1ac Plan: Plan: The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States. Cartels Contention one is cartels: Drug violence is spiraling out of control in Mexico Jo Tuckman Mexico City, The Guardian, Friday 9 May 2014 09.10 EDT “Violence erupts again in Mexican state where drug wars began” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/09/violence-mexico-tamaulipas-state-drug-wars ac 8-27 A spate of extreme violence in Mexico's north-eastern Tamaulipas state has ended the relative calm in the region where the country's drug wars began. Officials say about 80 people have been killed in almost daily street battles. This week the state's top detective, Salvador de Haro Muñoz, was among five people killed in a shootout. Ten police officers have been arrested for allegedly leading him into an ambush. Fourteen people were killed in one day this month in a string of gun battles between federal forces and unidentified gunmen in the city of Reynosa, across the border from McAllen, Texas. " It's worse than ever ," said a local woman who saw three shootouts on three consecutive days while visiting relatives in Tampico in early April. The woman, who asked not to be identified, said authorities did nothing to intervene beyond advising people to stay off the streets. " This is a failed state with no law and no authority." Tamaulipas has been a focal point in the drug wars as one of the busiest places on the border for northbound drugs and migrants and southbound weapons and cash. But the latest outbreak of bloodletting has prompted fears that the region is set for a return to the worst days of 2010 , when entire populations fled towns in the region to escape the violence. Be skeptical of arguments that violence is decreasing—families deliberately under-report deaths for fear of retaliation By Karla Zabludovsky covers Latin America for Newsweek. “Murders in Mexico Down From Height of the Drug War, But Violence Persists” Filed: 7/23/14 at 6:42 PM http://www.newsweek.com/murders-mexico-down-height-drug-war-violence-persists260990 During Mexico’s President Enrique Pena Nieto’s first year in office, after he had promised to cut back on everyday violence, there were 22,732 recorded homicides the National Institute of Statistics and Geography announced Wednesday.¶ The figure, which the institute called preliminary, is slightly lower than the previous year but still higher than when Felipe Calderon, Pena Nieto’s predecessor, took office. In 2007, shortly after Calderon declared war on drugs, the number of homicides reached 8,867. During his six years in office, homicides peaked at 27,213, in 2011.¶ “This is lower than I expected,” said Rene Jimenez Ornelas, coordinator of the unit for the analysis of violence at Mexico’s National Autonomous University, of the number of homicides in 2013. Jimenez Ornelas said one of the reasons for a lower-than-expected number is that many people prefer to have their loved ones’ death registered as a heart attack or another natural cause to avoid an investigation. “Why? Because they make the rest of the family pay ,” said Jimenez Ornelas, implying that criminals might seek revenge and kill family members who report a homicide. Nation-wide legalization of marijuana is a game-changer for stopping violence in Mexico—takes a huge chunk out of cartel profits and frees up police resources Hesson 14 -- immigration editor, covers immigration and drug policy from Washington D.C. [Ted, "Will Mexican Cartels Survive Marijuana Legalization?" Fusion, fusion.net/justice/story/mexican-cartels-survive-marijuanalegalization-450519, accessed 6-2-14] 1. Mexico is the top marijuana exporter to the U.S. A 2008 study by the RAND Corporation estimated that Mexican marijuana accounted for somewhere between 40 and 67 percent of the drug in the U.S. The cartel grip on the U.S. market may not last for long. Pot can now be grown for recreational use in Colorado and Washington, and for medical use in 20 states. For the first time, American consumers can choose a legal product over the black market counterpart. Beau Kilmer, the co-director of the RAND Drug Policy Research Center, says that a few states legalizing marijuana won’t eliminate the flow of the drug from down south, but a change in policy from the federal government would be a game changer. “Our research also suggests that legalizing commercial marijuana production at the national level could drive out most of the marijuana imported from Mexico,” he wrote in a 2013 op-ed. 2. Marijuana makes up more than $1 billion of cartel income Pot isn’t the main source of income for cartels. They make most of their cash from drugs like cocaine and heroin. But marijuana accounts for 15 to 26 percent of the cartel haul, according to RAND’s 2008 data. That translates to an estimated $1.1 billion to $2 billion of gross income. The drop in sales certainly wouldn’t end the existence of drug traffickers — they bring in an estimated $6 billion to $8 billion annually — but losing a fifth of one’s income would hurt any business. On top of that, Kilmer says that marijuana likely makes up a higher percentage of the cartel take today than it did back in 2008. So taking away pot would sting even more . 3. Authorities could focus on other drugs Marijuana made up 94 percent of the drugs seized by Border Patrol in the 2012 fiscal year, judging by weight. If pot becomes legal in the U.S. and cartels are pushed out of the market, that would allow law-enforcement agencies to dedicate more resources to combat the trafficking of drugs like heroin and cocaine. Most comprehensive studies prove violence will be significantly reduced in the long-run, and short-term lashout will be limited Beau Kilmer et al 10, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany M. Bond, Peter H. Reuter (Kilmer--Codirector, RAND Drug Policy Research Center; Senior Policy Researcher, RAND; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. in public policy, Harvard University; M.P.P., University of California, Berkeley; B.A. in international relations, Michigan State University, Caulkins--Stever Professor of Operations Research and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Bond--research economist in the Office of the Chief Economist of the US Department of Commerce's Economics and Statistics Administration, Reuter--Professor in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Criminology at the University of Maryland. “Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help?” RAND occasional paper (peer reviewed), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf However, there is at least one countervailing factor that might reduce violence in the short run. Given that the signal of market decline will be strong and unambiguous, experienced participants might accept the fact that their earnings and the market as a whole are in decline. This could lead to a reduced effort on their part to fight for control of routes or officials, since those areas of control are now less valuable. Of course, that does presume strategic thinking in a population that appears to have a propensity for expressive and instrumental violence. The natural projection in the long run is more optimistic . Fewer young males will enter the drug trade, and the incentives for violence will decline as the economic returns to leader- ship of a DTO fall. 10 However, the long run is indeterminably measured: probably years, and perhaps many years. The outcome, either in the short or long term, of a substantial decline in the U.S. market for Mexican marijuana in 2011 is a matter of conjecture. One view is that, in the short run, there could be more violence as the DTO leadership faces a very disturbing change in cir- cumstances. The fact that a decline in their share of the marijuana market would come after a period in which there has been rapid turnover at the top of their organizations and much change in their relationships with corrupt police could make it particularly difficult for the DTOs to reach a cooperative accommodation to their shrunken market. However, if the Mexi- can government lessens pressures and signals its willingness to reach an accommodation with a more collaborative set of DTOs, the result could be a reduction in violence. In the long run, the analysis is different. One would think that DTO participation would become less attractive . However, the government’s actions are again capable of reversing this. The government might take advantage of the weakened state of its adversary to break up the larger DTOs; a configuration of many smaller organizations could lead to greater competitive violence. Alternative activities can’t make up for profits—post-prohibition effect on the mafia proves Robelo 13 -- Drug Policy Alliance research coordinator [Daniel, "Demand Reduction or Redirection? Channeling Illicit Drug Demand towards a Regulated Supply to Diminish Violence in Latin America," Oregon Law Review, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1227, 2013, l/n] It is also impossible to foresee how regulation would affect levels of violence. Some analysts believe a short-term increase in violence is possible (as competition over a smaller market could intensify), but that violence in the longer term will decline. n106 Some analysts point out that organized crime may further diversify into other activities, such as extortion and kidnapping, though these have been shown to be considerably less profitable than drug trafficking. As one scholar [*1249] notes, given the profitability of the drug trade, "it would take roughly 50,000 kidnappings to equal 10% of cocaine revenues from the U.S. n107 While the American mafia certainly diversified into other criminal endeavors after the Repeal of alcohol Prohibition, homicide rates nevertheless declined dramatically. n108 Combining marijuana regulation with medical regulatory models for heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine could strike a major blow to the corrosive economic power of violent trafficking organizations, diminishing their ability to perpetrate murder, hire recruits, purchase weapons, corrupt officials, operate with impunity, and terrorize societies. Moreover, these approaches promise concrete results - potentially significant reductions in DTO revenues - unlike all other strategies that Mexico or the United States have tried to date. n109 Criminal organizations