Rush to the Border:
Internal and External Stresses from Migration on the European Union
A Working Draft
By:
Michelle Legassicke
M.A., PhD Candidate, Dalhousie University
Research Fellow at the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative at Dalhousie University
&
Andrew Bergel
M.S., PhD Candidate, Dalhousie University
Instructor, Dalhousie University, College of Sustainability
Draft Manuscript to be presented at:
The Millennium Conference on 'Failure and Denial in World Politics
17-18 October 2015, at the LSE.
Do not cite without author's permission or consent
1
Introduction
There is a clear disjunction between written European Union (EU) policy and how
it is able to deal with the internal and external stresses that are being placed on it by the
migration crisis. This paper will look at the current migration crisis, emphasizing the
disjunction in EU policy and the needs of frontline states1, states acting as the initial point
of entry into the EU, and backline states2, states where economic migrants3, asylum
seekers4, and refugees5 often transfer for long-term resettlement. Given the different role
of both frontline and backline states, their needs are quite different. In an ideal situation,
frontline states would received and process irregular migrants6, migrants that entered a
country without authorization, temporarily housing and providing them with resources
while their applications are being reviewed. Once approved, migrants then could travel
through the Schengen zone to backline states, where they often settle and build their
lives. Ideally, there would be a steady system of individuals entering the EU from
frontline states and moving to backline states at a rate that does not overload either state’s
systems. However, the impact of the migration crisis on both frontline and backline states
have caused the system set up by both groups of states to be overloaded by the sheer
number of irregular migrants arriving into the EU. The numbers can no longer be
1
This paper will refer to frontline states as states that act as initial points of entry for various types of
migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Italy, Greece, Spain, Bulgaria, and to an extent Hungary are
deemed frontline states, where protocol for processing various types of entry applications is done before
individuals are transferred and resettled under the Dublin Treaty Regulations – in this case the Dublin III
round concluded in 2013.
2
This paper will use the term backline states when discussing non-frontline states where migrants, asylum
seekers, and refugees are transferred for long term resettlement within the European Union.
3
An Economic migrant is an individual who has left their home country in order to improve their overall
quality of life. “Key migration terms.” International Organization for Migration (2015).
http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Migrant
4
An asylum seeker is an individual who is seeking safety from prosecution or harm that will come to them
in their home country and is waiting on the decision of their application. “Key migration terms.”
International Organization for Migration (2015). http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Migrant
5
Refugees Strictly refers to the definition of a refugee provided by the United Nations High Commissioner
on Refugees from the 1951 Refugee Convention which terms a refugee as someone who “owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” “Flowing Across Borders,” UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html.
6
An Irregular migrant refers to an individual who has entered a country without authorization, has stayed
beyond their visa allowance, or has broken a condition of entry into a country, and therefore does not have
formal legal status in transit or host countries. This can include both asylum seekers as well as economic
migrants. “Key migration terms.” International Organization for Migration (2015).
http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Migrant
2
processed by frontline states in a timely manner, causing a build up of irregular migrants
in camps and detention centers. Backline states are being overloaded with requests to
settle increased numbers of irregular migrants, causing them to reduce the number of
transfers to their backline states. The response by frontline and backline states to the
migration crisis has revealed a need for a greater holistic approach toward the migration
crisis that addresses the needs of frontline and backline states equally.
Reality of Irregular Migration into the European Union
Between January and October 2015, more than 533,591 irregular migrants have
successfully made the treacherous journey across the Mediterranean Sea.7 However, too
many migrants have failed to make this journey; according to the International
Organization for Migration (IMO), as of October 2015 we know of at least 2,287
migrants that are considered missing or dead.8 While not all migrants who make the trip
across the Mediterranean or over land through Greece and the Balkans into Hungary
apply for asylum, the European Union (EU) has received 530,265 claims thus far in
2015.9 The current systems that the EU has in place to review asylum applications are
being overloaded, resulting in long wait times both for regular migrant10 applicants and
irregular migrants11 applicants. For example, Sweden is predicting a drop in Asylum
seekers from 90,000 to 74,000 due to the six-month waiting period before their cases are
heard.12 However, frontline countries such as Greece and Italy are struggling to meet the
demands of irregular migrants due to the sheer number of applicants that they have.
“Refugee/Migrant Emergency Response,” UNHCR (September 2015).
