Media’s Influence on the Communication of a Short-Term Crisis: A Case Study of
Copenhagen Airports
Table of Contents
Introduction and Considerations in relation to the Research (Helene & Karen-Louise) .............................. 2
Introduction to Theoretical Approaches (Helene & Karen-Louise) .............................................................. 4
Theoretical Approaches ................................................................................................................................ 6
Stakeholder Theory (Karen-Louise) ........................................................................................................... 6
Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management (Karen-Louise) ................................................................... 7
Theory on Organizational Image (Helene).............................................................................................. 10
Media + Crisis = Chaos? (Karen-Louise) .................................................................................................. 13
The Social Media (Helene) ...................................................................................................................... 15
Sum-up, Criticism and Relevance of Theoretical Approaches (Helene & Karen-Louise) ............................ 17
Sum-up of Theoretical Approaches ......................................................................................................... 17
Methodology (Helene & Karen-Louise) ...................................................................................................... 20
Case Selection ......................................................................................................................................... 22
Introduction to the Case.......................................................................................................................... 25
Introduction to Analytical Approaches (Helene & Karen-Louise) ............................................................... 27
First Analytical Approach ............................................................................................................................ 29
Crisis Management by Copenhagen Airports (Karen-Louise) ................................................................. 29
Analysis of the Maintenance of Image of Copenhagen Airports (Helene).............................................. 32
Crisis at Copenhagen Airports + Media = ? (Karen-Louise) ..................................................................... 36
Analysis of the use of Social Media in relation to the crisis (Helene) ..................................................... 41
Second Analytical Approach (Helene & Karen-Louise) ............................................................................... 44
Theoretical Discussion of the Findings of the First Analytical Approach ................................................ 45
Recommendations for Future Actions..................................................................................................... 49
Conclusion (Helene & Karen-Louise) .......................................................................................................... 52
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................ 55
List of Appendixes ....................................................................................................................................... 58
1
Introduction and Considerations in relation to the Research
This project investigates an organization’s crisis communication during a short-term crisis, as
we envision that a short-term crisis brings some obstacles in relation to crisis communication.
We foresee that a short-term crisis forces an organization to be well-prepared prior to the
crisis, as the spokesperson needs to know exactly what to do. One reason for stating this is the
reach of media nowadays; especially via the internet. It is argued that ”(...) the first role of crisis
management is to get ahead of the situation and remain in charge of it throughout” (Ruff & Aziz
2003, 107) and one might suggest that this is a tough task in today’s world, as the media,
especially since the introduction of the internet and the social media, is present at all times.
Due to the reach and speed of news in today’s global/technological world, we speculate that
the media is highly influential in shaping the public’s opinion about organizations. We envision
that this is especially accurate during a crisis in an organization, as the media might have an
agenda of its own. It is, however, argued that an organization has a part in shaping the public’s
opinion as, “communication in a crisis is not merely a set of defensive tools, but a necessary
pro-active means of influencing and shaping opinions, rumors and damaging speculation or
accusations to positive advantage” (Seymour & Moore 2000, 98).
These speculations have led to the following Research Question, which serves as the basis of
the research in this project; What influence does the media and media attention have on crisis
communication during a short-term crisis? What issues should the organization be aware of in
relation to this?
In this project, we use the term media to cover newspapers, television and furthermore, social
media. It is argued that “word travels quickly” and that an organization must find “appropriate
communication channels” (Hoskins, 2010), which relates to the speculated influence of media
on an organization’s crisis communication, as it is important to realize the reach and speed of
media, especially social media. “Many organizations do not formally plan in terms of
incorporating social media in the crisis communication plan” (Strander, 2012) – we keep this
argument in mind, while analyzing.
2
During a crisis, it is argued to be important that the public is equipped “(…) with clear and
consistent information” and that an organization must move “(…) quickly and lead the
conversation” (Hoskins, 2010). It is argued that “it is critical for organizations in crisis to
establish themselves as the source of credible news in the fact-finding stage, and not rely on
outside media to carry their message” (Syme 2011); we agree with this notion, especially as a
short-term crisis forces the organization to react fast and with concise information/facts, as it is
argued that “if you don’t communicate immediately, you lose your greatest opportunity to
control events” (Freeo 2011).
Statistics show that “92% of Americans use multiple platforms to get their news” and that
“almost 60% of people get their news both online and offline” (Syme 2011) – due to
Globalization, especially in the shape of Americanization, we find that these tendencies can be
transferred into a Danish context, which is the focus in this project. In addition to this, it was
also found that in 2011, there were “(…) over 800 million active users on Facebook, and over
200 millions on Twitter” (Syme, 2011). These statistics put an additional pressure on
organizations dealing with a crisis, as it might seem difficult to control information, as the
media, and social media, moves quickly.
Through this project, we aim at reaching an understanding of how an organization’s crisis
communication is affected by media (and social media) and we envision that this could lead to
guidelines for other organizations dealing with short-term crises. In relation to this, we find that
it is important to note that these guidelines are not definite, as an organization must adapt the
findings and relate it to the context in question.
This Introduction is followed by the Theoretical Approaches, after which the methodological
deliberations are offered. Hereafter, we move to the First Analytical Approach. This is followed
by a Second Analytical Approach, where after an answer to our Research Question is provided
in the Conclusion.
3
Introduction to Theoretical Approaches
The following sections of theory provide the basis for the following analyses, where we look
into communication during a short-term crisis and how this is influenced by the presence of the
media. The hereafter following section on Methodology explains the concrete use of the theory
in greater detail. We set out with the understanding that “(…) crisis management seeks to
prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the organization and
stakeholders (…) from harm” (Coombs 2007, 5) and one of the most important aspects when
communicating during crisis is to “(…) tell it all, tell it fast and tell the truth” (Freeo 2011, 1).
First, we briefly touch upon Stakeholder Theory, as we deem this relevant in order to fully grasp
the two main theoretical approaches, namely Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management and
the Theory on Organizational Image. We set out with the understanding that an organization
must act in the best interest of its stakeholders, especially during a crisis.
Hereafter, we move towards introducing W. Timothy Coombs 3 stages, where we look into his
definition of stages during a crisis and what a spokesperson should be aware of during these.
The theory section on Organizational Image serves as a natural supplement to the section on
Coombs’ three stages to Crisis Management. This theory section supplements the theory as
presented by Coombs by adding knowledge on the role of image in this correlation, while
mainly drawing on the stages presented by Joseph Eric Massey.
The stages defined by Coombs, along with the stages presented by Massey are included in the
First Analytical Approach; here, the focus is on the second stage of these theories, the crisissituation and the Image Maintenance stage.
After this, we include the 4 stages of the media’s agenda, as defined by Jane Jordan-Meier.
Here, we also include what issues a spokesperson ought to be aware of during each stage.
4
The last part of the theory section includes an assessment of theory on the Social Media. This
section revolves around the use and tools of the social media in crisis communications
relations. We assess Manuel Castells and Whitney Holmes’ thoughts on the subject, in order to
gain an understanding of the area.
These 5 streams of theory are deemed to compliment and complete each other, and are found
to be a solid basis for the analyses.
5
Theoretical Approaches
Stakeholder Theory
We include a brief presentation of Stakeholder Theory, as it is argued that “communication
with stakeholders is (…) critical (…)” (Coombs 2007, 19) during a crisis, especially as
“reputations are formed as stakeholders evaluate organizations” (Coombs 2007, 24) and we
argue that an organization especially is being subjected to evaluation during a crisis situation.
This is due to the great media coverage, which we return to later. The definition of
stakeholders, we use throughout this project, is “(…) any persons or groups that have an
interest, right, claim, or ownership in an organization”, whereby there exists two types, namely
primary and secondary stakeholders (Coombs 2007, 25). It is argued that “during crises there
are multiple stakeholders and each (…) needs to receive (…) messages” (Zaremba 2010, 31). In
addition to this, the importance of identifying stakeholders prior to a crisis, is highlighted (Ruff
& Aziz 2003, 31).
Following the notion that “if your employees and customers don’t feel like insiders, they are
going to act like outsiders” (Freeo 2011, 5), we argue that the communication during a crisis
ought to relate to the various stakeholders of the organization. In addition to this, it is
important to note that there are differences in stakeholder needs; “companies need to
evaluate (…) and make sure (…)” (González-Herrero & Smith 2008, 149) that the crisis
communication is following this evaluation in regards to the choice of media.
Having introduced the theory of Stakeholders, we find it important to note that we choose not
to include Shareholder theory, as this is not relevant in connection with our research question –
we focus on the crisis situation, where we argue that the focus ought to be on stakeholders.
6
Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
W. Timothy Coombs offers a three-stage approach to crisis management, which serves as the
basis for this project combined with the stages within Organizational Image Theory. Every stage
includes sets of actions that ought to be covered in each stage in order for an organization to be
successful in crisis communication (Coombs 2007, 17-18). In connection with each of these
stages, we choose to include actions presented by Alfonso González-Herrero & Suzanne Smith
(González-Herrero & Smith 2008), whose research is focused on the connection between crisis
communication and the internet. They argue that, a company “will need to plan and determine
how the company will use the internet to interact and exchange information” (GonzálezHerrero & Smith 2008, 146) with its various stakeholders – we find this relevant in connection
with this project, as it is argued that a short-term crisis poses a greater need for speedy and
appropriate information and one might suggest that this is obtained by incorporating the
internet in an organization’s crisis communication.
Pre-Crisis
↓
Crisis
↓
Post-Crisis1
In this project, we mainly focus on stage 2, the Crisis situation, as this is the center of attention
in the following analysis. Our reason for this, as stated earlier in the Introduction to Theoretical
Approaches, is that our Research Question places emphasis on the crisis situation, as opposed
to the other stages. However, we do include some information of the other stages, as we
include them in order to provide a theoretical foundation to the Second Analytical Approach
later in this project.
1
This model has been produced on the basis of the stages presented by W. Timothy Coombs (Coombs 2007).
7
The Pre-Crisis Stage is mainly concerned with signal detection and prevention. Here, an
organization must be prepared in regards to preventing a crisis and this can be done by means
of the ability to detect warning signals (Coombs 2007, 21). Furthermore, Coombs state that
“favorable organization-stakeholder relationships are a benefit during crisis management”
(Coombs 2007, 25), which we argue to be an area an organization ought to focus on prior to a
crisis, as we deem it to be easier to build great relationships before a chaotic event hits. This
stage also focuses on the preparation of crisis management and how a crisis situation can be
prevented from unfolding greatly.
In addition to the abovementioned, there are some actions that ought to be taken in order for
the crisis communication to be suited for the reach and speed of the internet; the crisis
communication team must be trained in handling the “virtual world” in regards to, for example,
the language and tone for dialogue hereof, as it is argued to be less formal than the corporate
tone in traditional communications (González-Herrero & Smith 2008, 148).
