Reading Reflection #2: On the Ethics of Dwarf Tossing
Presented to Dr. Charlene Weaving
HKIN 354: Ethics in Sport
Daniel Boucher
201101251
February 5, 2015
Dwarf-tossing is an objectively abhorrent moral particularity. This, at least, is what I intend
to show in the following essay. I think that most people who consider dwarves human being worthy
of empathy would reflexively agree with me in this. However, this alone is no moral argument, and I
don’t think that it is so clear whether or not dwarf-tossing is truly immoral. However, by referring to
the ideas of Kretchmar, Fraleigh, and the contractualists from part two of the text, I will show that
dwarf-tossing is an unethical activity and ought not to be supported by sports ethicists. Furthermore, I
think that some changes to the rules of dwarf-tossing could allow the practice to continue in an
ethical way and increase the good the sport provides.
To begin, I will need to put forth a reason for which dwarf-tossing is unethical. This is not as
straight forward as one may intuit. For example, if we think about the dilemma in terms of
consequences, the practice seems perfectly fine. A classical utilitarian might argue that the dwarf is
paid a sum that (assuming the dwarf is a rational actor) he values more than the “dignity” he loses by
participating, if indeed he believe he is losing dignity at all. And since the people doing the tossing
are also extracting value from the enterprise, dwarf-tossing is actually a utility creating enterprise. I
think this few is myopic. The utility that is created among the parties involved in the transaction is
not greater than the utility lost by all the dwarfs who have lived and will live in a society where they
are not treated as human beings. If one counts all the utility gained by every action that separates
dwarfs from humans over human history, then compares all the utility lost from all dwarfs who suffer
the effects of heightism, one would surely conclude that there was more utility lost than gained. It
was in thinking about these kinds of utility calculations over time that led Rawls to his conception of
Justice. Rawlsian justice is the perfect place for me to begin supporting my argument.
In the text, Loland takes the stance that fairness in sport would be maximized if one
considered forming the rules in such a way that everyone has equal-opportunity. Loland uses Rawl’s
“vail of ignorance” to imagine a sport in which everyone can compete fairly. While Loland’s makes
the case for fairness among athletes, the argument can easily be extended to external actors. If every
country should spend equal amounts of money on their sports teams and health care in order to make
sport fairer, this would also create utility for non-athletes in society. Since being a dwarf is not a
condition for which one is responsible, the heightism experienced by dwarfs in sport ought to be
eliminated, even though they aren’t the athletes. MacPhee agrees, sport has a moral obligation to
fairness (i.e. contractualist justice) and integrity, not to societal norms (as Fraser would argue).
I spoke above about heightism. By that I mean the well-documented lack of empathy,
discrimination, poverty, and separation dwarfs experience. Separation is both a symptom and cause
of the heightism disease. Dwarf-tossing helps ingrain that separation in our society and thus is not
fair. It is Kretchmar who points out that sport contests are about “human singularity”. However, in
the sport of dwarf-tossing, the dwarf is the test, not part of the contest, therefore dwarf-tossing
promotes the idea that dwarfs are not part of the “human singularity”. Farleigh also shows that
dwarfs are indeed not participating in the sport like the rest of the “human singularity”. The dwarfs
thrown can’t win, and their only end is external to the contest. Fraleigh also echoes Kretchmar’s view
that contest is about the relationship between humans (which necessarily does not include dwarfs
during a dwarf-tossing contest). These points demonstrate the separation caused by the sport
between society and dwarfs.
The norms inherent in dwarf-tossing are immoral and do not deserve a separate moral
framework simply because they are unique to the sport. Within the sport, the interest of dwarfs are
not adequately considered and so the sport is not fair (by MacPhee and Loland’s reckoning). A better
version of the game would have pairs of dwarfs and throwers as teams, competing with different
roles on the same team and trying to win together. This would pass all the ethical tests considered in
the above essay.