverse impact of legalization: (1) Restriction: Marijuana use and possession among individuals under the
age of twenty-one should be prohibited. Intoxication with marijuana should be prohibited while
operating heavy machinery, or working in sensitive occupations. (2) Treatment: Currently only a small
percentage of people who need treatment for marijuana addiction actually receive it. Yet treatment
works. Any policy change that increases the absolute number of people with addiction should also set
forth the mechanism to offer treatment to those who need it. (3) Labelling: Given concerns about adding a new
“smokeable” product, and the importance of instilling public awareness of long term risk from the outset. Appropriate labelling
should characterize the known quantity, strength, and constituents, and such labelling should be
standardized and monitored for accuracy. (4) Commerce: Manufacture, marketing, distribution, and sales
of marijuana should be closely regulated to ensure appropriate controls, ranging from safety, to
zoning. (5) Education: Widespread educational efforts should be developed to educate the population
about marijuana and ensure the public health. (6) Research: Assumptions about the impact of legalization, and the potential
effectiveness of the measures described here, are speculative. No major industrialized country has legalized marijuana. In the event of
legalization, it would be vital to objectively study the impact of such policy change and the effectiveness of provisions taken to minimize harms.
Additionally, a mechanism needs to be established for monitoring and documenting intoxication, for the purpose of ascertaining DUI, or
intoxication while involved in other sensitive activities. (7)’[6]’ Revenue: Taxes
should be commensurate to the social costs
of the drug, and should be applied towards those ends. Given the complexity of regulating and overseeing the principals
described above, it would be prudent to establish an appropriations committee to oversee the appropriate allocation of funds.69VI.
CONCLUSION Marijuana
is the most widely used illicit substance. In many regions, the widespread
perception that criminal sanctions against marijuana users are ineffective and unjustified has
generated a re-evaluation of public policy on marijuana. Marijuana has already been decriminalized in some states, and
further legalization initiatives are forthcoming.
The war on drugs increases the likelihood that those who use drugs will become
problem users – legalization would increase access to treatment for such users
Mary M, Cleveland: ‘“Downsize” Drug Prohibition’ in Mark Thornton’s 2007 “Prohibition versus Legalization Do
Economists Reach a Conclusion on Drug Policy?” (Ph.D. in Agricultural and Resource Economics from the University of
California, Berkeley Economist and long-time activist for social justice -- Executive Director of the Association for Georgist
Studies) JV
Cleveland states that she is a critic of drug prohibition (1998, 573). She concludes, "Policies
that stigmatize and imprison drug
users may hurt rather than help troubled young people and problem users." The abstractions of
"prohibition" or "legalization" have little to do with troubled people's behavior or needs. There must
always be some policing of illegal drug markets, just as with bootleg liquor markets, but the drug war makes the
black markets very dangerous and therefore attractive to troubled young people with limited opportunities
and a high risk of becoming problem users of hard drugs. The drug war does not cause the family and social problems
that put young people at risk, but rather diverts resources and attention from education and
treatment programs that might help them. Although "legalization" in any of its many possible
variations cannot solve family and social problems, any more than repeal of alcohol prohibition solved
the problems that caused some individuals to become alcoholics, it can help, when combined with a
downsizing of the drug war, to restrict casual access to drugs while making it easier for problem users
to find treatment.
Legalization > Decrim
Laundry List
Legalization is a bigger step than decriminalization and medicalization - solves
Miron 2010 (Jeffrey A. Miron, senior lecturer and the Director of Undergraduate Studies in the
Department of Economics at Harvard University. Marijuana Legalization in California. Cato Institute. May
27, 2010. http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/marijuana-legalization-california)
Marijuana legalization is a far bigger step than decriminalization or medicalization, which have
already occurred in California and other states. Decriminalization legalizes possession of small
amounts of marijuana, but it does not eliminate the underground market or permit easy taxation.
Medicalization is closer to legalization, but it still leaves producers and consumers in a legal gray area
and collects less revenue than legalization.
Legalization will move the marijuana industry above ground, just as the repeal of alcohol prohibition
restored the legal alcohol industry. A small component of the marijuana market might remain illicit —
moonshine marijuana rather than moonshine whiskey — but if regulation and taxation are moderate, most producers
and consumers will choose the legal sector, as they did with alcohol.
Legalization would therefore eliminate most of the violence and corruption that currently characterize
marijuana markets. These occur because, in underground markets, participants cannot resolve
disputes via non-violent mechanisms such as lawsuits, advertising, lobbying, or campaign
contributions. Instead, producers and consumers in these markets use violence to resolve disputes with each other and bribery or
violence to resolve disputes with law enforcement. These features of “vice” markets disappear when vice is legal, as abundant experience with
alcohol, prostitution, and gambling all demonstrate.
Legalization would result in numerous other benefits. Medical marijuana patients would no longer suffer legal limbo or social stigma from using
marijuana to treat nausea from chemotherapy, glaucoma, or other conditions. Infringements
on civil liberties and racial
profiling would decline, since victimless crimes are a key cause of such police behavior. Quality control
would improve because sellers could advertise and establish reputations for a consistent product,
allowing consumers to choose low or high-potency marijuana.
Legalization would also generate budgetary savings for state and federal governments, both by
eliminating expenditures on enforcement and by allowing taxation of legalized sales. I recently estimated
that the net impact would be a deficit reduction of about $20 billion per year, summed over all levels of government.
Black Market
Decriminalization doesn’t solve the black market or public health improvements
Blumenson and Nilsen 9 (Eric Blumenson, Professor of Law, Suffolk University; J.D. Harvard Law School; Eva Nilsen, Associate
Clinical Professor of Law, Boston University; J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M Georgetown Law Center, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for
Marijuana Law Reform, 17 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 43, Fall 2009) PC
Decriminalization retains many of the drawbacks of present policy, however, while jettisoning the worst. It still
leaves marijuana production and sale to a black market populated by criminals, and eliminates any
[*76] government control over the drug or its market. And although removing criminal penalties would liberate marijuana
users from the virtually total loss of liberty that may be imposed under current law, preventing use of the substance raises separate liberty
concerns we address elsewhere. n124¶ Legalization
eliminates the drawbacks just noted but may have many of its own,
depending on its form. Unlike decriminalization, it fully respects individual liberty, and it can help the government
control the market in harm reducing ways. Legalization should dry up the black market just as ending
prohibition did, leaving in its place licensed sellers who would have every business incentive to insure
government imposed age limits, purity standards, and labels. It draws a sharp distinction between "soft drugs" and
"hard drugs," and removes the necessity for users to buy from people who sell both; and according to MacCoun and Reuter, to the degree that
marijuana became more available and less expensive, it might draw people away from more dangerous drugs they use now. n125¶
Legalization also paves the way for drug education programs that, by recognizing distinctions between drugs and
between use and abuse, have the credibility and content to actually educate and safeguard their listeners. The
juxtaposition of marijuana use and cigarette use - legal but age-restricted and subject to a massive public education campaign - is informative.
In 1991, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention commenced measuring the use of both. From then until 2005, cigarette smoking
among high school students has declined, while marijuana smoking has increased by 25%. n126 Treating
cigarettes as a public
health problem seems to have worked in ways that the drug war's law enforcement focus has not .¶
Finally, legalization at the federal level promotes accelerated scientific research and technological
development (for example, smokeless delivery systems) that could result in major improvements in safety. n127
Only legalization solves enforcement disparities and underground market –
decriminalization makes them worse
Duncan 9 (Cynthia S. Duncan, University of Colorado, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009, Note: The
Need for Change: An Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1701, July 2009, p. 1726-9) PC
Decriminalization of marijuana is a wholly unsatisfactory compromise between strict prohibition and
legalization. n132 Decriminalization carries with it many of the same societal costs associated with total prohibition
n133 and retains almost every negative aspect associated with prohibition. n134 [*1727] Decriminalization as it
currently exists removes the criminal sanctions for possession of marijuana for personal use n135 without
providing for a non- criminal method of obtaining it; n136 therefore, all trafficking remains illegal. n137 The
enforcement and deterrence efforts aimed at trafficking remain the same as under strict prohibition, n138
which means that the racial and economic disparities associated with these methods are also retained.
[*1728] In addition, because decriminalization offers no new methods of deterring underage use, there is no positive impact on the underage
usage rates attributable to decriminalization. n139¶ Although experience with decriminalization has shown it does not have an appreciable
effect on overall usage rates, n140 any
increase in demand associated with an easing of possession sanctions is
still supplied "entirely by the black market." n141 Removing the criminal sanctions for personal use does
not "dismantle the destructive and dangerous criminal supply networks that have taken deep root" in our own backyard. n142
Not only does decriminalization do nothing to remove the criminal networks, it may increase their profits. n143 "Thus,
decriminalization is likely to prove to be the worst of all possible policies when it comes to the drug-dealing aspect of the marijuana problem."
n144¶ Thirteen states have now adopted some form of decriminalization, n145 but without decriminalization of marijuana at the federal level,
this simply creates a system that puts state and local drug measures easing the restrictions on marijuana at odds with federal laws prohibiting
all marijuana use. n146 Decriminalization at the federal level that mirrors decriminalization at the state level would only eliminate the conflict
currently existing between federal law and state and local measures. n147 Federal
decriminalization would produce no
additional positive impact on the usage rates among young people, would do nothing to dismantle
illegal trafficking operations, and would maintain many of the racial and [*1729] economic disparities
associated with prohibition. n148¶ For those opposed to strict prohibition, decriminalization of personal use may be viewed as a
positive step. n149 However, because in many ways decriminalization is no better policy than prohibition, decriminalization as it
currently exists, whether at the state or federal level, is unsuitable as a long-term solution.
Legalization is key to solve underground markets and taxation – decriminalization
leaves them in tact by sustaining prohibition
DPA 14 (Drug Policy Alliance, Why is Marijuana Decriminalization Not Enough? April 2014,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact_sheet_Marijuana_Decriminalization_and_Legalization_April2014.pdf, da 7-29-14) PC
Decriminalization will also do nothing to eliminate the lucrative underground market for marijuana,
estimated to be worth $30 billion or more in the U.S.18 This immense market is completely untaxed, a source of
revenue that federal and state governments can ill- afford to neglect.¶ Instead, prohibition ensures that this
vast market enriches criminal organizations and produces massive violence, crime and corruption.
Virtually all marijuana- related violence is the result of prohibition, which keeps responsible businesses out of the market. Illegal
businesses have no legitimate means to settle disputes, so violence inevitably results – as it did during
alcohol Prohibition.19¶ The effect has been unending bloodshed in countries like Mexico, where at
least 100,000 people have been killed in prohibition-related violence since late 2006.20 Marijuana
prohibition is a major cause of this carnage; in fact, one scholar recently argued, “Perhaps the most serious harms [of marijuana]
relate to its trafficking and production in Mexico...It has caused great harm to Mexico, as a source of both homicides and corruption.”21¶ The
federal government has asserted that “[M]arijuana distribution in the United States remains the
single largest source of revenue for the Mexican cartels,”22 and is “a cash crop that finances corruption
and the carnage of violence year after year.”23 Recent estimates by RAND Corporation and the Mexican
Institute for Competitiveness project that legalizing marijuana nationally could reduce cartels’ drug
export revenues by between one-fifth and one-third.24
Only legalization ends the black market and war on drugs
Dighe 2014 [Huffington Post, Ranjit Dighe, Professor of Economics, The State University of New York at
Oswego, “Legalize it – The Economic Argument,” January 30, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ranjit-dighe/legalize-marijuana-economic-argument_b_4695023.html]
All told, the expected costs of legalizing marijuana are minimal. (That includes one I did not mention previously, the
"gateway" effect of marijuana to using harder drugs. As for that claim, studies have shown marijuana to be scarcely more of a gateway drug
than alcohol, and that the vast majority of marijuana users have never even tried cocaine.) What about the benefits? The tax benefits tend to
be greatly overblown, first of all because higher taxes aren't really a benefit (they are a transfer from people who pay them to people who
don't) and also because studies, notably that of economist Jeffrey Miron, estimate the increased tax take at about $6 billion, or less than 1
percent of the current federal deficit. The benefits of reduced prohibition enforcement costs are similarly small, about $10 billion. The
bulk
of the benefits would be to current and prospective marijuana consumers. I understand that many people do not
care about other people's prospective enjoyment of legal marijuana or their increased convenience in obtaining it. Which is fine: the economic
way of thinking is not for everybody. But consider the biggest benefit, which is that some
19 to 32 million people would no
longer be treated as criminals and subject to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, asset forfeiture and other
punishment.¶ This benefit goes way beyond the criminal justice system's costs of enforcing pot laws. It is about the ability of those 19 to
32 million users, their families, and friends to live normal lives. In my own neighborhood a kindly older gentleman was recently arrested for
possession of not quite four pounds of marijuana and sentenced to a year in state prison. He was a good neighbor and caused no inconvenience
to anyone in the community, but current law dictated that he could no longer live among us. His imprisonment has been devastating to his wife
and family, has deprived the community of a good and well-liked neighbor, and has made him a convict or ex-convict forever. No reasonable
cost-benefit analysis would justify his imprisonment.¶ Perhaps because of the huge personal and social costs of criminalizing the recreational
behavior of tens of millions, about a dozen states have already "decriminalized" marijuana. In
most cases, decriminalization is a
halfway measure whereby consumption is either legal or subject to a civil fine (like a parking ticket)
but the drug's manufacture or sale is still illegal. This is better than continuing to treat marijuana as a
Schedule I narcotic, but this kind of decriminalization has been tried before, with alcohol. It was called
Prohibition, which actually did not ban the consumption of alcohol but only its manufacture, sale and transportation. We've all heard how that
turned out. Under alcohol prohibition or pot decriminalization, using the substance is okay but procuring it makes you a criminal and forces you
to deal with bigger criminals (dealers) in an unregulated black market. Product
safety, quality control and peaceful conflict
resolution, among other things, will be lacking in such a market. If pot were "decriminalized"
nationwide along these lines, some 19 to 32 million people could still be criminals if they tried to buy
it. Compared with continuing the war on marijuana, the net benefits of decriminalization appear
large, but the net benefits of legalization look much larger. Open and regulated markets are safer than
black markets, and our judicial system is clogged enough already with real criminals.
Legalization addresses illegal sources – decriminalization allows for the continuation
of illegal suppliers
Moran 2011 (Thomas J. Moran, “Just a Little Bit of History Repeating: The California
Model of Marijuana Legalization and How it Might
Affect Racial and Ethnic Minorities,” Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice, 4-12011, p.575-576, accessed 8-1-2014)
It is no surprise then that the advocates for decriminalization have¶ grown. As of this writing, thirteen states have laws on their books making¶
possession of marijuana in small amounts for personal use a merely finable¶ offense.109 That number will likely rise because decriminalization
is so¶ facially attractive in that it saves state governments high amounts of¶ money.110 In fact, the states that decriminalized marijuana during
the Carter¶ administration managed to have their laws escape Reagan’s drug war¶ largely because not arresting people for possession did not
clearly affect use¶ or other drug-related problems, while the police did clearly save money.111¶ Yet national
decriminalization is
hardly the answer, particularly for¶ minority groups. Even if arguing that decriminalization would not increase¶ the use
rate, one must still recognize that decriminalization would still not¶ lower the illegal and dangerous supply
networks. Because these networks¶ predominately poison minority communities, for minorities¶
decriminalization represents the "worst of all possible policies."112 Moreover, if use rates instead increased,
decriminalization in doing nothing¶ to destroy or fight the criminal organizations supplying marijuana
would¶ increase those organizations’ profits.113 A higher use rate under a¶ decriminalized regime is not just likely but
inevitable because¶ decriminalization would eliminate the group of non-users who have¶ refrained from using simply out of a fear of
punishment. If that fear no¶ longer has basis, then those non-users would no longer have a reason for¶ abstaining. More users equals more
profits, and because decriminalization¶
bats an eye at the criminal organizations absorbing those profits,
minorities¶ would be faced with not only the same criminals besetting their¶ communities, but
financially strengthened ones.114 While decriminalization¶ may clear out the jails and prevent many minorities from being
introduced¶ to jails in the first place, minority groups would do well to consider whether¶ increasing the wealth of criminal organizations is an
acceptable side effect.
Trafficking
Only full legalization ends trafficking
Duncan 2009 [41 Conn. L. Rev. 1701 (2008-2009) Need for Change: An Economic Analysis of
Marijuana Policy, The; Duncan, Cynthia S,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/conlr41&div=50&id=&page=]
Decriminalization carries with it many of the same societal costs associated with total prohibition and
does nothing to dismantle illegal trafficking operations. Legalization, on the other hand, would
eliminate the criminal supply network and would also remove the direct and collateral sanctions that
currently fall so harshly upon minority and low-income marijuana users.
Revenue
Only legalization provides economic benefits – reduces law enforcement spending and
increases tax revenue
Duncan 9 (Cynthia S. Duncan, University of Colorado, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009, Note: The
Need for Change: An Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1701, July 2009, p. 1731-3) PC
The regulatory systems of alcohol and tobacco are frequently suggested as models for regulating
marijuana. n164 Presumably as with alcohol and tobacco, marijuana would be sold to the general adult [*1732] population, with restric tions prohibiting
underage use the only real limitations in place. A more restrictive "personal license" system is suggested by Professor Mark Kleiman, which would also impose age
limit restrictions, but in addition would impose annual per user quantity limits on purchases. n165 These are just two examples of possible regulatory systems.
Legalization of marijuana could take many forms, with varying degrees of regulatory control. This section focuses on legalization of marijuana as an overall policy
and how it differs from prohibition, not on the regulatory parameters of any particular legalization system. This section examines from a legalization standpoint
issues already addressed with respect to prohibition. ¶ The
obvious distinctions between legalization and prohibition are
budgetary ones. Production, distribution, and possession of marijuana are all illegal under the Controlled Substances Act. n166 Whereas
decriminalization only eases the sanctions against possession, legalization would remove the criminal
sanctions from all elements of the marijuana industry. Regardless of the level of regulation necessary for a legalization policy,
removal of all sanctions represents an immediate savings of the billions of budgetary dollars and
millions of man-hours expended every year enforcing prohibition. n167 In addition to eliminating the budgetary
expenditures of prohibition, legalizing the production and distribution of marijuana would bring in tax revenues.
Marijuana production and distribution already constitute a significant market, n168 with the United States marijuana
market estimated to have a value of over $ 10 billion. n169 [*1733] Under prohibition, none of this market is taxed.
Legalized marijuana would generate billions of dollars in tax revenue. n170 As a previously prohibited, and thereby untaxed, commodity, "the yield of a new tax on
[marijuana] is pure gain." n171 The budgetary impact, while only one of many factors to be considered in evaluating a marijuana policy, strongly favors legalization.
Use by Minors
Legalization is the best way to reduce underage usage – empirically changes suppliers’
incentives
Duncan 9 (Cynthia S. Duncan, University of Colorado, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009, Note: The
Need for Change: An Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1701, July 2009, p. 1736-8) PC
A possible increase in adult use of marijuana under legalization does not necessarily translate into an increase in underage use. Advocates
of legalization argue that legalizing marijuana may succeed where prohibition has failed and actually
reduce the availability of marijuana for underage use. n187 Underage use of marijuana is a necessary concern under any
policy, and while it can be argued that marijuana is not so harmful as to require strict prohibition under all circumstances, every effort must be
made to prevent and deter underage use. n188 If retail sale of marijuana to adults is legalized, only selling to minors will remain illegal. n189
Under the current system of prohibition, selling marijuana to anyone is illegal, regardless of age. With
no incentive to differentiate
between the ages of their customers, drug dealers do not discriminate by age. n190 On the other hand,
stricter enforcement of laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to those under eighteen is
believed to have contributed to the significant decrease in cigarette smoking among teenagers. n191 A
marijuana legalization policy would also include an age limit on purchase and use, and provide for
strong sanctions against those who ignore the restrictions. In forty years, prohibition has failed to reduce the availability
of marijuana to teenagers. There is no way of knowing exactly what effect legalization of marijuana might have on underage use. Nevertheless,
it may be possible to create and maintain a system at least as effective at deterring underage [*1737] use as the system we have now by
focusing enforcement resources on only one demographic. n192 For these reasons, underage use is not a factor that weighs heavily for or
against legalization. n193
Unfair Arrests
Legalization solves unfair arrests, while decriminalization can cause them to increase
DPA 14 (Drug Policy Alliance, Why is Marijuana Decriminalization Not Enough? April 2014,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact_sheet_Marijuana_Decriminalization_and_Legalization_April2014.pdf, da 7-29-14) PC
Despite its benefits, decriminalization
falls short in many ways – largely because it still lies within the framework of
prohibition. Consequently, decriminalization still suffers from the inherent harms of prohibition – namely, an illegal,
unregulated market; the unequal application of the laws (regardless of severity of penalty) toward certain groups,
especially people of color; unregulated products of unknown potency and quality;11 and the potential for
continued arrests as part of a “net-widening” phenomenon.12¶ Marijuana prohibition is unique among American criminal
laws – no other law is both enforced so widely and harshly yet deemed unnecessary by such a substantial portion of the population.¶ Under
decriminalization, marijuana possession arrests may continue, or even increase, because police may be
more inclined to make arrests if they present less administrative burdens as infractions, civil offenses,
or even misdemeanors (without jail), as opposed to felonies.13 A similar process of “net-widening” occurred
in parts of Australia that decriminalized marijuana, where the number of people arrested (but not booked)
actually increased. Because many could not afford to pay the fines imposed after an arrest, the end result was
“an increase in the number of individuals being incarcerated for marijuana offenses, albeit now indirectly for
their failure to pay a fine.”14¶ A misdemeanor conviction, moreover, can seriously hinder an individual’s ability to
succeed and participate in society by preventing him or her from obtaining employment, housing and
student loans. Even an arrest record can be an obstacle to opportunities for otherwise law-abiding individuals.15
Federal Action Best
Congress Key
Only congressional action solves inconsistencies in state regulatory regimes and
dispensaries – Colorado and Washington prove
Boyd et al, 14 (Graham Boyd, Visiting Senior Fellow for the Third Way Social Policy & Politics Program,
Sarah Trumble, Policy Counsel for the Third Way Social Policy & Politics Program and Lanae Erickson
Hatalsky, Director of the Third Way Social Policy & Politics Program, June 2014, “Marijuana Legalization:
Does Congress Need to Act?”, <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/830/Third_Way_Report__Marijuana_Legalization-_Does_Congress_Need_to_Act.pdf>)ZB
Drug law enforcement in the United States has long followed a path of "cooperative federalism," where
states and the federal government share a common goal of controlling drug use through criminalization. Federal law enforcement agents, led
by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), target high-level drug producers and sellers, while the far more numerous state and local police
and prosecutors handle the vast majority of cases involving low- level consumers, producers, and sellers. This division of labor arises in part
from the Constitution, which establishes the federalist structure, in part from the Controlled Substances Act, which dictates the specific
elements of federal policy, and in part from Congressional funding decisions which limit the number of federal drug agents and prosecutors. But
as states begin to legalize marijuana use within their borders for purposes of state law, this
enforcement model has become impractical. The federal government must update its marijuana enforcement policy to
ensure that states can effectively regulate marijuana use, that dispensaries will be managed by law-abiding citizens, and that these markets will
not be targets for criminal activity. If
legalizing states are going to regulate effectively, they need federal
consistency . Colorado and Washington State have both set up strict state regulatory regimes for the
recreational use of marijuana, but without
federal cooperation—or at the very least, consistency—participants in those
regimes are subject to the whims of changing administrations and unpredictably fluctuating guidance .
Under federal law, all use, cultivation, and sale of marijuana are illegal and prosecutable, even if someone is adhering to state law.‘ Current
federal guidance has suggested that these state markets will not be targeted for enforcement efforts so long as certain standards are
being met, but this guidance is worth little more than a pinky promise- it provides no legal cover and could be easily
changed unilaterally or even ignored by prosecutors in the current Administration or any others in the
future.’ States need federal consistency and cooperation in order to establish strong and reliable licensing
and regulatory regimes that will keep drugs out of the hands of children and criminals. The federal
government‘s outdated policy remains a formidable obstacle to achieving this goal and a potential barrier to state experimentation that could
identify a path for new and more effective approaches to marijuana policy. If
the threat of federal prosecution exists, most
legitimate business owners won't run dispensaries-—only those comfortable operating at the edge of the law will. Anyone
running a marijuana-related business operating under a state license understands that even if his or her actions may not be a target for federal
action today, a future prosecutor may look back and punish the conduct—and the current guidance would be no defense. The
usual
Constitutional protection against ex post facto criminal punishment (prosecution for actions that were not illegal
when they were taken) does not apply to marijuana businesses or consumers here, since the federal
guidance explicitly warns that all such conduct remains illegal. So long as anyone can be prosecuted for violating
federal law despite state legalization, only those who are willing to risk imprisonment will run marijuana dispensaries—and that could attract
exactly the types of businesspeople we don't want at the helm of the legal marijuana market In order to create an orderly, safe marijuana
industry—one that serves the public safety goals of protecting children and dismantling organized crime—the threat of federal law
enforcement must be removed or at least suspended for a definite period of time. And since
the Administration lacks the
power to unilaterally provide a truly safe harbor against federal enforcement, the only solution is for
Congress to act —amending the Controlled Substances Act to establish waivers for or otherwise
exempt those who act in compliance with state-level marijuana laws in certain states from federal
laws outlawing marijuana use, possession, and sale. Forcing dispensaries to run all-cash businesses is dangerous and
illogical. Not only are sellers and consumers of legal marijuana violating federal law under the status quo—-so too is any bank that accepts
deposits or holds accounts from any marijuana-related business, regardless of whether it is legal in the state.’ This means (despite efforts
described below by the Obama Administration to ameliorate the problem) that dispensaries are prohibited from holding bank accounts, using
debit cards, writing checks to pay their taxes, or any another banking-related activity. As a result, dispensaries
must currently
operate as all-cash businesses—and criminals know it.’ Every inventory purchase, rent payment, employee salary, and
customer transaction must be done in cash. Dispensaries in Colorado are paying taxes with shopping bags full of cash, making them a
magnet for thieves and other criminals and putting dispensaries, their employees, their customers,
and their neighbors in danger.‘° Regardless of how well-regulated or strictly enforced the legal
marijuana market may be, unless and until it has access to banking services, it is at risk of falling
victim to crime and will be forced to operate on the fringes.
Decisive congressional action key – solves lack of leadership and effective interstate
regulation
Reid, 14 (Melanie, Associate Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law,
“THE QUAGMIRE THAT NOBODY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WANTS TO TALK ABOUT: MARIJUANA”,
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW, Vol. 44, Spring 2014, 169-206)ZB
The United States is currently in a precarious state caused by a lack of leadership on the marijuana
legalization issue. State and federal laws are in conflict. In two states, a citizen can possess marijuana, but cannot grow,
distribute, or import marijuana without risking federal prosecution. There is sufficient overlap between federal and state laws that the issue can
be no longer ignored. Congress
is aware that: Controlled substances manufactured and distributed
interstate cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed
intrastate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances
manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed
intrastate. . . . Federal control of the intrastate in-cidents of the traffic in controlled substances is
essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic. 204 Moreover, it would not be sensible
to amend federal laws that currently prohibit simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844 to allow possession of small amounts of marijuana, if
there are state laws that criminalize its use. Demand for marijuana invariably leads to its cultivation and production, and yet, in some states,
selling and manufacturing marijuana is labeled as a crime, while possession is not. 205 In this current environment, Colorado and Washington
may become the Amsterdam of the United States. In 2012, in Colorado alone, “there were 274 marijuana interdiction seizures destined for
other states, com- pared to 54 of such seizures in 2005. This is a 407 percent increase.” 206 Citizens from other states will take marijuana
vacations to these two states, perhaps giving rise to the same effects witnessed by Dutch coffee shops catering to international tourists—too
many visitors bringing in a criminal element to the state, creating a black market for marijuana. Col- orado and Washington could overtake
Mexico to become the leading sup- pliers of marijuana to the rest of the United States. One grower in California dreams of “bud’n’breakfast
inns” and “tasting rooms”— “[t]ourism in Mendocino could be bigger than pot tourism in Amster-dam.” 207 Legalization in one state, and
criminalization in the others sim- ply does not work. 208 Professor Sam Kamin
has suggested that a type of “cooperative
federalism” could result from state-level legalization, where the federal gov- ernment looks the other way, and states
that have legalized marijuana effectively regulate marijuana within its own borders. 209 However, this proposed solution flies
in the face of the rule of law: A collection of legal principles that all relate to the placement of
limitations on the exercise of political power and the operation of government. Those principles include (1)
government must follow its own rules; (2) government must apply the law impartially; and (3) government must provide due process for those
accused of breaking the rules. 210 The federal government violates the rule of law when it chooses to apply federal laws without impartiality by
prosecuting federal marijuana cases in states that have not legalized marijuana and turning a blind eye in states that have legalized marijuana.
The federal government must either legalize and regulate or criminalize and prohibit marijuana
production and use. As to legalization (Option 1), two bills, the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013 211 and the Marijuana
Tax Equity Act of 2013, 212 are currently before Congress that would effectively make the transition from criminalization to legalization a
reality at the federal level. States
should enlist federal agencies to provide expertise and oversight in handling
licensing, quality control, and enforcement of regulatory laws. States are incapable of independently
handling this issue.
The courts have delegated power over marijuana to congress
Ilya Somin, Assistant Professor of Law at the George Mason University School of Law, September
2006, “Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs.”, Symposium on the War on
Drugs, P. 18-19, http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/06-31.pdf
Post-Raich Court of Appeals decisions confirm the view that congressional power is now virtually limitless .