would still rely on other activities for their income, but they would be left weaker and less of a threat to security. Furthermore, the U nited S tates and Latin American governments would save resources currently wasted on prohibition enforcement and generate new revenues in taxes - resources which could be applied more effectively towards confronting violence and other crimes that directly threaten public safety. n110 Even modest losses means cartels can’t corrupt the police and judiciary Usborne 14 [David, "How Central Is Marijuana In The Drug War? Ctd," The Dish, quoted by Andrew Sullivan, 1-11-14, dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/01/11/how-central-is-marijuana-in-the-drug-war-ctd/, accessed 6-9-14] A 2012 research paper by the Mexican Competitiveness Institute in Mexico called ‘If Our Neighbours Legalise’, said that the legalisation of marijuana in Colorado, Washington and California would depress cartel profits by as much as 30 per cent. A 2010 Rand Corp study of what would happen if just California legalised suggests a more modest fall-out. Using consumption in the US as the most useful measure, its authors posit that marijuana accounts for perhaps 25 per cent of the cartels’ revenues. The cartels would survive losing that, but still. “ That’s enough to hurt , enough to cause massive unemployment in the illicit drugs sector,” says [fellow at the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center David] Shirk. Less money for cartels means weaker cartels and less capacity to corrupt the judiciary and the police in Mexico with crumpled bills in brown envelopes. Crimes like extortion and kidnappings are also more easily tackled. Mexico instability undermines U.S. leadership and risks global arms races Robert Haddick, contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command, managing editor of Small Wars Journal, "This Week at War: If Mexico Is at War, Does America Have to Win It?" FOREIGN POLICY, 9--10--10, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/10/this_week_at_war_if_mexico_is_at_war_does_america_have_to_win_it, accessed 5-213. Most significantly, a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect America's role in the rest of the world . An increasingly chaotic American side of the border, marked by bloody cartel wars, corrupted government and media, and a breakdown in security, would likely cause many in the U nited S tates to question the importance of military and foreign policy ventures elsewhere in the world. Should the southern border become a U.S. president's primary national security concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no doubt adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America, with potentially disruptive arms races the result. Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let's hope that the United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control. U.S. leadership is key to global stability and preventing nuclear great power wars Brooks et al 13 Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51 A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action . Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition , arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations , regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war . 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that threats is incapable of securing itself from various that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China . It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged U nited S tates. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige , status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the U nited S tates. Greater higher likelihood of competitive regional regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize , and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The U nited S tates will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship , including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85 Drug cartel instability will spill over throughout Latin America Bonner 10 – senior principal of the Sentinel HS Group (Robert C., former administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “The New Cocaine Cowboys”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66472/robert-c-bonner/the-new-cocaine-cowboys) The recent headlines from Mexico are disturbing: U.S. consular official gunned down in broad daylight; Rancher murdered by Mexican drug smuggler; Bomb tossed at U.S. consulate in Nuevo Laredo. This wave of violence is eerily reminiscent of the carnage that plagued Colombia 20 years ago, and it is getting Washington's attention. Mexico is in the throes of a battle against powerful drug cartels, the outcome of which will determine who controls the country's law enforcement, judicial, and political institutions. It will decide whether the state will destroy the cartels and put an end to the culture of impunity they have created. Mexico could become a first-world country one day, but it will never achieve that status until it breaks the grip these criminal organizations have over all levels of government and strengthens its law enforcement and judicial institutions. It cannot do one without doing the other. Destroying the drug cartels is not an impossible task. Two decades ago, Colombia was faced with a similar -- and in many ways more daunting -- struggle. In the early 1990s, many Colombians, including police officers, judges, presidential candidates, and journalists, were assassinated by the most powerful and fearsome drug-trafficking organizations the world has ever seen: the Cali and Medellín cartels. Yet within a decade, the Colombian government defeated them, with Washington's help. The United States played a vital role in supporting the Colombian government, and it should do the same for Mexico. The stakes in Mexico are high. If the cartels win, these criminal enterprises will continue to operate outside the state and the rule of law, undermining Mexico's democracy. The outcome matters for the United States as well -- if the drug cartels succeed, the United States will share a 2,000-mile border with a narcostate controlled by powerful transnational drug cartels that threaten the stability of Central and South America. That causes nuclear war and extinction Manwaring 05 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf) President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability , criminality, insurgency, regional conflict , and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD , genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict .62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the security, peace, and prosperity .65 more they and their associated problems endanger global Econ Contention 2 is the Economy US economy is stagnating now—annual growth rate is sluggish Wall Street Journal 14 (8-26-14, "'Secular Stagnation' May Be for Real" Wall Street Journal) online.wsj.com/articles/william-galston-secular-stagnation-may-be-for-real-1409095263 The U.S. has an economic growth problem , and it started before the Great Recession. Between 1949 and 2000, Third Way's Jim Kessler calculates, the annual rate of growth exceeded 3% a total of 34 times—two years out of every three. During the eight Clinton years, growth reached 4% five times and fell below 3% only twice. Since 2000 growth has reached 3% just two times and did not reach 4% at all, even during 2003-07, the peak years of the recovery from the 2001 recession. Since the beginning of the recovery from the Great Recession of 2008-09, annual growth has not yet reached 3%, and 2014 looks to be no exception . The big picture puts these details in sharp relief: Between 1949 and 2000, the economy grew on average 3.6% annually. Since then, growth has averaged only 1.8%. In the economic circumstances of recent decades, only a sustained period of robust growth has raised wages and household incomes. Unless the economy can resume the more robust growth of the second half of the 20th century, U.S. workers will be hard-pressed to regain the ground they have lost, let alone offer the prospects of something better for their children. Legalizing marijuana boosts the economy: A. Job growth Legalization creates new opportunities for innovation and spurs growth in other industries which locks in resilience Cassillas 14 (Cassandra, reporter, quoting Charles Arnold, business development and investment consultant, 6-13-14, "Charles S. Arnold Claims Marijuana Could Save U.S. Economy" Opposing Views) www.opposingviews.com/i/society/druglaw/charles-s-arnold-claims-marijuana-could-save-us-economy The U nited S tates economy has had a rough few years . Inequality has been rising. The middle class is squeezed harder and harder with each passing year. Innovation is falling off. Outsourcing has become a regular part of doing business for major corporations. A fresh industry of some sort needed to come along and, fortunately for the economy, it has. Reports from across the board suggest that the “green rush,” or legalization of recreational marijuana, may be exactly what the doctor ordered. By now, everyone has heard about the impressive $2 million in taxes Colorado collected within the first month of recreational marijuana being legalized, but that is actually just the cherry on top . Tax revenue from marijuana legalization is easy to compute, which is why it is such a popular talking point. The real benefit of legalization is something else entirely: it opens the doors to a slew of ancillary businesses, investment opportunities and even stock options. The weed market is relatively untapped and provides entrepreneurs with nearly endless opportunities. Where there is marijuana, there is also a simultaneous need for pipes, bongs, containers, growing apparatuses, and everything in between. And this isn’t just the opinion of optimistic, pro-pot activists. The business community agrees. Chuck S. Arnold, a long time business development and investment consultant who has worked in a variety of industries, is constantly on the lookout for the most innovative new areas to build businesses. Arnold believes the future is looking bright for people who are willing to bet on legal marijuana. “Marijuana legalization is spurring growth in other industries ,” Chuck S. Arnold claims. “From industrial lights to smoking apparatus, the