The Crisis-Stage, which serves as the main focus in the following analysis, revolves
around the recognition and containment of the tough event and “many of these actions should
have been put in place in advance” (González-Herrero & Smith 2008, 149), during the pre-crisis
stage. Here, the main focus should be on being “quick, consistent and open” in regards to the
communication (Coombs 2007, 128). It is important to work towards limiting the duration and
furthermore, “stakeholders must be informed about the crisis and actions must be taken to
address it (…)” (Coombs 2007, 127). The form and content of the communication is important
during this stage, as “first impressions form quickly and color the remainder of stakeholders’
reception of the crisis communication efforts” (Coombs 2007, 128).
The main purpose of crisis communication is argued to be to “(…) reestablish credibility and
confidence with internal and external audiences” (Freeo 2011, 2), which relates to the focus on
stakeholders, as mentioned prior. The ideal way to handle the communication during a crisis is
that “one individual should be designated as the primary spokesperson to represent the
Company, make official statements and answer media questions throughout the crisis” (Freeo
2011, 2); this spokesperson should obtain the ability to handle and establish credibility with the
media and to remain calm in stressful situations (Freeo 2011, 3). The spokesperson ought to be
8
“one who can bring both the head and heart together” and therefore, it is proposed that the
organization should have clear guidelines and provide training, especially for dealing with the
media (Jordan-Meier 2011). In addition to this, as briefly touched upon in the Introduction to
Theoretical Approaches, the first statement from the spokesperson must appear quickly, as it
“(…) helps to create the impression of control and is necessary to get the organization’s
definition (…) into the media and out to the stakeholders” (Coombs 2007, 129) and furthermore
as it is argued that if the spokesperson does not communication immediately, the organization
loses its greatest opportunity to control events (Freeo 2011, 5).
In regards to the incorporation of the internet in the crisis communication, it is argued to be
important that an obvious link to crisis communication is placed on the organization’s website
and that announcements are clearly seen from the website (González-Herrero & Smith 2008,
151).
The Post-Crisis Stage relates to the aftermath of a crisis, as it is concerned with making
sure that the crisis is over and furthermore, that the organization is better prepared for the
next crisis (Coombs 2007, 19), which can be obtained by evaluating efforts and changing these
according to what worked in the crisis situation. Additionally, an important focus in this stage is
making sure that stakeholders are left with a positive impression of the organization’s crisis
management efforts (Coombs 2007, 19). Furthermore, it is important that news rooms on the
organization’s website are updated according to the situation (González-Herrero & Smith 2008,
151).
9
Theory on Organizational Image
As touched upon in the section Introduction to Theoretical Approaches, the successful
maintenance of a good image through communication during a crisis is crucial for the further
success of an organization. It is especially during crisis situations that the knowledge of how to
communicate and maintain the image of legitimacy matters. The image of an organization is at
stake during crisis situations, and we suggest that this is due to the media coverage. Therefore
this theory section on the maintenance of the organization image through different channels
and tools is appropriate in relation to the Research Question.
In this section, various streams of theory on the subject of image maintenance are drawn upon,
but the main stream of theory is the theory on Organizational Image Management.
Authors of theory in this area such as Massey (Massey 2004) and Cowden & Sellnow (Cowden &
Sellnow 2002) are assessed, as well as the addition of further relevant sources were these are
deemed useful.
The theory on Organizational Image Management suggests, that image management is a threestage process, “(…) that involves creating, maintaining, and in some cases regaining an effective
organizational image” (Massey 2004, 234).
Massey argues that the first stage focuses on how the organization needs to build up their
image, in order to differentiate itself to catch the eye of the stakeholders2. “(…) This is difficult
since most people have a certain amount of skepticism of the unknown” (Massey 2004, 234),
and effective and knowledgeable PR-work towards creating the image is therefore key. The
second stage involves maintaining the image once it has been established. This is done through
an ongoing attention to the desired segment and frequent evaluation of the tools and channels
used for this goal. The communication with the stakeholder group is very important, as well as
the adjustment of the communication strategy, according to the feedback and experiences
gained in the field (Massey 2004, 234) (Stephens et al. 2005, 391). It is a dialogic process, as
“(…) organizations are strategically communicating with stakeholders to influence perceptions”
(Massey 2004, 234), and stakeholders are thereby “(…) forming their own ideas about the
2
See Stakeholder Theory
10
image of the organization” (Massey 2004, 234). This is what makes coherent communication
and a good connection important – if not in fact essential - according to this stream of theory. If
this fails, and the image is damaged or loses its value, the image of the entire organization is
threatened. The final and third stage, is a stage not all organizations reach. It could be argued
though, that as the market is tightening due to the global crisis, it becomes more significant.
The stage is the process of restoration of image, typically due to the organization experiencing
some form of crisis (a “post-crisis” stage). Again, communication with the stakeholders and an
understanding of the target-segment is key. If this is conducted successfully, the organization
returns to the second stage, of maintenance. If not, restructuring the organization, changing
the identity, and in worst case scenarios; mergers and/or name changes, are needed (Massey
2004, 235).
The chosen area of focus for this section is that of the second stage in the theory of
Organizational Image Management. This is argued, as the first stage of this theory is arguably
something that relates to new organizations, and thereby a pre-crisis stage, and does not have
anything to do with crisis within an organization. The third stage is dealing with the aftermath
of a failed image, a post-crisis stage, which is not something that the present Research Question
is related to either3.
The second stage of the Organizational Image Management theory treats the maintenance and
security of an image, through communication to the stakeholders and the media - during a
crisis, in this instance – and what to be aware of in such situations. As a crisis situation is an
insecure stage for the organization, this is likely not the time and place for improvement of
image in the immediate situation.
One of the reasons offered as to why a good image is important to an organization, is that a
successful image is what maintains “(…)the stakeholder perception, that the organization is
legitimate” (Massey 2004, 236). “The purpose of communication during a crisis is to influence
the public’s perception of the organization and to maintain a positive image or restore a
3
As we touched upon in Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
11
damaged image among stakeholders” (Stephens et al. 2005, 395); this quote underlines the
already stressed point, that strong communication throughout the crisis is what ensures the
maintenance of a good image. Furthermore, Stephens et al. here offers the understanding, that
the mere purpose of the communication conducted, is done as to influence the perception of
the organization. In addition, the trust in the organization is at stake during tough times such as
crisis, and it is crucial for the organization to put forward the notion that it “has a right to
continue operations” (Massey 2004, 236). It is argued that “it is imperative that organizations
attempt to restore legitimacy through communication (…)” (Massey 2004, 239). It is therefore
crucial, that the legitimacy, as mentioned earlier, is restored in the eyes of the stakeholders,
and “communication strategies play a very important role in this process” (Massey 2004, 245).
It is evident that ways of restoring an image changes over time, as it is argued that “what was
effective last year (…), may not be effective now, and will most likely not be effective in the
future” (Massey 2004, 245). Additionally, it is argued by scholars, that the notion of “one
voice”, and the organization seeming as “one” during a crisis is essential, for the stakeholders to
maintain trust in the organization, and as not to make the stakeholders “chose” between
parties within the organization (Cowden & Sellnow 2002, 194). The showcasing of internal
conflict is likely to delegitimize both parties, and thereby the organization, in the mind of the
stakeholders (Cowden & Sellnow 2002, 194).
It is concluded by Massey, that it is only through careful dialog and strategic communication
with the stakeholder-group, that successful maintenance of the image of an organization during
a crisis is obtained (Massey 2004, 245). Furthermore it is added, that the internet and online
interactive media has changed the way organizations can and should communicate with their
stakeholder-groups, and that this then requires that “(…) organizations take an integrated
communication approach to image management to ensure that a consistent image is sustained
(…) through all channels of communication” (Massey 2004, 246).
12
Media + Crisis = Chaos?
It is argued that “the news media play a crucial role in the court of public opinion. They are
influential in shaping how the community thinks and feels about an organization’s reputation,
its values, and its actions. Depending on how the media are managed, they can hurt or help in a
crisis” (Jordan-Meier 2011, 43). It is also argued that “(…) speedy communication with both the
old and new media” helps an organization mitigate the damage of its reputation (Jordan-Meier
2011, 45-6). W. Timothy Coombs present the argument that “stakeholders are more likely to
draw upon indirect that direct experiences when drafting their personal views of an
organization’s reputation (Coombs 2007, 24). Mediated reports are a part of indirect
experiences, which is deemed to be the most important, and this is why we find this section of
the media’s influence during a crisis to be important.
A construction of a 4-stage model portraying the patterns in media behavior/cycles of news
coverage in a crisis (Jordan-Meier 2011, 43) has been created, which we find to be applicable in
this project, as we, in the following analyses, set out to investigate the connection between the
media and an organization’s crisis communication during a short-term crisis. When dealing with
the media, an organization must keep in mind that it is tested on their ability to deliver credible
information (Jordan-Meier 2011, 117).
Stage 1, “the Fact Finding stage”, is also known as the “Breaking News stage”, as it is
concerned with the media asking speculative questions, whereby the media are acting in the
interest of public safety (Jordan-Meier 2011). In this stage, one often see the media comparing
a crisis to previous crises (Jordan-Meier 2011, 56) in order to obtain knowledge and gain an
understanding of the current situation.
Stage 2, “the Unfolding Drama stage”, is also known as the “reputation-forming stage”,
as the media attention moves from the event to the organization’s response (Jordan-Meier
2011, 59). During this stage, the media start “digging for dirt” and the center of attention is the
organization and the people being in the center of the event (Jordan-Meier 2011, 59). Here, the
expectations are “that the media will tell us what went wrong, who was responsible, and what
might happen in the future” (Jordan-Meier 2011, 60).
13
Stage 3, “the Finger-Pointing stage”, is concerned with why-types of questions, as it is
argued that “once the immediacy of the crisis is over, people want to know who to blame (…)”
(Jordan-Meier 2011, 67). Here, it is important for the organization to remain available to the
media and other stakeholders and also to monitor the variety of social media (Jordan-Meier
2011, 71-2).
Stage 4, “the Resolution and Fallout Stage”, is the end of the crisis; here, there is a need
to mark the end of it, which can take the shape of a press-release, twitter post etc. (JordanMeier 2011, 75). Furthermore, this stage emphasizes the organization to portray what it has
learned, how it can be fixed and what it will do for the crisis not to appear again (Jordan-Meier
2011, 76). Another important aspect of this stage is the rebuilding of stakeholder relationships
and that the organization reviews the crisis in order to provide information on what has been
learned (Jordan-Meier 2011, 78-9).
It is argued that “a crisis situation is always difficult when dealing with the media” (Freeo 2011,
5), especially due to “24-hour news networks” (Coombs 2007, 9) and the new media4
(González-Herrero & Smith 2008), which relates to the notion that the public have access to
information regarding the crisis at all times of the day. On the other side, it is argued that the
damage can be minimized if the crisis and media are handled correctly (Freeo 2011, 1).