Five circuit courts have now held that Raich requires them to uphold a ban on the intrastate possession of internet images of child
pornography,83 reversing a previous trend under which the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits had held that at least some such prosecutions fall
outside the scope of congressional Commerce Clause authority.84 In United States v. Sullivan, the recent D.C. circuit case upholding the statute,
Judge David Sentelle—a staunch conservative advocate of constitutional limits on federal power85—wrote a concurring opinion where he
noted the ways in which the case highlighted tensions between Raich and Lopez, and explained that he “would have vote[d] to reverse
appellant's conviction were it not for . . . Raich. 86 Nonetheless, Sentelle concedes that “[he] cannot
fault the majority's
application of the later decision in Raich. 87 If even so strong a defender of limits on federal power is
persuaded that Raich permits regulation of activities that probably fall outside the three Lopez categories,88 it is a safe bet that
other lower court judges will reach the same conclusion. A recent Tenth Circuit decision is the only lower court case so
far that seems to set some limits on federal power under Raich. In United States v. Patton, the Tenth Circuit upheld a federal law criminalizing
possession of body armor by convicted felons.89 In an opinion by Judge Michael McConnell, the court concluded that possession of body armor
does not fall within Raich’s
definition of economic activity, which includes the “production, consumption, and
distribution” of commodities.90 Judge McConnell argued that possession of body armor does not constitute “consumption” of a
commodity because “[c]onsumption is the ‘act of destroying a thing by using it; the use of a thing in a way
that thereby exhausts it,’ Black's Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed.2004), and possessing or wearing body armor neither destroys nor
exhausts it.”91 Possession of body armor is therefore different from the possession of medical marijuana in Raich, since the latter eventually
“exhausts” the drug by using it for medicinal purposes.92 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the body armor statute does not get the benefit of
“aggregation” because it does not regulate economic activity.93 And it cannot be upheld as regulation of noneconomic activity because it is not
part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.94 In the end, the Tenth Circuit upheld the statute under Scarborough v.United States, a 1977
statutory interpretation case that seems to permit federal regulation of a commodity that has previously passed through interstate
commerce.95
Congress Key – Executive
Congressional inaction risks 2016 reversal of executive guidelines
Boyd et al, 14 (Graham Boyd, Visiting Senior Fellow for the Third Way Social Policy & Politics Program,
Sarah Trumble, Policy Counsel for the Third Way Social Policy & Politics Program and Lanae Erickson
Hatalsky, Director of the Third Way Social Policy & Politics Program, June 2014, “Marijuana Legalization:
Does Congress Need to Act?”, <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/830/Third_Way_Report__Marijuana_Legalization-_Does_Congress_Need_to_Act.pdf>)ZB
The next few years will bring a diversity of state approaches to marijuana. In some states, any
marijuana activity will remain a crime. In others, decriminalization measures will make personal use
of the drug a civil offense like a speeding ticket, subject simply to a low-level punishment like a fine rather than jail time. In
many others, a limited exception for those with a medical recommendation will allow some degree of legal regulated use, production, and sale
of marijuana. And in a growing number of states, marijuana use will be legal for adults, and marijuana production and sale will be legal for
licensed entities. If a state wants to treat marijuana use as a crime, the federal government will continue to cooperate with efforts to ensure
their criminal framework is achieving federal public safetygoals. If a state creates a sufficiently strict regulatory framework that protects those
same federal interests, federal officials should provide assurance that those who play by the rules will not be punished, while partnering with
state officials to hold accountable those who don't. That is exactly what a "waive but restrict" approach would do.
The time for
Congress to act is now. In 2016, a new president, and potentially a new party, will be elected to the
White House. If Congress has done nothing by then, a new administration could reverse the Obama
guidelines, file preemption lawsuits against Colorado, Washington, and any other state that has
legalized marijuana by that point, and prosecute anyone who has participated in their markets. On
the other hand, a new administration could potentially go even further in the direction of federal nonintervention. If Congress doesn't act, the next President could unilaterally make major shifts in the federal government's policy towards
states that have legalized marijuana—and what the next policy might look like is anyone's guess.
Congress Key – AT: Courts
Congress is the only option for legalization – courts can’t declassify – legal experts go
aff
Sheets, 13 (Connor Adams, senior reporter for International Business Times, April 19, 2013,
‘’Marijuana Legalization 'Inevitable': But How & When Will Weed Become Hassle-Free?”,
<http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-legalization-inevitable-how-when-will-weed-become-hassle-free1187787>)ZB
While experts may disagree on the time frame, they all agree that it's more than likely that marijuana will eventually be legal in all 50 states.
But the question of how exactly it will come to pass is not yet settled. Will it be through congressional action that ends up on the president's
desk or will the judiciary make it happen through a wide-ranging ruling that forces the government's hand? Joan Smyth, a former city
prosecutor and city
attorney for multiple California municipalities who prosecuted many marijuana cases
and is now a partner at the Los Angeles law firm Kaufman Dolowich Voluck & Gonzo, believes that Congress is the only route
to federal marijuana legalization. She adds that “people are just going to have to elec t -- if it’s a significant
enough issue to them -- congresspeople who believe that something needs to be done. Unless Congress gets
in and changes the law, the courts aren’t going to have a lot to go on to re-schedule or declassify
marijuana.” Heckler said that the highest court in the land may end up taking up the issue before Congress acts. “The Supreme Court may
well have to someday determine whether a person can be prosecuted by the federal government for having something that is legal under state
law,” he said. He added later: “If it’s interstate commerce, the federal government has the power to regulate the act in question. If someone
could convince the court that smoking marijuana is not something that affects interstate commerce in any way, then perhaps you could have a
good constitutional argument.” The high court is
most likely to take on a case in which advocates would
essentially argue that the states have legal standing to pass their own laws regarding marijuana,
Luftman said. But he believes that argument probably wouldn’t hold, and that by that logic Congress
is likely the only option for legalization . “With respect to the argument, the issue is that there’s the theory of
preemption, which basically states that pursuant to the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution,
federal law preempts state laws,” Luftman said. In such a case, Heckler and most other legal experts agree that
the Supreme Court would most likely rule on the side of the federal government. “We’ve got a bunch of states
that are saying it’s OK, and the federal government saying it’s not,” Heckler said. “I would think the Supreme Court would have to come down
on the side of the federal law, and that’s why people are looking to Congress.”
Cooperative Federalism Good – Marijuana
Cooperative federalism key – states skew executive enforcement and regulation
Kleiman, 13 (Mark AR, Professor of Public Policy in the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs. 2013.
"Cooperative enforcement agreements and policy waivers: new options for federal accommodation to
state-level cannabis legalization." Journal of Drug Policy Analysis 6.1 (1941).)ZB
The vast bulk of drug law enforcement is carried out by state and local, rather than federal, authorities. That
is especially true for cannabis, where the federal effort is concentrated on relatively high-level dealing
and the federal government makes fewer than 10% of the arrests for growing or selling and an even smaller fraction of arrests for mere
possession. Accordingly, the
CSA 2 provides that: The Attorney General shall cooperate with local, State, and
Federal agencies concerning traffic in controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled
substances. To this end, he is authorized to … notwithstanding any other provision of law, enter into contractual
agreements with State and local law enforcement agencies to provide for cooperative enforcement
and regulatory activities under this chapter. [emphasis added] Note the mix of mandatory and permissive language. The
Attorney General is commanded to cooperate and authorized to enter into contractual cooperation agreements “notwithstanding any other
provision of law.” Whether this author- ity could extend to an agreement not to enforce the federal law under specified circumstances remains
an open question. But there
is a completely straightfor- ward argument to be made that such agreements
could advance the cause of “suppressing the abuse of controlled substances”; if Colorado or
Washington were to cease the enforcement of the laws against unlicensed cannabis produc- tion and
against sale for shipment out of state, the federal government would find it difficult – perhaps impossible – to
close the resulting gap and prevent an explosion of exports, perhaps leading to a national collapse in
cannabis prices. 3 Thus, a cooperative agreement binding the state and its localities to vigorous
enforcement against exports in return for federal acquiescence in intra-state sales regulated and
taxed under state law would plausibly advance the purposes of the Act better than any alternative
available to the Attorney General. A less explicit form of such an agreement might list joint enforcement
priorities in order, leaving state-legal activities off the list or placing them at its end. Either version of
the written-agreement approach would have substantial advantages, in terms of certainty for state officials and
industry participants, over semi-formalized administrative discretion. It might also do more to encou- rage vigorous state efforts to suppress
production and sale for sales out of state than could be accomplished with a nod and a wink. To
the immediate objection that
the Executive Branch – charged by the Constitution with the “faithful execution” of the laws–has no authority to acquiesce
in the violation of some of those laws, there is an equally immediate rejoinder; those laws are now
being violated and will continue to be violated, in ways the Executive is practically powerless to
prevent in any case and still more powerless without the active engagement of state and local
enforcement agencies. If “the abuse of con- trolledsubstances”canbemoreeffectivelysuppressedwithcooperativeagreements than
without them, then the mandate to cooperate for the purposes of the Act might be best carried out by explicitly agreeing not to do what the
federal government cannot in fact do with or without such an agreement.
Federal Government Prereq - Avoids Big Weed DA
The United States should regulate marijuana’s price, information and availability –
avoids the big weed DA
Kleiman 14 (Mark Kleiman, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash Out of
Cannabis Legalization, Washington Monthly, March/April/May 2014,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all, da
7-30-14) PC
Maybe you think the gains of legalizing marijuana will outweigh the costs; maybe you don’t. But that’s quickly becoming a moot point. Like
it
or not, legalization is on its way, unless something occurs to reverse the current trend in public
opinion. In any case, it shouldn’t be controversial to say that, if we are to legalize cannabis, the policy aim going
forward should be to maximize the gains and minimize the disadvantages. But the systems being put in
place in Colorado and Washington aren’t well designed for that purpose, because they create a
cannabis industry whose commercial interest is precisely opposite to the public interest.¶ Cannabis
consumption, like alcohol consumption, follows the so-called 80/20 rule (sometimes called “Pareto’s Law”): 20 percent of
the users account for 80 percent of the volume. So from the perspective of cannabis vendors, drug abuse
isn’t the problem; it’s the target demographic. Since we can expect the legal cannabis industry to be financially dependent on
dependent consumers, we can also expect that the industry’s marketing practices and lobbying agenda will be
dedicated to creating and sustaining problem drug use patterns.¶ The trick to legalizing marijuana, then,
is to keep at bay the logic of the market—its tendency to create and exploit people with substance
abuse disorders. So far, the state-by-state, initiative-driven process doesn’t seem up to that challenge.
Neither the taxes nor the regulations will prevent substantial decreases in retail prices, which matter much more to very heavy users and to
cash-constrained teenagers than they do to casual users. The
industry’s marketing efforts will be constrained only by
rules against appealing explicitly to minors (rules that haven’t kept the beer companies from sponsoring Extreme Fighting on
television). And there’s no guarantee that other states won’t create even looser systems. In Oregon, a proposition on the 2012
ballot that was narrowly defeated (53 percent to 47 percent) would have mandated that five of the seven
members of the commission to regulate the cannabis industry be chosen by the growers—industry capture,
in other words, was written into the proposed law. It remains to be seen whether even the modest taxes and
restrictions passed by the voters survive the inevitable industry pressure to weaken them
legislatively.¶ There are three main policy levers that could check cannabis abuse while making the
drug legally available. The first
and most obvious
is price . Roughly speaking, high-potency pot on the illegal market today
costs about $10 to $15 per gram. (It’s cheaper in the medical outlets in Colorado and Washington.) A joint, enough to get an occasional user
stoned more than once, contains about four-tenths of a gram; that much cannabis costs about $5 at current prices. The price in Amsterdam,
where retailing is tolerated but growing is still seriously illegal, is about the same, which helps explain why Dutch use hasn’t exploded under
quasi-legalization. If
we too want to avoid a vast increase in heavy cannabis use under legalization, we
should create policies to keep the price of the drug about where it is now.¶ The difficulty is that marijuana is
both relatively cheap compared to other drugs and also easy to grow (thus the nickname “weed”), and will just get cheaper and
easier to grow under legalization. According to RAND, legal production costs would be a small fraction of the current level, making
the pre-tax value of the cannabis in a legally produced joint pennies rather than dollars.¶ Taxes are one way to keep prices up.
But those taxes would have to be ferociously high, and they’d have to be determined by the ounce of pot or (better) by
the gram of THC, as alcohol taxes now are, not as a percentage of retail price like a sales tax. Both Colorado and Washington
have percentage-of-price taxes, which will fall along with market prices. In states where it was legal, cannabis
taxes would have to be more than $200 an ounce to keep prices at current levels; no ballot measure now under consideration has taxes nearly
that high.¶ Collecting
such taxes wouldn’t be easy in the face of interstate smuggling, as the tobacco
markets illustrate. The total taxes on a pack of cigarettes in New York City run about $8 more than the taxes on the same pack in
Virginia. Lo and behold, there’s a massive illicit industry smuggling cigarettes north, with more than a third of the cigarettes sold in New York
escaping New York taxes. Without
federal intervention, interstate smuggling of cannabis would be even
worse. Whichever state had the lowest cannabis taxes would effectively set prices for the whole
country, and the supposed state option to keep the drug illegal would fall victim to inflows from neighboring states.¶ The other way
to keep legal pot prices up is to limit supply. Colorado and Washington both plan to impose production limits on growers. If
those limits were kept tight enough, scarcity would lead to a run-up in price. (That’s happening right now in Colorado; prices in the limited
number of commercial outlets open on January 1 were about 50 percent higher than prices in the medical outlets.) But those states
are
handing out production rights for modest fixed licensing fees, so any gain from scarcity pricing will go
to the industry and encourage even more vigorous marketing. If, instead, production quotas were put
up for auction, the gain could go to the taxpayers. Just as a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions
can be made to mimic the effects of a carbon tax, production quotas with an auction would be the
equivalent of taxes.¶ The second
policy
lever
government has
is information : it can require or provide product
labeling, point-of-sale communication, and outreach to prevent both drug abuse and impaired driving. In principle,
posting information about, say, the known chemical composition of one type of cannabis versus another could help consumers use the drug
more safely. How that plays out in practice depends on the details of policy design. Colorado
and Washington require testing
and labeling for chemical content, but techniques for helping consumers translate those numbers into
safer consumption practices remain to be developed. The fact that more than 60 percent of cannabis userdays involve people with no more than a high school education creates an additional challenge, one
often ignored by the advanced-degree holders who dominate the debate.¶ The government could also make sure
consumers are able to get high-quality information and advice from cannabis vendors. In Uruguay, for
example, which is now legalizing on the national level, the current proposal requires cannabis vendors to be
registered pharmacists. Cannabis is, after all, a somewhat dangerous drug, and both much more complex chemically and less familiar
culturally than beer or wine. In Washington and Colorado, by contrast, the person behind the counter will simply be
a sales agent, with no required training about the pharmacology of cannabis and no professional obligation to promote safe
use.¶ A more radical approach would be to enhance consumers’ capacity to manage their own drug use
with a program of user-determined periodic purchase limits. (See “A Nudge Toward Temperance.”)¶ All of these
attempts by government to use information to limit abuse, however, could be overwhelmed by the determined marketing efforts of a deeppocketed marijuana industry. And the courts’ creation of a legal category called “commercial free speech” radically limits attempts to rein in
those marketing efforts (see Haley Sweetland Edwards, “The Corporate ‘Free Speech’ Racket”). The “commercial free speech” doctrine creates
an absurd situation: both state governments and the federal government can constitutionally put people in prison for growing and selling
cannabis, but they’re constitutionally barred from legalizing cannabis with any sort of marketing restriction designed to prevent problem use.¶
Availability represents a third policy lever . Where can marijuana be sold? During what hours? In what form? There’s a reason
why stores put candy in the front by the checkout counters; impulse buying is a powerful phenomenon. The
more restrictive the
rules on marijuana, the fewer new people will start smoking and the fewer new cases of abuse we’ll
have. Colorado and Washington limit marijuana sales to government-licensed pot stores that have to
abide by certain restrictions, such as not selling alcohol and not being located near schools. But they’re free to advertise.
And there’s nothing to keep other states, or Colorado and Washington a few years from now, from
allowing pot in any form to be sold in grocery stores or at the 7-Eleven. (Two years before legalizing cannabis,
Washington’s voters approved a Costco-sponsored initiative to break the state monopoly on sales of distilled spirits.)¶ To avoid getting
locked into bad policies, lawmakers in Washington need to act, and quickly. I know it’s hard to imagine anything
good coming out of the current Congress, but there’s no real alternative.¶ What’s needed is federal legislation requiring
states that legalize cannabis to structure their pot markets such that they won’t get captured by
commercial interests. There are any number of ways to do that, so the legislation wouldn’t have to be overly prescriptive. States
could, for instance, allow marijuana to be sold only through nonprofit outlets, or distributed via small
consumer-owned co-ops (see Jonathan P. Caulkins, “Nonprofit Motive”). The most effective way, however, would be
through a system of state-run retail stores.¶ There’s plenty of precedent for this: states from Utah to Pennsylvania to Alabama
restrict hard liquor sales to stateoperated or state-controlled outlets. Such “ABC” (“alcoholic beverage control”) stores date back to the end of
Prohibition, and operationally they work fine. Similar “pot control” stores could work fine for marijuana, too. A
“state store” system
would also allow the states to control the pot supply chain. By contracting with many small growers ,
rather than a few giant ones, states could check the industry’s political power (concentrated industries are almost always
more effective at lobbying than those comprised of many small companies) and maintain consumer choice by avoiding a
beer-like oligopoly offering virtually interchangeable products.¶ States could also insist that the private growers sign
contracts forbidding them from marketing to the public. Imposing that rule as part of a vendor agreement rather than as a regulation might
avoid the “commercial free speech” issue, thus eliminating the specter of manipulative marijuana advertising filling the airwaves and covering
highway billboards. To prevent interstate smuggling, the federal government should do what it has failed to do with cigarettes: mandate a
minimum retail price.¶ Of course, there’s a danger that states themselves, hungry for tax dollars, could abuse their monopoly power over pot,
just as they have with state lotteries. To avert that outcome, states should avoid the mistake they made with lotteries: housing them in state
revenue departments, which focus on maximizing state income. Instead, the
new marijuana control programs should
reside in state health departments and be overseen by boards with a majority of health care and
substance-abuse professionals. Politicians eager for revenue might still press for higher pot sales than
would be good for public health, but they’d at least have to fight a resistant bureaucracy.
Congressional action is key – state action leads to uncertainty or excessive industry
influence
Kleiman 14 (Mark Kleiman, professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to Make a Hash Out of
Cannabis Legalization, Washington Monthly, March/April/May 2014,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all, da
7-30-14) PC
But letting
legalization unfold state by state, with the federal government a mostly helpless bystander, risks creating a
monstrosity; Dr. Frankenstein also had a laboratory. Right now, officials in Washington and Colorado are busy issuing state licenses to
cannabis growers and retailers to do things that remain drug-dealing felonies under federal law. The Justice Department could have shut down
the process by going after all the license applicants. But doing so would have run the risk of having the two states drop their own enforcement
efforts and challenge the feds to do the job alone, something the DEA simply doesn’t have the bodies to handle: Washington and Colorado
alone have about four times as many state and local police as there are DEA agents worldwide. Faced with that risk, and with its statutory
obligation to cooperate with the states on drug enforcement, Justice chose accommodation.¶ In August, the deputy U.S. attorney general
issued a formal—though nonbinding—assurance that the feds would take a mostly hands-off approach. The memo says that as long as state
governments pursue “strong and effective” regulation to prevent activities such as distribution to minors, dealing by gangs and cartels, dealing
other drugs, selling across state lines, possession of weapons and use of violence, and drugged driving, and as long as marijuana growing and
selling doesn’t take place on public lands or federal property, enforcement against state-licensed cannabis activity will rank low on the federal
priority list. Justice has even announced that it is working with the Treasury Department to reinterpret the banking laws to allow state-licensed
cannabis businesses to have checking accounts and take credit cards, avoiding the robbery risks incident to all-cash businesses.¶ That
leaves the brand-new cannabis businesses in Colorado and Washington in statutory limbo. They’re
quasi-pseudo-hemi-demi-legal: permitted under state law, but forbidden under a federal law that
might not be enforced—until, say, the inauguration of President Huckabee, at which point growers
and vendors, as well as their lawyers, accountants, and bankers, could go to prison for the things they’re
doing openly today.¶ But even if the federal-state legal issues get resolved, the state-level tax and regulation
systems likely to emerge will be far from ideal. While they will probably do a good job of eliminating the illicit cannabis
markets in those states, they’ll be mediocre to lousy at preventing an upsurge of drug abuse as cheap,
quality-tested, easily available legal pot replaces the more expensive, unreliable, and harder-to-find
material the black market offers.¶ The systems being put into place in Washington and Colorado roughly
resemble those imposed on alcohol after Prohibition ended in 1933. A set of competitive commercial
enterprises produce the pot, and a set of competitive commercial enterprises sell it, under modest
regulations: a limited number of licenses, no direct sales to minors, no marketing obviously directed at minors, purity/potency testing and
labeling, security rules. The post-Prohibition restrictions on alcohol worked reasonably well for a while, but have been substantially undermined
over the years as the beer and liquor industries consolidated and used their economies of scale to lower production costs and their lobbying
muscle to loosen regulations and keep taxes low (see Tim Heffernan, “Last Call”).¶ The same will likely happen with cannabis. As
more and
more states begin to legalize marijuana over the next few years, the cannabis industry will begin to
get richer—and that means it will start to wield considerably more political power , not only over the states
but over national policy, too. ¶ That’s how we could get locked into a bad system in which the primary downside of
legalizing pot—increased drug abuse, especially by minors—will be greater than it needs to be, and the benefits,
including tax revenues, smaller than they could be. It’s easy to imagine the cannabis equivalent of an Anheuser-Busch InBev peddling lowcost, high-octane cannabis in Super Bowl commercials.
action—and soon .
We can do better than that, but only if Congress takes
Federal Government Prereq – Preemption
Federal action is key – multiple federal agencies can hinder state legalization efforts in
the SQUO
Vitiello 12 (Michael Vitiello, Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. Symposium: The Road to Legitimizing Marijuana: What Benefit at What Cost?: Why
the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, 2012) PC
One cannot discuss the problems of implementing Proposition 215 or any other efforts to legalize marijuana
without recognizing the elephants in the room: federal drug laws and federal agencies' War on Drugs.
Elsewhere, I have described the long standing federal hostility towards marijuana, beginning with its criminalization in the 1930s as prohibition
ended, and including the protracted litigation brought by the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) to reclassify
marijuana. n79 Litigation dragged on between 1972 and 1992, with drug enforcement agencies using various procedural maneuvers to prevent
a hearing on the issue. n80 Despite an administrative law judge's recommendation, the DEA administrator ruled against reclassification. n81
After a brief flirtation with decriminalization during the Carter administration, the presidents between Carter and Obama have pursued an
aggressive War on Drugs, including marijuana. n82¶ Such aggressiveness did not abate after
the passage of Proposition 215.
Federal authorities, often with the cooperation of state law enforcement agents, pursued an aggressive strategy of
prosecuting cannabis clubs, n83 doctors who recommended marijuana, n84 and marijuana growers, whether they were growing for
the black market or the gray medical marijuana market. n85 The strategy utilized [*71] criminal and civil sanctions, including raids on cannabis
clubs and pursuit of forfeiture of their assets. n86 "Despite [his] strong states-rights rhetoric," President George W. Bush's
administration pursued an aggressive strategy against those involved in the medical marijuana
business. n87 The Bush Administration litigated two Supreme Court cases that effectively left in place
federal power to regulate marijuana at all levels, despite state efforts to allow the medical use of
marijuana. n88 In one case, the Supreme Court rejected a distributor's claim that selling marijuana was a medical necessity. n89 In the
other, the Court found that the Commerce Clause was broad enough to allow Congress to criminalize
even the cultivation of a small amount of marijuana. n90¶ Consistent with candidate Obama's position during his
campaign, Attorney General Eric Holder announced guidelines suggesting that the federal government would end raids on legitimate cannabis
clubs. n91 The Obama Administration's position has led, in large part, to the recent expansion of marijuana dispensaries. n92¶ Since the
passage of Proposition 215, local
efforts to expand medical marijuana have depended upon the willingness of
federal law enforcement agencies to tolerate local laws that violate federal law. According to news reports,
despite the more tolerant approach of the Justice Department, the IRS has begun auditing one of the leading marijuana
dispensaries. n93 A representative of the Harborside Health Center, the self-proclaimed "world's largest dispensary,"
reported that the IRS audited its books for compliance with the tax code's rules disallowing
deductions for illegal activities. n94 While the center would not comment on its position, n95 consistent with Reagan-era
legislation, drug dealers [*72] cannot deduct ordinary business expenses, such as salaries and the cost of
producing the drugs. n96¶ Aggressive enforcement of the tax code would create an ironic situation: the dispensaries most
likely to comply with tax laws would be driven out of business. That would leave the marijuana trade
to dealers least likely to comply with the law, whether the tax law or criminal law.¶ Back to my original question: so what is
wrong with the initiative process? One might ask, "given that you are a tepid legalizer, what is wrong with this state of affairs?" At least for
anyone with as little as fifty dollars for a doctor's visit, n97 Californians can possess and use marijuana with virtual immunity from state
prosecution. Among other concerns, I see three major problems in the wake of Proposition 215.¶ My first concern is that the law lacks
legitimacy. Insofar as we have de facto legalization of marijuana, it came about without an honest debate. n98 Instead, it resulted from
manipulation of the initiative process.¶ My second concern is that the
initiative process has limited the legislature's
ability to reform the law in light of experience with its enforcement. Proposition 215 has created
many problems for city planners and law enforcement agencies. But the legislature cannot reform the
initiative if the legislation is inconsistent with the initiative. n99¶ My third concern is that Proposition 215 has
created chaos for fifteen years. That uncertainty has significant human costs, with some individuals
acting in good faith and ending up running afoul of the law. n100 Uncertainty is also economically
inefficient. For example, inconsistent signals from city governments are economically wasteful when
business owners open dispensaries, only to learn later that zoning laws have been changed.
Federal legalization is a prereq to state-level legalization or growers will still be
criminalized federally.
Firestone 14
7/26, David, NYT Writer, [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-time-let-statesdecide-on-marijuana.html ], “Let the States Decide on Marijuana”
Many states
are unwilling to legalize marijuana as long as possessing or growing it remains a federal
crime. Colorado, for instance, allows its largest stores to cultivate up to 10,200 cannabis plants at a
time. But the federal penalty for growing more than 1,000 plants is a minimum of 10 years in prison
and a fine of up to $10 million. That has created a state of confusion in which law-abiding growers in
Colorado can face federal penalties. Last August, the Justice Department issued a memo it would not interfere with the legalization
plans of Colorado and Washington as long as they met several conditions: keeping marijuana out of the hands of minors or criminal gangs;
prohibiting its transport out of the state; and enforcing prohibitions against drugged driving, violence and other illegal drugs. The
government has also said banks can do business with marijuana sellers, easing a huge problem for a
growing industry. But the Justice Department guidance is loose; aggressive federal prosecutors can
ignore it "if state enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust," the memo says. That's a shaky
foundation on which to build confidence in a state's legalization plan. More important, it applies only
to this moment in this presidential administration. President Obama's Justice Department could
change its policy at any time, and so of course could the next administration.
States cannot decriminalize something outlawed by the FG
Ogden 9
10/9, David W., Deputy Attorney General, “Memorandum for selected United States Attorneys”,
[http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf]
Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law, and the list of factors above is not intended
to describe exhaustively when a federal prosecution may be warranted. Accordingly, in prosecutions
under the Controlled Substances Act, federal prosecutors are not expected to charge, prove, or
otherwise establish any state law violations. Indeed, this memorandum does not alter in any way the
Department's authority to enforce federal law, including laws prohibiting the manufacture, production,
distribution, possession, or use of marijuana on federal property. This guidance regarding resource
allocation does not "legalize" marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it
intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
individual, party or witness in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. Nor does clear and
unambiguous compliance with state law or the absence of one or all of the above factors create a
legal defense to a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this memorandum is intended
solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion.
Federal Government Prereq – Banking
Federal action is necessary – lack of state influence on banking regulations has a
chilling effect
Chemerinsky 14 (Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, Legal Studies Research paper
Series No 2014-25, University of California- Irvine School of Law, 14-16 also by Jolene Forman, American
Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Fellow, Allen
Hopper:American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director,
Sam Kamin- University of Denver ~ Sturm College of Law, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights
and Remedies Program)
Perhaps the most profound, and most well-documented, consequence of marijuana’s prohibited
status at the federal level is the unavailability of even the most rudimentary banking services for
those engaged in marijuana commerce. The threat – often explicit – of money laundering prosecutions
has made banks unwilling to engage in any transactions with marijuana businesses. As a result,
marijuana in the states is largely a cash business, with all of the problems and negative connotations
associated with businesses forced to the periphery of legality. The lack of commercial banking is more
than a dignitary harm for those operating in the marijuana industry; for many it is a sincere safety
concern. Marijuana businesses present an easy target for thieves who are aware that these businesses
often have no choice but to keep large quantities of cash on hand. Regulators in Colorado and
Washington State grasped early on that resolution of this problem would be one of the key concerns of
the administrative process –marijuana businesses are much more difficult to regulate and tax if they
are operating on a cash basis. However, lawmakers in both states also realized fairly quickly that, given
the predominantly federal nature of banking regulation, there was little that could be done at the
state level alone. Although the Obama administration announced in early 2014 that marijuana
businesses should have access to banking services59 and promulgated a pair of memos purporting to
loosen banking restrictions on the marijuana industry,60 there is little that the executive branch can do
unitarily; the core of the banking problem is the continuing illegality of marijuana at the federal
level.61
Federal Government Prereq – Banking – Crime MPX
Banking restrictions force businesses to keep cash on hand – leads to crime waves
against dispensaries
Dokupil and Briggs 2/14 (Robber Gangs Terrorize Colorado Shops, Small Business, NBC News
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101391433#)
One thief, posing as a delivery man, pulled a can of bear mace on employees and ransacked their
marijuana shop, fleeing in a defensive cloud of "ultra-pepper" spray. Another opened the wall of a
dispensary with an ax and attacked the store's safe with a circular saw. Still another stuck to the
basics. He kicked in the front door and pointed his gun at the counterman. An accomplice kicked in the
back door and filled a duffel bag with more than $10,000 worth of high-quality cannabis. For weeks
now, the Mile High state has allowed the sale of recreational pot to adults, and so far the Rockies still
stand. But crimes like the ones above, all of which occurred in Colorado in the last six months, have
produced an acid-drip of anxiety in the industry, highlighting the dangers faced by those hoping to
drag America's most popular illegal drug into the light. Because marijuana remains banned by
Congress, banks and security firms deny services to most dispensaries. That leaves them cash-based
and vulnerable, a magnet for criminals who like the idea of unguarded counting rooms and shelves
lined with lucrative horticulture. "Everyone in the industry is having nightmares," says Michael Elliot,
executive director of the Marijuana Industry Group, a powerful young lobby in Colorado. "You hit a 7Eleven, you'll get 20 bucks. You hit a dispensary, you'll get $300,000 on a good day," adds Mitch
Morrissey, District Attorney for Denver. "It's only a matter of time before someone gets shot." (Read
more: How legal marijuana could be the next great American industry) Since 2010, the new pot barons
have been required to install alarms and surveillance cameras, and most secure all cash and retail pot in
a floor-bolted safe overnight. That helps limit losses, but the thieves keep coming. They throw bricks
through windows, and tunnel under floors. One team tore away the locks on a grow house with a set of
chains and a Subaru Outback. Another crashed an Audi through a warehouse door. At first, most of the
heists were softened by a kind of likable idiocy. Owners joked about the hapless fellow who zip-lined
through an opening in a greenhouse roof, then lacked the oomph to climb his way out. Or the thief who
kicked into an apartment above a pot shop, only to be chased off by the apartment's surprised owner, a
member of the Denver Nuggets. Or the team that crowbarred into a dispensary in 2012, leaving with a
broken scale and $8 from a "karma jar" on the counter. More recently, however, the crimes have sent a
forked bolt of fear through the industry. Last summer, for example, a trio of gunmen "demanded
Weed" from the workers at a dispensary called 420 Wellness, according to documents provided by the
district attorney's office. As two of the gunmen filled "several trash bags" with award-winning
marijuana, the third leapt over the counter and took a female employee by the elbow, leading her
around the shop as a human insurance policy. Police caught up with that squad soon after they fled the
scene, charging the ringleader with aggravated robbery and kidnapping. But over the next six weeks, a
different team of burglars hit at least eight dispensaries, and a third team is still on the loose after a
stick-up at New Age Wellness in nearby Boulder County. Moments after closing time, two men dressed
in baby-blue ski-masks burst in, pointed guns, and cleaned out the little mountain depot. "It's an
epidemic," says one of the employees, who declined to give his name for safety reasons. "Everything is a
lot tighter now. It isn't so homey anymore." To judge by the data, it's not so homey anywhere in the
region's marijuana market, where attempted theft has gone from a concern to a near-certainty. In 2009,
the Denver Police Department estimated that about 17 percent of marijuana retail shops had been
robbed or burglarized in the last year. That was good news: a bit less than liquor stores (20 percent)
and banks (34 percent), and on par with pharmacies. Today, however, a darker picture has emerged.