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php#_ga=1.5575411.1516484979.1435626899
8
“Mediterranean Update: Missing Migrants Project,” International Organization for Migration (2 October
2015). http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/Mediterranean_Update_2_October.pdf
9
“Migrant Crisis: Migration in Europe explained by graphics,” BBC News (24 September 2015).
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911
10
Regular migrants refer to individuals who are authorized to migrate under legally recognized means.
Arezo Malakooti and Eric Davin, “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots,”
International Organization for Migration (June 2015), 3.
11
Irregular migrants can refer to an individual who has entered a country without authorization, has stayed
beyond their visa allowance, or has broken a condition of entry into a country, and therefore does not have
formal legal status in transit or host countries. This can include both asylum seekers as well as economic
migrants. Arezo Malakooti and Eric Davin, “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the
Dots,” International Organization for Migration (June 2015), 3.
12
“Refugees Shun Sweden over long waiting times,” The Local (23 July 2015).
http://www.thelocal.se/20150723/refugees-shun-sweden-over-long-waiting-times
7
3
While Hungary has been receiving increased numbers in 2015, with at least
200,000 irregular migrants crossing the border from January to October, the
disproportionate burden of receiving migrants has fallen on Italy and Greece over the past
few years. As of 14 September 2015, Italy and Greece received 121,500 and 288,020
irregular migrants respectively.13 These numbers are a staggering jump from the previous
year’s, in which Italy, Greece, and Hungary received 170,100,14 43,500,15 and 43,00016
irregular migrants respectively. While there has been an astronomical jump in irregular
migration to Hungary in the past year, Hungary still does not consider itself a frontline
country. In September 2015, Hungary adopted a series of controversial emergency laws
in order to reduce the flow of irregular migration across its borders.
In mid-September, Hungarian officials built a barbed-wire fence between on the
Serbian-Hungarian border and deployed the military to monitor possible breaches in the
fence.17 Furthermore, they have designated Serbia as a ‘safe’ country in which they can –
following the policy of nonrefoulement, can only send individuals to a country that they
believe they will not prosecuted – send irregular migrants as well as those denied
asylum.18 While this policy has allowed Hungary to process irregular migrants much
faster, it also takes away from the ‘duties’ frontline countries serve in the EU. That is,
initial processing and registration into the Schengen zone. Most irregular migrants that
enter the EU via frontline states tend to move into backline countries over the long-term.
While Hungary has been able to turn away irregular migrants to Serbia, Italy and Greece
have no such option of sending irregular migrants to a designated safe country, as the
countries they would most likely send migrants back to would be considered weak or
“Refugee and migrant crossing the Mediterranean to Europe: Overview of arrival trends as of 14
September 2015,” UNHRC. (14 September 2015).
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/documents.php?page=1&view=grid
14
“Migrant arrivals by sea in Italy top170,000 in 2014,” International Organization for Migration (16
January 2015). http://mac.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn2015/pbn-listing/migrant-arrivals-by-sea-in-italy.html
15
“Numbers of refugee arrivals to Greece increase dramatically,” UNHRC (19 August 2015).
http://www.unhcr.org/55d32dcf6.html
16
Rick Lyman, “Route of Migrants into Europe Shift Towards Balkans,” New York Times (18 July 2015).
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/world/europe/route-of-migrants-into-europe-shifts-towardbalkans.html
17
“The Day That Europe Shut the Door,” Globe and Mail (16 September 2015).
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/migrant-crisis-hungary-shuts-its-doors-as-borderless-europefalls-topieces/article26363818/
18
Ibid.
13
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failed. The challenge posed to frontline countries in dealing with the migrant’s crisis
comes primarily through challenges posed within weak and failed states. In the next
section, the push factors out of these countries will be discussed.
Push factors of irregular migrants
The majority of irregular migrants19 attempting to reach the European Union are
fleeing persecution and poverty they were faced within their home country. Many factors
of insecurity have resulted in the increasing number of irregular migrants: droughts,
floods, desertification, erosion, food insecurity, lack of economic opportunities, natural
resource insecurity, violent conflict, porous borders, and political instability. While these
factors push irregular migrants to the decision to flee their state of origin, it is also these
factors of insecurity that allow them to travel through so many countries in the hopes of
making it to final their final destination inside of the EU, as weak and failed state create a
transit link through to the EU. Irregular migrants arriving in the EU originate from weak
and failed states such as: Senegal, Libya, Nigeria, and Mali in West and North Africa;
Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan in Eastern Africa; and Syria and Afghanistan from the
Middle East and Central Asia. With Libya as the highest used transit point for migration
through the central Mediterranean, countries that migrants travel through to reach Europe
are a who’s who of the top 25 countries on the Fragile State Index.20
Each individual factor of insecurity has not led to an increase in migration into
Europe. Rather, the combination of multiple factors of insecurity has caused the increase
in migrants seeking paths to Europe. Therefore, given that there are currently many
threats to security of nationals within many states across the African continent and in the
Middle East, we argue that these factors of insecurity are compounding and increasing,
leading to the influx in migrants into the EU. Due to the increase in the number of factors
of insecurity, the factor of unpredictability alone could lead to an increase in migration.