When an organization deals with the media during a crisis, it must pay attention to a set of
issues, as presented throughout this section. Furthermore, it is important for the organization
to understand that “if the crisis team does not supply the initial crisis information to the media,
some other groups will, and they may be (…) misinformed” (Coombs 2007, 129), which we find
to be closely linked to the reach and speed of the new media.
4
In this project, this concept refers to social media and websites (the company in crisis and news medias’)
14
The Social Media
In this section the focus is on the influence of the social media on an organization’s crisis
communication, and what tools and issues to be aware of. As mentioned in Introduction to
Theoretical Approaches, this theory section serves as additional theory, complementing the
other chosen theories.
We argue, that the segment using the social media at this point is so vast, that it simply cannot
be overlooked in a project-frame like this. In this relation, the focus is on the social media
platforms, Facebook and Twitter, as we argue these to be the two most widely used of the
present social networks.
Authors such as Castell (2007) and Holmes (2011) are assessed throughout this section, as well
as the addition of further relevant sources where these are deemed applicable.
It is argued that “(…)the fundamental battle being fought in society is the battle over the minds
of the people” (Castell 2007, 238), and according to Castell this is now increasingly being fought
on social media platforms.
It is important to realize, that not everyone using the social media has other’s best interest at
heart and that “(…)stakeholders on the ground are now citizen journalists aided by social media
via mobile technology” (Holmes 2011, 4). Furthermore, the narratives via social media, of the
stakeholders experiencing a crisis first hand, cannot be controlled and this makes “(…) it even
more important for communicators to master the use of social media” (Holmes 2011, 13).
Therefore, it is crucial, that the information given out on the various social platforms, are
coming from the source first, that is, the organization itself. This is crucial, if the organization
wants to have any say in what is being distributed as information and truth. It is in this sense
therefore important to be on top, and to be the first with information distributed in the social
media, as; “social media can hinder organizations' crisis communication by spreading
misinformation at rapid speed” (Holmes 2011, 2). In addition to this, we speculate if the
creation of so-called profiles on sites such as Twitter and Facebook, in the pre-crisis stage,
might be beneficial for organizations. This way, stakeholders will know where to look for
information in an on-going crisis situation.
15
Communicators of today are under immense pressure to give out information and react fast, as
the social media platforms designed for this, and the vast amount of people frequenting them,
are rising (Holmes 2011, 3). Expectations of organizations communicating rapidly are high, as
many stakeholders have taken in the channels that social media offers, and thereby expect
organizations to do the same. As the “(…)social media can help the practice by supplying
stakeholders with a ready resource to make sense of a crisis, and by creating a way to share
integral, time-sensitive information quickly to citizens and crisis managers and communicators”
(Holmes 2011, 1), it is an ideal channel for providing fast and up-to-speed information,
according to this theory. It has to be added, that an evaluation of the target-segment and their
familiarity and use of the social media is key, as “not all audiences are equally familiar with
social media and traditional channels of communication could be more adequate in some
instances” (Gonzales-Herrero & Smith 2008).
It is important to note, that the addition of the use of social media into the crisis
communication plan of an organization, does not need to be time-consuming and radical; “(…)
communication strategies do not need to be drastically overhauled to incorporate the social
media” (Holmes 2011, 11), as processes merely need to be re-tooled into the original plan.
16
Sum-up, Criticism and Relevance of Theoretical Approaches
Sum-up of Theoretical Approaches
The first section includes a brief introduction to the theory of Stakeholders, where the
importance of focusing on these is stressed. An organization must be aware of who its
stakeholders are and how to relate its communication towards these.
Hereafter, we introduce W. Timothy Coombs’ 3 stages explaining how a crisis unfolds
and furthermore, what crisis communicators ought to be aware of during each stage. We also
touch upon the importance of incorporating the Internet as a crisis communication tool. In
addition to this, we touch upon some of the main characteristics and tasks of an organization’s
designated spokesperson.
The theory section on Organizational Image, gives a thorough understanding of the
second stage of Massey’s theory on image maintenance, as well as the insights of other
scholars. It is argued that a good image as a legitimate and truthful organization, is maintained
by strategic and dialogic communication. In addition, it is stressed that the tools for maintaining
the image, changes over time, and that steering clear of expressing conflict within the
organization is key. It is furthermore argued that the interactive media has changed the way
organizations can and should communicate, in order to reach all levels of a segment.
After this, we introduce an important aspect to include in crisis communication, namely
the media. This section introduces Jane Jordan-Meier’s 4-stages. The 4-stage approach sets out
to explain media behavior during a crisis and while introducing the stages, it is also touch upon
what an organization and its spokesperson ought to be aware of when engaging in dialog with
the media.
A section on the theory of Social Media is added as a supplement to the media theory.
Here, the importance of being first, on-top of the communication via the social media, which is
seen as the ideal channel - and knowing the use of this media of the target-segment is stressed.
The segment is rising, and the stakeholders expect the organization to use these formats as
well. It is important for communicators to master social media platforms, as it is argued that
the narratives from the stakeholders cannot be controlled otherwise.
17
Criticism and Relevance of Theoretical Approaches
The relevance of the theories in relation to the Research Question, is the interest in what
organizations should be aware of during a short-term crisis communication-wise, and how the
conducted communication during a crisis and the use of media, can influence the image and
stakeholder perception, and thereby the organization.
One might argue that the Theoretical Approaches are broadly defined. This poses a risk of
generalizing tools and definitions, which could prove difficult to apply on a specific case. We
find it important to note that we envision that the theoretical guidelines can be a challenge to
implement completely in a crisis situation, as a crisis is unexpected, and chaotic. In addition to
this, we are aware that an organization may not want to include the theoretical understanding
of real-life phenomenon and that these theories do not represent every aspect of
organizational literature and we include the possibility that we might be missing some points
due to this. We, however, find these guidelines useful, as they propose a solid foundation for an
organization’s crisis communication. We argue that an organization needs to include the
guidelines5 prior to the crisis outbreak and implement them normatively.
We find the stages, as put forward by W. Timothy Coombs, useful in relation to our research
area, as we set out with the understanding that a short-term crisis introduces obstacles
communication-wise. We argue that these stages provide a general understanding of a crisis
and what to be aware of – and that these provide a great theoretical foundation for our
analysis.
The relevance of the theory section on Organizational Image, relies on how a good image is
important for the success of an organization. It is argued that ”organizations must sustain an
effective image with their stakeholders in order to maximize their chances for success” (Massey
2004, 234). Previously, organizations could disconnect their internal functioning from their
external (...) because there were few contacts between insiders and outsiders” (Hatch & Schultz
5
As presented in the Theoretical Approaches
18
1997); and still maintain their image, but this has changed with the ever-increasing use of
several forms of media. This angle of theory is useful, for investigating the state of an image
during a crisis, how it is influenced by media and communication by the organization, and what
to be aware of in relation to this.
We find the construction of a 4-stage model portraying the patterns in media behavior/cycles
of news coverage in a crisis (Jordan-Meier 2011, 43) to be relevant in this project, as it helps us
gain an understanding of the media’s incentives during a crisis and furthermore, it presents
guidelines for the organization in regards to dealing with the media.
The theory section on the Social Media serves as additional theory in regards to media, as these
are closely linked. This additional area of theory is found to be relevant and useful, as the social
media is a big, and growing, part of the overall media.
As briefly touched upon prior, we find that these theoretical approaches to crisis
communication and the media coverage supplement each other and allow us to gain a deeper
and more thorough understanding of key concepts within the field. We see these theories to be
interdependent, as they provide different tools of communicating during a crisis in the various
media – our reason for stating this, is that we find that, by including all 5 theoretical
understandings, we are able to provide an answer to our Research Question.
As touched upon during the Theoretical Approaches, the focus of the following analyses is
mainly on the second stage of Coombs’ theory and of second stage of the theory on
Organizational Image.
However, we anticipate that the additional stages prove useful in our Second Analytical
Approach, as these can provide a theoretical foundation during this.
19
Methodology
Having now accounted for our theoretical framework, the following offers methodological
deliberations in relation to the use of this theory in the subsequent analyses.
We use the following definition to cover the term crisis; “(…) a significant event that prompts
(…) news coverage and public scrutiny and has the potential to damage the insititution’s
reputation, image or financial stability. A crisis could be precipitated by (…) a controversy. (…) A
controversy (…) describes (…) a case of employee misconduct” (Duke 2012). During this project,
our understanding of a short-term crisis is that it is a crisis that arises and foregoes in a matter
of a few hours.
The choice of theory for this project relates to our Research Question, as we aim at analyzing
the influence of the media on an organization’s communication during a short-term crisis, and
what to be aware of in relation to this. The stages on Crisis Communication, as presented by
Coombs, and Massey’s theory on Image of an Organization during a crisis, as well as
supplementary theory on the media and social media, is deemed as a solid basis when seeking
to come to a conclusion to the Research Question6.
The epistemological stance for this project and the theories presented above is placed within
Interpretivism, as we set out to interpret a crisis in the eyes of a variety of stakeholders
(Bryman 2008, 15-18). This is one of the key elements within Constructivism along with the
changeability and interactivity of communication in today’s world (Bryman 2008, 19-21). These
views are beneficial for this project, as we look into the influence of the media on the
communication, and the issues and problems to be aware of in regards to this.
We take a Qualitative Approach in this project, as our focus is upon the wording of the
statements presented throughout a crisis, as opposed to looking into the statements in a
quantifiable manner. With basis in the theory defined7, we analyze the chosen data and by
conducting this research, we aim to provide the reader with additional findings relating to the
relationship between crisis communication and media; this being, for example, in the shape of
6
7
This has been thoroughly explained in Sum-up, Criticism and Relevance of Theoretical Approaches
See Theoretical Approaches
20
guidelines for future action. This way of conducting research is argued to be a mix of deductive
and inductive theory (Bryman 2008, 9) in that the theory provides us with a pre-understanding
of Crisis Communication and the media’s behavior, which allows us to look for certain keywords
while analyzing, which relates to the deductive approach. We also apply the inductive approach
in that we aim to present the reader with other ways of dealing with media in relation to Crisis
Communication. This relates to the Hermeneutic Circle as we aim at reaching another
understanding based on existent knowledge (Bryman 2008, 532).
The areas of theories we include in this project were presented in the Theoretical Approaches.
We apply the theories to the chosen case in order to find an answer to the Research Question,
as we find the theories’ outlook to be a great foundation for conducting our research8. As
briefly touched upon prior9, we include the second stages of Coombs’ theory and of Massey’s
theory in the following First Analytical Approach; the reason for this is the focus on the crisis
situation, and furthermore, that the data compiled relates mainly to the crisis situation.