There are about 325 marijuana companies in Denver, based on an analysis of licensing data done for
NBC News by Marijuana Business Daily, a leading trade publication. (Most companies hold numerous
licenses.) At the same time, there have been about 317 burglaries and seven robberies reported by
these companies in the last two years, according to police data. That's an annual robbery and burglary
rate of about 50 percent, more than double what it was in 2009.
Federal Government Prereq – Lawyers
Federal legalization is key – otherwise, marijuana businesses face tons of legal barriers
Chemerinsky 14 (Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, Legal Studies Research paper
Series No 2014-25, University of California- Irvine School of Law, 14-16 also by Jolene Forman, American
Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Fellow, Allen
Hopper:American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director,
Sam Kamin- University of Denver ~ Sturm College of Law, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights
and Remedies Program)
So long as marijuana remains illegal at the federal level, marijuana businesses will have difficulty
operating as full legal citizens. One of the biggest obstacles facing marijuana businesses, for example,
is finding attorneys willing to provide legal services. The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
and the ethics rules of nearly every state prohibit an attorney from knowingly facilitating the criminal
conduct of her client. Because nearly all the actions of a marijuana professional remain violations of
federal law, any assistance that a lawyer gives to a business that she knows to be in violation of
federal law could be construed as an ethical violation. This is true not just when the lawyer helps a
marijuana retailer purchase product from a marijuana grow facility – when she assists in the actual
violations of federal law, in other words – but also when the lawyer incorporates the marijuana
business, helps draft a lease, lobbies local government officials for a zoning exemption or negotiates
an employment agreement. Because all of these tasks help a marijuana business to break federal law,
there is a plausible argument that the lawyer subjects herself to discipline for knowingly doing so. State
bar committees considering the ethics of representing the marijuana industry have largely split on the
issue. Most recently, the Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar Association concluded that, as it is
currently drafted, lawyers put themselves at risk when they perform many legal tasks for marijuana
clients: A lawyer cannot comply with Colo.RPC 1.2(d) and, for example, draft or negotiate (1) contracts
to facilitate the purchase and sale of marijuana or (2) leases for properties or facilities, or contracts for
resources or supplies, that clients intend to use to cultivate, manufacture, distribute, or sell
marijuana, even though such transactions comply with Colorado law, and even though the law or the
transaction may be so complex that a lawyer’s assistance would be useful, because the lawyer would
be assisting the client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal under federal law.70
Federal Government Prereq – Preemption – Courts
Federal legalization is a prerequisite – courts continue prohibition based on
inconsistency, Colorado proves
Kamin, 14 (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of
Denver, Sturm College of Law, J.D. & Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2014, The Limits of
Marijuana Legalization in the States, IOWA LAW REVIEW BULLETIN, Vol. 99:39,
<http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ilr/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ILRB_99_Kamin.pdf>)ZB
Three recent Colorado cases—one from federal court and two from state court—illustrate the hazards of marijuana
being legal under Colorado law, but prohibited under federal law. First, in Coats v. Dish Network, the Colorado
Court of Appeals upheld the firing of a quadriplegic medical marijuana patient who had tested
positive for marijuana during company- ordered screening.*$ The employer, a national satellite television provider,
terminated the employee on the grounds that he violated a company-wide policy prohibiting its employees from using illicit substances
ln response, the employee argued that his termination violated Colorado's lawful
off-duty conduct statute, which prohibits employers in this at-will employment state from firing employees for engaging in lawful
whether on the job or off.=4
conduct while off duty. As a registered marijuana patient, the employee argued that his use of the drug was lawful and his termination violated
the statute designed to protect him. A
divided court of appeals panel held that marijuana use was not in fact
lawful conduct under the statute because of the continued federal prohibition." Several months later, a
Federal District Court for the District of Colorado came to a similar conclusion in Curry v. MillerCoors,
Inc.27 To make matters worse for employees in these situations, a different panel of the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that an employee terminated for testing positive for marijuana may, for that same reason, be
denied unemployment benefits, notwithstanding Colorado’s law purporting to decriminalize marijuana use.28 While these results
clearly frustrated the intent of Colorado voters in seeking to remove the penalties attendant to marijuana use,29
both the state and
federal courts considering the interaction of state employment law with the federal marijuana
prohibition were simply unwilling to overlook the inconvenient fact that possessing marijuana is not
legal. As we shall see in the examples that follow, this fact continues to have salience, even as the administration distances itself from the
possibility of enforcing that law in states with robust marijuana regulations.
Supremacy Clause means marijuana would be functionally illegal even under state
legal regimes
Mikos 9
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 3/9, “On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical
Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal“,
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1356093]
These grim assessments stem from serious doubts about the legal status and practical significance of
laws exempting marijuana from state sanctions. Consider, first, questions surrounding the states‘ de
jure power—their power to enact and enforce such laws. Many scholars have suggested (or simply
assumed) that state medical marijuana laws have been preempted by the CSA. 73 Though no one has
considered the assertion at length, it seems to be based upon a straightforward application of conflict
preemption doctrine as presently understood. 74 Caleb Nelson, one of the nation‘s leading scholars of
preemption, explains the doctrine as follows: If state law purports to authorize something that federal
law forbids or to penalize something that federal law gives people an unqualified right to do, then
courts would have to choose between applying the federal rule and applying the state rule, and the
Supremacy Clause requires them to apply the federal rule. 75 Nelson did not have medical marijuana
laws in mind when he wrote this formula, but the implication of the highlighted passage seems
abundantly clear: a state law that allows citizens to use marijuana must give way to a federal law that
bans the use of marijuana. 76
The court gives power to the feds but doesn’t want to get involved
John He, Harvard Political Review, November 24, 2009, “Fights Over Federalism”, Harvard Political
Review, http://harvardpolitics.com/covers/fog-of-war/fights-over-federalism/
On questions of jurisdiction over drug laws, the Supreme Court has typically backed the federal
government. The Court ruled in 2005 in Gonzales vs. Raich that, under the commerce clause, the federal government has
the power to regulate cannabis use and enforce the CSA, despite state marijuana laws. This past June,
however, San Diego County attempted to sue California for violating federal drug laws, but saw its
lawsuit turned down by the Supreme Court. While this no-decision might be taken as a sign of the Court shifting its opinion on
state marijuana laws, UCLA professor Mark Kleiman warns not to conclude too much from the ruling. As he explained to the HPR, “my
understanding is that the Court ruled that federal law trumps state law ; the counties are creatures of the states, and can’t
sue their parents. No contradiction there.” As Mirken put it, the courts have sought an “awkward middle ground” between federal and state
power. With Obama distancing the federal government from the issue, however, and the Court reluctant to involve itself in the dispute, it
seems that the shift of power to the states will continue.
Federal Government Prereq – Preemption – AT: DOJ Memo
Memo is a drop in the bucket – tax code kills effective legalization
Kamin, 14 (Sam, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of
Denver, Sturm College of Law, J.D. & Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2014, The Limits of
Marijuana Legalization in the States, IOWA LAW REVIEW BULLETIN, Vol. 99:39,
<http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ilr/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ILRB_99_Kamin.pdf>)ZB
As welcome as the second Cole Memo was to those working to regulate marijuana in Colorado and
Washington (and to those advocating the repeal of state marijuana prohibitions more generally) it did not end the state–
federal tension over marijuana regulation. Even if the federal government promises—in a non-binding
way—to forestall enforcement of the CSA in those states enacting rigorous regulations, doing so only eases the
most obvious tensions between state and federal law in this area. So long as the federal prohibition
remains in place, state policy aimed at removing the impediments to the taxation and regulation of
marijuana will necessarily be hamstrung. Professor Leff’s recent article in the Iowa Law Review provides a prime example of
the ongoing state–federal tension.17 He demonstrates the difficulty that a Reagan-era tax provision can pose to
marijuana professionals, even to those who do not currently fear arrest or forfeiture of their assets
under the CSA.18 Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code makes the running of a marijuana business
nearly impossible.19 As Leff points out, § 280E forbids these operators from deducting operating expenses, except the price of the
goods themselves, from their taxes.20 As a result, marijuana practitioners are disadvantaged not just vis-à-vis other
legitimate businesspersons but also vis-à-vis those involved in other, more serious, criminal conduct.
As Leff points out, the assassin for hire is able to deduct the price of her sniper rifle while the marijuana retailer cannot deduct the cost of
paying her employees.21
Federal Government Prereq – Stigma
Removing the federal ban on marijuana is key to eliminating the social stigma which
suppresses accessibility
Mikos 9
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 3/9, “On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical
Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal“,
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1356093]
More interestingly, some have suggested that the federal ban blocks states from fostering
independent, marijuana-friendly norms in their jurisdictions. As long as the federal ban persists, so the
argument goes, social norms condemning drug use and criminal behavior will continue to suppress use
of marijuana for medical purposes, even if the federal ban is not rigorously enforced. 95 As one
prominent criminal law scholar reasoned, ―If a seriously ill patient in California is denied legal
medicinal marijuana by contrary federal law, he will simply suffer rather than attempt to obtain
marijuana through the illegal drug market” 96
Federal Government Prereq – Taxes
Marijuana businesses face stiffer tax codes unless federal policy is changed
Chemerinsky 14 (Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, Legal Studies Research paper
Series No 2014-25, University of California- Irvine School of Law, 14-16 also by Jolene Forman, American
Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Fellow, Allen
Hopper:American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director,
Sam Kamin- University of Denver ~ Sturm College of Law, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights
and Remedies Program)
A little-known provision of federal tax law makes the operation of a successful marijuana business –
even one operating in clear compliance with state law – an incredibly difficult proposition. Federal Tax
Rule 280E64 requires those operating in violation of federal drug laws – and only federal drug laws65
– to pay federal income tax and to do so on extremely disadvantageous terms. Under 280E a
marijuana retailer cannot deduct her expenses prior to calculating her taxable income; other than the
cost of obtaining the goods for sale, a marijuana business is required to pay taxes on its gross receipts.
All other usual business expenses – retail rent, employee payroll, lights, heating and cooling, etc. –
cannot be deducted as they can in any other business, either legitimate or illegal. Even if the federal
government does not seek to prosecute marijuana business for violating federal law, and even if it
does not seek to forfeit the assets of businesses in violation of that federal law, it is already applying
rule 280E against those businesses in ways that may prove nearly as crippling to the industry. For
example, in 2011 the IRS ruled that Harborside Health Center, California’s largest medical marijuana
dispensary, owed millions in taxes under the application of 280E.67 Steve DeAngelo, Harborside’s owner
was quoted as saying that a literal interpretation of 280E would ruin not just him but the entire industry:
"No business, including Harborside, could survive if it's taxed on its gross revenue. All we want is to be
treated like every other business in America."68
Federal Government Prereq – Trafficking
Legalization in all 50 states solves better – legalization in select states causes
trafficking
Caulkins 2012 [Jonathan P. Caulkins, Anna Kasunic, Michael A. C. Lee, Carnegie Mellon
University Heinz College, “Marijuana Legalization: Lessons from the 2012 State
Proposals,” World Medical & Health Policy, August 27, 2012, accessed 8-31-2014,
http://www.antoniocasella.eu/archila/Caulkins_2012.pdf]
The price declines and associated effects on consumption would not be limited to the state or states
that legalized for two reasons: drug tourism and interstate smuggling.¶ As the Dutch experience suggests, if a state
legalizes, it could receive an influx of drug tourists hoping to take advantage of the opportunity to
legally purchase and openly use marijuana. There is no obvious way to project how common this would be, but to give some sense of the
potential magnitude, Figure III shows the number of past-month marijuana users that live within a certain distance of the borders of Missouri or Colorado, two
states that entertained legalization proposals in 2012 (although only Colorado’s proposition made it on the ballot). As an aside, conventional sales taxes on gasoline,
hotel rooms, and restaurant meals purchased by drug tourists in the state that legalized could be non-negligible compared with revenues the marijuana sales taxes
generate themselves, particularly for CO-RLA which initially caps excise taxes at 15% and exempts medical sales. (One-quarter of Colorado’s past-month users
possess medical recommendations). Legalization
could also affect prices if marijuana traffickers choose to source
marijuana from the state that legalizes, instead of from their current sources in Mexico or elsewhere.
In as much as marijuana traffickers are in the business for profit, one might expect them to gravitate to whatever “source zone” offered product on the most
favorable terms. As the previous section suggested, prices in a state that legalized could be quite low. Furthermore, there are obviously no international borders
that must be crossed when smuggling marijuana from Colorado or Missouri to any other of the lower 48 states. ¶ Based on seven different datasets, Caulkins and
Bond (2012) estimated the wholesale price gradient when trafficking illegal marijuana within the US to be about $400 per pound per one thousand miles. By adding
this cost of illegal transport to the legal price that Kilmer et al. estimated, they found that marijuana
produced legally in California and
trafficked illegally across state lines could undercut current (quality-adjusted) prices in most other
states.
Federal Government Prereq – Uncertainty
Federal legalization is key to resolve supplier uncertainty and realize economic gains
Vitiello 12 (Michael Vitiello, Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. Symposium: The Road to Legitimizing Marijuana: What Benefit at What Cost?: Why
the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, 2012) PC
Another lesson that policy
makers should learn from our experience with Propositions 215 and 19 is that the
success of reform depends on the position taken by the federal government. While federal prosecutors have
little interest in prosecuting individual users, it remains a federal offense; individuals proceed at their own risk by using
marijuana. n223 More importantly, individuals interested in commercial enterprises, like marijuana dispensaries, are
dependent on a hands-off position from federal authorities. n224 Absent a change in federal law, a
change [*87] in administrations could render their investments worthless. n225 Even worse, their success
may depend on the position of different agencies within the federal government; for example, if the IRS
can enforce provisions preventing dispensaries from deducting business expenses, many dispensaries the ones most likely to comply with the law - will be driven out of business. n226 And federal forbearance
is almost certainly necessary if states desire to maximize tax revenues from the marijuana trade. n227
A2: Anti-Commandeering Clause
Supremacy Clause overrides the Anti-commandeering clause.
Drahozal 4
Drahozal, Christopher R. The Supremacy Clause: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution.
No. 7. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.
Thereafter, in Printz v. United States (1997), the Supreme Court held unconsti- tutional a provision of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on handgun pur- chasers. In requiring state and local officials to administer a
federal law, the Act violated the anti-commandeering principle Of New York v. United States. The
Court again distinguished Testa as "standlingl for the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to
enforce federal law—a conclusion mandated by the terms Of the Supremacy Clause." Testa "says
nothing about whether state executive officers must administer federal law."S3 Thus, in New York
and in printz, the Supreme Court indicated that the anti-commandeering rule does not apply to State
courts Clause" because of the Supremacy Clause and, in particular, the State Judges cluse.
A2: States cause federal legalization
State legalization won’t cause the federal government to fill in - resources
Caulkins et al. 12 (Jonathan P. Caulkins, Anna Kasunic, Michael A. C. Lee, Carnegie Mellon University Heinz College, Marijuana
Legalization: Lessons from the 2012 State Proposals, forthcoming in World Medical & Health Policy, 27 August 2012,
http://www.antoniocasella.eu/archila/Caulkins_2012.pdf, da 7-30-14) PC
A state may legalize marijuana for adults, perhaps as soon as November 2012, but marijuana would remain illegal at the federal level, and the
federal government would probably not stand idly by. The response to medical marijuana is instructive. President Obama flatly rejected
legalization at the recent Cartagena summit (Calmes 2012), and some media sources describe the Obama administration as even harsher than
George W. Bush was in cracking down on large-scale medical marijuana dispensaries (Dickinson 2012). Nevertheless, the
federal
government may be reluctant to run roughshod over programs directly endorsed by the voters at the
ballot box, and the federal government continues not to intervene in state-sanctioned medical
marijuana distribution except for large- scale operations and/or those that violate (its reading of) state
law.¶ Furthermore, while federal agents would clearly retain the power to arrest anyone anywhere in the U.S. for any marijuana violation—
even possession by someone with a medical marijuana card—it is equally clear that federal agencies lack the resources to fill
in for the removal of all state and local enforcement.¶ In 2010, state and local law enforcement made
97% of the more than 800,000 marijuana sales and possession arrests nationwide (FBI Uniform Crime Report 2012).
The majority of those arrests were for possession, and it seems unlikely that the federal government could, or would
want to, assume the burden of deterring individual marijuana users.¶ The situation for sellers is
similar, albeit less extreme. State and local agencies account for roughly 90% of marijuana sales and distribution arrests away from the
Southwest Border; federal prosecutors often only accept cases involving hundreds of pounds of marijuana, not just one or two pounds, let
alone one or two ounces or joints. Figure I shows the total number of marijuana sales arrests per state for some states considering legalization,
and the share of those arrests made by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The far-left column shows the total number of marijuana
arrests the DEA made nationwide.¶ 13¶ The figure suggests that if
the DEA or other federal enforcement agencies do not
reallocate resources, legalization in any given state will lead to a roughly 90% drop in arrests of
marijuana sellers in that state, presumably with a greater than 90% drop for lower-level sellers and a
less than 90% drop for higher-level distributors.¶ Second, the DEA’s ability to fill in for “missing” sales arrests varies with the
size of the state. State and local enforcement agencies in California make more sales arrests than the DEA does nationwide, not just in
California. For
states like Washington the DEA could apparently make up for the missing marijuana sales
arrests, but doing so with existing resources would noticeably reduce enforcement intensity
elsewhere. By contrast, Montana in a typical year has fewer than 100 marijuana sales arrests; if Montana were the only state to legalize, it
would be entirely possible for the DEA to prevent any reduction in enforcement risk for sellers.
State regulation/taxation causes federal preemption
Legalization would require licensing and regulation of all marijuana transactions
avoiding the chance of Federal preemption
Todd Garvey Legislative Attorney and Brian T. Yeh Legislative Attorney January 13, 2014 (State Legalization of
Recreational Marijuana: Selected Legal Issues – http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43034.pdf) JV
Although the legalization aspects of both the Washington and Colorado laws would likely survive a
legal challenge, the regulation and licensing aspects of each law may raise more substantial
preemption concerns. In addition to removing state penalties relating to certain marijuana-related
activities, both states envision comprehensive, state implemented regulatory and licensing regimes to
control the cultivation, distribution and sale of marijuana within the state. These provisions can
arguably be distinguished from the legalization provisions in two key ways, both of which appear to
support a finding of preemption. First, the regulatory and licensing provisions potentially create an
increased “obstacle” to the accomplishment of federal objectives by “authorizing” conduct federal
law prohibits. Second, the affirmative act of regulating and licensing marijuana cultivation and
distribution may not invoke the same Tenth Amendment protections enjoyed by the states’ initial
decision to simply remove marijuana-related penalties under state law. To the contrary, arguments
can also be made in opposition to preemption. The regulation and licensing provisions could be viewed
as a necessary implementation mechanism through which the states may efficiently identify those
individuals who have met the requirements of the state marijuana law without impeding the
enforcement of federal law. Moreover, the regulatory and licensing provisions could be characterized
as imposing additional restrictions on marijuana access—an objective consistent with the purposes of
the CSA—and thus are not subject to conflict preemption. These contrasting views, either of which
could be invoked in a court’s review of the Colorado and Washington laws, are discussed in greater
detail below.
Miscellaneous
Neolib Answer
Drug policing is enabled by specific policies – the alt is a privileged and pointless
denunciation of reformism in the face of the police state – prefer changing drug
policies to the alt’s more-kritikal-than-thou politics
Henry A. Giroux Fall 3
(Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department; “Authoritarianism’s
Footprint and the War Against Youth,” http://facpub.stjohns.edu/~ganterg/sjureview/vol21/authoritarianism.html)
For many young people and adults today, the private sphere has become the only space in which to
imagine any sense of hope, pleasure, or possibility. Market forces narrow the legitimacy of the public sphere by redefining
it around the related issues of consumption and safety. Public spaces are either being privatized, under-funded to the
point of collapse, or increasingly subject to surveillance and police control. Big government, generally
considered a curse to advocates of neo-liberalism, is now popularly presented as a guardian of
security–security not in terms of providing adequate health care or a social safety net, but with
increasing its role as a policing force, resulting in the ongoing abridgement of basic freedoms and
dissent, the criminalization of social problems, and the prioritizing of penal methods over social
investments. Young people, especially those who are poor are no longer considered in need of help in
a society marked by deep racial, economic and social inequalities, instead they have become the
problem. Moreover, such perceptions signal a growing shift in the public's consciousness of young people and a willingness to support
legislation that portrays many young people as a threat to the social order. What is one to make of social policies that portray youth, especially
poor and minority youth, as a generation of suspects? What are we to make of a social order-- headed by a pro-gun, pro-capital punishment,
pro-big business, pro-Empire building conservative such as George W. Bush-- whose priorities suggest to urban youth that American society is
willing to invest more in sending them to jail than providing them with high quality schools and a decent education? How does a society justify
housing poor students in schools that are unsafe, decaying, and with little or no extra curricular activities while at the same time it spends five
times more annually–as high as $20,000 in many suburban schools–on each middle class student, housing them in schools with Olympic
swimming pools, the latest computer technology, and well cared for buildings and grounds? What
message is being sent to
young people when during the 1980s and 1990s "state and local spending on corrections grew at six
times the rate of such spending on higher education."7 How does a society claim without irony that
racism has ended in the United States when 29 percent of all black men will have spent some time in
jail over the course of a lifetime or when in a state such as New York "more Blacks entered prison
just for drug offenses than graduated from the state’s massive university system with
undergraduate, masters, and doctoral degrees combined in the 1990s."8 In this instance, the culture of
domestic militarization, with its policies of containment and brutalization, becomes more valuable to
the dominant social order than any consideration of what it means for a society to expand and
strengthen the mechanisms and freedoms of a more fully realized democracy.9 As the state is downsized and
basic social services dry up, containment policies become the principle means to discipline youth. For instance, in
many states across the country, but more recently in New Jersey, child welfare officials place foster care children in juvenile detention centers
rather than placing them in "foster-care group homes, where they can get intense mental health care and regular education." As this example
illustrates, children
are now punished lacking a decent home, treated as criminals and placed in facilities
that make it clear to them they are neither wanted or cared about. It is this turn away from social
compassion to punitive and harsh discipline that provides the context for the emergence of zero tolerance
legislation aimed at the public schools, policies that simply extend to young people the elements of harsh control
and regulation implemented in other public spheres where inequalities breed the conditions for
poverty, suffering, misfortune, and resistance. Marginalized students learn quickly that they are
surplus populations and that the journey from home to school no longer guarantees them a job; on the
contrary, school now becomes a training ground for their "graduation" into containment centers such as
prisons and jails that keep them out of sight, patrolled and monitored so as to prevent them from
becoming a social canker or political liability to those white and middle class populations concerned
about their own safety. Schools, especially those in poor rural areas and urban centers, increasingly resemble other weakened public
spheres as they cut back on trained psychologists, school nurses, programs such as music, art, athletics, valuable after school activities, and the
school year itself. As Jesse Jackson points out, schools
not only fail to provide students with a well-rounded
education, they often "bring in the police, [and] the school gets turned into a feeder system for the
penal system."10 Across the nation school districts are lining up to embrace zero tolerance policies. According to the United States
Department of Education about 90 percent of schools systems nationwide have implemented such policies in order to deal with either violence
or threats.11 Many educators first invoked zero tolerance rules against those kids who brought guns to schools. But over time the policy was
broadened and now includes a gamut of student misbehavior ranging from using or circulating drugs, harboring a weapon, to threatening other
students--all broadly conceived. Under zero tolerance policies, forms of punishments that were once applied to adults now apply to first
graders. Originally aimed at "students who misbehave intentionally, the law now applies to those who misbehave as a result of emotional
problems or other disabilities" as well.12 Unfortunately, any sense of perspective or guarantee of rights seems lost as school systems across the
country clamor for metal detectors, armed guards, see-through knapsacks, and, in some cases, armed teachers. Some school systems are
investing in new software in order to "profile" students who might exhibit criminal behavior.13 As a one-size fits all solution to school problems,
zero tolerance policies redefine students as criminals and as a result more and more young people are either suspended, arrested, or expelled
from school, often for ludicrous reasons. For example, two Virginia fifth-graders who allegedly put soap in their teacher’s drinking water were
charged with a felony.14 A 12-year-old boy in Louisiana who was diagnosed with a hyperactive disorder was suspended for two days after
telling his friends in a food line "I’m gonna get you" if they ate the all the potatoes! The police then charged the boy with making "terroristic
threats" and he was incarcerated for two weeks while awaiting trial. A 14-year-old disabled student in Palm Beach, Florida was referred to the
police by the school principal for allegedly stealing $2.00 from another student. He was then charged with strong-armed-robbery, and held for
six weeks in an adult jail, even though this was his first arrest.15 There is also the equally revealing example of a student brought up on a drug
charge because he gave another youth two lemon cough drops.16 As Larry Grossberg points out, youth under sixteen cannot get a tattoo or get
their ears pierced without the consent of an adult but are considered old enough to be tried and jailed as an adult, and put to death-- and the
numbers are increasing at an alarming rate.17 Zero
opportunity through education, reinforces
tolerance laws, while a threat to all youth and any viable notion of equal
in the public imagination the image of students of color as a source
of public fear and a threat to public school safety. Zero tolerance policies and laws appear to be well-tailored
for mobilizing racialized codes and race based moral panics that portray black and brown urban youth
as a frightening and violent threat to the safety of ‘decent’ Americans. Not only do most of the high profile zero
tolerance cases involve African-American students, but such policies also reinforce the racial inequities that plague school systems across the
country. For example, the New York Times, has reported on a number of studies illustrating "that black students in public schools across the
country are far more likely than whites to be suspended or expelled, and far less likely to be in gifted or advanced placement classes."18 USA
Today reports that "In 1998, the first year national expulsion figures were gathered, 31% of kids expelled were black, but blacks made up only
17% of the students in public schools."19 Within
such a climate of harsh discipline and disdain, it is easier to put
young people in jail than to provide the education, services, and care they need to face problems of a
complex and demanding society.20 As the criminalization of young people finds its way into the
classroom and every other aspect of social life, it becomes easier for school administrators, educators, and
legislators to punish students rather than listen to them or, for that matter, to work with parents, community
justice programs, religious organizations, and social service agencies.21 The notion that children should be viewed
as a crucial social resource who present for any healthy society important ethical and political considerations about the quality of public life, the
allocation of social provisions, and the role of the state as a guardian of public interests appears to be lost in a society that refuses to invest in
its youth as part of a broader commitment to a more substantive democracy. Young people are quickly realizing that schools have more in
common with military boot camps and prisons than they do with other institutions in American society. Under this insufferable climate of
increased repression and unabated exploitation, young people and communities of color become the new casualties in an ongoing war against
justice, freedom, social citizenship, and democracy. As the foundations of the national in-security state are being solidified through zero
tolerance policies, anti-terrorist laws, soaring incarceration rates, the criminalization of homelessness, racial profiling, and anti-immigration
policies, the forces of repression become more integrated, marked by an increasing combination of various elements of federal and local law
enforcement agencies. Under such circumstances,
it is time for intellectuals, cultural workers, students, and
activists who inhabit a wider variety of public spheres and social movements to take a stand and
remind themselves that collective problems deserve collective solutions and that what is at risk is not
only a generation of young people and adults now considered to be either a generation of suspects or
a threat to national security, but the very promise of democracy itself. At the heart of any democracy is a respect
for liberty, freedom, justice, and those aspects of the social contract that provide safety nets for people in need and equal opportunities for all
to be individual and social agents. Compassion, justice, responsibility, and civic courage infuse citizenship with a publicness that acknowledges
the importance of recognizing not only our relationship to others, but the need to keep extending the boundaries of justice, recognizing that in
a democracy a society is never just enough. As theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, and Edward Said
have reminded us, intellectuals have a special responsibility to use their talents to uncover the imposed silence of normalized power, to create
the conditions for a culture of questioning and a critical dialogue around crucial social issues, and to present alternative narratives that both
make dominant power accountable and offer alternative democratic views of the future. Intellectuals, especially academics, need to connect
their work to a larger public and assume a measure of responsibility in naming, struggling against, and alleviating human suffering. This suggests
working with others to produce knowledge in a variety of public spheres that can address those forms of social suffering, relations of power,
and cultural formations such as the concentrated media that pose a threat to democracy. Academics need to reject the cult of professionalism
and assume the role of citizen scholars, which means as the late Edward Said pointed out, maintaining "a kind of coexistence between the
necessities of the field and the discipline of the classroom, on the one hand, and of the special interest that one has in it, on the other, with
one’s own concerns as a human being, as a citizen in a larger society."22 Such a recognition places a particularly important demand upon
academics who increasingly seem to have de-politicized the very possibility of politics as they retreat into the most arcane discourses,
specializations, or simply a moral indifference to the outside world. Rather than consolidate authority, academics need to make it accountable,
tempering a reverence for power and authority with a deep distrust of its motives and effects.
Academics need to reclaim not
only their intellectual courage but a sense of ethical responsibility. Connecting academic work to
social change should not be summarily dismissed either as partisan nor viewed as a burden.
Roy has argued that there
Arundhati
are times in a nation’s history when its political climate makes it imperative for
intellectuals to take sides. Given the assault being waged by the Bush Administration on public services, the welfare state, the
environment, workers, civil rights, and democracy itself, I believe that this is a crucial time in American history for
academics to make their ideas and voices felt in the struggle to reclaim democracy from the market
fundamentalists and powerful corporate interests.23 Pierre Bourdieu is right in suggesting that the time is right for
intellectuals to assume responsibility for creating an international social movement that would
exercise real influence on transnational corporations, nation states, and non-governmental
agencies.24 Intellectuals have a special responsibility to make sure that protests provide the conditions
for new social actors and constructive modes of social action and political intervention , rather than
allowing protests to degenerate into what Alain Touraine has called "pointless denunciations."
Intellectuals at all costs must fight against the assumption the mythic assumption of the neo-liberal
order that there are no alternatives and in doing resist the slide into cynicism and apathy with a new
political language and vision, one marked by a discourse of critique and possibility.
Marihuana Policy Neg
State Budgets
State Budgets Fine Now
State budgets are fine now – showing surpluses.
Wilson, 7-15 [Reid, “After years of cuts, state budgets show surpluses”, The Washington Post, 7-15-14,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/15/after-years-of-cuts-state-budgetsshow-surpluses/, RSR]
Years after a recession hammered state budgets, forcing across-the-board cuts to programs and services, the
economic recovery is
once again bolstering personal and corporate incomes, and swelling state coffers beyond
expectations . Initial reports show many states ended Fiscal Year 2014 with budget surpluses , thanks
to growing tax revenue collections. In some cases, states have hundreds of millions or billions of dollars to
spend . Other states pulled in just a few million dollars over the break-even point. But even the
smallest surplus is better than the tide of red ink that washed over states during the depths of the
recession. California ended the fiscal year with $1.9 billion left over in its state general fund, Controller John Chiang (D) said last week, the
first time the general fund ended with a positive cash balance since 2007, the year before the recession began. The state Department
of Finance has projected a $4.2 billion surplus for Fiscal Year 2014-2015, which began July 1. Ohio
netted an $800 million surplus, its fourth straight year of black ink. New Hampshire ended the fiscal
year $5.6 million over budget. South Dakota notched its third straight surplus. Indiana, Arkansas and
Georgia have all reported nine-figure surpluses just days after the fiscal year ended.