When factors of insecurity become compounded, “poverty, injustice, environmental
19
This paper uses the term irregular migrant when discussing the larger groups who are making their way
into the EU using the Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Balkan routes, which are the
focus of this paper. When used, this term encompasses both asylum seekers as well as economic migrants,
as both groups have been found to travel together, particularly when leaving Libya by boat.
20
“Fragile State Index 2015,” Fund For Peace (Spring 2015). http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015.
5
degradation, and conflict interact in complex and potent ways” threatening already weak
states and resulting in the migration out of these states.21
While there might be a variety of factors of insecurity that contributes to a
migrant’s decision to leave their home country, the next decision they must take is where
to re-settle. The factors that most affect the decision as to which country to migrate to, as
well as what point of crossing, will include: initial location of the irregular migrant, how
heavily the border crossing is monitored and controlled, knowledge of the ease of passage
for previous migrants, the level of possible abuse that will occur while in transit, the
length of the journey, risks to life involved, cost of the journey, and the network in place
in the transit countries used.22 While each of these factors effect which migration route is
taken, separate considerations of pull factors towards the EU will be discussed.
Pull factors and Routes taken by Irregular Migrants
The official website of the Migration Home Affairs is quick to point out that
while the images of “migrants and asylum-seekers crammed into unseaworthy boats
making perilous voyages to Europe have come to symbolise the tragic reality of the
irregular migration phenomenon… most irregular migrants originally entered the EU
legally on short-stay visas, but remain in the EU for economic reasons once their visa has
expired.”23 However, throughout 2014 there was a 310% increase in migrants using sea
routes into central and eastern Mediterranean States. While irregular migrants can use
many means to gain access to the EU – crossing land borders, using air travel to gain
access to the EU, staying in the EU after their visas have expired, using fraudulent
documents – the irregular crossing of maritime borders has become the primary way
migrants are entering the EU.24 Migrants are using two main routes in order to reach the
Schengen zone: the Central Mediterranean route and the Eastern Mediterranean route.
World Commission on Environment and Development, A/42/427 “Our Common Future, From One Earth
to One World” 4 August 1987. http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-11.htm
22
Arezo Malakooti and Eric Davin, “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots,”
International Organization for Migration (June 2015), 9.
23
Migration Home Affairs, “Irregular Migration and Return,” European Commission (2015)
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/index_en.htm
24
Migration Home Affairs, “Irregular Migration and Return,” (2015) European Commission
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/index_en.htm
21
6
Historically, the most active route used by irregular migrants was the Eastern
Mediterranean route out of Turkey by land and sea crossings into Greece, Cyprus, and
Southern Bulgaria. In 2014, this route experienced the second highest use by irregular
migrants; 50,830 migrants were detected crossing through the Eastern Mediterranean
routes illegally.25 In order to reduce the number of migrants using this route, the
European Union has been working with Turkish authorities to bolster the capacity of
Turkish border guards. As Turkey is considered a ‘safe’ country, as it can house and
provide resources for refugees, and act as an offshore processing center. In this, the EU
would take applications from Asylum and migrants while they are based in Turkey,
process them, and if approved, move them to assigned countries within the EU. This
would not only create a safer option for reaching the EU, but it would also reduce the
flows of irregular migration. The hope is that by monitoring the borders shared by the EU
and Turkey more closely, that migrants can be detained before they cross into the EU. As
it is not always possible to prevent the flow of migrants into the EU, Greek authorities
have been actively trying to identify migrants once they arrive in Greek territory in order
to detain and return them to their country of origin. Therefore, by strengthening border
monitoring, identifying and detaining migrants, the EU is trying complicate entry via the
Eastern Mediterranean route in hopes of discouraging migrants from using the route at
the rates we have seen in 2014/15. While the Eastern Mediterranean route is still
experiencing high levels of illegal crossings, these programs are likely to reduce the
numbers of migrants crossing illegally.