The additional stages are included in the Second Analytical Approach, as we set out to evaluate
the efforts of the chosen case in regards to crisis communication and furthermore, include
recommendations for future application of these. This poses the opportunity for us to generate
knowledge, which we envision takes the shape of guidelines/recommendations for
organizations dealing with short-term crisis communication combined with the influence of
media/social media in the future.
8
9
This has been thoroughly explained in Sum-up, Criticism and Relevance of Theory
In the Theoretical Approaches
21
Case Selection
The chosen case is that of the Security personnel strike at Copenhagen Airports, Denmark on
March 15, 2012. We find that this strike allows us to investigate a short-term crisis and the
communication hereof, as the event was highlighted in a variety of media.
The empirical data serves as the basis of our analyses and this consists of Danish articles
relating to the crisis at Copenhagen Airports and two interviews from Tv2 News10. The articles
included as data in our analyses are chosen with the aim of providing an accurate account of
the short-term crisis and we find that including a variety of major national online news sites
provide a broad and nuanced picture of the news coverage.
We include two interviews from Tv2 News, as we find that these offer different accounts of the
crisis situation, as one includes a stakeholder’s viewpoint, whereas the other offers the
response from Copenhagen Airports, in the shape of Søren Hedegaard Nielsen, Public relations
Manager.
By including a variety of data sources, we argue that we are able to look at the communication
during a short-term crisis from a broader perspective. We argue that by including data deriving
from a variety of sources with different agendas, we lessen bias, as we find that we analyze all
data in equal terms.
It has to be noted that the data included in the project is written in Danish; in order for us to
include it in this project, we have translated useful quotes into English and we are aware that
some aspects risk being lost due to this translation. The original sources written in Danish are
included11 in order to lessen the risk of losing aspects of these.
Originally, we included a written interview with Søren Hedegaard Nielsen, who was the
spokesperson on the morning of the crisis. This was included in order to obtain Copenhagen
Airports’ viewpoint on the short-term crisis and as we found that this written interview
provided knowledge obtained through, and after, the crisis. This interview included questions
relating to the day of the crisis, the incorporation of social media and what Copenhagen
Airports learned from the short-term crisis on 15 March, 2012.
10
11
The empirical data are included as Appendixes
See Appendixes
22
As we proceeded to include these viewpoints in our analysis and presented Søren Hedegaard
Nielsen with the results, he did not agree with our conclusions and recommendations and did
not want to appear as part of the project. For ethical reasons, this means that we choose not to
include the interview and quotes here from. As it is a process, we still obtained knowledge
through the cooperation with Søren Hedegaard Nielsen, but this is not included in this project.
We regret Søren Hedegaard Nielsen’s decision, as we found that the inclusion of his viewpoint
provided an additional angle in our Analytical Approaches, as we were able to analyze the
short-term crisis both in the eyes of the organization itself, the primary and the secondary
stakeholders. We, however, still include the viewpoint of Søren Hedegaard Nielsen, via the
Appendixes; here statements deriving from Søren Hedegaard Nielsen are included, along with a
transcription of a television-interview on the morning of the crisis. We are aware that this
presents a risk of him being portrayed through the media’s viewpoint.
As briefly touched upon, this project is of a case study design, as we look at a case in order to
provide the reader with an answer to our Research Question, as presented in Introduction and
Considerations in relation to the Research. Our research strategy is qualitative, as we analyze
statements made during the short-term crisis. Concretely, our analyses are conducted as a
critical case (Bryman 2008, 55), which we envision to provide guidelines for organizations
experiencing a short-term crisis. Following the thoughts of Flyvbjerg (2006), we argue that this
case study can be generalized to other organizations in the same situation, as it is argued that
context-dependent learning offers the possibility of a deeper understanding of a subject, as
Flyvbjerg argues that it offers expertise knowledge. Further, the case study poses a great
method of learning for other contexts and situations (Flyvbjerg 2006, 222). “The closeness of
the case-study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth of details” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 223)
offers a nuanced view on events as opposed to the study of an object with greater distance.
We deem that the case is critical, as we conduct our research using a well-developed
theoretical understanding in order to investigate a phenomenon, in this case a short-term crisis,
deeper (Bryman 2008, 55); following Flyvbjerg, we argue that a critical case study allows us to
investigate a general problem through a case of strategic importance (Flyvbjerg 2006, 229).
Strategic importance stands for our case, as it holds strategic relevance towards providing an
23
answer to the Research Question. Concretely, we argue this case to be “a most-likely”
(Flyvbjerg 2006, 231) situation, as an organization of the size of Copenhagen Airports is bound
to experience a crisis and have some experience in dealing with media and communication in
this relation. Therefore, we envision that the critical case can allow us to generalize findings
(Flyvbjerg 2006, 230) in order for organizations to learn from the Airport’s response.
We categorize the crisis at Copenhagen Airports as a Challenging Crisis as it is “(…) when the
organization is confronted by discontented stakeholder with claims that it is operating in an
inappropiate manner” (Coombs 2007, 65), which we find to be the appropriate definition for
the short-term crisis on March 15, 2012, as the personnel stroke unannounced.
Copenhagen Airports is a large organization and therefore it can be argued to be under major
media coverage, especially during crises. This is due to the importance it has for the
infrastructure and connections both in and out of the country. We envision that if we are able
to learn from and revise the findings of this project, other organizations should be able to use
these findings as well. It has to be noted though, that these findings cannot be granted the
eternal truth, as every organization will have to interpret, revise and adapt the guidelines to
their specific context.
24
Introduction to the Case
We have briefly touched upon the chosen case and this section provides additional information,
as we find this useful in that it provides a context and an understanding of the event. It is here
important to note that we are aware that this introduction to the case is based upon media
accounts of the short-term crisis; as we touch upon throughout this project, we keep in mind
that the media have an agenda of its own, while reporting from a situation. We, however, argue
that by including several media agencies, we lessen the risk of being influenced by the media’s
viewpoint on the short-term crisis at Copenhagen Airports as much as possible.
The case used to illuminate the area of interest, is the unannounced short-term strike in
Copenhagen Airports in Copenhagen, Denmark, on March 15th 2012 (Appendix 1).
This case is found to be useful for supporting an understanding of similar situations12, and for
posing an answer to the Research Question, as we argue that the strike can be seen to have
posed a crisis for the airport. This is especially because of the great media coverage, it received.
An airport is an important part of the surrounding infrastructure, both nationally and
internationally, and we argue that this can be one explanation to the interest and coverage of
the media.
Shortly before 5 am on March 15, 2012, the security personnel attended a union meeting,
wherein it was agreed that the personnel would take strike action (Appendix 2). The strike was
an attempt to get the attention of the top management, as the security personnel feel that they
are underpaid, in comparison to the great profit of the airport economy, that the airport
administration informs about on the intranet (Appendix 3), and that the present rules for wages
during lieu day in relation to, for instance, a new ash cloud, are not fair towards the employees
(Appendix 4).
3-400 employees in the security department downed tools on the day, and as a result hereof,
there were massive delays of the check through of passengers and goods (Appendix 3 & 5). The
security personnel resumed work shortly before 9 am on the same day, making it a short-term
12
See Case Selection
25
crisis13, but the delays were present throughout the day (Appendix 6), creating a “relatively
chaotic” situation in the airport (Appendix 7, own translation).
13
As defined prior in this section on Methodology
26
Introduction to Analytical Approaches
The analyses are divided into two sections; the First Analytical Approach investigates the
communication and media coverage during the short-term crisis at Copenhagen Airports. Here,
we include the theory to analyze what was done and how this relates to the theoretical
prescriptions. The Second Analytical Approach includes a discussion of the findings of the First
Analytical Approach and in addition to this, recommendations for future actions for improving
crisis communication.
The First Analytical Approach is based upon the Theoretical Approaches, as presented prior. We
look into the crisis situation, focusing especially on the communication hereof. We include
separate sections analyzing data according to the individual Theoretical Approaches, as we find
that this creates a clear view on how the communication during the crisis at Copenhagen
Airports relates to the theoretical viewpoints as to how things should be done.
We assume that this leads us towards areas where Copenhagen Airports could improve their
communication and this is the focal point in the following section, namely the Second Analytical
Approach. In Theoretical Discussion of the findings of the First Analytical Approach, we look
into the way the crisis was handled in relation to the theory and which areas could be
improved; this section, we argue, revolves around the post-crisis situation, as we evaluate the
efforts taken by Copenhagen Airports. Hereafter, Recommendations for Future Actions,
includes suggestions as to how the crisis could have been handled differently and we argue that
these recommendations can be included in the pre-crisis stage, as the organization ought to
include these in the future actions within Crisis Communication.
As touched upon in Stakeholder theory, an organization has primary and secondary
stakeholders. In the case of the crisis at Copenhagen Airports, we argue that the primary
stakeholders are employees, passengers and airline- and travel agencies, whereas the
secondary stakeholders include the media – Coombs argue that primary stakeholders are able
27
to stop organizational operations14, whereas the secondary stakeholders ‘only’ have the ability
to damage the organization (Coombs 2007, 26). It is, however important to note that we
speculate that the secondary stakeholders, the media, are able to influence the viewpoint of
the primary stakeholders. Therefore, we offer the understanding that the main focus ought to
be on primary stakeholders, but that an organization must keep a close eye on the secondary
stakeholders, as well.
14
Which proved to be the case at Copenhagen Airports, as the security personnel on strike stopped the operations
of the Airport for a few hours.
28
First Analytical Approach
Crisis Management by Copenhagen Airports
As touched upon in the Introduction to Analytical Approaches, this section takes its departure
in the three-stage approach to crisis management, as defined by W. Timothy Coombs15. The
focus is on stage two, the crisis situation, and how the communication deriving from the case of
Copenhagen Airports relates to the guidelines presented by Coombs. As the theory has been
presented earlier16, we do not include references in this section.
It was suggested that an organization must incorporate the internet in its communication as a
way to exchange information – for example by including announcements on the front page of
the website. It is hereby implied that stakeholders look for information via the organization’s
website and this is evident, as the Danish News site, DR, mentions that “according to the
Airport website, a few flights has been cancelled” (Appendix 9, own translation). It is, however,
suggested that the information on Copenhagen Airports’ website was not kept up to date
throughout the crisis, as another News site, Tv2, states that “both domestic- and International
flights have been affected by the long wait, despite the fact that Copenhagen Airports’ own
website, www.cph.dk, still says that the wait for security for International flights is 2 minutes”
(Appendix 7, own translation).