Massive revenue increases now help state budgets.
Lambert, 6-13 [Lisa, “Budgets rebound but states to limit spending increases”, 6-13-14, Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/13/us-usa-states-budgets-idUSBRE95C04A20130613, RSR]
(Reuters) -
Most U.S. states are set to end this fiscal year in solid financial shape , but a report on Thursday said an
array of threats including federal budget cuts and potential sales tax declines will keep state spending. The
survey of states' fiscal
conditions conducted by the National Governors Association and the National Association of State
Budget Officers found that revenues have come in stronger than expected this fiscal year, and "a
number of states could finish fiscal 2013 with modest surpluses." In total, states will likely end this
fiscal year with balances of $23.7 billion. For most, fiscal 2013 ends on June 30. Florida and Indiana will likely
have ending surpluses of more than $2 billion. Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Ohio and Texas
may have balances greater than $1 billion. California, which scraped the bottom during the recessioninduced crisis, is expected to have a surplus of $785 million.
Legalization Doesn’t Increase Revenues
Legalization would not result in governmental revenue.
Evans, Executive Director, Drug Free Projects Coalition, ’13 [David, “THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION”, The Journal of Global Drug Policy and Practice, 12-30-13, RSR]
In spite of legalization, crime is endemic and will not diminish even though the kinds of crimes
committed might change. In fact, under a heavily regulated legalization regime, police detentions for
marijuana-related offenses may dwarf the current rate. Legalization will increase drugged driving and
more drugged driving will mean more dead and injured drivers and other innocent victims and all the
cost related to these tragedies (78). Marijuana significantly impairs the ability to safely operate a motor
vehicle. Driving problems include: decreased handling performance, inability to maintain headway,
impaired time and distance estimation, increased reaction times, sleepiness, impaired sustained
vigilance and lack of motor coordination (79). Marijuana is the most prevalent drug found in fatally injured drivers testing
positive for drugs (80). Under
our current laws few offenders are in prison for marijuana possession . No more
than two-tenths of one percent (.2%) of federal inmates are locked up for marijuana possession and, among state prisoners, only one-tenth of
one percent (0.1%) are in for marijuana possession without a prior record (81). Predictably, most of these prisoners are charged with probation
or parole violations or with possession of wholesale quantities where intent to distribute could not be proved. The
proponents of
legalization ignore the fact that legal sanctions deter or delay potential abusers, thereby limiting the
growth of the illicit market. Law enforcement also leverages drug users/addicts into treatment through the use of drug courts that
offer treatment as an alternative to incarceration. According to a recent study by Colorado State University,
Colorado’s legalization experiment will require retailers of marijuana to charge 318% more than
producers (82). The same study also found that current estimates of legalization’s revenue potential
are overblown by about 60% and that, in reality, legalization would raise revenue equal to only 1%
of Colorado’s budget . Ultimately, this will push users into the black market and drive retailers into the
tax-evading ‘grey market.’ Law enforcement resources will need to be re-marshaled to address
problems caused by marijuana-impaired driving, underage purchases, and criminals who seek to
undercut licensed marijuana retailers. For a state to benefit from tax revenue, it must first collect the tax proceeds. States that
have attempted to tax medical marijuana, a notoriously cash-only business, find this to be a problem. Of course, part of the reason why medical
marijuana is cash-only is because banks have refused to do business with those who sell drugs in violation of federal law. States
will need
to spend exorbitant amounts of taxpayer money to monitor retailers, conduct investigations, and
prosecute tax evaders. Moreover, enforcement can cause marijuana markets to behave in surprising
ways. For example, in California’s Humboldt County, the wholesale price of marijuana fell when the
federal government stepped up enforcement efforts (83). The explanation for this was simple – enforcement caused
retailers to change their purchasing patterns so growers found themselves steeped in excess product which they began pushing off as quickly
and cheaply as they could. In other words, law
enforcement spending would merely shift from one category of
offense to another. Since enforcement costs would not be insubstantial , there are good reasons to
question whether purported savings from legalization are achievable or meaningful.
Revenues wouldn’t even come close to covering the costs of legalizing marijuana.
Carise, Scientist/Clinician Substance Abuse Treatment Field, ’13 [Deni, “Legalizing Marijuana -- The
Real Costs”, 7-23-13, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deni-carise/legalizingmarijuana-the-_b_3620472.html, RSR]
Pro-legalization groups are often comparing the potential tax revenue of marijuana with alcohol and tobacco; it is true that nothing is more
heavily taxed in our society than these two substances. Yet, under closer examination,
it is clear that this revenue doesn't even
come close to covering the enormous costs to our society from these products: alcohol misuse results
in increased traffic accidents, ER visits, domestic violence and lost work productivity, while both
substances lead to substantial and costly medical problems, and even death. In 2010, there were
15,990 alcohol liver deaths and 25,692 alcohol-induced deaths excluding alcohol-related accidents and
homicides. In the prior year, there were 10,839 traffic fatalities in alcohol-impaired-driving crashes. These are just the figures for fatalities -quite obviously the costs to society soar even higher when figuring in those "lucky" enough to just be injured in accidents or still living with
emphysema, lung or liver disease. There
are still many people who believe that a person high on marijuana can
function properly at home or work and can operate a motor vehicle without impairment. But the
reality is that in 2011, marijuana was involved in 455,668 emergency room visits nationwide, and
marijuana has been proven to impair motor coordination and reaction time, being the second most
prevalent drug (after alcohol) implicated in automobile accidents.
Legalization Hurts the Economy – Comparative
Legalization would reverse any economic recovery – results in a new recession –
prefer our evidence it’s comparative.
Evans, Special Adviser to the Drug Free America Foundation, ’12 [David, “Marijuana Legalization's
Costs Outweigh Its Benefits”, 10-30-12, US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/debateclub/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/marijuana-legalizations-costs-outweigh-its-benefits, RSR]
Legalization will cause a tremendous increase in marijuana use. Based on the experience elsewhere, the
number of users will double or triple . This means an additional 17 to 34 million young and adult users in the United States.
Legalization will mean that marijuana businesses can promote their products and package them in
attractive ways to increase their market share. Increased marijuana use will mean millions more
damaged young people. Marijuana use can permanently impair brain development. Problem solving, concentration, motivation, and
memory are negatively affected. Teens who use marijuana are more likely to engage in delinquent and dangerous behavior, and experience
increased risk of schizophrenia and depression, including being three times more likely to have suicidal thoughts. Marijuana-using
teens are more likely to have multiple sexual partners and engage in unsafe sex. Marijuana use
accounts for tens of thousands of marijuana related complaints at emergency rooms throughout the
United States each year. Over 99,000 are young people. Despite arguments by the drug culture to the
contrary, marijuana is addictive . The levels of THC (marijuana's psychoactive ingredient) have never been higher. This is a
major factor why marijuana is the number one drug causing young people to enter treatment and why
there has been a substantial increase in the people in treatment for marijuana dependence. Marijuana
legalization means more drugged driving. Already, 13 percent of high school seniors said they drove after using marijuana while only 10 percent
drove after having several drinks. Why run the risk of increasing marijuana use among young drivers? Employees
who test positive
for marijuana had 55 percent more industrial accidents and 85 percent more injuries and they had
absenteeism rates 75 percent higher than those that tested negative. This damages our economy . The
argument that we can tax and regulate marijuana and derive income from it is false. The increased use
will increase the multitude of costs that come with marijuana use. The costs from health and mental
wellness problems, accidents, and damage to our economic productivity will far out strip any tax
obtained . Our economy is suffering. The last thing we need is the burden that legalization will put
on us .
Legalization Hurts the Economy – Laundry List
Legalization would impose massive economic costs.
Evans, Executive Director, Drug Free Projects Coalition, ’13 [David, “THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION”, The Journal of Global Drug Policy and Practice, 12-30-13, RSR]
In 2011, the National Drug Intelligence Center released a report that assessed $193 billion in annual
losses due to illnesses, accidents, lost productivity, and crime resulting from illicit drug use (63). While
the report did not separate marijuana from other drugs, it attributed nearly two-thirds of the losses to the impact of
drug use on productivity . The costs of property crime and homicides were roughly equivalent. An
earlier study conducted by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia
University noted that “governmental spending is skewed toward shoveling up the burden of our
continued failure to prevent and treat the problem rather than toward investing in cost effective
approaches to prevent and minimize the disease and its consequences.” The study estimated that, in 2005,
$467.7 billion was spent on substance abuse addiction by federal ($238.2 billion), state ($135.8
billion), and local ($93.8 billion) governments. It found less than 3% of spending was related to prevention but more than
three-fifths was due to healthcare costs, including those attributable to alcohol and tobacco use (64). Economic Consequences of Legalization In
effect, legalization
endorses marijuana as socially acceptable. It eliminates criminal penalties, reducing
prices, increasing availability, and de-stigmatizing use (65). More likely than not, these consequences are
irreversible : “Legalization would reduce the costs of supplying drugs by more than taxes could offset,
pushing retail prices into uncharted waters. We can be confident this would affect consumption; we
just don’t know by how much. One might consider giving legalization a trial run, pledging to repeal it if consumption ended up
rising more than anticipated. However, even temporary legalization could have permanent consequences. Society
could certainly ‘unlegalize’ and reimpose prohibition, but that would not return matters to the status quo ex ante any more than putting toast
in the freezer would change it back into fresh bread.” (66)
Economists estimate that marijuana use will increase by
75% - 289% once legalized, or more if advertising is permitted. However, the higher end of this range is
probably more accurate
because current usage is underreported by 20%-40%. (67). According to the 2010 National Survey on Drug
Use and Health, 17.4 million Americans used marijuana in 2010. Legalization
could thus invite between 13.05 million and
47.85 million new users (68). Increase in Marijuana-related Healthcare Costs Inevitably, the increase in use will
correspond to an uptick in incidents of dependence and abuse. If the number of new users is between 13.05 million
and 47.85 million, then treatment admissions would likely increase from 1.3 million to 4.8 million
respectively. These estimates assume a dependence rate of only 10%. Non-dependent users are still more prone to
illnesses, accidents, and crime than non-users. Since legalization is expected to cut marijuana prices in half, making it more
affordable, the drop in market prices will compound risks for users who are young, poor, or already
addicted (69). As a consequence, medical providers may need to adapt to the influx of new users who are
involved in accidents or who report marijuana-induced panic attacks or dependence (70). While
Medicaid and other public assistance programs currently pay for nearly two-thirds of all inpatient
admissions, this share is expected to increase under the Affordable Care Act, with or without
legalization (71).
Legalization Hurts the Economy – Public Health
Legalization massively hurts the economy – public health costs.
CNBC, ’10 [“Legalizing Marijuana Not Worth the Costs”, 4-20-10, http://www.cnbc.com/id/36267217#,
RSR]
With the U nited S tates still struggling through the recession, state governments are exploring
convenient fixes for overcoming massive debts burdening their states. After years of heavy spending,
California, for example, is facing a $42 billion deficit. To address this staggering shortfall, some
legislators are proposing the legalization of marijuana to boost tax revenue. Certainly some states are in dire
economic straits; however, we cannot allow social and law enforcement policy to be determined simply by revenue needs. Put plainly,
marijuana was made illegal because it is harmful; citing revenue gain as reason to legalize the drug
emphasizes money over health and ignores the significant cost burdens that will inevitably arise as a
result. As former head of theU.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, I am intimately familiar with the many challenges marijuana legalization
poses, and from my experience, the best economic policy for dealing with marijuana is to discourage use by
enforcement and education rather than legalization and taxation. Legalizing the drug will swell
societal ills, and this outweighs the monetary benefits that might be achieved from its lawful sale. This is
not the first time legalization has come to the fore. In the 1970s, Alaska legalized the drug—only to recriminalize it in
1990 after Alaskan teen marijuana use jumped to twice the national average. This is clear evidence that if
legalized, marijuana use will increase (even among children).
There are significant cost burdens that come along with
increased marijuana use . For example, there will be a greater social cost from decline in worker
productivity and school performance. Legalization will also lead to a greater need for drug education,
rehabilitation and treatment. And there will be costs associated with selling the drug . Do we really want our
governments to sell substances known to betoxic to the body, and which has no medical value that is recognized by the medical community, for
the sake of sheer profit? If this were a corporation proposing such a thing, it would be taken to court. Consider these findings from a white
paper by the California Police Chiefs Association’s Task Force on Marijuana Dispensaries: California legalized “medical” marijuana in 1996, and
dispensaries where the drug is handed out – to pretty much whoever comes in with a doctor’s note – have become catalysts for serious crime.
According to the white paper, dispensary operators have been attacked, robbed and murdered.
Also, “drug dealing, sales to
minors, loitering, heavy vehicle and foot traffic in retail areas, increased noise and robberies of
customers just outside dispensaries” are all criminal byproducts resulting from California’s medical
marijuana distribution. We can expect similar problems—but on a far grander scale—from full legalization. Given these cost burdens—
not to mention health and societal burdens—we should continue to focus efforts to discourage drug use. We can do this in a variety of ways.
On alcohol and cigarettes, we require warnings and education. With methamphetamine, cocaine and other harmful drugs, we prohibit and
criminalize their sale and use. While
marijuana may not be as harmful and addictive as methamphetamine, it is
harmful nonetheless, and the best economic policy is to make its sale and use illegal . The additional
costs of drug education and rehabilitation combined with the increased social costs associated with
increased marijuana use and sale are all greater than the potential revenue gained through
legalization. Even with the U.S. economy struggling, we should not buy into the argument that vices
should be legalized, taxed and regulated—no matter how much revenue we think it may generate.
Some things just aren’t worth the costs.
Legalization has negative effects on public safety.
Evans, Executive Director, Drug Free Projects Coalition, ’13 [David, “THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION”, The Journal of Global Drug Policy and Practice, 12-30-13, RSR]
Studies also shed light on marijuana’s implications for public safety. Short-term and long-term use are
known to cause cognitive impairment affecting sensorimotor functioning, attention span, memory,
self-control, learning, and educational attainment (54). Sensorimotor and attentional deficits undermine users’ ability to
safely engage in complex tasks like operating a motor vehicle or other heavy machinery. Studies have found that drivers under
the influence of marijuana typically exhibit reduced reaction speed, frequent lane-weaving, and they
are twice as likely as unimpaired drivers to be involved in traffic accidents (55). Using marijuana before
driving has been found to increase the risk of fatal outcomes in motor vehicle collisions (56).
Research on workplace injuries confirms these findings; employees who are impaired by the effects of
marijuana are more likely to be involved in accidents at work (57). In addition to its short-term effects on sensory
perception, marijuana use can impair decision-making an self-control during and long after intoxication.
Known colloquially as ‘good judgment,’ self-control is generally believed to improve from youth into adulthood
and to degenerate with substance abuse and dependence. Self control inhibits risk-seeking and
impulsive behaviors that limit educational attainment and contribute to criminal conduct. Economists,
criminologists, and medical researchers have studied and documented these effects (58). According to one study, “the
probability of being arrested for a non-drug involved violent, property and income-producing crime”
is greater for marijuana users than non-users (59).
Healthcare costs are super important to the economy.
The Economist, 7-25 [“Why nurses are the new auto workers”,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/07/health-care-jobs, RSR]
CAR manufacturing was the defining industry of the 20th century. In the 21st it is health care. Health
spending comprised 17% of America’s GDP in 2012 . About one in ten workers are employed in the
health sector. These workers have the crucial job of making American health care more efficient,
probably the country’s top domestic challenge . Those who are not doctors have a particularly important role—nurses and
lesser-trained workers can monitor and care for patients out of hospital, which should result in better quality of life for patients and lower costs
for everyone else. But just as the car industry was the 20th century’s main battleground for fights over labour,
that health workers will be at the centre of the latest bitter conflict .
it is increasingly clear
Legalization Hurts the Economy – Worker Productivity
Legalizing marijuana would drastically reduce worker productivity – hurts the
economy.
Evans, Executive Director, Drug Free Projects Coalition, ’13 [David, “THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION”, The Journal of Global Drug Policy and Practice, 12-30-13, RSR]
Marijuana-impaired workers contribute to a decrease in productivity due to employee turnover,
absenteeism, and illness. While performance effects might vary according to job task, frequency of
use, and users’ personal characteristics, studies have found marijuana and alcohol pose comparable
risks to productivity (60). Employees who tested positive for marijuana had 55% more industrial
accidents and 85% more injuries compared to those that tested negative on a pre-employment exam
and they had absenteeism rates 75% higher than those that tested negative (61). Low-income groups and
minorities may be particularly vulnerable to the unintended effects of legalization. According to one analysis, social stigma
surrounding marijuana use could deepen the divide between managerial employees and rank-and-file
workers: “[Marijuana use] does impair them as far as managerial favor, raises, promotions, and the
like. Indirect effects such as these could severely inhibit the workforce and overall production of
minority groups, by stunting their ability to move up the chain of responsibility and command. Further
complicating this is the fact that with the legalization of marijuana, individuals would have less incentive to hide their
habit, making it all the more easier to suffer remaining stigmatizing social consequences.
Compounding the problem is that in the legalized world ‘[e]ach new user would be at some risk of
progressing to heavy, chronic use . . . .’” (62)
Federal Econ Fine Now
Economy becoming super resilient now.
DMN, 7-23 [Dallas Morning News, “U.S. economy, though sluggish, may now be sturdier”, 7-23-14,
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20140723-u.s.-economy-though-sluggish-may-now-besturdier.ece, RSR]
WASHINGTON — Out
of a seemingly hollow recovery from the recession, a more durable if still slow-
growing U.S. economy has emerged. That conclusion, one held by a growing number of economists ,
might surprise many people. After all, in the five years since the recession officially ended, Americans’ pay has basically stagnated.
Millions remain unemployed or have abandoned their job searches. Economic growth is merely plodding along. Yet as the economy has slowly
healed, analysts
say it has replaced some critical weaknesses with newfound strengths . Among the trends:
Fewer people are piling up credit card debt or taking on risky mortgages. This should make growth
more sustainable and avoid a cycle of extreme booms and busts. Banks are more profitable and holding additional
cash to help protect against a repeat of the 2008 market meltdown. More workers hold advanced degrees. Education
typically leads to higher wages and greater job security, reducing the likelihood of unemployment.
Millions who have reached retirement age are staying on the job. This lessens the economic drag from
retiring baby boomers and helps sustain consumer spending. Over the long run, such trends could help
produce a sturdier economy , one less prone to the kind of runaway growth that often ends in a steep and sudden slump. The
downside? At least in the short term, these same trends have prevented the economy from accelerating. When consumers borrow and spend
less freely, for example, they restrain growth. And when people seek to work longer or become more educated, often there aren’t enough jobs
for all of them, at least not right away. People with advanced degrees can often find lower-paying jobs that don’t require much education. But
when they do, they tend to push some people with only a high school education into unemployment.
One of the most striking
trends in the recovery has been an aversion to personal debt. A typical U.S. household owes $7,122 in
credit card debt, $1,618 less than at the start of the recession, according to an analysis of New York
Federal Reserve data by the firm Nerd Wallet. (After factoring in inflation, the balance is $2,900
lower.)
Five signs that the economy is on pace for a recovery now.
AP, 7-5 [“5 reasons why US economy is recovering”, 7-5-14,
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/07/05/5-reasons-why-us-economy-is-recovering/, RSR]
WASHINGTON – How does the U.S. economy do it? Europe is floundering. China faces slower growth. Japan is struggling to sustain tentative
gains. Yet the
U.S. job market is humming, and the pace of economic growth is steadily rising . Five full years
economy is finally showing the vigor that Americans have long
awaited. Last month, employers added 288,000 jobs and helped reduce the unemployment rate to 6.1
percent, the lowest since September 2008. June capped a five-month stretch of 200,000-plus job gains — the first in nearly 15 years. After
after a devastating recession officially ended, the
having shrunk at a 2.9 percent annual rate from January through March — largely because of a brutal winter — the U.S. economy is expected to
grow at a healthy 3 percent pace the rest of the year. Here
are five reasons the U nited S tates is outpacing other
major economies: AN AGGRESSIVE CENTRAL BANK
"The Federal Reserve acted sooner and more aggressively than other
central banks in keeping rates low," says Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist at the Economic Outlook Group. In December 2008, the
Fed slashed short-term interest rates to near zero and has kept them there. Ultra-low loan rates have made it
easier for individuals and businesses to borrow and spend. The Fed also launched three bond-buying programs meant to reduce long-term
rates. By contrast, the European Central Bank has been slower to respond to signs of economic distress among the 18 nations that share the
euro currency. The ECB actually raised rates in 2011 — the same year the eurozone sank back into recession. It's worth keeping in mind that the
Fed has two mandates: To keep prices stable and to maximize employment. The
ECB has just one mandate: To guard against
high inflation. The Fed was led during and after the Great Recession by Ben Bernanke, a student of the Great Depression who was
determined to avoid a repeat of the 1930s' economic collapse. Janet Yellen, who succeeded Bernanke as Fed chair this year, has
continued his emphasis on nursing the U.S. economy back to health after the recession of 2007-2009 with the help of historically low rates.
STRONGER BANKS
The United States moved faster than Europe to restore its banks' health after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The
U.S. government bailed out the financial system and subjected big banks to stress tests in 2009 to
reveal their financial strength. By showing the banks to be surprisingly healthy, the stress tests helped restore
confidence in the U.S. financial system . Banks gradually started lending again. European banks are only now undergoing stress
tests, and the results won't be out until fall. In the meantime, Europe's banks lack confidence. They fear that other banks are holding too many
bad loans and that Europe is vulnerable to another crisis. So they aren't lending much. In the United States, overall bank lending is up nearly 4
percent in the past year. Lending to business has jumped 10 percent. In the eurozone, lending has dropped 3.7 percent overall, according to
figures from the Institute of International Finance. Lending to business is off 2.5 percent. (The U.S. figures are for the year ending in mid-June;
the European figures are from May.) A
MORE FLEXIBLE ECONOMY Economists say Japan and Europe need to
undertake reforms to make their economies more flexible — more, in other words, like America's.
Europe needs to lift wage restrictions that prevent employers from cutting pay (rather than eliminating jobs) when times are bad. It could also
rethink welfare and retirement programs that discourage people from working and dismantle policies that protect favored businesses and block
innovative newcomers, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has argued. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has proposed
reforms meant to make the Japanese economy more competitive. He wants to expand child care so more women can work, replace small
inefficient farms with more large-scale commercial farms and allow more foreign migrant workers to fill labor shortages in areas such as nursing
and construction. Yet his proposals face fierce opposition. "Europe and Japan remain less well-positioned for durable long-term growth, as they
have only recently begun to tackle their deep-rooted structural problems, and a lot remains to be done," says Eswar Prasad, a professor of
trade policy at Cornell University. China is struggling to manage a transition from an economy based on exports and often wasteful investment
in real estate and factories to a sturdier but likely slower-growing economy based on more consumer spending.
CUTTING
Weighed down by debt, many
LESS BUDGET-
European countries took an ax to swelling budget deficits. They slashed
pension benefits, raised taxes and cut civil servants' wages.
The cuts devastated several European economies . They led to
27 percent unemployment in Greece, 14 percent in Portugal and 25 percent in Spain. The United States has done some budget cutting, too, and
raised taxes. But U.S.
austerity hasn't been anywhere near as harsh. A ROARING STOCK MARKET The Fed's
easy-money policies ignited a world-beating U.S. stock market rally. Over the past five years, U.S. stocks have easily
outpaced shares in Europe, Japan and Hong Kong. That was one of Bernanke's goals in lowering rates. He figured that miserly fixed-income
rates would nudge investors into stocks in search of higher returns. Higher stock prices would then make Americans feel more confident and
more willing to spend — the so-called wealth effect.
Most economists agree it's worked .
No Impact to Econ
Most rigorous historical data proves there’s no impact to econ collapse.
Brandt and Ulfelder 11—*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an
Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas.
**Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist
whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011,
“Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network]
statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely
held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When
These
economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use
to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit.
When growth slows, however, citizens and
cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively.
The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime
breakdown. Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly
affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and
evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of
civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events,
but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed
results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to
have hardly been studied in recent years , as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and
This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term
variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries
worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a
dynamics of protest and repression.
hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between
economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and
multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for
ours is the first statistical study of this
relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity. As such, we believe this paper offers what is
probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date. As the results show, some of our findings are surprising.
endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge,
Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods
of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime
changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these
the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as
uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain
why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime
failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social
unrest associated with the crisis.
relationships, our findings do suggest that
Our evidence is assumptive of the worst case scenario – even that doesn’t lead to war.
Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and
Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p.
403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would
a
worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine
democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these
bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be
dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of
the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic
interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen
internationally have fought bloody civil wars.
Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and
economic liberalism become discredited , it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict
leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by
impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to
be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did
before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have
seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution
shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict , it will not make war
thinkable .
Transportation Infrastructure No Solve Warming
Transportation only accounts for 33% of fuels and massive alt causes to the planincludes more than just highways
Bogo ‘9 (Jennifer Bogo, PopularMechanics.com “Report Sees Dire Future for Warming's Impact on U.S.
Transport”, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/4254048, October 1, 2009, LEQ)
Transportation's contribution to global warming has been well articulated. It's responsible for 33 percent of United
States emissions from fossil fuel combustion--more if you count the life-cycle emissions from extracting fuel
and manufacturing vehicles. Now, for the first time, the government is taking an in-depth look at the flip scenario: how global
warming is affecting transportation.
And more things than spending are key to solve
Bogo ‘9 (Jennifer Bogo, PopularMechanics.com “Report Sees Dire Future for Warming's Impact on U.S.
Transport”, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/4254048, October 1, 2009, LEQ)
In the near term, taking
inventory of America's most vulnerable infrastructure will be key. By outfitting it
with technology to monitor its condition, as well as shifts in regional climate, officials will be able to
receive advanced warning of potential failures. The report emphasizes redundant communications
and power systems for restoring transportation systems quickly in the event that they do go down. To adapt to
new extremes, transportation providers should work more closely with weather forecasters and
emergency planners, and respond to severe weather events in ways that are more routine and proactive than ad hoc. In other words,
develop emergency response and evacuation plans before emergencies occur, and make sure they are
communicated clearly to the people living in high-risk areas.
No Warming Impact – Adaptation
Prefer our ev – their authors are too short-term and ignore adaptation
Goklany 11 (Indur M., science and technology policy analyst for the US Dept of the Interior, “Misled
on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming”
December 2011, http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf)
A third approach would be to fix the root cause of why developing countries are deemed to be most at-risk, namely, poverty. Sustained
economic growth would, as is evident from the experience of developed countries, address virtually all problems of poverty, not just that
portion exacerbated by global warming. It is far more certain that sustainable economic growth will provide greater benefits than emission
reductions: while there is no doubt that poverty leads to disease and death, there
is substantial doubt regarding the reality
and magnitude of the negative impact of global warming. This is especially true as assessments often
ignore improvements in adaptive capacity. Of these three approaches, human well-being in poorer countries is likely to be
advanced most effectively by sustained economic development and least by emission reductions. In addition, because of the inertia of the
climate system, economic development is likely to bear fruit faster than any emission reductions. These figures also indicate that the compound
effect of economic development and technological change can result in quite dramatic improvements even over the relatively short period for
which these figures were developed. Figure 5, for instance, covered 26 years. By contrast, climate change impacts
analyses
frequently look 50 to 100 years into the future. Over such long periods, the compounded effect could well be spectacular.
Longer term analyses of climate-sensitive indicators of human well-being show that the combination
of economic growth and technological change can, over decades, reduce negative impacts on human
beings by an order of magnitude , that is, a factor of ten, or more. In some instances, this combination has
virtually eliminated such negative impacts. But, since impact assessments generally fail to fully account
for increases in economic development and technological change, they substantially overestimate
future net damages from global warming . It may be argued that the high levels of economic development depicted in Figure 6
are unlikely. But if that’s the case, then economic growth used to drive the IPCC’s scenarios are equally unlikely, which necessarily means that
the estimates of emissions, temperature increases, and impacts and damages of GW projected by the IPCC are also overestimates. B. Secular
Technological Change The
second major reason why future adaptive capacity has been underestimated (and
the impacts of global warming systematically overestimated) is that few impact studies consider
secular technological change. 25 Most assume that no new technologies will come on line, although some
do assume greater adoption of existing technologies with higher GDP per capita and, much less frequently, a modest generic improvement in
productivity. 26 Such an assumption may have been appropriate during the Medieval Warm Period, when the pace of technological change was
slow, but nowadays technological change is fast (as indicated in Figures 1 through 5) and, arguably, accelerating. 27 It is unlikely that we will see
a halt to technological change unless so-called precautionary policies are instituted that count the costs of technology but ignore its benefits, as
some governments have already done for genetically modified crops and various pesticides. So how much of a difference in impact would
consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into
the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development
nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, the
time horizon of climate change
impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more. The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of
1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in
adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human
capital. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that over the span of a few decades, changes in economic
development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental
impacts and improve human well-being, as measured by a variety of objective indicators. 41 Thus, not
fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change
would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders
of magnitude if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new
technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly
naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even
during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is ingvalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the
developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0
to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100.
Your authors are alarmist – adaptation does solve and your impacts have a long
timeframe.
Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online:
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf
The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the
impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006).
Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water
supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006),
and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of
Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009).
Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at
risk (Stern 2006). These
statements are largely alarmist and misleading . Although climate change is a serious problem that
deserves attention, society’s
immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to
catastrophic consequences . The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over
the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences . The severe impacts
require a century (or two
in the case of Stern 2006)
predicted by alarmists
of no mitigation . Many of the predicted impacts assume
there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small
regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold
and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt . It is not at all
apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate
risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.
No Warming Impact – Conflict
No climate based resource wars.
Pinker, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology –
Harvard University, ’11 [Steven, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Google
Books]
Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is "maybe, but maybe not." Though climate change can cause plenty of
misery and deserves to be mitigated for that reason alone, it will
not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political
scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are
skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource
shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharn countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving
them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004)
do not generally lead to armed conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example,
caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in
Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land
and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be
organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed
economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any
connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not
subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification,
distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In
a regression analysis on armed
conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous,
politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages,
or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a
large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or two , he concluded, "those who
foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict,
have very little support in the large-N literature ." Salehyan adds that relatively inexpensive advances in
water use and agriculture practices in the developing world can yield massive increases in productivity with a
constant or even shrinking amount of land, and that better governance can mitigate the human costs of
environmental damage, as it does in developed democracies. Since the state of the environment is at most one
ingredient in a mixture that depends far more on political and social organization, resource wars
are far from inevitable, even in a climate-changed world.
No Warming Impact – Experts
Consensus of experts agree no impact to warming
Hsu 10 [Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humanssurvive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html]
His views deviate sharply from those of most
experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans.
Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't
foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing
are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at
the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet
to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that
the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of
fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change
already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker,
a geochemist and renowned climate
scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained
skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and
predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill
many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the
planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment
whose result remains uncertain."
Social Services Fail
Social service spending fails.
Muhlhausen, Research Fellow in Empirical Policy Analysis at the Center for Data Analysis at The
Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity at The Heritage Foundation, ’14 [David, “Do Federal
Social Programs Work?”, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #2884 on Budget and Spending, 3-1914, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/do-federal-social-programs-work, RSR]
Do federal social programs work? Based on the scientifically rigorous multisite experimental
evaluations published since 1990, the answer certainly cannot be in the affirmative . Despite the best
social engineering efforts, overwhelming evidence points to the conclusion that federal social
programs are ineffective. Ameliorating such problems as low academic achievement, poor cognitive
ability, poverty, joblessness, low wages, and personal relations appears to be out of reach for federal
social programs. The most notable exception is welfare-to-work programs, which increased earnings, but participants still received some
government assistance.
The evidence clearly shows that federal social programs are ineffective . It cannot be
just a coincidence that the many multisite evaluations published since 1990 overwhelmingly find that
this is true. Our nation faces a severe debt crisis that threatens our very future. Americans should not
fear eliminating social programs. Now is the time for deep budget cuts in federal social programs . The
social programs that Congress continues to fund need to undergo large-scale experimental evaluations. Multisite experimental evaluations are
the best method for assessing the effectiveness of federal social programs. Yet to date, this method has been used to evaluate only a handful of
federal social programs. Congress needs to reverse this trend.
STEM Fine Now
SQUO solves STEM shortages – multiple efforts underway.
Van Roekel, President of the National Education Association, ‘12
[Dennis, “Leading the STEM Challenge”, 10/3/12, The Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dennis-van-roekel/leading-the-stem-challeng_b_1936512.html, RSR]
President Obama
recently announced a plan to create 100,000 new STEM teacher positions to prepare
students for the 2.7 million new jobs expected in those sectors by 2018. The President said that preparing this
workforce is "going to make more of a difference in determining how well we do as a country than
just about anything else that we do." That's why the National Education Association launched a
$500,000 challenge grant that calls on leading business and technology companies to help us increase
the number of certified science and math teachers. There's a severe shortage, especially in low-income communities, and
that needs to change. We know the things that work -- quality early childhood education, smaller class sizes, greater emphasis on reading,
math, science, art and technology, up-to-date textbooks and computers and highly qualified teachers. The
National Education
Association has placed special emphasis, not just on identifying programs that work, but exploring
ways to spread or replicate these programs, so that even greater numbers of our students benefit. From
NEA's Priority Schools Campaign that is working to help transform low-performing schools, to our work with the Breakfast in the Classroom
program to help ensure that students start the school day nourished and ready to learn -- educators
and their union are leading
the way with innovations and programs that help to lead the change in our profession and in the lives
of our students. But we can't do it alone. We're aggressively reaching out to leaders of business, technology,
and philanthropy to urge them to partner with us and match this STEM grant. There's been a lot of talk about
jobs going overseas and how the U.S. is losing its competitive edge -- now is the time to stop talking and take action.
STEM high now – it applies to nuclear scientists too – DOE solving shortages.
Koebler, ‘12
[Jason, “Department of Energy Labs Push to Fill STEM Void”,
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/stem-education/2012/06/27/department-of-energy-labs-push-tofill-stem-void, RSR]
DALLAS—The Department
of Energy's 19 "National Labs" have pushed the envelope for years, doing the
work that private industry and universities "can't ... won't ... or shouldn't do," and they're beginning
to usher in the latest generation of American scientists with public-private partnerships and "STEM
hubs" near many of their campuses. Formed after the development of the nuclear bomb, the labs have focused on "solving
the most difficult problems not only for the nation, but for the world," according to Karen Gardner, director of
human resources at Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and Southern California. Those labs host some of the world's
fastest supercomputers and have designed the components necessary to build nuclear weapons. [STEMx
National Network Launched at STEM Solutions Event] The National Laboratories employ more than 26,000 scientists,
plus about 700 student interns each summer--but a few years ago, directors of some of the laboratories noticed that the
pipeline of intern candidates was drying up, which Bill Rogers, director of the Center for Advanced Energy Studies, said could put America's
national security at risk. "National
labs do what industry and universities can't do because it's too expensive
or dangerous, won't do because it's too risky, or shouldn't do because they are government programs
with a military or homeland security national interest," he said. They decided to do something about the shortage--in
Tennessee, the Oak Ridge Laboratory has started a program to train 150 STEM teachers and will host a
three-day, intensive STEM Leadership Academy to teach educators best classroom practices . On Long
Island, the Brookhaven National Laboratory has partnered with the Long Island Museum of Science to launch the Portal to Discovery, which
Kenneth White, manager of the lab's educational programs, calls a "transition place between community and the laboratory." "It'll
create a
microcosm of the laboratory," he said. "We're connecting the industries of Long Island to students
and teachers to help them understand career paths." The labs also recruit students by holding family
outreach nights at local schools, attending the national Science Bowl, and looking for talent at STEM
competitions.
Their ev is a lie – most qualified analysis err neg.
Benderly, January/February 2012 (Beryl Lieff – writer for Science Magazine and Prism, What Scientist
Shortage, Columbia Journalism Review, p.
http://www.cjr.org/reports/what_scientist_shortage.php?page=all&print=true)
The senators’ comments echo the conventional wisdom about America’s scientific labor force, repeated
in countless media articles and broadcasts, and by business and political leaders all the way up to and including President Obama: we are
failing to produce a sufficient quantity of scientists and engineers and therefore must import large
numbers of foreigners to remain innovative and competitive. Just a pair of recent examples: a Washington Post op-ed on August 4,
2011, that explained how to “curb our engineering shortage” and a New York Times story on November 4, 2011, headlined “Why Science
Majors Change Their Minds (It’s Just so Darn Hard),” that highlighted a call by “the president and industry groups” for “colleges to graduate
10,000 more engineers a year.” But what
“we all know,” as Senator Cornyn put it, turns out not to be true —and the
perpetuation of this myth is discouraging Americans from pursuing scientific careers. Leading
experts on the STEM workforce,
including Richard Freeman of Harvard, Michael Teitelbaum of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Paula Stephan of
Georgia State University, Hal Salzman of Rutgers, Lindsay Lowell of Georgetown, and Norman Matloff of the
U niversity of C alifornia-Davis, have said for years that the US produces ample numbers of excellent
science students . In fact, according to the N ational S cience B oard’s authoritative publication Science
and Engineering Indicators 2008, the country turns out three times as many STEM degrees as the
economy can absorb into jobs related to their majors.
No Terror Impact
No impact to terror – their ev is fear mongering.
Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and
Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington,
D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance
and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp.
81–110, Chetan]
It seems increasingly likely that the
official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been
substantially deluded —massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually
presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive
datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at
the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40
Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs of
irresponsible fearmongering , just about
the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have
a greater chance of being hit by lightning
than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted
that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the
September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the
emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread
they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or
unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which
of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive
to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes,
terrorism does of course exist. Much of the
reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality . In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been
“spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our
premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined,
and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion
dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and
unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have
constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in
which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in
which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing
yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after
the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells,
they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up
and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of
“experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a
Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI
Director Robert
the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to
identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not
seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities
presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and
the “intent” to inflict “signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary
Mueller assured
thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation
of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able,
mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct
a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten
words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By
2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night
is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much
solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass
destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In
the wake of the killing of
Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content
appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff
a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb.
This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining
and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and
technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be
detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the
American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that
none of them
were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter
biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even
dreamed of the prospect;
and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty
bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a
Even if a weapon were made
abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country
with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the
talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.
pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51
Too many logistical and technical difficulties.
Gavin, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs at UT Austin, ‘10
[Francis, Winter 2009/2010, “Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,”
International Security 34.3]
Coherent policies to reduce the risk of a nonstate actor using nuclear weapons clearly need to be developed. In particular, the rise of the Abdul
Qadeer Khan nuclear technology network should give pause.49 But again, the news is not as grim as nuclear alarmists would suggest. Much
has already been done to secure the supply of nuclear materials, and relatively simple steps can
produce further improvements. Moreover, there are reasons to doubt both the capabilities and even the
interest many terrorist groups have in detonating a nuclear device on U.S. soil. As Adam Garfinkle writes, "The
threat of nuclear terrorism is very remote."50 Experts disagree on whether nonstate actors have the scientific, engineering,
financial, natural resource, security, and logistical capacities to build a nuclear [End Page 19] bomb from scratch. According to terrorism expert
Robin Frost, the
danger of a "nuclear black market" and loose nukes from Russia may be overstated. Even
if a terrorist group did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it against a U.S. target
would present tremendous technical and logistical difficulties .51 Finally, the feared nexus between
terrorists and rogue regimes may be exaggerated. As nuclear proliferation expert Joseph Cirincione argues, states such
as Iran and North Korea are "not the most likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles , if any, are
small and exceedingly precious, and hence well-guarded."52 Chubin states that there "is no reason to believe that
Iran today, any more than Sadaam Hussein earlier, would transfer WMD [weapons of mass destruction] technology to
terrorist groups like al-Qaida or Hezbollah."53 Even if a terrorist group were to acquire a nuclear device, expert Michael
Levi demonstrates that effective
planning can prevent catastrophe : for nuclear terrorists, what "can go wrong might go
wrong, and when it comes to nuclear terrorism,
a broader, integrated defense, just like controls at the source of
weapons and materials, can multiply, intensify, and compound the possibilities of terrorist failure,
possibly driving terrorist groups to reject nuclear terrorism altogether ." Warning of the danger of a terrorist
acquiring a nuclear weapon, most analyses are based on the inaccurate image of an "infallible ten-foot-tall enemy." This type of alarmism,
writes Levi, impedes the development of thoughtful strategies that could deter, prevent, or mitigate a terrorist attack: "Worst-case estimates
have their place, but the possible failure-averse, conservative, resource-limited five-foot-tall nuclear terrorist, who is subject not only to the
laws of physics but also to Murphy's law of nuclear terrorism, needs to become just as central to our evaluations of strategies."54
Top experts vote neg.
Walt 12 (Stephen, Belfer Professor of International Affairs – Harvard University, “What Terrorist
Threat?,” Foreign Policy, 8-13, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/13/what_terrorist_threat)
Remember how the London Olympics were supposedly left vulnerable to terrorists after the security firm hired
for the games admitted that it couldn't supply enough manpower? This "humiliating shambles" forced the British government to call in 3,500 security personnel of
its own, and led GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney to utter some tactless remarks about Britain's alleged mismanagement during his official "Foot-in-Mouth"
foreign tour last month. Well,
surprise, surprise. Not only was there no terrorist attack, the Games themselves came off rather
well. There were the inevitable minor glitches, of course, but no disasters and some quite impressive organizational achievements. And of course, athletes from
around the world delivered inspiring, impressive, heroic, and sometimes disappointing performances, which is what the Games are all about. Two lessons might be
drawn from this event. The first is that the head-long rush to privatize everything -- including the provision of security -- has some obvious downsides. When
markets and private firms fail, it is the state that has to come to the rescue. It was true after the 2007-08 financial crisis, it's true in the ongoing euro-mess, and it
was true in the Olympics. Bear that in mind when Romney and new VP nominee Paul Ryan tout the virtues of shrinking government, especially the need to privatize
Social Security and Medicare. The second lesson is that we
continue to over-react to the "terrorist threat." Here I
recommend you read John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart's The Terrorism Delusion : America's Overwrought
Response to September 11, in the latest issue of International Security. Mueller
and Stewart analyze 50 cases of supposed
"Islamic terrorist plots" against the United States, and show how virtually all of the perpetrators were (in their words)
"incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled,
amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish." They quote former Glenn Carle, former
deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats saying "we must see jihadists for the small, lethal,
disjointed and miserable opponents that they are," noting further that al Qaeda's "capabilities are far
inferior to its desires." Further, Mueller and Stewart estimate that expenditures on domestic homeland security (i.e., not counting the wars in Iraq or
Afghanistan) have increased by more than $1 trillion since 9/11, even though the annual risk of dying in a domestic terrorist attack
is about 1 in 3.5 million . Using conservative assumptions and conventional risk-assessment methodology, they estimate that for these expenditures
to be cost-effective "they would have had to deter, prevent, foil or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year."
Finally, they worry that this exaggerated sense of danger has now been "internalized": even when politicians and "terrorism experts" aren't hyping the danger, the
public still sees the threat as large and imminent. As they conclude: ... Americans seems to have internalized their anxiety about terrorism, and politicians and
policymakers have come to believe that they can defy it only at their own peril. Concern about appearing to be soft on terrorism has replaced concern about
seeming to be soft on communism, a phenomenon that lasted far longer than the dramatic that generated it ... This extraordinarily exaggerated and essentially
delusional response may prove to be perpetual." Which is another way of saying that you
should be prepared to keep standing in
those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life, and to keep paying for far-flung foreign interventions designed to
"root out" those nasty jihadis.
Cartels
No Solvency - Cartels Resilient
Marijuana won’t touch cartels – its easy for them to diversify
Sylvia Longmire – 2014. (A former officer and investigative special agent in the Air Force and author of the forthcoming book “Cartel:
The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars,” Breitbart, “LONGMIRE: LEGALIZED POT WILL FORCE CARTELS TO DIVERSIFY FURTHER,” 4/9/2014,
http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-Texas/2014/04/10/Longmire-Legalized-Pot-Will-Force-Cartels-to-Diversify-Further, Accessed 8/1/2014).
Breitbart Texas’ Contributing Editor and author of the forthcoming book Border Insecurity recently joined Fusion LIVE to discuss the market
effects of American states legalizing marijuana with respect to Mexican cartels.“[Legalization] will be a big financial hit if marijuana is fully
legalized but [cartels] could
get on the legal side and will still be illegal in other parts of the world where
marijuana is in demand. But sure, they’ll shift their resources to other illegal drugs—they’ll also take a look at
kidnapping, extortion of businesses in Mexico—there are a lot of ways cartels can make money even if
marijuana was fully legalized in the U.S.”
Plan won’t solve – cartels have been adapting for years and marijuana is their least
lucrative product
Elizabeth Dickinson – 2011. (Freelance Journalist and former managing editor at Foreign policy; ForeignPolicy, “Legalizing Drugs
Won’t stop Mexico’s Brutal Cartels,” 6/22/2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/22/legalizing_drugs_wont_stop_mexicos_brutal_cartels, Accessed 8/2/2014)
But would legalization really work? With each day that passes, it looks like it wouldn't
be enough, for one overarching reason:
The cartels are becoming less like traffickers and more like mafias. Their currency is no longer just
cocaine, methamphetamines, or heroin, though they earn revenue from each of these products. As they
have grown in size and AMBITION, like so many big multinational corporations,
they have diversified . The cartels are now
active in all types of illicit markets, not just drugs.¶ "Mexico is experiencing a change with the
emergence of criminal organizations that, rather than being product-oriented -- drug trafficking -- are
territorial based," says Antonio Mazzitelli, head of the UNODC office in Mexico City. They now specialize in running
protection rackets of all kinds, he says, which might explain why the violence has gotten so bad:
Mafias enforce their territorial control by force, killing anyone who resists or gets in the way. ¶
"Before, we had organized crime, but operating strictly in narcotrafficking," adds Eduardo Guerrero
Gutiérrez, a consultant and former advisor to the Mexican presidency. "Now we have a type of mafia
violence ... and they are extorting from the people at levels that are incredibly high -- from the rich,
from businesses." For this reason, Mazzitelli says, legalization would have "little effect."¶ Cartels such as the
Zetas and La Familia, long categorized as drug-trafficking organizations, have transformed themselves
into territorial overlords. With distinctive zones of influence, complex organizations, and a wealth of
manpower on which to draw, they act as shadow governments in the areas they control, collecting
"taxes" on local establishments and taking a cut of the profits from illegal immigration to the United
States . "This fight is not solely or primarily to stop drug trafficking,"
Mexican President Felipe Calderón told the
U.S. Congress in May 2010. "The aim is to ensure the safety of Mexican families, who are under threat of abuse and wanton acts of criminals."¶
The cartels' expansion may have begun through their everyday narcotrafficking work -- namely through money laundering, one of the most
discussed topics in Mexican politics today. Once upon a time, this was quite easy to do; cartels could wire the money in convoluted ways or
open new accounts to which individuals would report earnings from businesses that existed only on paper.¶ But as the government cracked
down in recent years, the cartels got more creative. In June 2010, Mexican authorities put strict limits on how much cash any individual could
deposit into a bank on any given day or in any given month. They also limited the amount of cash one could use to buy things like airplanes or
cars. So the cartels started engaging in actual trade, which helps them launder their drug profits, explains Shannon O'Neil, a fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. They
buy consumer goods, such as televisions and perfumes, in the
United States and sell them on the Mexican side at a loss. The revenues are "clean" money. And as a
bonus, the cartels have a network of vendors ready and willing to sell illicit goods. ¶ Other markets are
entirely separate from the narcotics business. Perhaps the most dramatic example is oil, one of Mexico's largest exports and
increasingly a vehicle for illicit trade. On June 1, the country's national oil company, Pemex, filed a lawsuit
accusing nine U.S. companies of colluding with criminals linked to the drug trade to sell as estimated
$300 million worth of stolen oil since 2006. That's an amount equal to the entire cocaine market in
Mexico, says UNODC's Mazzitelli. In other words, if the cocaine trade dried up, the cartels would still
have access to an equally large source of revenue.¶ Equally troubling is the firearms trade , which has
a direct link both to the violence and to the sustainment of the criminal organizations working across
this country of 107 million. There are no reliable estimates of just how big this market is, but according to a recent U.S. Senate
investigation, some 87 percent of the weapons used by the cartels are sourced from the United States. "If this were Southeast Asia, they'd be
bombing the gun stores in Arizona, as if that's the Ho Chi Minh trail," says Ted Lewis, head of the human rights program at Global Exchange.¶
Mexico's cartels have also infiltrated the government and security forces, though primarily at a local
level. "Just going by all the reports -- academic and media -- we could safely assume that all municipal police departments are infiltrated,"
argues Walter McKay, a security consultant who has spent the last three years working in Mexico. "But it's not just the police. We
focus on police and police corruption, but the entire apple is rotten." In the latest example of how high the rot goes,
the ex-mayor of Tijuana, Jorge Hank Rhon, was recently arrested for gunrunning and alleged links to organized crime.¶
Then there is the
cartels' sheer size . An estimated 468,000 people worked in the drug trade in 2008, making the cartels collectively among the biggest
industries in Mexico. (By comparison, the state oil company, the largest firm in Mexico, has about 360,000 employees.) The
cartels also
now outnumber the police, estimated at just over 400,000 personnel nationwide in 2010.¶ The corruption and weakness of the
police explains why, over the last half-decade, Calderón has deployed 50,000 troops across the country to decapitate the cartels' leadership and
reclaim their territory block by block. Take away a criminal organization's leadership and turf, the thinking goes, and you also rob it of the ability
to control just about every market -- not just the narcotics trade. Just on Tuesday, June 21, the government apprehended José de Jesús "El
Chango" Méndez, leader of the so-called "Knights Templar" cartel. Calderón quickly touted the arrest as a "coup by the federal police against
organized crime" on Twitter.¶ Yet critics of the government's strategy say it has been far too militarized. Violence has increased every year since
the drug war began, and many civil society groups here accuse the national security forces of hurting as many civilians as they do actual
criminals. And
even "success" risks a "balloon effect ," as a cartel squeezed in one location will almost
inevitably pop up elsewhere. This effect is already painfully visible in Latin America as a whole, with
Mexican cartels such as the Zetas moving into Guatemala and overwhelming the much-weaker state.¶
Many activists are thus calling for a completely new approach. Silvano Cantú, a researcher at the Mexican Commission for the Defense and
Promotion of Human Rights, argues that Mexico needs to think bigger than trying to win back its turf city by city. "We need to be talking to
everyone," he says, mentioning the United States, Colombia, Europe, and "anywhere they clean money and buy arms." The government, too, is
frustrated with the guns; cutting down on the sale in the United States is one of the Calderón administration's key demands. ¶ The legalizers, a
group that includes former heads of state from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, largely agree with this comprehensive approach. Trying to cut
supply without cutting demand is a losing game, they argue. "The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals
and societies around the world," they wrote in the most recent report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, an independent panel that has
called for a dramatic rethinking of the drug war. Their recommendations call for the normalization of drugs (that is, legalization of
possession linked with public-health regulation), including cocaine.¶ That would almost certainly hurt the cartels, but it probably wouldn't
be enough, counters Mazzitelli of the UNODC. "Legalization is a fake solution to the problem of security," he
argues, citing a 2010 Rand Corp. report that found that legalizing marijuana in California would cut cartel
profits by just 2 to 4 percent. If it does come, legalization is also quite a ways off -- and Mexico's crisis is happening now. Only about
half of U.S. citizens polled last year by Gallup supported legalizing marijuana, the least lucrative (and arguably the least
dangerous) drug entering the country from Mexico.
Their cards about cartel profits are pure speculation – multiple revenue streams would
likely keep them profitable
CRS – 2013. (Lisa N. Sacco, Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy; Kristin Finklea, Acting Section Research Manager and Specialist in
Domestic Security; Congressional Research Service, “State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives: Implications for Federal Law Enforcement,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43164.pdf, Accessed 8/1/2014).
A number of organizations have assessed the potential profits generated from illicit drug sales, both worldwide and in the United States, but
“[e]stimates of marijuana ... revenues suffer particularly high rates of uncertainty.”101 The former National
Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), for instance, estimated that the sale of illicit drugs in the United States generates between $18 billion and $39
billion in U.S. wholesale drug
proceeds for the Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations annually.102 The proportion
that is attributable to marijuana sales, however, is unknown.103 Without a clear understanding of (1)
actual proceeds generated by the ¶ sale of illicit drugs in the United States, (2) the proportion of total
proceeds attributable to the sale of marijuana, and (3) the proportion of marijuana sales controlled by
criminal organizations and affiliated gangs, any estimates of how marijuana legalization might impact
the drug trafficking organizations are purely speculative . ¶ Marijuana proceeds are generated at many points along the
supply chain, including production, transportation, and distribution. Experts have debated which aspects of this chain—and the related
proceeds—would be most heavily impacted by marijuana legalization. In addition, the potential impact of marijuana legalization in 2 of the 50
U.S. states (complicated by two separate legal frameworks and regulatory regimes) may be more difficult to model than the impact of federal
marijuana legalization. For instance, in evaluating the potential fiscal impact of the Washington and Colorado legalization initiatives on the
profits of Mexican drug trafficking organizations, the Organization of American States (OAS) has hypothesized that “[a]t the extreme, Mexican
drug trafficking organizations could lose some 20 to 25 percent of their drug export income, and a smaller, though difficult to estimate,
percentage of their total revenues.”104 ¶ Other scholars have, in estimating the potential financial impact of marijuana legalization, based their
estimates on a hypothetical federal legalization of marijuana. Under this scenario, small scale growers at the start of the marijuana productionto-consumption chain might be put out of business by professional farmers, a few dozen of which “could produce enough marijuana to meet
U.S. consumption at prices small-scale producers couldn’t possibly match.”105 Large drug trafficking organizations generate a majority of their
marijuana-related income (which some estimates place at between $1.1 billion to $2.0 billion) from exporting the drug to the United States and
selling it to wholesalers on the U.S. side of the border.106 This revenue could be jeopardized if the United States were to legalize the
production and consumption of ¶ recreational marijuana. ¶ Aside from the fiscal impact of U.S. marijuana legalization on drug revenues
generated by the criminal networks in Mexico, some have also questioned whether there might be an impact on the levels of drug traffickingrelated violence in Mexico. In short, there is no definitive answer to this question, and arguments have been presented to support both the
stance that marijuana legalization in the United States could drive violence higher (because of increased competition for the scarce revenues
that would be generated from an expected dwindling market of Mexican- produced marijuana) and the position that such legalization could
help in reducing drug trafficking-related violence (because the profit motive for entering and dominating the drug trade might be reduced).
Either way, “[a]ny changes in cannabis markets will take time to develop and may occur
simultaneously with other changes that also affect violence rates in Mexico.”107 ¶ State Marijuana Legalization
Initiatives: Implications for Federal Law Enforcement ¶ The
diversification of drug trafficking organizations’ illicit
activities could also mitigate the impacts they might feel from various levels of marijuana legalization
in the United States. While these criminal networks might generate a substantial portion of their proceeds from the growth,
production, transportation, and sale of marijuana, they have enhanced their dominance over the market of other illicit substances. Mexican
drug trafficking organizations control more of the wholesale cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine distribution than any other major drug
trafficking organizations in the United States.108 In
addition to their drug-related illegal activities, Mexican criminal
networks have diversified their operations, adding to their portfolio crimes ranging from kidnapping
and extortion to human trafficking and intellectual property rights violations.109 Profits from these
enterprises may help supplement their drug trafficking-related income.
Cartel Marijuana sales are often exaggerated
Beau Kilmer et. al. – 2010. (Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany M. Bond, and Peter H. Reuter also contributed; Drug Policy Research
Center of the Rand Corporation, “Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico,” 2010, RAND_OP325.pdf, Accessed 8/1/2014)
Often, big
numbers of dubious origin are tossed around in drug policy discussions with little thought and,
frankly, little consequence. Some U.S. government reports suggest that Mexican and Colombian DTOs
combined earn $18 billion–$39 billion annually in wholesale drug proceeds (NDIC, 2008d), and one
analysis even estimated that 60 percent of all Mexican DTO drug revenue comes from exporting
marijuana (ONDCP, 2006). Legalization advocates seize on such figures to supplement their traditional
arguments, and the figures have been repeated in the popular press, with even respectable news
sources claiming that “the Mexican cartels could be selling $20 billion worth of marijuana in the U.S.
market each year” (Fainaru and Booth, 2009).¶ The $20 billion figure appears to come from
multiplying a $525-per-pound markup by an estimate from the Mexican government that 35 million
pounds were produced in Mexico and then rounding up. However, no data support the claim that U.S.
users consume 35 million pounds (~16,000 metric tons [MT]) per year, let alone that they consume this much marijuana from
Not surprisingly, violence in Mexico plays a prominent role in debates about marijuana legalization in the United States.
Mexico. (This point is addressed in detail in Chapter Three.) This is three times the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) (2009)
upper bound for total U.S. consumption and nearly four times the amount estimated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DASC,
2002).
61% is a gross overestimation of cartel drug profits – its closer to 15%
Jonathon P. Caulkins and Michael Lee – 2011. (Carnegie Mellon University; “Legalizing Drugs in the US: A Solution to Mexico’s
Problems for Which Mexico Should Not Wait,” 2011, http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/legalizing-drugs-us108-124.pdf, Accessed
8/1/2014)
Would legalizing marijuana reduce violence in Mexico? Advocates such as former New Mexico governor Gary Johnson argue that legalizing
marijuana is “the only practical way to weaken drug cartels” (Johnson, 2010), often citing an Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
document which asserted that 61% of DTO revenues derive from marijuana exports (National Drug Control Strategy, 2006, pg. 36). However,
61% is a gross exaggeration even for strictly drug-related revenues, and DTOs also generate
considerable revenue from nondrug-related activities. Kilmer et al. (2010b) debunk the 61% figure
and estimate the correct proportion to be more like 15-26% of drug-related revenues. ¶ Statewide
legalization in the midst of continued federal prohibition is far different than nationwide legalization. Still, given how easy it is to smuggle drugs
across state lines within the US, marijuana diverted from legal production in even one state might displace most Mexican marijuana from US
markets (Kilmer et al., 2010b; Caulkins and Bond, in submission). ¶ It is very hard to know how losing perhaps one-fifth of drug-related
revenues would affect DTO violence (Kilmer et al., 2010b). Perhaps it would cut violence by as much as one-fifth, but the DTOs might respond
by trafficking more of other drugs or shifting focus to nondrug-related activities such as kidnapping, human trafficking, or racketeering (FelbabBrown, 2010).
What is certain though is that legalizing marijuana in the US will not make the DTOs go
away (Longmire, 2011).
You would have to legalize hard drugs to impact the cartels
Jonathon P. Caulkins and Michael Lee – 2011. (Carnegie Mellon University; “Legalizing Drugs in the US: A Solution to Mexico’s
Problems for Which Mexico Should Not Wait,” 2011, http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/legalizing-drugs-us108-124.pdf, Accessed
8/1/2014)
To achieve a noticeable
decrease in Mexican violence, legalizing marijuana would not be enough. The US would have to
legalize hard drugs as well. However, as Keith Humphreys notes (2011; elsewhere in this volume), the probability of legalizing hard
The political landscape in the US is not amenable to drug legalization, with the exception of marijuana.
drugs in the US is essentially zero. Congress and the American people simply don’t want it. The body of this paper explains why that reticence
can be grounded in a perfectly rational aversion to irreversible risky gambles, not necessarily from ignorance or lack of imagination.
No Solvency - Diversification
Cartels are diversified- losses from marijuana are negligible and they can just shift to
other illegal activities
Longmire 11 (Sylvia, former officer and investigative special agent in USAF, author of “Cartel: The
Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars”, “Legalization Won’t Kill the Cartels,” New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/opinion/19longmire.html?_r=2&smid=twnytimesopinion&seid=auto& 6/18/11)
Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. Marijuana legalization has many merits, but it would
do little to hinder the long-term
economics of the cartels — and the violent toll they take on Mexican society. For one thing, if marijuana makes
up 60 percent of the cartels’ profits, that still leaves another 40 percent, which includes the sale of methamphetamine, cocaine, and brown-
marijuana were legalized, the cartels would still make huge profits from the
sale of these other drugs. Plus, there’s no reason the cartels couldn’t enter the legal market for the
sale of marijuana, as organized crime groups did in the United States after the repeal of Prohibition.
powder and black-tar heroin. If
Still, legalization would deliver a significant short-term hit to the cartels — if drug trafficking were the only activity they were engaged in. But
cartels derive a growing slice of their income from other illegal activities . Some experts on organized
crime in Latin America, like Edgardo Buscaglia, say that cartels earn just half their income from drugs. Indeed, in
recent years cartels have used an extensive portfolio of rackets and scams to diversify their income.
For example, they used to kidnap rivals, informants and incompetent subordinates to punish, exact
revenge or send a message. Now that they have seen that people are willing to pay heavy ransoms,
kidnapping has become their second-most-lucrative venture, with the targets ranging from
businessmen to migrants. Another new source of cartel revenue is oil theft, long a problem for the Mexican
government. The national oil company, Pemex, loses hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of petroleum every year to bandits and criminal
gangs who tap into pipelines and siphon it off. Now the cartels are getting involved in this business, working with associates north of the border
to sell the oil to American companies at huge markups. In 2009 a federal court convicted an American businessman of helping to funnel $2
million in petroleum products stolen from Pemex by a Mexican cartel, eventually selling it to a Texas chemical plant owned by the German
chemical company BASF. The chemical company claims never to have known where the products came from. Cartels
are also moving
into the market in pirated goods in Latin America. The market used to be dominated by terrorist
groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, who operated in the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay. Now the field is being overtaken by Mexican cartels, which already have so much control
over the sale of pirated CDs, DVDs and software that many legitimate companies no longer even
bother to distribute their full-price products in parts of Mexico. Taking another page from traditional
organized crime, cartels are also moving into extortion. A cartel representative will approach the owner of a business —
whether a pharmacy or a taco stand — demanding a monthly stipend for “protection.” If those payments aren’t made on time, the business is
often burned to the ground, or the owner is threatened, kidnapped or killed. A popular cartel racket involves branded products. For
example, a cartel member — most often from Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana, two of the largest
and most diversified cartels — will tell a music-store owner that he has to sell CDs with the Zetas logo
stamped on them, with the cartel taking a 25 percent cut of the profits. Noncompliance isn’t an
option. With so many lines of business, it’s unlikely that Mexican cartels would close up shop in the
event of legalization, even if it meant a serious drop in profits from their most successful product.