The central Mediterranean route that flows from North Africa to Europe,
primarily out of Libya into Italy, with some migrants also leaving Algeria or arriving in
Malta, is the most used route for irregular migration. In 2014, 170,000 migrants used this
route to cross the border into the EU. This crossing now represents 60% of all irregular
migration and illegal border crossing detection into the EU.26 The Italian coast guard has
been active in retrieving migrant vessels that entering their domestic waters and bringing
them to shore for processing. However, the Italian State is facing increased migration
levels at rates that its migrant detention centers cannot handle. The Italian state does not
“Eastern Mediterranean Route,” Frontex (2015). http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/easternmediterranean-route/.
26
Risk Analysis Unit, “Annual Risk Analysis 2015,” Frontex (April 2015): 18.
25
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have the resources needed to be the primary access point of migrants attempting to arrive
to the European Union. While Sicily has been the primary reception point for migrants
using this route if they were detained, migrants now being rescued are being disembarked
and held in either Apulia or Calabria in order to relieve the pressure that was being placed
on Sicily.27
Many have argued that maritime search and rescue operations, such as the Mare
Nostrum have acted as a pull factor for migrants to use the central Mediterranean route.
Launched in October 2013 following the death of 300 migrants off the coast of the Italian
island Lampadusa, Mare Nostrum was given a primary mandate to patrol the
international waters used as the primary migration route between Italy and Libya in order
to intercept migrant vessels, as well as operate a search and rescue in the region. The
Italian government committed to the nine million Euros per month budget, for the 13
months of the operation before it was cancelled in November 2014. Mare Nostrum has
been widely credited with saving the lives of 140,000 migrants as it took a proactive
approach to identifying migrant vessels in distress, and under the requirements of
international law, brought them to the Italian shores. Critics of the operation were not
only quick to point out the cost of the operation, but also the message that was being sent
to migrants, as the pro-active action of the Italians were saving many lives and ensuring
migrants vessels that were in distress would reach the EU. Therefore, smugglers could in
theory overfill a very cheap craft, and send it towards the Italian coast knowing that there
were high chances that it would be rescued.
The rational for both arguments, that a search and rescue mandate needs to be
included in any maritime operation launched by the EU, as well as why smugglers would
take advantage of this policy, stem from requirements established in international law.
According to article 98 of the Convention on the Laws of the Seas, states are required to
render assistance to individuals/ships in distress.28 Therefore, if migrants leave the
domestic waters of the departure state, international laws would then be applicable. Given
that the majority of irregular migrants are traveling across the Mediterranean Sea on
Risk Analysis Unit, “Annual Risk Analysis 2015,” Frontex (April 2015): 20.
“Rescue at Sea: a guide to principles and practices as applied to refugees and migrants,” The
International Maritime Organization, January 2015, 4.
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/Documents/UNHCR-Rescue_at_Sea-GuideENG-screen.pdf
27
28
8
“unseaworthy and often overcrowded vessels,” international actors are required to
provide assistance once these vessels are detected.29 According to Frontex, the primary
EU-wide organization that manages and secures external borders and cooperation among
member states agencies, many migrants using maritime crossings will issue distress calls,
as their vessels cannot handle the voyage.30 Therefore, many commentators believe that
the only way to reduce the number of migrants reaching the European Union is by
preventing the departure of these vessels and/or facilitating their interception within the
domestic waters of the departure state.
Arezo Malakooti and Eric Davin found that the success of Mare Nostrum was not
the most significant pull factor that resulted in irregular migrants using Libya as their
preferred final transit point for migration across the Mediterranean. As discussed above,
the increase in the level of conflicts that are breaking out across Africa and the Middle
East are driving irregular migrants to find paths into Europe. In addition, Malakooti and
Davin argue that there can be no direct correlation between the search and rescue success
of Mare Nostrum and the increase in irregular migration, as the actual increases in 2015
occurred under Operation Triton.31 While the EU had expanded the scope and funding of
Operation Triton, a Frontex-run border enforcement operation that replaced Mare
Nostrum in November 2014. The operation is only active within 30 nautical miles of the
Italian coast, and does not conduct active patrols in order to identify migrant boats in
distress. While, Operation Triton has continued to respond to emergency calls from
migrant vessels that are in distress, however, many vessels often do not have the
appropriate radios or cellular phones that can be used to contact authorities.