legalization of marijuana is blazing a trail for future businesses to not only be see moderate success, but thrive ostensibly well in an often turbulent contemporary fiscal environment.” B. State budgets Massive state budget cuts to schools remain in place, which prevents growth and destroys competitiveness—new revenue sources are needed Leachman and Mai 14 (Michael, Director of State Fiscal Research with the State Fiscal Policy division of the Center, Ph.D. in sociology from Loyola University Chicago, and Chris, Research Assistant with the State Fiscal Project, Master of Public Policy from the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School, 5-20-14, "Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession" Center on Budget and Policy Priorities) www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=4011 States’ new budgets are providing less per-pupil funding for kindergarten through 12th grade than they did six years ago — often far less. The reduced levels reflect not only the lingering effects of the 2007-09 recession but also continued austerity in many states ; indeed, despite some improvements in overall state revenues, schools in around a third of states are entering the new school year with less state funding than they had last year. At a time when states and the nation are trying to produce workers with the skills to master new technologies and adapt to the complexities of a global economy, this decline in state educational investment is cause for concern . Our review of state budget documents finds that: At least 35 states are providing less funding per student for the 2013-14 school year than they did before the recession hit. Fourteen of these states have cut per-student funding by more than 10 percent . (These figures, like all the comparisons in this paper, are in inflation-adjusted dollars and focus on the primary form of state aid to local schools.) At least 15 states are providing less funding per student to local school districts in the new school year than they provided a year ago. This is despite the fact that most states are experiencing modest increases in tax revenues. Where funding has increased, it has generally not increased enough to make up for cuts in past years. For example, New Mexico is increasing school funding by $72 per pupil this year. But that is too small to offset the state’s $946 per-pupil cut over the previous five years. Restoring school funding should be an urgent priority . The steep state-level K-12 spending cuts of the last several years have serious consequences for the nation. State-level K12 cuts have large consequences for local school districts. Some 44 percent of total education spending in the United States comes from state funds (the share varies by state). Cuts at the state level mean that local school districts have to either scale back the educational services they provide , raise more local tax revenue to cover the gap, or both. Local school districts typically have little ability to replace lost state aid on their own. Given the still-weak state of many of the nation’s real estate markets, many school districts struggle to raise more money from the property tax without raising rates, and rate increases are often politically very difficult. Localities collected 2.1 percent less in property tax revenue in the 12-month period ending in March 2013 than in the previous year, after adjusting for inflation. The cuts deepened the recession and have slowed the economy’s recovery. Federal employment data show that school districts began reducing the overall number of teachers and other employees in July 2008, when the first round of budget cuts began taking effect. As of August 2013, local school districts had cut a total of 324,000 jobs since 2008. These job losses have reduced the purchasing power of workers’ families, in turn reducing overall economic consumption, and thus deepened the recession and slowed the pace of recovery . The cuts undermine education reform and hinder school districts’ ability to deliver high-quality education, with long-term negative consequences for the nation’s economic competitiveness. Many states and school districts have undertaken important school reform initiatives to prepare children better for the future, but deep funding cuts hamper their ability to implement many of these reforms. At a time when producing workers with high-level technical and analytical skills is increasingly important to a country’s prosperity, large cuts in funding for basic education threaten to undermine the nation’s economic future. Legalization generates up to $100 billion in new revenue Easton 09 (Stephen, fellow at the Fraser Institute, "PRO: FUND CRIME—OR TAXES?" Businessweek) www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2010/03/legalize_mariju.html As California readies for its November referendum, the first public test of the marijuana-legalization issue, it makes sense for Americans to have a look in the rearview mirror. The current prohibition on marijuana consumption exactly parallels the 1920s alcohol prohibition. Every year, a widely consumed illegal substance makes potential criminals of millions and actual criminals of hundreds of thousands. And like booze during Prohibition, this substance, marijuana, is the easy revenue of organized crime, contributing tens of billions of dollars to growers, who commit a variety of bad acts both at home and abroad. How much money is made from this single illegal substance? In fairness, nobody knows for sure. "Illegal" means hard data are difficult to come by. We do know, however, that according to recent figures, U.S. consumers number anywhere from 25 million to 60 million (depending on how likely survey respondents are to tell the whole truth), and at an average cost of $5 per cigarette (and factoring in one per day for each user), total spending on marijuana may add up to $45 billion to $110 billion a year. What about possible tax revenue? From Canada we’ve learned that the production cost of (government-sponsored) marijuana is roughly 33¢ a gram. Currently, U.S. marijuana consumers pay at least $10 per gram retail for illegal marijuana. If the cost of retailing and distribution is the same as for legal tobacco cigarettes, about 10¢ a gram, then selling the (legal) product at exactly the same price as on the street today ($10 per gram) could raise $40 billion to $100 billion in new revenue. Not chump change. Government would simply be transferring revenue from organized crime to the public purse. Colorado proves significant revenue can be generated—taxes don’t deter people from buying within the legal market Walker 14 (Jon, author of “After Legalization”, 2-25-14, "These 5 Numbers Show Marijuana Legalization Is Going Well in Colorado" Just Say Now) justsaynow.firedoglake.com/2014/02/25/these-5-numbers-show-marijua Limited marijuana possession has been legal for over a year in Colorado and retail shops have been open for almost two months. This means there is now real data showing that legalization is going well and mostly as its backers intended. These five numbers tell the story: 1) 77 percent decrease in state court marijuana cases - Legalization has caused marijuana arrest to plummet saving the state money . This drop is remarkable given that Colorado already had fairly liberal marijuana laws before Amendment 64 was approved. The Denver Post found, “the number of cases filed in state court alleging at least one marijuana offense plunged 77 percent between 2012 and 2013. The decline is most notable for charges of petty marijuana possession, which dropped from an average of 714 per month during the first nine months of 2012 to 133 per month during the same period in 2013 — a decline of 81 percent.” 2) $184 Million in new tax revenue – Legal marijuana sales are now projected to bring in $184 million in new tax revenue for the state during the first 18 months. This is higher than initial projections . Much of this money will go to education and drug treatment. This number isn’t just important because it will help the state balance its budget. Significant tax revenue also proves that people are choosing to move from the black market to the new legal system even though there are high excise taxes. 3) 58 percent support for legalization – Now the that people of Colorado have gotten a chance to directly experience legalization they are increasingly supportive. Currently 58 percent of voters in Colorado support the new legalization law while only 39 percent oppose it. By comparison, in 2012 the ballot measure only won by 55.3 percent yes to 44.7 percent no. 4) 10 percent last month usage rate – In the first month after retail stores opened only 10 percent of Colorado voters said they actually used marijuana. This is right in line with use rates before legalization, showing it has not turned the state into a “land of potheads.” 5) 6.3 percent increase in airline flight searches – Early indications are that legalization will also be a modest boost for tourism. According to Hopper, “Flight search demand for Denver has been 6.3% above the national search average since December 1st.” During the first week of January flight searches were up 14 percent. Since marijuana was legalized in Colorado marijuana arrests are way down, tax revenue is up and support for reform continues to grow. This is what success looks like. C. Substitution Marijuana trades off with alcohol—multiple studies confirm Anderson and Rees 2013, D. Mark Anderson Montanta State University Daniel I. Rees* University of Colorado Denver Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), “The Legalization of Recreational Marijuana How Likely is the Worst-Case Scenario?