Cartels are economic entities, and like any legitimate company the best are able to adapt in the face
of a changing market. This is not to say that drug legalization shouldn’t be considered for other reasons. We need to stop viewing
casual users as criminals, and we need to treat addicts as people with health and emotional problems. Doing so would free up a significant
amount of jail space, court time and law enforcement resources. What it won’t do, though, is stop the violence in Mexico.
Cartels aren’t just traffickers- they’re in all types of illicit markets
Dickinson 11 (Elizabeth, Foreign Policy assistant managing editor, “Legalizing Drugs Won’t Stop
Mexico’s Brutal Cartels,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/22/legalizing_drugs_wont_stop_mexicos_brutal_cartel
s 6/22/11)
This would be excellent news -- if it weren't for some alarming trends going in the other direction. As
the cocaine trade through
Mexico has fallen dramatically, the violence here has risen remarkably. Whereas 2006 saw just over 2,000 deaths
attributed to drug violence, in 2010 there were an estimated 11,000 such killings, according to data from Stratfor and local press accounts.
Ciudad Juárez, a border city of approximately 2 million at the center of the ongoing violence, has seen a particularly sharp spike. In 2001, there
were just 16 murders for every 100,000 Ciudad Juárez residents. In 2010, that number reached 93 -- an increase of nearly sixfold -- according to
the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights. In
other words, the war on drugs may be taking
its toll on the narcotics trade, but it hasn't done anything to end the violence -- a stubborn fact that
runs counter to an emerging consensus about the drug war. Across Latin America, intellectuals, scholars, and even
policymakers are increasingly arguing that there is just one thing that can bring an end to the narco-troubles: the decriminalization of the drug
trade in the United States. Legalize and regulate use, proponents argue, and prices would drop and the illicit trade would disappear overnight.
Cartels would be starved of their piece of the global illicit drug pie, which the UNODC has estimated at some $320 billion per year. But would
legalization really work? With each day that passes, it looks like it wouldn't be enough, for one overarching reason:
The cartels are becoming less like traffickers and more like mafias. Their currency is no longer just
cocaine, methamphetamines, or heroin, though they earn revenue from each of these products. As
they have grown in size and ambition, like so many big multinational corporations, they have
diversified. The cartels are now active in all types of illicit markets, not just drugs. "Mexico is
experiencing a change with the emergence of criminal organizations that, rather than being productoriented -- drug trafficking -- are territorial based," says Antonio Mazzitelli, head of the UNODC office in Mexico City.
They now specialize in running protection rackets of all kinds, he says, which might explain why the
violence has gotten so bad: Mafias enforce their territorial control by force, killing anyone who resists
or gets in the way. "Before, we had organized crime, but operating strictly in narcotrafficking," adds
Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, a consultant and former advisor to the Mexican presidency. "Now we have a type of mafia violence
... and they are extorting from the people at levels that are incredibly high -- from the rich, from
businesses." For this reason, Mazzitelli says, legalization would have " little effect. " Cartels such as the Zetas and La
Familia, long categorized as drug-trafficking organizations, have transformed themselves into territorial overlords. With distinctive zones of
influence, complex organizations, and a wealth of manpower on which to draw, they act as shadow governments in the areas they control,
collecting "taxes" on local establishments and taking a cut of the profits from illegal immigration to the United States. "This fight is not solely or
primarily to stop drug trafficking," Mexican President Felipe Calderón told the U.S. Congress in May 2010. "The aim is to ensure the safety of
Mexican families, who are under threat of abuse and wanton acts of criminals." The cartels' expansion may have begun through their everyday
narcotrafficking work -- namely through money laundering, one of the most discussed topics in Mexican politics today. Once upon a time, this
was quite easy to do; cartels could wire the money in convoluted ways or open new accounts to which individuals would report earnings from
businesses that existed only on paper. But as
the government cracked down in recent years, the cartels got more
creative. In June 2010, Mexican authorities put strict limits on how much cash any individual could deposit into a bank on any given day or in
any given month. They also limited the amount of cash one could use to buy things like airplanes or cars. So the cartels started engaging in
actual trade, which helps them launder their drug profits, explains Shannon O'Neil, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington.
They buy consumer goods, such as televisions and perfumes, in the United States and sell them on the Mexican side at a loss. The revenues are
"clean" money. And as a bonus, the
cartels have a network of vendors ready and willing to sell illicit goods.
Other markets are entirely separate from the narcotics business. Perhaps the most dramatic example
is oil, one of Mexico's largest exports and increasingly a vehicle for illicit trade. On June 1, the country's
national oil company, Pemex, filed a lawsuit accusing nine U.S. companies of colluding with criminals linked to the drug trade to sell as
estimated $300 million worth of stolen oil since 2006. That's an amount equal to the entire cocaine market in Mexico, says UNODC's Mazzitelli.
In other words, if the cocaine trade dried up, the cartels would still have access to an equally large source of revenue. Equally
troubling
is the firearms trade, which has a direct link both to the violence and to the sustainment of the
criminal organizations working across this country of 107 million. There are no reliable estimates of
just how big this market is, but according to a recent U.S. Senate investigation, some 87 percent of the
weapons used by the cartels are sourced from the United States. "If this were Southeast Asia, they'd be bombing the
gun stores in Arizona, as if that's the Ho Chi Minh trail," says Ted Lewis, head of the human rights program at Global Exchange. Mexico's cartels
have also infiltrated the government and security forces, though primarily at a local level. "Just going by all the reports -- academic and media -we could safely assume that all municipal police departments are infiltrated," argues Walter McKay, a security consultant who has spent the
last three years working in Mexico. "But it's not just the police. We focus on police and police corruption, but the entire apple is rotten." In the
latest example of how high the rot goes, the ex-mayor of Tijuana, Jorge Hank Rhon, was recently arrested for gunrunning and alleged links to
organized crime. Then
there is the cartels' sheer size. An estimated 468,000 people worked in the drug
trade in 2008, making the cartels collectively among the biggest industries in Mexico. (By comparison,
the state oil company, the largest firm in Mexico, has about 360,000 employees.) The cartels also now
outnumber the police, estimated at just over 400,000 personnel nationwide in 2010. The corruption
and weakness of the police explains why, over the last half-decade, Calderón has deployed 50,000
troops across the country to decapitate the cartels' leadership and reclaim their territory block by
block. Take away a criminal organization's leadership and turf, the thinking goes, and you also rob it of the ability to control just about every
market -- not just the narcotics trade. Just on Tuesday, June 21, the government apprehended José de Jesús "El Chango" Méndez, leader of the
so-called "Knights Templar" cartel. Calderón quickly touted the arrest as a "coup by the federal police against organized crime" on Twitter. Yet
critics of the government's strategy say it has been far too militarized. Violence has increased every year since the drug war began, and many
civil society groups here accuse the national security forces of hurting as many civilians as they do actual criminals. And
even "success"
risks a "balloon effect," as a cartel squeezed in one location will almost inevitably pop up elsewhere.
This effect is already painfully visible in Latin America as a whole, with Mexican cartels such as the
Zetas moving into Guatemala and overwhelming the much-weaker state. Many activists are thus
calling for a completely new approach. Silvano Cantú, a researcher at the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion
of Human Rights, argues that Mexico needs to think bigger than trying to win back its turf city by city. "We need to be talking to everyone," he
says, mentioning the United States, Colombia, Europe, and "anywhere they clean money and buy arms." The government, too, is frustrated
with the guns; cutting down on the sale in the United States is one of the Calderón administration's key demands. The legalizers, a group that
includes former heads of state from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, largely agree with this comprehensive approach. Trying to cut supply without
cutting demand is a losing game, they argue. "The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies
around the world," they wrote in the most recent report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, an independent panel that has called for a
dramatic rethinking of the drug war. Their recommendations call for the normalization of drugs (that is, legalization of possession linked with
public-health regulation), including cocaine. That would almost certainly hurt the cartels, but it probably wouldn't be enough, counters
Mazzitelli of the UNODC. " Legalization
is a fake solution to the problem of security ," he argues, citing a 2010 Rand Corp.
report that found that legalizing marijuana in California would cut cartel profits by just 2 to 4 percent. If it does come, legalization is also quite a
ways off -- and Mexico's crisis is happening now. Only
about half of U.S. citizens polled last year by Gallup supported
legalizing marijuana, the least lucrative (and arguably the least dangerous) drug entering the country
from Mexico. If legalization is out and sending in the Army doesn't work, what's left? Among the most popular alternative ideas floating
around Mexican civil society is that of creating "citizen security" -- empowering local communities to resist organized crime. That means not
only improving policing but also reintroducing the state in other ways, through education, economic opportunity, and a judicial system that
investigates and punishes crime, explains Edgar Cortez, a researcher for the Mexican Institute of Human Rights and Democracy. The broken
justice system is unquestionably part of the problem. Mexico has a poor record of holding criminals to account for all manner of improper
activity -- from trafficking to homicide to regular old theft. "You have all these arrests and more than 40,000 deaths, but we don't have anybody
arrested and investigated successfully," says McKay, the security consultant. Most police departments in the United States and Canada, he
notes, have an 80 to 90 percent "solve rate" of finding the alleged perpetrator. "In Mexico it's almost zero." It's no coincidence that crime rates
of almost every kind are up, according to the Mexican government's own data. Extortion, bank robbery, kidnapping, and armed robbery have all
risen dramatically since 2006. The sheer amount of progress needed to stop the cartels is daunting. But Cantú, the human rights researcher,
chooses to remain optimistic. "We have to put forward alternative options," he argues. "We have to call upon the people to have hope."
Cartels are diversified and are likely to smuggle weapons for terrorists
EVELYN KRACHE MORRIS – 2013. (International Security Program Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University; Foreign Affairs, “Think again: Mexican Drug Cartels,” 12/3/2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels, Accessed 7/29/2014)
Logistics, then, are the DTOs' main source of revenue, and illegal drugs are but one of the products they offer.
As the cartels' revenue
streams become increasingly diversified, the drug trade will become less and less important. In fact,
the prospect of the DTOs' selling their services to terrorists, say by transporting weapons of mass
destruction across the U.S.-Mexico border, has begun to frighten analysts both inside and outside
government.
No Solvency - Revenue
Legalization won’t hurt cartel revenue and won’t alter Mexican state stability- too
many institutional malfunctions
Hope 14 (Alejandro, security policy analyst at IMCO, a Mexico City research organization and former
intelligence officer, “Legal U.S. Pot Won’t Bring Peace to Mexico,” Bloomberg,
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-01-21/legal-u-s-pot-won-t-bring-peace-to-mexico
1/21/14)
Since Jan. 1, Colorado has had a legal marijuana market. The same will soon be true in Washington State, once retail licenses are issued. Other
states, such as California and Oregon, will likely follow suit over the next three years. So does
this creeping legalization of
marijuana in the U.S. spell doom for the Mexican drug cartels? Not quite. The illegal marijuana trade provides
Mexican organized crime with about $1.5 billion to $2 billion a year. That’s not chump change, but according to a number of
estimates, it represents no more than a third of gross drug export revenue. Cocaine is still the cartels’
biggest money-maker and the revenue accruing from heroin and methamphetamine aren’t trivial.
Moreover, Mexican gangs also obtain income from extortion, kidnapping, theft and various other types
of illegal trafficking. Losing the marijuana trade would be a blow to their finances, but it certainly
wouldn’t put them out of business. But surely Mexico would experience less violence if marijuana was legal? Yes, to some extent,
but the decline wouldn’t be sufficient to radically alter the country’s security outlook. In all likelihood,
marijuana production and marijuana-related violence are highly correlated geographically. Marijuana
output is concentrated in five states (Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, Michoacan and Guerrero) that accounted for approximately
a third of all homicides committed in Mexico in 2012. Assuming improbably that half of all murders in those areas were marijuana-related, we
can estimate that the
full elimination of the illegal marijuana trade would reduce Mexico’s homicide rate to
18 per 100,000 inhabitants from 22 -- still about four times the U.S. rate. Well, but couldn’t the Mexican
government gain a peace dividend by redirecting some resources from marijuana prohibition to other law enforcement objectives? Yes, but the
effect would probably be modest. Only 4 percent of all Mexican prison inmates are serving time exclusively for marijuana-related crimes. In
2012, drug offenses represented less than 2 percent of all crime reports in the country. When it comes to only federal crimes (7 percent of the
total), the share of drug offenses rises to 20 percent, but that percentage has been declining since 2007. So
the legalization of
marijuana won’t free up a huge trove of resources to be redeployed against predatory crime.
Whatever the legal status of marijuana, Mexico needs to tackle its many institutional malfunctions. Its
police forces are underpaid, undertrained, under motivated and deeply vulnerable to corruption and
intimidation. Its criminal justice system is painfully slow, notoriously inefficient and deeply unfair.
Even with almost universal impunity, prisons are overflowing and mostly ruled by the inmates
themselves. Changing that reality will take many years. Some reforms are under way, some are barely
off the ground. As a result of a 2008 constitutional reform, criminal courts are being transformed, but progress across states has been
uneven. With a couple of local exceptions, police reform has yet to find political traction. The federal Attorney General’s Office is set to become
an independent body, but not before 2018. The reformist zeal that President Enrique Pena Nieto has shown in other policy areas (education,
energy, telecommunications) is absent in security and justice. Security policy remains reactive, driven more by political considerations than by
strategic design. And results have been mixed at best: Homicides declined moderately in 2013, but both kidnapping and extortion reached
record levels. Marijuana legalization won’t alter that dynamic. In the final analysis, Mexico
doesn’t have a drug problem, much
less a marijuana problem: It has a state capacity problem. That is, its institutions are too weak to
protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens. Even if drug trafficking might very well decline in
the future, in the absence of stronger institutions, something equally nefarious will replace it.
Legalizing Marijuana does not eradicate cartel profit
Morris 2013 (Evelyn Krache, is an International Security Program fellow at the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
“Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels” Foreign Policy, issue 203 (1 December 2013), pages 30-33
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels DECEMBER 3)
"The Problem Is the War on Drugs. Legalization Would Help." Hardly. Legalization has become an
increasingly popular, if still controversial, proposal among those who think that the costs of the war on
drugs have overwhelmed the benefits, including some Central and South American leaders, like
Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina. But because DTOs are dealing in far more than just illegal
drugs, the disappearance of one revenue stream would not eradicate the cartels or decisively erode
their power. Even if the cartels were dependent on drug money, which they aren't, the idea that
legalization is a binary switch that would cut off profits from the drug trade is fundamentally flawed.
In the context of drugs like marijuana, "legalization" implies wide availability and fairly easy access,
but it is highly unlikely that the U.S. government would remove all, or even many, restrictions on
drugs like ecstasy or heroin, leaving the cartels' business in those narcotics intact. What's more, even
legitimate drugs can spur illicit trade if they are in high demand but the supply is tightly controlled.
Drugs like oxycodone, a highly addictive painkiller, are legally manufactured and sold in the United
States, but "oxy" is strictly regulated under Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. Those
restrictions gave rise to a thriving black market in the drug, with prices reaching as high as $150 per pill.
Cartels are not dependent on Marijuana-they have other revenue sources
Longmire Sylvia, 2011( a former officer and investigative special agent in the Air Force, is the author
of the forthcoming book “Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars.” “legalization Won’t Kill
the Cartels http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/opinion/19longmire.html June 8, DATE ACCESSED
8/2/14)
Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. Marijuana legalization has many merits, but it would do little to
hinder the long-term economics of the cartels — and the violent toll they take on Mexican society. For
one thing, if marijuana makes up 60 percent of the cartels’ profits, that still leaves another 40 percent,
which includes the sale of methamphetamine, cocaine, and brown-powder and black-tar heroin. If
marijuana were legalized, the cartels would still make huge profits from the sale of these other drugs.
Plus, there’s no reason the cartels couldn’t enter the legal market for the sale of marijuana, as
organized crime groups did in the United States after the repeal of Prohibition. Still, legalization would
deliver a significant short-term hit to the cartels — if drug trafficking were the only activity they were
engaged in. But cartels derive a growing slice of their income from other illegal activities. Some experts
on organized crime in Latin America, like Edgardo Buscaglia, say that cartels earn just half their income
from drugs. Indeed, in recent years cartels have used an extensive portfolio of rackets and scams to
diversify their income. For example, they used to kidnap rivals, informants and incompetent
subordinates to punish, exact revenge or send a message. Now that they have seen that people are
willing to pay heavy ransoms, kidnapping has become their second-most-lucrative venture, with the
targets ranging from businessmen to migrants. Another new source of cartel revenue is oil theft, long a
problem for the Mexican government. The national oil company, Pemex, loses hundreds of millions of
dollars’ worth of petroleum every year to bandits and criminal gangs who tap into pipelines and
siphon it off. Now the cartels are getting involved in this business, working with associates north of the
border to sell the oil to American companies at huge markups. In 2009 a federal court convicted an
American businessman of helping to funnel $2 million in petroleum products stolen from Pemex by a
Mexican cartel, eventually selling it to a Texas chemical plant owned by the German chemical company
BASF. The chemical company claims never to have known where the products came from. Cartels are
also moving into the market in pirated goods in Latin America. The market used to be dominated by
terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, who operated in the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay. Now the field is being overtaken by Mexican cartels, which already have so much control
over the sale of pirated CDs, DVDs and software that many legitimate companies no longer even
bother to distribute their full-price products in parts of Mexico. Taking another page from traditional
organized crime, cartels are also moving into extortion. A cartel representative will approach the
owner of a business — whether a pharmacy or a taco stand — demanding a monthly stipend for
“protection.” If those payments aren’t made on time, the business is often burned to the ground, or the
owner is threatened, kidnapped or killed. A popular cartel racket involves branded products. For
example, a cartel member — most often from Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana, two of the largest
and most diversified cartels — will tell a music-store owner that he has to sell CDs with the Zetas logo
stamped on them, with the cartel taking a 25 percent cut of the profits. Noncompliance isn’t an option.
With so many lines of business, it’s unlikely that Mexican cartels would close up shop in the event of
legalization, even if it meant a serious drop in profits from their most successful product. Cartels are
economic entities, and like any legitimate company the best are able to adapt in the face of a
changing market.
No Impact – Mexican Stability
Mexico won’t collapse- economy is growing and corruption is decreasing
Barone 13 (Michael, political analyst, coauthor of annual Almanac of American Politics and senior
policy analyst for the Washingon Examiner, “Mexico becomes a stable, politically diverse neighbor,”
American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/politics-and-public-opinion/mexico-becomesa-stable-politically-diverse-neighbor/ 4/6/14
We Americans are lucky, though we seldom reflect on it, that we have good neighbors. In East Asia, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and the Philippines face challenges from China over islands they have long claimed in the East China Sea. In Europe, Germany and other
prosperous nations face demands for subsidies from debt-ridden nations to avoid the collapse of the euro. When Southern Europeans look
across the Mediterranean, they see Muslim nations facing post-Arab Spring upheaval and disorder. The United States has land borders with just
two nations, Canada (more on that another day) and Mexico, where Barack Obama is headed next month. They're both good neighbors. I
realize that most of the recent news on Mexico has been about violent drug wars. You
get 500,000 hits when you Google
"Mexico failed state." But that's a misleading picture. The war on drug lords waged by President
Felipe Calderon from 2006 to 2012 has had considerable success and has been de-emphasized by his successor,
Enrique Pena Nieto. The focus on the drug war ignores Mexico's progress over the last 25 years as an
electoral democracy. For 71 years, it had one-party rule of the PRI, or Party of the Institutional Revolution. Under PRI rule, a president
selected by his predecessor selected his successor. But under PRI Presidents Carlos Salinas (1988-94) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000),
Mexico established a clean election system under which the opposition conservative PAN and leftist
PRD parties won state and legislative offices. This was capped when PAN candidate Vicente Fox was elected president in July
2000. When Zedillo came on television and said, "I recognize that Vicente Fox is the next president of Mexico," thousands of Fox supporters
gathered around Mexico City's Angel of Independence and stomped so strongly in unison that the Earth shook. Fox and his PAN successor,
Calderon, had some significant policy successes. But they were frustrated in getting changes in the energy sector, in which the state-owned
monopoly Pemex has lagged behind, and in education, where teacher jobs are handed down from parent to child. The reason
is that
since 2000, none of Mexico's three parties has had a majority in Congress. That's one result of genuine
political competition, in which voters have imposed rotation in office in governorships and legislative
seats. But it also meant that the PAN presidents could not get reforms through Congress if they were opposed by the PRI and the PRD. Things
have been different since the 2012 presidential election. PRI candidate Enrique Pena Nieto seemed a depressingly conventional politician, who
as governor of the state of Mexico (which surrounds central Mexico City) won publicity for dating a telenovela star. Pena won the July election
handily and on taking office in December called for major reforms. He issued a 34-page Pact for Mexico, which proposed greater competition
for Pemex in the energy sector, plus education and judicial reforms. Remarkably, it was endorsed by PAN and PRD as well as the PRI. Pemex has
been a sacred cow in Mexico since the 1930s when President Lazaro Cardenas seized foreign oil operations and created the state-owned
monopoly. The Pemex union was a pillar of the PRI establishment. Now a PRI president was proposing to reform it, and his move was endorsed
by a PRI party convention in March. Pena also acted on education. In February, Congress passed a law establishing a transparent system for
teacher hiring and evaluation. The next day, the government arrested the head of the teachers union and charged her with spending $156
million of union funds on luxury goods. And Pena has moved to deregulate telecommunications, which threatens the position of telecom
billionaire Carlos Slim. There
is other heartening news from south of our border. Mexico's economy is
moving ahead with 5 percent growth. Since the NAFTA treaty went into effect in the 1990s, it seemed
that Mexico's economy was tethered to ours, leaving it unable to close the gap with the United States.
Now as our economy slogs along slowly, Mexico is moving toward catching up. It is, as former Foreign
Minister Jorge Castaneda has proclaimed, a majority middle-class country now. It is also a country
from which, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, there has been no net migration to the United
States since 2007. All this vindicates our previous four presidents, who pressed for closer ties with
Mexico. But most of the credit belongs to the leaders and people of Mexico. Good neighbors.
Mexico becoming increasingly stable- Moody’s sovereign rating upgrade proves
Global Credit Research 14 (“Rating Action: Moody's upgrades Mexico's sovereign rating to A3 from
Baa1; stable outlook,” Moody’s Investors Service, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodysupgrades-Mexicos-sovereign-rating-to-A3-from-Baa1-stable--PR_292144 2/5/14)
Moody's Investors Service has today upgraded Mexico's government bond ratings to A3 from Baa1. The
outlook is stable. The decision to upgrade Mexico's sovereign ratings was driven by the structural
reforms approved last year, which Moody's expects will strengthen the country's potential growth
prospects and fiscal fundamentals. As the full impact of the reforms becomes more evident over time, Moody's expects
that Mexico's credit metrics will report firm - but gradual - improvements, thereby further reinforcing the
country's already robust sovereign credit profile. Specifically, the upgrade of Mexico's sovereign
ratings was driven by the following four factors linked to the country's reform package: - Approval of a
comprehensive reform agenda, which reflects political will to address longstanding structural issues - Improved mediumterm economic prospects associated with higher potential growth that is likely to result from the comprehensive reform package - A
strengthened fiscal outlook that incorporates higher government savings and additional buffers - An
overall credit profile that is similar to that of other A-rated countries
Turns - Civilians
Legalization won’t solve- will hurt more Mexican civilians in long run
Corcoran 13 (Patrick, MA Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Mexico’s shifting
criminal landscape: changes in gang operation and structure during the past century,” InSightCrime.org
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/700/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12117-013-91908.pdf?auth66=1407004616_6fa114f7864b91ac4d7579906bea212c&ext=.pdf 3/1/13)
The changing nature of Mexico's trafficking industry offers policy-makers a handful of suggestions and cautionary notes. One is that the
security challenge is no longer limited to the drug trade. As noted above, many of the newer gangs increasingly
rely on revenues from alternative activities rather than the drug trade. The most notable of these are extortion and
kidnapping. These crimes are qualitatively different from the rest because, by design, they prey on
successful, law-abiding citizens. For all but the unluckiest Mexicans, avoiding the ill effects of the drug trade is simply a matter of
not becoming a drug trafficker However, running a thriving legitimate business today makes one a target for extortion and kidnapping, which is
to say, these
crimes punish the very ingredients of a prosperous society. This indicates that two of the
solutions most frequently offered——demand reduc-tion and legalization—would not be sufficient to
address Mexico's current problems. ln the long run, driving down the total amount of money available to
criminal groups would almost certainly reduce their threat, but such a transition would not happen overnight. The
estimated 500,000 Mexicans who currently make their living off of the drug trade, many of them
violent actors, would seek to replace the income Because the most logical substitutes for drug
trafficking are other illicit activities— such as extortion, kidnapping and bank-robbery—that often
have a greater impact on civilians, suddenly reducing demand or legalizing drugs may even have a
short-term perverse effect of increasing the chaos.
Turns - US Mexico Relations
Legalizing marijuana tanks US-Mexico relations
Murray et al. 11 (Chad Murray, Ashlee Jackson, Amanda C. Miralrio, Nicolas Eiden, “Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization” The George
Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission: Capstone Report;
https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf
4/26/11)
Relations between the U.S. and Mexico will deteriorate in the short-term if the U.S. legalizes
marijuana. Relations between the United States and Mexico have improved over the last decade, and
President Obama and President Calderón continue to work diligently to maintain relations and combat drugs. However, this
relationship is likely to decay even if the United States legalizes marijuana in only a de facto manner
on the state level. Last year President Calderón openly expressed his distaste for Proposition 19 before it was defeated in November. He
believes that any form of legalization of marijuana in the United States would be a sign of hypocrisy as
evident when he stated, “I think they [United States] have very little moral authority to condemn a Mexican farmer who for hunger is planting
marijuana to sustain the insatiable North American market for drugs.”86 Although President Calderón has acknowledged the fact that the drug
policy debate needs to take place, he has been adamant that legalization in the United States is not the best policy. In addition, other
Latin
American leaders, such as Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia, have expressed their support of President Calderón‟s
position on the legalization of marijuana. President Calderón and others believe that the legalization of marijuana in the
United States would delegitimize the Mexican war on drugs. Some scholars note that if the United States legalized
marijuana, the Mexican populace would be left wondering, “What team are you [United States] playing for?”87 Mexico has spent a lot
of blood and treasure fighting against DTOs over the last few years, and some feel that the
legalization of marijuana in the United States, no matter how well intentioned, would be negating
those efforts. Proof of the seriousness of Mexico‟s dedication to the drug war is evidenced by the
recent tensions between the United States and Mexico. Relations between the two countries have
been terse ever since Wikileaks revealed that Ambassador Pascual wrote that he did not believe that
President Calderón could win the war on drugs. This caused such strife that Ambassador Pascual resigned in March 2011.
President Calderón has been dedicated to helping Mexico combat drugs, and he was unwilling to allow a U.S. Ambassador to openly criticize his
efforts. If President Calderón was this forceful of the Wikileaks incident, the
legalization of marijuana in the U.S. would
likely be trying on the bilateral relationship. How far this distancing would go is up for debate, given Mexico‟s dependence on
U.S. trade and counter-narcotics aid programs. Were President Calderón no longer in office and U.S. states legalized marijuana, the effects
would likely to be similar, although maybe not as severe. If the PRI were to return to power, it is likely that they would begin to distance
themselves from the United States, as they did in the past. The PRI preferred to handle DTOs through a series of tacit agreements that
maintained order instead of collaborating with the U.S. In this sense, the fallout between the United States and Mexico might not be as severe,
but it is likely that Mexico would still publically reprimand the United States‟ actions. Either way, the legalization of marijuana in the United
States would harm U.S.-Mexico relations and the United States should consider the repercussions before initiating policy reform.
Turns - Strengthens Cartels
Legalization of marijuana increases demand- DTOS will still supply
Stimson 2010 (Charles "Cully,"Manager, National Security Law Program and Senior Legal Fellow,
“Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No” Legal Memorandum #56 on Legal Issues
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/legalizing-marijuana-why-citizens-should-just-sayno September 13, 2010 8/2/14)
According to the Department of Justice’s National Drug Threat Assessment for 2010, Mexican drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) “have expanded their cultivation operations in the United States, an
ongoing trend for the past decade…. Well-organized criminal groups and DTOs that produce domestic
marijuana do so because of the high profitability of and demand for marijuana in the United
States.”[53] Legalize marijuana, and the demand for marijuana goes up substantially as the
deterrence effect of law enforcement disappears. Yet not many suppliers will operate legally, refusing
to subject themselves to the established state regulatory scheme— not to mention taxation—while
still risking federal prosecution, conviction, and prison time. So who will fill the void?
Legalization will increase cartel influence- history proves
Felbab-Brown 10 (Vanda, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in
the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Institution, “Why Legalization in Mexico is Not a Panacea for
Reducing Violence and Suppressing Organized Crime,”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/09/23-mexico-marijuana-legalizationfelbabbrown?rssid=mexico&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3a%2
bBrookingsRSS%2ftopics%2fmexico%2b(Brookings%3a%2bTopics%2b-%2bMexico 9/23/10)
But, even if legalization did displace the DTOs from the marijuana production and distribution market
in Mexico, they can hardly be expected to take such a change lying down. Rather, they may intensify
the violent power struggle over remaining hard-drug smuggling and distribution. (Notably, the
shrinkage of the U.S. cocaine market is one of the factors that precipitated the current DTO wars.)
Worse yet, the DTOs could intensify their effort to take over other illegal economies in Mexico, such
as the smuggling of migrants and other illegal commodities, prostitution, extortion, and kidnapping,
and also over Mexico’s informal economy – trying to franchise who sells tortillas, jewelry, clothes on
the zócalo -- to mitigate their financial losses. They are already doing so. If they succeed in franchising
the informal economy and organizing public spaces and street life in the informal sector (40% of
Mexico’s economy), their political power over society will be greater than ever.
Solvency
No Solvency – Changing Schedule
Removing marijuana from the list of schedule 1 drugs won’t solve legal certainty.