In reality, the pull towards using the Central Mediterranean route is because many
irregular migrants see it as the more ‘secure’ route. While it is far more dangerous than
most other routes, migrants who take this route have the highest chance of getting to the
EU. Furthermore, the major pull factor in choosing the EU as a destination point is the
belief that the lives of the irregular migrants will improve once they arrive: it is conflict
“Mediterranean Migrant Crisis: Italy ‘at war’ with people smugglers,” BBC News, 22 April 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32420900.
30
Risk Analysis Unit, “Annual Risk Analysis 2015,” Frontex (April 2015): 18.
31
Arezo Malakooti and Eric Davin, “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots,”
International Organization for Migration (June 2015), 7.
29
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free, has many economic opportunities, and provides a higher standard of living then the
country of origin that irregular migrants have left. Due to the draw of living in the EU,
and the flow of migrants across the many established routes leading to a few frontline
states, only a handful of states are tasked with the initial role of registering and
processing migrants into their country. While this is a burden for frontline states in the
short-term, they often do not need to deal with long-term integration of irregular migrants
into their state. Most migrants who make it to the frontline states of Italy, Greece, and
Hungary move to the backline states once processed. However, given the spike in
migration, frontline states are currently facing increased numbers that they have been
unable to handle. The burdens this has caused will be discussed in the next section.
Undue Burden on Frontline states
As is show above, the bulk of irregular migration into the EU falls on three
countries. Frontline countries such as Italy, Greece, and Hungary have the unilateral
responsibility of processing irregular migrants and asylum seekers according to the
Dublin Regulations, last revised in 2013. The Dublin Regulations are especially
significant, as it stipulates that asylum seekers are required to stay and apply for asylum
in the first EU country that they enter.32 Entry-point countries are therefore responsible
for reviewing the asylum application of irregular migrants. However, the processing
centers in each respective country have become severely overloaded, and strongly require
other EU countries to aid them. While there have been reports that “some EU countries,
such as Greece, Italy, and Croatia, have been allowing migrants and refugees to pass
through to countries where they have families and better prospects,” these actions are in
direct violation of the Dublin Regulations.33 This could result in these irregular migrants
being deported back to the EU country they originally entered, or even back to their home
country.34 While certain countries such as Germany, have made ad-hoc exceptions to the
Dublin Regulation for asylum seekers (particularly those from Syria) that reach their
Jeanne Park, “Europe’s Migration Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations (23 September 2015).
http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874.
33
“Why is EU Struggling with migrants and asylum,” BBC News (21 September 2015).
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286.
34
Jeanne Park, “Europe’s Migration Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations (23 September 2015).
http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-migration-crisis/p32874.
32
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borders in August 2015, September and October have seen significant backpedaling on
open acceptance of irregular migrants. This would indicate that any movement of
irregular migrants or asylum seekers would occur through more officially sanctioned
channels.
The EU ministers have agreed to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers from the
Mediterranean and Balkans: 54000 from Hungary, 50400 from Greece, and 15600 from
Italy.35 The target groups for this emergency policy are asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq
and Eretria, as they qualify for international protection as refugees. Thus far, the EU
plans to move only 66000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece, keeping the rest of the
allocated numbers as a reserve to be used at a later date. This agreement’s focus is to
provide relief to frontline states who are receiving the vast majority of irregular migrants.
And given that Hungary does not yet define itself as a frontline state, Italy and Greece
will be receiving the bulk of the benefits from this ad-hoc solution, as they will be
relieved of a portion of those seeking asylum within their countries.
The laws passed by the Hungarian government can be seen as a backlash to the
disproportionate burden that is being held by frontline states (regardless of the fact that
Hungary does not consider itself a frontline state). The Hungarian government is aiming
to deal with asylum request within an hour, and they fully plan to exercise their ‘right’ to
reject applicants almost immediately.36 It is highly unlikely that Hungarian officials
would be able to conduct a thorough investigation into the asylum seekers backgrounds.
Therefore, the action of the Hungarian government is straddling a delicate line: while
they are actually processing the asylum applications at a rate that are far faster than other
states in the EU, the speed is harmful to the migrants. The Dublin Regulations required
that the initial receiving country conduct a thorough investigation into the asylum seekers
claim to ensure that if they are accepted or denied, it is legitimate.
Frontline states also have the responsibility in sorting out migrants into the legal
categories in which they fall depending on their backgrounds. If an individual is an
asylum seeker, or a “person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a
“Migrant Crisis: Migration in Europe explained by graphics,” BBC News (24 September 2015).