As suggested in the Introduction to Analytical Approaches, we find that the main focus in Stage
2, the crisis situation, ought to be on the organization communicating towards its primary
stakeholders. Our reason for stating this is that we find that these are the ones in need of
information, as the primary stakeholders are the ones being influenced by the crisis and
furthermore, as they are the ones able to cause the organization damage17. As presented in
Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management, it is important for an organization to relate its
communication to its stakeholders and make these feel like insiders; this seems to have proven
difficult for Copenhagen Airports, as several stakeholders have criticized the Airport for its lack
15
See Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
In Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
17
As touched upon in Introduction to Analytical Approaches
16
29
of communication. This is seen in Appendix 3, where an employee involved in the strike
expresses his discontent with the organization; “at the management parking, which we can see
from here, a shiny brand new Porsche is parked. Rumor has it that one of the Managers
received it as a bonus for the 2011 outcome” (Appendix 3, own translation). This could be
argued to show, that this quote relates to speculations deriving from a lacking stakeholderrelationship between the management and the employees – the employee quoted above does
seemingly not feel like an insider and, as mentioned in the theoretical approaches, this can be
fatal for Copenhagen Airports, as stakeholders help create the image of an organization.
Another primary stakeholder showing his discontent is Stig Elling, the manager of Star Tours, a
Danish Travel Agency – he criticizes Copenhagen Airports for the lack of information and places
focus upon the morning being chaotic (Appendix 6). It has to be noted, that Stig Elling
acknowledges that the situation of a crisis can be hard to handle. Still, he maintains the
viewpoint, that he will “demand an account from Copenhagen Airports” (Appendix 6, own
translation), as he says it has been very hard to obtain information (Appendix 6). In addition to
this, passengers criticize the Airport for the way it handles the crisis (Appendix 11, 12, 15 & 17);
again focusing especially on the lack of information, while presenting speculative arguments “
(…)some say, that there has been a single security-check open since 5 am this morning”
(Appendix 17, own translation). Furthermore, this passenger focuses attention towards the lack
of professionalism, while proposing ways in which the crisis situation could have been handled
better by Copenhagen Airports (Appendix 17).
This is in direct opposition to what Coombs defines as important during a crisis, namely that
stakeholders must be informed and at the same time, this suggests that Copenhagen Airports in
this case failed in getting its view of the crisis into the media and thereby towards its
stakeholders.
While analyzing Copenhagen Airports’s crisis communication, we recall the guidelines as
presented by Coombs18, namely that the communication must be quick, consistent and open.
As it was a short-term crisis, we propose that the organization’s communication must appear
especially quick; this was, however, not the case with Copenhagen Airports on this particular
18
See Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
30
occasion. As mentioned prior19, the crisis began shortly before 5am, but the communication
seen in our Appendixes show that the response from Copenhagen Airports did not occur before
06.34 (Appendix 9) – this is in direct opposition with the theory20 that proposes that
communication must appear within the first hour or less. One might argue that this period
without information from the organization presents an opening for speculation from both
primary and secondary stakeholders, which can present obstacles in regards to future
stakeholder relationships.
19
20
In Introduction to the case
As presented in Media + Crisis = Chaos?
31
Analysis of the Maintenance of Image of Copenhagen Airports
This section of the project revolves around the analysis of data, taking departure in the theory
section on Organizational Image Theory, and the scholars presented here. As the theory was
thoroughly explained in the section on Organizational Image Theory, it is not elaborated on
here.
As mentioned prior21, the main focus is on the second stage of Massey’s theory on
Organizational Image Management, namely the stage of maintenance, that is, the stage an
organization finds itself in during a crisis situation.
The main thought throughout this section, is how strong and consistent communication with
the stakeholder group, is the correct way to conduct crisis communication in order to maintain
the image of the organization. As seen in many of the Appendixes, and as it is seen in this
section, the communication from the Airport during the crisis left a lot to desire according to a
variety of stakeholders, and also, potentially harmed the image of the organization
unintentionally.
It is apparent, that the media has only used very little information from the Public relations
Manager of Copenhagen Airports, as the same statement is seen in several different articles;
the mentioning of the safety still being in place, and the traffic of the airport just starting
around the time of the crisis (Appendix 9, 13, 15, and 16). While the actual information of the
statements cannot be argued to be untrue, it is deemed to not be enough, and that it is not
effective in this circumstance22. These statements are not deemed strong and as appropriative
informative, as they only provide very little and rather formless information, and at the same
time, it is not the information that the passengers are seeking (Appendix 17). At the same time,
the information given in the statements, is rather vague; “but the flights are only just starting
now (…)” (Appendix 9, own translation), “I see that delays are announced for the five of the first
seven departures, and it is up to the Airline companies to decide if they will be departing
without passengers” (Appendix 13, own translation). While these two quotes are not deemed
21
22
In Theory on Organizational Image
As presented in Theory on Organizational Image
32
to hold untruthful information, it is not strong communication, in the sense that it leaves a lot
up to speculations. We argue that strong and precise communication with no room for
speculations, is what is needed. Concretely, the statement saying that it is up to the airline
companies to decide whether they send off flights with empty seats, is information that both
make the passengers worry if their flight will leave without them, and at the same time, it
makes the organization come across as parted (Appendix 2). The free room for speculation, can
according to this area of theory damage the further reputation and image of the organization,
as the purpose of communication is to maintain or influence the stakeholders’ perception. This
is furthermore seen in Appendix 15, as a passenger says “but (eh) nothing (sound goes off a bit)
on, on if the flights are postponed, if they are waiting, or if they are taking off or – what the
time-frame is in this situation.” (Appendix 17, own translation). It is evident, that the
information that the primary stakeholders are seeking, is rather consistency and preciseness,
and not the vague information given out. The Public relations Manager does try to give out
information in regards to the time-frame, but it never gets stronger than “No, unfortunately I
cannot – I do not know at this present moment. Hopefully, we will soon know more about how
long this unofficial strike will last (…)” (Appendix 16, own translation). Even though this is
probably all the information he is capable of giving at the moment, the importance of ”closing
down” that area of media interest fast, is important, in order to maintain the image of the
organization as legitimate and in charge. We deem that the lack of precise information is
probably due to guidelines internally saying that they cannot give out more information at this
time.
Another aspect of the theory, is the focus on presenting the organization as “one”, and not
showcasing internal conflicts to the public, as touched upon briefly above. Failure to do so, as
presented in the theory section23, severely threaten the legitimacy of the crisis communication
conducted, and the overall image of the organization. This “guideline” is clearly overstepped, as
the Public relations Manager comment that “it is completely unannounced and we are quite
frustrated that it is happening now” (Appendix 16, own translation), “(…) we had no idea at all
that the security personnel would be having a union meeting, and then go on a strike (…)”
23
See Theory on Organizational Image
33
(Appendix 5, own translation) and “it does not look too good here in the Airport” (Appendix 9,
own translation). These quotes clearly expose the internal conflict in the organization in the
moments during the crisis, as the Public relations Manager so openly expresses the irritation
and frustration with the security personnel being in strike. This creates the image of an
organization in conflict, and it creates the risk of portraying the organization as weak, and
without “one” voice. This could potentially damage the image of the organization. It could be
argued, that it could have been a conscious decision to portray the internal conflict, as it left
the Airport in a chaotic state, and that the dissociation from the actions of strike could leave
the management appearing without blame. We24, however, deem that this is not desirable in
this situation though. Not even after the crisis was over, and the arguably stressing situation
had ended which could have explained the ill-fortunate statements, did the rhetoric of internal
conflict end, as it is stated that it was “(…) very uncommon and completely unacceptable” and
that “it does not make the negotiations any easier, that the security personnel downs tools
completely without warning” (Appendix 9, own translation). These statements are found in the
press release of the morning of the strike on the airports own website (www.cph.dk), where we
argue that the organization should have known better than to expose the internal conflict.
As suggested in the theory25, the essence of a dialogic approach is also important for the
perception of the organization of the stakeholders, and thereby the image of the organization.
As stated, the mere reason for crisis communication is to maintain and influence the
perception, and thereby image, by communication, and that a dialogic approach is favorable for
this. It is favorable, as the dialog between stakeholders and organization, creates a perception
of the organization as open and communicative, and as interested in providing information.
Also, it gives the stakeholders a feeling of inclusiveness and of being somewhat in charge of the
situation, as their opinion seemingly matters more in this instance. At the same time, it seems
clear from the Appendixes included, that there was not sufficient dialog between the primary
stakeholders in the airport and the organization of Copenhagen Airports, during the short-term
crisis. The theoretical suggestion of importance of dialog, is indicated to be correct by the
24
25
Along the lines of theoretical understandings
See Theory on Organizational Image
34
Appendixes, as the primary stakeholders seem frustrated with the lack of dialog and
information hereof (Appendix 6, 7, 9, 16 & 17) – as also seen in Crisis Management by
Copenhagen Airports. Quotes like “(…)it has been very difficult to obtain proper
information(…)” (Appendix 6, own translation) seems as leading the mood of the news
coverage of the morning.
Lastly, another key guideline according to the theory section on Organizational Image, is that of
at all times being attentive towards what the target segment needs in terms of communication
and information. Evaluation of tools and channels of communication, in order to adjust and
correct the implemented communication is important, as it is also argued in the section on
Stakeholder theory. This again draws upon the previously mentioned notion of dialogue, and
how the failure of this, jeopardizes the image of the organization.
35
Crisis at Copenhagen Airports + Media = ?
This section takes its departure in the four-stage approach portraying media behavior, as
defined by Jane Jordan-Meier26. Here, we analyze how the media interpreted the crisis at
Copenhagen Airports and furthermore, we investigate the efforts taken by the spokesperson in
regards to communication, as we speculate that the communication deriving from the
organization in crisis relates to the media’s outlook on the crisis situation. As the theory has
been presented earlier, we do not include references in this section.
As mentioned prior27, an organization is tested on its ability to deliver credible information
during a crisis and this is the starting point, while analyzing the role of the media during the
case of the crisis at Copenhagen Airports. As emphasized in the previous analyses 28, a variety of
stakeholders did not find that the information needed was given; this, we argue, could be a sign
that the Airport’s crisis communication is potentially not well-suited for the chosen types of
media, as the desired focus did not seem to come across, according to the findings in this
project.
Stage 1 is present, as the media focuses on the public safety. This is seen by the media including
remarks on the probability on delays (Appendix 2, 8, 9, 13 & 16) and furthermore, as the
spokesperson emphasizes that “(…) even as the security personnel is at a meeting, the general
safety of the Airport is not compromised” (Appendix 9, own translation).
In Stage 2, the media seeks to provide information on what went wrong and who was
responsible29. This is seen in the media’s accounts of the strike at Copenhagen Airports
(Appendix 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 13 & 16); here the focus is on explaining the situation and how it affects
the passengers. In addition to this, it is interesting to note the differences in portraying the
crisis; Appendix 3 focuses on the employees on strike and on including their account of who is
responsible, whereas Appendix 4 focuses on Copenhagen Airports’s account of the strike. We
argue that this stage naturally leads to the following stage.
26
See Media + Crisis = Chaos?
In Media + Crisis = Chaos?
28
Crisis Management by Copenhagen Airports & Analysis of Maintenance of Image of Copenhagen Airports
29
As thoroughly explained in Media + Crisis = Chaos?