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management Winter 2013 Studies based on clearly-defined natural experiments generally support the hypothesis that marijuana and alcohol are substitutes . For instance, DiNardo & Lemieux (2001) found that increasing the MLDA from 18 to 21 encourages marijuana use. Using data from the NSDUH and a regression discontinuity design, Crost & Guerrero (2012) found a sharp decrease in marijuana use at 21 years of age, suggesting that young adults treat alcohol and marijuana as substitutes. Finally, Anderson, Hansen, & Rees (2013) examined the relationship between legalizing medical marijuana and drinking using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. These authors found that legalization was associated with reductions in heavy drinking especially among 18- through 29-year-olds. In addition, they found that legalization was associated with an almost 5 percent decrease in beer sales, the alcoholic beverage of choice among young adults (Jones, 2008). The results of DiNardo & Lemieux (2001), Crost & Guerrero (2012) and Anderson, Hansen, & Rees (2013) suggest that, as marijuana becomes more available, young adults in Colorado and Washington will respond by drinking less, not more . If non-medical marijuana states legalize the use of recreational marijuana, they should also experience reductions in drinking with the accompanying public health benefits. Economic costs from alcohol use are astronomical Jaslow 13 (Ryan, reporter, citing a CDC report, 8-14-13, "Heavy drinking costs U.S. $223.5B a year: Which state has highest tab?" CBS News) www.cbsnews.com/news/heavy-drinking-costs-us-2235b-a-year-which-state-has-highest-tab/ Heavy drinking carries major health risks, according to the C enters for D isease C ontrol and Prevention, including elevated odds of long-term ailments like liver disease, heart problems, fertility issues, some cancers and neurological issues like stroke or dementia. Shorter term, alcohol poisoning, traffic accidents, falls, violence and risky sexual behaviors are risks also associated with large amounts alcohol consumption. A new CDC report shows these alcohol-related health woes take a heavy financial toll on the U.S., to the tune of $223.5 billion a year -- and some states' wallets fared worse than others. Binge drinking -- defined as when men drink more than five drinks and women drink more than four drinks in two hours -was responsible for more than 70 percent of the excessive alcohol costs., a total of $171 billion annually. "It is striking to see most of the costs of excessive drinking in states and D.C. are due to binge drinking, which is reported by about 18 percent of U.S. adults," report author Dr. Robert Brewer, alcohol program lead at CDC, said in a statement. A 2012 CDC study estimated about 38 million U.S. adults, or about one in six people, are binge drinkers, with a reported average of four episodes per month. A study by the agency one year later revealed almost 14 million women binge drink about three times a month, consuming an average of six drinks per binge. The latest report, published Aug. 13 in the American Journal of Preventive Medicine, estimated state-by-state economic costs of drinking including those from binge drinking and underage drinking. The median state cost associated with excessive drinking was $2.9 billion, with about $2 out of every $5 of these costs being paid for by the government. The state that absorbed the least alcohol costs was North Dakota, coming in at $420 million. The most costs were found in California, totaling nearly $32 billion. The researchers broke down the numbers even further and found based on population, the District of Columbia has the highest per-person cost associated with excessive drinking ($1,662 per person) while Iowa had the lowest ($622). "The state estimates calculated here are most likely substantial underestimates ," wrote Brewer and the researchers. Marijuana use has a minimal economic impact—decades worth of studies debunk productivity claims Dighe 14 (Ranjit, Professor of Economics, The State University of New York at Oswego, 1-30-14, "Legalize It -- The Economic Argument" The Huffington Post, accessed 7-27-14) www.huffingtonpost.com/ranjit-dighe/legalize-marijuana-economicargument_b_4695023.html As for the effect of marijuana on worker productivity, the first thing to note is that nobody is advocating smoking marijuana or being high on the job, any more than anyone advocates drinking or being drunk on the job. People are expected to show up for work sober, and employers have always had the right to fire people who fail to meet that basic requirement. The issue, then, is whether smoking marijuana in one's free time impairs one's job performance. Longterm memory loss and "amotivational syndrome" have been alleged, but decades' worth of studies have debunked both of those claims. Federal legalization is key—maintaining prohibition undermines investor confidence and creates operational barriers Mitchell 12 (Dan, 11-19-12, "What would a legal American marijuana industry look like?" Fortune) fortune.com/2012/11/19/what-would-a-legal-american-marijuana-industry-look-like/ Colorado and Washington have legalized marijuana in their states. Other states will likely follow suit. But there won’t be a real “marijuana industry” until federal laws are repealed. If that happens, everything will change. FORTUNE — Last week, Jerry Brown, the governor of California who leads the world’s eighth-largest economy, issued his strongest plea yet for the federal government to back off enforcing federal marijuana laws in his state. President Obama and the Justice Department, he said, must “recognize the sovereignty of the states” and stop trying to “nullify a reasonable state regulation.” He sounded almost like a Southern libertarian as he invoked “states’ rights.” Brown’s statement came in the wake of the passage of ballot measures in two states, Washington and Colorado, to legalize marijuana. In California voters came very close in 2010 to doing the same, and such a measure seems likely to pass next time out. Other states are sure to follow as well. But that doesn’t mean that a real marijuana industry will grow out of the country’s changing sentiments toward pot — with large-scale distribution, marketing, and retail sales — any time soon. For that to happen, the federal government would have to do a lot more than merely back off and recognize “state’s rights.” It would have to repeal the federal laws banning the possession, use, and distribution of marijuana. And that might take a long while yet, given that the politics in, for example, Georgia, are a lot different from the politics in Washington, Colorado, and California (even Oregon isn’t quite there yet — its ballot measure failed on Election Day). There needs to be a national consensus, and the nation isn’t there yet. And until full federal repeal of prohibition, a multitude of insurmountable barriers will remain in place. The chief one is simple economics: the industry simply can’t scale to a degree that would attract investors (who would be scared of investing anyway). One of the many reasons that pot costs so much — about $300 an ounce on average — is that growers must keep their operations relatively small and, usually, hidden. Forget for the moment the direct impact that pot’s illegality (meaning, risk) has on prices: the costs of production alone are enormous just because economies of scale aren’t achievable. Even if the state police are no longer coming after growers, the feds might be. MORE: Big beer dresses up in craft brewers’ clothing Then there is the problem that medical-marijuana businesses already face in states where they are allowed: vendors of all kinds of necessary services can’t or don’t want to deal with them. Banks won’t lend them money. Insurers won’t insure them. Many landlords won’t rent to them. Credit-card companies won’t process their payments. If your customers can’t sign for something with dignity, and you can’t obtain health insurance for your employees, it’s unlikely that your business will ever scale. US growth is key to reverse stagnation Caploe ‘9 (David Caploe is CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia., “Focus still on America to lead global recovery”, April 7, The Strait Times, lexis) IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America- centred' for more than 60 years . Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US. This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'subprime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that there is no other engine for the world economy - and hasn't been for the last six decades. If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Economic stagnation causes global WMD conflict Hutchinson 14 (Martin, Business and Economics Editor at United Press International, MBA from Harvard Business School, former international merchant banker, 1-3-14, “The chilling echoes of 1914, a century on” Wall Street Journal) http://online.wsj.com/articles/william-galston-secular-stagnation-may-be-for-real-1409095263, The years before 1914 saw the formation of trade blocs separated by high tariff barriers. Back then, the world was dominated by several roughly equivalent powers, albeit with different strengths and weaknesses. Today, the world is similarly multi-polar. The United States is in a position of clear leadership, but China is coming up fast. Europe is weaker than it was, but is still a force to be reckoned with. Japan, Russia, Brazil, India are also too powerful to ignore. A hundred years ago, big international infrastructure projects such as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, and before it the Suez Canal, were built to protect favored trading. Today’s equivalent may be the bilateral mining partnerships forged between, for instance, China and mineral-rich African states. Today, the World Trade Organization offers some defence against tariffs. But protectionism could be become entrenched if prolonged economic stagnation leads countries to pursue their own narrow interests. Germany, Austria, Russia and France lost between 20 and 35 percent of national output between 1913 and 1918, according to Angus Maddison’s data used in Stephen Broadberry’s “The Economics of World War One: A Comparative Analysis”. British GDP declined in 1914 and 1915, but grew 15 percent over the four years, as did the U.S. economy. The 37 million military and civilian casualties may tell a more accurate story but if history were to repeat itself, the global conflict could be both more universal and more destructive. Nuclear weapons proliferate. Warped diplomatic anger could lead to the deployment of chemical and biological devices. Electromagnetic pulses could wipe out our fragile electronic networks. Like the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that sparked World War One, the catalyst for cataclysm might be something quite surprising. A global run on bank and other investment assets or an outbreak of hyperinflation, maybe? These threats get more serious the more policymakers pump up equity, bond, property and banking bubbles. If global wealth evaporates, or is proven to be an illusion, today’s largely cordial global entente could be smashed with precipitous speed. 