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911
36
“The Day That Europe Shut the Door,” Globe and Mail (16 September 2015).
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/migrant-crisis-hungary-shuts-its-doors-as-borderless-europefalls-topieces/article26363818/
35
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country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee
status under relevant international and national instruments,” they must apply for asylum
on the legal territory of the first country they land in the EU.37 It therefore falls to
frontline states to investigate the asylum claim, and decide whether to grant asylum,
giving those individuals official refugee status. The problem that is faced by frontline
states is that irregular migrants that make it to the EU are not necessarily asylum seekers;
they can also be economic migrants.
Economic migrants do not have the same international protection given to asylum
seekers, and they can be returned either to their home country or the last ‘safe’ country
they were in before heading to the EU. When trying to separate out economic migrants
from asylum seekers, non-asylum seekers may attempt to prolong their stay in Europe by
refusing to identify themselves as well as their country of origin. Furthermore, any
attempt to return migrants to their country of origin must be done in such a fashion that
the condition of the migrant is monitored to ensure that the individual is not harmed upon
return. The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees
have established the principle of nonrefoulement, in which a receiving country cannot
send individuals back into a country in which they might be persecuted.38 This
complicates the processing of irregular migrants for frontline states, as they not only have
to investigate asylum claims, but also are having troubles returning economic migrants to
their country of origin.
In order to reduce the number of asylum seekers that use irregular migration to
make it to the EU, the idea of creating an offshore processing center has been floated.39
This would involve the establishment of a safe space, which would house asylum seekers
outside the Schengen region could apply and wait for their claims to be processed. Those
approved would be provided a safe passage into the EU. The hope would be that this
would reduce the number of deaths of migrants trying to make it to the EU, as it would be
Arezo Malakooti and Eric Davin, “Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots,”
International Organization for Migration (June 2015), 3.
38
Zara Rabinovitch, “Pushing out the Boundaries of Humanitarian Screening with In-country and Offshore
Processing,” Migration Policy Institute (16 October 2014). http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/pushingout-boundaries-humanitarian-screening-country-and-offshore-processing
39
Zara Rabinovitch, “Pushing out the Boundaries of Humanitarian Screening with In-country and Offshore
Processing,” Migration Policy Institute (16 October 2014). http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/pushingout-boundaries-humanitarian-screening-country-and-offshore-processing
37
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a safer alternative then making the deadly voyage, especially across the Mediterranean.
However, there are two immediate problems with establishing an offshore processing
center. First, these centers would have to be establish in areas in which migrants
congregate en mass; while such a center might be successful in Turkey, which is a major
departure point for migrants before they reach the EU, it is unlikely to be established in
weak or failed states such as Libya. While this type of center would be most needed
within a departure country such a Libya, the instability that currently exists in the country
means that there would be no guarantees of security. Furthermore, by the time migrants
have made it to departure countries they have already travelled through many weak and
failed states, putting their lives at risk just to reach a proposed offshore processing center.
Second, in order to even process these applications, the EU would have to agree in
advanced to the number of migrants that will be accepted, as well as how they would be
distributed across member states.
Given that offshore distribution centers inherently require burden sharing across
EU member states, it is no surprise that Southern European countries, particularly Italy
and Greece, are in favour of such a plan. Both countries brought up the possibility of
establishing these centers in North Africa while held the EU presidency in 2014 – Greece
term ended in July 2014 when Italy assumed the presidency – as it would reduce the
number of irregular migrants arriving across the Mediterranean.40 In the next sections, the
policies and migration crisis will be examined through the frame of backline states. While
frontline states bear the initial burden of processing irregular migrants upon their arrival,
backline states must develop policies and processes which address the needs of the their
states in integrating migrants over the long term.
Continuing disjunction between Frontline and Backline States under Dublin III
Since 1999, The European Union has attempted to reconcile varying asylum
seeking systems throughout its member states into the stated goal of a Common European
Asylum System (CEAS). This has resulted in a nearly decade and a half process,
culminating in successive rounds of the so-called Dublin Convention Regulations, most
Zara Rabinovitch, “Pushing out the Boundaries of Humanitarian Screening with In-country and Offshore
Processing,” Migration Policy Institute (16 October 2014). http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/pushingout-boundaries-humanitarian-screening-country-and-offshore-processing
40
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recently revised in 2013, and enacted in January 2014, into what is commonly called
Dublin III. One of the primary goals of the Dublin Convention was to establish a
hierarchy of criteria for asylum applications within the European Union. Under Chapter
III of the most recent Dublin III rendition, the following hierarchy was established to
determine the EU Member State responsible for asylum applications.