Boyd et al, ‘14
[Graham (Visiting Senior Fellow in the Social Policy and Politics Program at the Third Way); Sarah
Trumble (Policy Counsel for the Social Policy & Politics Program at Third Way); and Lanae Erickson
Hatalsky (Director of Third Way's Social Policy & Politics Program), “Marijuana Legalization: Does
Congress Need to Act?”, Social Policy, Third Way, June 2014, RSR]
Currently, marijuana is regulated as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act, meaning it “has no currently accepted medical use
in treatment in the United States” and is considered less medically beneficial than Schedule II drugs such as cocaine and methamphetamine.24
Many people have suggested removing marijuana from the list of Schedule I controlled substances,
and Attorney General Holder has suggested that he would be open to discussing that issue with
Congress.25 However, while it is worth having a debate about whether marijuana belongs on a list with
heroin and LSD, lowering its schedule would still require a prescription for legal use under federal
law—even in states where broad recreational use has been legalized.26 So while reclassifying
marijuana as lower than Schedule 1 would fix some issues, including paving the way for needed
research around its medical uses, a conflict would still exist between what is legal under federal law
versus under state law in states that have legalized recreational use. Market participants would still
be at risk of prosecution, and banks would still be unwilling to do business with recreational
dispensaries.
It’s impossible to regulate marijuana to make it a schedule II drug.
Reid, Associate Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law, ‘14
[Melanie, “THE QUAGMIRE THAT NOBODY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WANTS TO TALK ABOUT:
MARIJUANA”, The New Mexico Law Review, Vol. 44, Spring 2014, RSR]
Schedule I substances have a high potential for abuse, have no accepted medical use in the United States, and lack accepted safety data for use
under medical supervision.138 On the other hand, Schedule II substances are approved for medical use, but have a high potential for abuse.139
The problem with transferring cannabis from Schedule I to Schedule II lies in the fact that marijuana
plants vary in potency , because each plant produces different quantities and compositions of THC
and cannabidiol (“CBD”).140 On one day, a smoker might inhale marijuana with a 3 percent THC concentration, and on another day,
might inhale marijuana with a 20 percent concentration. It
would be virtually impossible for the FDA to regulate the
doses of active ingredients such as THC and CBD, or create a method of growing and blending
marijuana so that the substance has “well-defined and measureable ingredients that are consistent
from one unit (such as a pill or injection) to the next. This consistency allows doctors to determine the doses and
frequency.”141 It
would be impossible to meet quality control standards, and the standardization
requirements pertaining to purity and potency when filing for a New Drug Application.142 In order to place
a drug on Schedule II, the FDA would have to determine the correct dosage for medicinal use. In 1989, the DEA denied the National
Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws’ (NORML) petition to reschedule marijuana plant material from Schedule I to Schedule II.143 The
findings of fact revealed that Cannabis or marijuana cannot be defined chemically, nor can it be easily
standardized. . . . [S]moking as a dosage form to deliver marijuana to the human body is unsuitable
for medical treatment due to: (1) lack of standardization of the marijuana, (2) lack of knowledge of
the amounts of each constituent available, (3) lack of knowledge of the activity of the chemicals while
burning, (4) amount of product ingested being dependent on the individual’s smoking technique, and
(5) possible carcinogenic effect of smoking. There are no drugs which are delivered by smoking which
are medically used in the United States.144 Currently, no prescribed medicines are ingested by
smoking. Opium poppy is not smoked for medical purposes; instead, opium is extracted from the plant, and a variety of opiate products
(e.g., morphine and paregoric) are produced and listed under the CSA’s Schedule II.145 Under government regulations, “[i]n contrast to
variations in cannabinoid content evident in cannabis, naturally occurring opium derivatives remain quantitatively stable and the potency can
be chemically standardized.”146 Thus, Marinol,147 and Sativex,148 but not marijuana for smoking, or raw marijuana for eating, can be placed
on Schedule II, because the latter two forms are an imprecise and dangerous way to ingest CBD, and serve no medicinal purpose. Using pure
extracts of CBD already produced by the pharmaceutical companies would be the safer method to ingest CBD for medicinal purposes.
No Solvency – Black Market Turn
Social costs paid by the government will increase with legalization.
Sabet, Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction
Medicine, University of Florida, ‘13
[Kevin, “A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to Determine Where to Go in
Drug Policy”, Oregon Law Review, Vol. 91, 2013, RSR]
Many legalization advocates urge the government to “tax the hell out of” drugs,14 in order to pay for
the assumed increased use and addiction costs. That way, new users will be deterred from starting because the price would
be out of reach. The most vulnerable (i.e. the poor) would benefit from high costs, too, since one might think that those with less disposable
income can afford expensive drugs. Ironically,
however, this scenario actually exacerbates some of the worst
qualities of prohibition. High-cost drugs would ensure that an already well-established black market
would remain largely in tact. If a person can buy cocaine for ten dollars an ounce from a dealer or go to a government-sponsored
“drug store” for ten times that much, he or she would opt for the former scenario. Especially if drugs were still illegal for minors (no one has
seriously proposed legalizing marijuana or cocaine for minors), a black market would still have reasons to linger. This is
precisely what
occurred in Canada when it imposed steep taxes on cigarettes.15 In fact, today there is a thriving black
market for the highly taxed cigarettes in certain parts of the U nited S tates as criminals smuggle
packs of cigarettes from lower-taxed states to those with higher taxes. For example, New York has the highest tax
on cigarettes in the country ($4.35 per pack, with an additional $1.50 in New York City).16 As a result, it has the highest smuggling rates in the
United States: 60.9% of cigarettes were smuggled into New York in 2011.17 After
Massachusetts, Florida, and Utah raised
their cigarette taxes, smuggling significantly increased.18 California Board of Equalization officials
have recently estimated that cigarette excise tax revenue evasion was $182 million in fiscal year
2005–06.19 Around fifteen percent of all cigarettes sold in that state have somehow avoided the
excise taxes in place on each pack to raise revenues for the state budget.20 This is lower than evasion rates in
other countries, according to the Chief Economist for the California Board of Equalization.21 For example, about twenty-two percent
of the United Kingdom’s domestic cigarette market now consists of smuggled cigarettes.22 In Canada,
smuggled cigarettes represented about thirty-three percent of all domestic cigarette consumption at
their peak.23 In the United States, illegal drugs cost $193 billion per year in lost social costs. 24 That number
would no doubt increase under legalization and then have to be distributed to the new number of
total drug users. Experience with taxing alcohol and tobacco shows that any attempt to pay for lost
costs through taxes would be futile . Indeed the social costs of legalization (e.g., increased health
costs, accidents, productivity losses) outweigh any possible tax that could be levied against the drug.
Drugs that are already legal in the United States are a good example of what would happen if we
thought we could reap the financial benefits of illegal drugs: For every one dollar of revenue they
produce, they each cost the United States ten dollars in lost social costs.2
No Solvency – Grey Market Turn
Marijuana legalization leads to a gray market.
Sabet, Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction
Medicine, University of Florida, ‘12
[Kevin, “There Are Smarter Ways to Deal With Marijuana Than Legalization”, US News and World
Report, 10-30-12,
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/there-are-smarter-ways-todeal-with-marijuana-than-legalization, RSR]
Even the
supposed benefits of legalization may not pan out. Ironically, under legalization, we could see
arrest rates for marijuana actually increase , similar to what we see with alcohol (there are 2.7 million
arrests a year for alcohol versus 800,000 for marijuana), as more users drive high or violate marijuana
growing and using laws. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the underground market would
significantly diminish. In a legal market, where marijuana is taxed, the well-established illegal drug
trade has every incentive to remain. Today's thriving underground market for tobacco is a good
example of this. The drug trade is so profitable that even undercutting the taxed price would leave
cartels with a handsome profit . Marijuana legalization would also do nothing to loosen the cartels'
grip on other illegal trades such human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, piracy, and other illicit drugs
(marijuana accounts for a minority of revenues gained by drug trafficking groups). Producing marijuana en
masse at home is also much easier to do than with tobacco or alcohol.
We can expect a thriving grey market.
No Solvency – Regulation
Regulated legalization won’t solve – the black market will exploit holes and use will
increase.
Sabet, Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction
Medicine, University of Florida, ’13 [Kevin, “A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on
Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy”, Oregon Law Review, Vol. 91, 2013, RSR]
In 1996, local communities throughout Holland were given the authority to decide whether coffee shops should be allowed within their
jurisdictions.81 Since then, three quarters of the nearly 500 local communities in Holland have refused to allow coffee shops to operate within
their borders at all.82 As a result, Amsterdam became
home to one-third of all coffee shops in the country
despite having only five percent of the country’s population.83 But the black market sale of marijuana
did not go away in areas with a high concentration of coffee shops legally selling pot. There are several
reasons for this and all relate to the unfailing opportunism of black market sellers in exploiting the inevitable gaps left open in any regime of
legal marijuana. For example, black market
dealers take advantage of coffee shops not being open twenty-four
hours a day to offer round-the-clock service. Black market sellers also target minors too young to
legally enter coffee shops. Additionally, while there are limits on the amount of pot a coffee shop visitor
can purchase, there is no limit on how much a customer can buy from a black market dealer in a single
transaction.84 All of these factors combined create an enforcement problem for Holland’s criminal
justice system. Predictably, as pot use was normalized by coffee shops, an increase in marijuana use among Holland’s
young people occurred. Rates of youth marijuana use more than doubled from the mid-1980s to the
mid-1990s. An analysis by a pair of researchers who are sympathetic to marijuana legalization and decriminalization found that the
percentage of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds reporting marijuana use went from fifteen percent in 1984 to forty-four percent in 1996, an
increase of 300% for that age group.85 The
Dutch always had lower rates of youth marijuana use than the United
States, but since the mid- 1990s, Dutch rates have caught up to their American counterparts.
Marijuana potency has also risen dramatically over the last decade or so. The European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction has posted statistics showing that THC concentrations in marijuana sold in coffee shops more than doubled between
1999 and 2004, from an average of 8.6% in 1999 to more than 20% in 2004.86 As
potency levels escalated, users began
developing a tolerance for the drug, requiring increasingly higher levels of THC to get the same high—
a vicious cycle that accelerates the development of dependency. Dutch citizens now are more likely to
be admitted to treatment centers for marijuana use than citizens of any other European country.87
Holland holds yet another distinction that the pro-pot movement might wish would go away. Foreign Affairs, published by the
United States-based Council on Foreign Relations, did an analysis of Holland’s drug experiment and
described how that country’s lenient laws and status as “the drugs capital of western Europe” had
turned it into “ a magnet for . . . criminal types .”88 And we are not just talking about marijuana trafficking. Law enforcement
authorities in both France and Britain estimated that eighty percent of the heroin used or seized in those countries passed through or was
temporarily warehoused in Holland.89 Dutch traffickers manufactured most of the amphetamines and ecstasy pills consumed in Europe.90
According to a British customs official, “ Holland
has become the place for drug traffickers to work . . . it’s an
environment which is relatively troublefree from a criminal’s point of view.”91 To their credit, Dutch law
enforcement have begun to fund enforcement operations and intelligence at a much higher rate now than in the past.92 Dutch officials
did not predict these effects of marijuana legalization. Nor did they predict the sharp increase in use
rates, the higher rates of dependency, the significant increase in treatment admission rates, or all the
other social and public health problems that have emerged in Holland over the years.
No Solvency – Taxation
Government taxation of marijuana increases the cost on the government.
Sabet, Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction
Medicine, University of Florida, ’13 [Kevin, “A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on
Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy”, Oregon Law Review, Vol. 91, 2013, RSR]
Many legalization advocates urge the government to “tax the hell out of” drugs,14 in order to pay for
the assumed increased use and addiction costs. That way, new users will be deterred from starting because the price would
be out of reach. The most vulnerable (i.e. the poor) would benefit from high costs, too, since one might think that those with less disposable
income can afford expensive drugs. Ironically,
however, this scenario actually exacerbates some of the worst
qualities of prohibition. High-cost drugs would ensure that an already well-established black market
would remain largely in tact. If a person can buy cocaine for ten dollars an ounce from a dealer or go to a government-sponsored
“drug store” for ten times that much, he or she would opt for the former scenario. Especially if drugs were still illegal for minors (no one has
seriously proposed legalizing marijuana or cocaine for minors), a black market would still have reasons to linger. This is
precisely what
occurred in Canada when it imposed steep taxes on cigarettes.15 In fact, today there is a thriving black
market for the highly taxed cigarettes in certain parts of the U nited S tates as criminals smuggle
packs of cigarettes from lower-taxed states to those with higher taxes. For example, New York has the highest tax
on cigarettes in the country ($4.35 per pack, with an additional $1.50 in New York City).16 As a result, it has the highest smuggling rates in the
United States: 60.9% of cigarettes were smuggled into New York in 2011.17 After
Massachusetts, Florida, and Utah raised
their cigarette taxes, smuggling significantly increased.18 California Board of Equalization officials
have recently estimated that cigarette excise tax revenue evasion was $182 million in fiscal year
2005–06.19 Around fifteen percent of all cigarettes sold in that state have somehow avoided the
excise taxes in place on each pack to raise revenues for the state budget.20 This is lower than evasion rates in
other countries, according to the Chief Economist for the California Board of Equalization.21 For example, about twenty-two percent
of the United Kingdom’s domestic cigarette market now consists of smuggled cigarettes.22 In Canada,
smuggled cigarettes represented about thirty-three percent of all domestic cigarette consumption at
their peak.23 In the United States, illegal drugs cost $193 billion per year in lost social costs. 24 That number
would no doubt increase under legalization and then have to be distributed to the new number of
total drug users. Experience with taxing alcohol and tobacco shows that any attempt to pay for lost
costs through taxes would be futile . Indeed the social costs of legalization (e.g., increased health
costs, accidents, productivity losses) outweigh any possible tax that could be levied against the drug.
Drugs that are already legal in the United States are a good example of what would happen if we
thought we could reap the financial benefits of illegal drugs: For every one dollar of revenue they
produce, they each cost the United States ten dollars in lost social costs.2
No Solvency – States Key
States solve – without state cooperation, the federal government can’t enforce
penalties
Mikos 12
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 12/12, [http://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/limits-federal-supremacy-when-states-relax-or-abandon-marijuana-bans], “On the Limits of
Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans“, Policy Analysis No. 714, Page 2-3
On a more practical level, the fact that state exemptions remain enforceable is con- sequential; these
states laws, in other words, are not merely symbolic gestures. The main reason is that the federal
government lacks the resources needed to enforce its own ban vigorously: although it commands a $2
tril- lion dollar (plus) budget, the federal govern- ment is only a two-bit player when it comes to
marijuana enforcement. Only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases gen- erated every year
are handled by federal au- thorities.10 The states, by virtueof their great- er law enforcement
resources (among other things), hold the upper hand. The federal ban may be strict—and its penalties
severe— but without the wholehearted cooperation of state law enforcement authorities, its im- pact
on private behavior will remain limited. Most medical marijuana users and suppliers can feel
confident they will never be caught by the federal government.11
A2: Netherlands
Netherlands model sucks – increased drug use.
Sabet, Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction
Medicine, University of Florida, ‘6 [Kevin, “The (Often Unheard) Case Against Marijuana Leniency”, Pot
Politics: Marijuana and the Costs of Prohibition, Oxford University Press, 2006, RSR]
There does seem to be a correlation between marijuana and other drug use- most proponents and
opponents of marijuana decriminalization agree on that
(Golub 81 Johnson, 1994). But what is so special about
marijuana? Indeed, people advocating legalization retort that most people who have used cocaine have also used milk. Does that make milk a
gateway drug? Hardly, as MacCoun and Reuter point out, since there is no correlation be- tween drinking milk and snorting/injecting/smoking
cocaine (MacCoun 81 Router, 2001). But even they admit, in their support for a less restrictive marijuana policy, that " the
evidence for
a correlation between cannabis use and hard drug use is . . . overwhelming " [MacCoun and Reuter, 2001, citing
Kandel, Yamaguchi, & Chen 1992). So
what causes the strong correlation between marijuana use and the use of
other drugs? We're still trying to figure that out, but it appears that evidence has weakened for any kind of
genetic effect on drug using by people who by their nature are rebellious. Australian researchers
published in 2003 a major study in the Journal of the American Medical Association that followed 31 l
same-sex twin pairs; each pair had one twin that had used marijuana before age 17 and one who had
never used the drug. The researchers found that the marijuana-using twins were five times more likely
to go on to hallucinogens such as LSD, three times more likely to go on to cocaine, and twice as likely
to go on to heroin [Lynskey et al., 2003]. Lynskey and his colleagues claimed they found a causal relationship
between marijuana and other drugs. Though this assertion was contested by an editorial in the same
issue of the Journal written by a leading marijuana researcher, the study gives the gateway theory
overwhelming force . So marijuana can lead to other drugs. The Australian study still didn't tell us why, but the
authors point out three of the most popular assertions: [a] Initial pleasurable experiences with
marijuana may encourage other drug use; (b) innocuous early experiences with marijuana [little
chance of running into the law and/or having a negative biological reaction) may re- duce the barriers
to trying other drugs; and (C) obtaining marijuana from the underground market, which is necessary
when the drug is illegal, implies coming into Contact with the underworld and dealers who sell drugs
other than pot. All of these seem plausible. Marijuana does not usually produce a negative reaction after the first puff. Indeed, for most
people it is a pleasurable experience that does not cause the violence of smoking crack or the crazed feelings of injecting methamphetamine.
Additionally, since
most people rarely suffer great criminal justice consequences for smoking or
possessing a few joints, this could lead to the impression that all drug use is easily con- cealable and
that the omnipresence of the police is a myth. This latter thought may give fodder to those wishing to recriminalize
marijuana in places where penalties have been eliminated. For example, after years of decriminalization, Alaska voters
put a successful initiative on the ballot in 1990 stipulating penalties for marijuana possession. This third
plausible explanation is a favorite of legalization advocates. It is used profusely to argue for the legalization of marijuana and the separa- tion of
marijuana from other drug markets. They claim that if marijuana were brought out of the underground market, kids would have less Contact
with cocaine and heroin dealers and thus have a harder time than they do currently in obtaining those drugs. Indeed, many marijuana
apologists cite the fact that cocaine use among those who have used marijuana is lower in the Netherlands than in the United States (22% vs.
33%, from MacCoun 81 Reuter, 2001]. And although this is true as of 1996 (which is important to note since drug use rose between 1992 and
1996 before leveling off in 1997 and falling in 2001), we don't know whether to attribute the difference to separate drug markets or the cultural
and social differences that exist be- tween the two countries. The use rates of cocaine in the United States and Netherlands do not control for
other possible factors, and, as MacCoun says, "Cross-country comparisons are problematic" (MacCoun 2001]. Reinarman, Cohen, and Kall's
(2004) analysis comparing drug policy in Amsterdam and San Francisco, and concluding that San Francisco's policies are worse since more
people go on to harder drugs there than in Amsterdam, completely ignores the obvious limitations of global city comparisons (which do not
take into account cultural, social, and political climates, and, perhaps most important in this case, nuances in the law: San Francisco's marijuana
I am skeptical of the theory that says separating markets will lead to
less prevalence of other drugs since people are usually introduced to marijuana by their friends, not
by contact with aggressive dealers (Dupre, I995; Sim- mons, Conger, 8:. Whitbeck, 1988). Many
dealers of marijuana sell just that and do not have contact with dealers of other drugs. Besides, evidence
from abroad that American marijuana smokers use more cocaine than the Dutch, evidence of other
drug use because of marijuana's legal status, is purely speculative. That argument loses even more
credence when we consider that alcohol and tobacco-our two legal drugs-act as gateway drugs in a
pro- found way. Additionally, the normalization of marijuana in the Netherlands seems to have actually
attracted dealers of other drugs. There may be evidence that a laissez-faire attitude on one drug
(marijuana in this case) has a gateway effect of attracting dealers of other drugs. The Netherlands is
the largest producer of MDMA (Ecstasy) in the world, according to the United Nation's International
Narcotics Control Board. Law enforcement in Britain and France further attest to it. "Holland is Europe's drug supermarket. Drugs of
all kinds are freely available there," says one British official [qtd. in Collins, 1999). French officials report that 98% of
amphetamines seized in France in 1997 came from Holland, as did more than three quarters of the
ecstasy tablets. A leading French law enforcement official laments, "The light sen- tences they hand out and the
laws are notoriously lax, even Dutch-like).
liberal attitude of their judges has resulted in an explosion in the number of international trafficking
groups operating out of Holland." He continues: "Get arrested with 50 kilos of heroin or cocaine in France or England and you'll be
sentenced to 20 years to life and serve at least 17 of those years. . . . In Holland . . . the most you'll get is eight years, of which you'll serve only
four in prison, where you'll be in your own cell with color TV and a stereo and have the right to a conjugal visit twice a month from a woman
who may-or may not-bc your wife. Is it any wonder then that the country has become the drug traffickers’ preferred working place? (qtd. In
Collins, 1999).
A2: Portugal
Portugal is not a success story – drug use is still high.
Sabet, Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction
Medicine, University of Florida, ‘13
[Kevin, “A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to Determine Where to Go in
Drug Policy”, Oregon Law Review, Vol. 91, 2013, RSR]
In 2011, The New Yorker was much more careful in its review of the law’s effects: “[T]here is much to debate about the Portuguese approach to
drug addiction. Does it help people to quit, or does it transform them into more docile drug addicts, wards of an indulgent state, with little
genuine incentive to alter their behavior?”65 So what is the straight truth about Portugal and its drug policy? In short, some use and harm
levels went up, others went down. And
it is questionable whether the policy that Portugal enacted is working
as intended. Depending on which years, age groups, or outcomes one examines, the statistics on the impact of drug use change
dramatically. The significance of Portugal’s experience and the impact of that country’s drug policy have
been overstated in several ways. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA), long considered the authority on drug statistics in Europe , compiled statistics showing an
increase in lifetime prevalence rates for the use of cannabis, cocaine, amphetamines, ecstasy, and
LSD between 2001 and 2011.66 Those figures are for the general population of Portugal, ages fifteen to sixty-four years of age.67
The European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD) survey of fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds shows an overall increase in
the prevalence of marijuana use between 1999 to 2011, although there was an initial dip in use rates.68 Past-month prevalence for marijuana
use in that age group went from five percent in 1999 to eight percent in 2003 to six percent in 2007 and finally up nine percent in 2011.69
EMCDDA concluded, “the most recent ESPAD study corroborates the findings of the [UN World Health Organization] study, showing increasing
consumption of illicit substances [in Portugal] since 2006.”70 Data on the number of drug-related deaths is mixed. Some sources point to an
increase in deaths from 280 in 2001 to 314 in 2007.71 Others point to different numbers. For example, data from the General Mortality Registry
of the Statistics National Institute shows that twenty-six cases of drug-related deaths occurred in 2010.72 That represents fewer deaths than
the twenty-seven cases reported in 2009 and 2002 but is higher than the number of drug-related deaths reported in each of the years between
2003 and 2008.73 Clearly, it is a mixed picture. As Stanford University’s Dr. Keith Humphreys notes of the EMCDDA’s data, “Portugal
decriminalized all drugs in 2001, and these factually accurate data can be used to prove that Portugal’s policy has been a complete success or a
complete failure, assuming the analyst has no intellectual integrity.” With this evidence in hand, the EMCDDA concluded that under Portugal’s
drug law, “[t]he
country still has high levels of problem drug use and HIV infection, and does not show
specific developments in its drug situation that would clearly distinguish it from other European
countries that have a different policy.”75 The new policy, then, appeared to be neither novel nor a magic bullet. It is also highly
debatable whether Portugal’s law has encouraged people with drug problems to seek treatment. As The New Yorker article pointed out,
treatment facilities “became far more accessible just as the new law was passed.”76Any positive treatment trends and other claimed benefits
seen since 2001 may simply be due to increases in treatment capacity and reach. We do not really know. Indeed, it appears that Portugal’s
policy is not really a true decriminalization or legalization strategy. It is more of a treatment-or- ”dissuasion”-focused approach similar to those
of Portugal’s European neighbors. While the Portuguese experience with drug policy reform extends beyond marijuana, the fact that prolegalization advocates point to it as a successful model for North American pot legalization makes it highly relevant to this context. Close
examination has demonstrated that drug legalization advocates in the United States are not
strengthening their case by highlighting the Portuguese drug law model.
States
States Key
States can legalize marijuana – federal government can’t preempt
Mikos 12
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 12/12, [http://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/limits-federal-supremacy-when-states-relax-or-abandon-marijuana-bans], “On the Limits of
Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans“, Policy Analysis No. 714, Page 2
Congress has banned marijuana out- right, recognizing no permissible medical use for the drug.
Violation of the ban carries a variety of modest to severe sanctions, both criminal and civil. In
Gonzales v. Raich, the Su- preme Court affirmed Congress’s power to enact the ban.3 In fact, the Court
suggested that Congress’s power to regulate, and hence to proscribe, medical marijuana (among other things) was almost unlimited.4 The deci- sion caused some commentators to declare that the war over medical marijuana was
over, and that the states had clearly lost.5 As long as Congress wanted to eradicate mari- juana, the states
seemingly could do nothing to stop it. But Raich did not stop (or even slow) state legalization
campaigns. At the time Raich was decided, when Congress’s authority was still (somewhat) doubtful,
10 states had le- galized medical marijuana.6 Since that time, however, 8 more states (and the District
of Columbia) have passed legislation legaliz- ing the use of medical marijuana,7 and sev- eral more
states may soon join the fray.8 The flurry of legislative activity is puzzling: If the war on medical
marijuana is truly over, why are the states still fighting? The states retain both de jure and de facto
power to exempt medical marijuana from criminal sanctions, in spite of Con- gress’s uncompromising
ban on the drug. States may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress has not preempted—
and more importantly, may not preempt—state laws that merely permit (i.e., refuse to pun- ish)
private conduct the federal government deems objectionable. To be sure, the objec- tives of the state
and federal governments clearly conflict: states want some residents to be able to use marijuana,
while Congress wants total abstention. But to say that Con- gress may thereby preempt state inaction
(which is what legalization amounts to, af- ter all) would, in effect, permit Congress to command the
states to take some action— namely, to proscribe medical marijuana. The Court’s anticommandeering rule, however, clearly prohibits Congress from doing this.9
States solve – without state cooperation, the federal government can’t enforce
penalties
Mikos 12
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 12/12, [http://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/limits-federal-supremacy-when-states-relax-or-abandon-marijuana-bans], “On the Limits of
Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans“, Policy Analysis No. 714, Page 2-3
On a more practical level, the fact that state exemptions remain enforceable is con- sequential; these
states laws, in other words, are not merely symbolic gestures. The main reason is that the federal
government lacks the resources needed to enforce its own ban vigorously: although it commands a $2
tril- lion dollar (plus) budget, the federal govern- ment is only a two-bit player when it comes to
marijuana enforcement. Only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases gen- erated every year
are handled by federal au- thorities.10 The states, by virtueof their great- er law enforcement
resources (among other things), hold the upper hand. The federal ban may be strict—and its penalties
severe— but without the wholehearted cooperation of state law enforcement authorities, its im- pact
on private behavior will remain limited. Most medical marijuana users and suppliers can feel
confident they will never be caught by the federal government.11
States solve – broad powers, shapes norms, empirically states can legalize even if the
federal government won’t recognize it
Mikos 12
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 12/12, [http://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/limits-federal-supremacy-when-states-relax-or-abandon-marijuana-bans], “On the Limits of
Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans“, Policy Analysis No. 714, Page 3
Even more interesting, an analysis of the medical marijuana conflict reveals that states also have
comparatively strong sway over the private (non-legal) forces that shape our actions, such as our
personal be- liefs about behavior and our social norms. Simply by allowing their residents to use
marijuana for medical purposes, the states have arguably fostered more tolerant atti- tudes toward
the practice, making it seem more compassionate, less dangerous, and less wicked, thereby removing
or softening the personal and societal reproach that once suppressed medical use of the drug. The
expressive power of permissive state legisla- tion—largely ignored by the academy—can- not easily be
undone or countered by Con- gress. As a result, the states may possess even more de facto power visà-vis Congress than is commonly perceived. In this paper I will provide a definitive study of one of the
most important federal- ism disputes in a generation.12 It shows that states have wielded far more
power and in- fluence over medical marijuana than previ- ously recognized. The states have not only
kept the patient breathing, so to speak, in an- ticipation of a day when federal policy might change; they
have, for all practical purposes, already made medical marijuana de facto legal within their
jurisdictions.To be sure, more battles will be fought, but they won’t change the reality that the states—
and not the federal government—have already won the war over medical marijuana. More important,
however, by shedding new light on the struggle over medical mari- juana, this paper also has much
broader relevance to our understandings of federal- ism and state resistance to federal authority.
Although it focuses on medical marijuana, the insights generated here could be applied across a wide
range of issues pitting restric- tive federal legislation against more permis- sive state laws. Over the
past decade, states have legalized a variety of controversial prac- tices that Congress has sought to
proscribe or restrict. For example, states now recognize same-sex marriages, legalize certain abortion
procedures, permit sports gambling, and al- low possession of firearms that Congress proscribes (or
has sought to curtail).13 Ref- erenda in Colorado and Washington now al- low even more federally
proscribed activity, namely, the recreational use of marijuana.14 As the case study of medical marijuana
dem- onstrates, states (generally) possess legal authority to enact permissive legislation governing such
issues, in spite of contrary congressional policy: states are merely re- storing the state of nature. And as
with medi- cal marijuana, the ultimate outcome on such issues may hinge more on Congress’s capacity to enforce its own laws and its ability to manage the non-legal forces that shape our behavior than
on the Supreme Court’s proc- lamations demarcating Congress’s substan- tive powers vis-à-vis the
states. I highlight the need for courts, commentators, and law- makers to distinguish between federal
laws authorizing conduct banned by the states (under which state power is significantly constrained),
and federal laws banning con- duct authorized by the states (under which states wield considerably
more power).
States Key – Historical
Historically State and Local Responsible for Drug Control
Chemerinsky 14 (Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, Legal Studies Research paper
Series No 2014-25, University of California- Irvine School of Law, 14-16 also by Jolene Forman, American
Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Fellow, Allen
Hopper:American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California- Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director,
Sam Kamin- University of Denver ~ Sturm College of Law, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights
and Remedies Program)
The implied obstacle preemption analysis begins with a strong presumption against the preemption of
state statutes, particularly where, as here, such statutes operate in a field within which states have
traditionally regulated; Congress specifically left a significant role for the states in regulating controlled
substances like marijuana. The CSA itself addresses areas traditionally regulated by the states and their
subdivisions: public health and medical care, land use, and state and local government’s power to
criminalize conduct. Since the country’s founding, it has been chiefly state and local governments, not
the federal government, that have taken responsibility for crafting and enforcing laws designed to
promote health and protect safety. In the field of drug control, specifically, states have long
experimented with laws and policies aimed at reducing the harms caused by the misuse of controlled
substances while maximizing their social and medicinal benefits.
Historically, states took the lead on marijuana
Pacula, Chriqui, Reichmann, and Terry-McElrath 2
Rosalie Liccardo, Jamie F., Deborah A. and Yvonne M., “State Medical Marijuana Laws: Understanding
the Laws and Their Limitations”, Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2002), pp. 413-439, Page
415-6
The beginning of the 20th century in the United States ushered in an era of societal reform focused on
reducing the recreational use and abuse of many substances, including alcohol and opium (i). The I906
Pure Food and Drug Act, the I9I7 Harrison Act and the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and
Volstead Act in 1920 were all indications of such efforts. From 1910 to 1920, it became apparent that
the recreational use of marijuana was also increasing. By the late 1920s, sensational reports of
violence resulting from recreational marijuana use were common in the media. Motivated by fear,
numerous local jurisdictions began passing laws prohibiting the use of marijuana. By 1927, fifteen
states had enacted laws against any sale or possession of marijuana, and by 1931, another fourteen
states passed similar bans on non-medical sale and use (i).