2ac Case Fear of nukes exerts a restraining impulse --- even aggressive leaders are forced to moderate Robert Jervis 9, the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, “Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying”, The National Interest, November/December, 10.27.2009, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22356 Mueller may also be too quick to dismiss the possibility that in a world absent nuclear weapons, the Soviets would have seen limited conventional wars as safe. As In the prenuclear era, states used limited force to change the status quo even when they would have shied away from a worldwide conflagration (think of the wars that led to the unification of Germany and Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century, for example). Without nuclear weapons, the American threat to wage an all-out war might have seemed neither credible nor efficacious. And in a world without them, aggression by the Soviets would have increased in probability.¶ Indeed, the influence of nuclear weapons may have extended even more broadly. The Cold War saw multiple crises and several wars in which the United States and the USSR were involved either directly or indirectly. So a story goes: back in the 1980s, an American said how significant it was that none of these involved nuclear weapons. More perceptive, a Soviet analyst replied, “actually, they were all nuclear wars.” It is notable that these crises greatly diminished after the onset of mutual second-strike capability in the mid-1960s. Of course, the chronology does not prove cause and effect, and even scholars less ingenious than Mueller have been able to come up with alternative explanations like the effects of learning or the mellowing of the Soviet system. But sometimes the obvious one is correct.¶ One can go further still and note that all international politics in this period was conducted under the shadow of nuclear weapons. The knowledge that any confrontation, not to speak of war, could lead to overwhelming destruction was likely never far from anyone’s mind. The effects of this fear saturated our consciousness and ways of thinking about politics, and may well have influenced the selection of leaders on both sides. Even Richard Nixon, who talked about his “madman theory,” was rash only in his private statements.¶ Maybe nuclear weapons only had a modest impact, as Mueller insists. Maybe history would have been pretty much the same without them. But the very pervasiveness of our nuclear fear—and the weapons’ very influence—was so widespread that trying to trace out the likely course of a nonnuclear world simply does not make much sense. University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer showed, conventional deterrence can falter when the attacker believes that a quick victory is possible.4 Reps don’t cause war Reiter 95 DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, most skeptical view of preemptive war, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.¶ The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war . In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are present to a very high degree . This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces , as they are associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test. Discourse doesn’t shape reality Fram-Cohen ’85 [Michelle, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible?” American Translators Association Conference, enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html] Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving ?reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users. language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless exists in reality, and can be K No alternative to the law---other ideas bring more inequality and abuse Jerold S. Auerbach 83, Professor of History at Wellesley, “Justice Without Law?”, 1983, p. 144-146 As cynicism about the legal system increases, so does enthusiasm for alternative dispute-settlement institutions. The search for alternatives accelerates, as Richard Abel has suggested, "when some fairly powerful interest is threatened by an increase in the number or magnitude of legal rights.*'6 Alternatives are designed to provide a safety valve, to siphon discontent from courts. With the danger of political confrontation reduced, the ruling alternatives prevent the use of courts for redistributive purposes in the interest of equality, by consigning the rights of disadvantaged citizens to institutions with minimal power to enforce or protect them . It is, therefore, necessary to power of legal institutions is preserved, and the stability of the social system reinforced. Not incidentally, beware of the seductive appeal of alternative institutions . They may deflect energy from political organization by groups of people with common grievances; or discourage effective litigation strategies that could provide substantial benefits. They may, in the end, create a two-track justice system that dispenses informal "justice" to poor people with "small" claims and "minor" disputes, who cannot afford legal services, and who are denied access to courts. (Bar associations do not recommend that corporate law Justice according to law will be reserved for the affluent, hardly a novel development in American history but one that needs little encouragement firms divert their clients to mediation, or that business deductions for legal expenses—a gigantic government subsidy for litigation—be eliminated.) from the spread of alternative dispute-settlement institutions.¶ It is social context and political choice that determine whether courts, or alternative institutions, can render justice more or less accessible—and to whom. Both can be discretionary, arbitrary, domineering—and unjust. Law can symbolize justice, or conceal repression. It can reduce Despite the resiliency and power of law, it seems unable to eradicate the tension between legality and justice : even in a society of (legal) equals, some still remain more equal than others. But diversion from the legal system is likely to exploitation, or facilitate it. It can prohibit the abuse of power, or disguise abuse in procedural forms. It can promote equality, or sustain inequality. accentuate that inequality . Without legal power the imbalance between aggrieved individuals and corporations, or government agencies, cannot be redressed . In American society , as Laura Nader has observed, " disputing without the force of law ... [is| doomed to fail ."7 Instructive examples document the deleterious effect of coerced informality (even if others demonstrate the creative possibilities of indigenous experimentation). Freed slaves after the Civil War and factory workers at the turn of the century, like inner-city poor people now, have all been assigned places in informal proceedings that offer substantially weaker safeguards than law can provide. Legal institutions may not provide equal justice under law, but in a society ruled by law it is their responsibility.¶ It is chimerical to believe that mediation or arbitration can now accomplish what law seems powerless to achieve . The American deification of individual rights requires an accessible legal system for their protection . Understandably, diminished faith in its capacities will encourage the yearning for alternatives. But the rhetoric of "community" and "justice" should not be permitted to conceal the deterioration of community life and the unraveling of substantive notions of justice that has accompanied its demise. There is every reason why the values that historically are associated with informal justice should remain compelling: especially the preference for trust, harmony, and reciprocity within in their absence there is no effective alternative to legal institutions.¶ The quest for community may indeed be "timeless and universal."8 In this century, however, the communitarian search a communal setting. These are not, however, the values that American society encourages or sustains; for justice without law has deteriorated beyond recognition into a stunted off-shoot of the legal system. The historical progression is clear: from community justice without formal But injustice without law is an even worse possibility, which misguided enthusiasm for alternative dispute settlement now seems likely to encourage. Our legal culture too accurately expresses the individualistic and materialistic values that most Americans deeply cherish to inspire optimism about the imminent restoration of communitarian purpose. For law to be less conspicuous Americans would have to moderate their expansive freedom to compete, to acquire, and to possess, while simultaneously elevating shared responsibilities above individual rights. That is an unlikely prospect unless Americans become, in effect, unAmerican . Until then, the pursuit of justice without law does incalculable harm to the prospect of legal institutions to the rule of law, all too often without justice. equal justice. Liberal legal thought provides space for the K Altman, Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University, 90 (Andrew, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, page 8) In addition, it would be a distortion of liberal theory to suggest that it has no place for nonlegal modes of social regulation, such as mediation. Liberals can and do acknowledge the value of such nonlegal mechanisms in certain social contexts and can consis that the liberal view requires us to recognize that such procedures and rules have a central role to play in resolving fairly and effectively the conflicts that arise in a society characterized by moral, religious, and political pluralism. Thus, the liberal endorsement of legalism does not necessarily involve a commitment to legalism in the sense that Judith Shldar defines the term: “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules. ” Shldar, Legalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 1. Shlclar understands full weli that a commitment to the liberal rule of law does not entail an acceptance of legalism in her sense of the term. See Legalism, pp. xi-xli. And those who reject the rule of law can argue in the political arena for extending the role of such informal mechanisms. Of course, a liberal state could not allow the antinomians to eradicate legal institutions; in that sense, one might say that the liberal rule of law is not neutral. But the kind of political neutrality which the liberal defends does not aim to guarantee that any normative view has an opportunity to remake society wholly in its vision. It does guarantee an opportunity to negotiate and compromise within a framework of individual rights, and there is no reason why those who defend non- legal modes of social regulation cannot seize the opportunity under a liberal regime to carve out a significant role for nonlegal modes of social regulation within the liberal state. The liberal ver sion of political neutrality demands that antinomians have such an opportunity, but there is nothing remotely inconsistent in liberal thought in making that demand or prohibiting antilegalism from going so far as to destroy all legal institution Statistically proven that heg prevents war Owen ‘11 John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.catounbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/ Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhas they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the dat a. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony— specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both . The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course : its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development —communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism . Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong. Global violence decreasing – civilization has become more moral Pinker, Johnstone Family Professor at Harvard University, ‘7 (Steven, March 19, “A History of Violence” The New Republic, lexis) In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular form of entertainment was cat-burning, in which a cat was hoisted in a sling on a stage and slowly lowered into a fire. According to historian Norman Davies, "[T]he spectators, including kings and queens, shrieked with laughter as the animals, howling with pain, were singed, roasted, and finally carbonized." Today, such sadism would be unthinkable in most of the world. This change in sensibilities is just one example of perhaps the most important and most underappreciated trend in the human saga: Violence has been in decline over long stretches of history, and today we are probably living in the most peaceful moment of our species' time on earth. In the decade of Darfur and Iraq, the claim that violence has been diminishing may seem somewhere between hallucinatory and obscene. Yet recent studies that seek to quantify the historical ebb and flow of violence point to exactly that conclusion. Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution--all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light. At one time, these facts were widely and shortly after the century of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage--the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions-pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like Jose Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It applies over several orders of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And it appears to be a worldwide trend, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts--such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men--suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But , in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations--namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on. Meanwhile, for another kind of violence--homicide--the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. In every country he analyzed, murder rates declined steeply--for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a shockingly happy picture: Global violence has fallen steadily since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots . Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent. The decline of killing and cruelty poses several challenges to our ability to make sense of the world. To begin with, how could so many people be so wrong about something so important? Partly, it's because of a cognitive illusion: We estimate the probability of an event from how easy it is to recall examples. Scenes of carnage are more likely to be relayed to our living rooms and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. Partly, it's an intellectual culture that is loath to admit that there could be anything good about the institutions of civilization and Western society. Partly, it's the incentive structure of the activism and opinion markets: No one ever attracted followers and donations by announcing that things keep getting better. And part of the explanation lies in the phenomenon itself. The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. As deplorable as they are, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the lethal injections of a few murderers in Texas are mild by the standards of atrocities in human history. But, from a contemporary vantage point, we see them as signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen. The other major challenge posed by the decline of violence is how to explain it. A force that pushes in the same direction across many epochs, continents, and scales of social organization mocks our standard tools of causal explanation. The usual suspects--guns, drugs, the press, American culture--aren't nearly up to the job. Nor could it possibly be explained by evolution in the biologist's sense: Even if the meek could inherit the earth, natural selection could not favor the genes for meekness quickly enough. In any case, human nature has not changed so much as to have lost its taste for violence. Social psychologists find that at least 80 percent of people have fantasized about killing someone they don't like. And modern humans still take pleasure in viewing violence, if we are to judge by the popularity of murder mysteries, Shakespearean dramas, Mel Gibson movies, video games, and hockey. What has changed, of course, is people's willingness to act on these fantasies. The sociologist Norbert Elias suggested that European modernity accelerated a "civilizing process" marked by increases in self- control, long-term planning, and sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others. These are precisely the functions that today's cognitive neuroscientists attribute to the prefrontal cortex. But this only raises the question of why humans have increasingly exercised that part of their brains. No one knows why our behavior has come under the control of the better angels of our nature, but there are four plausible suggestions. The first is that Hobbes got it right. Life in a state of nature is nasty, brutish, and short, not because of a primal thirst for blood but because of the inescapable logic of anarchy. Any beings with a modicum of self-interest may be tempted to invade their neighbors to steal their resources. The resulting fear of attack will tempt the neighbors to strike first in preemptive self-defense, which will in turn tempt the first group to strike against them preemptively, and so on. This danger can be defused by a policy of deterrence--don't strike first, retaliate if struck--but, to guarantee its credibility, parties must avenge all insults and settle all scores, leading to cycles of bloody vendetta. These tragedies can be averted by a state with a monopoly on violence, because it can inflict disinterested penalties that eliminate the incentives for aggression, thereby defusing anxieties about preemptive attack and obviating the need to maintain a hair-trigger propensity for retaliation. Indeed, Eisner and Elias attribute the decline in European homicide to the transition from knightly warrior societies to the centralized governments of early modernity. And, today, violence continues to fester in zones of anarchy, such as frontier regions, failed states, collapsed empires, and territories contested by mafias, gangs, and other dealers of contraband. Payne suggests another possibility: that the critical variable in the indulgence of violence is an overarching sense that life is cheap. When pain and early death are everyday features of one's own life, one feels fewer compunctions about inflicting them on others. As technology and economic efficiency lengthen and improve our lives, we place a higher value on life in general. A third theory, championed by Robert Wright, invokes the logic of non-zero- sum games: scenarios in which two agents can each come out ahead if they cooperate, such as trading goods, dividing up labor, or sharing the peace dividend that comes from laying down their arms. As people acquire know-how that they can share cheaply with others and develop technologies that allow them to spread their goods and ideas over larger territories at lower cost, their incentive to cooperate steadily increases, because other people become more valuable alive than dead. Then there is the scenario sketched by philosopher Peter Singer. Evolution, he suggests, bequeathed people a small kernel of empathy, which by default they apply only within a narrow circle of friends and relations. Over the millennia, people's moral circles have expanded to encompass larger and larger polities: the clan, the tribe, the nation, both sexes, other races, and even animals. The circle may have been pushed outward by expanding networks of reciprocity, a la Wright, but it might also be inflated by the inexorable logic of the golden rule: The more one knows and thinks about other living things, the harder it is to privilege one's own interests over theirs. The empathy escalator may also be powered by cosmopolitanism, in which journalism, memoir, and realistic fiction make the inner lives of other people, and the contingent nature of one's own station, more palpable--the feeling that "there but for fortune go I." Whatever its causes, the decline of violence has profound implications. It is not a license for complacency : We enjoy the peace we find today because people in past generations were appalled by the violence in their time and worked to end it, and so we should work to end the appalling violence in