Family Unification: Articles 8-11, of the 2013 version of the convention, outlines
asylum seekers that have families, or family members, with international protection status
(refugee status), shall have their application examined by the Member State in which that
status was granted. This includes situations where the majority family members have
submitted their applications for processing in a particular member state – thus
“Responsibility for examining the application for international protection of all the family
members and/or minor unmarried siblings shall lie with the Member State which the
criteria indicate is responsible for taking charge of the largest number of them.”41
Legal Residence and/or Visas are next in determining hierarchy for Member State
processing. Outlined in Articles 12 & 14, asylum application processing will fall upon the
Member State where a current or expired residence visa was issued, or where entry was
granted with the waiver of such a visa.42
For illegal entry, and where none of the above conditions apply, Article 13
determines it as the responsibility of the Member State where the asylum seeker first
entered the European Union to process the application.43 This places the primary burden
of processing illegal entry applications on the frontline states, as outlined in previous
sections of this paper.
However, Dublin II and III, have attempted to relieve this burden through a “Take
Charge” and “Take Back” procedure. If a Member State is determined to have hierarchy
in the processing of an application it may request that another Member State “take
charge” of that application. This request must be submitted by the frontline state “within
three months of receiving an application for asylum;” then leaving the backline state with
41
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. Chapter
III, Article 11.
42
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. Chapter
III, Articles 12 & 14.
43
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. Chapter
III, Articles 13.
14
“two months to accept or reject the request.” This “take charge” mechanism undeniably
places the power for acceptance in the hands of the backline state, which can easily reject
requests from overwhelmed frontline states. A problem further compounded by the “take
back” request system.44
The “take back” procedure allows Member States to transfer asylum seekers back
to the original Member State in which they crossed into the EU – Italy and Greece being
the two most common recipients of these requests in recent years.45 Thus, if an illegal
migrant is finger printed upon arrival in Italy or Greece, and then later seeks asylum in
Sweden or Germany, this request can be denied under the “take back” protocol and
returned to the frontline state. However, Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria have all been cited
by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), on different
occasions, as lacking the needed infrastructure to properly house asylum seekers, and
migrants during their application process.46 The UNHCR even called for a “temporary
suspension of Dublin transfers back to Bulgaria in early 2014” due to conditions for those
returning. And in Greece, we have seen recent riots, in early September 2015, on the
Island of Lesbos – requiring additional security personal and leading the UNHCR to call
for “’exceptional measures’ to speed up the registration of thousands of refugees stranded
there.47
These long delays in processing often provide the lag time for the asylum
shopping, where irregular migrants will attempt to reapply in backline Member States
where conditions are seen as far better than in Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria. In 2013,
Germany and France saw 64 percent and 14 percent redundancy of applications with
Poland, while Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland saw a 32 percent, 19 percent, and 18
44
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. Chapter
VI, Articles 20-22.
45
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013. Chapter
VI, Articles 24-25.
46
Fratzke, Susan, “Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System,” Migration Policy
Institute (March 2015), p. 10.
47
Squires, Nick, “'We just want to leave this island': Refugees and migrants on Lesbos desperate to go to
Athens,” The Telegraph, September 6th, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11847157/UN-calls-for-emergencyevacuation-of-17000-refugees-on-Lesbos.html
15
percent redundancy respectively with Italy.48 There is even tremendous redundancy
between backline states themselves where, in 2013, initial claims made in Sweden where
also submitted in Germany, 41 percent, and Denmark, 12 percent.49
In an interview with Eritrean asylum seekers in the Guardian in 2011, before the
most recent spike in migration to Europe, getting finger printed in Italy was compared to
having the AIDs virus where they “know they will never be cured.”50 One such migrant,
who began a new application process in the United Kingdom, discusses how he was
given modest “one-bedroom flat,” started a college and learned English before his
fingerprints were found and he was promptly transferred back to Italy, his Member State
of entry.51 Another Somali asylum seeker fleeing al-Shabab in his home country,
interviewed by Al Jazeera over the summer of 2015, tested the “take back” protocol
under the post 2013 Dublin III revisions with little improvement. After an initial arrival
in Italy, through the central Mediterranean Libyan route, he left, submitting applications
in Norway and Denmark, both times being transferred back to Italy.52 Not until he
attempted an application in Germany, this time with an immigration lawyer after his first
German application was rejected, was he finally allowed to stay, albeit with his case still
under threat of the Dublin “take back” provision.53
These types of movements in the irregular migrant population can be taken
advantage of by hard-pressed frontline states. With the “take charge” and “take back”
protocol favoring the willingness of the backline states, the current Dublin Convention
could tempt frontline states to deploy irregular methods such as long waiting periods in
inhospitable conditions that lead asylum seekers to travel to other states. Or, in the case
of Hungry, to unilaterally declare itself as not a frontline state and begin a process of
almost instantaneous entry denials at its border crossing with “safe countries,” like
Fratzke, Susan, “Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System,” Migration Policy
Institute (March 2015), p. 14.