By the time the federal government passed the Marihuana Tax Act in I937, every state had already
enacted laws criminalizing the possession and sale of marijuana (z). The federal law, which was
structured in a fashion similar to the I9I4 Harrison Act, maintained the right to use marijuana for
medicinal purposes but required physicians and pharmacists who prescribed or dispensed marijuana
to register with federal authorities and pay an annual tax or license fee. Even though the Act
maintained a physician's right to prescribe marijuana, the law was opposed by the American Medical
Association on the grounds that (a) it would limit a physician's ability to truly control the non-medical
use of marijuana, and (b) it would needlessly overburden physicians who wanted to prescribe marijuana,
therefore making them less willing to do so. After passage of the Act, prescriptions of marijuana
declined because doctors generally decided it was easier not to prescribe marijuana than to deal with
the extra work imposed by the new law. The dramatic reduction in doctors' willingness to prescribe
marijuana for medicinal purposes is perhaps best exemplified by the removal of cannabis from standard
pharmaceutical reference texts (including the United States Pharmacopeia) by I9424 (I).
States Key – Laboratories
America is a very diverse place, with its constituent states ranging widely in culture,
and having varying economic interests, such as those tied to prisons. It is far more
coherent to let the States choose since they are more likely to know what is best for
themselves.
Firestone 14
7/26, David, NYT Writer, [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-time-let-statesdecide-on-marijuana.html ], “Let the States Decide on Marijuana”
The states are taking the lead because they're weary of locking up thousands of their own citizens for
possessing a substance that has less potential for abuse and destructive behavior than alcohol. A
decision about what kinds of substances to permit, and under what conditions, belongs in the purview of the
states, as alcohol is handled. Consuming marijuana is not a fundamental right that should be imposed
on the states by the federal government, in the manner of abortion rights, health insurance, or the
freedom to marry a partner of either sex. It's a choice that states should be allowed to make based on
their culture and their values, and it's not surprising that the early adopters would be socially liberal
states like Colorado and Washington, while others hang back to gauge the results.
State decentralization is better – promotes citizen choice and policy innovation
Shectman 14 (Matthew Joint Authority? The Case for State Based Marijuana Regulation, Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy, Judicial Law Clerk for the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 62-64)
This state-based framework is supported by two overarching policy rationales: 1) citizen choice; and 2)
policy innovation. Decentralization would promote more autonomy among the United States
population to choose the laws and regulations that fit their lifestyle preferences so that if a "resident
of one state does not like the rules imposed by the majority there, he is free to move to a state whose
laws better suit his preferences or circumstances. For example, if a nation consisted of one hundred
people, forty of whom want marijuana to be legalized and sixty who would opt to retain the status quo,
the ban on marijuana possession will remain in place—as it is in the CSA—Cleaving forty citizens
unhappy with the law. If, however, the nation were divided into separate states, each with the power to
enforce its own laws, then more citizens would be content with the nation's regulatory policy. For
instance, if one state contains fifty residents who favor the status quo and ten residents who would opt
for legalization, while another state contains ten residents favoring continued illegality, and thirty who
would opt for legalization, then one state will opt to maintain marijuana's illegal status, while the other
will opt for some form of legalization. Simple arithmetic provides that eighty of the nation's citizenry will
be satisfied, while twenty are still unhappy with the policy. Adding in the option for citizen mobility and
minimal transactions costs, the net benefits could be even greater. Decentralization also promotes
policy innovation where states with divergent political considerations experiment with new—and
possibly more optimal— regulatory policy. In stark contrast, a purely unitary federal policy only gives
the political process one shot to respond to social needs.' As Justice Brandeis' famous dissent points
out, "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country." The simplistic example above shows us how the policy innovation rationale
easily fits into the public choice model wherein two states adopting different policies can adapt, amend,
or reject their own policies in response to the consequences—^both positive and negative—displayed
by their peer state's policy choices.^'
States Key – AT: Preemption
Federal Law does not preempt state law – scotus will not provide the necessary
clarification to how state and federal drug policy interact for federal enforcement to
occur.
Mikos 9
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 3/9, “On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical
Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal“,
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1356093]
To be sure, not everyone believes the CSA does—or that Congress necessarily even could—preempt
state medical marijuana laws. 85 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the preemption
issue, 86 despite many claims to the contrary, 87 and some states have carried on despite lingering
doubts about their de jure authority (though not without struggles, as just noted). The problem is that
the analysis on both sides of the preemption debate has been largely conclusory 88 or misguided, 89
leaving lawmakers frustrated and confused as they deliberate how to proceed.
State action restores the “state of nature” in law – no preemption
Michael Berkey, Candidate for J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Spring 2011, “MARY JANE'S
NEW DANCE: THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LEGAL TANGO”, Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics
Journal, Vol. 9, P. 437-438, Lexis
For a different perspective on
the "uncooperative federalism" model, Mikos argues that when a state enacts
medical marijuana laws, it merely restores its policy to the "state of nature," n132 where many forces
besides the government shape behavior. n133 Rather than examining preemption principles under the often misguidedly
utilized positive conflict analysis, n134 Mikos's state of nature framework provides a more comprehensive
analysis. It is the state of nature - and not action/inaction, per se - that defines the boundary between
permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering. Namely, Congress may drive states into or prevent states from departing from - this state of nature (preemption), but Congress may not drive
them out of - or prevent them from returning to - the state of nature (commandeering). n135 Using the
"state of nature" guide, Mikos discusses how federal and state law interacts with each other under § 903 n136
of the CSA. n137 He concludes that most of the exemptions forming the basis of state medical marijuana laws
are prohibited from federal preemption by anti-commandeering [*438] principles, as Congress cannot
force states to re-criminalize medical marijuana, which would cause states "to depart from the state
of nature." n138
Empirically, states can legalize marijuana while protecting users and dealers from
federal punishments
Pacula, Chriqui, Reichmann, and Terry-McElrath 2
Rosalie Liccardo, Jamie F., Deborah A. and Yvonne M., “State Medical Marijuana Laws: Understanding
the Laws and Their Limitations”, Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2002), pp. 413-439, Page
415-6
Given the complexity involved and the federal oversight required to establish a TRP, some states
opted to pass legislation that allowed for the medicinal use of marijuana in other ways. Anticipating a
change in the federal scheduling of marijuana, six states rescheduled marijuana out of Schedule I in
their own state schedules. This action, at least in theory, enabled physicians to prescribe marijuana to
qualified patients. A major limitation of this approach, however, was the fact that the federal
government was, and still is, responsible for administering licenses for prescription of medicines.
Thus, without a formal change in the federal scheduling of marijuana, physicians in a state that
rescheduled marijuana were not protected from federal sanctions if they did indeed prescribe the
substance. Given the limitations of these first two approaches, legislatures in nine other states chose
to enact statutes that protected physicians from prosecution for prescribing marijuana (physician
prescription laws) for medicinal purposes.
States Key – AT: Preemption – Anti-Commandeering Clause
The commandeering clause prohibits the FG from enforcing its ban if states legalize
marijuana.
Mikos 12
Robert, Law Professor at Vanderbilt, JD from UMich, 12/12, [http://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/limits-federal-supremacy-when-states-relax-or-abandon-marijuana-bans], “On the Limits of
Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans“, Policy Analysis No. 714, Page 10
Congress’s preemption power is not co- extensive with its substantive powers, such as its authority
to regulate interstate com- merce. The preemption power is constrained by the anti-commandeering
principle. That rule stipulates that Congress may not com- mand state legislatures to enact laws nor
order state officials to administer them.91 To be sure, the rule does not limit Con- gress’s substantive
powers but rather only the means by which Congress may pursue them. For example, Congress may
designate the sites for new radioactive waste dumps, al- though it may not order state legislatures to
do so; and it may require background checks for gun purchases, although it may not order state law
enforcement officials to conduct them. All the same, the anti-commandeering rule constrains
Congress’s power to preempt state law in at least one increasingly impor- tant circumstance—namely,
when state law simply permits private conduct to occur— because preemption of such a law would be
tantamount to commandeering.
States Key – AT: Preemption – AT: Courts
The court should adopt an interpretation of preemption allowing state-level
contradictions to the CSA – it allows legalization
Michelle Patton, University of California, Berkeley Hastings School of Law, Spring 2010, “The
Legalization of Marijuana: A Dead-end or the High Road to Fiscal Solvency?”, Berkeley Journal of
Criminal Law, Vol. 15, P. 182-184, Lexis
Even under a stricter standard, it is very likely that the U.S. Supreme Court would hold that legalizing
marijuana greatly undermines the CSA and its policies. The objectives of the CSA are to conquer recreational drug abuse,
prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate sources into illegal channels, and combat the traffic of illicit drugs. n180 When enacting the CSA,
Congress specifically found that the manufacture, local distribution, and possession of controlled substances have a substantial and direct
effect upon interstate commerce. n181 They also found that it is not feasible to distinguish between controlled substances manufactured and
distributed interstate and intrastate, and that federal control of the intrastate incidents is essential to the effective control of the interstate
incidents. n182 When the Supreme Court decided that the federal government could regulate local marijuana activities in Gonzales v. Raich, the
Court supported federal regulation of intrastate controlled substances and found that "failure
to regulate the intrastate
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA." n183 Any measure
permitting the cultivation, sale, possession or use of marijuana for recreational purposes [*183] would
contravene these principles and pose a substantial obstacle to the effective control of interstate
marijuana commerce and the elimination of recreational drug use. Given the similarity between wholesale
legalization and the Supreme Court's findings regarding medical legalization in Gonzales v. Raich, it is likely that if a successful
initiative was appealed to the Supreme Court and it conducted an obstacle analysis, the Court would
adopt this approach and invalidate the initiative. If the courts limit the analysis to conflict preemption,
as is likely, especially in California, the decision will depend on the actual language of the provisions . A conflict only
preempts when compliance with both federal and state laws is a "physical impossibility." n184 If the language of the provision
exempts marijuana-related conduct from prosecution under California law, the provision will likely be
upheld. n185 In City of Garden Grove, the court held that the CUA did not conflict with the CSA because the CUA did not legalize any conduct
prohibited under the CSA. n186 Instead, the CUA merely exempted conduct from prosecution under California laws. n187 This, importantly,
is more than an issue of semantics. There is no statute or constitutional provision that requires states
to prohibit and prosecute all conduct that is illegal under federal law. As a result, an initiative will
likely be upheld under a conflict analysis if it merely decriminalizes marijuana. However, all of the
initiatives go beyond decriminalization. They all provide for the legislature to enact laws regulating and taxing marijuana. If
these laws and regulations positively conflict with the CSA in a manner in which simultaneous
compliance with both laws is impossible, they would be preempted under a conflict analysis . n188 A literal
interpretation of this language is that a positive conflict would exist only if one law requires conduct that is
prohibited by the other. n189 This interpretation has support in Wyeth v. Levine and Justice Thomas's dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon
and is explicitly adopted in [*184] San Diego NORML. n190 If this interpretation is adopted by the court, an initiative
legalizing marijuana and its implementing legislation will be upheld unless it requires conduct that
violates the CSA. Alternatively, federal and state court dicta exist supporting an interpretation that a
state law can also positively conflict if it provides that compliance with a federal law is not required.
n191 If this interpretation is adopted by the court, the initiative and its implementing legislation will be
upheld unless it requires conduct that violates the CSA or provides compliance with the CSA is not
required.
State courts have the power to interpret and trump federal law – where is your
federalism now?
David S. Schwartz, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School,
December 17, 2013, “HIGH FEDERALISM: MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL
POWER TO REGULATE STATES”, Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 567, P. 638-640,
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/35-2/SCHWARTZ.35.2.pdf
State courts are obligated to apply federal law in a non discriminatory fashion as rules of decision, and to choose federal law as the rule of
decision over a conflicting state law. If Congress passed an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and authorized state courts to hear federal
prosecutions under the CSA, then presumably under Testa y. Katt, state courts would have to entertain such cases. In such a (hypothetical)
federal marijuana prosecution in state court, state law defenses—such as medical marijuana legalization—would be preempted, just as they
would be in federal court. However, even in this hypothetical regime, state
marijuana legalization laws would continue to
govern prosecutions under state law. Short of that unlikely situation, however, state courts should have little occasion to apply
the CSA as a rule of decision. Applying the anti- commandeering clear statement rule, the CSA would not apply to state officials at all. The
question becomes whether the CSA is binding on state courts in the more tangential ways it arises in cases otherwise properly before a state
court. As discussed above, there are a few patterns this might take. A CSA violation might be offered as an element to a state law cause of
action, such as nuisance or ejectment. It might arise in a probation or parole revocation proceeding. Or it might be asserted as the basis of
some legal disability under state law. If
federal law does not by its own force create a private right of action in
nuisance or some other tort, it is hard to see how it can do so when imported into state law . The CSA contains no
express provision creating a private right of action. The Supreme Court has been exceedingly reluctant to infer private rights of action from
federal criminal statutes.25’ The few courts to consider whether the
CSA creates a private right of action have held (correctly) that it does
not.252 To be sure, state law torts may have a federal law element—such as negligence per se for the violation of a federal safety statute, or a
nuisance action against a drug dealer living next door. But the effect that a violation of federal law is to be given when
embedded in a state law claim seems manifestly a question of state law. For Congress to dictate that
its laws must be applied in a particular way as elements of state tort or property law claims would amount
to commandeering of state legislatures under New York. The anti-commandeering clear statement
rule would mean that courts should not impose such an outcome. The anti-discrimination principle of Testa y. Katt
has no application to this point. State courts must apply federal law in a non discriminatory fashion, insofar as they must hear any federal claim,
which meets the state court’s jurisdictional grant under analogous kinds of state law cases. But this does not mean that a state legislature
cannot discriminate among federal policies when deciding how or whether federal policies will ramify in state substantive law. State
courts
are entitled, and indeed required, to apply state law in determining the state law implications of a federal
element.253 This might be the rule even without an anti-commandeering clear statement rule, but is certainly the rule with it. The same
principle should apply to the case of state bar prosecutors and state medical licensing authorities. Although these officials might be operating
under a general mandate to require members of their supervised professions to adhere to federal criminal laws, that mandate necessarily
stems from state, not federal law.254 They would be required to obey a state law providing that, for example, bar discipline could not be
imposed against an attorney acting in compliance with state law.255 Even if state law did not expressly address this, a court applying the state’s
own principles of preemption and statutory interpretation would be correct in holding that the state
policy in favor of marijuana
legalization would trump a general professional standard impliedly incorporating federal laws
including the CSA.256
Miscellaneous
Legalize Retail Sales CP
Legalizing only retail sales solves big weed and doesn’t boost use – the Netherlands
prove
Kreit, 13 (Alex, Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson
School of Law, 2013, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room for Compromise?, 91
Oregon L. Rev. 1029)ZB
I The Fear of Another "Big Tobacco" and Insights from the Netherlands For
many marijuana legalization opponents, the potential
impact of marijuana advertising and development of a marijuana industry on use rates is a central
concern. The recently formed marijuana prohibition advocacy group, Smart Approaches to Marijuana, lists "preventing another big tobacco"
as the first issue page on its website, [*1032] for example. n9 The group argues that, "if it's legalized, marijuana will be
commercialized" and "[a] commercial marijuana industry will act just as the tobacco industry acts." n10
This fear is not limited to legalization opponents. Prominent marijuana legalization agnostics, like Mark Kleiman, often cite the risk of mass
marketing of marijuana in explaining their position. As Kleiman sees it, "cannabis isn't harmful enough to be worth banning. But that doesn't
mean that it's safe to give America's marketing geniuses a new vice to peddle." n11 If
a big-tobacco-style marijuana industry
ever were to develop, there would first need to be large-scale marijuana manufacturers selling
branded products. For example, a convenience store chain like 7-Eleven might sell cigarettes and alcohol, but manufactures like Phillip
Morris and Coors are the companies behind nationwide marketing of tobacco and alcohol. Similarly, the prospect of commercial manufacture
and wholesale distribution is likely to account for a significant percentage of any reduction in the price of marijuana under a legalization system.
n12 The
experience of the Netherlands is instructive on this point. Although there is a perception that the
Dutch have legalized marijuana, this is not quite true. Rather, "the Netherlands has quasi-legalized
only retail sales, not commercial production and distribution."
n13 The average Dutch marijuana user or tourist in
Amsterdam is unlikely to notice this distinction, but most researchers believe it helps to explain why marijuana use rates and prices in the
Netherlands are not much different than in many European countries with marijuana prohibition. n14 [*1033] In 2011, Robert J. MacCoun
conducted a thorough review of the
literature on Dutch marijuana policy. MacCoun found that, although "there are several
lines of circumstantial evidence that the Dutch retail system increased consumption, especially in its early years," today "Dutch citizens
use cannabis at more modest rates than some of their neighbors, and they do not appear to be
particularly likely to escalate their use relative to their counterparts in Europe and the United States."
n15 Similarly, U.S. and Dutch marijuana prices appear to be roughly comparable. n16 Why hasn't legalization had a bigger impact on prices and
use in the Netherlands? MacCoun cites the Dutch prohibition on commercial manufacturing as a probable explanation. He notes it is "likely that
prices in the Netherlands are elevated by their unusual hybrid regime which approximates legalization at the user level, but European style
prohibition at the level of growers and traffickers." n17 Jonathan Caulkins, Angela Hawken, Beau Kilmer, and Mark Kleiman similarly argue that
"by
keeping production and wholesale distribution illegal, the Dutch kept their cannabis prices high
and marketing to a minimum. That situation is a far cry from legalization." n18 In contrast to the Netherlands, the
marijuana legalization laws in both Colorado and Washington include the commercial production of
marijuana. In Washington, those who obtain a marijuana producer's license will be permitted to
"produce marijuana for sale at wholesale to marijuana processors." n19 In turn, processors will package and
distribute the produce to retailers. n20 In Colorado, marijuana cultivation facilities will be licensed to grow marijuana and sell it directly to retail
stores. n21 This
feature makes Colorado and [*1034] Washington's laws broader than the Dutch marijuana
policy and has fueled prohibitionists' concerns about the impact on use rates. II Permitting Retail Sales While
Prohibiting Commercial Manufacture The conflict between federal law and the Colorado and Washington legalization measures appears to
present a choice between two options. Either
the federal government can try and interfere with these laws, or it
can let them move forward. But there is room for compromise between these two positions. The
federal government could give states the leeway to implement Netherlands-style retail sales while
continuing to prohibit the commercial manufacture and wholesale distribution of marijuana. A policy like
this could be accomplished relatively easily as a matter of legislative drafting. The main
Controlled Substances Act offenses
are manufacture, distribution, possession with the intent to distribute, and possession. n22 Congress
could allow states to pursue quasi-legalization regimes like that of the Netherlands by eliminating
some of these offenses and altering others for marijuana. n23 For example, consider a regime in which it was no longer a
federal crime to possess or possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, but manufacture and distribution of more than one ounce of the
drug were still prohibited. In a system like this, federal law would criminalize the cultivation and wholesale distribution of marijuana, much like
the Dutch policy. But states like Colorado and Washington would have the freedom to regulate retail marijuana sales outlets without significant
federal interference. These establishments would be able to sell an ounce or less of marijuana to customers - an amount consistent with both
the Colorado and Washington laws n24 - without violating federal law.
Retail stores would need to be able to possess
large quantities of marijuana in order to operate, of course, and [*1035] removing federal prohibitions on
possession and possession with the intent to distribute marijuana would allow them to do this. n25 How
would a system like this compare to the status quo and to proposals to remove all federal obstacles to state marijuana legalization? Drug
warriors are unlikely to embrace any proposal that is at odds with the vision of states as loyal soldiers, dutifully carrying out the federal strategy
by arresting and prosecuting marijuana offenders. But pragmatic prohibitionists might come to see a policy like this as the least-bad choice
among the federal government's options for responding to state legalization laws. n26 This is because, if the experience with medical marijuana
laws is any indication, it may not be possible for the federal government to effectively stop states from legalizing marijuana. The Supremacy
Clause might seem to present a straightforward and cost effective method for blocking state marijuana legalization laws. Colorado and
Washington's laws certainly make it more difficult to enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act, after all. So, don't they stand "as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's full objectives under the" n27 Controlled Substances Act? The problem for any preemption
challenge to Colorado and Washington is that while the federal government can prosecute marijuana cases under the Controlled Substances
Act, it cannot conscript state and local actors into doing so. The anti-commandeering principle forbids the federal government from forcing
states to criminalize conduct n28 and, for this reason, would be [*1036] likely to make any preemption lawsuit dead on arrival. n29 Tellingly,
the federal government has never sued to block any state or local medical marijuana law on preemption grounds. Direct
enforcement
may be effective at keeping marijuana stores from opening up in Colorado and Washington in the
short term, but over time it can become a bit like trying to drain the ocean with a thimble. This has
certainly been the case with medical marijuana. n30 During the Bush administration, the federal government raided nearly 200 medical
marijuana dispensaries and criminally prosecuted a number of medical marijuana caregivers. However, around the time Bush left office, there
were between 300,000 and 400,000 medical marijuana patients in California and over 700 medical marijuana storefronts in the state. n31 Since
2011, the Obama administration has waged war on state medical marijuana laws, n32 and yet in late-2012, it was estimated that there were at
least 500 (and perhaps more than 1,000) dispensaries in Los Angeles alone. n33 The
problem for the federal government is
that it is almost entirely dependent upon states to enforce drug prohibition. In 2010, for example, there were
853,838 arrests for marijuana offenses. n34 That same year, there were only 7,130 marijuana cases disposed of in federal court n35 - just 0.8
percent of the number of arrests. To put this [*1037] in perspective, if the federal government were to attempt to prosecute all medical
marijuana dispensaries in Los Angeles, that would represent between a seven percent and fourteen percent increase in the number of all
federal marijuana cases nationwide. Even more revealing, in 2011, there were only thirty-nine federal marijuana prosecutions (including
medical and non-medical marijuana prosecutions) in the Central District of California, which includes Los Angeles. n36 This dynamic explains
why the federal government has been unable to successfully block state medical marijuana laws and, in the long run, is not likely to have any
more success when it comes to state marijuana legalization laws. Indeed, instead
of stopping the implementation of state
medical marijuana laws, the primary effect of federal enforcement efforts seems to have been to
make state medical marijuana laws less well controlled than they otherwise might be. n37 It is worth noting
that even if it were possible to effectively block implementation of state marijuana legalization laws, federal elected officials may not have the
political will to pursue this strategy for long. One January 2013 poll reported that, while Americans remain split roughly evenly in their views on
marijuana legalization, a sizable majority believes states should have the option to pursue legalization laws without federal interference. n38
Sixty-eight percent of respondents said the federal government should not arrest marijuana growers who are in compliance with state law
while sixty-four percent said sellers in compliance with state law should also be protected. n39 [*1038] Given these dynamics, state marijuana
legalization opponents who are hoping the federal government can block Colorado and Washington's laws may be out of luck. If that is the
case, they may be better served by focusing attention on the aspects of legalization they find most worrisome: commercial manufacture and
wholesale distribution. This goal is also much more achievable than preventing retail storefronts. That is because the number of large
manufacturers and wholesalers is much smaller than the number of retailers. n40 To be sure, the government cannot stop all marijuana
manufacture and distribution. The fact that 42.4% of Americans admit to having used marijuana n41 despite its decades-long prohibition is a
testament to that. But it is very likely that the
federal government could keep marijuana production in the black
market in states that legalize marijuana, unlike retail sales. This would address the chief concern raised
by most legalization opponents: the prospect of another big tobacco-type industry.
Supreme Court Deference
Court power in federalism is grounded in its degree of deference – they control the
balance between state and federal power
David S. Schwartz, Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School, December 19, 2012,
“The Political Safeguards of Federalism, Revisited: the Case of Marijuana Legalization”, P. 1-6, pdf
Judicial review always comes down to a question of deference: to what extent will a court defer to, or
rigorously second guess, the policy choices of legislative bodies? The degree of deference adopted by
the Supreme Court has varied over time and by subject. For example, in its modern jurisprudence, the Court applies
strict, non-deferential,judicial review of laws classifying by race or infringing free speech. But the Court applies deferential review to legislative
classifications regulating economic matters. Laws reviewed non-deferentially are frequently struck down; laws reviewed deferentially, rarely so.
Constitutional doctrine reformulates the question of whether federalism will be protected judicially or
politically by asking what the courts’ role should be in determining whether the regulated matter falls
within the national legislative power. Under the theory of “enumerated powers,” the legislative jurisdiction of Congress is
limited to those matters specifically articulated in the Constitution, while the states retain exclusive legislative jurisdiction over all other matters
falling outside the reach of congressional power. The Supreme Court has always clearly maintained that, if the regulation at issue is within the
legislative reach of Congress, the courts may not second-guess its wisdom or effectiveness – the latter question being purely political rather
than judicial. As Chief Justice Marshall famously phrased the matter, [S]hould congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for
the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such
a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to
effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of its necessity, would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power. But it
should also be apparent that Marshall’s formulation is ambiguous on the definitional question of whether the “object” of the law is one
“entrusted to the [national] government”: That question, too, may be reviewed deferentially or non-deferentially, and Marshall does not say
which. The ambiguity inherent in this foundational Marshall opinion has played out throughout U.S. constitutional history. A. The “Unsteady
Path” of Judicial Review of Federalism The
Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence over the past century has
charted “an unsteady path,” in the understated words of Justice O’Connor.1 This reference refers to a history of
vacillation between non-deferential and deferential review of federalism “boundary” disputes. The most
significant line of doctrine has involved the Court’s interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause.2 During the so-called “Lochner era,”
from the late 1880s to 1937, the Court struck down numerous federal laws aimed at regulating the national economy, taking the position that
broad areas of economic endeavor – employment, manufacturing, mining, agriculture – were “local” in nature and subject to exclusive state
legislative jurisdiction.3 Between 1937 and 1942, the Court famously reversed course, adopting a highly deferential approach to national
economic legislation. Under this approach, Congress could regulate any activity that, viewed in the aggregate, had a substantial affect on
interstate commerce.4 This “substantial effects” test permits Congress to regulate not only major industries, but also very minor intra-state
participants in interstate markets. Over the next five decades, the Court thus upheld the application of the federal Agricultural Adjustment Act
to a farmer’s small wheat crop grown for home consumption5 and the application of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to a small roadside restaurant
that refused to serve black patrons.6 The breadth of the substantial effects test greatly expanded the Court’s understanding of the legislative
domain of Congress. But perhaps as
important was the Court’s deference to Congress in the threshold decision
of whether the test should apply: that is to say, the Court has typically deferred to Congress on the
definitional questions of whether a local activity was part of an interstate market, and whether that
activity in the aggregate substantially affected the interstate market, were matters for the reasonable
discretion of Congress.7 So the law stood for nearly sixty years. A less prominent line of doctrine was that applying the Tenth
Amendment, which provides that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” Prior to 1937, the Court had viewed the Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation
on the powers of Congress, barring regulation even of interstate commerce that unduly interfered with purportedly local legislative matters.8
The Court overruled this understanding of the Tenth Amendment in 1941, holding that “[the Tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is
retained [by the states] which has not been surrendered.”9 At this point, the Tenth Amendment appeared to offer no protection to state
autonomy against congressional encroachment. However, the Court carved out a narrow, but significant exception to this view of the Tenth
Amendment in 1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery.10 There, the Court reversed a merely eight-year-old precedent11 by holding that
federal minimum wage laws could not be constitutionally applied to state and local government employees. The Court reasoned that the
Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating “the states as states,” and thus certain
“traditional state functions” were immune from federal regulation. But National League of Cities was an unstable
precedent sustained by a 5-4 majority with the fifth vote coming from an admittedly uncertain Justice Blackmun.12 Over the next few years,
the Court created several exceptions to the National League of Cities exception – and the
pendulum seemed to swing back
toward Congressional power.13 In its 1985 decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,14 the Court reversed
itself for the second time in less than twenty years – a virtually unheard of step – and overruled National League of Cities. Again, the issue was
whether the federal Fair Labor Standards Act applied to state and local employees, and this time the Court held that it did. Justice Blackmun,
who switched sides to make the difference, wrote the the 5-4 majority opinion concluding that “the
attempt to draw the
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism[.]”15 Of significance for the
argument of this paper, the Garcia Court attempted to lay out a manifesto in support of deferential judicial review of limitations on the
powers of Congress vis-à-vis the states. The opinion offered an extended argument that the political process,
rather than rigorous judicial review, offered the primary safeguard for federalism. This argument will be
developed further in the next section. The Court’s forceful and detailed articulation in Garcia might well have resolved the
controversy in favor of the argument that the political structures in the Constitution and political realities outside it will protect
federalism better than non-deferential judicial review. But it didn’t. In Garcia itself, then-Justice Rehnquist warned that
the Tenth Amendment principle of National League of Cities “will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court.” Rehnquist was partly correct. In 1991, the Court held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to prohibit
states from imposing a mandatory retirement age on state judges.16 In 1992, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress
from “commandeering” state legislatures – ordering them to enact legislation to conform with federal policy17 – and in 1997 the Court
extended this anti-commandeering rule to state executive officials.18 Finally, the Court since 1995 has gone beyond its re-revival of the Tenth
Amendment to hold on three occasions that federal laws exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In 1995, the Court struck
down a statute criminalizing gun possession in schools19; in 2000, it struck down a federal damages remedy for victims of gender-motivated
violence20; and in 2012, the Court held that the “individual mandate” – a federal requirement on individuals to purchase health insurance that
was the centerpiece of President Obama’s signature legislation, the Affordable Care Act – could not be sustained as an exercise of the
commerce power.21 It would be a mistake to view the developments since Garcia as a pendulum swing fully back to the non-deferential review
of federalism boundaries characteristic of the pre-1937 era. The amplitude of the pendulum swing, if not becoming consistently smaller, is
generally trending smaller. For example, the Tenth Amendment “revival” under National League of Cities was quite limited compared to pre1937 doctrine, since it applied only to “traditional state governmental functions” rather than extending to all intrastate activity by private
actors as well. And the “anti-commandeering” rule’s re-revival of National League of Cities is narrower still: it prohibits Congress from ordering
state legislatures or executive officials to carry out federal policies, but it does not overrule Garcia. Under
current doctrine,
Congress can subject states to “generally applicable” laws and thus, for example, require states to pay their employees
the federal minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act.22 Even the Commerce Clause decisions – despite their occasional high profile –
are relatively modest compared to pre-1937 doctrine. The Court’s current doctrine holds that Congress can regulate any local economic activity
that, taken in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.23 The Court’s recently-emphasized requirements that the activity be
“economic” and that it be “activity” rather than “inactivity” still allow very broad legislative jurisdiction to Congress. Indeed, as
recently as
2005, the Court upheld the application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to the backyard
cultivation and possession of small amounts of medical marijuana that were legal under California law.24
And yet the debate over the Court’s role can be significant in important and high-profile cases, as the recent
“Obamacare” case illustrates. Although the individual mandate was upheld as an exercise of the congressional taxing power, the Court’s ruling
that the mandate was not authorized as commerce regulation could have significant consequences by pushing Congress to rely on the tax
system rather than direct regulation when addressing other free-rider problems in the national economy. And there
remains a
pronounced debate on the Court and in the legal academy about the degree of deference to be
afforded to congressional judgments on whether the definitional criteria (“economic activity” and “substantial
effects”) are met.