27
36
Our reason for arguing this is that, Stage 3 centers its attention on blame. Here, we suggest that
the communication in Appendix 3 tries to blame the Airport, whereas other Appendixes’
communication blames the employees who are on a strike (Appendix 5, 6, 8, 13 & 16). This
could also be an indication of the Media portraying, what they assume people would want to
read; the media’s own agenda may be shining through. We argue that this is especially evident,
as the Public relations Manager explains that “it is really frustrating, and we had no idea at all
that the security personnel would be having a union meeting, and then go on a strike (…)”
(Appendix 5, own translation) – here, we argue that the Public relations Manager reacts
wrongly, as it has been emphasized30 that an organization must act as a whole and not blame
each other31.
We argue that Stage 4 is clearly apparent in Appendix 14. This stage revolves around the
organization portraying what it has learned and furthermore the rebuilding of stakeholder
relationships32. We argue that this is seen in the Press Release deriving from Copenhagen
Airports; here the focus is on apologizing to the stakeholders who were affected by the strike
and in addition also on praising the passengers for being understandable and remaining calm
(Appendix 14). Furthermore, we find that this relates to Coombs’ 3rd Stage, Post-Crisis, as the
organization, via this Press Release, tries to leave the stakeholders with a positive impression.
Freeo defines a spokesperson as one that is able to handle and establish credibility with the
media, while remaining calm in stressful situation33. The spokesperson on the morning of the
crisis of Copenhagen Airports, Søren Hedegaard Nielsen, was the main source of information
during the crisis and his efforts in relation to the prescribed theoretical understanding of how a
spokesperson is to respond34 are analyzed in this section. Appendix 2 features statements from
the spokesperson; these are deemed to provide rather unclear information, as Søren
Hedegaard Nielsen fail to provide clear facts relating to how the strike affects the passengers
(Appendix 2). This is seen in several statements (Appendix 5, 8 & 13), especially as he, when
30
In Theory on Organizational Image
This argument is also presented in Analysis of the Maintenance of Image of Copenhagen Airports
32
As explained in Media + Crisis = Chaos?
33
In Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
34
As it has been explained in Coombs’ three stages to Crisis Management
31
37
being asked about the number of travellers influenced by the strike, explains that “Mja, if I was
able to answer that, then … No, unfortunately I cannot – I do not know at this present moment”
and “(…)hmm, that is hard to say at this moment, (…)” (Appendix 16, own translation). Even as
it is likely to have been impossible to know the facts at this time, a more clear statement should
have been given, we argue; if no specific information is available, a spokesperson ought to
include when this information is expected to appear. A spokesperson ought to remain calm in
stressful situations, but this seems to have proven difficult for the spokesperson on the
morning of the crisis of Copenhagen Airports, as he explains that “it is really frustrating, and we
had no idea at all that the security personnel would be having a union meeting, and then go on
a strike (…)” (Appendix 5, own translation), “it does not look too good here at the Airport.
Everything is chaos (…)” (Appendix 9, own translation) and “it is completely un-notified and we
are fairly frustrated that it takes place right now” (Appendix 16, own translation). We find that
these statements suggest that the spokesperson was not able to portray composure during the
strike, as he mentions the word chaos and furthermore, as he criticizes the employees on a
strike by including remarks relating to frustration35. As we have mentioned prior36, an
organization must stick together during a crisis and this does not seem to be the case in the
Public relations Manager’s statements.
Another failure in the communication was that it could be seen as though not all information
was given – this is argued to be interpreted by the recipient stakeholders as a sign of covering
up and this can potentially lead to mistrust and broken stakeholder relationships. Appendix 15
includes a remark stating that “the Public relations Manager does not wish to inform how many
staff members from security are included in the meeting. But he expects them to return soon”
(Appendix 15, own translation). Here, we find it important to note that Public relations
Manager may not have had the actual number of employees on strike, but that the media still
manages to portray him as insufficient with information.
35
36
As it was also suggested in Theory on Organizational Image
In Theory on Organizational Image
38
A spokesperson was also defined37 as one that is able to bring head and heart together and we
argue that this is evident in the communication deriving from Søren Hedegaard Nielsen. He
comes across as reassuring and apologizing (Appendix 2 & 13) and furthermore, he comes
across as a human, when including his personal view on the situation; “when I have a paralyzed
Airport at hand, I am certainly not pleased” (Appendix 9, own translation); this is argued to be a
great statement for enhancing stakeholder-relationships during a crisis.
As mentioned38, it is argued that one person should be designated as spokesperson during a
crisis. This proved to be the case during the crisis at Copenhagen Airports, as seen in the
Appendixes. However, we find it puzzling to note that the Press Release offered after the
crisis39 include statements of a different spokesperson, namely Henrik Peter Jørgensen, Vice
President of Communication at Copenhagen Airports (Appendix 14).
As it has been suggested throughout this project and demonstrated through the analyses, the
media plays a large role in portraying and interpreting an organization’s crisis communication. It
could be suggested that the media has an agenda of its own, as the news agencies need the
public’s attention in order to continue its operations – we return to this notion in the following
Second Analytical Approach, as we find it to be of great importance in relation to this research
focus. We argue that the media’s agenda is present, when various news sources choose to
focus upon the sensational aspects of a crisis, as opposed to an unbiased version. During the
crisis at Copenhagen Airports this is seen by newspapers stating that “airtraffic stands still (…)”
(Appendix 1, own translation), “(…) the queue for security (…) was as long as a bad year”
(Appendix 3, own translation) and ”here, where I am standing, at the Domestic departures
section, it is crowded. Everything has stopped” (Appendix 9, own translation); the rhetoric
seems to be applied in order for the situation to appear spectacular and maybe even more
chaotic than reality. Furthermore, we speculate that the media might have focused on this
specific crisis in particular because of the prominent people being affected by the strike
(Appendix 10, 11, 12, 15 & 16). This is, however, also connected to the argument that if the
37
In Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
In Coombs’ three stages of Crisis Management
39
Which we, in Crisis Management by Copenhagen Airports, categorized as a means of re-creating stakeholderrelationships
38
39
crisis team does not supply initial crisis information to the media, some other groups will and
they might be misinformed40 - we find this to be true during the crisis at Copenhagen Airports,
as several stakeholders gave statements during the crisis situation. Appendix 17 depicts an
interview with a passenger and here the focus is not upon the actual situation, but rather upon
depicting a personal view on the situation; “(…) it is completely packed, some has gotten ill
waiting in line, and has fallen down and we get no information (sound goes off a bit). I think
that is what frustrates people the most” (Appendix 7 & 17, own translation); this statement
creates a spectacular event by including the fact that people has fallen down. We propose that
this statement is a way of creating additional focus and that it might be included because of the
media’s own agenda. Our reason for stating this is that it is not something all the news sites
have taken up, and it therefore seems as an individual minor event in the big event, only added
for the sensational value.
40
As thoroughly explained in Media + Crisis = Chaos? & Analysis of the use of Social Media in relation to the crisis
40
Analysis of the use of Social Media in relation to the crisis
This section focuses on the analyses of data, especially of Appendix 18-22 and bibliography
entrances CPH Air Facebook 1-4, as these are concerned with the social media – namely Twitter
and Facebook, as we stated in the theory section of the Social Media as well. This analysis takes
its departure in the theory presented in the theory section The Social Media, and the various
authors featured here; as the theory was thoroughly explained prior, it is not elaborated on in
this section.
In the section on theory of the Social Media, it is suggested by Castell, that the battle of
organizations, is of the “minds of the people” (Castell 2007, 238), and that this is increasingly
taking place on the social media platforms. The perception of the organization is formed on
these, as the segment of users is greatly increasing all the time and the understanding that
“you can accept the social media to be a focal point in a crisis since that is where people rally”
(Jordan-Meier 2011, 62) is argued to be accurate.
What is argued is the importance of realizing, that bad media, and negative attention is easily
obtained in the social media, unless the organization itself is present on social media platforms,
guiding the information and conversations in the right direction.
As researched on Twitter, the only profile regarding Copenhagen Airports, is a site put up by
“dedicated fans” (Appendix 20). This contradicts everything the theory on The Social Media
stands for41, as the airport has no way of controlling the information put online by this site – in
the name of the airport - and also, has no profile of their own, to counterpart the information
put up by the fan site. This way, the airport has no way of providing information, or distributing
the truth as perceived by the airport. This is a huge flaw according to the understanding of the
theory, as the theory suggests that the social network is an ideal channel, and ready-made
source, for providing fast and precise information, and immediately closing down areas prone
of speculations by the stakeholders. This relates to the thought of Syme (2011), presented in
Introduction and Considerations in relation to the Research.
41
As explained in The Social Media
41
Another problem with this is actually, that the Twitter profile that looks to be Copenhagen
Airports’s professional profile – run by the fans – did not have information on the strike on that
morning either (Appendix 19). This means, that it comes across as if Copenhagen Airports just
did not bother to put up information on their “own” profile to the users and stakeholders
seeking information on Twitter.
In connection to this, it is realized, that it is not clear whether or not the airport in fact has a
profile on the social network of Facebook, when browsing the site. There are several different
sites (CPH Air Facebook 1-4), but it is not clear which one is the official one, or, if any of them in
fact are official and provided by the airport. All the profiles are all rather bland, with little or no
information, very few “likes” (indications that people follow them), and seem rather
unprofessional, as opposed to other organizations Facebook sites. Two of them even seem
completely forgotten (CPH Air Facebook 3 and 4), which could be speculated to be worse than
not having a Facebook profile at all.
In as it is impossible to figure out which, if any, site is the official site, stakeholders on the
morning of the crisis, would have had no clue which to frequent. And even if they searched all
of them, none of the ones obtained through this research, holds any information from the
morning of the crisis. This seems strange, as Facebook arguably is the most widely used social
network in Denmark, and the entire world, and has been for some time. We argue, that the
efforts towards incorporating Facebook in the overall communication plan, and thereby also in
times of crisis, seem lacking.
Coincidently, many Danish politicians were in the airport on the morning of the crisis, travelling
from the capital to a meeting in the province. Many of them were online and active on their
Twitter accounts, talking about the issues in the airport - as Benedikte Kjær and Ellen Trane
Nørby stated; “chaos in the airport. Union meeting stops politicians course to Aalborg for the KL
summit. It is really hot in here!“ and “(…) greatly delayed (…)” (Appendix 18, own translation),
“Photo of chaos in Cph Airport. Security close down work. Hundreds of members of parliament,
journalists, politicians on their way to the KL summit (…)” (Appendix 21, own translation).
Narratives like these were sent out on Twitter, without the airport itself being able to respond
42
and correct the negative phrases, as there is no official Twitter account associated with
Copenhagen Airports. This is directly what the theory is warning against, as both Holmes and
Castell argue that the vast flock of the segment using Twitter should be realized, and the
importance of being able to bring information and truths to the stakeholders fast is essential.