49
Ibid.
50
Grant, Harriet, and Domokos, John, “Dublin regulation leaves asylum seekers with their fingers burnt,”
The Guardian, October 7, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/07/dublin-regulationeuropean-asylum-seekers.
51
Ibid.
52
Brenner, Yermi, “Refugee: Safe but lonely, seeking asylum in Germany,” Al Jazeera, June 21 st, 2015,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/06/refugee-world-refugee-day-seeking-asylum-germany150617121349660.html
53
Ibid.
48
16
Serbia, as previously discussed. This approach would, in theory, alleviate Hungary from
having backline states forcing “take back” provisions on Budapest, as would be the case
if asylum seekers were properly processed and fingerprinted.
These aspects of the Dublin Convention have already become notorious among
asylum seekers, with many now refusing “to have their fingerprints taken or to submit
asylum applications in Italy in hopes of circumventing the Dublin Regulation and getting
their claims evaluated elsewhere” - this is especially the case with Syrian refugees, where
claims for protected status are particularly strong.54 In fact, even when refugee status is
legally granted in Italy or Greece, “applicants may choose to file an additional claim in
another Member State in response to inadequate facilities or poor integration
prospects.”55
In addition to the disjunctions in responsibility between frontline and backline
states already listed, the current Dublin Convention also leads to high economic costs.
Transfers and detention being the most financially draining.56 With frontline states, such
as Greece and Italy already undergoing economic downturns and austerity, the added cost
of detention, processing, and transferring can also create conditions that could be seen as
mistreatment of already vulnerable populations. In some cases, “asylum authorities in
some Member States consider transferring asylum seekers using the Dublin procedure to
be less expensive than processing the application themselves, as the duration process may
be shorter.”57 That processing cost is further magnified by asylum shopping, where
multiple applications add to bureaucratic expenses across two or more states – often
ending in denial anyway. Such financial incentives/considerations, already morally
repugnant given their derivation over vulnerable populations seeking protected status,
could also turn applicants into a bureaucratic football passed back and forth under the
“take charge” and “take back” clauses.
Conclusion
Fratzke, Susan, “Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System,” Migration Policy
Institute (March 2015), p. 15.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid 15-16.
57
Ibid 16.
54
17
Current spikes in migration into Europe might best be directly contributed to an
interrelated basket of complications such as: political upheaval, local and transnational
conflict, lack of economic opportunity, and porous failed states within the greater area of
North Africa and the Middle East. Thus far, responses to the current calamity seen in
trans-Mediterranean migration into the EU have been a combination of ad hoc responses
that mostly address symptomatic yet issues, such as processing and smuggler financing,
along with long delayed, and to be implemented, protocols for the resettlement of asylum
seekers defined as refugees under the current legal framework. Suffice it say, these
preliminary measures will likely fall short of both short, medium, and long term
comprehensive policy needs by Brussels in addressing current migratory patterns.
Unfortunately for the European Union, the new Dublin III regulation was baptized
in this fire of civil wars and failed states on the EU periphery, leading to an extreme test
of its administrative capability. And while being overly critical of its operationalization
might seem unfair, well over half a million migrants of all classifications, in 2015 alone,
are now caught in this system and its legal frontline/backline state dichotomy. Until a
more holistic and sustainable solution can be found, the current spate of desperate news
reports will continue.
While Dublin III was meant to streamline procedures between member states, it
has proven less than adequate for the task, and new policy adjustments will be needed to
cope with a migrant flow that may only increase with new Russian military offenses in
Syria, coupled with the continued lack of a cohesive state structure in the Libyan transit
point. No doubt a mix of better infrastructure in frontline states, faster more transparent
permanent transfers to backline states, and increased construction of external processing
centers in states bordering the EU, where applicants can more easily apply for EU
asylum, could all play role in remedying Dublin’s current short comings.
18
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