our time. Nor is it necessarily grounds for optimism about the immediate future, since the world has never before had national leaders who combine pre-modern sensibilities with modern weapons. But the phenomenon does force us to rethink our understanding of violence. Man's inhumanity to man has long been a subject for moralization. With the knowledge that something has driven it dramatically down, we can also treat it as a matter of cause and effect. Instead of asking, "Why is there war?" we might ask, "Why is there peace?" From the likelihood that states will commit genocide to the way that people treat cats, we must have been doing something right. And it would be nice to know what, exactly, it is. Focus on representations sanitizes power structures and doesn’t solve Doug Stokes, University of Bristol Politics Department, “Gluing the Hats On: Power, Agency, and Reagan’s Office of Public Diplomacy,” PAPER PRESENTED FOR THE BRITISH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION, 2001, http://web.archive.org/web/20060221025303/http://www.aqnt98.dsl.pipex.com/hats.htm. In her discursive practices approach, Doty argues that more poststructurally inclined questions as to “how” foreign policy is made possible (that is, an examination of the prior conditions of possibility) provides a more nuanced account of foreign policy formation than questions which ask “why” (that is, why a particular decision or policy was pursued). She rightly argues that “why” questions pre-suppose a discursive matrix, a mode of being and a background of social practices. Furthermore, these “why” questions fail to account for “how these meanings, subjects, and interpretative dispositions are constructed”.66 However, in arguing for the superiority of analyses of possibility conditions, she misses a crucial point and simplifies the very nature of the “how” of foreign policy practice. Whilst it is important to analyse the discursive conditions of possibility of policy formation, in failing to account for how various discourses were employed and through what institutional mechanisms, how some discourses gained ascendancy and not others, and how social actors intervene in hegemonic struggles to maintain various discourses, Doty seriously compromises the critical potential of her analysis. By working with a notion of power free from any institutional basis and rejecting a notion of power that “social actors possess and use”,67 she produces a narrative of foreign policy whereby the differential role of social actors is erased from foreign policy processes and decision making. For Doty it seems, power resides in discourses themselves and their endless production of and play on meaning, not in the ability on the part of those who own and control the means of social reproduction to manipulate dominant social and political discourses and deploy them institutionally and strategically. The ability to analyse the use of discourses by foreign policy elites for purposeful ends and their ability to deploy hegemonic discourses within foreign policy processes is lost through a delinking of those elites and discursive production (her “dispersed” notion of power). Furthermore, Doty assumes that the “kind of power that works through social agents, a power that social actors posses and use” is somehow in opposition to a “power that is productive of meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships and a range of imaginable conduct”. But these forms of power are not mutually exclusive. Social agents can be both subject to discourse and act in instrumental ways to effect discourse precisely through producing meanings and subject identities, and delineating the range of policy options. Through her erasure of the link between foreign policy processes and purposeful social agents, she ends up producing an account of hegemonic foreign policy narratives free from any narrator.68 This is particularly problematic because the power inherent within representational practices does not necessarily operate independently from the power to deploy those representations. The power to represent, in turn, does not operate independently from differential access to the principal conduits of discursive production, sedimentation and transmission (for example, the news media).69 Thus, Doty’s account fails to provide an adequate analysis of the socially constructed interests that constitute the discursive construction of reality. As Stuart Hall argues “there are centers that operate directly on the formation and constitution of discourse. The media are in that business. Political parties are in that business. When you set the terms in which the debate proceeds, that is an exercise of symbolic power [which] circulates between constituted points of condensation.”70 The overall critical thrust of poststructurally inclined IR theorists is blunted by both the refusal to examine or even acknowledge the limits and constraints on social discourses and the denial of any linkage between identity representations and the interests that may infuse these representations. Pursuit of hegemony’s locked-in – the only question is effectiveness, means the impact to the K is non-unique Dorfman 12, Assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs (Zach What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism, http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605) The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twentyeight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools . Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran . And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay. Our advantage isn’t based on myopic security discourse- multiple independent fields support our hegemony advantage, prefer our advantage because it is interdisciplinary Wohlforth 9 William, professor of government at Dartmouth College, “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity. Reject non interdisciplinary explanations of IR Steve Smith, Vice Chancellor of the Univ. of Exeter, BA, MA, PhD IR From Univ. of Southhampton, , Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible in International Relations? International Studies Review (2003) 5, No research agenda can lead to synthesis, simply because different approaches see different worlds. With regard to dialogue, it is important to make four points: (1) Any research agenda should be empirically (or problem) driven and not determined a priori by the kinds of empirical questions deemed relevant. (2) Such an agenda needs to be open to all interpretations of events and not preclude ex cathedra any particular approach. (3) Such an agenda should also be interdisciplinary because the study of international relations cannot be restricted to any one discipline. Being interdisciplinary permits us to open up epistemological and methodological space while, lessening claims for the exceptionalism of international relations as a field. (4) Such an agenda would not use methodology and epistemology to police the boundaries of what can and cannot be talked about and studied. Several other contributors to this forum, namely, Frank Harvey, Joel Cobb, and Andrew Moravcsik, criticize this author’s answers to the questions posed to us. Harvey and Cobb’s basic complaint is that these responses fail to provide the criteria by which to assess work in each approach. The argument here, however, is decidedly not that there are no standards but that the standards for assessing work within any one approach must be the standards of that research tradition. Appealing to any neutral ground for judging work merely reintroduces the epistemological orthodoxy of the mainstream in the disguise of neutral scholarly standards. In this regard, this author sides with Friedrich Kratochwil’s comment that there is no philosopher’s stone on which to build foundational truth claims. This statement does not imply, however, that there are no standards for assessing work. Far from wishing to protect any theory from fatal criticism, the point is to ensure that no one theory gets protected by epistemological gatekeeping. (143) Their insistence on being ‘first’ reifies extremism and fragmentation in the academy – only the perm avoids scholarship shutdown David Lake 11, political science prof at UC-San Diego, Why "isms" Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress, International Studies Quarterly (2011) 55, 465-480 My critique of our profession is a common one, but one worth repeating. Most generally, we organize ourselves into academic "sects" that engage in self-affirming research and then wage theological debates between academic religions. This occurs at both the level of theory and epistemology. In turn, we reward those who stake out extreme positions within each sect. Unfortunately, this academic sectarianism, a product of our own internal political struggles, produces less understanding rather than more. Some reasonably fear intellectual "monocultures," as McNamara (2009) has called the possible hegemony of rationalism. But the current cacophony is not a sign of productive intellectual ferment in the pursuit of meaningful knowledge." Rather, we have produced a clash of competing theologies each claiming its own explanatory "miracles" and asserting its universal truth and virtue. Instead, a large measure of intellectual humility Is in order. Theoretically, we are far from the holy grail of a universal theory of international politics—if indeed such a grail even exists. We should focus instead on developing contingent, midlevel theories of specific phenomena. This analytical eclecticism is likely to be more productive (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). But we aLso need a lexicon for translating otherwise incommensurable theories and making them mutually intelligible. In the following section, I outline the problems with theoretical sects and affirm the case for analytic eclecticism. I then end with one possible "Rosetta stone" that aims to facilitate conversation across research traditions by suggesting that all theories of international studies can be disaggregated into the basic and common concepts of interests, interactions, and institutions. Epistemologically, there is perhaps an even deeper divide that is, unfortunately, not so easily bridged. The nomothetic vs narrative divide cuts through all of the social sciences and possibly beyond. This divide endures because scholars—either innately or through socialization—find one form of explanation more intellectually satisfying than the other. Yet, in international studies, we have reified this divide and, as with our theories, have formed mutually exclusive churches. Rather than claiming one or the other epistemology Is always and everywhere superior, we should recognize that both are valid and perhaps even complementary paths to understanding. The question is not which approach is inherently superior, but which yieIds greater insights under what circumstances. The second major section below takes up epistemology and its consequences for professional practice and knowledge. 