As this did not happen, the narratives of the politicians, who are followed by many on Twitter,
became the main source of news and information for many on the site. The use of words and
statements by the politicians such as “(…) everything has stopped (…)” (Appendix 18, own
translation), and “(…) Copenhagen Airport is closed (…)” (Appendix 22, own translation) creates
a very negative perception of the airport, and even though they might not true or the definition
the organization wants to come out42, the statements are the news that reach the surface, as
no official statements were stated on the site.
42
The Airport was at no point closed, in opposed to what is stated in Appendix 22
43
Second Analytical Approach
W. Timothy Coombs (Coombs 2001, 165) and Joseph Eric Massey (Massey 2004) argue that
”Crisis Management is ongoing” and that it needs frequent evaluation – we agree with this, and
find that it fits with the purpose of this Analytical Approach. Here, we look into what an
organization like Copenhagen Airports could have done differently while communicating during
the strike, according to the theoretical understandings and findings43.
This Analysis is based on the theories, but we also draw upon the findings of the First Analytical
Approach, as we argue that these offer a view of the tools applied during the crisis at
Copenhagen Airports. We envision that the findings of the First Analytical Approach allow us to
look into what could have been done differently44, and thereby also proposing alterations and
recommendations for the future45, both for Copenhagen Airports and other organizations
experiencing a short-term crisis.
As we concluded throughout the First Analytical Approach, we investigated some areas, where
we deem, from the data present, that Copenhagen Airports could have chosen other ways of
responding or reacting, during the short-term crisis. We briefly touch upon these areas in the
following. This section we envision allow us to gain knowledge on areas, where the Airport
could alter its current operations in regards to Crisis Communication, which is the focus in the
last section of this analysis, where we include our recommendations for future strategies of
Crisis Communication both for Copenhagen Airports and other organizations experiencing
similar events.
We do not include references in this Analysis, as the aspects presented have been touched
upon prior in this project46.
43
As presented throughout this project.
In the following section, Theoretical Discussion of the Findings of the First Analytical Approach
45
In the following section, Recommendations for Future Actions
46
In the Theoretical Approaches & First Analytical Approach
44
44
Theoretical Discussion of the Findings of the First Analytical Approach
The First Analytical Approach concluded that we found the Crisis Communication, during
the security strike at Copenhagen Airports, rather vague and unclear in central areas. One
might speculate why the communication deriving from the Airport came across like this; one
explanation might be due to the unexpected nature of the crisis (Appendix 5, 8, 9, 13 & 16). In
addition to this, it can be argued to be because of the agenda of the media covering the event.
It has been suggested47 that Crisis Communication must be quick, consistent, open and strong,
in order to create an image of a legitimate organization, which we did not find to be the case
during the security strike at Copenhagen Airports. Here, lack of strong information and the fact
that the Airport did not communicate quickly, left both the primary and secondary stakeholders
with the opportunity to speculate48. Furthermore, the offered communication is not deemed
suitable for the purpose, the stakeholders and the chosen types of media, as the information
offered through this communication was not what the public needed49.
The lack of a response within one hour as prescribed in the theory, is in direct opposition with
the findings of our First Analytical Approach, where we concluded that the first statement from
Copenhagen Airports did not appear in major national media before 6.34. We find this puzzling,
as we include major national online news sites50 coverage of the crisis at Copenhagen Airports
as data; we speculate if this could be due to a lack of interest from the media. It might be that
the media chose to include reporting from the crisis after the realization that prominent people
were affected by the strike, and that the sensational value would be more apparent with this
realization.
As further argued51, a dialogic approach to the communication, and the stakeholders it affects,
is beneficial. As found in the First Analytical Approach, Copenhagen Airports fails to do this, and
thereby misses the chance to create the image of an open and communicative organization. If
dialog had been achieved, it could in turn have created the image of a legitimate and truthful
47
In the Theoretical Approaches
Which was proposed in the First Analytical Approach
49
As seen throughout the First Analytical Approach
50
As defined in Methodology
51
Theory on Organizational Image
48
45
organization, which actively works hard to find a solution to the problems that arise during a
crisis.
The Public relations Manager came across as confused and stressed, as we argue that he did
not remain composed during the crisis, did not come across as willing to offer information and
came across as covering up information, which has been argued52 to be some of the important
aspects when dealing with the media. By using a word like chaos, blaming the security
personnel on a strike (thereby indicating internal conflict) and seemingly holding back
information to the media, the Airport risks broken stakeholder-relationships. We find, that a
clear focus upon stakeholders and the correct communication towards these, does not come
across as achieved by Copenhagen Airports during the security strike. We speculate that the
way the spokesperson appears in the media might be due to the unexpectedness of the crisis,
as opposed to a lack of training in dealing with the media.
In addition to these aspects, we found it puzzling to note that Søren Hedegaard Nielsen was
replaced as a spokesperson post-crisis, when Copenhagen Airports offered a press release
focusing on praising the stakeholders and apologizing for any inconvenience (Appendix 14). This
is in direct opposition to what the theory suggests as a guideline for an organization in crisis;
namely that one spokesperson should be designated. We speculate that an additional
spokesperson was included in order for the Airport to mark an end to the crisis and
furthermore, as the new spokesperson possibly seems more ‘on top’ of the situation and can
praise the stakeholders in a different manner, as he has been ‘looking from the sideline’. Also, it
should be noted, that the possibility of only having one spokesperson is achievable, as the
event is as stated short-term, and not covering a longer time-span.
As seen in several instances in the First Analytical Approach, the primary stakeholders on
site during the crisis, were not satisfied with the information given to them during the crisis53
and we speculate if this is a sign of the Airport’s crisis communication not being suited for a
short-term crisis of this kind, as presented in the section Crisis Management by Copenhagen
Airports. We argue, that having a separate plan for these kinds of situations might be
52
53
In the Theoretical Approaches
See First Analytical Approach
46
appropriate for an organization, and that the incorporation of social media in this plan would
be beneficial, as argued by Strander54 (2012). It seems as if Copenhagen Airports might not
have had clear guidelines for an event of this kind, as lack of correct handling is indicated
throughout the research. As argued in Analysis of the use of Social Media in relation to the
crisis, we see that it is an essential flaw to not incorporate the social media platforms the crisis
communication for this type of event. It seems that Copenhagen Airports did not incorporate
these, as no Twitter account has been attainable, and no official Facebook site has been found.
Also, it should be noted, that various sources of the newest information in the area, argues that
these platforms of social media are useful for organization in situations like this (AtCore and
Twitter Statistik); it is seen, that the segment of Twitter users is high and rising, and that most
users use the network for information on celebrities or organizations of interest. In other
words, the activity of the users cannot be used for measuring if they read updates from, for
instance, Copenhagen Airports – because, at it is seen from these sources, they do (AtCore and
Twitter Statistisk).
In relation to this, it was seen in the Analysis of the use of Social Media in relation to the crisis,
that a lot of prominent people happened to be at the airport that morning. Their updates
through Twitter ended up on many news sites, as well as in the news feed of their “followers”
on the network (Appendix 11, 12, 15, 18, 21 and 22). We argue, that this must be basis to
indicate, that Twitter is used, and that the narratives provided by the stakeholders became the
truth of the crisis situation on the network; this should not have been the case, and would have
been easily avoidable.
Furthermore, we speculate that the presence of these prominent people made the media blow
the crisis out of proportion. As we touched upon in Media+Crisis=Chaos?, media agencies need
public attention to continue its operations. This we argue to be the media’s own agenda, as
they have the possibility to focus on various aspects of a news story; in the case of the crisis at
Copenhagen Airports, the focus was directed towards the prominent people being stuck and
furthermore, the sensational wording while describing the crisis55.
The findings in proportion to Facebook was that of all of the sites found relating to the airport,
54
55
In Introduction and Considerations in relation to the Research
As specified in First Analytical Approach
47
it was not possible to conclude which is the official one – furthermore, none of them provide
any useful information, as it was seen in Analysis of the use of Social Media in relation to the
crisis (Facebook 1-4). As seen in the theoretical sections of Social Media and Media + Crisis =
Chaos? , precise and clear information through the internet, and thereby social networks, is one
of the easiest and fastest ways of providing information, truth and trust to stakeholder groups.
Another problem with the state of the Facebook profile(s) is that they all seem rather deserted
– we put forward the speculation, if this in fact is worse than not having a site. We argue that
the steady and frequent updating of such profiles provides the image of a lively,
communicating, and open organization.
The use of social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, and the incorporation of these
into a communication or crisis communication plan, is of course something that needs to be
thought through, and the vision of the use needs to be decided and evaluated. We argue
though, that it is strange and striking, that it seems that neither of these platforms are
incorporated in Copenhagen Airports’ communication plans. It seems rather old-fashioned and
gives the impression of an organization denying quick and easily accessible information and
updating.
The media poses a severe threat to the image of the organization, if it is not handled
accordingly, as seen in the Theoretical Approaches, and in the First Analytical Approach. As
argued, a fast and strong response can potentially close down areas of speculation, and
maintain and/or restore the image. We argue that this is not obtained by Copenhagen Airports,
as there are several speculations and “half-truths” on the News sites (Appendix 2, 3, 7, 9, 13
etc.).
We argue that this section adds knowledge to the post-crisis stage, as we evaluate the efforts
taken during the crisis.
48
Recommendations for Future Actions
As briefly mentioned prior in this analysis, we choose to include this section, where we propose
areas, where Copenhagen Airports and other organizations dealing with a short-term crisis,
could alter its measures of operation. All findings relate to the previous Analytical Approaches.
A general recommendation for the communication during a crisis, is that dialog with the
primary stakeholders is crucial, but that the secondary stakeholders should not be ignored;
therefore, we recommend that an organization defines its stakeholders prior to a crisis.
Communication that happens fast and information being strong and precise, with no room for
speculation, is key. This can be reached, by speeding up the process of informing the various
channels of communication; concretely, we suggest, following the theoretical understanding,
that a statement is published within one hour. If this proves difficult, it would be a good idea to
make standard press releases that mentions that a spokesperson returns as soon as additional
knowledge in the area is gained; at the same time, this allows the spokesperson to regain
composure and figure out the facts of the crisis before dealing with the media. As long as some
information is released quickly, the content can be revised on a continuous basis. Also, the
statements given out should be in a form that does not invite speculations and uncertainty.
Even as the situation of a crisis is arguably unexpected and happens rapidly, the composure of
the spokesperson is very important. Strong rhetoric and the ability to keep calm, as well as
presenting the organization as “one”, is crucial during crisis situations. That is, to not place
blame on specific groups within the organization. This is both in terms of the maintenance of an
image, as well as getting the organization’s definition of the situation across to the media. In
addition to this, we recommend that only one spokesperson represent the organization during
a short-term crisis; if more than one is included in a short amount of time, we argue that the
stakeholders become confused, as it might appear that the spokesperson, who appeared firstly,
is being corrected by the other one.