1ar Econ Nuke war Turns dehum Peter Beckman, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, et al, The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, 2K, p. 296-297 Individual death is not the only death that affects the way people live. Since humans are social beings who define themselves naturally as parts of families, societies, kinship groups, religions, nations, and humanity as a whole, how they view themselves will depend largely on whether they anticipate the continuing existence of these social entities. In the prenuclear age, the individual obviously dies, but the social unit, the nation, the family, the species, was understood as outliving death. But in the nuclear age, we must anticipate nuclear death as a collective experience, what Norman Cousins called “irrational death”—death of a new kind, a nondiscriminating death without warning, death en masse. ‘While all deaths are individual, in the mass deaths of the twentieth century, be they at Auschwitz or at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the individual is lost in a faceless, mindless, random destruction. Writer Norman Mailer described the transformation as follows: For the first time in civilized history, perhaps for the first time in all history, we have been forced to live with the suppressed knowledge that the smallest facets of our personality or the most minor projections of our ideas ... might be doomed to die as a cipher in some vast statistical operation in which our teeth would be counted, and our hair would be saved, but our death itself unknown, unhonored and unrewarded, a death which could not follow with dignity as a possible consequence to serious actions we have chosen, but rather a death in a gas chamber or a radioactive city; and so ... in the midst of civilization ... our psyche was subjected itself to the intolerable anxiety that death being causeless, life was causeless as well, and time deprived of cause and effect had come to a stop. If the type of death we anticipate is important because it affects how we view ourselves in the world, then the pervasive fear of nuclear annihilation does not necessarily tell us anything about death per se, but rather it reveals something about the perception humans have of their place and worth in the world. Nuclear weapons challenge a basic belief in the importance of the individual. They challenge possibly the most central tenet of the Judeo-Christian world view: Each individual is unique and important and created in the image of God. If you save one life it is like saving the entire world, the Talmud teaches. “God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten son,” John says. Now, we are haunted with the image of human beings as objects, as matter, to be burned, radiated, turned into ashes or vapor. Cartels Mexican cartels cause massive structural violence and commit human rights abuses AP 12 (1-11-12, "Mexican drug war toll: 47,500 killed in 5 years" CBS News) www.cbsnews.com/news/mexican-drug-war-toll47500-killed-in-5-years/ Two decapitated bodies were found inside a burning SUV early Wednesday at the entrance to one of Mexico's most luxurious malls, feeding fears drug violence is infiltrating privileged realms previously thought safe. Police recovered the mutilated bodies before dawn off a toll highway at a shopping mall entrance in the heart of the Santa Fe district that's a haven for international corporations, diplomats and the wealthy. The heads and a threatening message were dumped a few yards away, Mexico City prosecutors said in a statement. Hours later, the government released a drug war body count recording more than 47,500 victims in five years , echoing independent death Pot is key to cartels—blocks their ability to recruit, buy weapons, and corrupt politicians Laura Carlsen Director, Mexico City-based Americas Program of the Center for International Policy; columnist, Foreign Policy in Focus “How Legalizing Marijuana Would Weaken Mexican Drug Cartels” Posted: 11/02/2010 3:55 pm EDT Updated: 05/25/ 2011 6:10 pm EDT http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-carlsen/how-legalizing-marijuana_b_777837.html ac 8-28 opponents of legalization have issued a barrage of confused and contradictory arguments. Their aim is to somehow debunk the common-sense fact that legal sourcing erodes the black-market profits of organized crime. The most recent argument thrown out in the anti-Prop. 19 campaign, claims that the California marijuana market is insignificant to Mexican drug traffickers. That argument was blown out of the water on October 18 when the Mexican Army and police seized 134 tons of marijuana, wrapped and ready to be smuggled from Tijuana across the border. The huge cache was estimated to be worth at least $338 million dollars on the street. Mexican authorities guessed that it was owned by the nation's most powerful drugtrafficking organization, the Sinaloa Cartel. Even if much of that is distributed to other states, the sheer size of the potential shipment shows that the U.S. marijuana market for Mexican traffickers, calculated at $20 billion a year, is well worth fighting for. Since before Prop. 19 came along, reports showed that Mexico's drug cartels were concerned about how U.S. production and legalization of medical marijuana cut into their profits. Prohibition creates the underground market that generates their economic, political and military strength. In the months leading up to today's vote on California's Proposition 19 to legalize recreational use of marijuana, With the drop in income from marijuana sales, cartels have less money for buying arms and politicians, or recruiting young people into the trade. The drug cartels also consider the marijuana black market worth killing for. Just days after the historic bust, thirteen young men were massacred at a drug rehabilitation center. An anonymous voice came over police radio saying the act was "a taste of Juarez" and that up to 135 people could be murdered in retaliation for the bust--one per ton. Although calculating Mexican cartel earnings from marijuana sales will always be a guessing game, it's indisputable that as long as it's illegal every penny of those earnings goes into the pockets of organized crime. From the peasant who converts his land from corn to pot to feed his family, to the truckdriver who takes on a bonus cargo, to the Mexican and U.S. border officials who open "windows" in international customs controls, to the youth gangs who sell in U.S. cities--all are sucked into a highly organized and brutal system of contraband. Legalization in part of the world's leading market would take a huge chunk out of this transnational business. War turns gender violence Eaton 04. [Shana JD Georgetown University Law Center 35 Geo. J. Int'l L. 873 Summer lexis] While sexual violence against women has always been considered a negative side effect of war, it is only in recent years that it has been taken seriously as a violation of humanitarian law. In the "evolution" of war, women themselves have become a battlefield on which conflicts are fought. Realizing that rape is often more effective at achieving their aims than plain killing, aggressors have used shocking sexual violence against women as a tool of conflict, allowing battling forces to flaunt their power, dominance, and masculinity over the other side. The stigma of rape is used to effectuate genocide, destroy communities, and demoralize opponents-decimating a woman's will to survive is often only a secondary side effect. Sexual violence against women during wartime had to reach horrifying levels before the international community was shocked enough to finally take these atrocities seriously. It took the extremely brutal victimization of vast numbers of women, played out against a backdrop of genocide, to prove that rape is not simply a natural side effect of war to be lightly brushed aside. The conflicts in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia put women's rights directly in the spotlight, and the international community could no longer avoid the glare. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, ethnic cleansing was central to the conflict. Raping women helped to achieve this aim in a number of ways, from forced impregnation, where offspring would have different ethnicities than their mothers, to the use of sexual violence to prevent women from wanting to have sex again (thus limiting their likelihood of bearing children in the future). Additionally, rape was used as a means of destroying families and communities. Raping a woman stigmatized her, making it unlikely that she would ever want to return home, and in many cases, ensuring that if she did return home that she would be rejected. Civilians, particularly women, came to be used as tools to achieve military ends, putting the human rights of these women at the heart of the conflict. Empirically true Levy and Sidel, 7 (Barry Levy- Adjunct Professor of Community Health at Tufts University School of Medicine, Victor SidelProfessor of Social Medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College, War and Public Health, Edition 2) Women are especially vulnerable during war (see Chapter 12). Rape has been used as a weapon in many wars- in Korea, Bangladesh, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda, the former Yugslavia, and elsewhere. As acts of humiliation and revenge, soldiers have raped the female family members of their enemies. For example, at least 10,000 women were raped by military personnel during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The social chaos brought about by war also creates situations and conditions conductive to sexual violence.