Concretely, time-frames can be given, as long as these are revised continuously. Also, the
continuous evaluation of the tools and channels of crisis communication is essential, as this
creates an image of an updated and up-to-speed organization. This, at the same time, forges
good dialog, which in turn gives the organization a reputation as legitimate and truthful to the
49
stakeholders.
Good dialog could be obtained, by sending information personnel on the floors during a crisis
and through this keep the primary stakeholders informed. From personal visits to Copenhagen
Airports, we realize that this is an already included method of operating; we, however, suggest
that additional information personnel should be sent out during crisis and that these should be
more visible in the terminals. This we state on the basis that the information personnel already
present have seemingly not been able to provide the information needed, which we support by
Annette Juhler Kjær mentioning the need of more tangible information (Appendix 17). We find
that this relates to the abovementioned statement, where we suggest that additional
information personnel should be sent out during crisis and that they should possess knowledge
and routines in addressing frustrated stakeholders on ground floors.
We argue, that a separate plan for a short-term crisis like presented throughout this project, is
beneficial. We argue, that if there is a specific plan of action, in terms of overall communication
and addressing the media, the crisis communication appear a lot smoother and give a more
“calm and collected” image of the organization.
Guidelines are important when dealing with the media; one thing to aim for is that the “(…)
organization must be prepared to issue a statement within one hour or less (…)” (Jordan-Meier
2011, 187), as we briefly touched upon in the previous section. In connection to this, we argue
that a set of guidelines specifically for dealing with the media during a short-term crisis would
have been helpful for the spokesperson, in order for a good appearance in the media; these
guidelines should include methods of how to communicate during uncertain times where none
or only a small amount of information is available, as we argue that this seems56 to be one of
the main problems in relation to the media performance by Søren Hedegaard Nielsen.
An additional area that we recommend is the incorporation of newer technological ways of
communicating; one of the basic things that should be done is updating of the organization’s
website; it is argued that stakeholders turn to this in times of crisis in order to obtain
information. Therefore, we propose that employees communicating publically are trained in
the less formal language of the virtual world and that standards are set up for notifications via
56
In First Analytical Approach
50
the organization’s website.
Arguably one of the easiest, and virtually cost-free, options of communicating fast and directly
towards an organization’s stakeholders is by incorporating social media platforms. It is seen
through the analyses, that the segment for using both Facebook and Twitter is big and active
enough for incorporating into the crisis communication plan. The platforms are ready sources,
and the stakeholders using them expect organizations to do the same. The bad narratives that
was formed on Twitter in relation to this strike, would have been easily defended and opposed,
and speculation could have been closed down, had the organization taken advantage of the
platform. We recommend that a person is assigned to keep social media profiles updated, so
that mistakes, as found in this case, can be avoided. At the same time, it creates a positive and
modern image of the organization, as information is very easily attained. Another advice is to
create a Facebook profile that in fact looks like a professional site; as mentioned, it is not clear
which Copenhagen Airports site is the official, as it is now. In this regard, we recommend that a
direct hyperlink to the Facebook and Twitter profiles is put on the Airport website, as well as
publishing a brief note, explaining the stakeholders what to expect from the social media
platforms, in the news feed of the Airport website.
Overall, the frustration of stakeholders not finding information when needed, as well as
damage to the image of the Airport, could have been avoided to a large extent by these
measures.
Additionally, it is seen in Appendix 6 that Star Tours have incorporated a text messaging service
for their customers, for fast and easy information. We find this noteworthy, and suggest that a
similar solution could be highly beneficial for organizations during short-term crises. This
recommendation would need some research in order to find out if it is beneficial in the specific
context, but we note that it is interesting to consider this option in the future.
We argue that this section adds knowledge to the pre-crisis stage, as we here include areas that
we find ought to be incorporated to enhance stakeholder-relationships and that these
recommendations, can assist an organization in the preparation for another crisis.
51
Conclusion
Despite the criticism offered prior in this project, we argue that the Theoretical Approaches are
useful in connection with our research area. We find that these theoretical viewpoints provide
an organization with guidelines when engaging in Crisis Communication; therefore, one might
suggest that the theories ought to be broadly and generally defined, as the organization itself
must interpret the guidelines to its specific context.
In proportion to this, we suggest, along the thought of Holmes (Holmes 2011, 8), that a new
aspect could, and maybe even should be added to the existing crisis stage models, by Coombs
and Massey. We argue that it would be beneficial to include a dimension relating to the
incorporation of newer communication methods and how this, theoretically, can be done. This
would present an addition to these theories that correlates with the findings through this
project relating to future crisis communication strategies.
However, we agree with the notion that ”although most of the basics of crisis management
remain the same, the tools to apply them need to be revised an adapted to today’s digital
environment” (Herrero-Gonzales 2008, 151), following the argument presented by Massey
stating that “what was effective last year (…) may not be effective now, and will most likely not
be effective in the future” (Massey 2004: 245). We argue that this project proves that a
constant revision of Crisis Communication strategies ought to occur in order for an organization
to be able to deal with the media attention, it receives during a crisis.
The influence of the media has, throughout this project, proven to be massive; both as we
suggest that the media agencies has an agenda of their own and as the social media platforms
allow stakeholders to engage in image damaging narratives during a crisis. We argue that the
media’s influence can be both positive and negative; mainly dependent on the organization’s
communication. The media can work to the advantage of the organization, if information
provided from the organization is leading towards this. However in this case we see that the
various different media work against the interest of the organization, as the communication
52
coming from Copenhagen Airports was neither sufficient nor strong enough to avoid
speculations.
In relation to this we see that what the organization needs to be aware of is that
communication at all times provides the information needed of both the primary and
secondary stakeholder-groups, and that this communication is precise, informative, strong and
open, in order for the area of speculations and half-truths to be closed down rapidly. This we
see, is done by continuously evaluation of the stakeholder group.
In this specific case, we concluded that Copenhagen Airports should be aware of incorporating
communication via both traditional and new media channels. Concretely, we found that
Copenhagen Airports should include notifications on their website in times of crisis as to inform
stakeholders, create social media accounts in order to control the narratives and be aware of
the expectations from stakeholders frequenting traditional media channels. We argue, through
the Analyses, that the Airport’s stakeholders are ready for newer technological means of
communication and we emphasize the importance of incorporating these.
Having conducted this research, we find that areas of the study would be interesting to look
further into. If more resources had been available, we find that additional areas would have
been fruitful to look into, and that the results of this study could have been even more
academically strong with this addition.
For future research, we suggest conducting a qualitative semi-structured interview with Søren
Hedegaard Nielsen; we envision that this can provide us with additional knowledge in the area
and furthermore, we will be able to discuss the fact that the Public relations Manager did not
want to appear in this project after having been presented with the results.
In order to obtain an even broader account of the events on March 15, 2012 we suggest
including written or qualitative semi-structured interviews with other stakeholders; here, we
find it interesting to include the viewpoint of a member of the striking security personnel, an
employee from the Airport, a passenger and in addition to this, a member of the
Communications department at Copenhagen Airports. Including an interview with a
53
communications employee, would have allowed us to look further into the communicative
efforts during the crisis. By including a variety of stakeholder accounts, we would be able to
investigate how the communication offered by Copenhagen Airports related to the variety of
stakeholders it was aimed at.
In addition to this, it would be interesting to include the Airport’s Crisis Communication Plan
and relate this to the guidelines as presented in the Theoretical Approaches.
54
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List of Appendixes
Appendix 1: http://avisen.dk/flytrafikken-i-kastrup-lammet-af-strejke_162285.aspx (Accessed
April 23 2012)
Appendix 2: http://www.b.dk/nationalt/fagligt-moede-giver-flaskehals-i-kastrup-lufthavn
(Accessed April 21 2012)
Appendix 3: http://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/samfund/article1726153.ece (Accessed April 21
2012)
Appendix 4: http://www.b.dk/nationalt/askesky-skyld-i-lufthavnsstrejke (Accessed April 23
2012)
Appendix 5: http://www.tic.travel/news/15032012/strejke-i-kastrup-afbl%C3%A6st (Accessed
April 23 2012)
Appendix 6: http://www.b.dk/nationalt/stig-elling-taenk-hvis-det-var-en-charterweekend
(Accessed April 23 2012)
Appendix 7: http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/article.php/id-48911035:rejsende-venter-timevis-ikastrup.html?ss (Accessed April 23 2012)
Appendix 8: http://www.b.dk/nationalt/strejke-i-kastrup-lufthavn-afblaest (Accessed May 11
2012)
Appendix 9: http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2012/03/15/063316.htm (Accessed May 11
2012)
Appendix 10:
http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Ligetil/Dagens_fokus/Indland/2012/2012/03/15085737.htm
(Accessed May 11 2012)
Appendix 11: http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2012/03/15/080523.htm (Accessed May 11
2012)
Appendix 12: http://nyhederne-dyn.tv2.dk/article.php/id-48911536:politikernes-tweets-fralufthavnen.html (Accessed May 11 2012)
58
Appendix 13:
http://m.b.dk/touch/article.pml;jsessionid=0EBBB13EF374F6AF7500230E3B977487.uwportal4?guid=19319321 (Accessed May 11 2012)
Appendix 14:
http://www.cph.dk/CPH/DK/PRESSE/Nyheder/2012/K%C3%B8benhavns+Lufthavn+beklager+ge
nerne+efter+ulovlig+arbejdsnedl%C3%A6ggelse.htm (Accessed May 11 2012)
Appendix 15: http://nyhederne-dyn.tv2.dk/article.php/id-48909791:ministre-fanget-ilufthavnsstrejke.html (Accessed May 11 2012)
Appendix 16: Transcription of http://nyhederne-dyn.tv2.dk/article.php/id-48910799:uvarsletstrejke-i-k%C3%B8benhavns-lufthavn.html (Accessed May 11 2012)
Appendix 17: Transcription of http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/article.php/id-48911035:rejsendeventer-timevis-i-kastrup.html?ss (Accessed May 11 2012)
Appendix 18: Benedikte Kjær, Twitter profile screen shot;
https://twitter.com/#!/benediktekiaer (Accessed April 21 2012)
Appendix 19: CPH Airport, Twitter profile screen shot; https://twitter.com/#!/CPH_airport
(Accessed April 21 2012)
Appendix 20: CPH Airport, Twitter Info screen shot;
https://twitter.com/#!/search/cph%20airport (Accessed April 21 2012)
Appendix 21: Ellen Trane Nørby, Twitter profile screen shot;
https://twitter.com/#!/EllenTraneNorby (Accessed April 21 2012)
Appendix 22: Margrethe Vestager, Twitter profile screen shot; https://twitter.com/#!/vestager
(Accessed April 21 2012)
59